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Operation Barbarossa 1

Operation Barbarossa
Operation Barbarossa (German: Unternehmen Barbarossa, for Frederick I) was the code name for Nazi Germany's
invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that began on 22 June 1941.[1] [2] Over 4.5 million troops of the
Axis powers invaded the USSR along a 2900 km (1800 mi) front.[3] In addition to the large number of troops, it also
involved 600,000 motor vehicles and 750,000 horses.[4] Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 18 December
1940; the secret preparations and the military operation itself lasted almost a year, from spring to winter 1941. The
Red Army repelled the Wehrmacht's strongest blow, and Adolf Hitler had not achieved the expected victory, but the
Soviet Union's situation remained dire. Tactically, the Germans had won some resounding victories and occupied
some of the most important economic areas of the country, mainly in Ukraine.[5] Despite these successes, the
Germans were pushed back from Moscow and could never mount an offensive simultaneously along the entire
strategic Soviet-German front again.[6]
Operation Barbarossa's failure led to Hitler's demands for further operations inside the USSR, all of which eventually
failed, such as continuing the Siege of Leningrad,[7] [8] Operation Nordlicht, and Battle of Stalingrad, among other
battles on the occupied Soviet territory.[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Operation Barbarossa was the largest military operation in human history in both manpower and casualties.[14] Its
failure was a turning point in the Third Reich's fortunes. Most important, Operation Barbarossa opened up the
Eastern Front, to which more forces were committed than in any other theatre of war in world history. Operation
Barbarossa and the areas that fell under it became the site of some of the largest battles, deadliest atrocities, highest
casualties, and most horrific conditions for Soviets and Germans alike — all of which influenced the course of both
World War II and 20th century history.

German intentions

Nazi theory regarding the Soviet Union


As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf ("My Struggle") that he would invade the Soviet Union, asserting
that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space", i.e. land and raw materials) and that these should be
sought in the east. Nazi racial ideology cast the Soviet Union as populated by "Untermenschen" ethnic Slavs ruled by
their "Jewish Bolshevik" masters.[15] [16] Mein Kampf said Germany's destiny was to turn "to the East" as it did "six
hundred years ago" and "the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State."[17]
Thereafter, Hitler spoke of an inescapable battle against "pan-Slav ideals", in which victory would lead to
"permanent mastery of the world", though he said they would "walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will
help us."[18] Accordingly, it was Nazi stated policy to kill, deport, or enslave the Russian and other Slavic
populations and repopulate the land with Germanic peoples (see New Order).
Operation Barbarossa 2

1939-1940 Nazi-Soviet relations


The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed shortly
before the German and Soviet invasion of Poland in
1939. It was ostensibly a non-aggression pact but secret
protocols outlined an agreement between the Third
Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the
border states between them.[19] The pact surprised the
world[20] because of the parties' mutual hostility and
their competing ideologies. As a result of the pact, Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strong
diplomatic relations and an important economic
relationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940,
in which the Soviets received German military and
industrial equipment in exchange for raw materials,
such as oil, to help Germany circumvent a British
blockade.[21]

But despite the parties' ongoing relations, both sides


were strongly suspicious of each others' intentions.
After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and
Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet
Soviet and German invasions, annexations, and spheres of influence
entry into the pact.[22] [23] After two days of in Central and eastern Europe 1939-1940
negotiations in Berlin from November 12–14, Germany
presented a proposed written agreement for Soviet entry into the Axis. The Soviet Union offered a written
counterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940, to which Germany did not respond.[24] [25] As both sides began
colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, though they signed a border and
commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941.
Operation Barbarossa 3

Germany plans the invasion


Stalin's reputation contributed both to the Nazis'
justification of their assault and their faith in success. In the
late 1930s, Stalin had killed or incarcerated millions of
citizens during the Great Purge, including many competent
and experienced military officers, leaving the Red Army
weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often emphasized the
Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with
propaganda. German propaganda claimed the Red Army
was preparing to attack them, and their own invasion was
thus presented as pre-emptive.

In summer 1940, when German raw materials crises and a


potential collision with the Soviet Union over territory in
the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union
looked increasingly like Hitler's only solution.[26] While no
concrete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his
Situation in Europe by May/June 1941, at the end of the
generals in June that the victories in western Europe "finally Balkans Campaign and immediately before Operation
freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown Barbarossa
with Bolshevism",[27] though German generals told Hitler
that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation."[28]
The Führer anticipated additional benefits:

• When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labour shortage in the German industry could be relieved by
demobilization of many soldiers.
• Ukraine would be a reliable source of agriculture.
• Having the Soviet Union as a source of slave labour would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position.
• Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United Kingdom.
• The German economy needed more oil and controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this; as Albert Speer, the
German Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said in his interrogation, "the need for oil certainly
was a prime motive" in the decision to invade.[29]
Operation Barbarossa 4

On 5 December, Hitler received military plans for the invasion, and


approved them all, with the start scheduled for May 1941.[30] On 18
December 1940, Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 to the German
High Command for an operation now codenamed "Operation
Barbarossa" stating: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to
crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign."[30] [31] The operation was
named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman
Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion
was set for 15 May 1941.[31] In the Soviet Union, speaking to his
generals in December, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack
on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be
ready to repulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red
Army would need four years to ready itself. Hence, "we must be ready
much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two
years."[32]

In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum


on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Weisung Nr. 21: Fall Barbarossa
Belorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a further
economic burden for Germany.[33] Another German official argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic form
were harmless, the occupation would not produce a gain for Germany and "why should it not stew next to us in its
damp Bolshevism?"[33]

Hitler ignored German economic naysayers, and told Hermann Göring that "everyone on all sides was always raising
economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From now onwards he wasn't going to listen to any more
of that kind of talk and from now on he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind."[34] This was
passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of an
invasion of the Soviet Union — that it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured intact.[34]
Beginning in March 1941, Göring's Green Folder laid out details of the
Soviet Union's proposed economic disposal after the invasion. The
entire urban population of the invaded land was to be starved to death,
thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allowing the
urban population's replacement by a German upper class. During the
Nuremberg Trials in 1946, Sir Hartley Shawcross said in March 1941,
as well as administrative divisions previously created, the following
divisions in the Russian East were planned:
Rudolf Hess and others at Heinrich Himmler's
• Ural (central and south Ural and nearest territories, created from "Building and Planning in the East" March 1941
planned east Russian European territorial reorganization) Exhibition
• West Sibirien (future west Siberia and Novosibirsk held lands)
• Nordland (Soviet Arctic areas: West Nordland (Russian European north coasts) and Ost Nordland (northwest
Siberian north coasts))
In summer 1941, German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be
administered in the following Reichskommissariates:
• Ostland (The Baltic countries and Belarus)
• Ukraine (Ukraine and adjacent territories)
• Kaukasus (Southern Russia and the Caucasus area)
• Moskowien (Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia)
Operation Barbarossa 5

• Turkestan (Central Asian republics and territories)


Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraum
idea ("Drang nach Osten") for the benefit of future "Aryan" generations.


We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down


—Adolf Hitler

Operation Barbarossa was to combine a northern assault towards Leningrad, a symbolic capturing of Moscow, and
an economic strategy of seizing oil fields in the south beyond Ukraine. Hitler and his generals disagreed on which of
these aspects should take priority and where Germany should focus its energies; deciding on priorities required a
compromise. Hitler thought himself a political and military genius. While planning Barbarossa in 1940-1941, in
many discussions with his generals, Hitler repeated his order: "Leningrad first, the Donetsk Basin second, Moscow
third."[1] [35] Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the east. He was convinced Britain
would sue for peace, once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union, the real area of Germany's interests. General
Franz Halder noted in his diaries that, by destroying the Soviet Union, Germany would destroy Britain's hope of
victory.
Hitler had grown overconfident from his rapid success in Western Europe and the Red Army's ineptitude in the
Winter War against Finland in 1939–1940. He expected victory within a few months and therefore did not prepare
for a war lasting into the winter. This meant his troops lacked adequate warm clothing and preparations for a longer
campaign when they began their attack. The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would prove
to be his undoing.[36]

German preparations


When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.


