G.R. No.

174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law – Equity – Change of Name – Change of Sex – Marriage
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a
male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was
successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of
his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the
petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry
his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that
Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis
for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness
on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT
NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar
that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the
petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-
assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be
grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the
basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local
civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the
entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to
enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed
to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female,
having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition
where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female
characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small
ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be
granted.
Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or
naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a
male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones.
There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.
FAMILY HOME
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO
SALINAS
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,
Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where
the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under
Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged
that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority.
The residential house in the present case became a family home by
operation of law under Article 153.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
Ruling:
The petitioner’s contention that petitioner and his family should
consider it a family home from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well
taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions
of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall
have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the
execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the
judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19,
1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance
of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of
justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying
the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746 August 28,
2007
Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto
Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person “fixer” who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona,
Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they
never went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil
registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March
26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number
“7054133” is not identical with the marriage license number which appears
in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent
against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is
void.
Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the
parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no
sufficient basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties or party
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage
license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere
typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether
or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been
duly and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage on January 9, 1993
was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage?
Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void
ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 201061, July 3,
2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article
148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became
the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with
Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided
in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name
of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
De castro vs De Castro (2008) G.R. No. 160172

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

Held:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born
out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law?
Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance
of the law excuses no one” has special application to judges, who, under
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.
FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955
October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal
Falsification of Public Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties and among them is
the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13
appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a
surety bond but this document was found to be falsified. The two complaints
for falsification of document was brought before Manila prosecutor’s office
and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and respondent
Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the
latter affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of
respondent Villadores as an accused in the two criminal cases. Accordingly,
the original informations were amended to include the respondent among
those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and
Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging
damages sustained by the petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by
the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial court. The respondent
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently,
respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the
appellate court pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for
the crime committed by the respondent and the same has redounded to his
benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since it is a mere
obiter dictum.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner
Villanueva is not an offended party is a mere obiter dictum.
Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not
an offended party is not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point
within the issue presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter
dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any
statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Hence, in the
instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores
in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations.
Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the offended party was,
thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the
discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
Facts:
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land into
three equal shares and to give him the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied that plaintiff
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he
died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and
claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the
death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio;
and also identified pictures where the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of
the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.)
Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified that she knows Inocentes
Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as
the parents of Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan,
by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as
witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was not married
when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his brother
married anybody and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes
died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered
a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.
Ruling:
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-
owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether
he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad)
and his putative father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that
all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of said municipality. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of
the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were
presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s self-
serving negations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.
FERANCULLO v. FERANCULLO (2006) A.C. No. 7214

FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in
this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the
same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470 October
8, 1985
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in
1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied
the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the
parties?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. The case involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380 October
5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
BAYOT v. CA
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was
docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also
issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay
a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's
incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss,
since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to
be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of
jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder
of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown
in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America,
a country which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-
couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce
is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale
of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.
Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and De Quintos
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
Facts: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas
hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be
given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After
conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between
Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that
she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs;
that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and
caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with
Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Catalina constitute psychological incapacity.
Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability
to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and
the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in
deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid
down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it
from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.
Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Azcueta v. CA G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first
meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old
while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no child.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her petition and during her
testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his
mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a
room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even
bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have
an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. Sometime later, her husband told
petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after,
petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was
supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the
money he gave her came from his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became
physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex
once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would
always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to
have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that
they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not
agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he
did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a
witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She
corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married
petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. She learned later that Rodolfo
told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas said that based on the
information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to
masculine strivings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

HELD:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with
Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her
husband.

In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on
the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.

Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed
and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment;
that from the choice of the family abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his
mother; and that the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to have a child
stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally
failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own
decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations. Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared
null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying
that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and
abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render
him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The
CA’s reasoning that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due
to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting
a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he is unemployed are
all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point
out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert
witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by
evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his
mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his
marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a
grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s dependent
personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a
husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;
one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters
that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-
being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his
early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those
instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply
them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological
incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also
changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In the case at
bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on
mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon
Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they
were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and respondent got marriedon
December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter,
they lived with the Ramon’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses
were shouldered by Ramon’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries
were spent solely for their personal needs.
Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly
allowance ofP1,500.00 from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned
from his family’s business. Because of this, Ramon engaged into (1) a
fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton
trading business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her inlaws.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence
and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorro’s mother where petitioner
continued to carry the financial burdens
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having
an extra-marital affair. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the
parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a
cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply
read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he
accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room.
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and
asked them to intervene, Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his
spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited,
sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as
respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to
Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner,
with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of
their house. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed
and set aside RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological
incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno and
Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical
psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of
petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo
therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s
psychological incapacity is incurable.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three
reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems
include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that
a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts
in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not
exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity. In the case at
bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s
pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa.
ANTONIO vs. REYES
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of
age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy
of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on
his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of
fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause
of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March
14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to
her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of
the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband
and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.