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Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 1 Responsabilidade sem liberdade 1. A ameaça Tenho vindo a escrever livremente sobre a responsabilidade moral, na medida ignorando uma visão popular entre os filósofos que não existe tal coisa. As pessoas são responsáveis pelos seus actos apenas quando eles são no controle do que eles fazem - apenas, no jargão filosófico padrão, quando eles têm e agir de um livre-arbítrio. Você não é responsável pelo prejuízo quando alguém empurra-lo em um mendigo cego, por exemplo, ou quando um hipnotizador faz você roubar o copo de mendigo. Muitos filósofos - e muitas outras pessoas - acredite que essa observação aparentemente inocente está em fato inteiramente destrutiva de pelo menos central e grande parte da ética e da moralidade. Eles pressionam o poderíamos chamar de "não livre-arbítrio" desafio da seguinte forma. "As pessoas nunca estão realmente em controle de seu próprio comportamento, mesmo quando parece que eles são. Sua vontade nunca é livre porque seu comportamento é sempre causada por uma combinação de leis físicas ou biológicas e influências ambientais agindo em seus cérebros, uma combinação de forças e eventos totalmente além de seu controle. A responsabilidade moral é, portanto, uma ilusão e é sempre inadequado manter as pessoas censurável ou castigá-los por aquilo que fazem. "Este desafio moral responsabilidade é completamente independente da questão discuti no capítulo N: se o que chamei de tese de impacto causal é o som. O desafio seria pelo menos tão ameaçadora como se aceitássemos que a tese e acredita que a verdade sobre o valor que tem ou pode ter um impacto causal sobre nossas mentes. O livre-arbítrio desafio é provavelmente o mais popular única questão filosófica ter escapado os livros-texto e entrou na literatura popular e da imaginação. A literatura filosófica está em se assustadoramente vasto e complexo. Ela entrelaça três grupos de problemas que devemos tomar
cuidado de separar. Encontramos, em primeiro lugar, as discussões sobre as causas e conseqüências de pensamento e ação. É todo o comportamento humano totalmente determinado por eventos anteriores sobre os quais as próprias pessoas não têm controle? Se não, é um comportamento causado por acaso, ao acaso ou biológicas sobre eventos físicos que, igualmente, as pessoas não têm nenhum controle? Ou pode alguma faculdade da mente humana - a "vontade" exercer uma espécie de agência de propósito que não seja causado por alguma coisa em si, mas sua ocorrência própria? Pode um ser humano será uma causa sem causa? Vou chamar esses "científica" questões, mas muitos filósofos disputariam em conta este nome impróprio. Eles consideram, pelo menos, uma das perguntas que listei se a vontade humana pode agir espontaneamente, como uma causa sem causa - como uma questão metafísica ao invés de uma de física ou biologia. Achamos, por outro, as discussões sobre o que é denominado "liberdade". Em que circunstâncias é alguém livre para agir como ele deseja? É a sua liberdade comprometida apenas quando ele está sujeito a algumas externas restrição - apenas quando ele está ligado ou fechado, por exemplo? Ou quando ele está mentalmente doente? Ou quando ele não consegue governar a si mesmo ou controlar seus apetites que ele deseja? Ou quando ele não
Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 2 comportam-se como razão e verdadeira moralidade exige? Ou é a sua ilusória liberdade sempre que suas escolhas e comportamento são inevitáveis dada eventos anteriores ou forças além de seu controle? Ele é livre, isto é, apenas se e quando a sua própria vontade age como a causa sem causa de seu comportamento? Finalmente, em terceiro lugar, encontramos discussões de responsabilidade. Quando é apropriado para alguém para julgar seu comportamento crítico, e para os outros para julgá-lo dessa forma? Quando é apropriado para ele sentir orgulho ou de remorso, por exemplo, ou para outros elogios ou culpá lo? Sempre que ele age ao invés de se posta em prática? Sempre que ele toma decisões por si mesmo ao invés de ser, por
exemplo, hipnotizado? Ou somente quando sua vontade é a causa sem causa de suas ações? Apenas esta última edição - da responsabilidade - é a nossa preocupação aqui. É uma questão ética. (Também é, naturalmente, uma moral questão, mas vou me concentrar principalmente na sua dimensão ética neste capítulo.) É, pois, distinto do primeiro conjunto de questões: as questões científicas que podem ser respondidas, se em tudo, só através da investigação empírica ou especulação metafísica. Algumas pessoas, embora poucas filósofos, parecem apenas assumir que se o determinismo é realmente verdade, então a responsabilidade moral é necessariamente ser apenas uma ilusão. Mas essa inferência requer uma ética premissa maior e, como nós veremos, é muito longe de ser óbvio se qualquer premissa ética mais plausível seria tornar o inferência de som. O segundo grupo de questões - sobre a liberdade - não são, no entanto, independente dos outros dois grupos: não há verdadeira questão sobre se as pessoas são livres no sentido em questão, que é ou não a científica ou a questão ética no disfarce. Alguns filósofos, aparentemente, usar o idéia de liberdade, simplesmente para dizer o não-determinismo: dizer que as pessoas são realmente livres, assumir, apenas significa que o determinismo é falso. Outros usam a idéia de liberdade, simplesmente para se referir a responsabilidade moral: eles dizem que as pessoas são ou não são livres quando eles querem dizer apenas que eles são ou não são moralmente responsáveis por suas ações. Nenhuma destas formas de expressão é um erro conceitual: não é um erro linguístico, quer dizer que as pessoas não são realmente livres desde determinismo é verdadeiro ou que as pessoas são realmente livres, mesmo se o determinismo é verdadeiro, quando são sujeito a nenhuma restrição externa. Se houver algum conflito real entre essas duas declarações, o conflito é um dos substantivos não ética precisão conceitual. Então, falando de liberdade neste contexto é inútil e muitas vezes os patrocinadores confusão. Proponho não discutir liberdade neste capítulo, embora o meu assunto é a polêmica livre -arbítrio. Daí o título do capítulo. A nossa pergunta é a terceira, a questão da responsabilidade. Como vamos enfrentar essa questão?
Nossas discussões anteriores sobre a natureza do raciocínio ético e moral são diretamente no ponto. A mundo de valor é parte do mundo de interpretação: a ética ea moral são melhor compreendidas como gêneros interpretativo. Podemos defender qualquer uma de nossas convicções sobre como viver e como devemos tratar os outros apenas pela incorporação de que a condenação em uma estrutura maior de valor a partir do qual ele desenha, e para a qual contribui, suporte argumentativo. Não podemos aceitar qualquer conta de ética ou
Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 3 responsabilidade moral, não importa o quão convincente que parece por conta própria, se não podemos aceitar a sua prorrogado ou moral conseqüências éticas. Temos de resistir a qualquer reclamação sobre as condições de responsabilidade que é oferecido como um axioma: não há axiomas em uma estrutura interpretativa. Os filósofos às vezes dizem que eles têm uma "inabalável" a intuição de que as pessoas não podem ser responsabilizados por suas ações, se o determinismo é verdadeiro. Talvez eles possam defender que "a intuição" contra os argumentos contrários Vou oferecer neste capítulo: talvez eles possam encontrar mais geral éticas ou convicções morais que a sustentam, ou talvez eles podem mos trar que a intuição é tão firmemente tecidas no tecido da nossa vida que não pode de forma sensata e plausível ser questionada. Eu acho que não, porém. Vou argumentar, ao contrário, que a inabalável convicção de suposto encontra quase nenhuma moral ou ética independente de apoio em tudo. É condenado e não suportado pelo resto do que pensamos. debates clássicos do livre-arbítrio e responsabilidade, muitas vezes começam em uma moral, ao invés de uma ética problema. É direito de punir ou castigar alguém por um dano que infligiu, quando foi alucinante, ou sofrendo de algum distúrbio mental outras? Ou se ele tivesse um infeliz educação ou agiu sob coação? Seria justo alguém preso que cometeu um crime, enquanto
agindo sob uma ou outra dessas deficiências? Se não, porquê? Estas questões e as respostas antecipadas preparar o caminho, nos debates modernos, para a ameaça do determinismo: se as ações de todos estão determinados por forças além de seu controle em nossa maneira de pensar doentes mentais ações muitas vezes as pessoas são, então, é tão injusto culpar ninguém, pois é para culpar os mentalmente doente. Proponho-me começar de forma diferente: perguntando como e por que as pessoas normalmente se colocam responsável por aquilo que eles têm feito, e porque, em alg umas circunstâncias, não e não deve fazê-lo. Essa tática diferente traz a estratégia do capítulo em linha com a estratégia geral de o livro, que tenta chamar a moralidade, como um departamento do valor, fora do melhor entendimento da ética - o melhor entendimento, ou seja, de como viver bem. Neste caso, a estratégia permite nos concentrar em algo importante que a estratégia mais usual nos tenta ignorar. Quando começamos na primeira vez que a terceira pessoa, damos mais atenção à forma como se sente ao ser confrontado com uma decisão. Nós pagamos mais atenção, nomeadamente, à impossibilidade de decidir, sem assumir a responsabilidade pela forma como se tem decidido. 2. Questões Preliminares Tipos de Responsabilidade Responsabilidade é um conceito complicado, usamos a "responsabilidade moral" e "moralmente responsável", em diversos e facilmente confundida sentidos. A responsabilidade moral, em todos os sentidos, é diferente da responsabilidade causal. Uma pessoa é causalmente responsável por um evento, podemos dizer que, se algum ato de dele é parte da cadeia causal que melhor explica a ocorrência desse evento. Eu seria causalmente
Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 4 responsável por um prejuízo para o mendigo cego, se eu tivesse colidido com ele distraidamente ou enquanto bêbado ou maluco ou até mesmo apenas acidentalmente. (Mas não quando alguém me empurrou para ele
da atribuição responsabilidade. (Ele agiu responsavelmente em recusar o suborno. Eu tenho a responsabilidade de julgar o meu ato em pé o mendigo lhe dar nada. enfim. Um político que envia sua nação para a guerra com inteligência inadequada claramente é irresponsável em todas as três formas. Devemos distinguir a responsabilidade virtude. se for o seu dever de atender ou cuidar dele. Alguém tem responsabilidade por algum ato de julgamento. Virtude de causalidade. ou que ele se comportou de forma responsável ou irresponsável em agir como ele fez. A última pessoa a sair de uma sala.) Tornamos distinções entre diferentes formas ou modos de responsabilidade virtude: distinguimos intelectual. julgamento é de responsabilidade . Estes são todos. se for apropriado para elogiar ou criticar seu agir contra um norma que determina como as pessoas devem se comportar. Um cientista que não verifica seus cálculos carece responsabilidade intelectual. agir sem meu tem contribuído para o prejuízo. que é a responsabilidade moral para os resultados de algum ato ou evento.) A longa discussão do Capítulo N focada em uma espécie de responsabilidade moral. que eu agora chamo de "virtude" da responsabilidade. Esse é o tipo de responsabilidade que temos em mente quando dizemos que alguém é responsável ou pessoa irresponsável. Alguém tem a responsabilidade de atribuição de alguma matéria. então. um empregador pode ter responsabilidade por qualquer dano conseqüência de seus funcionários causar. como uma forma de responsabilidade moral. Eu tenho responsabilidade consequência dos danos que causam ao meu condução negligente. mas não para o mal quando alguém empurra me nele. poderíamos dizer. Esses diferentes sentidos de responsabilidade moral são claramente interligados. ser distinguido de responsabilidade de julgamento. um escritor que não faz backup de seus arquivos não tem responsabilidade prática. Ele teria sido irresponsável se tivesse aceite. moral e responsabilidade prática. é responsável por desligar as luzes eo sargento é responsável por seu pelotão.porque. uma eleitor que vota em um candidato porque ele descobre que sua sexy não tem responsabilidade moral. ea atribuição responsabilidade por sua vez são diferentes de responsabilidade conseqüência.