—Adolf Hitler

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in the Balkans had
finished. By the third week in February 1941, 680,000 German troops were stationed on the Romanian-Soviet
border.[21] In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved 3.5 million German soldiers and about 1 million Axis soldiers
to the Soviet border, launched many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled materiel in the
East. The Soviets were still taken by surprise, mostly due to Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attack
only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet leader also believed the Nazis would be likely
to finish their war with Britain before opening a new front. He refused to believe repeated warnings from his
intelligence services on the Nazi buildup, fearing the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a war
between Germany and the USSR.[37] According to documentary series Battlefield, Hitler wired Stalin to say that the
troop massing along the Reich's eastern borders was to "keep them away from attacks by the West."
Spy Dr. Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date; Swedish cryptanalysts led by Arne Beurling also
knew the date beforehand, but Sorge and other informers (e.g. from Berlin Police dept.) had previously given
different invasion dates which passed peacefully before the actual invasion. In addition, British intelligence
gathering information through ULTRA warned the Soviet Union of impending invasion several months prior to 22
June 1941.[38]
The Germans set up deception operations, from April 1941, to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real
target: Operations Haifisch and Harpune. These simulated preparations in Norway, the Channel coast and Britain.
Operation Barbarossa 6

There were supporting activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises. Some
details of these bogus invasion plans were deliberately leaked.
Hitler and his generals also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. At Hitler's insistence, the German High
Command (OKW) began to develop a strategy to avoid repeating these mistakes.
The strategy Hitler and his generals agreed on involved three separate army groups assigned to capture specific
regions and cities of the Soviet Union. The main German thrusts were conducted along historical invasion routes.
Army Group North was to march through the Baltics into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of
Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk and then Moscow, marching
through what is now Belarus and the west-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike the
heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing eastward over the steppes of
the southern USSR to the Volga and the oil-rich Caucasus.
Hitler, the OKW and the various high commands disagreed about what the main objectives should be. In preparing
for Barbarossa, most of the OKW argued for a straight thrust to Moscow, but Hitler kept asserting his intention to
seize the resource-rich Ukraine and Baltics before concentrating on the Soviet capital. An initial delay, which
postponed the start of Barbarossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941, may have been insignificant, especially
since the Russian muddy season came late that year. However, more time was lost at various critical moments as
Hitler and the OKW suspended operations in order to argue about strategic objectives.
The Germans also decided to bring rear forces (mostly Waffen-SS units and Einsatzgruppen) into the conquered
territories to counter the partisan activity they knew would erupt in areas they controlled.

Soviet preparations
Despite the impressions of Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak.
Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to
Germany. Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became
progressively more oriented toward military production. In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for
the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations.
On 5 May 1941, Stalin gave a speech to graduates of military academies in Moscow declaring: "War with Germany
is inevitable. If comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for two or three months that will be our good
fortune, but you yourselves must go off and take measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces"[39] . Many
highlight this as recognition by Stalin of the impending attack.

Development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union


from 1939 to 1941[40]
1 January 1939 22 June 1941 % increase

Divisions 131.5 316.5 140.7


calculated

Personnel 2,485,000 5,774,000 132.4

Guns and mortars 55,800 117,600 110.7

Tanks 21,100 25,700 21.8

Aircraft 7,700 18,700 142.8

According to Taylor and Proektor (1974), the Soviet armed forces in the western districts were outnumbered, with
2.6 million Soviet soldiers vs. 4.5 million for the Axis. The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July
1941, though, amounted to a little more than 5 million men, 2.6 million in the west, 1.8 million in the far east, with
Operation Barbarossa 7

the rest being deployed or training elsewhere.[41] These figures, however, can be misleading. The figure for Soviet
strength in the western districts of the Soviet Union counts only the First Strategic Echelon, which was stationed on
and behind the Soviet western frontier to a depth of 400 kilometers; it also underestimates the size of the First
Strategic Echelon, which was actually 2.9 million strong. The figure does not include the smaller Second Strategic
Echelon, which as of 22 June 1941 was in process of moving toward the frontier; according to the Soviet strategic
plan, it was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Strategic Echelon by early July. The total Axis strength
is also exaggerated; 3.3 million German troops were earmarked for participation in Barbarossa, but that figure
includes reserves which did not take part in the initial assault. A further 600,000 troops provided by Germany's allies
also participated, but mostly after the initial assault.
Total Axis forces available for Barbarossa were therefore in the order of 3.9 million. On 22 June, the German
Wehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 German divisions), including 29 armoured and
motorized divisions, some 90% of its mobile forces, attacking on a front of 1200 km (750 mi) between the Baltic Sea
and the Carpathian Mountains, against NKVD border troops and the divisions of the Soviet First Operational
Echelon (the part of the First Strategic Echelon stationed immediately behind the frontier in the three western Special
Military Districts) because it had completed its deployment and was ready to attack about two weeks before the Red
Army was scheduled to have finished its own deployment with the Second Strategic Echelon in place. At the time,
41% of stationary Soviet bases were located in the near-boundary districts, many of them in the 200 km (120 mi)
strip around the border; according to Red Army directive, fuel, equipment, railroad cars, etc. were similarly
concentrated there.[42]
Moreover, on mobilization, as the war went on, the Red Army gained steadily in strength. While the strength of both
sides varied, in general the 1941 campaign was fought with a slight Axis numerical superiority in manpower at the
front. According to Mikhail Meltyukhov (2000:477), by the start of war, the Red Army numbered altogether
5,774,211 troops: 4,605,321 in ground forces, 475,656 in air forces, 353,752 in the navy, 167,582 as border guards
and 171,900 in internal troops of the NKVD.
In some key weapons systems, however, the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable. In tanks, for example, the
Red Army had a large quantitative superiority. It possessed 23,106 tanks,[43] of which about 12,782 were in the five
Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). However, maintenance and
readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks
needed for resupply beyond their basic fuel and ammunition loads.
Also, from 1938, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support, but after their
experiences in the Winter War and their observation of the German campaign against France, had begun to emulate
the Germans and organize most of their armored assets into large armour divisions and corps. This reorganization
was only partially implemented at the dawn of Barbarossa,[44] as not enough tanks were available to bring the
mechanized corps up to organic strength.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields
a balance of immediately-available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. The best Soviet tank, the T-34, was
the most modern in the world, and the KV series the best armored. The most advanced Soviet tank models, however,
the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2% of the total
Soviet tank force. But while these 1,861 modern tanks were technically superior to the 1,404 German medium
Panzer III and IV tanks, the Soviets in 1941 still lacked the communications, training and experience to employ such
weapons effectively.
The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and
readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge
(1936–1938). Of 90 generals arrested, only six survived the purges, as did only 36 of 180 divisional commanders,
and just seven out of 57 army corps commanders. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed,[45]
while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable." Three of the five
Operation Barbarossa 8

pre-war marshals and about two thirds of the corps and division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less
experienced officers in their places; for example, in 1941, 75% of Red Army officers had held their posts for less
than one year. The average Soviet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German division
commander. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessary
for their jobs.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and
Soviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques.[46] Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing, explaining
why aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed, making easy targets
for the Luftwaffe in the first days of the conflict. Prior to the invasion the VVS was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe
reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspace.
The Soviet war effort in the first phase of the Eastern front war was severely hampered by a shortage of modern
aircraft. The Soviet fighter force was equipped with large numbers of obsolete aircraft, such as the I-15 biplane and
the I-16. In 1941, the MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1 were just starting to roll off the production lines, but were far
inferior in all-round performance to the Messerschmitt Bf 109 or later, the Fw 190, when it entered operations in
September 1941. Few aircraft had radios and those that were available were unencrypted and did not work reliably.
The poor performance of VVS (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily, Soviet Air Force) during the Winter War with Finland had
increased the Luftwaffe's confidence that the Soviets could be mastered. The standard of flight training had been
accelerated in preparation for a German attack that was expected to come in 1942 or later. But Soviet pilot training
was extremely poor. Order No 0362 of the People's Commissar of Defense, dated 22 December 1940, ordered flight
training to be accelerated and shortened. Incredibly, while the Soviets had 201 MiG-3s and 37 MiG-1s combat ready
on 22 June 1941, only four pilots had been trained to handle these machines.[47]
The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared, and units were often separated and without transportation to
concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-designed artillery pieces, some of the guns
had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely
well-equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were
sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a
single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The army was in the midst of reorganizing the
armor units into large tank corps, adding to the disorganization.
As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality in the
field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, insufficient motorized logistical
support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantage.
In August 1940 British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week after Hitler
informally approved the plans for Barbarossa.[38] Stalin's distrust of the British led to his ignoring the warnings,
believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war.[38] [48] In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own
intelligence services and American intelligence made regular and repeated warnings of an impending German
attack.[49] However, Stalin chose to ignore these warnings. Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in
general and making significant preparations, he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler.[50] He also had an
ill-founded confidence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which had been signed just two years before. Last, he also
suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR.[51]
[52]
Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire back
without permission when attacked — though a partial alert was implemented on 10 April — they were simply not
ready when the German attack came.[48]
Enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did attack. However, these
forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the Red Army. In 1938, it had adopted, on the
instigation of General Pavlov, a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations. Infantry divisions,
reinforced by an organic tank component, would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones. Then came the shock of
Operation Barbarossa 9

the Fall of France. The French Army, considered the strongest in the world, was defeated in a mere six weeks. Soviet
analysis of events, based on incomplete information, concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by a
reliance on linear defence and a lack of armored reserves.
The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the infantry divisions
would henceforth be concentrated in large formations.[53] Most tanks would also be concentrated into 29 mechanized
corps, each with over 1031 tanks.[54] Should the Germans attack, their armoured spearheads would be cut off and
wiped out by the mechanized corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the German
infantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in Ukraine, was to be enormously reinforced to be
able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German Army Group South, it would swing north through
Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North. With the complete annihilation of the encircled German Army
thus made inevitable, a Red Army offensive into the rest of Europe would follow.[55] [56]

The Soviet offensive plans theory


Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR, Adolf Hitler put
forward a thesis that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an
offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the German invasion as a
pre-emptive strike.[57] After the war this view was brought forward by
some Wehrmacht leaders, like Wilhelm Keitel.[58]
This thesis[59] was reiterated in the 1980s[57] based on the analysis of
circumstantial evidence.[60] Thus, it has been found that a proposal was
drawn up by Zhukov and signed by Vasilevsky and Vatutin suggesting German Soldiers with Soviet Civilians
secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops on the Western
border, under the cover of training. The proposed operation's objective was to cut Germany off from its allies, and
especially Romania with its oilfields that Germany needed to conduct the war.[61]

