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RULE 3 NO.

24-28
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 180771
April 21, 2015
MAINPOINT: Ponente J. Leonardo-de Castro: The Court passed the landmark Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws. (ISSUE ON
LOCUS STANDI)

Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the
President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention.”

CONCURRING OF LEONEN: View that extending the application of “real party-in-interest” to


the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will
potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement
of a right.

FACTS: Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu. The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from
implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution
and certain international and municipal laws. Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No.
181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify
the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in
connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public
respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait
Oil Exploration Project.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the “Resident Marine Mammals” in
the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit
the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively
known as “the Stewards”) who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect the Tañon Strait, among others. Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization,
established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial
(Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities
and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R.
Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.

ISSUES: 1. WON Petitioner (resident marine mammals) may be considered as real party in
interest and may have locus standi?

2. WON they can implead President Arroyo as unwilling co-petitioner under sec 10 rule 3?

RULING:1.YES. The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws. Even before the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the
issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.” Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that
does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light
of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce
our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.(J. De Castro, Ponente)

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having
standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties-in-interest. The same
cannot be said about animals. Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the
environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go
as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the
courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals
and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury. (concurring of J. Leonen)

2. NO. Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.—If the
consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. Under the foregoing rule, when
the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be
made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the
Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party’s name
cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would
be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including
former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an
unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act
she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.”
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in
this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case. ( J. De Castro)

View that petitioners should not take it upon t Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
cannot be a party to this suit. As a coequal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the
President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter
hemselves to simply implead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. egos. The procedural
situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on
the contemptuous. The Former President’s name should be stricken out of the title of this case.
(concur J. Leonen)

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED,
Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Bulawan vs. Aquende


G.R. No. 182819.
June 22, 2011
MAINPOINT: Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is
one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation. As such, they must be
joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.

FACTS: Petitioner Bulawan claimed that she is the owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No.
1634-B). She filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against Lourdes
Yap who claimed to be the owner of the same property. In her answer, Yap claimed that it’s Lot
No. 1634-A that she owned while the Aquende family owned Lot No. 1634-B.

Trial Court ruled in favor of Bulawan as the rightful owner and possessor. Yap appealed but the
CA dismissed it. Register of Deeds informed respondent Aquende of the trial court’s writ of
execution against his property. Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation
involving his property having received no summons or notice of adverse claim.

Aquende filed a Third Party Claim against the writ of execution because it affected his property
and that he is not bound by the trial court’s decision for not being a party to it. The Clerk of Court
said that a Third Party Claim was not the proper remedy because the sheriff did not levy upon or
seize his property. He then filed a Notice of Appearance with Third Party Motion but this was also
denied.

Thereafter, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA due to extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. He argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan failed to implead him
despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and thus, prevented him from participating
in the proceedings and protecting his title. Also, he is an indispensable party and the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded in the case. CA ruled in
favor of Aquenda.

ISSUES: 1. WON annulment of judgment is the proper remedy


2. WON Aquende is a proper party to sue for the annulment of the judgment

RULING:
1.YES. The judgment may be annulled as there was extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction under
Rule 47, Sec. 2 of RoC. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court. It is the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant which
prevented a party from having his day in court. in this case, Aquende was prevented from
protecting his title when Bulawan failed to implead him as a party. Also, trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person as he was not a party to it.
2.YES. Aquende’s lot and Bulawan’s lot refer to the same lot no. 1634-B. Aquende is an
indispensable party as his interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation. As such,
he must be joined as plaintiff as defined in Sec. 7, Rule 3 of RoC.
Autocorp Group vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation
G.R. No. 166662. June 27, 2008

MAINPOINT: The misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.—The
misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court explicitly states: SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Neither misjoinder
nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. A necessary party is one who is
not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to
those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.

