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IN PHILOSOPHY
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Phenomena themselves (objects of what you would probably call "experience") can be considered from the metaphysical angle. The problem of universals. But I don't suppose that we want to quarrel about how we're going to use a word. In as much as metaphysical statements are not testable by observation. perhaps. To say what philosophy is. purely formal propositions and statements of observation. I should hold that philosophy. I agree that my position is philosophical. I can quite understand. Professor Ayer. or hypotheses. We maintain that you can divide propositions into two classes. as I understand it. begins. m a sense. and I shouldn't dream of denying or of belittling in any way its utility: I think it's obviously an extremely useful thing to do to analyse and clarify the concepts used in science. We should say that if philosophy was to be a branch of knowledge. of course. Copleston Metaphysics. should not be metaphysics. if this be understood. Analytic Philosophy and Science YER: WELL. what it is that we are going to call "philosophy" and I have given you my answer. to be significant. You would hold. too. to be significant. It is here published for the first time with the kind permission of ProfesSoI Ayer and Father C0~1eston. It is not. if one divides significant propositions into two classes. Empirical propositions. C. A [This debate took place on the Third Program of the British Broadcasting Corporation on June 13. are statements of actual or possible observation. AYER:And that which is left out is what people called philosophers might well be expected to study? COPLESTON: Yes.j philosophers confining themselves to logical analysis if they wish to do so. among other things. For one thing. Ayer and F. that's the point at which I should disagree with hm And so would many other philosophers disagree~especiallyon the Continent. I gather. on the other hand. like those of logic and mathematics. In everyday life. AYER:Yes. where science leaves off. because I do not mean to imply that the metaphysician cannot begin until science has finished its work. But if the Logical Positivist means that logical analysis is the only function of philosophyi . should be verifiable as scientific hypotheses are verifiable is to claim that metaphysics. as distinct from the sciences. It consists rather in a certain technique-a certain kmd of attitude towards philosophic problems. 1949. but by this I mean that it is itself a question of philosophical analysis. is a very useful thing. formal and empirical. is certainly a philosophical act. in a sense. one presupposes a philosophy. In my personal opinion. or the various possible meanings. where science leaves off. J . namely. is a metaphysical problem. Moreover. the room being the world as amenable to scientific handling and investigation. We have to decide. If this were so. I say that metaphysical philosophy begins. as I hope to show later. Thus. one of the chief functions of metaphysics is to open the mind to the Transcendent-to remove the ceilmg of the room. so much as to discuss the points underlying what you've just said. depend for their validity on the conventions of a symbol system. as I think it commonly has been. and it is they that constitute science in so far as science isn't purely mathematical. FATHER COPLESTON. one thing which those of us who are called logical positivists tend to have in common is that we deny the possibility of philosophy as a speculative discipline. It would take the form of trying to elucidate the concepts that were used in science or mathematics or in everyday language. Now our contention is that this exhausts the field of what may be called speculative knowledge. that in the account I gave of the possible fields of knowledge something was left out. Formal propositions. Don't you think that by saying what philosophy is. I mean that he asks other . it would have to consist in logic or in some form of analysis. But this is not to say that the metaphysician is simply concerned with the Transcendent. at any rate metaphysical philosophy.LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE -727i 63 Logical Positivism-A Debate A. the metaphysician would be quite unable to start. as it were. we hold they are not descriptive of anything. to claim that metaphysical propositions. Consequently we reject metaphysics. you've asked me to summarize Logical Positivism for you and it's not very easy. as an attempt to gain knowledge about the world by non-scientific means. COPLESTON: Yes. there are many terms used that practically have taken on an emotional connotation-"progressive" or "reactionary" or "freedom" or "the modern mind": -to make clear to people what's meant or what they mean by those terms. Logical Positivism is not a system of philosophy. And from this we should conclude that if philosophy is to be a cognitive activity it must be purely critical. for instance. but not that it is metaphysical. from which such statements can be logically derived. COPLESTON: Well. an obvious answer but it at least has the merit that it rescues philosophical statements from becoming either meaningless or trivial. and our reason for this would be somewhat as follows. or takes up a position as a philosopher? For example. one is adopting a philosophical position: one is claiming that there are no necessary propositions which are not purely formal.

precisely as scientist. precisely as free. would maintain that Man as free. from your point of view. I hold a principle. even if it could not be answered. And he then says "Why does the light go out when it is fused?" Then perhaps you tell him a story about electrical connections. you may give him the general theory of electricity which is again a "how" story. and so on. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITMSM-A DEBATE n729's. So that in the ordinary sense of a "why" question. It doesn't show that there's room for a quite different kmd of discipline. and then your "why" answers are deductions from that. If I ask. That is the "how" story. Metaphysical and Scientific Explanation AVER:I do not see that you can know a priori that human bebaviour is inexplicable. I think that one of the possible functions of the philosopher is to consider what is sometimes called the non-empirical or intelligible self. make the slightest differenceto anything that any one experiences. But if you say that it leaps into a quite different I think realm-the realm which you describe as the "transcendent"-then I cease to follow you. for example. if he's not satisfied with that. i. shows the logical connection of one proposition with another. That is why I said earlier on that one of the functions of the philosopher is to open the mind to the Transcendent. which is again a "how" story. and all the sciences together can give. questions than those asked by the scientist and pursues a different method. the question why anything is there at all. Some philosophers would say that metaphysics consists in raising problems rather than in answering them definitively. a very general description of reality. But. Perhaps I can illustrate No. wires. But what more is required is better psycbological investigation. how the earth comes to be in its . analyses them. for example. Supposing someone asks you "Why did the ligbt go out?" You may tell him the ligbt went out because there was a fuse.! a728t MEANING. You tell him that thmgs function in this way at this level. sort of question. is simply that a given science may not explain things. The psychologist certainly would not think so. I think that it can. To raise this qnestion is. that the physics of the seventeenth century was limited in so far as physicists of the eighteenth. when you've talked of the limits of science. quite apart from the question whether one can or cannot answer them definitively. or explain as much as you would like to see explained. COPLESTON: Well. I consider that it is one of the functions of the philosopher to show that there is such a problem. it seems to me. nineteenth and twentieth centuries have gone very much further. but there's a peculiarity about these "why" questions. leaving that out of account. one of the possible functions of a philosopher is to show how all these scientific analyses of man-the analyses of the biochemist. though I do not myself agree with the sheerly agnostic position. known as the principle of verification. which is again the method of science.e. There is an obvious objection. putting a "why" question is asking for a "how" answer at a higher logical level-a more general "how" answer. Well now if you raise this question with regard to the world as a whole. or some kind of observation is relevant to its truth or falsehood. AVER: To say that philosophy begins where science leaves off is perfectly all right if you mean that the philosopher takes the results of the scientist. to take the ceiling off the room-to use again a rather crude metaphor. is only a historical statement about a point which science has reached at a given stage. AYER:Limits of science? You see I can quite well understand your saying that science is limited if you mean only that many more things may be discovered. but I would like to turn to metaphysics in general. I am not a follower of Karl Jaspers. but I think that to call attention to what he calls Existenz is a legitimate philosophical procedure. cannot be adequately handled by any scientist who presupposes the applicability of the principle of deterministic causality and conducts his investigations with that presupposition in mind. The most you can say is that our present stock of psychological hypotheses isn't adequate to explain certain features of it: and you may very well be right. for example. which to me seems to be perfectly acceptable. I see no reason to suppose that the biochemist will be able to give an exhaustive analysis of Man. one of the functions of the philosopher. But that. I think that one of the possible functions of the philosopher (a function which you presumably exclude) is to reveal the limits of science as a complete and exhaustive description and analysis of reality. And I thmk I can explain why I cease to foilow you. and you haven't made clear to me what that different kind of discipline which you reserve for the philosopher is supposed to be. and. AYER: Yes. You may say. and so on. You may say that the qnestion cannot be answered. but. you give him the general theory of electromagnetics. according to which a statement intended to be a statement of fact is meaningful only if it's either formally valid. But the scientist. We need to form new theories and test the theories by further observation. COPLESTON: I didn't mean that at all. you're asking for what? The most general possible theory? COPLESTON: the metaphysical question I have in mind is a different No. in my opinion. against the phrase "nou-empirical self". Karl Jaspers. And then if he's not satisfied with that. The biochemist can describe Man within his own terms of reference and up to a certain extent. the empirical psychologist and so on-are unable to achieve the exhaustive analysis of the individual human being. It seems to me that all you've said. what I mean in reference to anthropology. it is true. for example. Then." I think myself that some positive descriptive statements about the Transcendent are possible. although biochemistry may doubtless continue to advance. I COPLESTON: don't care for the phrase "transcendent statement. I thmk that there is value in raising the metaphysical problems. but. My difficulty with your so-called transcendent statements is that their truth or falsehood doesn't. does not raise. The scientists can describe various particular aspects of things. Now.