que o comportamento não é sempre determinado pelos acontecimentos passados para além do de controle do agente. ou como uma questão de qualquer ciência ou metafísica. por exemplo. Nós não podemos ser convencido . por exemplo. ou ambos. Somente atos para os quais alguém é judgmentally responsável pode corretamente figura no julgamento global se está a virtude responsável. É verdade. nunca se adequado atribuir a responsabilidade de julgamento qualquer um. Em qualquer caso. as pessoas por vezes. mas que a conseqüência responsabilidade depende de terem a responsabilidade por algum ato de julgamento das suas próprias: definição empregados ao trabalho. os empregadores podem ter conseqüência a responsabilidade pelos danos causa seus empregados -. é da responsabilidade de julgamento que o desafio agora estamos preocupados com as chamadas diretamente na questão. que não podemos realmente acreditar. Mais terminologia será útil. portanto.necessária para a responsabilidade moral dos outros sentidos. e incompatibilistas acreditam que não é. A literatura do "livre arbítrio" problema divide os filósofos que se preocupar se a responsabilidade de julgamento é coerente com Página 5 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 5 determinismo ou epifenomenalismo em duas categorias. Isso pode ser certo? As estacas É importante notar. porque eles acreditam. e que é. desde o início. em geral boa para os escravos. Alguns incompatibilistas são otimistas: eles Acreditamos que a responsabilidade de julgamento é verdadeiro. Eu não quero dizer só que é difícil acreditar que a forma como alguém pode achar difícil acreditar que um amante tem traído ou que a escravidão foi . têm conseqüências para a responsabilidade dos actos dos outros como eu disse. incompatibilistas Outros são pessimistas: eles acreditam que todo comportamento é determinado por acontecimentos passados. ou agiu de forma contrária à sua responsabilidade de atribuição. Compatibilistas acreditam que é consistente.
que estava sempre destinada a passar por ele. nada vai acontecer. Suponha que você realmente acredita que suas decisões e ações são totalmente determinadas por eventos além de seu próprio controle. além disso. Você pode pausar. ou que a sua sensação de tomada de decisões é apenas o efeito mais que a causa do que você faz. depois de passar o mendigo. Mas. não simplesmente agindo como se o ato fosse um tique ou uma tosse. Você não pode escolher. ou seja. considerando ainda que razões você tem a agir de uma maneira ou outra. eles não podem agir sem sentido. No entanto. Claro que esta necessidade não é moral nem ética crítica: raramente é. e mesmo assim você optou por parar e.que você pode dar ao luxo de dar a cada mendigo que enfrentar? Mas você continuará a segurar a sua escolha a um padrão normativo. que decisão seria. então. você não pode escolher. Você deve escolher. porque não há maneira que nós podemos viver sem pedir. Você está convencido. depois de ter dado dinheiro a ele. congelados em suas trilhas. Uma sensação de responsabilidade de julgamento não é um complemento opcional para as pessoas como elas agem. você não pode revogar ou o pensamento ou o fato de que tem uma escolha a fazer. sem supor que existe um melhor e pior escolha para que você faça. ver o que vai acontecer. você irá escolher para fazer qualquer outra coisa. excepto em questões banais particular. de alguma forma melhor. sem supor que sua escolha é uma questão apropriada para a autocrítica. porque foram destinadas a ignorar o mendigo que não têm culpa e não tenho nada a lamentar em ter . Depois que você escolher você pode ser capaz de tratar a escolha dessa forma: você pode insistir. Pode criticar-se o que você tomar para ser motivos puramente instrumental . que sua consciência decisão de entregar-lhe um dólar ou dois não desempenhou nenhum papel efetivo na sua realmente fazendo isso. mesmo para si mesmo. o que significa que não podemos viver sem julgar o nosso comportamento como agimos. quando você se aproxima dele. Ou. como nós decidir o que fazer.mesmo intelectualmente que não estamos judgmentally responsáveis por nossas ações. eventualmente. Você não pode levantar-se acima de si mesmo só para ver como você escolher.
teria nenhuma razão para sentir remorso ou vergonha . desleal. em ambos enganar os meus impostos é moralmente errado e também que eu não seria censurável . para declarar que um criminoso tenha feito algo moral mente errado e ainda é possível acrescentar que ele tem demonstrado um moralmente mau caráter. De Nessa perspectiva. a moralidade é uma rede integrada de normas. os pedidos Página 6 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 6 mais que isso. Normalmente. . Se enganar é moralmente errado. seu impacto ético.feito isso.se eu enganado. Ainda é possível. ou seja. que você nunca tem a responsabilidade de julgamento. está imune juízo crítico desde o início. ou seja. e é isso que você simplesmente não pode acreditar. Como é que pode mostrar um mau caráter para fazer o que não é errado fazer? Do ponto de vista de alguém decidir como agir. Eu não posso. Isso pode parecer uma fórmula extravagante do que incompatibilistas pessimista pedir-lhe para acreditar. deve pelo menos fazer sentido para mim. Mas a conclusão ameaçada. então eu tenho uma razão de um tipo particularmente forte para não enganar. Mas essa distinção torna-se problemático quando se considera o impacto da determinismo da perspectiva de primeira pessoa: quando nós consideramos. e é difícil ver como eu poderia vir a acreditar que. por tudo isto exclui. sentir culpa ou vergonha se eu agir ao contrário do que razão. em Galen Strawson hipérbole. vemos padrões críticos como nos fornecer razões a favor ou contra os actos. para Deus enviar alguém para o inferno. se eu realmente acredito que o determinismo faz insensata de criticar-me dessa forma. Nem posso pensar que se enganar revelaria um mau caráter. Então. não posso pensar que tenho uma razão moral para não trapaça. o foco em uma dimensão de crítica: eles argumentam que se o determinismo é verdade. como uma tosse que não pode parar. Alega que a sua decisão. então é errado culpar ou punir alguém por aquilo que ele faz. e se eu tiver uma razão desse tipo especial. acho que a trapaça é moralmente errado.
É por isso que não podemos realmente acreditar Incompatibilismo pessimista. determinismo fora não ter razões de alguns tipo especial. então todos nós. para exemplo. igualmente questões além do meu controle. Além disso. Mas e quanto à crítica de outras normas que normalmente empregam na auto crítica? Se eu abraço Incompatibilismo pessimistas ainda posso supor que as razões de prudência do interesse próprio. então a sua aniquilando o poder é católica através razões. o que significa que vamos acho que temos motivos. Mas se o determinismo significa que não há nenhuma maneira que eu deveria se comportar quando o destino já determinou como eu vai se comportar. então.não é uma coleção de módulos amovíveis cada um dos quais pode ser eliminado. que é. deixando o resto. vamos. porque cada um é uma questão além do meu controle. afinal. Razões vai multidão em cima de nós quando temos de decidir. Se o determinismo significa que estamos apenas Página 7 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 7 peões da natureza. quando desviou para o ar frio e se dissipar. mas a própria idéia de ter razões. mesmo mais ou menos intacta. da natureza. apesar de nossa consciência. intelectualmente . Pessimista compatibilismo não não é um país estável. os furacões e as pessoas. Também não são imprudente. não violam as normas morais ou mostrar mau caráter moralmente. finalmente. andar na mesma barco do mar. Acho que tenho uma razão de qualquer espécie para atuar em uma forma ou de outra só quando eu tirar esse motivo alegado para afectar a forma como eu deveria agir. atuar sobre alguns e rejeitar outros. Os furacões não são censuráveis quando eles matam. então também deve apagar qualquer diferença entre o meu ser surpreendido por relâmpagos e minha tomando meu pequeno barco em uma tempesta de com raios: ambos são. exigir-me a agir de uma forma ou de outra? Eu não acho que se eu me tola Foi atingido por um raio em uma tempestade súbita e inesperada. Se o determinismo apaga a moral ou ético diferença entre ser atingido por um raio e traindo os meus impostos.
em seguida. Alguns advogados criminalistas um alegaram que devemos abandonar tradicionais direito penal. 3. mesmo que nada mais fez. mas a incoerência: ele nos pede para acredito que não podemos acreditar. dizem. e substituir apenas o tratamento terapêutico porque. Claro que é. . o que é que nós todos a falta de responsabilidade para julgar qualquer coisa. funcionários que tratam de criminosos acusados como responsáveis por suas ações não são responsáveis pelos seus próprias ações. as pessoas nunca são responsáveis pelo que fazem e por isso é injusto culpar e puni-los. Primeiro. então. e por isso é errado para acusá-los de agir de forma injusta. Este absurdo revela recursiva. Mas A conclusão. interpretativamente teoria. que não podemos acreditar que a proposição em que as dobradiças. Eu tenho enfatizado a perspectiva de primeira pessoa em defender essa conclusão forte. como eu tenho. 1 Eles se contradizem: se ninguém tem a responsabilidade de julgamento. E errado me a acusar-me de acusá-los indevidamente. de agir de forma errada em acusar a Funcionários de agir de forma errada. Mas se assim é depende do questões éticas e morais começamos agora explorar. porque eu não sou responsável tanto. então mantém na terceira pessoa também. a posição do responsável. lembre-se da economia ordinárias da responsabilidade de julgamento: a maneira como você e outros utilizam a idéia de responsabilidade no dia-a-dia. Duas versões de Controle Talvez estejamos condenados a incoerência que acabei de descrever. Se eu não posso acreditar que me falta responsabilidade de julgamento. satisfazendo da responsabilidade moral. E assim por diante. também mal de mim para acusar os criminologistas. Talvez haja apenas não é consistente. mesmo quando eu aceitar que minhas próprias ações são determinadas. não tenho base para supor que alguém não tem a responsabilid ade de julgamento só porque suas ações são determinado. Não se recomenda a reforma.filosóficos. com seu aparato de culpa e punição. porque o criminologistas não somos responsáveis também.
sobre os estados mentais de outras pessoas. o momento em que um dado é lançado. como parte do que a capacidade. Alguém que é incapaz de compreender o fato de que as armas podem ferir as pessoas não é responsável quando ele alguém atira.comportamento deliberado tem uma vida interior: há uma maneira que sente deliberadamente para agir. . preferências. o momento em que a decisão de agir se confunde com a ação decidida. alguma habilidade mínima para formar crenças verdadeiras sobre o mundo. Nós tem em mente. não devem ser responsabilizados porque eles não tinham alguma capacidade essencial para a responsabilidade. Pretendemos fazer alguma coisa e nós fazemos isso. no entanto. Página 8 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 8 agir e ser atendido: entre empurrar e ser empurrado. entre 1 Cite Clarence Darrow. no primeiro caso. Nós também temos em mente. O nosso complexo de idéias mais sobre a responsabilidade depende de melhorias nessas idéias bruto. que o decisão não reflete a sua própria sentença ou a intenção. mas sim de sua mente e controlador neste último caso. Há um momento de decisão final. a capacidade de tomar decisões que se encaixam o que poderíamos chamar de personalidade agente normativo: seus desejos. mas também daqueles que agem sob a controle de outra pessoa. Podemos distinguir as ocasiões normais em que as pessoas decidem agir não só daqueles em que são postas em prática. mas não para o que acontece conosco: por dirigir muito rápido. e sobre as prováveis consequências do que fazem. mas não por ser atingido por um raio. que. como parte dessa capacidade. essencial para a nossa experiência ética e moral. Nós pensamos que somos judgmentally responsável por aquilo que fazemos. Nós dizemos. Essa sensação interna de ação deliberada marca a distinção. apesar de ter agido em seu próprio julgamento ou a intenção que. como em hipnose ou tecnologia formas superiores de controle da mente. ou quando são vítimas de certas formas de deficiência mental ou doença.
É verdade. ou alguém cujo senso de certo e errado foi deformada assistindo a violência na televisão. mesmo quando estes contradizem os impulsos todos os seus efeitos mais reflexiva.o "sistema de responsabilidade". poderíamos chamá-lo . é judgmentally responsável por seus atos. Nós podemos portanto. abordar a questão deste capítulo . Eu deveria me segurar ou outras pessoas responsáveis por aquilo que eu ou eles fazem quando estão no controle de suas próprio comportamento. Mas uma plausível teoria filosófica da responsabilidade deve explicar. em seguida. por que eu sou responsável por ignorar um mendigo. convicções ou anexos é incapaz de ação responsável.tentando construir e justificativas morais éticos do sistema de responsabilidade para ver se estas a responsabilidade colocada em risco. decisões Genuíno. como demonstra a literatura filosófica. Esse princípio de controle explica. lealdade e auto-imagem. Este sistema de idéias sobre responsabilidade . É deve identificar de forma mais geral ou moral dos princípios éticos que fundamentam os principais contornos do sistema e. são propositais. e alguém que não pode igualar a sua decisão final a qualquer um dos seus desejos. Pode parecer óbvio o princípio ético e moral justifica o sistema de responsabilidade. sobre se alguém que é incapaz de resistir aos impulsos decorrentes do intervalo cego. mas não quando eles não são . Mas. o controle . ou alguém que é forçado a agir contra suas convicções por ameaça de dano grave se ele não tiver. apegos. Discordamos. por exemplo.convicções. pensamos. mas não quando estou empurrados para ele.é compatível com a responsabilidade de julgamento determinismo . ao menos abstrata recurso do sistema. explicar de que forma esses princípios estão satisfeitos ou porque eles não são.é muito amplamente compartilhada quando se afirma como abstratamente como eu tenho. ou para o que eu faço quando eu ajo Página 9 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 9 de doença mental grave. planos. muito do que o sistema torna -se controversa quando especificado em maior detalhe. por exemplo.
se a sua decisão ea ação são completamente causados por eventos anteriores além de sua controle ou se sua decisão não faz parte da cadeia causal que termina em sua ação. Poderíamos adotar essa versão diferente. Mas outras interpretações do princípio do controlo de salvaguardar o compatibilismo. Ele faz o controle e. transferir a responsabilidade sobre o que está disponível para um agente de introspecção e para os outros através da interpretação de seu comportamento geral. o princípio de controle criativo ou algo muito . e que o mais proeminente compatibilistas. Vou chamar essa versão do princípio do controlo o "controle princípio criativo". as interpretações do princípio do controle abstrato estão disponíveis. É claro que muitos outros. portanto. Mas o meu muito longe de amostragem abrangente da literatura sugere que historicamente mais proeminentes e incompatibilistas contemporânea aceitar. Uma vez que o determinismo afirma que as pessoas nunca estão no controle dessa forma. incluindo Hobbes. diferente e mais complexo. em torno ea partir nossos cérebros. por exemplo. alguma versão do princípio de controle hidráulico. Collins e Hume. assim como compatibilistas moderna. porque faz transferir a responsabilidade sobre a causalidade dos fluxos de energia eléctrica ou outra força natural para. como um princípio ético e moral profundo.princípio pode ser interpretado de uma grande variedade de formas e qual a interpretação que acreditamos melhor capta o seu recurso vai determinar se estamos ou compatibilista sob re incompatibilistas responsabilidade. Poderíamos chamar esta versão do princípio do controlo do "princípio de controle hidráulico". por exemplo: as pessoas estão em controle de seu próprio comportamento quando eles têm e podem exercer as duas capacidades que eu descrevi as capacidades normais de formar crenças com base em provas e argumentos e chegar a decisões que são chamados pela sua personalidade normativa. o sistema hidráulico princípio de controle produz Incompatibilismo. Podemos interpretar a exigência de controle da seguinte maneira. porque pressupõe que as pessoas criam sua s vidas através de suas decisões independentemente de a melhor explicação causal dessas decisões. Uma pessoa não está em controle de seu comportamento.
mais que rege nossas vidas. seres conscientes podem situar-nos em qualquer um dos dois mundos: o mundo fenomenal cada um de nós cria e evolui através e em sua vida mental eo mundo natural que nos inclui. que seria útil para os nossos propósitos para comparar e contrastar as duas versões princípio do controle abstrato mais. Essa reivindicação histórica não faz parte do meu argumento e não vou persegui-lo. Página 10 Livre-Arbítrio e Responsabilidade: Projecto Não Cotação 10 Devemos concentrar-nos agora. o ponto da responsabilidade do sistema geral. por uma questão de ética ou moral análise. Podemos afirmar a diferença.como ele em mente. sobre o importante e filosófica grandes diferenças entre os dois princípios que afectam a possibilidade e caráter de julgamento responsabilidade. O princípio de controle hidráulico assume a responsabilidade de ser essencialmente um fato da segunda mundo: é um facto fixada pelo papel do resto do mundo natural para explicar o nosso comportamento. através de uma metáfora espacial familiar. seja porque estamos compatibilistas ou porque somos otimista não compatibilistas. Os princípios expressam diferentes concepções radicalmente do ponto do resumo exigência de controle que todos nós aceitamos e. O que está a ser dito. Porque. Sugere. como parte de a natureza. que os nossos dois princípios que tomamos para justificar o sistema de responsabilidade é determinante para muitas destas controvérsias. porém. É . portanto. então precisamos confrontar as controvérsias no âmbito da responsabilidade sistema que acabei de mencionar. se nós não rejeitam a idéia de responsabilidade. Muitos quebra-cabeças filosóficos começa no fato de que nós. e (como veremos mais adiante). a favor e contra cada uma dessas duas concepções de que o princípio abstrato? Que proporciona uma justificação mais satisfatória para o sistema de responsabilidade que eu descrevi? É claro que o interesse destes dois princípios não se esgota a sua influência sobre a disputa clássica. juntamente com a nossa vida mental. no entanto. inicialmente.
Ou. através dessa metáfora.ambos fazem -. eles pensam. os dois princípios que refletem as atitudes contrastantes em direção a outra filosófica central questão: o fundamento da dignidade humana. Muitas pessoas acham que a confirmação de nosso caráter excepcional na religião. assim como o enorme sucesso da física ampliada do Iluminismo ameaça. à Sua imagem. Nós pode descobrir que somente através da comparação de cada um deles com os outros princípios que compõem o grande rede de valor ético e moral que apreenderam e manter a nossa convicção. That hope is embedded in the hydraulic control principle but. mas sim qual deles é eticamente errado. Caso contrário. Certamente alguns grandes enigmas filosóficos levantam tão profundas e epistemológicos questões metafísicas. se Ele negou. de alguma forma isenta ou especiais dentro a ordem causal da natureza. sozinhos. Two sources of dignity might be thought to remain. ou outras questões de nãofilosofia normativa. pensamentos e capacidades que constituem o mundo fenomenal. nós somos apenas mais do homogeneizado física coisas que nos rodeia. O princípio de controle criativo assume a responsabilidade de ser fixado no as decisões. mas por uma inteligência suprema que tinha feito nós. We might find that our decisions are after all in some way independent of the transactions of the physical and biological world. como. located there.nesse sentido um fato natural. no entanto. a nossa prédestino não foi decretado por uma mecânica sem alma. No entanto. it is threatened by scientific . Nossa auto-estima como animais distintos parece que muitas pessoas a depender de nossa capacidade de ver a nossa vida consciente. Mas não é este: ele se transforma em julgamento ético e moral ou não epistémico mistérios metafísicos. que temos de escolher entre os dois princípios pelos explorando a possibilidade de dualismo metafísico ou epistemológico. Eu não deve sugerir. no mínimo. Talvez Deus nos deu o livre arbítrio como um ato milagroso de graça. O deísmo do Iluminismo bloqueados que escapar para a maioria filósofos. A questão não é se um dos nossos dois princípios faz sentido filosófico .
On the other hand.descoberta. as I said. make any difference to moral responsibility? The creative control principle has the initial advantage of avoiding the incoherence I described: it assures those who . motives. we might think that the fact of our consciousness and the phenomenal world of challenge it offers ± the challenge of lives to lead and thousands of unscripted decisions to make ± itself gives us all the dignity we need or should crave. and which does not reflect or alter the intentions. convictions and emotions with which we act. Each has obvious initial strengths as an ethical or moral principle. then how can we be responsible for it? On a second look. at first blush. however. to capture the essence of responsibility: If we really can't help doing something. How can the presence or absence of some physical or biological or mysterious mental process of which we cannot be aware. Each of the two principles is popular. Their pessimistic colleagues abandon that road to Página 11 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 11 dignidade. So we must struggle to choose and we can create value ± the adverbial value of living well ± through our choices. in the philosophical literature. however. We might read the long existentialist tradition in philosophy as built on that second view of our dignity: that undeniable sense in which our existence precedes our essence. Essa é a view expressed in the creative control principle. The hydraulic control principle seems. but also has apparent weaknesses. if we have no choice but to do it. So far as we know. Optimistic non-compatibilists struggle to defeat the threat: they appeal to Kantian metaphysics or various forms of dualism. nothing else in the universe faces that challenge or has the opportunity to create such value. Nature may know what we will decide but we do não. many philosophers have found the principle arbitrary.
I gave at the office. is only an illusion. I walk past. I see a beggar on the st reet and I wonder whether to give him something. my assumption of responsibility is subject to scientific refutation. I Página 12 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 12 assume that I am judgmentally responsible for my action: it makes sense either to blame me for stinginess or praise me for good judgment. I decide against giving. 4. however unshakeable. If my decision was actually determined by forces or events that were wholly beyond my control ± if the combination of my genes and my environment made it inevitable that I would not give ± then my sense of responsibility. suppose. as they cannot. I won't miss a dollar or two. I quickly rehearse reasons for and against. He looks hungry. I am an adult. They live under an illusion and those who embrace the creative control principle may be succumbing to the same illusion. Pirandello's six characters might think they are responsible for what they do because they think they are independent of their author and can challenge and confront him. They do not realize that they are only puppets on a string.are drawn to determinism as science that individual responsibility is not a casualty of their condenação. I do not suffer from any mental disease and I have the ordinary capacity to suit my decisions to my preferences and convictions. But it seems. He'll spend it on drugs. on a second look. If my decision made no difference to my behavior ± if these physical events would . that the confrontation is itself scripted. to depend on illusion. But we know. of normal inteligência. If the hydraulic control principle is correct. however. Hydraulic Control? Causal Presuppositions The hydraulic control principle supposes that our familiar assumptions about judgmental responsibility embody causal assumptions that may be false.
Certain now famous experiments conceived by Benjamin Libet. But brain states. at least illustrate this hypothesis. the argument continues. It supposes that the internal sense of having decided to do something is only a side-effect of the physical and biological events that have actually produced the behavior decided upon. Epiphenomenalism denies more: it denies that ment al events even figure in the causal chain that ends in movements of nerve and muscle. including decisions and the initiation of action. Ele é careful to point out that his results do not preclude the possibility that the subject may interrupt . Determinism (in what I believe is now its most fashionable form) begins in the assumption that all mental activity.have taken place. is correlated to distinct brain states: no one feels that he is making a particular decision unless his brain is in a particular (and in principle identifiable) state of electrical excitement. produced by physical and biological forces. are physical phenomena that do not arise spontaneously but must b e caused by something whose existence is prior to that state. Libet concludes that the subject's decision is not the cause of his raising his right hand. Even if we accept that an act of will (whatever that is) can cause brain states to change. no matter what was going on in my mind ± then once again my sense of responsibility is misplaced. an experimental psychologist. So all changes in the brain that are correlated with mental activity must have causal antecedents that are not themselves pieces of mental activity but are rather external states of affairs. that act of will is itself correlated to yet another brain state that must in turn be caused by something prior to it. though they hardly demonstrate that it is true. 2 An experimental subject is asked spontaneously to raise whicheve r of his hands he wishes: scans indicate that the brain activity that ends in his raising one hand begins a small fraction of a second before the different brain activity begins that constitutes awareness of which hand he will raise. but only another effect of whatever did make him raise his right hand.
Every Tuesday's New York Times brings fresh surprises about brain geography. then whatever part of me forms that decision. Determinism and epiphenomenalism may both be true: I am not competent to judge either of them as scientific theories. the moral lives of chimpanzees. whether we call it my ³will´ or by some other name. or so I thought. to be true. Libet believes. Nossa grandchildren had better be ready for anything. about potent alleles on neglected chromosomes. hesitating over my choice of words. They think. Everything is possível. Neither has been demonstrated. and about the interrelations among all these and our mental life. I believe. the reptilian brain beneath your cerebrum and the neo-Darwinian explanation of the trolley problem I discussed in Chapter N . that all conscious decisions. are sideeffects rather than causes. If every conscious decision is only a side -effect. É is only the fraud of Oz. Isso 2 Cite Libet article. Interpretive Isolation . however. It began while I was still. is enough to protect moral responsibility: I am responsible if I do not intervene to cancel some decisions I should have cancelled. physics and chemistry. pulling levers and pluming steam to no effect whatsoever. Epiphenomenalists suppose. for instance. including decisions to cancel a process begun unconsciously. that the series of physical events that culminated in my typing the last word in this sentence began before I actually decided which word to type assiduously. Página 13 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 13 possibility. Every dinner party brings fresh speculation about the sexual reasoning of baboons.any activity begun without or in advance of any decision by a fresh decision: I may initiate an act of shoplifting unaware but cancel it once I become aware that I am about to steal. can hard ly be in charge of what happens.
B. a principle somewhat different from the hydraulic control principle was once popular among incompatibilists: this held that people are not responsible for any particular action unless it was possible for them to have acted otherwise in the very circumstances in which they acted. Is it defensible? In this section I try to describe the reasons (many of them well canvassed in the literature) why so many philosophers have rejected o princípio. A principle is arbitrary. The force of that different objection is easily illustrated. So it is true of A that when he fails to apologize. that we would not accept that principle if we did not already believe determinism true. however. then of course this is never possible. that they find the principle arbitrary. Suppose A is Página 14 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 14 wholly under the control of a brain manipulator. a situation B can detect infallibly. I shall now to establish something that should be even more worrying to defenders of the hydraulic principle: that it finds no basis in the rest of our convictions even if we assume that determinism and epiphenomenalism are not verdadeiro. because the principle would then contradict convictions about our judgmental responsibility that we cannot disbelieve.The hydraulic control principle is popular. or so I shall argue. For example. I said earlier. If A is about to apologize. because it is interpretively isolated from the larger scheme of moral and ethical conviction on wh ich it must draw for substantive support. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt pointed out. If determinism is true. he could not have acted in any . who is determined never to let A apologize for any action. Eu disse que we could not integrate the hydraulic control principle with our other beliefs if we thought determinism or epiphenomenalism true. then B will intervene to prevent this. summing up these reasons.
but . Unless we thought determinism true. are only part of an after-the-fact documentary film playing on the screen of your mind: what you do causes your sense of having decided to do it. He is trying with all his heart to do algo ruim. Epiphenomenalism and Attempt I begin with that principle's second requirement: that our decisions be causally potent. Suponha epiphenomenalism in the dramatic form I described earlier is true. is guilty merely of an attempt. But A. that we must take the same view of the hydraulic control principle. including any act interrupting an act earlier begun. the rival dies. So we cannot accept the principle that hinges responsibility on alternate possibility as a general ethical or moral principle. We have no reason to accept it as a general moral or ethical princípio. from the simplest to the most complex and farreaching. we would have no reason to doubt that A is judgmentally responsible for his surly behavior in spite of the fact that he could never have behaved in a non-surly way. is initiated in your nervous and muscular system before you take the decision to do it. He wants to kill his rival. an attempted murder is morally as bad as a successful murder. the gun he is holding fires. But it wasn't he who killed him. Your decisions. absolutely hates apologizing for anything and would never do so. rather than the other way around. it was (we might say) only his programmed reptilian brain. Lawyers like to invent cases like this one: A puts arsenic in B's coffe e. We might say: someone who decides to injure someone else. But what can it have to do with judgmental responsibility? Responsibility is an ethical or moral matter: it attaches to final decisions whether or not these are causally effective. So what? At least in this kind of case. A hypothesis is of course amazing. I hope to show. But he fails because his decision is not the cause of what happens. partly through arguments already familiar in the work of others.contrary way. but whose decision is only epiphenomenal. Everything you do. he decides to do so. as a matter of his own charact er. intending to kill him.
and then asks whether that agent actually causes the body it inhabits to act in a certain way. we can't be sure that A wouldn't have warned B just before he sipped the coffee. that is the assumption that makes the law yers' question ± why should A be punished less severely than C? difficult to answer. hold the person-within-the-person responsible for what he has tried to do. Lawyers discover ± or invent ± policy or procedural reasons to explain why attempted murder should be punished less severely than murder. But that artificial bifurcation of a person is exactly what the hydraulic control principle itself relies on. however. We normally treat people as whole people: the same person who has a mind also has a brain. nerves and muscles. Nevertheless A is morally as much at fault as if he were a murderer. and a person's acting involves all of these. I agree that this comparison between the action of a single person and of two distinct people is strange. but only of attempted murder. C shoots him dead. So why shouldn't we say that the person who tries to kill his rival and fails beca use his decision is not the Página 15 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 15 cause of the rival's death but only an epiphenomenal consequence of muscular behavior is nevertheless morally culpable? He is judgmentally responsible for having tried. Kant said that nothing is really . personifies part of mind as an agent called the will. A is not guilty of murder. we must. or whether it is only a fraud pulling lever s disconnected from anything. We want to encourage people to change their minds at the last moment. It is strange to treat a person and his reptilian brain as separate actors. The hydraulic control principle separates mind from body.just as B is about to drink. for the purposes of moral and ethical criticism. But these reasons of policy have no application here. the way we treat A and C in the lawyers' imagined case. If we accept this picture. of course.
But this is only a sporadic occurrence: your free will is a sometime thing. But you cannot tell the difference: you never know which decision is original and which was determined. causal potency. Chance and Guilt So there is little to be said for the second requirement of the hydraulic control principle. however. I said. can identify anything else that differs in the two cases: Nothing in your internal experience or outward behavior is any different when your action is totally determined by external forces from what it is when your will acted spontaneously and unaffected by anything else. for example. Imagine that determinism is not generally true: people often make decisions that are not determined by any past external event or force. You make decisions over your life that all seem. deeply arbitrary because it makes the most basic attributions of guilt. from your internal phenomenal perspective. or whether you burn with remorse for it ± should depend on . It seems an immediate objection.good except a good will. as well as their self-criticism. can detect the difference after you act: they allow scientists to discover which of your decisions were original and which not. Sometimes your decisions are indeed only the result of past events and forces wholly beyond your control. Incredible instruments. fault or praise turn on what seems. Agora turn now to the first requirement. If we were persuaded of epiphenomenalism. albeit mysterious. we would add that nothing is really responsible except a purposive will. at least from any plausible moral or ethical perspective. a matter of pure chance. So only the fantasy instrument can detect the difference. free choices. however. It seems crazy that how others treat you and how you judge yourself ± whether they put you in jail for some illegal act. but are the consequence only of a wholly original act of will with its own. that it makes people¶s treatment of one another. We can see this quickly through a fantasy. Neither the scientists nor you.
For all such people. If the bare. If I am right that it would be crazy to make responsibility turn on what the instruments display in my fantasy. in hundreds of other ways. People who lack the capacity to reason or properly to organize their desires lead very different lives from those who have those capacities. personality. moreover. It would make no ethical or moral sense to treat the two classes differently once instruments had identified their category. The responsibility system I described makes moral and ethical sense because it makes responsibility turn on qualities or factors that make some further difference to people's lives. not that everyone's behavior is sometimes determined and sometimes not. It makes no difference to that objection when we change the fantasy. deliberation. I might have supposed. we cannot accept it as a sound ethical or moral principle. it cannot support those judgments or denials when the fact is pervasive. but that some peo ple's behavior is always determined and other people's behavior never is. brute fact of determinism cannot support judgments or denials of responsibility when that fact is randomly distributed. Since the hydraulic control principle would seem arbitrary in these various different circumstances. The instrument's reading is a fluke totally disconnected from any of what normally matters: motive. and our relations with them. their lack of responsibility is a status not an occasional piece of cosmic whimsy. People who are hypnotized or whose brains are manipulated by mad scientists have become subordinated to alien wills. then the hydraulic principle must be wrong. The properties that lead us to excuse young children and mentally ill people are also qualities that affect their behavior and their lives. Determinism and Rationality The first requirement of the hydraulic principle seems arbitrary in a further way. when .Página 16 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 16 which type of event the instrument finally detects. intention.
our decisions are firmly grounded in our beliefs and values. desires and convictions out of which the decision is made. fix how the world is and if we are rational those laws therefore fix how we think it is. Se we are rational. not a reason for insisting on it. moral responsibility is an illusion whether or not determinism is true. ³To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way you are ± at least in crucial mental respects. Página 17 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 17 more judgmental responsibility for our acts if that were not so: if we had spontaneous thoughts about geography. unlike most incompatibilists. that judgmental responsibility for some decision requires causal responsibility for the beliefs. and that randomness would provide an excuse. physics and cosmology. allegiances and the rest . one of the other forms of responsibility I described ± intellectual responsibility ± depends on our not having that power. The laws of physics. convictions. It would be silly to think that we would have 3 Galen Strawson. 3 On the contrary. argues that since we do not choose the beliefs and convictions out of which we act. that is.we notice that none of what we might call the ingredients of rational decision have the independence from external events and forces that the principle requires for the decision itself. we would have to count those beliefs as random visitations. Philosophical Studies 75: 5-24. If we didn't think that some combination of the state of the world and the state of our nervous apparatus produced our beliefs. 13. He assumes. preferences. The Impossibility of Mental Responsibility. or if we could whimsically decide for ourselves which beliefs on these matters would take root in our minds . among other things. a reason for denying responsibility. but no one supposes that he can choose his beliefs or his values by an act of uncaused will. Nor do people choose their values: their tastes.´ See Galen Strawson.
In Chapter N I described what I called a rationality project: this requires people to try to work their various convictions. We cannot create these from nothing by some wondrous act of will. People try to train themselves to like caviar or skiing because for a variety of reasons they desire to be the kind of people who do like them. including their sense of authentic conviction. desires and preferences. to some degree people are able to influence their preferences and convictions. We struggle to like caviar or sky diving. and environment but also the causes of these: it would include the laws of physics and chemistry and the history of the universe. which means that a complete explanation would include not only facts about my genes. or to become better people by enrolling in churches or extension philosophy cursos. family. But we do this only because we have other convictions or preferences or tastes we did not escolher. and they are also sadly and inevitably frustrated. I argued in Chapter N that our moral convictions are not caused by moral truth: that the causal impact hypothesis is false. But these efforts at integrity respond to still deeper aspirations that we do not originate by any act of will either. If it were true. as I believe. at least to some degree. by what we find we just cannot believe. culture.of their normative personality. Yes. They join churches or self-help groups to acquire or strengthen convictions they already want to have. then any competent causal explanation of our convictions must lie in the personal history I described in that chapter. This is even more evidently true of our tastes. however. and they did not choose to have the latter desejo. then our convictions would of course then be caused by something outside us ± moral fact ± not an originating will inside. If in any case the psychological materials out of which my decisions emerge are inevitably determined by events beyond my control. why should it matter whether or not these psychological materials in turn make my decision inevitable? If I am rational. into a coherent and integrated whole. any seer who knew . If it is false.
I would be responsible for firing my employee only if I could have ignored my own beliefs. Given my beliefs about my employee's crimes. If his behavior is not predictable. There seems the makings of a dilemma here. performance and value to the organization. desires and tastes in the most marvelous and absolute detail. desires and convictions and acted contrary to what these required. Only something alien. and had an incredible computer at his disposal. it was inevitable that I would fire him.my beliefs. could predict my decisions with marvelous and absolute exatidão. can then account for his behavior. and all the other features of my normative and emotional personality. you would look for some external pressure or mental instability that prevented me from acting as rationality would exigir. On the contrary. given that knowledge. Seria wrong for you to praise or criticize me for it or for me later to take satisfaction or feel regret in ele. I fire an employee. Em these circumstances it would have been irrational for me not to fire this employee. my convictions about my assignment responsibility to my clients and my other employees. my desires for an honest and efficient organization. If someone is in full control of his action. then he is the kind of person whose behavior is entirely predictable given absolutely full knowledge of the beliefs and values he did not choose. convictions. This seems paradoxical. The hydraulic principle seems to insist that if this is really true ± if my decision was really inevit able ± it follows that I was not responsible for my act. my positive taste for Página 18 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 18 confrontation. and you would not think I was judgmentally responsible had I not fired hi m. then he is not in control. . like a disease. So the hydraulic control principle seems to make someone responsible only when he is not responsible.
But that is not necessarily (or. Mother Teresa is incapable of a selfish thought or action. Someone who was born into and grew up in a rigid military environment may never have been capable of shirking disagreeable or dangerous duty. in defiance of all their values. even usually) so.We can dissolve this dilemma only through some strategy like this one: we say that judgmental responsibility. someone born into a fundamentalist religious Página 19 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 19 . But the latter condition seems itself irracionais. according to the hydraulic principle. Martin Luther speaks psychological truth when he declares that he can do no other than declare his new faith before the world. The hydraulic principle is offered. I thi nk. But the familiar phenomenon of psychological impossibili ty nevertheless holds for some people. Psychological and metaphysical impossibility Suppose determinism is generally false. and it therefore seems perverse to insist that someone is not in control unless he has the power to lose control. tastes and preferences. Stalin is incapable of a generous or noble thought. remember. We might as well say that a society isn't free if it holds agreements to sell oneself into slavery null and void. People's decisions generally are the result of an exercise of will that is not made inevitable by past events beyond their control. requires not that people ever do act irrationally. Commentators sometimes say that people have put themselves in that situation by prior deliberate decisions: Mother Teresa may have squashed any selfish thought she had until she no longer had any. as an interpretation of the more abstract principle that people are liable to praise or blame only when they are in control of their own comportamento. Someone who acts irrationally is not in control. but that events beyond their control do not determine that they will not act irrationally.
4 But if we therefore decide that psychological impossibility doesn't count. these are not our acts. in certain instances. If we are tempted by the hydraulic principle we must decide whether this kind of psychological impossibility negates judgmental responsibility. then the source of the inevitability shouldn't matter. it would be wrong to blame anyone so double-dyed in evil as Stalin. We must think that someone's will can be the uncaused cause of his actions in spite of the fact that his character. Se inevitability is what defeats the ethically important kind of control. But that offers another dilemma. That is understandable. so that though we may blame ordinary political leaders for their infrequent acts of cruelty or tyranny. then why does metaphysical inevitability jeopardize responsibility? The Responsibility System The popular responsibility system I described makes exceptions to judgmental responsibility. Those distinctions seem implausible. makes it in fact impossible for him to act other than as he does act. But we are also not responsible when we are small children or seriously mentally ill. It might seem . formed by events wholly beyond his control. other than as they do. Nós must be distinguishing between psychological and some other kind of inevitability ± call it metaphysical. and though it would be right to praise generally selfish people for their occasional acts of generosity it would be wrong ever to praise anyone so instinctively good as Mother Teresa. We say that these people's character make it psychologically impossible for them to act. then the hydraulic principle seems arbitrary in a different way. Nós are not responsible when someone physically forces our body or manipulates our mind through hypnosis or chemical or electrical intervention.family or into a resentful and mistreated minority may never have been capable of acts that seem natural to others. so that we can praise or condemn Stalin and Mother Teresa as we do everyone else. If inevitability does not in itself defeat the important kind of control.
It is addressed to people who think that they and other people are normally responsible for what they do. ³You assume. that Mother Teresa is free and responsible because she does what is right for the right reasons but Stalin is not free or responsible because he does not. We now show you. A hydraulic control principle captures what you must take the crucial difference to be. Indeed the familiar pessimistic argument that I described at the outset begins with that claim. are not responsible.´ The . as uncaused causes. in effect. Peop le who are mentally ill are not in control of their behavior. she is not arguing from anything like the hydraulic control principle. but neither are people whose actions are caused entirely by events beyond their control. while in the normal cases people's acts of will. initiate t he causal chain that ends in acção.´ it tells them. among other people. I find her distinction unpersuasive but. that people's decisions are never original in that way but are always the product of events wholly beyond their control. by demonstrating the truth of determinism. ³that there are crucial differences between your normal situation and that of children and the mentally ill. 4 Susan Wolf argues.an important strength of the hydraulic control principle that it identifies and justifies all these exceções. It aims to show them that they already accept the hydraulic control principle. in any case. Pessimistic non-compatibilists argue that if we accept that mentally ill criminals should be excused because they are not responsible. Página 20 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 20 The structure of that familiar argument is important. but who also assume that children and the mentally ill. we must for that reason accept that no one is ever responsible because everyone is actually in the same position. Você acha que that in the exceptional cases people's decisions are caused by events beyond their control.
what justifies that distinction. We have no reason to think that young children. that strikes people as requiring that children be relieved of some or all judgmental responsibility. picks out. Ele lacks the normal capacity to form beliefs that are guided by facts and logic. and that young children and the mentally ill are not. young children. desires and preferences. They do assume that they are responsible for their decisions. Now consider someone suffering from a serious mental disease: he thinks himself Napoleon or God and he also thinks that his status as such entitles or even requires him to kill and steal. Young children have a defective capacity. prudence and morality of their having what they wa nt and doing what they want to fazer. to form correct beliefs about what the world is like. Few parents would deny that capacity to their young children. and hence about the consequence. Senior citizens make decisions that give effect to their beliefs. We therefore have no basis for ascribing a different internal agency or hydraulics of decision to them. He is crazy and the . not any assumption about the causal pedigree of their decisions. first. I imagined. that the hydraulic principle might be thought to require a capacity for irrationality as a condition of responsibility. But the strategy fails because that cannot be what ordinary people think. the creative control principle. make them in any other way. Whatever view we take about the freedom of an adult will must therefore hold for a young child as well. But the hydraulic control principle cannot be. a page or so ago. for them. But of course there is a difference: it is the difference that the other interpretation of the original control principle. judged by normal adult standards. They are often ignorant of ³the nature and quality´ of their acts. It is these incapacities. Consider. who certainly do make decisions.strategy assumes that the distinction ordinary people see between normal and exceptional cases is best explained as a difference in causal roles: decisions in exceptional cases but not in normal cases are determined by events beyond the agent's control.
Instâncias range from psychopaths ± the killer who begs society to catch and stop him before he kills again ± to the physiological or psychological addict ± the smoker or shooter or alcoholic or compulsive hand-washer who is desperate to stop but cannot. Like normal people.familiar responsibility system holds him exempt from judgmental responsibility for that reason. But that is only a figure of speech. and no one knows what it feels like to have his thoughts zapped into being. which might suggest something special about the causal pedigree of his decisions. Now consider a different form of mental disease: someone who though he has normal powers to form true beliefs. ethical and prudential convictions. We speak more accurately when we say that the disease has distorted its victim¶s julgamento. we might find it natural to say that his disease has made him kill. we are invoking the creative not the hydraulic control principle to justify the exception. I distinguish these unfortunate people from people who have been hypnotized into behavior they w ould reject or whose minds are manipulated by a villain with a thought -control ray gun. un -personified. Taken literally it is absurd. and though he is committed to unexceptional moral. True. he acts in a way that is fully predictable given a full knowledge of his beliefs and normative personality. But there is no reason to suppose that his decisions have either less or more initiating power than Página 21 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 21 they would have had if he were not crazy. We ordinary people have no reason to think that a crazy person's decisions have any less causal independence or originality than their own. the disease. is nevertheless unable to square his actual decisions with those convictions. But then. is not capable of that kind of action. I do not know what it feels like to be hypnotized. once again. Vou .
We think. that psychopaths and addicts make final decisions: to kill or to light or shoot up. They do not act and so their behavior raises no question of judgmental responsibility. S o we can sensibly ask whether it would make sense for ordinary people. We ordinary people.assume. then their cases raise the same problem as those of the ill people I do discuss. however. We do not think that on these occasions we have been hypnotized or zapped. in this account of our own lapses. felt decisions that merge into the actions the decisions contemplate. We can find no reason. who think that they themselves have judgmental responsibility for their acts. on the contrary. to excuse psychopaths or addicts from such responsibility because of some perceived difference in the etiology of their own and the latter's decisions. Contamos Página 22 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 22 the occasion as showing not a conquest of our minds by some alien force but a failure of our mind's ordinary capacity to organize and direct our reflective convictions.´ and we order another steak pommes frites. (If I am wrong. to think that an addict's situation is an . we might or might not struggle. But temptation wins: we say: ³Just this once. however.) I do suppose.´ or. concede that we ourselves are sometimes unable to overcome temptations of various sorts: we sometimes decide to do what our reflective values condemn as imprudent or errado. who believe that we are responsible for what we do but that psychopaths and addicts are not. that people in these latter cases do not make what I called final decisions: real. We might or might not deliberate much. ³The hell with it. that our wills are to blame: we say we have been weak-willed and we resolve not to sin again. Their behavior is like a cough or other production of their autonomic nervous system. we do not think our wills have been robbed of their ordinary originating power.
We have no basis for supposing that some alien force has usurped the role of the addict's will either. Resumo The hydraulic control principle is popular among philosophers a s an interpretation of the more basic idea that people are not judgmentally responsible for their acts when they are not in control of what they do. he is even incapable of understanding his peril. We may say that since he yields even though at some level he knows that the result will be disastrous. perhaps. who find it impossible to act badly or well. It seems arbitrary because when we imagine that the test might be met in some ordinary circumstances but not in others. That latter explanation does not invoke the hydraulic control principle. we might say. are nevertheless responsible. and it finds no support in those departments of value. We count the difference between us and him as one o f capability and therefore of degree. the difference it makes in those circumstances seems wholly inconsequential. he is very much weaker than we are. Parece unhelpful because it fails to explain why people who believe they normally have judgmental . But that interpretation is an ethical and a moral judgment. for example. it must be assessed as such. convictions and the rest ± are in any case not chosen or under an agent's control. He is in fact incapable. even when the attempt is unsuccessful. tastes.entirely different matter rather than only a difference in degree. Parece implausible because it cannot successfully explain why people of either very good or very bad character. But then we are not assuming that something about the causal history of mental events distinguishes his case from o nosso. so that independence from external causes could only mean freedom to be irrational. in the moment of acting. It is contradicted by familiar principles and assumptions: that people are responsible when they attempt harm. either way. about determinism or epiphenomenalism. It seems pointless since the ingredients of decision ± desires. it makes no assumption. of controlling his immediate impulses.
beliefs that respond to genuine evidence. People in fact have these two capacities to very different degrees. Someone is in creative control of his action when at the time of acting he has the two capacities I mentioned in my initial description of the responsibility system. We now turn to the second interpretation of the abstract control principle that I distinguidos. Creative Control? The creative control principle is much less ambitious and much more a matter of common sense than the hydraulic control principle. An idiot cannot for m a large enough stock of stable . I shall take as my initial examples of failed creative control those instances in which the failure is egregious and undeniable. Many of these arguments are re-workings. Taken together they demonstrate the interpretive isolation and therefore the weakness of the hydraulic control principle understood as either an ethical or a moral principle. from the ethical perspective. A brilliant scientist is much better at forming true beliefs about the physical world than I am. He must have a minimal capacity to form pertinent beliefs about the world in which he acts. Página 23 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 23 5. The principle supposes a threshold level of these capacities. and someone less impulsive is better at conforming his decisions to what he actually thinks good to have or do. of objections familiar in other forms. and much of the controversy among lawyers and laymen about when it is proper to hold people responsible for their behavior is controversy about where the threshold should be set. He must also have a minimal capacity to match his decisions to his full normative personality ± the full set of what he identifies as in some way good or desirable or appropriate for him to have or do.responsibility nevertheless suppose that they and others lack that responsibility in exceptional circunstâncias.
First.true beliefs about the world to make his life safe let alone profitable. have already been created. if determinism is true. Someone with serious frontal lobe brain injury may be wholly unable to avoid aggressive and violent behavior even though nothing he thinks or wants or approves recommends that behavior. Two questions arise. if we ourselves are in that position. pulling wool over our own olhos? I put the questions in that order because we cannot confront the suggestion that creative Página 24 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 24 control is an illusion until we have a better idea of what we should take the point of creative . I said. to a more sophisticated version of Pirandello's characters than I used earlier. The creative control principle holds that the idiot and the victim of serious brain damage are not judgmentally responsible for the decisions that manifest these incapacidades. We can compare our positio n. that the creative control principle locates responsibility within the phenomenal mundo. are we not simply the victims of illusion? Aren't we only posturing ± pretending to some causal independence that we know we don't have. in that sense. he lacks the minimum level of the first capacity. They know they are scripted: they cannot act but as he has decided they act. In that way they create lives even though these lives. It takes responsibility to depend on what is present to people as they act and to others interpreting their behavior. earlier. But they also know that they must live in complete ignorance of the script: it is written but not published. if that is our position. why does it matter what. in a different sense. we create? What is the point of judgmental responsibility in those circumstances? Em segundo lugar. So they do the best they can: they weigh reasons and praise or blame themselves and each other according to their judgment of what the best reasons are and require.
for example. we must distinguish that question of justification from different questions of explanation. that the widespread acceptance of the creative control principle contributes to the general welfare and is justified for that reason. they do not. if it does it not matter whether our decisions are made inevitable by events long ago. in the exceptional cases I described. Why Responsibility? The creative control principle offers to justify the central features of the responsibility system I described: it explains why people normally have judgmental responsibility for the decisions they make and also why. But we need to justify the principle itself. as throughout this book. Our question. It is fatal to the supposed utility of the latter principle that no one can apply it. even among people who are sophisticated about science? That is a question of psychological. without knowledge of mind-body interaction that is in principle unavailable. .control to be. A utilitarian might suppose. I believe that the creative control principle or something very like it is and always has been very widely accepted. If so. what explains that popularity and persistence. or could easily manufacture one. either to himself in retrospect or to others. is one of justification not historical explanation. social and perhaps biological explanation: neo -Darwinians would no doubt have an answer to it on hand. however. The consequentialist case for the creative control principle is at least more plausible than any consequentialist case could be for the hydraulic control principle. We cannot rule out in advance a consequentialist justification that brings explanation and justification closer together. at least in almost all cases. is it nevertheless crucial whether we now have the capacities I described? If a decision is inevitable anyway. A creative control principle on the contrary could readily be applied. Why. why should it matter what capacities were exhibited when the decision was finally made? Once again.
however. On reflection. I summari ze these ideas and assumptions now because the argument I shall make for the creative control principle depends so heavily on them. If you reject these understandings of the basic presumptions of our ethical lives.with knowledge readily available to anyone considering his own past behavior or the behavior of os outros. Isso responsibility yields two projects. The former. Only the former project directly implicates judgmental responsibility. Each of us must try. first. É draws on the foundational ideas and assumptions of ethics that we have been exploring throughout this book. as any principle underlying responsibility that is justified on consequentialist grounds should be. But how well you live depends only on what you do . we cannot accept a utilitarian or any other familiar form of consequentialist justification for the creative control principle. Each of us has an inescapable ethical responsibility to make something valuable of his life. I believe. The history of the criminal law in developed countries shows the impact of those improvements on the development of the insanity defense. any general duty to improve the overall welfare of humanity as a whole or any particular part of it. to make his life a good one. then the argument I make will have no grip on you. for instance. It is also sensitive to improvements in medical knowledge. as part of our basic personal responsibility to realize value in our own lives. I argued. to live well and also. Página 25 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 25 The strongest case for the creative control principle. project is the more fundamental of the two and it may require and therefore justify compromising the second. second. that we have no reason to assume that we each have. adverbial. in Chapter N . How good a life you have depends not just on what you do yourself but also on what happens to you. is a more fundamental one.
ambition. 5 Living well means identifying. as we put it. it allows us easily to account for the familiar and largely unrelated phenomenon now often called ³moral luck. sometimes. It is those final decisions that are the raw materials out of 5 The distinction between having a good life and living well is important in many areas of ethics and morality. Muitos people's lives. are picaresque or even shambles. late-in-life integrating interpretation or by conversion to a new integrity. may believe that his life has been ruined by the tragedy. It means making of a life not just a chronology but a narrative woven around values of desire. had a worse life in consequence. but also and independently regrets that it was he who drove the bus that killed them. character.si mesmo. But he has not lived his life less well: he should not have the different kind of corroding despair that someone feels who acknowledges . I have already emphasized that we cannot not make such decisions.) People often and sensibly feel great personal remorse for terrible events in their lives for which they have no fault. even if inarticulately. killing many of the children in his care.´ (See Nagel and Williams. We cannot test determinism or epiphenomenalism by waiting to see whether our nerves and muscles will act on their own without the mental component of that final decision. He regrets the children's deaths. judged as narratives. For example. He has indeed. unless they are redeemed by a new. We construct our personal narratives through what I called final decisions: those final decisions that are merged into and that we cannot pry loose from ou r actions. The school -bus driver who drives impeccably but crashes nevertheless. loyalties and ideals. taste. ± Hubbard's ³one damned thing after another´ or Millay's ³one damn thing over and over.´ But just for that reason those lives are not lived well. as anyone would. no matter how full of worldly success they turn out to be. as he knows. standards of success and then creating a life that is structured by those standards. No one creates a narrative of perfect integrity: we all act out of character.
I can make no other sense of my life going well or badly except to suppose that this is a matter of what I have decided to do. as I write a paragraph or end a love affair. His life has been ruined by his illness. Isso retrospective assessment of all our consequential decisions will ask: have we decided as well as we should? How have we stood up.his fault for a tragedy. of course. It would make no sense for me to deny. that I should not be held responsible for something I have done. we can do it for other people as they act and for ourselves in retrospecto. but it would be wrong to say that in consequence he has lived that life badly . Someone who has done great harm while seriously mentally ill is in the same position. and I myself later. But even these are assessable in retrospect if they turn out to be consequential. Almost all of these final decisions ± those we think trivial ± are made unreflectively. that this is my act or that it should count in my own or other people's judgment about my successes or failures. we can exempt certain decisions from counting in any overall ethical assessment if we think we have reason to do this. We may ask: does every decision we have made count. in judging what narrative our life exhibits? The decisions we made while children? While ill or under extreme pressure of some sort? A theory of responsibility must be seen as a response to these . Página 26 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 26 which we construct our life's narrative. Tomar responsibility for a decision is just to accept that it counts. Others. even in retrospect. I cannot think this as I act. in the only way we can stand up. to our mortality? However. But once I am conscious of leading a life. may judge that some particular decision does not after all count. if I am aware that I am leading a life I cannot act without supposing that each final decision does count.
We must design our filter with an eye to the overall ethical project and to the human situation as we understand it. We do not hold a blind person accountable for his reading deficiency. Nem todos os . Nós cannot. We can. adopt a much less generous filter. at least in the first instance. We often distinguish. In much of this book I have argued that we live well only if our decisions seek some integrity in a normative personality. between someone's doing a job badly and his not being able to do that job at all. we must accept that responsibility as part of the more basic responsibility to live well. It offers a screening filter and we must judge it as a theory of responsibility. only those Página 27 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 27 decisions that we or he has made when he had threshold levels of the capacities stipulated in the creative control principle. can have good or bad lives: they suffer pain and are often mistreated. howe ver. So we cannot adopt that dramatically forgiving filter. we believe. by asking how well it performs in that role. Dogs.perguntas. Mas we are responsible for our personality even though we did not choose it. Given our situation. exclude all those decisions we take guided by convictions or desires we did not choose. we cannot screen out everything we have done as not counting in assessing how well we have lived. in various contexts. It is not any metaphysics of freedom that justifies that distinct responsibility but an imperative. It requires that we count. for example. in assessing how well we or someone else has lived. We must not exclude so much that we have made the project of living well either pointless or impossible. The creative control principle offers a similar distinction at the most abstract nível. The very possibility of living a life requires that we accept responsibility for our character and convictions even though we did not choose them.
industry or laziness or anything else except randomness to the decisions that make up the course of his life. tastes. or in retrospect treat himself. People normally can. as I said. ambitions or convictions. any coherent ordering of tastes. and then our responsibility for what we do is called into question. If we assume. ideals and the rest ± and making decisions that exhibit that personality. A sybarite may turn into an ascetic or ± though this is rarer ± the other way around. attachments. sometimes dramatically. pervasively deceived by a master intelligence into thinking that they are embodied organisms living on planet Earth. loyalties. Someone cannot lead a life if he is not capable of forming a normative personality ± a stable system of desires. Philosophers sometimes imagine that they are only disembodied brains in a nutrient vat. But dogs cannot live well or mal. convictions. a good . But if someone's behavior cannot be interpreted by himself or others. because they normally have the two capacities the principle cites. An idiot or someone who thinks he is Napoleon or that pigs can fly lacks that minimal ability. If that is true. then they are not leading lives. then he is just enduring a life not creating one. any ground for ascribing selfishness or selflessness. Of course. then almost all of us have the epistemic capacity we need for most of our lives. a person cannot sensibly be treated. But from time to time some of us lack or lose that normal ability in one way of another. perhaps. that we are not brains in a vat. perhaps. as revealing any particular personality. Creating a life requires reacting to the environment in which that life is lived. preferences. desires. as we all must. And people's normative personalities change over time.dog has a dog's life: some have lives that other dogs mi ght envy. even from time to time. His life may be a bad one ± or. The second capacity the creative control principle requires is regulative. everyone acts out of character from time to time ± seized by a whim or impulse. as creating a life unless he can form beliefs about the world that are largely responsive to how the world is.
I think. I do make final decisions when I am hypnotized or when a fantastic scientist manipulates Página 28 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 28 electrodes embedded in my brain. Harry Frankfurt imagines human beings ± he denies them the title of people ± who lack that power altogether.one ± but he has done nothing that can be judged a success or even. I make no decision so the question of my epistemic or regulative capacities to make competent decisions does not arise. He calls these creatures wantons. But they would not count in judging how well I have lived. Perhaps. Of course I am not responsible for the damage that results when someone else pushes me into a blind beggar. It is therefore sensible that when I ask how well I have lived I distinguish between what I did when I had ample capacity to reflect my own desires and convictions in my . These events might ± they almost certainly would ± make my life worse. in spite of my e arlier assumption to the contrary. If I am to respond to the challenge of living well. These forces have shaped my personality. I must have the capacity to match my behavior to my sense of what living well would mean. It does not impair that capacity that this sense has inevitably been molded by forces gathered in my personal history including my genetic history. It obviously does impair that capacity when others have taken over my decision -making capacity to serve their own ends. That usurpation disconnects my decision from my personality so that it is at best an accident when these match. either because they have no normative personality or because they cannot bend their decisions to that personality. and says that wantons lack the kind of freedom we must have in mind when we speak of a free will. but they do not impair my capacity to make purposive decisions by matching those decisions to the personality they have shaped. a failure in living.
We must therefore ask what justification we have for exporting the principle from the ethical to the moral arena in that way. Em that different role it plays no direct part in anyone's judgment of how well he or anyone else has led his life. indeed serious loss of either might be a defining condition of mental disease. among other purposes. For the same reason. I t ake responsibility only for the former. 6 It is a central demand of self-respect. here as elsewhere. That requirement cannot be met ± 6 I must take care. A história of the insanity defense debate that I shall briefly describe later in this chapter shows a pendulum swing between a strict doctrine that emphasizes loss of epistemic capacity and a more generous doctrine that also makes regulative capacity critical. Estes conditions diminish or destroy the capacities on which judgmental responsibility depends. The creative control principle functions. as a threshold condition for blame and sanction. to guard against being understood to mean that the moral use of the responsibility system is subordinate to or dependant on its ethical role. a very young child does. as a moral as well as an ethical principle. but he does not have the cognitive or critical ability needed to match his decisions to any self consciously recognized ambitions or desires. what I have done when suffering from serious cognitive impairment or mental disease. I have emphasized the ethical role of the creative control principle because I believe it is easier to see its importance from the first person perspective. Mas . the creative control principle requires me also to disregard. I said in Chapter N .decisions and what I did when I lacked that capacity. in retrospect. of course. Instead it serves. Isso significa que recognizing and respecting the same responsibility in others. A beginning infant does not make decisions at all. Mental illness may savage either or both of the judgmental capacities in anyone. that we must not only take personal responsibility for making something of our own lives but must also treat the principle that requires this as an objective principle of value.
Suppose I rely on the creative control principle in criticizing myself: in deciding whether it is appropriate to feel shame or guilt or only deep regret for some decision I wish I had not taken. Nós should treat those we now style criminals medically rather than criminally.any interpretive argument for the truth of the principle in ethics depends on its making independent sense in morality as well. as it has in ethics. I hold myself responsible unless I am satisfied that I lacked some capacity essential to creative control when I took that decision. It would be an act of disrespect to him. that we can judge ourselves to act unfairly and therefore wrongly while we can only judge everyone else to act dangerously or inconveniently. Since it would deny that the principle of personal responsibility is an objective one. Página 29 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 29 we cannot be treating the principle of personal responsibility as having objective standing ± unless we understand personal responsibility to have the same character and dimension for everyone ± the same character and dimension in morality. Most people have a strong negative . What justification could I then have for using a different ± stricter or more lenient ± standard for judging the guilt of someone else? For deciding whether it is appropriate. We have already met a dramatic form of that incoherence. hoping to reprogram rather than to punish them. other conditions being met. Some criminologists say that since science has shown that no one has free will it would be wrong to punish anyone for anything. I amplify that statement briefly at the end of this chapter. it would also be a failure of self-respect. or appropriate only to sympathize with ele? That would mean my judging and treating him as I think he ought not to judge and treat si mesmo. The history of the criminal law across civilized nations seems to me to demonstrate that it does. to punish him in some way. This judgment supposes that ³we´ have responsibility that other people lack. that is.
with denying epiphenomenalism. in judging the merits or demerits of our final decisions. They sense. It presupposes only what logicians call material implication. not on the hydraulic causes or consequences of a decision.reaction to the proposal that outlaws should be treated medically rather than punished criminally. The conditionals are consistent. or ought to foresee. Delusion? The creative control principle easily passes the test that the hydraulic control principle fails: the former principle. of acting as we decide to act. we and others pay great attention to the consequences that we foresee. It serves as the foundation for the root ethical enterprise of creating value through nossas vidas. that this proposal fails the sovereign requirement that we treat responsibility in others as we cannot help but treat responsibility in ourselves. finds ample support among our other moral and ethical convictions. I believe. É purports to insulate responsibility from the scientific threats we have been considering. but on the drama of decision itself. if I do not Página 30 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 30 he will not. with epiphenomenalism. I can know the truth of those conditionals from my experience without making any assumption about the hydraulic force of my decision on the muscles that pull my trigger finger de volta. of course. someone will die through an action of mine. that is. They think that this would de-humanize outlaws. It makes responsibility turn. If I decide to pull the trigger. It treats the struggle of decision as the proper theatre of responsibility but makes no assumptions about how the stage on which the drama unfolds came to be arranged. Claro. It also fits the structure of morality that flows from and into that enterprise. . even though they are also consistent. unlike the latter. Mas isso attention presupposes no causal efficacy.
Hume and many other compatibilists suggest: we feel that we can decide as we finally think best. They believe that it has not . It declares that that overall assignment responsibility is in play only when a person is capable of pursuing the assignment. A toddler or idiot or madman makes decisions and presumably makes them with some sense of responsibility para eles. at least. though in a way that denies us all access to the content of the determination. but because it sets conditions on responsibility with an eye to the overall ethical judgment whether an agent has created value or disvalue in his life by the way he has lived it. when I described how it feels to make a decision.The creative principle does make exceptions for what it treats as pathological cases: it conditions responsibility on the capacities of the agent. and the rest of us should reject them now. will later come to think ± that it would be right not to count those decisions in deciding how well he has lived. that we feel as we ponder that we could decide either way. when he grows or if he recovers. we can await the latest exhilarating discoveries about the geography and electro-dynamics of our brains with boundless curiosity but with no terror. If we accept that principle as the ethical basis for our responsibility system. Is this complacency based only on delusion? I said. A principle makes capacities crucial to responsibility not because normal people have wills that are in charge while a child or an idiot or a madman does not. So the creative control principle makes the familiar responsibility system compatible with determinism and epiphenomenalism. But that feeling is sufficiently vindicated by the interpretation that Hobbes. But again these are not causal conditions. But he should reject judgmental responsibility for those decisions later. We think ± and the toddler. No doubt many people believe that determinism and epiphenomenalism are both wrong: in fact absurd. Determinism does not contradict that sense: it claims rather that what we finally think best has alre ady been determined.
and said that the latter goal presupposes the capacities the creative control principle recognizes. Perhaps the illusion is a deeper one. Página 31 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 31 unknown to us. the decision must be the agent's original achievement. Most of us have that capacity in ample degree. Am I missing the point? The objection may be more straightforward: that it is an illusion to suppose that anyone can attract credit or blame for doing something well or badly if it was not his doing at all. But whether that further thought is coherent or not. Nós . I said that if we were. I described the role a responsibility system built on creative rather than hydraulic control plays in people's efforts to live well. They wholly lack the capacity to form beliefs based on evidenc e. I also distinguished having a good life from living well. O flutuante brains are in complete ignorance of their situation. If determinism is true. But that is not true: we are not in that position. why aren't we all in a similar position? We are manipulated by outside forces just as we would be if we were only floating brains. It separates what we believe ought to count from what not. indeed we are now supposing that we have the capacity even to discover that all our decisions are determined by ancient events. that this is a matter of their spontaneous manufacture here and now. they have no way to discover it. but rather the work of forces beyond his control. We are not in either complete or terminal ignorance. we would not be leading lives at all. only brains in a vat. Pode now be said that the entire project of living well makes sense only for people whose decisions are not fixed in advance by external forces over which they have no control. it plays no part in the story I told.already been decided what they will think best. The bare phenomenon of a decision can't attract these judgments.
would we. That is not a metaphysical or conceptual claim. returns. we adore it and we celebrate him. He is done. how we would live. his convictions about greatness in art and his beliefs about the tastes of rich collectors. We valued what the artist did. But does the revelation lead us to value the artist's efforts or achievement less? Claro que não. . His canvas is exhibited. Then a guru in the Arctic Circle calls a press conference. But with a helpful twist. This is. only the old objection we have been considering in di fferent forms for some páginas. The guru explains that he has a painting machine directed by a powerful computer at whose disposal he has placed an exact description of every event since the beginning of time. if his hand created a painting because it was attached to a mechanical device like a signature machine manipulated by someone else? So we shouldn't claim credit for living a life well through our decisions if it was determined long ago. despairs. sighs. draws. paints. smokes. He unveils an exact replica of the great painting. drinks. that people can do a better or worse job of living by doing what it was inevitable that they would do? The painter begins on a giant canvas. I said that the decisions a person makes. We are amazed. paints over. by cosmic forces. because it switches focus from judgmental responsibility for particular decisions to creative credit or discredit for a life as a whole. lights up. as a matter of sound ethics. including of course information about the artist's various abilities. of course. rubs out. considered as phenomena in themselves without regard to their hydraulic ancestry or consequence.wouldn't credit an artist with any success or failure. É um ethical claim: what deserves credit or discredit remains a value judgment even in this rarefied contexto. But does this particular value judgment make sense? Is it right. Recémsophisticated dating techniques proves that it was created an hour before our artist began his own de trabalho. stands back. He sketches. He dreams and imagines. fix how well he has lived. paints feverishly.
It would be incoherent to admire him less now. and his own only by accident if at all. in the latter case. Making artistic decisions yourself means bringing to bear your own sense of the various aesthetic values in play and your own skill in exhibiting those values in a concrete work. actually made it. our amazing discovery cannot have cheapened the worth of a single one of those decisions. any more than we would if the guru had used the mechanical device. . because we admired the way he made the many thousands of Página 32 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 32 decisions that ended in the wonderful picture. as he painted. He thought. that he was making his own painting not someone else's. But he was errado. Suppose the guru. Ele didn't tie the painters arm to a mechanical device. instead he transmitted radio signals that moved the molecules of the artist's cerebellum in such a way that the artist's arm moved as the guru dictated. capacity essential to responsibility. instead of predicting and then reproducing the picture. he will abandon all pride ± or shame ± in what he has done. regulative. I imagined that a hypnotized patient might be in that position. None of that has changed. Our artist is brainwashed. And that is why someone else's painting through you is different from your painting yourself even if. We wouldn't give the artist credit then. But now suppose that the radio signals also made the artist think that the thousands of decisions he was making were his own decisions though they were not. But when he learns that the canvas actually signals the artistic skills of someone else. of course. into thinking that it is his own artistic genius that is now displayed on the canvas before him. Isso é why the creative control principle makes some level of the second. we are now assuming.before the press conference. your aesthetic values and skills were predestined by nature to take exactly the form they do take.
Or ± a more difficult case still ± the more concrete insight that this genre might be exploited brilliantly by swinging leaking paint cans over a prone lona. that has shaped an artist¶s skills. it is exactly that fact that endows people with that capacity. that fact. We imagine that the guru didn't radio discrete hand movements to the artist's brain but rather implanted the more general tastes ± a sense of the artistic possibilities of abstract expressionism.7 One more challenge. We can in this way manufacture hard cases for any judgment about the artist's responsibility for what his hand has made. Nor can it damage that capacity that their final decisions do 7 We can turn this screw through more turns of fantasy. however. taste and judgment. as I said. because we imagine two decision-makers rather than one. The second capacity is regulative: . But the capacities require no such thing. if it is a fact. rather than an Arctic guru. people never have the capacities the creative control principle assumes they normally do have because these capacities require the kind of causal originality or power that one or the other of these scientific hypotheses would make impossible. These fantasy cases are hard. It might be said that if determinism or epiphenomenalism is true. on the contrary. O primeiro of these is the capacity to form true beliefs about the physical world and the mental states of outras pessoas. and the facts make it unclear whose values and skills a particular decision should be understood as exhibiting. is completely irrelevant to the existence of the first capacity. Página 33 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 33 not enter into causal relations with their nerves and muscles. It does not damage that capacity that people's beliefs about the external world are caused by events beyond their control. perhaps ± to which the artist responded. That complication is absent when it is nature.
like a drunken sailor pushing the helmsman aside and taking the wheel? So that it was not his will but rather an overwhelming surge of sexual jealousy or some such force that provided the efficient cause of his muscles contracting around the trigger? I do not understand these questions and I doubt that many of the citizens. for reasons that go beyond the old free -will controversy.the principle assumes that people can normally make final decisions that can be understood as serving their desires and convictions in the light of their beliefs. . lawyers and judges who would have to answer it would understand it either. or under extreme duress of some kind. nevertheless has the capacity to exceed the speed limit. so that they usurped his will's normal causal role. in the circumstances. It is important to the much more practical controversies I mentioned. then we think the determinative question in these practical controversies is a psycho -biological one. 6. Peopl e have that capacity if their decisions have the stipulated character whether or not they were fated to have that personagem. about its application to particular cases. Responsibility in Practice The Insanity Defense The choice between the hydraulic and the creative control principles is also important. among people who accept the general structure of the responsibility system. we would ask: were these forces or influences strong enough. I said. or when overcome by an irresistible impulse. If we think that people are responsible only when their actions in fact flow from a spontaneous. That is an assumption about the character not the etiology or causal consequence of final decisions. whose behavior is certainly determined by events beyond its control. Perhaps the popularity of the hydraulic control principle among philosophers has contributed to the confusion that marks this area of the criminal law. Quando someone claims that he committed his criminal act in a blind range. or because he had watched too much violence on television. or because he grew up disadvantaged in a ghetto. A fast car. uncaused act of will.
They will also disagree about the more evidently normative issue ± about what level of incapacity is sufficient to let someone off the responsibility hook. People who must try to answer it ± jurors after hearing volumes of testimony. ³There but for the grace of God go I. They will disagree. named after the woodcutter who killed Peel¶s secretary while trying to kill the prime minister himself. We admire people who at least begin to answer that question introspectively. We ask instead: did the accused lack one or the other of the pertinent capacities to such a degree that it is inappropriate to ascribe responsibility to him? That question calls for two judgments: an interpretive judgment about his behavior and an ethical and moral judgment that reasonable people will make differently. in favor of the different principle I have tried to defend. When the public has been particularly anxious for vengeance after some crime. Would I regard myself as responsible. so that his violent act on this occasion confirmed rather than contradicted his general capacity to suit his decision to his convictions.´ The history of the insanity defense suggests that many people do not approach the issue in that introspective way. I think. about Página 34 Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 34 whether the defendant's general behavior showed an admiration for violence as a virtue. a mysterious one. then we pose a different question. The M'Naughten Rule. It is therefore often a difficult question but not. perhaps ± will have different opinions about the interpretive issue. for instance. Outrage is a more frequent spur. as part of his self-image. shrunk the defense to allow only the . judges and legislators have r esponded by cutting back the scope of the insanity defense. if I had the kind of incapacity the defendant¶s act revealed? That is the spirit of the attractive thought. in retrospect.If we reject they hydraulic control principle. however.
Over many decades most American states moved from that strict rule to a more forgiving one that permitted the accused to argue that he was confronted with an irresistible impulso. In any case. 8 Cite the PLI document. the attempted assassination of President Reagan that provoked the greatest complaints about the leniency of the insanity defense. manifested in other ways.first. judges and jurors make that judgment differently. is itself a classification. and stipulated that only a particularly low level of even that capacity could excuse. that the defendant lacked the necessary regulative capacity because he had watched too much television. Página 35 . Requiring a showing of mental disease also reduces the vagueness of the defense: the label ³disease. made to a Florida court. regulative capacity proved unwieldy and the results often seemed too permissive to many scholars as well as to the general públicas. They must be low indeed. We do not regard someone as suffering from mental disease if his cognitive and regulative capacities fall only somewhat short of what we take to be normal. 8 That rule by no means eliminates the need for judgment and different lawyers. however. The argument. cognitive. But asking juries to judge the appropriate level of the second. capacity to count. It was. many American states have now adopted a different approach based on a recommendation of the Practicing Law Institute: the defense is available only when the defendant is shown to have a mental disease.´ even if not a medical term of art. But the rule does change the focus from discrete event to general capacity. This has evidentiary advantages: it is easier to judge whether a defendant has shown a general incapacity. rather than just a single-shot temporary incapacity exhausted in the crime it is alleged to excuse. seemed a reductio ad absurdam that called the standard itself into question.
for instance. Ele aims. that people who grow up in ghetto poverty are less responsible for any anti-social behavior than people from more privileged . Torture. Further questions I will not explore arise if the general account of judgmental responsibility I have defended is right. at least in extreme forms. he cannot claim that he lacks either of the pertinent capacities to any degree. Someone who threatens torture hopes to change his victim's options just as someone does who threatens death. to extinguish his victim's responsibility. is diferentes. so the question is rather whether he made the decision that the law requires him to make. It would clearly be excusable if he was ordered. Someone facing torture remains responsible for his choice whether to obey to avoid it. that is. If someone obeys an order to kill because he is threatened with death himself if he does not obey. the torturer's aim is different: it is to create so much pain that the victim does lose his capacity to decide whether to yield or not. under the same threat. The torturer aims to reduce his victim to a screaming animal who no longer is able to reason in that way. If he kills. He obeys because he understands his situation accurately. He is responsible. and perhaps it is excusable even when the crime he commits is grave. and because he is able to conform his decision to his reflective judgment of what is best for him. It is common to say. But when the tortur e begins. But there is no place here for any suspicion that he lacks responsibility for whatever decision he makes. his act might or might not be excusable.Free Will and Responsibility: Draft Not for Quotation 35 Duress and Injustice Recognizing that the responsibility system embodies the creative control principle is also helpful in distinguishing a plea of incapacity that justifies denying or diminishing judgmental responsibility from other kinds of excuse that must find some other definition and consequence. Duress plainly falls into the latter category. to commit some minor crime.
If we generally hold people responsible for what they do in service of their normative personality even though they did not choose the personality they have. I suppose it would be possible for someone to think. But on the different view of responsibility I defended the claim of diminished responsibility seems problemat ic. That possibility makes as much sense to me as any other speculation about when a hydraulic will is displaced. Ghetto survivors are no less capable of forming accurate views about the world or of matching their decisions to their desires or convictions than people from more comfortable social strata. if he accepted the hydraulic control principle. the particular circumstances in which these convictions were formed nevertheless matters for judgmental responsibility? .fundos. that poverty or other disadvantage can usurp the will's place and cancel responsibility in that way. can we find any justification for the popular impulse to blame or punish people who grew up in disadvantage less severely? Is mitigation of blame part of a compensation package for prior injustice? Or do we have some other reason for supposing that though a person's convictions are never of his own choice.
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