Where the Bureau of Customs, through the Solicitor General, was not the one who initiated the
case, and neither was its consent obtained for the filing of the same, it may be considered an
unwilling co-plaintiff in said action, and the proper way to implead it as a necessary party should
be in accordance with Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS: Autocorp Group, represented by its President, Rodriguez, secured an ordinary re-export
bond from private respondent Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (ISAC) in favor of public Bureau
of Customs (BOC), to guarantee the re-export of 2 units of car (at 2 different dates) and/or to pay
the taxes and duties thereon. Petitioners executed and signed two Indemnity Agreements with
identical stipulations in favor of ISAC, agreeing to act as surety of the subject bonds
In sum, ISAC issued the subject bonds to guarantee compliance by petitioners with their
undertaking with the BOC to re-export the imported vehicles within the given period and pay the
taxes and/or duties due thereon. In turn, petitioners agreed, as surety, to indemnify ISAC for the
liability the latter may incur on the said bonds. Autocorp failed to re-export the items guaranteed
by the bonds and/or liquidate the entries or cancel the bonds, and pay the taxes and duties
pertaining to the said items, despite repeated demands made by the BOC, as well as by ISAC. By
reason thereof, the BOC considered the two bonds forfeited. Failing to secure from petitioners the
payment of the face value of the two bonds, ISAC filed with the RTC an action against petitioners
to recover a sum of money plus Attorney’s Fee. ISAC impleaded the BOC “as a necessary party
plaintiff in order that the reward of money or judgment shall be adjudged unto the said necessary
plaintiff.” Petitioners filed a MTD, which was denied. RTC ordered Autocorp to pay ISAC and/or
BOC the face value of the subject bonds plus AF. Autocorp’s MR was denied. CA affirmed the
trial court’s decision. MR was denied. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUES:
1. WON the BOC has been improperly impleaded and would be a ground for a dismissal of
the case?
2. WON the BOC is a necessary party?
RULING:1. NO. In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners’
arguments on the matter, holding that when the BOC forfeited the subject bonds issued by ISAC,
subrogation took place so that whatever right the BOC had against petitioners were eventually
transferred to ISAC. As ISAC merely steps into the shoes of the BOC, whatever defenses
petitioners may have against the BOC would still be available against ISAC. The Court likewise
cannot sustain petitioners’ position. The misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal
of the action. Section 11, Rule 3.

2.The subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-1584 is the liability of Autocorp Group to the BOC,
which ISAC is also bound to pay as the guarantor who issued the bonds therefor. Clearly, there
would be no complete settlement of the subject matter of the case at bar—the liability of Autocorp
Group to the BOC—should Autocorp Group be merely ordered to pay its obligations with the BOC
to ISAC. BOC is, therefore, a necessary party in the case at bar, and should not be dropped
as a party to the present case.
It can only be conceded that there was an irregularity in the manner the BOC was joined as a
necessary party in Civil Case No. 95-1584. As the BOC, through the Solicitor General, was not
the one who initiated Civil Case No. 95-1584, and neither was its consent obtained for the
filing of the same, it may be considered an unwilling co-plaintiff of ISAC in said action. The
proper way to implead the BOC as a necessary party to Civil Case No. 95-1584 should have been
in accordance with Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
“SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.—If the consent of any party who should be joined as
plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated
in the complaint.”
Nonetheless, the irregularity in the inclusion of the BOC as a party to Civil Case No. 95-1584
would not in any way affect the disposition thereof. As the Court already found that the BOC is a
necessary party to Civil Case No. 95-1584, it would be a graver injustice to drop it as a party.

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc


G.R. No. 152272.
March 5, 2012.
MAINPOINT: With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit,
the Court finds the opposition without merit. he necessary elements for the maintenance of a
class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

FACTS: JCHA et.al. (Homeowners Association, individual residents of Juana Complex I and
neighboring subdivisions) instituted an action for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit,
against Fil-Estate.

The complaint alleged that plaintiffs are regular commuters and motorists who constantly travel
along SLEX through a public road known as La Paz Road for more than 10 years. However, Fil-
Estate deliberately excavated, ruined, and closed said road, which made it not passable to motorists
and pedestrians. Despite complaints, Fil-Estate failed to make repairs on the road, causing damage
and inconvenience to motorists.

Fil-Estate filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and
that it was improperly filed as a class suit. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA upheld the RTC.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S): While they agree with the CA that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action, they disagree with the pronouncement that full-blown trial on the merits
was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the application of the writ of injunction, they
had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and motorists of
their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access toschools, churches, etc.

They also point out that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of a public road or
burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT(S): JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way
or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to
such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered private road and there is neither
a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.