If something's heavily camouflaged you can understand that it's there even if you can't see it. I can perfectly well think of a cow. which itself is not a description. COPLESTON: Well. But. begin with the objects of sense-experience and introspection. the answersupposing that there is an answer-must. Why not? I suppose it's because you can't test it in any way. It seems to me that when I propose a metaphysical question you ask me to re-state the question as though it were a scientific question. But each of them thought that intellectual reflection can lead the mind to postulate that reality. it obviously cannot consist in a further description of phenomena. the question would not be a metaphysical question. in the same way as a scientific hypothesis. There would be a contradiction if I did not distinguish between a scientific question and a metaphysical question. But if I ask why there are phenomena at all. When this awareness becomes articulate and finds expression. of course it can. and asking for the "why" of that is asking for a more general description still. And then you say. I think) would hold that one cannot think finite being as such without implicitly thmking the Infinite. the existence of phenomena in general requires some explanation. You can penetrate disguises. you yourself reflect on the data of experience: your philosophy does not consist in stating atomic experiences. The words "as such" are. AYER:But my objection is that your very notion of an explanation of all phenomena is self-contradictory. COPLESTON: is the contradiction? What AYER:The contradiction is. without thinking of any metaphysical . You seem to me to reject from the beginning the reflective work of the intellect on which rational metaphysics depends. But no metaphysician would pretend that one could see a metaphenomenal reality with the eyes: it can be apprehended only by an intellectual activity. But in any case to ask why any finite phenomena exist. Now your kind of penetration is a very queer one. but even if it were. I dare say one could. if you like) implies a dim awareness of the non-self-sufficiency of the world. it would not he scientifically testable without ceasing to be a metaphysical statement. and I should say explanation in terms of a transcendent reality. And I should maintain that an intellectual apprehension of the nature of what I call contingent being as such involves an apprehension of its relatedness to self-grounded Being. but a metaphysical question concerns the intelligible structure of reality in so far as it is not amenable to the investigation by the methods of empirical science. Thomas Acquinas supposed that one could investigate scientifically what they respectively believed to be the metaphenomenal reality. he is unlikely to ask any questions about its existence as such. If someone feels no wonder at the existence of the physical world. why there is something rather than nothing. refer to a reality beyond or behind phenomena. that if you accept my interpretation of what "why" questions are. Even if the series of phenomena did go back indefinitely.VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE >731< present condition. However. at this point I should like to remark that you're presupposing that one must be able to test every hypothesis in a certain way. go back indefinitely. though that activity must. It becomes a very. AYER:No indeed it doesn't. Some philosophers (Hegel among them. AYER: Well in one sense of the words. There I quite agree with you. And if one persists in asking such questions. in my opinion. Neither Spinoza nor Fichte nor Hegel nor St. then asking a "why" question is always asking for a more general description. I should say. "Give me an answer to a 'why' which doesn't take the form of a description. it may lead to a metaphysical speculation. I should maintain that the very ability to raise the question of the existence of the world (or of the series of phenomena. to a conscious thinking of contingent existence as such. why there is something rather than nothmg. without beginning. how it comes to be there.w730a MEANING. because you say you can discern things lying behind other thmgs with simply no experience of stripping off the disguise and coming across the thing undisguised. in my opinion. whether anything is responsible for the series. if I could do that. then you've not got an explanation and you haven't answered my question. finite or infinite. AVER: If you say anything of that kind. But if I ask whether anything lies behind phenomena. it still means that you're treating your transcendent reality. I could still raise the question as to why the infinite series of phenomena exists. for example. important. COPLESTON: That is not the question I am asking. It's like saying "Give me a description more general than any description. I do not mean to allow that every metaphysical statement is a hypothesis. COPLESTON: not exactly a question of a disguise. what form would your metaphysical question take? COPLESTON: Well. Whether such a question can be answered or not is obviously another matter. I am not asking for an answer in terms of empirical causes and conditions. of phenomena. But if you can't test it in any way." And clearly nobody can do that." and that's a contradiction. is to ask a different sort of question from the question why water tends to flow downhill rather than uphill. I can strip off It's camouflage and see the camouflaged thing with my eyes. That's because you know what it would be like to see it independently of seeing it in disguise. I maintain that this is a possible philosophical question. I go to the astronomer for an answer. COPLESTON: seems to me that we are discussing my particular brand It of metaphysics rather than Logical Positivism. Aristotle asserted that philosophy begins with wonder. very general scientific hypothesis. At least. Whatever the answer may be. Since I hold that philosophy consists in logical analysis. in theory. I am prepared to admit the possibility. or rather the statements about your transcendent reality. of necessity. it isn't in my view a matter of stating experiences at all: if by stating experiences you mean just describing them. Only you want to say it's not like a scientific hypothesis. I expect an answer which refers to empirical causes and conditions. I think. would it? AYER:Well. After all.

aren't you presupposing the validity of a certain philosophical interpretation of causality? It may be true or false. Tberefore it cannot be refuted by infra-atomic indeterminism. Some philosophers would probably say that this principle has only subjective necessity. statistical generalizations from observed phenomena. What questions are being asked? Now supposing one were to ask. Now. you can understand an a r p ment. But I should like to make some remarks about this use of the word "cause. though the principle is. because if it's a member of the class of all events it must be included in it and therefore can't be prior to it. that of course becomes meaningless. that I understood by the principle of causality the proposition that the initial state of every phenomenon is determined by a preceding phenomenon or by precedmg phenomena. Clearly no event can be prior to all events. the causal relation holds between things that happen. Moreover. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE ¥733 reality. Let me give another instance which illustrates the same point. To my way of thinking the philosophic principle of causality is simply an implication of the intelligibility of phenomena. the extrinsic reality in question must transcend them. Supposing you asked a question like "Where do all things come from?" Now that's a perfectly meaningful questiou as regards any given event. But what I understand by the philosophic principle of causality is the general proposition that every being which has not in itself its reason of existence depends for its existence on an extrinsic reality which I call. COPLESTON: Well now. that one cannot use the principle of I causality. and presumably anything that happens is in the world. Incidentally. in this connection. First of all. "Outside" suggests distance in space. This principle says nothing as to the character of the cause. I pass into the sphere of metaphysics. you are unduly limiting "meaningfulness" to a certain restricted kind of meaningfulness. I n my opinion. I have just used the word "outside. in a sense. At least this would be one of the meanings. If one denies that one can discern any implication or internal relation in the existing phenomena considered as such. I'm afraid. as you presuppose. if there is such a thing. let alone all phenomena? Well I think . I suppose. in order to transcend phenomena. You see. but I don't bold this view myself. Is the world dependent on something outside itself? Would you regard that as a possible questiou? COPLESTON: I think it's a possible question. it becomes meaningless. AVER:Metaphysic of the Absolute? I am afraid my problem still is. but an extrinsic reality. But the relating of the world to a Being outside the world would not bring that Being into the world. and philosophers too. then I think a metaphysic of the Absolute is possible. nor do I see any very cogent reason for holding it. AYER:But surely on any view of causality. some people. they can be intelligible or not. AYER: Well then. Yes AYER:Well then you're using a very queer sense of causation. presupposed by the scientist when he traces the connection between a phenomenal effect and a phenomenal cause. But what is the understanding of phenomena? Even a particular one. COPLESTON: agree. and it is not one which I accept. for example. want to generalize this and say with a profound air: "Perhaps all our experiences are hallucinatory." I am very glad you brought the questiou up. But now you can't be meaning that. aren't you? Because in the normal sense in which you talk of one event being dependent or consequent on another. of course. what is the intelligibility of phenomena? You can understand sentences. Let us say that they are generalizations which refer to observable events or phenomena. normally if one uses the word causation one is saying that the later event is dependent on the earlier. One can say of any one perception that it's a hallucination. the principle mentions not phenomenal causes. in the sense that all cases of the earlier are also cases of the later. but if you make it a cause you automatically bring this supposed reality into the world. as far as I understand the use of the term by scientists." Well. I mean the question is not really where these scientific expressions have come from. but it is a philosophical view. COPLESTON: would bring the world into relation with the reality. causal laws would mean for them. meaning by this that it isn't corroborated by one's own further perceptions or by those of other people. COPLESTON: isn't meaningful if the only meaningful questions are It those which can be answered by the methods of empirical science. But if yon generalize that question. It and personally I should not dream of adopting any metaphysic which did not start with experience of this world. but if I abstract from its characteristics as a cow and thmk of it merely as contingent being. Supposing. and that makes sense. if you will. AYER:That makes it rather more genetic than it need be. you'd be meaning that they had some kind of temporal relation to each other. quite apart from the fact that it may not apply even to all phenomena. If one is speaking of all beings which have not in themselves the reason for their existence. In fact. because if you were you'd be putting your cause in the world. then a metaphysic of the absolute becomes an impossible thing." This illustrates admirably the inadequacy of language for expressing metaphysical ideas. Now. if these are regarded as contingent events. I don't know what you mean by your other-worldly reality. the possibility of raising the question of the Absolute seems to depend largely on the nature of relations. if understood in a sense which involves references to phenomena exclusively. In exactly the same way I should say that this question of where does it all come from isn't meaningful. any more than it is refuted by the free acts of men. You're then askmg what event is prior to all events. "independent" would be better. but what use they're put to. I thmk. AVER:But it's precisely questions like this question about the world as a whole that I think we should rule out. cause. Asking where it came from is asking for a description of some event prior to it.à 732f MEANING. It may be free or not free. If the mind can discern such a relation. again I think I should accuse you of the fallacy of misplaced generalization.

Otherwise you will not recognize it as an explanation. i. Necessary and Contingent Propositions AVER:Now I think I get more of what you're saying. wouldn't you. that one has been given a good many metaphysical answers. if you don't get practical answers what kind of answers do you get? COPLESTON: Theoretical answers. COPLESTON: And why should it be necessary to do anything with a proposition? AVER:Because you put this up as a hypothesis. So what you want is to have a proposition that is both contingent and necessary. "Rational" and "scientific" are not equivalent terms. but to serve equally for anything that could conceivably happen. I should say the same about all statements of this kind. . But the trouble with these so-called metaphysical explanations is that they don't merely purport to explain what does happen. AYER:But does a non-scientific explanation explain anything? Let me take an example. Whether it's answerable or not is another pair of shoes. so long as an explanation is contingent. If COPLESTON: I seek the explanation of the world. That. But of course once your proposition becomes logically necessary it is a purely formal one.Â¥734 MEANING. Now I should say that would only be meaningful if you could show that events going this way rather than that way answered his purpose. This is to say. the same explanation would still hold. Now. but the trouble still is that these answers are given not as explanations of any particular event. But I still want to say that I don't regard these as genuine questions. AYER:Well." If I did." I didn't "just happen. In any case I'm not seeking the ontological explanation of the world in a proposition. and I don't know what it would be like for such a proposition to be true. that is. It becomes empty of significance because it's consistent with everything. But that's a contradiction in terms. phenomena just happen. And I'm not prepared to acquiesce in the idea that the series of phenomena. even if infinite. I thereby exclude other possibilities. are all phenomena intelligible? Does that mean that you are looking for a single theory from which every true proposition can be deduced? I doubt if you could find one. And I wonder if this notion of an explanation of all events isn't itself faulty. but the answers are forthcoming all the same. and a hypothesis is supposed to explain. is what distinguishes one explanation from another. you're going to say it's not a sufficient explanation. However you changed your data. COPLESTON: think that what you are demanding is that any explanaI tion of the existence of phenomena should be a scientific hypothesis. in the technical use of the word "scientific. COPLESTON: There is a contradiction only if one grants an assumption of yours which I deny. You might explain all events as they do occur. A proposition which is applicable to a contingent thing or event is not necessarily a contingent proposition. my existence would be unintelligible. What I An meant was that there is no reason why we should be able to deduce "practical" consequences from it. and then understanding the phenomenon would be a matter of explaining this description. provided you allowed the possibility that if they occurred differently your explanation would be falsified. "All explanations of facts are of the type of scientific hypotheses or they are not explanations at all. of course. and what I am looking for is an ontological explanation and not simply a logical explanation. You would recognize some description of it as an accurate description. and it is a prejudice to think that they are equivalent. just happens. would be empty as an explanatiou because nothing would disagree with it. I say such an answer explains nothing because I can do nothing with it. but any event that could occur. but of all events.e. For example." But the explauation of all finite beings cannot be a scientific explanation. So that you want for your proposition something that is logically necessary. Suppose someone said that the explanation for things happening as they did was that it answered the purposes of the deity. don't they? Is there a question of their being intelligible or not intelligible? COPLESTON: No. I think you can legitimately raise the question why there is finite existence as such. unless you can give me a good reason for doing so. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE ~ 7 3 5 ~ you could give a sense to understanding a particular phenomenon. to be explained in its turn. But aren't you asking for something contradictory? You see. which gives you an infinite regress? You see. then it becomes useless as an explanation. nor do I regard the answers as intelligible. and so doesn't explaiu anything. you'd want that theory again. I am considering an ontological question. necessary in so far as it's not just something happening to be. But if you're going to say that whatever happens is going to answer his purpose." But it can be a rational explanation all the same. as a simpleminded historian of philosophy. but that makes it as an explanation absolutely vacuous. I should have thought. AYER: Yes. that is something that might be otherwise logically. let us take the case of someone who says that the answer is that Reality is the Absolute expressing itself. When I explain something by telling you that this is the way it works. and incompatible with another. of deducing it from some theory. phenomena don't "just happen. But something which purported to explain all events. of course. So that any genuine explanation is compatible with one course of events. contingent in so far as it's got to describe the world. AVER: Well. They cannot all be true. I quite agree that many metaphysicians have supposed themselves to be asking and answering questions of this kind. but something that must be. not merely all events that did occur. but even if you did. you say. COPLESTON: explanation is meant to explain. certainly. In fact it's riot an explanation at all. Nor is the proposition that it is contingent an analytic or self-evident proposition.

you can't have. when the paper was grey. I think that there is a metaphysical version of the principle which is not simply what is sometimes called "a law of thought. it is better so. but is-what? The Nature of Logical Necessity COPLESTON: a necessary proposition I mean a certain proposition. if you tell me that the paper is both white and notwhite. I think. bad logical grammar. I do not believe that all certain propositions But. the ontological argument for the existence of God. in my opinion. and that. Supposing you chose. call empirical hypotheses. Now take the principle of contradiction. It's got to be necessary because you're not satisfied with anything contingent. COPLESTON: The world doesn't consist of contingent propositions. COPLESTON: you see. propositions which are certain and which are yet applicable to reality. to admit the abstract possibility of it. they do apply to propositions. I should call logically necessary. But I can't think it. of course. of course I shouldn't say that the world consists of propositions: it's very bad grammar. not itself logically necessary. AYER: Well. though I do believe that God's existence is the ultimate ontological explanation of phenomena. COPLESTON: Why should it at one and the same time be contingent and necessary? AYER:It's got to be contingent in order to do for an explanation. I should say that is because one can't admit the possibility of its being both white and not-white at the same time. Well." but is rather imposed on the mind by its experience of being. for instance. yes. AVER:Well now. by its reflection on its experience of being. AYER:No. I can't think it. though things may be expressed in contingent propositions. but I ought. are only formally valid.'736i MEANING. no. it seems to me that if it's purely formal. besides purely logical propositions and what you would. which you introduced. do apply to propositions in their ordinary logical acceptance. Then . AYER:Well. I think that there are necessary or certain propositions which also apply to things. COPLESTON: Yes. I'm not holdmg. A statement to the effect that a being is necessary could be translated into a statement that a proposition referring to that being was necessary. facts if you like. I believe that there are metaphysical propositions which are certaiu. Nor should I say that a necessary being consists of necessary propositions. and you can't have it. you want to have statements. AYER: You can't admit that possibility. AYER: Yes. By You may say that there are no certain propositions which are applicable to reality. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE "737t AYER: shouldn't you be? But COPLESTON: should one be? Why AVER: Well. COPLESTON: shouldn't admit that it's got to be contingeut in order I to do its work of explanation. in the sense of being tautologies. better. AVER:But surely a necessary being can only be one concerning which the proposition that it exists is necessary? COPLESTON: proposition would be necessary. You do waut to have it both ways. I'd say that it didn't do its work of explanation if it was contingent. propositions that are formally valid. 1 am not saying that there are propositions which are both necessary and contingent: what I am saying is that there are. which are both contingent and necessary. if by contingent you mean an uncertain empirical hypothesis. of course you don't tell me anything about fact. I can't admit its abstract possibility. But the words necessary and contingeut. about the use of the word "not. ultimate in what sense? In the sense that you can't find a more general proposition from which it can be deduced? An COPLESTON: ultimate principle or proposition is obviously not deducible-if you must speak of propositions instead of beings. that doesn't make the proposition contingent. which I should say meant a formally valid proposition. I regard the philosophic version as certain. Earlier in our discussion I distinguished at least two senses of the principle of causality. I do attempt. AYER:But how possibly could you derive anything empirical from a necessary proposition? I COPLESTON:am not attempting to derive an empirical thing from a necessary proposition. from which their connection is deducible. And a metaphysician can't have it either. which is the crucial sense for you. then I ought to admit there's a possibility of this piece of paper being white and not white at the same time." I should say that events are linked by causal necessity when there is some hypothesis. however. but not in any different sense. But it doesn't The follow that one can discern its necessity. then I must protest I don't understand your use of the word " necessary. and I can understand "causally necessary. Now you've got into the difficulty that from a logically necessary proposition. Now you want to introduce a third sense of necessity." but of course you could perfectly well introduce a convention by which it would be meaningful. do you? COPLESTON: Well. In other words. on your assumption. But I presume that you would say that the principle is only formal. but I do not accept the position that all necessary or certain propositions are tautologies. given existing conventions. what is explanation except a matter of deriving one proposition from another? But perhaps you prefer to call your ontological principle a fact. AYER: Well. to say it was white and not-white. I think. but that is another matter." You see. and therefore a materially empty proposition. Then what you're asking for is a fact that is at one and the same time contingent and necessary. you waut to derive a proposition with material content. which isn't either of those. If the reality in question happens to be contingent. it seems to me we've got a fairly clear meaning for " logically necessary". or. to render empirical things intelligible by reference to an absolute or necessary being.

and we have no call to stop them. I can't think of Smith being Smith-and-Jackson at the same time. but I can't think that. a kind of protoprinciple. the issue between us is in any case whether or not there are propositions which are certain and which yet apply to reality. I should say that it's not merely a law of thought or an analytic tautology that forces me to say that. but you can again quite easily imagine circumstances in which you would be inclined to change your logic in that respect. the difference would be that you couldn't make certain inferences that you now make. I can agree to speak about things using any terms I like. I have no wish to deny that there may be propositions which are purely formal. Is there any rule of speaking within that system? And suppose now you are using a three-valued logic. COPLESTON: Well." but I do not care for the phrase myself. but by saying both white and not-white. of course you can't. AYER:No. No one is claiming that it does. hear. COPLESTON: Well. However. COPLESTON: logic in which you don't exclude "p and not-p" may A have uses. Thus. If one wishes to keep within the sphere of purely formal logic one can. from the fact that the paper was not not-white you couldn't then infer that it was white: you could only infer that it was either white or the intermediate state. that I ought to admit the possibility of its being white-what I call white-of its being white and not-white at the same time. COPLESTON: Then does it not seem that there is at least one protoproposition which governs all possible systems of logic? AYER:No. If I have before me Smith and Jackson. If you have a symbol system which you use to describe those facts. Words like "not. and then if such things were very common. but I do not see that any significant statement can be made about this piece of paper in such a logic." according to which you could have two different persons inhabiting one body. then that symbol system will itself have certain conventions. or one person inhabiting different bodies. because you can equally well describe the phenomenon in the Aristotelian logic. because in that sense the notion of contradiction as you understand it wouldn't apply. governing the use of certain symbols in it. You shouldn't be expected to. No doubt you would say "Hear. the nature of your experiences. but that in no way alters the nature of the paper. COPLESTON: Then there are some laws. AYER:No. you could introduce a different grammar of color-classification which allowed you to say that the paper was and was not a certain color. that doesn't follow. you wouldn't be playing that game. and the descriptive expressions. Some people would call such propositions "synthetic a priori propositions." then of course you exclude the paper's being white and not-white. But I am convinced of the existence of valid metaphysical propositions. that govern all games? AYER:No. You could perfectly well use that to describe what you now describe. and adapted to meet them. I should like to raise another question. It seems to me that if the principle of contradiction is purely formal and tautological. for example in the case where the color is changing. simply formal propositions or tautologies. Perhaps you would help me to attain clarity in the matter. Would you say then that one was contradicting oneself? AYER:No. However." But I admit. you might get a new usage of "person. But of course you could describe the same experience in a different sort of logic. employ a three-valued logic. there are no laws that govern all games. Certain Hegelians want to do that. and I do not think that the introduction of the three-valued logic really affects the point. but if. Certain neurotic phenomena might very well incline one to say that Smith had acquired some of Jackson's personality. The fact is that the paper looks as it does. so long as it's understood how your terms are being used. COPLESTON: seems to me that it would be the nature of the thing It itself that forced me to speak in a certain way. certain proposiMy tions which are founded on an experience of reality and which are not. but each game has a certain set of laws governing it. in order to get your views on it. I suppose: I can agree to call this paper red." I should say. Within a three-valued system of logic is there any rule of consistency at all? AYER:Yes. AYER:What's common to all of them that if the conducted . because to think that would be to use symbols in a way not in accordance with the conventions under which that particular group of symbols are to be used. propositions which are certain and yet not purely formal. would you say one was at variance with the rules of the game? AYER: Yes. COPLESTON: Well. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE B739~ you would have altered your logic. AYER:I agree that such conventions are based on empirical facts. within a game. or observation of law. it seems to me. But purely formal propositions are not likely to help one in metaphysics. which you would choose to describe. COPLESTON: point is that there are. were logical expressions. My question is this. COPLESTON: Supposing one had another logical system. when I know that it's white. not by a separate word. but the nature of the things themselves. COPLESTON: Well. Now I think in any given symbol system I could separate what I call the logical expressions. But given that you're using a logic in which you exclude "p and not-p. therefore. if one likes to speak in that way. supposing in a system without the principle of contradiction one simply disregarded the principles of consistency within the system. whatever these laws may be. on this understanding. Otherwise it wouldn't be a system of logic. is itself. in the case where it's changing its color you like to say that it's both white and not-white. which brings you back to your two-valued system. consistency. There's no particular advantage in doing it. and you do not. that's all right. in my opinion. could you? AYER: Yes. on account of its association with the philosophy of Kant.~ 7 3 8 ~ MEANING.

technically meaningless. or bridge. AVER:And if it's done once. if the theory is true. AYER:The idea comes before the expression? As an image. and therefore. is to put the cart before the horse. would depend on whether they could be interpreted as counters in some other game. of course. then you're playing some different game. I suppose. that the belief of Western philosophers in substance was very much bound up with the subjectpredicate form of most sentences in Western languages. you're not playing that game. Compare the case of alternative geometries. isn't In it? I mean as to whether that is the case or not. that is. then if you don't observe those rules. Yes. COPLESTON: Granted.. COPLESTON: Well? AYER:Now supposing you have a game which breaks those rules. but I'm a little doubtful whether all ideas are accompanied by images. . Surely you can translate the Western philosophical problems into some quite primitive non-European languages. COPLESTON: Necessitated. "If you contradict yourself. you're allowed to revoke when you please. Now you might play bridge. AYER:What you can imagine to be possible depends very much upon what kind of symbol system you're using. COPLESTON: Yes. substance. in the sense that philosophical ideas depend on grammatical and syntactical structure? AYER:Not quite in that sense. even a metaphysical. in the sense that no logic applies to reality or that all possible logics apply equally well. That is certainly a valid statement. which seems to me to be a kind of proto-proposition governing all reasoning. but it is conventional. The Relation of Language to Philosophy COPLESTON: should like to know what you. the statement would be a philosophical. But I don't admit that all logics are games. partly at least. because there isn't. All you can say is. I should say. COPLESTON: are you producing unintelligible statements? And AYER:Whether the statements were intelligible or not. that if the grammatical and syntactical structure of different languages is different. AYER:Well now. as a logical po'utivist. AVER:And certain moves. Well. or something of that sort? COPLESTON: Sometimes. at any rate. this is not owing to the grammatical and syntactical structure of the language in question. COPLESTON: And you thmk that to some extent it depends on the language you use to do it in? . I think. occasionally. Avicenna." It means. I think about the relation of language to philosophy. I see no reason to say this. then you have a different game. AVER:Well. but owing to the absence of the abstract expression which will correspond to the Western idea. But supposing now you make revoking a general habit. supposing that they are games. anyone who violates this law isn't reasoning correctly. certain moves are allowed. namely the one we are now using. Averroes and Maimonides were due to differences in the grammatical and syntactical structures of the languages they respectively . . Let's take a test case. there is a certain architectonic governing the playing of those games. I should say. AYER:But surely all that you are saying is that in a language. it does seem to me that there is. logic. Would you say that philosophy depends on language. of course. that's considered to be a slip. Avicenna and Averroes in Arabic. but that in any game there must be some rule. if you contradict your premises and definitions. And it is an empirical question which logic is the most useful. To say that the expression governs the ideas and the formation of the ideas. COPLESTON: Observance of consistency seems to me to mean something more than "Unless you observe the rules of the game you do not observe the rules of the game. a Well principle of consistency." That is not an arbitrary or conventional principle. in Hebrew. philosophical problems raised in those languages are different. they would not be. But let us take your concrete example. exactly the same with logic. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE >741i in accordance with certain rules. AVER: No. If one did say it. COPLESTON: then. including not admitting contradictories.'740s MEANING. Now possibly you might be able to determine the rules of that game too. and nobody worries. Yes. I should suggest. you see: in an ordinary. you do not reason significantly. but I think that philosophy can be said to be about language. say Aristotelian. And we should find. are disallowed. And where difficulty in doing so arises. it will be an image. AYER:No. where one of the principles of correct reasoning is the observance of the law of non-contradiction. it ought. COPLESTON: that case it's a question of empirical investigation. COPLESTON: you give me an illustration of the way in which Can philosophy depends on language? AYER:Well. COPLESTON: Yes. not that there's any given rule that must be observed in every game. though possibly some other. Presumably the Greeks got the idea of substance before they applied the word "ousia" to it. to be empirically provable that the difference between the philosophies of Aristotle. take it this way. if the theory of the dependence of philosophy on language is true. It seems to me that the ideas come before the expression. according to your view. statement. Aristotle wrote in Greek. and you haven't stopped playing bridge. and revoke. Take it in the case of chess. COPLESTON: but within the game itself Ah. and Maimonides. for example. However.

it you mean by "verifiable" verifiable by direct sense-observation and/or introspection. I am not keen on appealing to intuition. which we've been talking about to some extent. Professor. You mentioned the principle of verification earlier. But I don't wish to deny that some philosophers have been misled by language. I can quite well believe that you have experiences different from mine. I should question any such extreme position. I'm not trying to adopt an extreme position. For example. in some cases I should think it would be due not to deficiency of language so much as to direction of interest. I certainly should not make any statement about all reality. that would substantiate or refute it. COPLESTON: you include introspection. that people who haven't had certain experiences won't understand propositions which refer to them. What I mean is this. that the content of the statement. AYER: Even if that were so. then I should say that the philosopher was misled by language. I know. but it looks to me as though the principle of verifiability were excogitated partly in order to exclude metaphysical propositions from the range of meaningful propositions. Now I don't want to misinterpret your position. and then I should admit that statements which are unintelligible to me might be meaningful for you. From which there are two corollaries: one. And if you presuppose this. Knowing what would be the case if it were true means knowing what observations would verify it. by direct observation. What I would emphasize would be that this question of the influence of language on philosophy is simply a question of empirical investigation in any given case. on the one hand. that statements to which no situations are relevant one way or the other are ruled out as non-factual. I you say that any factual f statement. But I still maintain that philosophers have been influenced by language. I should be in the position of the blmd man. one that I should call analytic. if one supposes that to every word there is a corresponding thing. AVER:I agree that it's an empirical question bow our own philosophical problems have grown up. experiences. That is precisely the kmd of statement that I use my principle in order not to make. Now obviously the existence of a metaphysical reality is not verifiable by direct observation. and I should try to derive this principle from an analysis of understanding. Nor do I wish to restrict experience to sense experience: I should not at all mind counting what might be called introspectible experiences. and. COPLESTON: Thank you. namely that to be significant a statement must be either. but evaluate what it was they were saying. or any particular red thing. for example. In other words. AYER: Maybe. perhaps we'd better attend to your principle of verifiability. The Principle of Verifiability COPLESTON: Well. I mean. mystical experiences if you like. then surely you are presupposing that all reality is given in sense-experience. then. though I see no compelling reason to rule it out from the beginning.~ 7 4 2 ~ MEANING. to use James's term. there corresponds a redness which is different from the redness of a rose. Now I do thmk it rather queer that people have been so inclined to believe in substance with no empirical evidence about it whatsoever. It seems to me that the differences are due to quite other causes. As far as I know that's never been shown. or feelings. secondly. COPLESTON: Yes. in order to be meaningful. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE Â 743i employed. The dogmatic a prior1 statement concerning the influence of language on philosophy should be studiously avoided. but I admit that I haven't made the empirical investigation. I'll state it in a fairly loose form. must be verifiable. However. I should say that understanding a statement meant knowing what would be the case if it were true. AYER:And then you get thmgs like the tendency to treat all words as names. not being easily able to isolate abstract words. If you are presupposing this. to go back. that to redness. it doesn't prove it invalid. It seems to me that logical positivism claims to be what I might call a "neutral" technique. just as Hume did. as . and that in turn means being disposed to accept certain situations as warranting the acceptance or rejection of the statement in question. and if you mean by "verifiable" verifiable by sense-experience. would you? AVER: Yes. a formal statement. unless you are willing to recognize a purely intellectual intuition as observation. I t would be true. But my Yes. but that I don't mind either. for example. or on the other hand empirically testable. I thought possibly you'd state it. the cash value. whereas in reality it presupposes the truth of positivism. But. you are presupposing that there can be no such thing as a metaphysical reality. as that philosophical problems are simply due to the form of the language which the philosophers who raised those problems used. COPLESTON: Yes. I suggest that acceptance of the principle of verifiability. partly theological. Of course the interesting thing now is not to find out why they said what they did. But that doesn't affect my contention that the method of solving these problems is that of linguistic analysis. but it does seem to me that you are presupposing a certain philosophical position. consists of a range of situations. Please pardon my saying so. you seem to me to be ruling out metaphysics from the start. which I understand you don't hold. This is only a conjecture. you are presupposing a philosophical position which cannot be demonstrated by the principle of verification. at least in principle. Let us assume (which after all is an empirical assumption) that you have even a sense different from mine. But I should then go on to say that the factual content of your statements was determined by the experiences which counted as their verifiers or falsifiers. point is that you assume that a factually informative statement is significant only if it is verifiable. Similarly I should expect people with ideographic languages to be less concerned about the problem of universals. I think the grammatical distinction of subject and predicate may be one cause. and how far it was significant or true.

is that metaphysical propositions do not satisfy a definite assumed criterion of meaning. I'm afraid. but I can perhaps make you unhappy about the consequences of not accepting them. actual or conceivable. inevitably involves the non-significance of such propositions. Now. then. I should probably be prepared to accept the principle if it were understood in a very wide sense. if "verifiable by experience" is understood as including intellectual intuition and also as meaning simply that some experience. since the truth of the principle of verifiability. and show how it functioned. the principle of verifiability: and by non-cognitive statements I presume you mean statements which do not satisfy that criterion. Is that so? AYER:I think the use of the word emotive is not very happy. this is what it does. This is how this proposition works. I can't stop you. But it does not follow that one must accept that criterion of meaning. So you understand them. You can't do anything with them. capable of being understood. My procedure is this: I should claim that the account I've given you of what understandmg a statement is. Then again I press you on your use of the word "facts. nor. I then take a mathematical proposition and play a slightly different game with that. leave ethical out of it. because you can give understanding a different meaning if you like. All that is shown. you may just want to say. If this is so. and I think you can quite correctly object that by putting my definitions together. I have given a definition of understanding according to which they're not. you could deduce certain observational consequences from it. all I come down to saying is that statements that are not scientific or common-sense statements are not scientific or common-sense statements. In this case. which isn't necessarily the case. AYER: What I do is to give a definition of certain related terms: understandmg. nor how these statements function. in your treatment of metaphysical propositions you are either applying the criterion of verifiability or you are not. then the significance of metaphysical propositions is ruled out of court a priori. They aren't parts of a symbolic system. not to be understood. between analytic statements on the one hand. but I accept what you say. indeed. if you like. You're perfectly entitled to." But my objection still remains. Someone may say he understands them. I accept. meaningful. and the second emotive. unless one has first assumed that they are non-significant. Tell me more about them. is relevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition concerned. But now I say. By cognitive statements I presume that you mean statements which satisfy the criterion of meaning." COPLESTON: You seem to me to be demandmg that in order for a factual statement to be significant one must be able to deduce observational consequences from it. and I then say: On the one hand. in a symbolic system. But I do not see why this should be so. it seems to me. if you mean by "emotive" simply "non-cognitive. is the account that does apply to ordinary common-sense statements. namely that. this is what it amounts to. no conclusion follows as to the significance or non-significance of metaphysical propositions. and then I would give a different account of how mathematical statements functioned. that is. I would show that it had a certain function. If you are. I think. what it is he understands. "I will accept as significant factual statements only those statements which satisfy these particular demands". in some sense of understanding other than the one I've defined. What I should do is this. But then I want to go further and say that I totally fail to understand-again. one has previously accepted your philosophical position. however. In this case the application of the criterion to concrete metaphysical propositions constitutes a proof neither of the nonsignificance of these propositions nor of the truth of the principle. You then present me with these other statements. they aren't statements of logic. because it suggests that they're made with emotion. AYER:No. or anyone else. COPLESTON: Yes. as it seems to be understood by you. of course. but it does not follow that I. your substitution of "noncognitive" for "emotive. a fortiori of course." COPLESTON: Very well." or something of that sort. has to make those particular demands before we are prepared to accept a statement as meaningful. AYER:I then say that statements which don't satisfy these conditions are not significant. I'm presupposing my own criterion. and to scientific statements. and a different account again of value-judgments. But of course you may say that in making it a question of how these statements function. that is to say. You'd call the first group cognitive. on the other hand. Or at any rate metaphysical statements. it seems to me that when you say that metaphysical statements are non-cognitive you are not saying much more than that statements which do not satisfy the principle of verifiability do not satisfy the principle of verifiability. "They're facts. and metaphysical and ethical statements on the other. implies the acceptance of philosophical positivism.~ 7 4 4 ~ MEANING. COPLESTON: Well. using my own use of understandmg: what else can I do?-I fail to understand what these other non-scientific statements and non-common-sense statements. and empirical statements. I should take any given proposition. in the sense of deriving any observational consequences from them. I reply. In what sense are they understood? They're not understood in my sense. All right. What I object to is any statement of the principle of verifiability which tacitly assumes the validity of a definite philosophical position. although I have used it in the past. are supposed to be. that is to say. you'd make a distinction. I can't force you to accept them. in my usage of the term. with other premises. In the case of a scientific hypothesis. they have no observational consequences. Nevertheless you reject my definition. Unless. in a calculus. You may legitimately say. it's not as simple as that. If . VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE 2745~ you appear to understand it. and show that it functions in a certain way. What do you want to say about them? Well. and so on. which don't satisfy these criteria. It's not clear to me what this sense of understanding is. I should then say.

But how could it possibly be verified empirically? Supposing it were fulfilled. But you want to admit these words without any reference to experience. AVER:You would certainly not have to know that it exists. if the prediction were fulfilled there would be no one there to verify. Everything's just the same if it's there or it's not there. to take the case of the past. Whether the thing they are supposed to stand for exists or not." because he would not be entitled to say this until he was dead." if I'm disposed to accept certain situations as verifying the presence or absence of what the word is supposed to stand for. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE B747i you mean directly observable consequences. COPLESTON: but there would be no evidence for the prediction Yes. not so much to its verification. the last man could not say with his last breath. AVER: It's certainly practically unverifiable." "cloth. certain internal experiences of thinking and so on which at any rate account for the formation of the idea. that is. then I should say that the proposition is either true or false whether one can verify it or not. and if you can say to me it's a disembodied spirit. have some idea of what is meant by a drogulus. I should say that I can form the idea of a drogulus or a disembodied spirit from the idea of body and the idea of mind. You may say that there's no mind and there's no spirit." Does that make sense? COPLESTON: seems to me to do so. On the other hand. AYER:No." then I should say that it isn't a proposition any more than if I said "piffle" was in the room. AYER:That's right. C~PLBSTON: yes. one's imagining oneself into the picture. I would say that I understand the words "angel. AYER:I don't at all object to your use of the word "facts" so long as you allow them to be observable facts. COPLESTON: Yes. But let us drop the prediction. if you mean by "count as its existing" that tbere must be some experience relevant to the formation of the idea. then I should agree. most people would think that this statement has meaning. If you said to me "By drogulus I merely mean the word 'drogulus. but it is this: "Atomic warfare will take place. because tbere is also evidence for the atomic thing. even if one can imagine the state of affairs that would verify it. For example. Well. . we have fossils of dinosaurs." and you say "What?" and I say "Drogulus. but you would have to know what would count as its existing.~746i MEANING. no man saw that. But take the contrary case. Now it wouldn't necessarily be the case that. That would be too easy a way of getting out of our d i i culty. Whether I can or cannot know that the facts correspond is another matter. quite irrespective of whether I can know whether tbere are corresponding facts or not. But in the case of the prediction I mentioned there would be nobody to observe the evidence and so to verify the proposition.' and I attach no other significance to it whatsoever. COPLESTON: two cases are different. everything is to go on just the same. but." and you say "What's a drogulus?" Well." "table. surviving all men. and clearly I. Suppose I say "There's a 'drogulus' over there. no. one knows quite well what it would be like to observe devastation. it means what it says. There's a drogulus there standing just behind you. the proposition has significance for me. and it will blot out the entire human race. the existence of which would verify the proposition. COPLESTON: I should say that you can have an idea of something No. but at any rate there are. Just as. as you'll admit. And you want to say that you can have ideas of things even though there's no possible situation in which you could recognize them. if I am the speaker. you appear to me to be demanding too much. there were dinosaurs before there were men. you are cancelling out the condition of the fulfillment of the prediction. can't myself verify it: but one knows what it would be like to have observed animals and not to have observed men. there's no doubt it describes a possible situation." Now. But the fact is it's there. but which would yet be considered by most people to have meaning and to be either true or false? Let me give an example. If I can at last imagine or conceive the facts. even in principle. "Well how am I to tell if it's there or not?' and I say "There's no way of telling. in point of fact. one had to observe oneself. because it's not the sort of thing you can see or touch. I don't want to assume the mantle of a prophet. I should say that to state that It there is a drogulus ill the room or not is true or false. until he was no longer in a position to verify the statement. In any case are there not some propositions which are not verifiable. if there's some experience that's relevant to the formation of the idea. imagine oneself verifying it. I say "I can't describe what a drogulus is. but to the truth or falsity of the propositions in which it is contained. at any rate. You can't be man. Now. But what is "having some idea" of something? I want to say that having an idea of something is a matter of knowing how to recognize it. In regard to the past we The have empirical evidence. because nothing would count as finding them. even though I'm quite unable to know whether such a thing actually exists or not. AYER:In terms of the evidence." "drogulus. what I should prefer to regard as the criterion of the truth or falsity of an existential proposition is simply the presence or absence of the asserted fact or facts. AYER:Not to the formation of the idea. One can imagine the evidence and one can Yes. and fail to observe any men. spiritually behind you. Putting the observer outside the story." And you say. it becomes very much easier for me. and I hope that the statement is false. of course. in order to do that. Clearly. that it will blot out the human race. but it's a disembodied being. Therefore I can say I have an idea of a drogulus or whatever it is. By importing yourself imaginatively into the picture. "Copleston's prediction has been verified. it has no physical effects of any kind. You have mentioned imagination. provided that yon can-that you. Thus by imagining it.

And when I said that God was intelligent. The metaphysician carries that reflection a stage further. My second remark is this: Because one cannot have a sense-experience of a metaphysical reality. I mean a being which in principle. which is nonsense. even then one can only speak about that metaphysical reality withm the framework of human language. I think that this is an important point. But it does not follow that we can have no knowledge of God." and I say "taller than?'and you repeat the first thing you say. that brings us back to the beginning.Â¥748 MEANING. but that I'm puzzled about the use of the term. AYER:Yes. "Is the character of observable reality of such a kind that it leads one to postulate a metaphysical reality. It's no good saying "Oh well. It isn't that I arbitrarily say there can't be such things. And if anyone has such an experience. and are then askmg "Does it occur or not? Does it exist or not?" and as if I'm arbitrarily denying that it exists. May I add two remarks? My first remark is that I do not mean to imply that no sense-experience is in any way relevant to establishing or discovering the existence of a metaphysical reality. less than intelligent. you may very well say to me "What meaning can you give to the word 'intelligent. but asking are these metaphysical realities isn't like asking are fhere still wolves in Asia. when you say that something is like something else you understand what both thmgs are. Since God is ex hypothesi immaterial. for example. AYER:But you're trying to have it both ways. and are you attributing that to God?" And I should have to say no. So you are really asking me to describe God in a manner which would be possible only if He were not God. But metaphysics involves intellectual reflection on experience: no amount of immediate sense-experience will disclose the existence of a metaphysical reality. owing to the finitude of the human intellect and to the fact that we can come to a philosophical knowledge of God only through reflection on the things we experience. Therefore. to the function of philosophy. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE Â 749i Are Statements about God Meaningful? COPLESTON: word "metaphysics" and the phrase "metaphysical The reality" can have more than one meaning: but when I refer to a metaphysical reality in our present discussion. there is a half-way house between admitting only the immediate data of experience and on the other hand leaping to the affirmation of a metaphysical reality without any reference to experience at all. I should have to say "God is not intelligent". My difficulty is not in answering the question "Are there.' because the only intelligence yon have experienced is the human intelligence. AVER: Do you mean simply that he knows more than any given man knows? But to what are you ascribing this property? You haven't begun to make that clear. you see. I not only freely admit that human ideas of God are inadequate." When am I to count a reality as metaphysical? What would it be like to come upon a metaphysical reality? That's my problem. But what you are I inviting me to do is to describe God in terms which will be as clear to you as the terms in which one might describe a familiar object of experience. and not merely in fact. I got no analogy. or are there not. speaking qualitatively. I COPLESTON: think that one must distinguish physical analogy and metaphysical analogy. but in the case of an ordinary analogy. COPLESTON: Well. If it were possible. Thus God is a metaphysical reality. of course it really has a meaning. He cannot in principle be apprehended by the senses. "God is intelligent. I should mean that God was more than intelligent. COPLESTON: quite see your point. I should say that one can't simply raise in the abstract the question "Are there metaphysical realities?' Rather one asks. though it does follow that our philosophical knowledge of God cannot be more than analogical. AYES: Yes. He would not be God. and therefore there's bound to he a radical inadequacy in any statements about a metaphysical reality. Then I understand it's taller than itself. I should mean that a stone was. Well. even though I could give no adequate account of what that intelligence was in itself. In other words. or an unfamiliar object which is yet so like to familiar objects that it can be adequately described in terms of things which are already familiar to you. I say "analogical of what?" And then you don't tell me of what. If it's something that you say doesn't have a meaning in my language. You merely repeat the first term of analogy. it does not mean that the metaphysical reality is deprived. If I say that God is intelligent. If I say. it does not follow that one could not have another type of experience of it. transcends the sphere of what can be sensibly experienced. already admitting the use of the term. and it is quite impossible to describe Him adequately by using concepts which normally apply to ordinary objects of experience. but also affirm that this must be so. if we agreed to use the word intelligent simply to mean human intelligence. but when I said that a stone is not intelligent. You yourself reflect on the data of experience. I don't know what people who say there are metaphysical realities mean by it. of its metaphysical character and becomes non-metaphysical. as it were. because I'm not. But God is ex hypothesi unique." because what meaning could it have except in the language in which it's used? COPLESTON: Let's take a concrete example." well. I certainly do believe that metaphysics must be based on experiences of some sort. And language is after all primarily developed to express our immediate experience of surrounding things. It's like saying that something is "taller than. then I don't understand it. metaphysical realities?" but in understandmg what usage is being given to the expression "metaphysical reality. of course. is it? It looks as if you've got a clear usage for metaphysical reality. a reality beyond the physical sphere?'If one grants that it is. I do not say so . But in this case if you say something is analogical.

even though you do not observe the dog's physical operations. I wouldn't admit that when I say God is personal I merely mean that God can enter into intercourse with human beings. However.i an. intelligence is in itself. I'm afraid. explain. All I'm trying to get at is that No. However you subsequently "Tvret the religious experience. It then becomes a question of terminology. AVER: No.51~ simply because I want to call God intelligent. When we speak of "extra-sensory perception" we are using the word "perception" analogously. COPLESTON: Let's come back to this religious experience. such as that the world was created. you allow me to give these words. I said that if God exists... for example. All I've admitted is an empirical proposition. it wouldn't then be a metaphysical proposition. just as the test for whether the table exists or not is that certain people have experiences. I shouldn't wish to argue from God to the features of the world. a repetition of the statement that was questioned in the first place.. you are using the word in an analogous sense." You no longer make them refer simply to the possibility of having these experiences. then what answer does one get? Only. of entering into relationship wit!. Of course you might give them an empirical meaning. or because I am satisfied by some argument that. AVER: No. if you speak of your dog as intelligent. I am ascribing to God a n : . But it is not all I mean by it.. one consequence would be that people could have certain experiences. as I said. which you've chosen to express in the same words as you also want to use to express your metaphysical proposition. AYER: Then you've given your statement a perfectly good empirical meaning. lated into human terms.. you'd admit that the proposition "God exists" could be a meaningful form of metaphysical proposition. and it has some meaning for you. Having got that admission you then shift the meaning of the words "God exists. AYER: Yes. human beings. I should be prepared to say that He was personal even if I had no reason for supposing that He entered into intercourse with human beings.Ute which. that does not make God an empirical reality. It'd be a perfectly good empirical proposition like the proposition that the unconscious mind exists. However. . But it would then be like a scientific theory. You allow me to say that the test whereby what yon call God exists or not is to be that certain people have experiences. They describe these experiences in a way which implies more than that they're having these experiences. The facts are that these human beings have these experiences. and so argue that I have admitted a metaphysical proposition. COPLESTON: Well of course I should prefer t o start from the features of the world before going to God.~7. relevant to any inference you might want to draw. God . COPLESTON: Pardon me. and yon would be using this in exactly the same way as you might use a concept like electron to account for.. and the proposition that God exists would also be an empirical proposition.:. say. provided that all I meant by saying that God exists was that some people have a certain type of experience. I am perfectly aware that I have no adequ. that certain people did have these eyperiences which they described as "entering into communion with God. an empirical meaning. existed. if you wish to call metaphysical propositions empirical propositions. and then you might put it up as a theory. and I know what counts as a case of extra-sensory perception." Then one would try to analyse it scientifically. a certain range of human experience. but either because I think that the world is such that it must be ascribed in certain aspects at least to a Being which can be described in human tern" only as intelligent. even if intelligent creatures have a non-sensible experience of Him. exists an Absolute Being and then deduce that that Being must.. by all means do so. but it's only in that case that one has anythingone can control. well then I'd say that if God is personal. find out in what conditions these things happened. but of course I haven't.. but presumably they attach some meaning to the term. COPLESTON: we'll leave that out. you'd admit that it was relevant to the 'th or falsity of the proposition that. namely. I was entering into yonr terms of reference. predict. But to keep within your terms of reference of empiricism. AYER:No. only the experiences are of a different sort. But in the case of your statements'I don't know what counts. trans. in the sense of not being a metaphysical reality. or anything of that kind. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE ~7. COPLESTON: The proposition that people have religious experiences would be an empirical proposition. If He does so.!^. Go'dflcan perfectly well be a metaphysical reality. then one of the consequences would be that He could enter into communication with human beings. of course. these shapes or noises. But not.50~ MEANING.. COPLESTON: Well. But if one asks what more. even if I accept yonr requirements. must be called intelliger : After all. All I originally said was that if God is personal. described as intelliidea of what that gent. You see. you might say that by "God is intelligent" you meant that the world had certain features. Then we'd inspect it to see if it had these features or not. Mathematicians who speak of multidimensional space have never observed such a space. I suggest that you're trying to have it both ways. AYER:~elevdSki@so as the proposition that God existed is taken far as a description or exdiction of the occurrence of these experiences. but I did not say that the test whereby what I call God exists or not is that certain people have certain experiences. What you'd have done would be psychology. but mathematical physicists do test their statements by observation. And it's possible to find human beings who claim to have a personal intercourse with God. that i s independent of physis or nature. then He's capable.

isn't exhausted by any one particular piece of evidence of that sort. and (b) that this peculiar sense hasn't been made clear to me. simply because any given observation or situation is compatible with it. I certainly do not think that one can do this. or would occur in certain circumstances? Take the case of physics. more generally. which my statement covers. Then the test of my having explained the observations is that hitherto unobserved points fall on the line I draw. but I do want to say that understanding phenomena is a matter of lining them. Let us take a case of a common-sense proposition. I can quite imagine somebody saying. you must then treat it as predicting. "Your argument for. from the question of meaning. of grouping them. I don't want to make the prediction a practical question. If we have. religious experiences. surely. What my proposition predicts is more evidence of the same kind. such as that there is a glass of water in front of us. But of course the meaning of that proposition. AYER:No. And I don't see that thereby any statement about reality to which one concludes via the experience is deprived of its metaphysical character. but demands the conclusion that God exists. COPLESTON: you see I consider that the existence of what we But call the world not only is compatible with God's existence. AYER:No. there's a conclusion. touchmg it. it seems to me. is this because you demand a particular kind of verification and reject any other type? Such an attitude would not seem to me to be warranted. We'll take the electronic theory. but I do not think that the world can be deduced from God. I should have thought that its function was to explain certain phenomena. or out of things themselves. Surely it's explicative. Spinoza might think otherwise. and that the test of an explanation is that it applies to the hitherto unobserved cases. What I want to say is that it isn't an explanation at all. the factual content of that proposition. COPLESTON: That's a matter for detailed argument and detailed discussion of some particular argument. not necessarily a prediction. AYER:Oh. I should not describe it as an attempt to predict events. but it doesn't follow there's any empirical evidence for the truth of your metaphysical proposition. In a certain sense I should call myself an empiricist. The evidence of that is my seeing it. COPLESTON: this predicting that I don't like. because it doesn't It's seem to me that even a scientific proposition necessarily consists in a prediction. I make no statements about what is real and what is not real. It's distinct. In that sense it would be based on experience. AYER: But isn't it explicative in the sensethat it links up with a particular phenomenon. and introduced into the empirical sphere. I may have misunderstood yon: but you seem to me to be saying that if the proposition that God exists means anything. say. Suppose I am describing the path of a body and I draw a graph. or with lots and lots of other ones that either will occur. in exactly the same way. 752à MEANING. even though the term of the reasoning might not itself be an object of experience.53 t it follows that in one case at least you are prepared to recognize the word "God" as meaningful. That seems to me again an empirical question. Another point. I go beyond the immediate evidence only in so far as I take this experience to be one of an indefinite series of experiences of seeing. of course. Equally. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE 0. If you mean by deducing an observation-statement deducing a thmg. Again: Are There Metaphysical Explanations? COPLESTON: then I don't claim that metaphysical propositions are But not in some way founded on reflection on experience. Do you want a world of electrons somehow behind the perceptual world? Is that what you're after? COPLESTON: No. AYER:Of course I recognize it as meaningful if you give it an empirical meaning. one should be able to deduce some observation-statement from it. but equally I should say that (a) it isn't the ordinary sense. It isn't that my seeing what I do is evidence for the existence of something totally unobservable.. except secondarily perhaps. that it originated in an endeavour to explain certain phenomena or. suppose I say that we both have immortal souls. have occurred. That's to say it doesn't even purport to do the work that an explanation does. etc. then the proposition will be empirically verified in due course. My objection to the kind of statements that we've agreed to call metaphysical is that they don't explain. but I' think that your empiricism is too narrow. COPLESTON: Then my idea of metaphysics would be that of explaining. the series of phenomena. as I said at the beginning. If you are demanding that I should deduce the . and also can be simply explicative. that it is part of the attempt to discover the constitution of matter. I believe that the existence of God can be inferred from the existence of the world. Now. but if you rule it out it would seem to me to be in virtue of a presupposed philosophy. in the case of your statement I should want to say that if you want to treat it empirically. You will not allow a factual statement to be significant unless it is verifiable. Your principles on which you're arguing are quite false. Are you then prepared to admit that my statement that we both have immortal souls is a significant statement? If you are not prepared. I don't want to say it isn't an accurate explanation. I want to say that I rule out nothing as an explanation so long as it explains. in certain conditions. AYER:Oh. the existence of God is false. of course I can't stop you." And if so. What it will mean will be the possibility of further religious experiences. Now if you want to say that you are using the word m some peculiar sense. so that the reasoning would rise out of the phenomena themselves. touching it. I may be having a hallucination. I can understand your ruling out all that reflective enquiry and reasoning that constitutes metaphysics.

aren't we?-this difficulty of a notion of causation that isn't the ordinary notion of causation. not emotionally) you might just as well abandon them. you will reject these other definitions too. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS LOGICAL POSITIVISM-A DEBATE >755< world from God. this notion of causality is much more like the ordinary notion of causation than the phenomenalistic notion which you would regard as the scientific notion. but I see no adequate reason for accepting it. but given the world then I should say that there is a necessary relationship. I am persuaded by it. but why should you be? Can I prove it? Yes. There are cases. I COPLESTON: have enjoyed our discussion very much. You do not deny the importance of the analytic method in philosophy. in any accepted sense of the term. if one could deduce the world from God. The principle of verifiability is not itself a descriptive statement. I'm certainly not going to say that God exists means that a world exists. it is not because I have no idea of God. I claim for my method that it does yield valuable results in the way of analysis. nor do you reject all the uses to which I put it. if by that you mean that the world follows necessarily from God. Thus you accept in the main the account that I give of empirical propositions. but not by purely empirical means. and with this yon seem disposed to agree. Do you mean that this conclusion follows logically. You cannot show me how they are to be tested.>754<s. if not in fact. then we're back on the point we've already been over. It is either a proposition or no proposition. and you seem to have no criterion for deciding whether they are true or false. I mentioned earlier on that what I mean On by the principle of causality is that anything which comes into existence owes that existence to an extrinsic reality. However. This notion may correspond to a popular prejudice. indeed. to anything observable that I wish to dismiss it as metaphysical. and that a rational metaphysic is possible if there are. as you have pointed out. that this has been my quarrel with you all along. which I term "cause. All that I require is that some indication be given of the way in which the expression relates to some possible experience. and you cannot say in what sense they are explanations. but for all the good they do you (I mean cognitively. I agree that we are back where we were. In short. that you fail to supply any rules for the use of your expressions. the observations could not in fact be made. You have indeed objected to my treatment of the propositions of logic. Its status is that of a persuasive definition. I have. But one knows what it would be like to make them. yon may say. on the basis of other d e h i tions. At least I am able to account for their validity: whereas on your view it is utterly mysterious. but there I think that I am in the right. apart from its theory of analytic propositions. This is my case against your metaphysical statements. COPLESTON: the contrary. If it is. No. and God would create necessarily. I think that one can have an intellectual experience~orintuition if you l i k e ~ o f being. Summary of the Major Disagreements AYER: It seems to me. that this is all entirely arbitrary. A metaphysical proposition is testable by rational discussion. you understand them. But now look at the results you get. you are demanding that I should adopt a particular idea of God and of creation. either a tautology or an empirical hypothesis. namely at the question whether there are any principles which can be called certain metaphysical principles. MEANING. For. a notion that's still totally unexplained. It is not necessary that the observations should actually be made. If I say that I cannot deduce observation-statements from the existence of God. where for practical. but because my idea of God will not permit me to say this. You say. This being so. no conclusion follows as to metaphysics. if I am to make the proposition "God exists" significant. in fact. as I think there are. on your premises. but what sort of a case can you make for them? I leave the last word to you. Now. AYER: Well. even indirectly. The statements which refer to them may be said to be verifiable in principle. That seems to me one of the chief issues between logical positivist and the metaphysician. But if you are really obstinate. reasons. I say they are unintelligible. simply embodies the notion of nineteenth-century positivism that the terms "rational" and "scientific" have the same extension. tried to show you how it can be derived from an analysis of understanding. I am not asking for explicit definitions. principles which express an intellectual apprehension of the nature of being. I do not think that this amounts to more than saying that metaphysics are not the same thing as empirical science. AYER: You said that the existence of the world demands the conclusion that God exists. If the latter. It is only when a statement fails to refer. I understand a statement of fact if I know what to look for on the supposition that it is true. To put the point more simply. So it looks as if we reach a deadlock. or even for theoretical." Incidentally. If the former. indeed you have said. But let us then see in what positions we are left. it must be. You put forward your metaphysical statements as ultimate explanations of fact. AYER:Logical or causal? COPLESTON: Causal. the . The main difference between us is that you want to leave room for metaphysics. When you say that metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they are unverifiable in your sense. I have contended that a metaphysical idea has meaning if some experience is relevant to the formation of that idea. And my knowing what to look for is itself a matter of my being able to interpret the statement as referring at least to some possible experience. I still find it difficult to understand the status of the principle of verification. You may decline to be persuaded by it. creation would be necessary. or follows causally? I COPLESTON: should say causally. I consider that logical positivism. but you admit that they are not explanations.

Nakhnikian (eds. A Critical History of Western Philosophy (New York: Free Press. Philosophical Analysis: Its Development between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press. R. A Study in Human Understanding (Cambridge: Harvard Un. however. In any case. of Chicago Pr. including scientific ones. Copleston. is a classic defense of the verifiability theory of meaning. Ashhy's contribution to D. 1951).). Kraft. 1953). Ayer (ed. of California PI. cit." reprinted in A. 1936-37 (sold as a monograph by Whitlock's. 1956).)."* in H. A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London: Duckworth. Twentieth Century Philosophy (New York: Free Press.). Selected Bibliography (ITEMS PROVIDED WITH ASTERISK ARE MORE ADVANCED) (FOR KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS SEE PAGE XVII) The history of the "Vienna Circle" and of its doctrines is covered in V. "A Note on Carnap's Meaning Criterion. is a substantially revised and very precise formulation of the principle. The following are systematic and sympathetic expositions of logical positivism: A. Popper. Warnock. I. most of the contributions were written in the early or middle 1950's.¥756 MEANING. Feigl's article. are meaningless. C. 1949). 1946. Positivism. 1951).). Carnap's "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language. Chapter V of this work contains numerous arguments against the verifiability theory. Buchler (ed. and P. Scriven (eds. Pap. Lewis' "Experience and Meaning. Another famous defense of the verifiability principle as well as of its destructive implications for traditional speculative philosophy is R. the principle is not a proposition. von Mises. Hospers. Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus* (London: Kegan Paul. H. A sympathetic discussion may also be found in J. 1958). and are here available in English for the first time. Ayer. traces some of the connections between Peirce's theory and the later verifiability principle of the logical positivists. Pears and B. Blanshard. Lewis are reprinted in Feigl and Sellars. 1964). Pr." which is available in H. Logical Positivism. I. Brace. Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz. Reichenbach. in B. If. There is a very useful introductory exposition of the major tenets of logical positivism in H. exposition. 1962). contains Carnap's most recent full-length discussion of the problems in question. Henle in P. J. the organ of the Vienna Circle. Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. and so on indefinitely. New York: Dover. VERIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ¥757 principle itself would require verification. is a classical statement of an empiricist theory of meaning by the founder of American pragmatism. F. second edition." PR. Alston in "Pragmatism and the Verifiability Theory of Meaning. Barnes. Joergensen. 1936). but partly critical. the whole of which is reprinted in W. and most fully in Part I1 of J. Carnap. 1951. "Logical Empiricism. 19571. 1952) and in J. cit. McGuinness. Frank. The Development of Logical Empiricism (Chicago: Un. in R. J. to escape an infinite regress. The entire movement is placed in its historical context in Chapter XVI of 1. English Philosophy Since 1900 (London: Oxford Un. Illinois: Open Court." in J. 1962). Joad. Schlick's is also available in Alston and Nakhnikian." PR. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Un.0. and F. The Philosophic Predicament (London: A. 1936. together with critical commentary. M.). reprinted in E. of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 1922. The last-mentioned of these works is written from a Catholic standpoint. Language.. Feigland M. Schilpp (ed. on your premises. Schlick's "Meaning and Verification. 1950). 1960. if the meaning of an existential proposition consists. 0. Pr. Hempel surveys the history of the principle and closes with a formulation that is closely patterned after Carnap's "Testability and Meaning. Volume I (Minneapolis: Un.).). then all propositions. Ayer (ed. is a concise and elementary exposition of the logical positivists' conception of philosophy as logical analysis of language and of their rejection of metaphysics. If this is so. In "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. P. 1936. according to the principle. and a more recent introductory exposition. There are critical discussions of various aspects of Carnap's position by P. Ayer (ed. 1959) is a collection of papers by leading logical positivists. with special reference to "theoretical languages" like the language of theoretical physics. cit.. There is a comprehensive discussion of the key doctrines of logical positivism in its early days in two articles by Ernest Nagel entitled "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe." JP. A. Elements of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Macmillan. Nagel. & C.F. R. of Chicago PI. of Minnesota PI. new English translation by D. Feigl and W.. C. cit. W. it is impossible. Rozehoom. The same author's "Testability and Meaning. It presupposes some knowledge of symbolic logic. J. Reason and Analysis (London: Allen & Unwin. E. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (LaSalle.). An Zntroduction to Philosophical Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall. Although the Schilpp volume was not published until 1964. The Philosophy of Peirce (New York: Harcourt.Sellars (eds. Logical Positivism.. J." PSt. 1955. contains a sympathetic. A Critical Examination of Logical Positivism (London: Kegan Paul. The essays by Schlick and C. O'Connor fed. 1956). against C. op. Contemporary Philosophy (London: Burns & Oates. Alston and G."* in Proc. Most of these were originally published in German in Erkenntnis. K. The most elaborate recent attack on logical positivism is contained. A more recent criticism of Carnap is W. it must. paperback). and H.)." In "The Criterion of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration. Logical Positivism (Glencoe: Free Press." PSI. the same author doubts whether a sharp distinction between the cognitively meaningful and the cognitively meaningless can be drawn. in its verifiability. M. R. C.). W. 1934. Passmore. Logic without Metaphysics (Glencoe: Free Press. 1949). A. 1964). Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. 1. Moore)."* PS. 1956). 1963). Critical discussions of logical positivism are to be found in W. Charles Peirce's "How To Make Our Ideas Clear. G. The Vienna Circle (New York: Philosophical Library.. op." in A. New York: Harcourt Brace. 0. 1951. 1940). which greatly influenced the founders of the Vienna Circle. "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts. Weinberg. LaSalle. I think. op. A Critique of Logical Positivism (Chicago: Un. 1936. Urmson. Black. F. Hempel has brought together high- . be meaningless. Much of Urmson's hook deals with the ideas contained in Ludwig Wittenstein's classic work. 1.. Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London: Kegan Paul. W. I. which also contains Carnap's account of the history of his views on the subject and replies to his critics. since the verification will itself need verification. But the principle of verification cannot itself be verified. 1950). P.. A. 1935). Yale Un. 1957). with references to both the teachings of the Vienna Circle and those of the Cambridge analysts (Russell. Illinois: Open Court. Chapter IV of G. paperback).

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