G.R.

1051 May 19, 1903

U.S. v. Dorr

FACTS:

1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of writing, publishing and
circulating scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.

2. The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06 April 1902 as an editorial
issue.

3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to important Government
positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity).

The following are part of the article:

“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who
should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the
Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during struggle, at the
risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”

“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be
notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character”.

“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil Commission are
rotten and corrupt…xxx”.

4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against it. However, albeit
the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be
regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient
to the laws.

5. There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil. Islands”, is used in
Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and institutions of the Islands” or “the
aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands is administered”?
ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292 for it directly
attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the Phil. Island?

RULING:

1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the
government is the aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration)”.[1]

2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in an abstract sense
(e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political system, its laws and institutions. The
Court opines that it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under
consideration.

3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil. Islands” is the
government as a system, however, the article in questions attacks the ‘government’ as the
aggregate of public officials who run it.

4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of
the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is
the character of men who are entrusted with the administration of the government which the
writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private morals and
wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not constitute any seditious tendency being
apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.

Respondents are acquitted.

[1] ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its
stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved
with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state
action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest,
bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC Case DigestSANIDAD VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-446640OCTOBER 12,
1976FACTS:On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by
the President of his present powers.Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President
issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential
Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential
Decree No. 991, the full text of which is quoted in the footnote below.On the same date of
September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to
be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites
in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The questions ask, to wit:(1) Do you want martial law to be
continued?(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have
the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.On
September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the
court has jurisdiction over the case?2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution?3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:Issue 1 –Justiciability of the courtsWe cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose
amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that
the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the
constitutional provision has been followed or notis the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the
people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.Issue 2 –
Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?As
earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a
matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that
judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's
preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.
Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that
constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of
the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to
its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his
office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather,
with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for
and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.Issue 3 -Is the submission to the
people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper
submission?It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the
specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333;
G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case
Digests,Political Law

Facts:This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violatesthe constitutionalguarantees of thefreedom of
expressionand of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THECORDILLERAAUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising theCordilleraAutonomous
Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled
last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec
Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the
power vested by the1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
on the said Organic Act for theCordilleraAutonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20,
1989, herein petitioner Pablito V.Sanidad,whoclaims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW"
for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the
Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides:Section 19.Prohibitionon columnists, commentators or announcers. —During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and
unconstitutional because it violatesthe constitutionalguarantees of thefreedom of
expressionand of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or
news correspondentwhomerely reports the news,

petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and
reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner
likewise maintains thatif mediapractitionerswere to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the
issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate
information, and hear, as well asventilate, all sides of the issue.Issue:Whether or not Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.Held:The Supreme Courtruled that Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the1987
Constitutionthatwhatwas granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the
use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil
sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also
the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality,whois a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period
(2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentatorwhois
also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates
unless required to take a leave of absence.However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11 (b), 2nd

par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulatethe exerciseby mediapractitionersthemselves of their right toexpression
during plebiscite periods. Mediapractitionersexercising theirfreedom of expressionduring plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis.Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned
because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television
times.The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and
void and unconstitutional

Javellana vs Executive Secretary

Plebiscite; Comelec; Justiciable Question

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

 The Plebiscite Case

1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was
amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of
delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting
the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January
15, 1973.

5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections,
the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no
force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question
to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose,
are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there
being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to
inform the people of the contents thereof.”

6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the
Proposed Constitution.

7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was
taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.”
Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite,

the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned
cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held
 were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935
Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the
main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders
of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to
defer its final action on these cases.

9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an
“urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not
later than January 15, 1973.”

10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution
requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion”
and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or
on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948
riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining
respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments
and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,
Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its
Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other
officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and
announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called
Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the
two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the
respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not
later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on
January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last
mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and
said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering
to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the
President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith
was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102,
earlier that morning.

 The Ratification Case

1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
 implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the
present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced
the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.

2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said

proposed constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve
proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people
of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution
was not a free election, hence null and void.

3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or
not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of
the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment
to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force
at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
 2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with
the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here
and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.

2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means
by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.

3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or
by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and
logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian
Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared
and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of
keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.

4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took
place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of
checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites.
This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of
the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the
“free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite
in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution

3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has
even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice
Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
 decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition
by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate
that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”

3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to
rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in
their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions
through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the
point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution.

1. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally
connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of
recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless
the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-
established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare
that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a
number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.

2. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action
under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps,
and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative
measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

3. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the
proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or
majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the
1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the
submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification
 or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

3. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.

1. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members
of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough
votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.