ISSUE: 1 WON the complaint states a cause of action;


2. WON the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit;
3. WON a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted

RULING: 1. YES The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause
of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause
of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz
Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been
using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted
over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is
the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when
they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third,
JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in
accordance with the relief sought therein.

2. YES The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz
Road.

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is
initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to
join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the
La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit
are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as
plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Binan,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

3.NO A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous


irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The
requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For
the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must
be shown to be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show
that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right
to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have
no clear legal right therein.

Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their
respective positions on the issues.
Banda vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620.
April 20, 2010.

MAINPOINT: Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties.

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings;
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or
other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts.

In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court
must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the
other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to
speak for the rest of the class.

FACTS: The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all
their co-employees at the National Printing Office. They challenge the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of
Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat
to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO contending that it is beyong the executive
powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued by former Pres. Aquino when the
latter still exercised legislative powers and that EO No. 378 violates petioners’ security of tenure
because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class suit.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds
to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect
his individual interest. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject
matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the
class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by
the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the
Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549
employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed
an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly
reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the
validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such
desistance was due to pressure from people "close to the seat of power." Still, even if we were to
disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a
sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A
perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in
the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20
petitioners effectively instituted the present case.

Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., 396 SCRA
210 (2003), we observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a
class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the
interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears,
to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named
party to speak for the rest of the class. Previously, we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic Church,
that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent
are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.

RULE 6 10 TO 11

La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 88938.
June 8, 1992

MAINPOINT: On the other hand, a stranger to the action, i.e., a person not a party to the action,
or as the law puts it," any other person than the defendant or his agent," whose property is seized
pursuant to the writ of delivery, is accorded the remedy known as a terceria, a third party claim to
wit: "SEC. 7. Third-party claim.—If the property taken be claimed by any other person than the
defendant or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer
while he has possession of the property, and a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, the officer is not
bound to keep the property or deliver it to the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff or his agent, on demand
of the officer, indemnifies him against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of
the property, and in case of disagreement as to such value the same shall be decided by the court
issuing the order.

To avail of the remedy, prior determination of whether one is a proper party defendant or a
stranger to the action is necessary.

Amendments under Section 2, Rule 10 amendment of complaint a matter of right before answer
is filed.
FACTS: La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (La Tondena) manufactures and sells a gin popularly known
as "Ginebra San Miguel," which is contained in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of
ownership "LA TONDEÑA, INC." and "GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL" stamped or blown-in to the
bottles which . . . (it [La Tondeña]) specially ordered from the bottle manufactures for its exclusive
use. The bottles were registered with the Philippine Patent Office and use of the registered bottles
by any one without written permission of the owner is declared unlawful by Section 2 of R.A. 623.
It was likewise alleged that the sale of the gin in the registered white flint, bottles does not include
the sale of the bottles themselves. By virtue of these facts, La Tondena prayed to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila to 1) “issue an order directing the, Sheriff or other proper officer . . . to take
into his custody all the 350 c.c. bottles of the plaintiff in the possession of the defendant . . . and
to dispose of the same in accordance with the rules of court”, 2) to be adjudged the lawful owner
possessor of the said bottles, and 3) for private respondent Tee Chin Ho to be made to pay, actual,
nominal and temperate and exemplary damages in specific stated amounts (aggregating
P75,400.00), as well as attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

Judge Santillan of the Manila RTC issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La Tondeña's
posting of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. In implementation of the writ, Deputy Sheriff
Regio Ruefa seized 20,250 bottles with the blown-in marks, "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San
Miguel". The sheriff Mr. Ruefa executed a handwritten "Receipt" and among others, was signed
by Tee Chin Ho as witness. Sheriff Ruefa's return attests that prior to seizing the bottles, he served
summons, copy of the complaint and its annexes, copy of the bond, and the writ of seizure
personally on one “Te Tien Ho” (it was La Tondena’s position the Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho
were one and the same person). The five-day period within which the sufficiency of the replevin
bond might be objected to or the return of the property seized expired without any person objecting
to the bond or seeking the return of the bottles, instead an individual identifying himself as "Tee
Chin Ho" filed on a pleading denominated "ANSWER” alleging 1) all purchases of La Tondeña's
gin necessarily included the bottles containing the gin; hence ownership of the bottles did not
remain in La Tondeña but was transferred to the purchasers; 2) it was from him, Tee Chin Ho, and
not from Te Tien Ho, that the bottles in question had been taken by Sheriff Ruefa, and it was taken
from a different numbered address on the same street (1105 instead of 1005 Estrada Street,
Manila); 3) La Tondeña had "masterminded and caused two instances of seizure against intervenor,
first through and by the Manila City, police, and second through the Court's sheriff.