According to Viktor Suvorov, Stalin planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West.
Stalin's idea was to fuel Hitler's aggressive plans against Europe, and only after the capitalists had exhausted
themselves fighting each other, would the USSR make their strike. For this reason Stalin provided significant
material and political support to Adolf Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to “liberate” the whole
of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that German Barbarossa actually was a pre-emptive strike that
capitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the 1941 borders. Some others who support the idea
that Stalin prepared to attack, like Mikhail Meltyukhov, reject this part of Suvorov's theory, arguing that both sides
prepared for attack on their own, not in response to the other side's preparations.
Although this thesis has drawn the attention of the general public in some countries,[57] , and has been supported by
some historians, it has not been accepted by the majority of western historians.[57] [62]

Order of battle
Operation Barbarossa 10

Strength of the opposing forces on the


Soviet Western border. 22 June 1941
Germany and Allies Soviet Union Ratio

Divisions 166 190 1 : 1.1

Personnel 4,306,800 3,289,851 1.3 : 1

Guns and mortars 42,601 59,787 1 : 1.4

Tanks (incl assault 4,171 15,687 1 : 3.8


guns)

Aircraft [63] [] 1 : 2.6


4,389 11, 537

Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” table 47,[64]

Composition of the Axis forces


Halder as the Chief of General Staff OKH concentrated the following Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe forces for the
operation:
Army Group North (Heeresgruppe Nord) (Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) staged in East Prussia with (26 divisions):
• 16th Army (16. Armee) (Ernst Busch)
• 4th Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 4) (Hoepner)
• 18th Army (18. Armee) (Georg von Küchler)
• Air Fleet 1 (Luftflotte eins) (Alfred Keller)
Army Group Centre (Heeresgruppe Mitte) (Fedor von Bock) staged in Eastern Poland with (49 divisions):
• 4th Army (4. Armee) (Günther von Kluge)
• 2nd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 2) (Guderian)
• 3rd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 3) (Hermann Hoth)
• 9th Army (9. Armee) (Adolf Strauß)
• Air Fleet 2 (Luftflotte zwei) (Albert Kesselring)
Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd) (Gerd von Rundstedt) was staged in Southern Poland and Romania with
(41 divisions):
• 17th Army (17. Armee) (Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel)
• Slovak Expeditionary Force (Čatloš)
• Royal Hungarian Army "Fast Moving Army Corps"(Miklós) - Initially part of a larger "Karpat Group" (Karpat
Gruppe)
• 1st Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 1) (von Kleist)
• 11th Army (Eugen Ritter von Schobert)
• Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, CSIR) (Messe)
• 6th Army (6. Armee) (Walther von Reichenau)
• Romanian 3rd Army (Dumitrescu)
• Romanian 4th Army (Constantinescu)
• Air Fleet 4 (Luftflotte vier) (Alexander Löhr)
Staged from Norway a smaller group of forces consisted of:
• Army High Command Norway (Armee-Oberkommando Norwegen) (Nikolaus von Falkenhorst) with two Corps
• Air Fleet 5 (Luftflotte fünf) (Stumpff)
Operation Barbarossa 11

Numerous smaller units from all over Nazi-occupied Europe, like the "Legion of French Volunteers Against
Bolshevism" (Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme), supported the German war effort.

Composition of the Soviet Forces


At the beginning of the German Reich’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 the Red Army areas of
responsibility in the European USSR were divided into four active Fronts. More Fronts would be formed within the
overall responsibility of the three Strategic Directions commands which corresponded approximately to a German
Army (Wehrmacht Heer) Army Group (Heeresgruppen) in terms of geographic area of operations.
On Zhukov's orders immediately following the invasion the Northern Front was formed from the Leningrad Military
District, the North-Western Front from the Baltic Special Military District, the Western Front was formed from the
Western Special Military District, and the Soviet Southwestern Front was formed from the Kiev Special Military
District. The Southern Front was created on the 25 June 1941 from the Odessa Military District.
The first Directions were established on 10 July 1941, with Voroshilov commanding the North-Western Strategic
Direction, Timoshenko commanding the Western Strategic Direction, and Budyonny commanding the
South-Western Strategic Direction.[65]
The forces of the North-Western Direction were:[66]
• The Northern Front (Colonel General Markian Popov) bordered Finland and included the 14th Army, 7th Army,
23rd Army and smaller units subordinate to the Front commander.
• The North-Western Front (Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov) defended the Baltic region and consisted of the
8th Army, 11th Army, and the 27th Army and other front troops (34 divisions).
• The Northern and Baltic Fleets
The forces of the Western Direction were:
• The Western Front (General Dmitry Grigoryevitch Pavlov) had the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and the
Army Headquarters of the 13th Army which coordinated independent Front formations (45 divisions).
The forces of the South-Western Direction were:
• The South-Western Front (Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos) was formed from the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th
Army and the 26th Army as well as a group of units under Strategic Direction command (45 divisions).
• The Southern Front (General Ivan Tyulenev) was created on 25 June 1941 with 9th Independent Army, 18th
Army, 2nd and 18th Mechanized Corps (26 divisions).
• The Black Sea Fleet
Beside the Armies in the Fronts, there were a further six armies in the Western region of the USSR: 16th Army, 19th
Army, 20th Army, 21st Army, 22nd Army and the 24th Army that formed, together with independent units, the
Stavka Reserve Group of Armies, later renamed the Reserve Front nominally under Stalin's direct command.
Operation Barbarossa 12

The invasion

Phase 1: The Frontier Battles (22 June 1941 - 3 July 1941)


At 03:15 on Sunday, 22 June 1941, the
Axis bombed major cities in
Soviet-occupied Poland. It is hard to
pinpoint the opposing sides' strength in
this initial phase, as most German
figures include reserves allocated to
the East but not yet committed, as well
as several other comparability issues
between the German and USSR's
figures. Roughly three million
Wehrmacht troops went into action on
22 June, and they faced slightly fewer
Soviet troops in the border Military
Districts. The contribution of the
German allies would generally not
make itself felt until later. The surprise
German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa
was complete: though the Stavka,
alarmed by reports that Wehrmacht
units were approaching the border, had at 00:30 ordered that the border troops be warned that war was imminent,
only a small number of units were alerted in time.

Aside from the roughly 3.2 million German ground troops engaged in, or earmarked for the Eastern Campaign, about
500,000 Romanian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, and Italian troops accompanied the German forces, while the
Army of Finland made a major contribution in the north. The 250th Spanish "Blue" Infantry Division was a
formation of volunteered Spanish Falangists and Nazi sympathisers.
Luftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration, supply dumps, and airfields, and mark
them for destruction. The Luftwaffe's task was to neutralize the Soviet Air Force. This was not achieved in the first
days of operations, despite the Soviets having concentrated aircraft in huge groups on the permanent airfields rather
than dispersing them on field landing strips, making them ideal targets. The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed
1,489 aircraft on the first day of operations.[67] Hermann Göring — Chief of the Luftwaffe — distrusted the reports
and ordered the figure checked. Picking through the wreckages of Soviet airfields, the Luftwaffe's figures proved
conservative, as over 2,000 destroyed Soviet aircraft were found.[67] The Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft on the first day of
combat. The Germans claimed to have destroyed only 3,100 Soviet aircraft in the first three days. In fact Soviet
losses were far higher: some 3,922 Soviet machines had been lost (according to Russian Historian Viktor
Kulikov).[68] The Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority over all three sectors of the front, and would maintain it
until the close of the year.[69] The Luftwaffe could now devote large numbers of its Geschwader (see Luftwaffe
Organization) to support the ground forces.
Operation Barbarossa 13

Army Group North

Opposite Army Group North were two Soviet armies. The Wehrmacht
OKH thrust the 4th Panzer Group, with a strength of 600 tanks, at the
junction of the two Soviet armies in that sector. The 4th Panzer Group's
objective was to cross the Neman and Daugava Rivers which were the
two largest obstacles in the advance to Leningrad. On the first day, the
tanks crossed the River Neman and penetrated 50 mi (80 km). Near
Raseiniai, the armoured units were counter attacked by 300 tanks of
the 3rd and 12th Soviet Mechanized Corps. It took four days for the
Germans to encircle and destroy the Soviet armour who lacked fuel,
ammunition and coordination. By the end of the first week the Soviet Crossing of the Daugava (Dvina) river by the
[70] 20th Panzer Division
Mechanized Corps had lost 90% of its strength. The Panzer Groups
then crossed the Daugava near Daugavpils. The Germans were now
within striking distance of Leningrad. However, due to their deteriorated supply situation, Hitler ordered the Panzer
Groups to hold their position while the infantry formations caught up. The orders to hold would last over a week,
giving time for the Soviets to build up a defence around Leningrad and along the bank of the Luga River. Further
complicating the Soviet position, on 22 June the anti-Soviet June Uprising in Lithuania began, and on the next day
an independent Lithuania was proclaimed.[71] An estimated 30,000 Lithuanian rebels engaged Soviet forces, joined
by ethnic Lithuanians from the Red Army. As the Germans reached further north, armed resistance against the
Soviets broke out in Estonia as well. The "Battle of Estonia" ended on 7 August, when the 18th Army reached the
Gulf of Finland coast.[72]

Army Group Centre

Opposite Army Group Centre were four Soviet armies: the 3rd, 4th,
10th and 11th Armies. The Soviet Armies occupied a salient that jutted
into German occupied Polish territory with the Soviet salient's center at
Białystok. Beyond Białystok was Minsk, both the capital of
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and a key railway junction. AG
Centre's two Panzer Groups' goal was to meet at Minsk, denying the
Red Army an escape route from the salient. The 3rd Panzer Group
broke through the junction of two Soviet Fronts in the north of the
salient, and crossed the River Neman while the 2nd Panzer Group Captured Soviet equipment.
crossed the Western Bug river in the South. While the Panzer Groups
attacked, the Wehrmacht Army Group Centre infantry Armies struck at the salient, eventually encircling Soviet
troops at Białystok.

Moscow at first failed to grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe that had befallen the USSR. Marshall Timoshenko
ordered all Soviet forces to launch a general counter-offensive, but with supply and ammunition dumps destroyed,
and a complete collapse of communication, the uncoordinated attacks failed. Zhukov signed the infamous Directive
of People's Commissariat of Defence No. 3 (he later claimed under pressure from Stalin), which ordered the Red
Army to start an offensive. He commanded the troops “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping near Suwałki and
to seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 26 June" and “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in
Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction” and even “to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24.6”[73] This
maneuver failed and disorganized Red Army units, which were soon destroyed by the Wehrmacht forces.
On 27 June, 2 and 3 Panzer Groups met up at Minsk, advancing 200 mi (320 km) into Soviet territory and a third of
the way to Moscow. In the vast pocket between Minsk and the Polish border, the remnants of 32 Soviet Rifle, eight
Operation Barbarossa 14

tank, and motorized, cavalry and artillery divisions were encircled.

Army Group South


In the south, opposite Army Group South were three Soviet armies, the 5th, 6th and 26th. Soviet commanders
reacted quicker and Germans faced determined resistance from the start. The German infantry Armies struck at the
junctions of these armies while the 1st Panzer Group drove its armored spearhead of 600 tanks right through the
Soviet 6th Army, aiming to take Brody. On 26 June, five Soviet mechanized corps with over 1,000 tanks mounted a
massive counter-attack on the 1st Panzer Group. The battle was among the fiercest of the invasion, lasting over four
days; in the end the Germans prevailed, though the Soviets inflicted heavy losses on the 1st Panzer Group.
With the Soviet counter-offensives' failure, the last substantial Soviet tank forces in Western Ukraine had been
committed, and the Red Army assumed a defensive posture, focusing on a strategic withdrawal under severe
pressure. By the end of the first week, all three German Army Groups had achieved major campaign objectives.
However, in the vast pocket around Minsk and Białystok, the Soviets were still fighting; reducing the pocket was
causing high German casualties and many Red Army troops were escaping. The usual estimated casualties of the
Red Army amount to 600,000 killed, missing, captured or wounded. The Soviet air arm, the VVS, lost 1,561 aircraft
over Kiev.[74] The battle was a huge tactical (Hitler thought strategic) victory, but it had drawn the German forces
away from an early offensive against Moscow, and had delayed further German progress by 11 weeks. General Kurt
Von Tippleskirch noted, "The Russians had indeed lost a battle, but they won the campaign".[74]

Phase 2: Battle for Smolensk (3 July 1941 - 5 August 1941)


On 3 July, Hitler finally gave the
go-ahead for the Panzers to resume
their drive east after the infantry
divisions had caught up. However, a
rainstorm typical of Russian summers
slowed their progress and Russian
defenses stiffened. The delays gave the
Soviets time to organize a massive
counterattack against Army Group
Center. Army Group Center's ultimate
objective was Smolensk, which
commanded the road to Moscow.
Facing the Germans was an old Soviet
defensive line held by six armies. On 6
July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd
Panzer Army with 700 tanks. The
German advances during Operation Barbarossa, 22 June 1941 to 9 September 1941.
Germans defeated this counterattack
with overwhelming air superiority. The
2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dnieper and closed on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer Army,
after defeating the Soviet counter attack, closed on Smolensk from the north. Trapped between their pincers were
three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the Panzer Groups came to within 10 miles of closing the gap but the trap would not
snap shut until 26 July. When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap, 180,000 Red Army troops were captured[75]
but liquidating the pocket took another 10 days in which time 100,000 Soviet troops escaped to stand between the
Germans and Moscow.

Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The German
troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement. Operations were
Operation Barbarossa 15

now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation. Hitler had
lost faith in encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers. Hitler now believed he could
defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant
seizing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and a
speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the north. He also wanted to link up with the
Finns to the north.
Fedor von Bock and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa, vehemently argued in favor
of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemy's
capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet
communications and transportation system. More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red
Army was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital. But Hitler was
adamant, and issued a direct order to Guderian, bypassing his commanding officer von Bock, to send Army Group
Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.

Phase 3: Kiev and Leningrad (5 August 1941 - 2 October 1941)


By mid-July below the Pinsk Marshes, the Germans had come within a few kilometers of Kiev. The 1st Panzer Army
then went south while the German 17th Army struck east and in between the Germans trapped three Soviet armies
near Uman. As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the
2nd Panzer Army, diverted from Army Group Centre, had crossed the River Desna with 2nd Army on its right flank.
The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.
For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Centre. On 8
August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses; the German 16th Army attacked to the northeast, the 18th
Army and the Estonian guerilla Forest Brothers cleared the country and advanced to Lake Peipus.[76] By the end of
August, 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within 30 mi (48 km) of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed southeast on
both sides of Lake Ladoga, reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.
At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army
Group North began the final push which within ten days brought it within 7 mi (11 km) of the city. However, the
advance over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) proved very slow and casualties mounted. At this stage, Hitler lost patience and
ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed but starved into submission. Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army
Group Center had remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counter-attacks in particular the Yelnya
Offensive in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began. These attacks
drew Hitler's attention back to Army Group Center and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th
Panzer Armies to break off their siege of Leningrad and support Army Group Center on its attack on Moscow.
Before the attack on Moscow could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of Army Group Centre had
swung to the south in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group South moved to the north from its Dniepr
bridgehead. The encirclement of Soviet Forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A savage battle ensued in
which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment. In the end, after ten days of vicious
fighting, the Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured. Actual losses were 452,720 men, 3,867
artillery guns and mortars from 43 Divisions of the 5th, 37th, 26th and 21st Soviet Armies.[77]
Operation Barbarossa 16

Phase 4: Operation Typhoon (2 October 1941 - 5 December 1941)


After Kiev, the Red Army no longer
outnumbered the Germans and there
were no more directly available trained
reserves. To defend Moscow, Stalin
could field 800,000 men in 83
divisions, but no more than 25
divisions were fully effective.
Operation Typhoon, the drive to
Moscow, began on 2 October. In front
of Army Group Centre was a series of
elaborate defense lines, the first
centered on Vyazma and the second on
Mozhaysk.

The first blow took the Soviets


completely by surprise as 2nd Panzer
Army returning from the south took The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Moscow:      Initial Wehrmacht advance -

Oryol which was 75 mi (121 km) south to 9 July 1941      Subsequent advances - to 1 September 1941      Encirclement
and battle of Kiev - to 9 September 1941      Final Wehrmacht advance - to 5
of the Soviet first main defence line. December 1941
Three days later the Panzers pushed on
Bryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the west. The Soviet 3rd and 13th armies were now encircled. To the north,
the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Soviet Armies. Moscow's
first line of defence had been shattered. The pocket yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the
start of the invasion to three million Soviet soldiers captured. The Soviets had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for
the defense of Moscow.

On 13 October, 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within 90 mi (140 km) of the capital. Martial law was declared in
Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon the weather had deteriorated. Temperatures fell while
there was a continued rainfall, turning the unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowing the German advance
on Moscow to as little as 2 mi (3.2 km) a day. The supply situation rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German
Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were re-organized. The pause gave the
Soviets, who were in a far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of
newly activated reservists. In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies which included 30
divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalin
there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. With the Siberian forces came over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.
The Germans were nearing exhaustion, they also began to recall Napoleon's invasion of Russia. General Günther
Blumentritt noted in his diary:
They remembered what happened to Napoleon's Army. Most of them began to re-read Caulaincourt's
grim account of 1812. That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I can still see Von
Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and standing before the map
with Caulaincourt's book in his hand.[78]
On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on
Moscow. Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no delay allowed to
improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies. The
Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the
northeast. 2nd Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south. As the Soviets reacted
Operation Barbarossa 17

to the flanks, 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and
ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. However, in the south, 2nd Panzer Army was being
blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies attacked the 2nd
Panzer Army and inflicted a shocking defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16th
Army back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement.
On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 15 mi (24 km) of Moscow, and could see the
spires of the Kremlin,[79] but by then the first blizzards of the winter began. The Wehrmacht was not equipped for
winter warfare. Frostbite and disease caused more casualties than combat, and dead and wounded had already
reached 155,000 in three weeks. Some divisions were now at 50% strength. The bitter cold also caused severe
problems for their guns and equipment, and weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe. Newly built-up Soviet units
near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a massive counterattack which
pushed the Germans back over 200 mi (320 km). The invasion of the USSR eventually cost the German Army over
250,000 dead and 500,000 wounded, the majority of whom became casualties after 1 October and an unknown
number of Axis casualties such as Hungarians, Romanians and Waffen SS troops as well as co-belligerent Finns.

Later events
Shirer argues that the fatal decision of the operation was the
postponement from the original date of 15 May because Hitler wanted
to intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greek
advances against Italy's occupation of Albania. However, this was just
one of the reasons for the postponement — the other was the late
spring of 1941 in Russia, compounded by particularly rainy weather in
June 1941 that made a number of roads in western parts of the Soviet
Union impassable to heavy vehicles. During the campaign, Hitler German Soldiers with destroyed Soviet tank at
Kaunas
ordered the main thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward to
help the southern army group capture Ukraine. This move delayed the
assault on the Soviet capital, though it also helped secure Army Group Center's southern flank. By the time they
turned to Moscow, the Red Army's fierce resistance, the mud following the autumn rains and, eventually, snow,
brought their advance to a halt.

In addition, resistance by the Soviets, who proclaimed a Great Patriotic War in defence of the motherland, was
much fiercer than the German command had expected. The border fortress of Brest, Belarus illustrates that tenacity:
attacked on the very first day of the German invasion, the fortress was expected to fall within hours, but held out for
weeks. (Soviet propaganda later asserted it held out for six weeks).[80] German logistics also became a major
problem, as supply lines grew very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the rear. The Soviets carried out
a scorched earth policy on some of the land they were forced to abandon in order to deny the Germans food, fuel,
and buildings.
Despite the setbacks, the German advance continued, often destroying or surrounding whole armies of Soviet troops
and forcing them to surrender. The battle for Kiev was especially brutal. On 19 September Army Group South seized
control of Kiev, and took 665,000 Soviets prisoner. Kiev was later awarded the title Hero City for its heroic defence.
Army Group North, which was to conquer the Baltic countries and eventually Leningrad, reached the southern
outskirts of Leningrad by August 1941. There, fierce Soviet resistance stopped it. Since capturing the city seemed
too costly, German command decided to starve the city to death by blockade, starting the Siege of Leningrad. The
city held out, despite several attempts by the Germans to break through its defenses, unrelenting air and artillery
attacks, and severe shortages of food and fuel, until the Germans were driven back again from the city's approaches
in early 1944. Leningrad was the first Soviet city to receive the title of 'Hero City'.
Operation Barbarossa 18

In addition to the main attacks of Barbarossa, German forces occupied Finnish Petsamo in order to secure important
nickel mines. They also launched the beginning of a series of attacks against Murmansk on 28 June 1941. That
assault was known as Operation Silberfuchs.

Reasons for initial Soviet defeats


The Red Army and air force were so badly defeated in 1941 chiefly
because they were ill-prepared for the Axis surprise attack. By 1941
the Germans were the most experienced and best-trained troops in the
world for the rapid, blitzkrieg-style warfare that encompassed the
Eastern Front during the second half of 1941. The Axis had a doctrine
of mobility and annihilation, excellent communications, and the
confidence of repeated low-cost victories. The Soviet armed forces, by
contrast, lacked leadership, training, and readiness. The officer corps of
A column of Red Army POWs captured near
the Red Army had been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge of Minsk is marched west.
1936-1938, and their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political
reasons, often lacked military competence, which was shown by the
difficulty that the Soviet Union had in defeating Finland in the
Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Much of Soviet planning assumed
that no war would take place before 1942: thus the Axis attack came
when new organizations and promising, but untested, weapons were
just beginning to trickle into operational units. Much of the Soviet
Army in Europe was concentrated along the new western border of the
Soviet Union, in former Polish territory that lacked significant
defenses, allowing many Soviet military units to be overrun and
A group of Soviet POWs, taken to undefined
destroyed in the first weeks of war. Initially, many Soviet units were
Prison Camp
also hampered by Semyon Timoshenko's and Georgy Zhukov's prewar
orders (demanded by Joseph Stalin) not to engage or to respond to
provocations (followed by a similarly damaging first reaction from Moscow, an order to stand and fight, then
counterattack; this left those units vulnerable to encirclement), by a lack of experienced officers, and by bureaucratic
inertia.

Soviet tactical errors in the first few weeks of the offensive proved catastrophic. Initially, the Red Army was fooled
by overestimation of its own capabilities. Instead of intercepting German armour, Soviet mechanised corps were
ambushed and destroyed after Luftwaffe dive bombers inflicted heavy losses. Soviet tanks, poorly maintained and
manned by inexperienced crews, suffered an appalling rate of breakdowns. Lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a
logistical collapse. The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous. Without tanks or sufficient
motorization, Soviet troops could not wage mobile warfare against the Axis.
Stalin's orders not to retreat or surrender led to static linear positions that German tanks easily breached, again
quickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies. Only later did Stalin allow his troops to retreat
wherever possible and regroup, to mount a defense in depth, or to counterattack. More than 2.4 million Soviet troops
had been captured by December 1941, by which time German and Soviet forces were fighting almost in the suburbs
of Moscow. Most of these prisoners were to die from exposure, starvation, disease, or willful mistreatment by the
German regime.
Despite the Axis failure to achieve Barbarossa's initial goals, the huge Soviet losses caused a shift in Soviet
propaganda. Before the onset of hostilities against Germany, the Soviet government had said its army was very
strong. But, by autumn 1941, the Soviet line was that the Red Army had been weak, that there had not been enough
Operation Barbarossa 19

time to prepare for war, and that the German attack had come as a surprise.

Outcome
The climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Center, already short on supplies because of the
October mud, was ordered to advance on Moscow; forward units of the 2nd Panzer Division's 38 Panzer Pioneer
Abteilung (38PzPi.Abtl.)[81] (armored engineers) came within sight of the spires of the Kremlin when they reached
the rail line just south of the town of Lobnya, 16 km (9.9 mi) from Moscow, on 1 December 1941. Soviet troops,
well supplied and reinforced by fresh divisions from Siberia, defended Moscow in the Battle of Moscow, and drove
the Germans back as the winter advanced. The bulk of the counter-offensive was directed at Army Group Center,
which was closest to Moscow.
With no shelter, few supplies, inadequate winter clothing, chronic food shortages, and nowhere to go, German troops
had no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland. The Germans avoided being routed by Soviet
counterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and exposure.
At the time, the seizure of Moscow was considered the key to victory for Germany. Nowadays, historians debate
whether the loss of the Soviet capital would have caused collapse; but Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve that
goal. In December 1941, Germany joined Japan in declaring war against the United States.
The outcome of Operation Barbarossa hurt the Soviets at least as badly as the Germans, however. Although the
Germans had failed to take Moscow outright, they held huge areas of the western Soviet Union, including the entire
regions of what are now Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, plus parts of Russia proper west of Moscow.
German forces had advanced 1050 mi (1690 km), and maintained a linearly-measured front of 1900 mi (3100
km).[82] The Germans held up to 500000 sq mi (1300000 km2) of territory with over 75 million people at the end of
1941, and went on to seize another 250000 sq mi (650000 km2) before being forced to retreat after defeats at
Stalingrad and Kursk. However, the occupied areas were not always properly controlled by the Germans and
underground activity rapidly escalated. Wehrmacht occupation was brutal from the start, due to directives issued by
Hitler himself at the operation's start, according to which Slavic peoples were considered a race of Untermenschen.
This attitude alienated the population, while in some areas (such as Ukraine) it seems that some local people had
been ready to consider the Germans as liberators helping them to get rid of Stalin. Anti-German partisan operations
intensified when Red Army units that had dissolved into the country's large uninhabited areas re-emerged as
underground forces, and under the German repressive policies. The Germans held on stubbornly in the face of Soviet
counterattacks, resulting in huge casualties on both sides in many battles.
The war on the Eastern Front went on for four years. The death toll may never be established with any degree of
certainty. The most recent western estimate of Soviet military deaths is 7 million that lost their lives either in combat
or in Axis captivity. Soviet civilian deaths remain under contention, though roughly 20 million is a frequently cited
figure. German military deaths are also to a large extent unclear. The most recent German estimate (Rüdiger
Overmans) concluded that about 4.3 million Germans and a further 900,000 Axis forces lost their lives either in
combat or in Soviet captivity. Operation Barbarossa is listed among the most lethal battles in world history.
The Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention (1929). However, a month after the German invasion in
1941, an offer was made for a reciprocal adherence to the Hague convention. This 'note' was left unanswered by
Third Reich officials.[83]
Operation Barbarossa 20

Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa


The gravity of the beleaguered German army's situation towards the end of 1941 was due to the Red Army's
increasing strength and factors that in the short run severely restricted the German forces' effectiveness. Chief among
these were their overstretched deployment, a serious transport crisis and the eroded strength of most divisions. The
infantry deficit that appeared by 1 September 1941 was never made good. For the rest of the war in the Soviet Union,
the Wehrmacht would be short of infantry and support services.
Parallels have been drawn with Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

Underestimated Soviet potential


German war planners grossly underestimated the mobilization potential of the Red Army: its primary mobilization
size (i.e. the total of already trained units that could be put on a war footing quickly) was about twice the expected
number. By early August, new armies had replaced destroyed ones. This alone implied Operation Barbarossa's
failure, for the Germans now had to limit their operations for a month to bring up new supplies, leaving only six
weeks to complete the battle before the start of the mud season. On the other hand, the Red Army proved it could
replace huge losses quickly, and was not destroyed as a coherent force. When the divisions of conscripts trained
before the war were destroyed, new ones replaced them. On average about half a million men were drafted each
month for the duration of the war. The Soviets also proved very skilled in raising and training many new armies from
the different ethnic populations of the far flung republics. It was this Soviet ability to mobilize vast (if often poorly
trained and equipped) forces rapidly and continually that allowed the Soviet Union to survive the critical first six
months of the war, and it was a grave underestimation of this capacity that rendered German planning unrealistic.
Also, data collected by Soviet intelligence excluded the possibility of a war with Japan, which allowed the Soviets to
transfer forces from the Far East (troops fully trained to fight a winter war) to the European theater.
The German High Command grossly underestimated the control the central Soviet government exercised. The
German High Command wrongly thought the Soviet government was ineffective. The Germans based their hopes of
quick victory on the belief the Soviet communist system was like a rotten structure which would collapse from a
hard kick.[84] In fact, the Soviet system proved resilient and surprisingly adaptable. In the face of early crushing
defeats, the Soviets managed to dismantle entire industries threatened by the German advance. These critical
factories, along with their skilled workers, were transported by rail to secure locations beyond the Germans' reach.
Despite the loss of raw materials and the chaos of an invasion, the Soviets managed to build new armaments
factories in sufficient numbers to allow mass production of needed war machinery. The Soviet government was
never in danger of collapse and remained at all times in tight control of the Soviet war effort.
The Germans treated Soviet prisoners brutally and showed cruelty to overrun Soviet populations. This treatment
instilled a deep hatred in the hearts and minds of the Soviet citizens. Hatred of the Germans enabled the Soviet
government to extract a level of sacrifice from the Soviet population unheard of in Western nations.
The Germans underestimated the Soviet people as well. The German High Command viewed Soviet soldiers as
incompetent and considered the average citizen as an inferior human being. German soldiers were stunned by the
ferocity with which the Red Army fought. German planners were amazed at the level of suffering the Soviet citizens
could endure and still work and fight.
The Germans also underestimated Soviet technical and productive capacity.
Operation Barbarossa 21

Faults of logistical planning


At the start of the war in the dry summer, the Germans took the Soviets by surprise and destroyed a large part of the
Soviet Red Army in the first weeks. When good weather gave way to the harsh autumn and winter and the Red
Army recovered, the German offensive began to falter. The German army could not be sufficiently supplied for
prolonged combat; indeed there was not enough fuel for the whole army to reach its objectives.
This was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation, but their warnings were
disregarded.[85] The entire German plan assumed that within five weeks they would have attained full strategic
freedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army. Only then could they have diverted necessary logistic support
to fuelling the few mobile units needed to occupy the defeated state.
German infantry and tanks stormed 300 mi (480 km) ahead in the first week, but their supply lines struggled to keep
up. Soviet railroads could at first not be used due to a difference in railway gauges, until a sufficient supply of trains
was seized. Lack of supplies significantly slowed down the blitzkrieg.
The German logistical planning also seriously overestimated the condition of the Soviet transportation network. The
road and railway network of former Eastern Poland was well known, but beyond that information was limited. Roads
that looked impressive on maps turned out to be just mere dust roads or were only in the planning stages.[85]

Weather
A paper published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hitler's plans miscarried
before the onset of severe winter weather. He was so confident of quick victory that he did not prepare for even the
chance of winter warfare in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties
(about 23% of its average strength of 3,200,000 troops) in the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 November
1941, General Eduard Wagner, Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported "We are at the end of our
resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter."[86]
The German forces were unready to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of the USSR. In autumn,
terrain slowed the Wehrmacht's progress. Few roads were paved. The ground in the USSR was very loose sand in
summer, sticky muck in autumn, and heavy snow in winter. German tanks had narrow treads with little traction and
poor flotation in mud. In contrast, the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV had wider tracks and
were far more mobile in these conditions. The 600,000 large western European horses the Germans used for supply
and artillery movement did not cope well with this weather. The smaller horses the Red Army used were much better
adapted to the climate and could even scrape the icy ground with their hooves to dig up the weeds beneath.
German troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in the autumn and winter of 1941. Equipment
had been prepared for such winter conditions, but the severely overstrained transport network could not move it to
the front. Consequently, the troops lacked adequate cold-weather gear, and some soldiers had to pack newspapers
into their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to below -30 °C (-22 °F). While at least some cold
weather uniforms were available, they rarely reached the Eastern Front because Hitler ordered that supply lines give
more priority to shipments of ammunition and fuel. To operate furnaces and heaters, the Germans also burned
precious fuel that was in short supply. Soviet soldiers, in contrast, often had warm, quilted uniforms, felt-lined boots,
and fur hats.
German weapons malfunctioned in the cold. Lubricating oils were unsuitable for these temperatures, leading to
engine malfunction and misfiring weapons. To load shells into a tank’s main gun, frozen grease had to be chipped off
with a knife. Soviet units faced less severe problems due to their experience with cold weather. Aircraft had
insulating blankets to keep their engines warm while parked. Lighter-weight oil was used. German tanks and
armored vehicles could not move due to a lack of antifreeze, causing fuel to solidify.
Due to the fact that few Russian roads were paved, when the rains and snow came in late October and early
November, most of the main roads turned to mud and with a combination of longer supply lines, the German
Operation Barbarossa 22

advanced stalled within sight of the spires of Moscow. The Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive led primarily by
Siberian troops trained for harsh winter combat recently arriving from the east along with the numerous T-34 tanks
held in reserve advanced up to 100 mi (160 km) in some sectors, showing that mobile warfare was still possible in
the Russian winter.
When the severe winter began, Hitler feared a repetition of Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow. He ordered
the German forces to hold their ground defiantly in the face of Soviet counterattacks. This became known as the
"stand or die" order. While some historians have argued that this order prevented the Germans from being routed,
others contend that this order restricted Germany's ability to conduct mobile defensive warfare and led to heavy
casualties from battle and cold.

Aftermath
With the failure in the Battle of Moscow, all German plans of a
quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet
counter offensives in the Winter of 1941 caused heavy casualties
on both sides, but ultimately lifted the German threat to Moscow.
Nevertheless despite this setback, the Soviet Union suffered
heavily from the loss of big parts of its army, allowing the
Germans to mount another large scale offensive in the summer of
1942, called Case Blue, now directed to the oil fields of Baku.
This offensive again failed in the same way as Barbarossa, the
Germans conquering vast amounts of no-mans-land, but ultimately
failing to achieve their final goals with the defeat at Stalingrad.
With the now running Soviet war economy and its much greater
manpower reserves, the Soviet Union was able to simply
outproduce and outnumber the Germans who were not prepared
for a long war of attrition. This way the last German all out
offensive in 1943 in the Battle of Kursk failed. After three years of
constant warfare the Germans were exhausted and so the Soviets
were finally able to defeat the Germans decisively in Operation
Bagration in summer 1944. This led to a chain of fast Soviet Soviet World War II poster depicting retreating Nazis,
among them Hitler and Göring. It reads : "Death to the
victories which now pushed the Germans back to Berlin in just one
German Occupiers!"
year, leading to the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945.

See also
• Eastern Front (World War II)
• Winter War
• Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II
• Black Sea Campaigns (1941-44)
• Siege of Leningrad - the siege began in 1941 and was ended in 1944.
• Continuation War – the war at Finnish front
• Operation Silberfuchs and Blaufuchs – the attack on the Soviet Arctic and German–Finnish general operational
plans
• Molotov Line – An incomplete Soviet defence line at the start of Operation Barbarossa
• Operation Northern Light – Summer of 1942 was another major attack against besieged Leningrad
• Captured Tanks and Armoured cars for German use in Russian Front
Operation Barbarossa 23

• Captured German equipment in Soviet use on the Eastern front


• Pobediteli – Russian project celebrating the 60th anniversary of World War II
• The Battle of Russia – film from the Why We Fight propaganda film series
Russian folk song about June 22, the day Germany invaded: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_22_June_song

References
• Bellamy, Christopher (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia in World War Two. New York: Knopf Publishers.
ISBN 978-0-3754-1086-4
• Bergstrom, Christer (2007). Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July-December 1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen.
ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
• Bethell, Nicholas., Time–Life (2000). Útok na SSSR : druhá světová válka (Attack on the USSR: World War 2).
Prague: Svojtka & Co. ISBN 80-7237-279-3.
• Clark, Alan (1965). Barbarossa: The Russian–German Conflict, 1941–45. New York: Willam Morrow & Co.;
1985 (Paperback, ISBN 0-688-04268-6).
• Erickson, John (2003). The Road to Stalingrad. London: Cassell Military. ISBN 0-304-36541-6.
• Erickson, John and Dilks, David eds (1994). Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press. 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7486-0504-5); 1998 (paperback, ISBN 0-7486-1111-8).
• Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan (2004). "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of
Barbarossa", War in History, Vol. 11, Issue 1., pp. 61–103.
• Farrell, Brian P (1993). "Yes, Prime Minister: Barbarossa, Whipcord, and the Basis of British Grand Strategy,
Autumn 1941", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 4., pp. 599–625.
• Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) (1991). Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London: Frank
Cass. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.
• Glantz, David M. (2001). Barbarossa: Hitler's invasion of Russia, 1941. Gloucestershire: Tempus. ISBN
0-7524-1979-X.
• Glantz, David M. (1998). Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Kansas: University Press
of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0879-6.
• Glantz, David M. (2005). Colossus Reborn: the Red Army at War, 1941–1943. Kansas: University Press of
Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1353-6.
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001). Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. Connecticut; London:
Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-08459-5.
• Hoffmann, Joachim. (2001). Stalin's War of Extermination. Capshaw, Alabama: Theses & Dissertations Press.
ISBN 0-9679856-8-4.
• Kershaw, Robert J. (2000). War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa, 1941/42. Shepperton: Ian Allan. ISBN
0-7110-2734-X.
• Kirchubel, Robert. (2003). Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1): Army Group South. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN
1-84176-697-6.
• Kirchubel, Robert. (2005). Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN
1-84176-857-X.
• Krivosheyev, G. (1993). Grif sekretnosti snyat. Poteri vooruzhonnyh sil SSSR v voynah, boevyh deystviyah i
voyennyh konfliktah, Voenizdat. Moscow.
• Krivosheev, G.F. ed. (1997). Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century. London: Greenhill
Books. ISBN 1-85367-280-7. Available online [87] in Russian.
• Koch, H.W. (1983). "Hitler's 'Programme' and the Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa'", The Historical Journal,
Vol. 26, No. 4., pp. 891–920.
• Latimer, Jon. (2001) Deception in War. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5605-8.
Operation Barbarossa 24

• Lubbeck, William; Hurt, David B. (2006). At Leningrad's Gates: The Story of a Soldier with Army Group North.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Casemate. ISBN 1-932033-55-6.
• Macksey, Kenneth. (1999). Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority. London:
Greenhill Books. ISBN 1-85367-383-8.
• Maser, Werner. (1994). Der Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg (
The breach of promise: Hitler, Stalin and World War II). Munich: Olzog. 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 3-7892-8260-X);
Munich: Heyne, 2001 (paperback, ISBN 3-453-11764-6).
• Megargee, Geoffrey P. (2006). War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941. Lanham,
Massachusetts: Rowman & Littelefield. (Hardcover, ISBN 0-7425-4481-8; paperback, ISBN 0-7425-4482-6).
• Murphy, David E. (2005). What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, Connecticut; London:
Yale University Press. 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 0-300-10780-3); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-300-11981-X).
• Reviewed by Robert Conquest at The American Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2. (2006), p. 591.
• Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich. (1968). "22 June 1941; Soviet Historians and the German Invasion". Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 0-87249-134-X.
• Pleshakov, Constantine. (2005). Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern
Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 0-618-36701-2.
• Raus, Erhard. (2003). Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945, compiled and
translated by Steven H. Newton. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press. 2003 (hardcover, ISBN
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• Rayfield, Donald. (2004). Stalin and his Hangmen. London: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-141-00375-8
• Reviewed by David R. Snyder in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 1. (2005), pp. 265–266.
• Roberts, Cynthia. (1995). "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941". Taylor and Francis
Publishers. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 1293–1326.
• Rees, Laurence. (1999). War of the Century: When Hitler Fought Stalin. New York: New Press. ISBN
1-56584-599-4.
• Shirer, William L. (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Schuster. (1964 Pan
Books Ltd. reprint, ISBN 0-330-70001-4).
• Stolfi, R.H.S. (2003). German Panzers on the Offensive: Russian Front. North Africa, 1941–1942. Atglen,
Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 0-7643-1770-9.
• Suvorov, Viktor. (2007). The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Dulles, Virginia:
Potomac Books. ISBN 1-59797-114-6.
• Taylor, A.J.P. and Mayer, S.L., eds. (1974). A History of World War Two. London: Octopus Books. ISBN
0-70640-399-1.
• van Creveld, Martin. (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 0-421-29793-1.
• Waller, John. (1996). The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War. London:
Tauris & Co. ISBN 978-186064092-6.
• Weeks, Albert L. (2002). Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield. 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).
• Wegner, Bernd ed. (1997). From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941. Providence,
Rhode Island: Berghahn Books. ISBN 1-57181-882-0.
• Reviewed by Peter Konecny, Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 34 Issue 2. (August, 1999) pp. 288–290.
• Wieczynski, Joseph L.; Fox, J.P. (1996). "Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on The Soviet Union, 22
June 1941", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 74, No. 2., pp. 344–346.
• Ziemke, Earl F. (1987). Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Washington DC: United States Army Center
of Military History; 1988: New York: Military Heritage Press. ISBN 0-88029-294-6.
Operation Barbarossa 25

• Ziemke, Earl F. (1966). Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington DC: United States
Army Center of Military History; Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2003 (paperback, ISBN
1-4102-0414-6).
• Мельтюхов, М.И. (2000). Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939–1941
(Документы, факты, суждения). Моscow: Вече. Available online [88] in Russian.
• Суворов, В. (2003). Последняя республика: Почему Советский Союз проиграл Вторую Мировую войну.
Моscow: AST. ISBN 5170078765. Available online [89] in Russian.
• Pictures taken by German soldiers during this operation: http://worldwar2photos.info/
• lt. Kolobanov and KV-2. Notable engagements of KV series against outnumbering enemy forces: http://wio.ru/
tank/ww2tank.htm

External links
• Operation Barbarossa [90] Original reports and pictures from The Times
• Relationship between the campaigns in the Balkans and the invasion of Russia [91] and associated timeline [92] in
The German Campaigns in the Balkans a publication of the United States Army Center of Military History
• Multimedia map [93]—Covers the invasion of Russia including Operation Barbarossa
• Operation Barbarossa [94]—Detailed analysis of the operation by author Bevin Alexander.
• Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence. The Soviet History of World War II [95], 28 October
1959.
• Huge very detailed online map on 22 June 1941. Dislocation of Soviet and German airforce and ground units in
one hour before invasion. [96]

References
[1] Higgins, Trumbull (1966), Hitler and Russia, The Macmillan Company, pp. 11–59, 98–151
[2] Bryan I. Fugate. Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. Novato: Presidio Press, 1984.
[3] World War II Chronicle, 2007. Legacy/ Publications International, Ltd. Page 146.
[4] Yad vashem - Chronology of the Holocaust (http:/ / www1. yadvashem. org/ about_holocaust/ chronology/ 1939-1941/ 1941/
chronology_1941_9. html)
[5] A.J.P Taylor & Colonel D. M Proektor, p. 106
[6] A.J.P Taylor & Colonel D. M Proektor 1974, p. 107
[7] Simonov, Konstantin (1979). "Records of talks with Georgi Zhukov, 1965–1966" (http:/ / www. hrono. ru/ dokum/ 197_dok/ 1979zhukov2.
html). Hrono. .
[8] Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941–44 (Studies in Russian and Eastern European History), edited by John Barber and Andrei
Dzeniskevich. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-4039-0142-2).
[9] The siege of Leningrad. By Alan Wykes. Ballantines Illustrated History of WWII, 3rd edition, 1972. Pages 9-61, and, Scorched Earth. (pages
205 - 240) By Paul Carell. Schiffer Military History, 1994. ISBN 0-88740-598-3 and, Finland in the Second World War. Between Germany
and Russia. Palgrave. 2002. (pp. 90 - 141)
[10] Military-Topographic Directorate, maps No. 194, 196, Officer's Atlas. General Staff USSR. 1947. Атлас Офицера. Генеральный штаб
вооруженных сил ССР. М., Военно-топографическоее управление,- 1947. Листы 194, 196
[11] Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945 ISBN 0-14-027169-4 by Richard Overy Page 91
[12] The World War II. Desk Reference. Eisenhower Center Director Douglas Brinkley. Editor Mickael E. Haskey. Grand Central Press,
Stonesong Press, HarperCollins, 2004. ISBN0-06-052651-3. Page 210.
[13] Siege of Leningrad. Encyclopedia Britannica (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ bps/ topic/ 335949/
Siege-of-Leningrad#tab=active~checked,items~checked>/ bps/ topic/ 335949/ Siege-of-Leningrad& title=Siege of Leningrad -- Britannica
Online Encyclopedia)
[14] Peter Antill, Peter Dennis. Stalingrad 1942. Osprey Publishing, 2007,ISBN 1846030285, 9781846030284. p. 7.
[15] Bendersky,Joseph W., A History of Nazi Germany: 1919-1945, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, ISBN 083041567X, page 177
[16] Müller, Rolf-Dieter, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment, Berghahn Books, 2002, ISBN
157181293, page 244
[17] Shirer 1990, p. 716
[18] Rauschning, Hermann, Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims, Kessinger Publishing,
2006,ISBN 142860034, pages 136-7
Operation Barbarossa 26

[19] Text of the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (http:/ / www. fordham. edu/ halsall/ mod/ 1939pact. html), executed 23 August 1939
[20] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 30, ISBN 0300112041
[21] Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, 1990 ISBN 0671728687, page
668-9
[22] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 57, ISBN 0300112041
[23] Brackman, Roman, The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life, London and Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, ISBN 0714650501,
page 341-3
[24] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 59, ISBN 0300112041
[25] Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L. (1997), Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations,
1922-1941, Columbia University Press, pp. 202–205, ISBN 0231106769
[26] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 127, ISBN 0275963373
[27] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 129–130, ISBN 0275963373
[28] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 138, ISBN 0275963373
[29] Yergin, Daniel (1991), The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-671-79932-0 p. 334
[30] Overy, R. J. (2004), The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0393020304
[31] Brackman, Roman (2001), The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life, Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0714650501
[32] Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007), Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler,
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, Da Capo Press, ISBN 0306815389
[33] Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001), Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, Yale University Press, pp. 69–70,
ISBN 030008459
[34] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 162, ISBN 0275963373
[35] Bryan I. Fugate. Operation Barbarossa. Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. Novato: Presidio Press, 1984.
[36] Albert Speer identifies these points in the The World At War series in the episode "Barbarossa".
[37] Whaley, Barton:_ Codeword BARBAROSSA, Cambridge, London 1973, ISBN 0-262-73038-3, pp.1-10.
[38] Waller 1996, p. 192.
[39] N. Lyashchenko, 'O vystuplenii I. V. Stalina v Kremle, 5 maya 1941', Volkogonov Papers, reel no.8, p.1.
[40] Meltyukhov 2000:446 (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ 11. html) Table composed by the author according to: История
второй мировой войны. Т. 4. С. 18; 50 лет Вооруженных Сил СССР. М., 1968. С. 201; Советская военная энциклопедия. T. I. M., 1976,
С. 56; Боевой и численный состав Вооруженных Сил СССР в период Великой Отечественной войны (1941–1945 гг.). Статистический
сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.). М., 1994. С. 10–12; РГАСПИ. Ф. 71. Оп. 25. Д. 4134. Л. 1–8; Д. 5139. Л. 1; РГВА. Ф. 29. Оп. 46. Д. 272.
Л. 20–21; учтены пограничные и внутренние войска: Пограничные войска СССР в годы Второй мировой войны, 1939–1945. М., 1995.
С. 390–400; РГВА. Ф. 38261. Оп. 1. Д. 255. Л. 175–177, 340–349; Ф. 38650. Оп. 1. Д. 617. Л. 258–260; Ф. 38262. Оп. 1, Д. 41. Л. 83–84;
РГАЭ. Ф. 1562. Оп. 329. Д. 277. Л. 1–46, 62, 139; Д. 282. Л. 3–44.
[41] A.J.P Taylor & D. M Proektor,p98
[42] Meltyukhov 2000:414
[43] N.P.Zolotov and S.I. Isayev, "Boyegotovy byli...", Voenno-Istorichesskiy Zhurnal, N° 11: 1993, p. 77
[44] The Russian Front by James F. Dunnigan, Arms & Armour Press 1978, p 82, 88 ISBN 0-85368-152-X
[45] Rayfield 2004, p. 315.
[46] Dunnigan, Russian Front, pp 93-94
[47] Bergström, p11-12
[48] Glantz & House 1995, p. 42.
[49] Waller 1996, pp. 196-8.
[50] Waller 1996, p. 202.
[51] Roberts 1995, p. 1293.
[52] Wold at War series: Volume 5. Supported by Dr. Grigori Tokaty (1909-2003), defected to Britain 1947.
[53] Roberts 1995, p. 1297-1298
[54] Glantz 1991, p. 96.
[55] Roberts 1995, p. 1212-14.
[56] Roberts 1995, p. 1309-1310.
[57] Teddy J. Uldricks. The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler? Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp.
626-643
[58] André Mineau. Operation Barbarossa: ideology and ethics against human dignity Rodopi, 2004. ISBN 9789042016330
[59] Viktor Suvorov, Thomas B. Beattie. Icebreaker: who started the Second World War? Hamish Hamilton, 1990. ISBN 0241126223,
9780241126226
[60] Chris Bellami. Absolute war. Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Vinage, 2007. ISBN 9870375724718. p.103.
Operation Barbarossa 27

[61] Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives, Anchor, (1997) ISBN
0-385-47954-9, pages 454-459 "In view of the fact that Germany at present keeps its army fully mobilized with its rear services deployed, it
has the capacity of deploying ahead of us and striking a sudden blow. To prevent this I consider it important not to leave the operational
initiative to the German command in any circumstances, but to anticipate the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it is in
the process of deploying and before it has time to organize its front and the coordination of its various arms".
[62] R. C. Raack Reviewed work(s):Was the USSR Planning to Attack Germany in 1941? by Joseph Bradley Source: Central European History,
Vol. 32, No. 4 (1999), pp. 491-493)
[63] Bergström 2007, p. 130:Uses figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen;
WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin
[64] Meltyukhov 2000, (electronic version) (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ index. html). Note that due to the fact that Russian
archives have been and to an extent still are inaccessible, exact figures have been difficult to ascertain.
The official Soviet sources invariably over-estimated German strength and downplayed Soviet strength, as emphasized by David Glantz
(1998:292). Some of the earlier Soviet figures claimed that there had been only 1,540 Soviet aircraft to face Germany's 4,950; that there were
merely 1,800 Red Army tanks and assault guns facing 2,800 German units etc.
In 1991, Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov published an article on this question (Мельтюхов М.И. 22 июня 1941 г.: цифры
свидетельствуют // История СССР. 1991. № 3) with other figures that slightly differed from those of the table here, though had similar
ratios. Glantz (1998:293) was of the opinion that those figures “appear[ed] to be most accurate regarding Soviet forces and those of Germany's
allies,″ though other figures also occur in modern publications.
[65] Keith E. Bonn (ed.), Slaughterhouse: Handbook of the Eastern Front, Aberjona Press, Bedford, PA, 2005, p.299
[66] John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, Cassel Military Paperbacks, 2003 edition, p.172
[67] Bergström 2007, p. 20
[68] Bergstrom 2007, p. 23.
[69] Glantz & House 1995, p. 49.
[70] Glantz & House 1995, p. 51.
[71] (Lithuanian) Gediminas Zemlickas. Pasaulyje—kaip savo namuose, Mokslo Lietuva, 11 February 1998, No. 3 (161) (http:/ / ic. lms. lt/
ml/ 161/ zemlickas. htm)
[72] Bergstrom 2007, p. 36.
[73] as cited by Suvorov: http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ suvorov7/ 12. html
[74] Bergstrom 2007, p. 70.
[75] According to http:/ / www. soldat. ru/ doc/ casualties/ book/ chapter5_13_08. html based on German sources (see site reference page)
[76] Tartu in the 1941 Summer War (http:/ / www. bdcol. ee/ fileadmin/ docs/ bdreview/ bdr-2003-9-13. pdf). By Major Riho Rõngelep and
Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen (2003). Baltic Defence Review 9
[77] Glantz & House 1995, p. 77.
[78] A. Clark 1995, p. 165.
[79] Shirer, William (1964), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pan, pp. 1032
[80] "A Day By Day Diary of WWII" (http:/ / www. bartcop. com/ 41081218. htm). . Retrieved 13 June 2006. See also Charles Messenger, The
Chronological Atlas of World War Two (New York: Macmillan Publishing 1989), p. 63.
[81] Strausß, Franz Joseph, Die Geschichte der 2.(Weiener)Panzer Division, pg 337. DÖRFLER im NEBEL VERLAG, Eggolsheim DE.
[82] Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, 11 October 2001, page 7
[83] Beevor, Stalingrad. Penguin 2001 ISBN 0141001313 p60
[84] German Attack of USSR ISBN 80 - 7237 - 279 - 3
[85] van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Cambridge, 1977. ISBN 0-421-29793-1
[86] "CSI" (http:/ / www. cgsc. edu/ carl/ resources/ csi/ Chew/ CHEW. asp). . Retrieved 2 April 2010.
[87] http:/ / www. rus-sky. org/ history/ library/ w/
[88] http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ index. html
[89] http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ suvorov3/ index. html
[90] http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ system/ topicRoot/ Operation_Barbarossa/
[91] http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ books/ wwii/ balkan/ 20_260_5. htm
[92] http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ books/ wwii/ balkan/ append. htm
[93] http:/ / english. pobediteli. ru/
[94] http:/ / www. militaryhistoryonline. com/ wwii/ articles/ barbarossa. aspx
[95] http:/ / www. foia. cia. gov/ CPE/ CAESAR/ caesar-25. pdf
[96] http:/ / www. krunch. ru/ page/ june22/
Article Sources and Contributors 28

Article Sources and Contributors


Operation Barbarossa  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=386692911  Contributors: (, .:Ajvol:., 0x6adb015, 119, 128.32.172.xxx, 14thArmored, 1exec1, 200.191.188.xxx, 3
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Eldumpo, Elrith, Emptyroute666, Epbr123, Eric Shalov, Ericoides, Esn, Esperant, Eurocopter, EvanHarper, Everyking, Excirial, Existenjoy, Explained Cause, Fallschirmjäger, Fartherred,
Favonian, Finlay McWalter, Firstorm, Flamerfrogpig, Fleminra, Folks at 137, Frank A, FrankA, Fullmetal.shinigami, GCarty, Gabr-el, Gaius Cornelius, Gatoclass, Gbinal, Gdr, Gene Nygaard,
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Image:Nazi-Soviet 1941.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Nazi-Soviet_1941.png  License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors: Original uploader was
Mosedschurte at en.wikipedia
File:Europe before Operation Barbarossa, 1941 (in German).png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Europe_before_Operation_Barbarossa,_1941_(in_German).png
 License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors: MaGioZal
Image:Fall Barbarossa 1.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Fall_Barbarossa_1.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Adolf Hitler
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