The sheriff delivered the bottles to La Tondena, however, a TRO was issued to maintain the status
quo and prevent La Tondena from seizing bottles at 1105 Estrada St. La Tondena reiterated its
position that Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho were one and the same person. Judge Santillan ruled in
favor of Tee Chin Ho, issuing writs of preliminary mandatory injunction and preliminary
prohibitory injunction, stating “that the seizure authorized by the Court's writ of replevin is only
against the person whose name and address is pleaded in the complaint namely TE TIEN HO at
No. 1005 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila; the two truckloads empty bottles seized by the Manila
Police (Exhibit "4") and by the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit "5") from intervenor Tee Chin Ho, is
improper and unlawful” and “ordering plaintiff La Tondeña Distillers, Inc., its agents, duly
authorized representatives or other persons acting for and in its behalf to return and restore unto
intervenor Tee Chin Ho at his address at 1105 Estrada St…” La Tondena raised the case to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus but was dismissed for
not being the proper subject of a petition for CPM.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not La Toneda may still amend his pleading as a matter of right?
2.WON Tee Chin Ho should still have moved to intervene in the action as defendant in
intervention?

RULING:
1.YES. Also overlooked by respondent Judge was that the amendment sought by La Tondeña
was one of those explicitly mentioned, and could, in the premises, be made as a matter of right,
in accordance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court It is plain from the record that
at the time that La Tondeña moved to amend its complaint to correct "a mistake in the name of a
party" and "a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description" of that party's place of residence
or business, no effective "responsive pleading" (i.e., the answer) had been served on it by the
person impleaded in the action as defendant; for the admission of Tee Chin Ho's answer-in-
intervention (with permissive counterclaim) was yet hanging fire and no notice of the Court's
action thereon had been served on La Tondeña. Clearly, then, the amendment which La Tondeña
wished to make was a matter of right in accordance with Section 2, Rule 10. Being directed at a
"defect in the designation of the parties," it was in truth a correction that could be summarily
made at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party," as
Section 4 of the same Rule 10 further provides.

2.NO. It is amazing, too, why Tee Chin Ho—who was already actually a defendant because he
had been served with summons and had implicitly acknowledged his status as such by signing or
causing the signing of his name to certain papers in which he was described as defendant—should
thereafter still have moved to intervene in the action as defendant in intervention. The more direct
step indicated under the circumstances, since he had already been brought into the action as
defendant, although against his will, was merely to draw the court's attention, by some appropriate
motion or pleading, to the lack of any cause of action against him because he was not the person
impleaded as defendant in the complaint and, of course, seek relief from the writ of seizure and
the recovery of such damages as might have been caused to him by the enforcement thereof.
However, Tee Chin Ho chose the more circuitous path: although already technically
a defendant, he still filed a motion to intervene as defendant, and also with the same basic
objective: to tell the Court he was not the person named in the complaint, and to recover the
property seized from him as well as damages.
By this maneuver, Tee Chin Ho was able to evade the legal consequences of the expiration of
the five-day period prescribed by Section 5 (in relation to Section 6) of Rule 10, supra; he
succeeded in recovering the bottles in question even after the expiry of said period, and what is
more, as defendant in intervention, he was able to put at issue the propriety of the ground relied
upon for a writ of delivery—which he would have been disqualified to do as defendant. It was
seriously wrong for the Court to have sanctioned such a maneuver.

Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. vs. Lerm


G.R. No. 143581.
January 7, 2008
MAINPOINT: On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its
counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being
compul sory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross-claims.
As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory
pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not
commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory
counterclaims.

FACTS: Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES
would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally
cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had altered the quantity and lowered the quality
of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC
could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and
equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and
equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the contract. KOGIES filed a motion
to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should
have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so
was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondent’s
counterclaims as these counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.

ISSUE: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the
respondent’s Answer with counterclaim?

RULING: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing
counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending
party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.” As to the failure to submit a
certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a
certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in
denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC
filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing
fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature.