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Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked • PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY
Card 7 18, 1970

Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of


Text
35 China • O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov
HTML
PS
Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of
PDF 64 China • I. Alexandrov
T* Renunciation of the Principles of Marxism-Leninism • APROPOS
19* OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT THE NINTH
80 CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
###
  II

99 Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Essence

Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST


123 INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS

  Crisis in the Political Development of China

144 [introduction.]

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE POLITICAL


AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S
145 REPUBLIC

153 THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST POLITICAL


159 SYSTEM

165 Maoism Preaches Poverty

185 Great-Power Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung

  III

The International Communist Movement and the Communist


Party of China • IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th
195 ANNIVERSARY OF THE CPC

232 Regarding Peking-Washington Contacts

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Questions Requiring an Answer • CONCERNING THE US-


242 CHINA TOP-LEVEL MEETING

254 The Preaching and Practice of the Chinese Leaders

277 Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and Practice

Concerning the Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and


285 China (1950–66)

320 Peking Against the Socialist Community

New Strategy for the Same Ends AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST


332 INTERNATIONAL • POLICY

The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China Since the


357 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China

***
 
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Pseudo-Revolutionaries
TOC
Unmasked
Card
PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970
 

8
Text
The centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has become a holiday for working people p
HTML
the world over. It has developed into a convincing demonstration of the triumph of
PS
PDF
Lenin’s cause, the vitality of Lenin’s ideas and behests. With the name of Lenin,
with his all-triumphant teaching, are linked all the historical accomplishments of our
T* agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism in the
19* USSR, the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system, the upsurge
of the international working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse
### of colonialism, and the emancipation of the oppressed nations.

The progressive world public has widely observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration p
of the birth centenary of the leader of the world revolution has served for the
Communist and Workers’ Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism, as a
powerful stimulus in their entire ideological and political activities. The fraternal
Parties have increased the struggle for the unity of the communist movement, for the
cohesion of all antiimperialist forces.

In the minds and hearts of revolutionary fighters throughout the world Lenin’s name p
is inseparably linked with the first socialist state and its Communist Party which
consistently implement his behests and continue his cause. The keynote of the Lenin 9
celebrations in the majority of countries was recognition of the outstanding role of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process,
expression of gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless heroic struggle, for its
loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless assistance to
all revolutionary liberation movements.

Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the world-wide battle for the minds and p
hearts of people. It has shown people everywhere the prospect for deliverance from
imperialism, and more and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of its economic,
social and political organisation. The community of socialist countries has become a
force without which, and in defiance of which, not a single major problem of our
time can be solved. The united might of the socialist countries and their active
policy in defence of peace are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions of the
imperialists and preventing the outbreak of a world rocket and nuclear war.

The celebration of the Lenin centenary has vividly reflected the growing tendency
manifested at the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties-the
tendency towards united action of all revolutionary and progressive forces of the
world; it has raised to a new level their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh
and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary process which unites the three great
forces of our time-the world socialist system, the international working-class and
national-liberation movements.

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10
I
It is not surprising that the masters of the outgoing world are resorting to lies and p
slander in an attempt to discredit and belittle the historical accomplishments of
Lenin’s homeland, of the fraternal socialist countries, the world communist and
working-class movement, and the fighters for national liberation. There is nothing
new about their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet
state.

The Soviet people and entire progressive mankind know the real reasons for the p
anti-socialist actions of imperialism. We first heard them more than half a century
ago. What is worth noting is something else-the fact that during the days when the
peoples of the world were celebrating Lenin’s anniversary the Peking leaders came
out in unison with imperialism’s malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign.
Peking has timed for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of fanning animosity
and hatred towards the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community, and
the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the world.

Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are the successes of the USSR in the p
development of socialist industry, agriculture, science and technology, the steady rise
in the living standard and cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the
defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set by our Party for further
intensification of socialist production for the purpose of building the material and
technical basis of communism and strengthening the positions of world socialism. In
its desire to discredit the inspiring example of the Soviet Union and the other 11
countries of the socialist community, Peking propaganda resorts to incredible lies and
distortions, abuses and slander.

Following in the wake of imperialist propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the p
“ aggressiveness” of the USSR and the “crisis” of Soviet economy; it resuscitates
Trotskyite “ideas” about "bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,” and equates US
imperialism with the Soviet Union which they call "social-imperialism.”

Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the principles of socialist p


internationalism underlying the relations between the countries of the socialist
community and declare that such community "does not exist.” Things reached such a
pass that Hitler’s ravings have been dragged out into the open about the need to
“save” the peoples from the "Slav danger.” Following the leaders of the nazi Reich
the Peking leaders are trying to portray the Soviet Union as a "colossus on clay
legs,” asserting that the USSR is only a "paper tiger" and threatening to "pierce it at
one go.”

Such ravings make up the content of a series of articles published in April in the p
Jenmin jihpao, Hungchi and Chiefangchiun pao, and of an article marking May Day.

These publications show that Peking has made it a tradition to resort to methods of p
rabid political and ideological provocations so characteristic of imperialist
propaganda.

Communists and all those who cherish the interests of peace and progress are p
deeply alarmed by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the international arena and
seriously concerned about the destiny of the Chinese revolution.

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The June 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties pointed p 12
out that recent events in China and the nature of the resolutions adopted at the 9th
CPC Congress had a negative effect on the entire world situation and on the struggle
of the anti-imperialist forces. The present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular
and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive activities against the countries of the
socialist community and seeking to split the ranks of anti– imperialist forces.

The actions of the Chinese leaders following the International Conference, which p
Peking terms a "black gathering,” show the soundness of the conclusions drawn by
Marxist-Leninist Parties to the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually launched
struggle against the world socialist system, the international communist movement
and the revolutionary fighters all over the world.

All this calls for greater vigilance with respect to Peking’s activities in the
international arena and for watching closely which way the Mao group is leading
China.

II

The entire home and foreign policy course of the Peking leaders is dictated by p
great-power and hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of realizing these
aspirations that China was turned into a proving ground of adventurous experiments,
the burden of which fell heavily upon the shoulders of the Chinese people.

The People’s Republic of China is going through an acute crisis in all spheres of its p
political, economic and cultural life. The Communist Party has been broken up. The
constitutional bodies of people’s power, trade-unions, Komsomol and other 13
democratic organisations and unions of artists and intellectuals have been dissolved.
There is nothing left of the Communist Party except its name, for Mao and his
associates are building up an altogether new political organisation which will serve as
a tool of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in the country.

State power bodies in China are built on the militarist pattern inherited from Chiang p
Kaishek’s rule. All power is concentrated in the hands of the military, Mao’s yes-
men, who are the bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The commanders
of military areas, armies and garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They
head the "revolutionary committees" and supervise the “regulation” of Party
organisation!?. Army units are quartered at enterprises, educational establishments
and offices. At industrial plants shops and teams are classed as companies and
squads. The same militarist system is being introduced at government offices and
educational institutions. The army controls the country’s economy and culture.

Commanding army officers issue orders, which workers, peasants, office employees p
and students must carry out unconditionally. This is the way society is being run
today in China, this is the way in which the ideas that all Chinese must be "obedient
bulls,” "eternally unrusting screws" and "Mao’s good soldiers" are translated into
practice. The Chinese people are being driven into barracks and are denied access to
knowledge and culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, "the more a person knows, the
more stupid he becomes.” In the last four years not a single work of fiction has 14
been published and no feature film has been released in the country. All museums
and libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao quotation books and his other
“works” are circulated in 3,000 million copies.

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During these years more than 70 million children of school age were deprived of
normal education in school. The country fell short of several million specialists, since
the academic process at institutions of higher learning was broken off. Such is the
result of the practical implementation of Mao’s thesis: "Schools are little tombs out
of which can come nothing but evil; they are shallow ponds swarming with turtles.”
Developing this thesis Mao said in 1964: "The course of science may be cut to half
its present length. Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music, arrow
shooting, chariot driving, holy books and arithmetic... No matter how many books
you read, you will not become an emperor... The point today is that, in the first
place, there are many subjects and, secondly, there are many books.”

But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim they are playing the part of Messiah in p
today’s world.

Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and servitude-such is the order of things in China p


today. And the Maoists want to thrust it upon other nations, to "hoist the banner of
Mao Tse-tung’s ideas over the whole world.”

The implementation of "Mao Tse-tung’s ideas" has also led to grave consequences p
in the economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy in a planned and
balanced way on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his
supporters, having discarded the Leninist principles of economic management and 15
replaced them by voluntarism, have caused the country to embark on the road of "big
leaps" and militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of industry and
agriculture.

The PRC’s economy has twice in the last decade been hurled back below the level p
it had reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year plan wa>3 carried out
successfully; this was at a time when the CPC guided the country’s economic
development on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, drawing on the
experience and relying on the all-round support and assistance of the USSR and
other socialist countries. At that time the PRC ranked among the first in the world in
development rates. But the second fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,”
and the third by the "cultural revolution.” As a result, industrial production has not
reached the levels mapped by the second and third five-year plans. It has been
marking time on the 1959 level.

According to Chinese statistics, the People’s Republic of China in 1959 produced p


41,500 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 348 million tons of coal, 3.7 million tons
of oil, and 18.4 million tons of steel, whereas last year it produced 60,000–65,000
million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 210–225 million tons of coal, 12–13 million tons
of oil, and 12–13 million tons of steel. Grain production remained at the 1957 level
and amounted to 185–190 million tons, while the cotton yield does not exceed 1.6
million tons.

It should be taken into account that the increase in population in the country, p
according to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year. This means that in the last
ten years per capita production of many major industrial and agricultural items has 16
not risen, but decreased.

Basic foods and manufactured goods are being supplied to the population under a p
strict rationing system.

The military-barrack regime in China, which is pictured by her propagandists as a p


kind of kingdom of universal equality, is really a caricature of socialist relations of

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production. The Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the national economy
out of its logjam. Emergency measures are being taken to remedy the situation.
Certain negative consequences of the " cultural revolution" in the sphere of
production are being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy in economic
management. But the Peking leaders are endeavouring to solve this problem
primarily by military-administrative methods,- by methods of coercion. Meanwhile
living standards of the working people remain to be very low: the wages of the
workers in the last four years have shrunk by at least 10–15 per cent and working
hours have been increased.

The hardships of life in China are aggravated by the Peking authorities’ p


concentration of the main effort on militarisation of the country. More than 40 per
cent of the national budget is set for military purposes. This is done to the detriment
of housing construction, which has all but, stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its
modernisation have been slashed), and education, health and cultural advancement of
the people.

The economy of the People’s Republic of China is actually divided into two parts. p
One comprises a narrow group of sectors connected with military production. This
part enjoys overall priority, and has not been subjected to the "cultural revolution" 17
treatment. The other part of the economy consists of the civil production sectors,
which are told to "lean on their own resources,” and not to expect investments.

This military deformity of the economy makes China’s entire economic and social p
development lopsided.

The Peking leaders have distorted the essence of socialist industrialisation. By p


relying on smallscale enterprises they only preserve the country’s economic
backwardness. The social consequences of this policy are also most negative: the
growth of an organised working class is being retarded.

In these conditions, the Peking propagandists seek to divert the attention of the p
population from the disastrous consequences of the economic policy which the
Maoists have imposed on the nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that the
USSR and other socialist countries are worse off than China, and thus to neutralise
justified discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes practically every day
articles about an "economic crisis" in the Soviet Union. The Peking propagandists
turn everything upside down in their attempt to belittle the achievements of the
Soviet people, to conceal from the population of China the truth about our country.

The following facts are, of course, known to the Peking leaders, but they are p
carefully hidden from the people. In the 1960–69 period in the Soviet Union
production of electricity went up from 292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000
million kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608 million tons; oil, from 148
million to 328 million tons; steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and grain, 18
from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.

The Soviet Union today ranks first in the world in the extraction of coal, iron ore p
and manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe and second in the world in the
extraction of oil, smelting of steel, production of electricity, and the output of many
key engineering items, chemicals and other important products.

Major successes have also been scored by the working people of other countries of p
the socialist community. For instance, industrial output in the member-states of the

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Council for Mutual Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950– 69 period.
During the same period industrial output in the advanced capitalist states rose only
2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose populations make up only one-tenth of
the world population, account for about one-third of world industrial output, and
their share in world industrial production is steadily rising.

In the past few years the socialist countries took important steps towards raising the p
efficiency of social production through its intensification on the basis of scientific
and technological progress. They are strengthening fraternal cooperation and working
to promote socialist economic integration. The successes of the socialist world not
only serve the interests of the socialist countries, but have a tremendous
revolutionising effect.

The rapid development of the national economy of the countries of the socialist p
community, whose economic growth rate is outstripping that of the capitalist states;
the improvement of the living standard of the working people; the fact that socialism 19
now leads in a number of fields in science and technology-all these real results of
the creative effort of the peoples of the socialist countries most decisively help to
ensure the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism over imperialism.

This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin’s teaching that we can make the greatest p
impact on the world revolution through our economic policy.

It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of p
China in 1956 pointed out the following: "The main purpose of the entire work of
the Party is to satisfy to the utmost the material and cultural needs of the people.
Thus it is necessary, on the basis of development of production, to improve the life
of the people, which, in turn, is an essential condition for stepping up the production
activity of the masses."/Peking now declares that concern for the people’s welfare is
"black economism" and "bourgeois degeneration.”

Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is being trampled underfoot in the PRC. p
As a result, production is made to serve the purpose not of steadily improving the
material and cultural standards of the working people, but of building up a military
potential necessary for carrying out expansionist activities in the world-aims totally
alien to the interests of the working masses.

The Peking leaders have weakened the positions of the working class, undermined p
its alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the socialist superstructure in China,
creating antagonistic relations between the main social sections of society.

Today, four years after the launching of the "cultural revolution,” the contradictions p 20
besetting China’s society remain acute, although it would seem that all measures have
been taken to suppress and exterminate the genuinely revolutionary, internationalist
forces in China, against which the "cultural revolution" was directed. This is why the
Chinese press continues to call for the rooting out of the "handful of enemies,” as all
opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called. Terror reigns in the country. Frame-
up trials continue to be held in large cities ending in group executions in squares and
stadiums in front of thousands of people.

The forcible assimilation of national minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular p


character of the present regime in China. Annually millions of new settlers are being
sent from Peking, Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and
the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous district. National minorities (that is, 45 million
people!) are doomed to complete forcible absorption and disappearance as national,

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ethnic groups. In the course of the "cultural revolution" local autonomy, already
limited, is turned into a fiction. The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The districts inhabited by the national
minorities have become centres of "labour armies" and concentration camps. The
age-old culture and distinctive features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and others-are being
systematically destroyed. This cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.

More and more troops are being dispatched to break their resistance. Many units are p 21
being brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.

The native population is being driven out of the districts bordering on the Soviet p
Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic. Yet despite all this Peking propaganda
finds it possible to praise the order forced upon the national minorities of China and
at the same time slander the Leninist policy of equality, friendship and fraternity of
the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland« tis required to prevent the truth about p
the USSR reaching the Chinese people.

The experience of national construction in the Soviet Union over a period of more p
than half a century has shown that the CPSU and the Soviet state, by implementing
the Leninist principles of national policy, have succeeded in creating and
strengthening the unshakable moral and political unity of all the peoples of the
USSR, have ensured the genuine blossoming of their economy and culture. This is
proved by data on the development of the Union Republics, former backward
outskirts of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power industrial output in
Uzbekistan increased 70 times over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times. These were areas with an almost
100 per cent illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and academies of
sciences and a wide network of schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.

The solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union (and this is one of the p
most acute and difficult problems of social life) is a major achievement of our
socialist system, an important step in mankind’s social development. The attempts of 22
the Peking leaders to discredit the Soviet Union’s national policy only succeeded in
exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han policy.

The barrack “communism” which they try to establish in China runs counter to the
requirements of a socialist society-the development of the productive forces and
utilisation of the results of the scientific and technological revolution; it runs counter
to the vital interests of the masses-improvement of their material and cultural
standards, development of socialist democracy, and provision of genuine equality of
nations; it runs counter to all the objective processes of social development which
spell victory of scientific socialism.

III

The anti-Leninist course of China’s present leadership is reflected in the field of


foreign policy as well. Preparation for war has been declared a long-term political
course for the entire nation. “Legalised” at the CPC’s 9th Congress was Mao’s thesis

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which boils down to the idea that war is inevitable and even desirable. "As for the
question of world war,” Mao said, "it is a case of either war provoking a revolution,
or revolution preventing war.” In explaining the meaning of this formula, Lin Piao at
the CPC’s 9th Congress, and later the Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution
with war. Thus, the newspaper Chieh tang jihpao said that revolution "must of
necessity develop into war.” According to this thesis war is not only something that
cannot be avoided; it is even some-

thing that should be sought. The paper deplores the fact that for a quarter of a 23
century now there has been no world war.

In one of their publications Chinese propagandists bluntly state: "The theory that p
war can be avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt that there will be a
war. The question is only when, whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to
avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged against views claiming that war can
be avoided in the obtaining situation.”

By preaching war the Maoists are writing off the interests of world socialism, the p
working people in all lands, and the world revolution. The Peking strategists proclaim
that "a civilisation hundreds of thousands of times better" will be built up on the
ruins of "crushed imperialism and social-imperialism.”

Thus at a conference of Party workers in Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: "If, for p
instance, the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one can do except start
building anew after the war when we may possibly obtain somewhat better results
than now.” In the last ten years whenever there was a heightening of international
tensions, the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve ona aim: that of heating
up the situation still more and of prodding the world towards war.

After the CPC’s 9th Congress the position of the present Chinese leaders on the p
issue of war and peace has been stated time and again in anti– Soviet tirades which
include the most recent articles. The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the
Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US imperialism. The current
campaign of nation-wide militarisation conducted by the Maoists is accompanied by 24
calls for preparing for war against the USSR and the other socialist countries, for
struggle to overthrow the socialist system in these countries.

The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the people’s attention from the deep social p
and political crisis that has seized the country by whipping up a rabid campaign of
jingoism and of hate towards the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and some
of China’s non-socialist neighbours. They are trying to lay the responsibility for all
the suffering and misery which Mao’s adventuristic course has caused the Chinese
people on "external enemies,” among whom Peking puts first not imperialism, but the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The intensity of the
false and provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat of an attack on the PRC
from the North" is a matter of common knowledge. Also common knowledge are the
unfounded territorial claims that the leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China’s neighbours including the USSR.

To further these claims and stir up hate toward neighbouring nations the leaders of p
the PRC engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the smokescreen of the
war hysteria that has been created in China, a policy is being carried out at an
intense pace of suppressing popular resentment, speeding up the country’s
militarisation and propagandising the inevitability of war.

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In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify this policy. One such pretext has been p
discovered in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about China’s exclusiveness,
about its historically ordained role of leader "beneath the heavens.” This chauvinistic
rubbish is clothed in the form of an "ultra– revolutionary" struggle to assert the 25
"thought of Mao" in the world.

Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal p
greatpower concepts, “super-revolutionary” phrasemongering and what is actually
anti-revolutionary practice.

The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill and cunning in passing themselves p
off as revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of the world revolution. If
we were to believe even for a moment the newspaper tirades and the speechifying of
the Peking leaders, one might think that there they were working round the clock to
promote the cause of the world revolution.

If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and p


proletarian internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the actions of the
revolutionary anti-imperialist forces, and imperialism would have a more limited field
for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks against the revolutionary forces.
However, Peking has made a different choice. China’s present leaders must answer
to the socialist countries, the international working-class and national-liberation
movements for having placed the PRC in opposition to the common front of anti-
imperialist forces.

In an attempt to hold back the world revolutionary process, the imperialists are p
uniting their efforts on an international scale. The Chinese leaders, however, are
spearheading their foreign policies against the cohesion of the countries of the
socialist community, they are trying to undermine the allied relations of the socialist
states-members of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the implementation of the
plans for the further development of socialist economic integration. And this, 26
precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to achieve.

In the last few years there has not been a single instance where, in a crisis world p
situation caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the PRC has joined the
socialist community and the anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the forces of
reaction and aggression.

The leaders in Peking are responsible for dooming some detachments of the p
communist and national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa to defeat by
imposing on these detachments their adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of
courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from Peking lost their lives, and the
revolutionary movement in some countries suffered serious setbacks and great losses-
such is the bloody result of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of the Peking
"ultra-revolutionaries.”

The escalation of the US imperialist aggression in Indochina, the continuation of p


Israel’s aggressive actions against the Arab states, the military intervention of the
imperialist powers in the domestic affairs of some states-all these actions are
spearheaded against the national-liberation movement and the social progress of
nations.

The Soviet Government’s Statement of May 4, 1970, noted that "the escalation of p
the US aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the need for unity and

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the strengthening of cohesion of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace forces in
the struggle against aggression.”

Such is the stand of our Party and Government and of the Soviet people. Such is p
the stand to which the fraternal socialist countries and the MarxistLeninist Parties of 27
the world adhere.

Under these conditions the negative consequences of Peking’s adventurist and p


splitting policies, aimed at undermining the bonds between the main detachments of
the anti-imperialist front, become particularly clear.

Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been conducting for some years a course p
of undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states, of
isolating the national– liberation struggle of peoples from their real alliesthe countries
of the socialist community and the international communist and workers’ movement.
Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied by attempts to slander the Soviet
Union’s internationalist policies. The "friends of people" from Peking are trying to
present the political, economic and military support given by the CPSU and the
entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist countries, to peoples fighting against
imperialist aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a " social-imperialist
policy”; they even concoct monstrous lies about "Soviet neocolonialism.”

According to their logic, it would have been better for the nations fighting against p
imperialism to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces of our time and left to
deal single-handed with a strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is actually
what the imperialists are dreaming of as they plan their adventures.

In acting in this manner Peking is telling the imperialists that it does not intend to p
take joint measures with the USSR and other socialist countries against imperialist
aggression. Such a stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the imperialist circles 28
and encourages them to continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and designs.
Yet another proof of this are the recent events in Indochina.

The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear by their actions that they are p
endeavouring to use the heroic struggle of the peoples for freedom for furthering
their own global intrigues, for they proceed from great-Han dreams of becoming
some new emperors of "great China" that would rule at least Asia, if not the entire
world.

Such a policy contradicts the interests of the world socialist system, the international
communist and workers’ movement, the national– liberation struggle of the peoples;
it contradicts the real interests of the Chinese people. "Super– revolutionariness" in
word and betrayal of the class interests of the working people in deed-such is the
meaning of Maoism in international relations.

IV

The current Chinese leadership is compelled to reckon with the tremendous prestige p
enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that he will not be able to
win the masses and keep them under his control with his name and his “ideas”
alone. For a certain period he disguised himself as a Marxist, and now he is even
trying to pass himself for a successor to Marx and Lenin.

There was a time when many of the notions that constitute Mao Tse-tung’s p

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“thought” were regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to Mao’s lack of


experience and theoretical background. Mao himself admitted that he "had various 29
non-Marxist views" and that he had "only a cursory bookish knowledge of
Marxism.” Mao often came under criticism in the CPC and in the Comintern.

The developments in China have revealed the real essence of Maoism, a reactionary p
Utopian petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the theoretical plane, is an eclectic
hotch-potch of widely different views including elements of Confucianism,
anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois nationalism.

Mao took the most conservative aspect of Confucianism-the preaching of p


submissiveness, the glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the supreme ruler.

From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the ideas about the special revolutionary p
character of the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of the working class.
Reactionary Utopian ideas, born of historical backwardness, are elevated by Mao to
the rank of a new theoretical discovery.

Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist doctrines great-power and chauvinistic p
views, transforming them into a Messianic theory about China’s exclusiveness.

To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about the precedence of political aims over p
the objective laws of social development; about the " tightening of the screws" and
the militarisation of society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph anywhere
before the victory of the world revolution; the theory of export of revolution,
according to which a world war is the only way of carrying out a revolution on the
world scale; and, finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of conducting
subversive activities in the ranks of the international communist and working-class 30
movement.

Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend based on “Sinoised” social-chauvinism, p


the " Sinoised Marxism" which was declared at the Ninth CPC Congress "an entirely
new stage of Marxism-Leninism,” accompanied by the suggestion that Mao be placed
"on a much higher level than Marx and Lenin.” This is an open attempt to replace
Marxism-Leninism by Mao’s “ideas” and political directives, which, in their class
nature, are alien to the theory and practice of scientific communism.

But this attempt is doomed to failure. The anti-socialist character of Maoism, its p
theoretical impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty cannot be compensated
for by the Mao cult.

However “ultra-revolutionary” they may sound, Mao’s ideas boil down to aggressive p
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring of Peking’s entire home and
foreign policy. And this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for the cause of
socialism in China.

The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in Peking was caused by Mao himself; this p
was to be expected and is now confirmed by the press. Recent articles from the
Chinese press contain direct references to Mao’s pronouncements aimed at creating
hate towards the Soviet Union among the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles
also quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties when he came out with
protestations of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.

In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central Committee’s Plenary Meeting that "on the p
whole, Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet Union.” Exactly a year 31

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later he said the following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in
Moscow devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "By
creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the solution of practical problems,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the Soviet people
continuous victories in the building of a new life. The programme of the
construction of communism in the USSR, put forward by the 20th Congress of the
CPSU, is a great model.”

What is all this if not cynical perfidy as regards our Party and people? p

Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest hopes on ideological subversion in the p
struggle against socialism, the subversive activities of the Maoists aimed at the
weakening and collapse of socialist countries, at splitting the communist movement
and mass progressive organisations, are actually making things easier for the class
enemies of the working people. In this the Chinese leaders are steadily drifting
towards anticommunism. A "shuttle communication" is under way between the
Peking propagandists and the bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each other’s
methods, terminology and "arguments,” and both use the poisoned weapon of anti–
communism. No renegade or hireling of the proletariat’s class enemies has ever done
bigger damage to the world revolutionary process than the Peking leaders are doing
today.

The latest articles from the Peking press and the Maoists’ actions in the p
international arena show that Peking has renewed its subversive activities against the
Marxist-Leninist Parties. The knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups in 32
various countries for fighting the Communist and Workers’ Parties and carrying out
provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class and national-liberation
movements has become one of the basic elements of the tactics of the Peking
leaders.

The interests of the world revolutionary movement call for resolute action to rebuff
the subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for maximum unity in the
struggle against imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.

***

For China there is only one way of socialist development, and this way was tested p
in practice by the Chinese people themselves in the years of their struggle for
freedom, in the years of creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist
community. It is the Leninist way to which, as developments in China have shown,
the most experienced and mature sections of Communists and non-Party people,
genuine internationalists, remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal
Communist and Workers’ Parties have been calling on the Chinese people to follow.

Unity and solidarity with the forces of the world socialist community and the p
revolutionary liberation movement, rehabilitation and consolidation of the truly
socialist basis of Chinese society -this is the only course that accords with the
interests of the Chinese people.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government have been consistently pursuing a policy p
aimed at restoring and promoting friendly relations with China. It is not through our 33
fault that these relations have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The present state of
relations between the PRC and the USSR and other socialist countries is a result of
the chauvinist policies conducted by the Chinese leadership, a result of its departure

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from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the political and p


ideological directives of the present-day rulers of China, waging a principled struggle
against their factionalist activities within the communist movement and their great-
power foreign policy, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have
been constantly striving to prevent ideological differences from affecting inter-state
relations.

The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and unambiguous stand on the Peking p
negotiations on the question of normalising the situation along the Soviet-Chinese
borders. Our country believes that it is necessary to reach an agreement that would
permit turning the borders into a line of goodneighbourliness. As it has been
repeatedly emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government,
we, while not retreating from our just and principled positions and while defending
the interests of our socialist homeland and the inviolability of its frontiers, will
continue doing everything in our power to normalise our inter-state relations with the
People’s Republic of China.

We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that Peking is bent on whipping up p
militaristic psychosis, demanding that the people "prepare for famine, prepare for a
war.” Even the launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless efforts of 34
Chinese scientists, engineers and workers, is used as an occasion for fanning
nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our country.

If all this is being done with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet p
Union, one must say in advance that these are vain efforts. The Soviet people have
strong nerves. Our people possess everything necessary to uphold the interests of our
homeland.

We proceed from the belief that the vital and long-range interests of the Soviet and p
Chinese peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact they coincide.

“In jointly following the road charted by Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against p
the sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph of the sacred cause of
socialism and communism,” L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, said in his report at the meeting marking the centenary of the birth of
Lenin, "lies the correct path for the future development of relations between China
and the Soviet Union, and between China and other socialist countries.”

The Soviet people proceeding from this historical path, retain a friendly attitude p
towards the Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and internationalist policy is bound
to triumph in China. Such is the objective logic of historical development.

Pravda, May 18, 1970

***
 
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Notes

< >
 

<< Concerning the 50th Anniversary of >>

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the Communist Party of China • O.


Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov
 

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<•> Concerning the 50th 35

Anniversary of the Communist Party


TOC of China
Card O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov
 

Text July 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party p
HTML of China. In the past half-century it has traversed a long and devious road of great
PS achievements as well as grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists united
PDF to form the Communist Party of China. Relying on the support and experience of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire international communist
T* movement, the Communist Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the
19*
Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and led the Chinese people to an
### historic victory in October 1949.

People’s China led by the Communist Party became part of the socialist camp, and p
established friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other fraternal states. With
their help the Chinese people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the national
independence of the People’s Republic of China, eliminating the remnants of the
semi– colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad democratic reforms. In
accordance with the will of the multi-million working masses the Communist Party
of China led the country along the road of building a socialist society, as defined in
the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in September 1956. The first five-
year plan for the country’s economic development was fulfilled in 1957. The 36
Communist Party of China emerged as a major contingent of the world communist
movement and enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the international meetings of
communist and workers’ parties in 1957 and 1960.

But in the late 1950’s the CPC leadership initiated a foreign and home policy p
which deviated from Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the principles of
proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. It began to
pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power
chauvinism, camouflaged with “left” phraseology; it openly embarked on a course of
undermining the unity of the socialist community, of splitting the world communist
movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups in a number of countries, in an
obvious attempt to unite them and turn them against the world communist movement.
This resulted in a considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist Party
and the working class within China and an upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist
elements.

After adopting an ideological and political line which is incompatible with p


Leninism, on the main questions concerning the international situation and the world
communist movement, the Peking leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union abandon the line adopted by the 20th CPSU Congress and the CPSU
Programme. They conducted intensive anti-Soviet propaganda, presented territorial
claims to the Soviet Union and even brought the matters to armed border clashes in
the spring and summer of 1969.

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The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties, resolutely countered the attempts to p
distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in the socialist community, 37
the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU Central
Committee and the Soviet Government displayed restraint and refused to be
provoked while doing everything they could to improve relations with China. The
last one and a half years have seen some signs of a normalisation of USSRPRC
relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts of the Soviet Union. At the same time
the Chinese leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line in their propaganda
and policy; the 9th CPC Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti– Marxist
course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Peking’s actions in
the international arena testify that the foreign policy of the PRC has in fact broken
away from proletarian internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at


the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties: "It is a big and serious task
to make an all-round MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events in
China over the last few years, and of the roots of the present line of the CPC
leaders, which is jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese people.” It is all the
more appropriate, on the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, to
review the path it has travelled, to consider its glorious and hard destiny.

The Communist Party of China was founded as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. p
At its First Congress the party set the task of carrying out a socialist revolution, 38
establishing the dictatorships of the proletariat and building a classless, communist
society. The Congress adopted a decision on the party’s joining the Comintern. In
early 1922 Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.

The emergence and development of the Communist Party of China proceeded in p


extremely complex conditions as a result of China’s economic, social, political and
cultural backwardness and the insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese
proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in China comprised three different
currents: the struggle of the peasantry and the petty national bourgeoisie against the
survivals of feudalism, the nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist
oppression, for national independence, and the proletariat’s struggle for socialism.

At the time when the CPC came into being the working-class movement in China p
was just beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary experience in class
struggle. The November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a political trend and as a party at a
time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself as a class and when
the class movement of workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge of the
national-liberation movement in China, in which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the earlier period, took place long
before the class awareness and class struggle of the exploited masses assumed an
appreciable scale.”

The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese proletariat was p


adversely affected by the fact that prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution in 39
Russia Marxism was unknown in China. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the gun
salvoes of the October Revolution brought MarxismLeninism to China.

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In his ‘Left-Wing’ Communism - an Infantile Disorder Lenin wrote the following p


with regard to the history of the establishment of a proletarian party in this country:
"Russia achieved Marxismthe only correct revolutionary theory-through the agony she
experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of
unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study,
practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience.
...Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of
international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world
revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.”   [39•1  

The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such experience. p

Thus the formation of the Communist Party in China proceeded in extremely p


difficult conditions. But nevertheless it was a natural and necessary result of the
revolutionary movement which emerged in China under the mighty impact of the
October Revolution, which awakened the revolutionary activity of the working class,
the broad working masses, including the peoples of the colonial and dependent
countries, in all parts of the world.

The "May 4 Movement" was a response to the October Revolution and showed that p
the working people of China were ready for a decisive struggle against imperialist
oppression. It was necessary then to merge the Marxist circles into a party capable of 40
leading the struggle of the young working class, and the democratic and national-
liberation forces against social oppression, against imperialism. Such a party came
into being in the 1920s. Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed within the
communist movement in China with the help of the Comintern, which set a correct
political course.

The Second Congress which took place in July 1922 confirmed the CPC’s striving p
to become a truly proletarian party. "We must be a real political party created by the
proletarian masses, imbued with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for the
interests of the proletariat and lead the proletarian revolutionary movement,” said the
Resolution on the CPC’s Rules. The Congress called for organisation of the party
after the Bolshevik model and adopted a resolution on joining the Comintern, which
subsequently guided the political and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists.
The world communist movement invariably came to the help of the Chinese
revolutionaries whenever they made mistakes.

The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and 4th (January 1925) Congresses p
regarded the proletariat as the party’s mainstay, the vanguard and then the leader of
the revolution, and the peasantry as the proletariat’s chief ally whose active support
was vitally important for the Chinese revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress
(April-May 1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more than 50 per cent of
whom were workers and about 19 per cent peasants.

The 6th Congress was an important landmark in the development of the Communist p
Party of China. It was held in June and July 1928 and was attended by a delegation 41
of the Comintern Executive. In February of the same year the 9th plenary meeting of
the Comintern Executive adopted a Resolution on the Chinese Question which
summed up the current developments and the specific features of the revolutionary
movement in China and pointed out that "the Comintern Executive has directed all
its sections to support the Chinese revolution in every way.” Guided by this
resolution the Congress adopted documents which in effect constituted the first
comprehensive programme of the CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese

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revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and unification of the country, complete


elimination of landlord ownership of land and liberation of the peasantry from all
feudal bonds, struggle for the power of Soviets of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’
deputies as the best form of government for implementing the democratic dictatorship
of the working class and peasantry in China. On the advice of the Comintern
Executive delegation the 6th CPC Congress gave special attention to the development
of the peasant movement and guerrilla struggle under the slogan of agrarian
revolution, with the aim of creating a regular Red Army of workers and peasants
based on guerrilla detachments.

This showed a truly Marxist approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution, the p
solutions to which were worked out by the Communists– internationalists.

But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend in the CPC another, essentially p
petty-bourgeois and nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of the upsurge
of the national liberation movement radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined
the party in great numbers. "Lifted by the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm of the 42
initial period, lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling, ignorant of the
experience of the international proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited
lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken no part in the class struggle of
the workers and peasants, a considerable part of these revolutionary petty-bourgeois
elements, far from being assimilated by the party and becoming consistent proletarian
revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all the political instability, inconsistency and
indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian habits and traditions, prejudices
and illusions characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,” stressed the
November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. This tendency,
associated mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into a petty-bourgeois and
nationalist trend which came to be known as Maoism.

The struggle between the Marxist, internationalist trend guided by the ideas p
underlying the Great October Socialist Revolution and the petty– bourgeois,
nationalist trend marked the entire history of the Communist Party of China. This
struggle was reflected in the decisions of the party congresses, in the theories and the
practical activity of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these two trends has
been and remains characteristic of the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and
his historiographers seek to distort the true picture, to confuse the issue. To this end
they oppose the "true line" of Mao Tse-tung to a host of “wrong” lines, whose
number grows in Peking publications every year. Recently most of the party cadres
have been labelled "those vested with power in the party and following the capitalist 43
road.”

The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the CPC was guided by the theses set p
forth in Lenin’s works and in the documents of the international communist
movement. These theses include the definition of the essential feature of the Chinese
revolution as a combination of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle
against imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement and the revolutionary
struggle in the countryside and to set up strongholds when the revolution is in
decline; the expediency of an alliance with the petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that in China armed
revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union of
the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and others. It was the implementation of
these theses by the Communist Party of China that made possible the victory of the
Chinese revolution in 1949. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist faction
was quite different. It did not and could not make any positive contribution to the

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development of the communist movement in China. The revolutionary movement


suffered setbacks and defeats whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists wittingly or
unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist theses.

Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the Maoists from time to time p
attempted to make the party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had to retreat. It
is significant that Mao Tse-tung attended only three out of the six CPC congresses
held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was deprived of the right to vote. The
Maoists launched fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with difficulties. 44

After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in April 1927 the Communist Party of p
China functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides -from the central
Kuomintang government and the separatist military cliques, from the troops of the
Western imperialist colonialists and the Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy
losses when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the remote north-western regions of
the country following the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the party gave
their lives in the struggle for the cause of the working people. The loss of the tried
cadres devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism seriously
weakened the position of the CPC.

This was used to advantage by the representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In p


early 1935 they conducted the "enlarged session of the CPC Central Committee
Politbureau" in Tsungyi and captured important posts in the party leadership. In the
autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union and the entire international communist
movement were concentrating their efforts on the struggle against nazism, they
launched a "drive to streamline the style of work" in the CPC. The aim of the
campaign was to turn the Communist Party of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand
to a petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political platform (the 22 works
selected for compulsory study during the “campaign” were mostly articles and
speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the
opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and moral terror. After more than
three years of struggle the petty-bourgeois nationalists managed to get the upper 45
hand-the 7th CPC Congress held in 1945 was conducted in an atmosphere of
deification of Mao Tse-tung and it approved "Mao Tsetung’s ideas" as the
ideological platform of the Communist Party of China.

At the same time the obtaining situation and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the p
Chinese people forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in the mainstream of
the revolutionary struggle.

In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced the idea of a united anti-imperialist p
front, stressing its particular importance for countries in colonial bondage at a time
of imperialist expansion. In keeping with this thesis a united front of the Communist
Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of resistance against Japanese imperialism
(1937–45) was proclaimed in China, which furnished the basis for rallying all
segments of the Chinese people for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The
petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united front, seeking every opportunity to
undermine it. Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the Chinese national-
liberation movement, the courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of the
CPC leadership for consistent implementation of the Comintern line, and were forced
to retreat. The united front policy helped to make the CPC a mass party, the
vanguard of the Chinese people, a political force of nation-wide significance.

The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler nazism and militarist Japan was of p

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tremendous importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945–49 the centre of the
Chinese revolutionary movement shifted to Manchuria where active preparation began
with Soviet assistance for the final phase of the struggle for liberating China from 46
colonial and social oppression.

The routing of militarist Japan, in which the Soviet Union played a decisive role, p
strengthened the revolutionary forces in China. The People’s Liberation Army had
then a safe rear and was able to reorganise and improve its combat equipment with
the Japanese arms and materiel captured by the Soviet troops.

The revolutionary forces of China received extensive material assistance from the p
Soviet Union. In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian organisations helped
in every way to rehabilitate the economy, to repair communication lines destroyed
during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the main railways in central and southern
Manchuria were restarted in a short time and large formations of the People’s
Liberation Army of China were able to regroup and concentrate, which helped to
complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its expulsion from Manchuria, and
furnished favourable conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.

The Chinese people were able to express their will freely in the areas liberated from p
the Japanese by the Soviet Army and began to set up people’s democratic bodies of
power.

At that time the USSR Government did everything to prevent open military p
intervention by the United States in China, above all in Manchuria.

The visits by Chinese delegations from the people’s democratic regions of p


Manchuria to the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1949 and other forms of consultation (a
group of Soviet party officials stayed in Manchuria from 1945 to maintain close
contact with the North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee; in early 1949
a responsible representative of the CPSU had a meeting with the Chinese leaders) 47
were of great importance to the CPC for elaborating a correct political line. This
assistance was all the more valuable since the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of
the CPC leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one extreme to another
in assessing the forces in the Chinese revolution. In 1945–46, for example, they
overestimated their forces and displayed " revolutionary impatience,” ignoring the
need to conserve forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive blow and the
need to combine the political and diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of
the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948–49, after the Kuomintang offensive
and the loss of Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC leadership showed
disbelief in the possibility of an early victory and proved helpless in dealing with
practical questions connected with the establishment of people’s power all over
China.

Manchuria with its well-developed industry and the large share of the country’s p
working class, its strong party organisations, and also thanks to the fact that it
borders on the Soviet Union, became in 1945–49 a strategic bridgehead from which
the People’s Liberation Army was able to launch a powerful offensive and quickly
liberate the whole country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their imperialist patrons.

The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese people was crowned with a glorious p
victory. In the vanguard were Communists true to Marxism– Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. At every stage of that struggle the Communist Party of
China had leaders who represented everything best in the Chinese revolutionary
48

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movement. These were the Chinese Communists whose real role was subsequently
ignored or wilfully distorted by the Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung
as the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement and creating a myth about
his infallability. Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or were forced out
from the CPC leadership, but their glorious memory lives on.

The fraternal union of the Chinese revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for
the relative weakness and disunity of the Chinese working class; it promoted the
consolidation of the internal forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them
against the import of counter-revolution. The victory of the Chinese people
convincingly proved the correctness of Lenin’s thesis that ”. . .this revolutionary
movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a
successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our
Soviet Republic against international imperialism.”   [48•1  

II

The formation of the People’s Republic of China and the establishment in China of p
people’s demo- : cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i ist Party, the
extensive and disinterested assistance I of the USSR and other fraternal countries,
and the changed balance of class forces in the international arena in favour of
socialism opened before the Chinese people broad possibilities of successful building
of socialism. In the first years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China the Communist Party drafted concrete ways of carrying out socialist 49
construction. In 1953 the CPC’s general line in the transition period was made
public, which called for mobilising all the forces for making China a mighty socialist
state.

In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and endorsed the course of building a p
socialist society in the People’s Republic of China. At the same time the Congress
proclaimed that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-
Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly interprets the laws of social
development, shows the correct ways of building socialism and communism.” This
thesis did away with the idea of "Sinoised Marxism" and with "Mao Tse-tung’s
thought" as the CPC’s ideological platform set forth at the 7th Party Congress in
1945.

The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired a strong foundation in China. But p
the petty– bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay down their arms.
They continued to deal underhand blows at the section of the party leadership and
rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.

In the mid-50’s the People’s Republic of China entered "the core of the p
revolutionary course,” to use Lenin’s expression. Radical changes were carried out in
the non-socialist economic sectors. The achievements of the first five-year plan
period furnished the basis for further advancement, for organising large-scale socialist
production under strict government control. The prospect of complete elimination of
the petty-owner element became quite real. This naturally aroused the resistance of
that element, greater vacillations, which, in turn, affected the petty-bourgeois, 50
nationalist elements in the CPC leadership. "In April 1956 ... we began to advance
our own line of construction,” Mao Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC
Central Committee in 1958.

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Lenin characterised the vacillations of the pettyowner element as follows: "This p


wavering flows in two ‘streams’: petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e., servility to the
bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of sentimental democratic and ‘Social-Democratic’
phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois revolutionism-menacing, blustering
and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in
deeds.”   [ 50•1  

At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the road of petty-bourgeois reformism. p
Even within the framework of CPC’s general orientation to scientific socialism they
advanced "new political stipulations,” which reflect right-wing opportunism.

In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a "course of prolonged coexistence of the p


Communist Party with bourgeois-democratic parties and reciprocal control between
them" (italics added) which in practice undermined the CPC’s leading role in society
and provided the bourgeois parties which remained in the People’s Republic of
China with an effective instrument for struggle for power. In practice the Maoist
slogan "May hundred flowers blossom" amounted to legalising anti-Marxist, anti-
socialist views and undermined the authority of the proletarian ideology in the
country. The theory of "contradictions within the people" which considered the
contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as non–
antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people and played into the hands of 51
the enemies of socialism.

The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these "new stipulations" to launch an p


open attack on socialism in the spring of 1957. The social and political system in the
People’s Republic of China, the system of economic management, all public
organisations were being criticised and discredited. Demands were made to annul the
changes that had been carried out in capitalist industry, handicraft production and
agriculture. Calls were made for physical extermination of Communists, for smashing
the CPC and its leadership. The petty-bourgeois, nationalist CPC leaders, concerned
about their own safety, above all else, hastened to introduce corrections in their "new
stipulations.” The working class and the Communists beat back the bourgeois
onslaught. But the shift in the CPC leadership’s policy to the right, the proclaiming
of opportunist “courses” and “slogans” had done their job-they further increased the
influence of the petty– bourgeois ideology.

The successful completion of the first five-year plan, the growth of the country’s p
economic and military might and of the international prestige of the Communist
Party of China and the People’s Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist
leaders from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they turned eagerly to petty-
bourgeois revolutionism, reflected by the so-called three red banners policy
announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC general line which provided a definite
plan of socialist construction a new "general line" was proclaimed in the form of a
vague appeal: "To strain all forces, to strive forward, to build socialism according to
the principle ’more, faster, better and more economically.’ " The "great leap" and the 52
setting up of "people’s communes" were declared the basis of the country’s economic
policy. In the international arena the line was to heighten tension, attain world
hegemony, worsen relations with the USSR and other socialist states.

The Communist Party of China found itself unable to cope with the consequences of p
these " innovations,” and a considerable portion of its membership began to waver.
This happened not only because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres had been
paralysed and ousted from leadership by that time. The fact is that owing to the
specific conditions in which the party had developed, and to the cadres policy that

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had been pursued for many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the party, the
petty-owner elements had become the dominating trend in the Communist Party of
China.

According to official Chinese data, in the late 50s the share of workers among party p
members was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.

We must not forget in this connection Lenin’s warning that ”. .. we constantly p


regard as workers people who have not had the slightest real ex- I perience of large-
scale industry. There has been case after case of petty bourgeois, who have become
workers by chance and only for a very short time, being classed as
workers”.   [ 52•1   Thus it happens that the proletarian character of a party does not
rule out a possible predominance, and in a very short time, of petty-owner elements.

Neither should we forget Lenin’s teaching that whenever former small owners join p
the party in vast numbers ”. . .the proletarian policy of the party is not determined 53
by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed
by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party.”   [53•1  

To be sure, the difficulties faced by the Communist Party of China were not p
insurmountable. As experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be coped with if
the party follows the Marxist– Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it
tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry
under the leadership of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests of the
working people. Yet the Maoists staked on petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the
basic interests of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia.
Moreover, the systematic “purges” struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres.

The home and foreign policy advanced by the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in p
the CPC leadership had a disastrous effect on China’s economy and brought about
real calamities in the country. Added to this were severe droughts and floods for
three years in succession. As a result, according to various estimates, the gross
national product in the People’s Republic of China fell by one-third, industrial output
was halved and the national income shrunk by more than one-quarter.

In the face of this the CPC leadership made changes in its home policy, although p
the "three red banners" slogan was not officially retracted. At the cost of tremendous
efforts of the working people and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to
socialist economic forms, the People’s Republic of China managed to regain the 54
1957 level of industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964. But the
country’s population grew considerably during this period. In 1964 China exploded
its first atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms race despite its limited
resources. Enormous sums had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for propaganda
and subversion against the world communist movement and for pursuing its great-
power foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC’s cooperation with socialist states did
irreparable damage to the country. As a result, difficulties continued to mount in
China.

The strife inside the CPC leadership was further aggravated. The key issue now was p
the question of the country’s further development. The choice was between returning
to the time-tested practice of socialist construction in close cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and following the petty-bourgeois,
nationalist road. In his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung admitted that attitude

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to the Soviet Union represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.

It should be stressed that the positions of the working class in the PRC were p
seriously weakened at that time. The destruction, during the "big leap,” of large-scale
industry which Lenin called the proletariat’s "vital basis" and the curtailment of
industrialisation deprived it of its class strength and undermined its ability to resist
petty-bourgeois vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the pettyowner, anarchist
element on developments in the country and its fluctuations continued despite the
fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative basis. Lenin thus characterised the main 55
features of this element: "It will take collectives, collective farms and communes
years to change this.”   [55•1   The Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get
the upper hand in the CPC leadership.

Quite obviously this course of events was not fatally inevitable, even in the
complex conditions of the People’s Republic of China. After the successful
completion of the first five-year plan in 1957 the country was on the threshold of
new achievements in economic and cultural development, in promoting democracy,
and in foreign affairs. Such achievements would undoubtedly have taken place had
the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded
and enhanced the party’s leading role, had it promoted in every way the growth of
the ranks of the working class, its political awareness and its influence in society.
But it was China’s misfortune that the party and the country came to be guided by
the representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views and aspirations. Their activity
furnished conditions for further attacks by the small-owner element against the
working class, which gradually turned into a frontal assault. It began at a signal
from Mao Tse-tung who called for "opening fire at the headquarters" (i.e., party
organisations). It became the notorious "cultural revolution.”

III

Lenin wrote the following with regard to the possible outcome of the struggle p
against the anarchist element represented by the small owner: 56

“Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can p
do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-
proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will
overthrow our workers’ power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was
overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of
petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands. That is the only view we can
take of the matter. . .”   [56•1  

The negative results of the "cultural revolution" are generally known. The situation p
in the People’s Republic of China developed in the direction of the second variant
predicted by Lenin. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the political system of
the People’s Republic of China as a state governed by the working class was
destroyed. The bodies of people’s power ceased to function. The Communist Party of
China itself as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to
bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist League, all other public
organisations, including the young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of socio-
political, economic and cultural life were put under the army’s control. The result
was what Lenin called a "shitt of power,” the ousting of the working class from the
real bodies of power and the loss by its party of the leading position in society. A

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military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into being in China. The proletarian ideology–


MarxismLeninism-was deprived of its leading role in society and replaced with "Mao
Tse-tung’s ideas.”

In order to step up and legalise this process of “shift of power" the Maoists broke p 57
away completely from the ideological and organisational principles formulated by the
Communist Party of China at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the 9th
CPC Congress held in April 1969. The Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the
army whose representatives headed the "revolutionary committees" that replaced the
elective local bodies of power in the course of the "cultural revolution.” The army
actually seized the highest party organs set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee
Politbureau (15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee (145 out of 279); this
did not include persons who formerly served in the army or were closely connected
with it. The Congress advanced as a programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the country. The Party Rules adopted by
the Congress proclaim "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" to be Marxism-Leninism of the
modern epoch. Though the Maoists use the term "democratic centralism" quite often
in the official press, in reality all their activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party. The Party Rules in effect
envisaged the creation, under the name of the Communist Party of China, of a new
political organisation which would serve as an obedient tool of the military-
bureaucratic dictatorship.

However, the formation of such an organisation dragged out in the face of serious p
difficulties. Thus Peking propagandists are forced to return once again to the question
of "streamlining and upbuilding the party organisations,” "cleaning up the party,” etc. 58
On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China the work of
forming provincial party committees was stepped up, although many district and other
local party organizations had not yet been established. The delegates to the
conferences (called “congresses” by the Chinese press) which form provincial party
committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the respective "revolutionary
committees.” The latter became the leaders of the new party committeesnearly all of
them being representatives of the army.

One indication that the petty-bourgeois nationalists are running into difficulties is the p
fact that they are forced to restore the former organisational structure which was
crushed during the "cultural revolution" under their instructions. The party Central
Committee continues to exist, though only formally, as does its Politbureau, and
medium– level and lower party links are being formed, though slowly. They have
been and are being "set up" by methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist party
norms. Their members are predominantly servicemen, while the Politbureau includes
people closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his private secretary, his
former bodyguard, etc). But this structure may come to play a positive part should
conditions in the party and the country take a favourable turn. Besides, the present
CPC leadership is faced with the necessity of reinstating some of the former party
cadres, who were persecuted or discredited during the "cultural revolution.”

Another indication of such difficulties encountered by the Maoists is that despite the p
many years of propaganda and mass “brainwashing” and the “re-cducation" of the 59
CPC members and party functionaries in the "May 7 schools,” which differ only
slightly from concentration camps, and the worst manifestations of the personality
cult, the attempt to inculcate "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" in the minds of the Chinese
Communists and the advanced sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with

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resistance. Only this can explain why, in the conditions obtaining in the People’s
Republic of China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun pointing out the need
to study the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main
purpose of this “study” is to bolster the influence of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
ideology-"Mao Tse-tung’s thought"-under the slogan of " disseminating Marxism-
Leninism.” The People’s Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung’s
works, ten million copies of the works of Marx and Lenin. This is, of course, a
mere drop in the ocean, considering the enormous population of the People’s
Republic of China and the fact that during the "cultural revolution" the number of
copies of Mao Tse-tung’s “quotations” and other works exceeded the astronomical
figure of three thousand million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung’s works is
continuing.

The resistance encountered by the Maoists in implementing their plans testify to the p
unceasing opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the CPC. The true
Communists of China are in a difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive programme for China’s development along
the socialist road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress, which the 9th
Congress had nothing to counter with.

However complicated the present situation in China may be, the resurgence of the p 60
Communist Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type, its reunification
with the world communist movement, the return of the People’s Republic of China
to the road of scientific socialism and friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with
the socialist community-these are objective demands of Chinese society. All the more
so since there remain elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite the fact
that these surviving socialist elements in the economy and social structure are
neutralised by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and deformed by the anti-socialist
policy, so long as the economic basis of society has not undergone qualitative,
radical changes, it can serve as the basis for China’s development in a positive
direction.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at


the 1969 Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties: "We do not identify the
declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations,
wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.
We are deeply convinced that China’s genuine national renascence and its socialist
development will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and
fraternal cooperation with them.”

***

The 50-year experience of the Communist Party of China is highly instructive not p
only to the parties functioning in countries whose level of development is similar to
that of China, but to the entire communist movement. The main conclusion to be 61
drawn from this experience is that a Communist Party must constantly strengthen its
combat efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need for a determined
struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society: "The force of habit in
millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that
has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest
people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the
mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully.”   [61•1  

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The fate of the Communist Party of China confirms once again Lenin’s thesis that p
the struggle ".. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices,
looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the
dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single
country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a
dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and
capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole).”   [61•2  
These words deserve special attention in our time when the world socialist system is
emerging as a decisive factor in mankind’s development.

Maoism as an ideological and political trend is essentially hostile to Marxism- p


Leninism; it substitutes sophistry and eclecticism for materialist dialectics and
voluntarism, for a materialist interpretation of history. A parasite drawing sustenance
from socialist ideology, this trend in effect denies the guiding role of the working 62
class in the socialist transformation of society, the role of the Communist Party as
the vanguard of the working class, and in every way belittles the role of the masses
in history. While employing anti-imperialist verbiage the Maoists are in fact opposed
to the international communist movement; they engage in subversive activities against
the Marxist-Leninist parties and seek to force their nationalist programme on the
latter.

That is why in waging a struggle against Maoism one must proceed from an p
awareness of the incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of social-
chauvinism with the aims of the world communist and liberation movement, with the
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning socialist construction, international
affairs and revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of violence and
overestimation of the power of the bayonet, great-power chauvinism and claims for
world hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of superstructure, which
means substitution of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people’s democratic
social system, and militarisation of society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.

That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully approved the principled Leninist line p
and the concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet
Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. It noted: "In a situation in which the
Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological– political platform,
which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist
countries and at creating a split of the international communist and the whole anti- 63
imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of
consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of
the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our
socialist Motherland.”

Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the slanderous fabrications of the Chinese p
propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government,
borrowed from the arsenal of Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist
fanatics.

At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed the CPSU’s course of normalising p
relations between the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good– neighbourly relations
and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Soviet p
Communists send fraternal greetings to the Communists and working people of

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China. The Soviet people are convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations
and friendship will be restored between the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China, since this meets the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the
interests of the world socialist system, of the revolutionary, liberation movement of
all the oppressed, the interests of universal peace.

Kommunist, No. 10, 1971

***
 
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes

 [ 39•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 25–26.

[ 48•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 151.

 [ 50•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 21.

 [ 52•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 254.

[ 53•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 257.

 [ 55•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27fi.

 [ 56•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 332. 56

 [ 61•1 ]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 44–45.

 [ 61•2 ]   Ibid., p. 148.

< >
 

<< Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked • Concerning the 50th Anniversary of >>


PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, the Communist Party of China • I.
1970 Alexandrov
 

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<<< A DESTRUcTIVE POLIcY   [ThE ChINESE lEadErShIp aNd ThE @AT LENINIST
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<< • >>
<•> Concerning 64

the 50th Anniversary


TOC of the Communist Party of China
Card I. Alexandrov
 

Text Half a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the inaugural congress of the Communist Party p
HTML of China (CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the foundation of the
PS Communist Party of China, a proletarian party of a new type. The congress
PDF documents stated that the Party’s aim was to bring about the dictatorship of the
proletariat, build socialism and fight for communism, and that the Party was
T* connected with the Communist International.
19*
Since then the CPC has traversed a long and thorny path. It headed the struggle of
###
the Chinese people for national and social liberation, led them to the victory of the
revolution, and directed China along the socialist road of development. The Party
was able to fulfil this task because the Communists, guided by the great Marxist-
Leninist teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and waged an unremitting
struggle against imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords, against
petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing and right-wing deviations, chauvinism
and nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist– minded members of the Party
constantly fought against the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring about the
triumph of the ideals of scientific communism.

65
I

The founding of the Communist Party of China was a result of the stepped-up p
political activity of the rising working class and the upsurge of the revolutionary
democratic and national-liberation movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of young Soviet Russia.

Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and, later on, a co-founder of the CPC p
and one of its leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist, said the following
about the significance of the October Revolution for China:

“We should greet the Russian revolution with pride as the beacon of a new world p
civilisation. We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from new Russia which is
being built on the principles of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we keep up
with world progress.”

In China, the struggle for social emancipation of the working people was closely p
tied in with the tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main obstacle to the revolution
at the time was imperialism which had made the country its semi-colony. Lenin’s
view that capital is "an international force" was confirmed in the course of the
liberation struggle which developed in China under the Party’s guidance. An
international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood, is needed to

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vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party and the people of the Soviet
Union, the world communist and workers’ movement became a reliable ally for the
CPC and the working people of China.

The Communist International and the Soviet Communists gave the Chinese p
revolutionaries the necessary practical assistance in organising the first Marxist 66
groups which appeared in China after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May Movement"
of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International and Lenin’s
speeches at this congress on the national and colonial questions served as an impetus
and ideological basis for the unification of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The
Communist International gave considerable assistance to the Chinese revolutionaries
in assimilating Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the Leninist Party of
Bolsheviks.

Right from the first the CPC found itself in the crucible of the national-democratic p
revolution and put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal programme. The period
between the first and third congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was a
period of Party organisational and ideological growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted
to the Communist International. At its Third Congress (1923) the Party advanced the
policy of building a united national-revolutionary front with the Kuomintang then
headed by the great revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen.

The anti-imperialist action of the people, with the working class as its chief force, p
kept mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for the CPC to ensure
proletarian hegemony in the national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong and
Canton sailors’ strike, the general strike of the Shanghai workers, and the growth of
the peasant movement in the country showed that the proletariat was the main
support of the Party, the vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was the 67
principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without whose support the victory of the
revolution in China was impossible.

The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927 by the right wing of the Kuomintang p
headed by Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united front. The Communist
Party of China and those supporting it were subjected to bloody terror. Hundreds of
thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese people were victimised. Among
those who perished were such outstanding leaders of the CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa
and Chu Chiu-po, CPC Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai, a
prominent leader of the peasant movement; Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser
of the Young Communist League of China; Su Chaocheng, leader of the famous
Canton Commune, and Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary
bases of the CPC.

Another feature that complicated the situation was the right-wing deviation that p
developed in the CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party’s ties with the
masses, hampered making use of the experience of the world communist movement
and implementing Comintern recommendations. The Sixth CPC Congress (1928),
convened at such a critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the Party in the
new situation. The Congress resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement and dealt with basic problems
such as the strategy and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution, the building of
the armed forces and the establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of developing the Chinese
revolution.

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The late twenties and first half of the 30’s again proved quite complex for the p 68
Party. The Communists were constantly persecuted by the reactionaries. In the Party
proper petty-bourgeois elements became active and in the mid-30’s seized the key
Party positions.

The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against the CPC, while conducting an anti- p
Soviet campaign, followed by armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The
Chinese Communist– internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary meaning of
Chiang Kai-shek’s slogan calling for war against the Soviet Union and slanderously
trying to accuse the USSR of "red imperialism.”

Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell the Chinese people as a result of this p
counter– revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that every time the enemies
of China, the enemies of socialism inside the country attempted to weaken the
revolutionary movement, to make it deviate from the right course, they inevitably
whipped up a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the years of the struggle
for the liberation of China. The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois elements
later on.

In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet Communists initiated a mighty p
international movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The Comintern called
upon all the Communists of the world to render "every kind of support to the
Chinese revolution.”

The Japanese imperialist aggression against China caused a reshuffling of forces in p


the country, and made the question of saving the nation paramount. Speaking at the
Comintern in 1936, G. Dimitrov stressed that the task of the CPC, was to "achieve 69
unification of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese
invaders.” The CPC Central Committee took the initiative in establishing a united
anti-Japanese front. This slogan conformed to the main interests of the Chinese
people and, because of its importance in the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became
a very influential national force.

The war against Japan was long and hard. The defeat of Hitlerite fascism and p
Japanese militarism made possible China’s final liberation from the Japanese
invaders. The decisive part in winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This provided highly favourable
conditions for the victory of the people’s revolutions in a number of countries of
Europe and Asia, including China. The liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the
Far East, the routing of Japan’s crack Kwangtung Army, the liberation of Manchuria
with the active participation of the troops of the Mongolian People’s Republic, the
Chinese and Korean guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan and
ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also predetermined the possibilities for the
subsequent defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the Soviet Union, US
intervention of China was prevented.

The military-revolutionary base set up by the Chinese Communists with the p


assistance of the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian specialists in Manchuria greatly
contributed to the victory of the Chinese revolution. This was the bridgehead from
which the completely reorganised, trained and rearmed National Liberation Army
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China drove out the Kuomintang 70
reactionaries from China.

The victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in China was a

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major event which greatly influenced world development. The success of that
revolution marked the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China. International solidarity,
the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with the international communist and
working-class movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and other
countries of the world socialist system ensured the victory of the Chinese people, the
Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in the many-year selfless struggle they
had waged under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

II

The victory of the revolution paved the way for the Chinese people to radical p
political, social and economic transformations. The objective requirements of the
further development of the revolution, with China taking the socialist road, as well as
the threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative for China to establish the closest
friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries which could render the PRC
the necessary political, military and economic support and assistance.

True to the great principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the CPSU and p
the Soviet people, just as during the years of revolutionary struggle, rendered the
Chinese people all the necessary support in building socialism. With the assistance of
the USSR more than 250 large modern industrial enterprises and other projects were
built in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these enterprises became "the 71
backbone of China’s industry.” "The assistance of the Soviet Union in the economic
construction of our country," Jenmin jihpao wrote at that time, "both quantitatively
and in scale is unprecedented in history.”

During the first decade following the founding of the PRC, the basis of socialism p
was laid in the country-an economic basis which provided opportunities for further
socialist construction.

The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the banner of strengthening the Marxist- p
Leninist forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the Party’s history, in the
life of the Chinese people. It confirmed the general line of building socialism in
close alliance with the countries of the world socialist system.

The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff to the nationalist and chauvinist p
tendencies in ideology and policy which had been manifested in the Party and the
country. In the "Fundamental Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical foundation of the Party was resolutely
stressed: "The Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-
Leninism.”

Having mapped out concrete ways and means of continuing socialist transformations p
and having determined the major tasks in developing the country’s national economy,
the 8th Congress stressed that the basic aim of the Party’s entire activities is "the
fullest satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the life of the people.”

In the foreign policy sphere the Congress defined as the major task the need "to p
continue to strengthen and consolidate the eternal and inviolable fraternal friendship 72
with the great Soviet Union and all People’s Democracies.”

Aware of the complex tasks of socialist construction facing the Party and the p
country, and mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the Congress urged the
Party to be vigilant and resolutely combat all manifestations of great-power

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chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology. The resolution of the Eighth


Congress read: "If we submit to the influence of non-proletarian ideology, display
conceit and complacency, fancy ourselves infallible, and stop learning with all
modesty, we shall, as before, fail to avoid the evil of subjectivism.” Further
developments showed how timely this warning was.

Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance with the line of the Eighth p
Congress, the greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC considered the time
was not ripe to implement them and, concealing their true intentions, had to vote for
the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on, however, Mao Tse-tung and his
following took action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened the lock-gate to
the surging wave of petty– bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class.
Capitalising on the Chinese people’s desire to build socialism in the shortest possible
space, advocates of this course used “left”-revolutionary slogans to plunge the
country into the voluntarist "great leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of
China characterised this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois fanaticism,” for
which even then the Chinese people had paid dearly.

The nationalist group in the CPC leadership kept enforcing their own platform on p 73
the Party and the country. By working up nationalist and jingoist sentiments, they
sought to gear Chinese home and foreign policies to the attainment of hegemonic
aims in the international arena.

The present leaders of the Communist Party of China spoke out against the world p
communist movement line jointly evolved by communist and workers’ Parties, the
CPC included. They put forth their own ideological and political platform,
inconsistent with Leninism on major questions concerning international affairs and
socialist upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties upholding Marxism-
Leninism had effectually thwarted all attempts to revise this science from “left”-
opportunist and nationalist positions, the Peking leadership launched an unprecedented
smear campaign and subversive activity against our Party and other fraternal parties.
This activity was extended to include not only the socialist system and the
communist movement but also the entire anti-imperialist front.

Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC ranks and among the vast masses of p
the Chinese people. To do away with this opposition, Mao Tsetung and his followers
started a fight against Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the CPC,
against politically-conscious workers, peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary
goal of the "cultural revolution" which dealt the CPC a telling blow and during
which many outstanding Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of Communists
fell victim to reprisals.

At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung and his entourage tried to legalise p
their home and foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile to Marxism- 74
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in China they, at the same time, came
up with the thesis on the “impossibility” of the victory of socialism before the
triumph of the world revolution. Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of " preparing for war" and turning the
entire country into a military camp the goal of China’s economic development and
the country’s socio-political life. Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic task.

The objective laws of socio-economic development, as well as the basic interests of p

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the Chinese people require a genuinely socialist policy based on the principles of
scientific communism.

However, the economic foundations of socialism, laid in the first decade of the p
PRC, are now subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the policy pursued
by the present Chinese leadership who seek to place the country’s resources at the
service of their great-power and hegemonic aims. This policy imperils the socialist
gains of the Chinese people and impedes the country’s progress.

The attempts of the present Chinese leadership to cast aspersions on the experience p
of the USSR and other fraternal parties, and statements made against the socialist
community create additional obstacles to building socialism in China.

As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU policy and the Soviet state, they are
resolutely rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful to sow discord
between the USSR and China when the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities
against the socialist countries and freedom-loving peoples. US imperialism and 75
Japanese militarism nurture aggressive plans against China as well as the USSR.
Therefore, the policy of using anti– Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting
territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists encourages the reactionary circles of the
United States, Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the anti-imperialist
front. Now, more than ever before, the situation in the world and in Asia demands
solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces. This was
stressed again at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties.
The trend of present-day world development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.

III

The Soviet people and our Communist Party have regarded and continue to regard p
the development of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people and the
Chinese Communists as an important prerequisite for strengthening the positions of
world socialism and promoting the unity of the international communist movement
and the entire anti-imperialist front.

It is precisely this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU p
and the Soviet state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and essence were
clearly described in the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at
plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and in speeches by Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

After thoroughly analysing questions pertaining to Sino-Soviet relations, the 24th p 76


CPSU Congress fully approved and confirmed the principled Leninist course and
concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government
with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations. When Chinese leaders advanced their
ideological-political platform which is incompatible with Leninism and spearheaded
against the socialist countries and at splitting the international communist movement
and the anti-imperialist movement in general, the CPSU Central Committee took to
the position of consistently upholding the principles of MarxismLeninism, making
every effort to strengthen the unity of the world communist movement and protecting
the interests of the socialist community of nations.

At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against carrying over existing serious p

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ideological differences to inter-state relations. It strives to normalise relations


between the USSR and the PRC, and does everything to restore the good-
neighbourly, friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that the objective requirements of China’s p
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for this normalisation. The long-
term vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash; on the
contrary, they make it imperative to restore and develop their cooperation and
friendship.

The numerous constructive steps for normalising relations with the PRC which were p
taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, are widely
known and approved of.

Soon after the meeting of the heads of government of the two countries held in p 77
Peking in 1969 on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks on border
questions began. Taking a constructive approach to this matter, the Soviet side
proposes that measures be taken to promote mutual understanding and a final
solution of all border disputes be achieved by concluding a new border treaty.
However, in order for the talks to be successful both partners must show goodwill
and seek to reach an agreement.

Of late the PRC Government, too, has made statements to the effect that ideological p
differences "should not interfere with the maintenance of state relations between
China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.” We take into consideration the statements by the Chinese side of their
willingness not to carry over ideological differences to inter-state relations.

Expressing the will of our Party and the people, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the p
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:

“We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The CPSU will
continue tirelessly to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries and the world
communist movement on a MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and
the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an improvement in relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would be in line with
the fundamental, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of socialism, the
freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is why we are prepared in every
way to help not only to normalise relations but also to restore neighbourliness and 78
friendship between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and express
the confidence that this will eventually be achieved.” This just and constructive stand
of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets with the
understanding and approval of fraternal socialist countries, communist and workers’
parties, all progressive and peace-loving forces, including the Chinese people.

***

The difficult half-century road of the Communist Party of China confirms that p
Marxism-Leninism alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear understanding of the
objective laws and trends of social development and a scientific approach to evolving
strategy and tactics in the struggle for the transformation of the world and the
construction of socialism and communism. Fidelity to MarxismLeninism and
proletarian internationalism guarantees the success of the activities of the
Communists. Inversely, when a detachment of the world communist movement
departs from these principles it is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause of

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the world army of the Communists.

Chinese Communist-internationalists have invariably stressed that unity with the p


CPSU, the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is of vital
importance for the victory of the revolution and successful advancement along the
road of socialism. On the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the
Soviet Communists, the Soviet people pay their respects to the heroism and
selflessness of the Chinese Communists, to all who, fighting for the implementation 79
of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, have not spared
and do not spare efforts for the Chinese revolution to triumph, for China’s
advancement along the road of progress and socialism.

Pravda, July 1, 1971

***
 
TEXT SIZE
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< >
 

<< Concerning the 50th Anniversary of Renunciation of the Principles of >>


the Communist Party of China • O. Marxism-Leninism • APROPOS OF
Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED
AT THE NINTH CONGRESS OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA
 

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<<< A DestructiVe Policy   [THE CHINESE lEadERSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
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mOVEmENTS]
<< • >>
<•> Renunciation of the Principles 80

of Marxism-Leninism
TOC APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
Card THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA
 
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N. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev p
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The International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow p
in June 1969 was a major success of the communist, working-class and liberation
T*
movements. It was an important step towards greater international cohesion of
19*
Communists on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
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Immense importance attaches to the conclusion made at the Conference to the effect p
that Communists must consistently uphold their principles, work for the triumph of
Marxism-Leninism and, depending on the specific situation, combat right and “left”
opportunist distortions of theory and policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand
against revisionism, dogmatism and “left” sectarian adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a vital condition for the correct
orientation and successful activity of the Communist and Workers’ Parties.

The harm that can be inflicted on the world communist movement by a departure p
from Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with internationalism is shown by the actions
of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China. This was thoroughly 81
analysed at the Conference by L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation.
"Almost ten years ago,” he said, "Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted an
attack on the principles of scientific communism. In its numerous statements on
questions of theory the CPC leadership has step by step revised the principled line of
the communist movement. In opposition to this it has laid down a special line of its
own on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .

“The facts show that the Chinese leadership speaks of struggle against imperialism p
while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by everything it does. It helps
the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps
them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at|
ttmes of acute international crises. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence
of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass
organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union
movement, and so on.

“Naturally, the imperialists make the most of Peking’s present orientation in the p
field of foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle against world socialism
and the liberation movement.”

The actions of the CPC leaders were also criticised by the heads of delegations p
from the absolute majority of other Parties represented at the Conference.

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It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want to listen to this criticism. They p
continue to stand in the way of the unity of the socialist countries, unity based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and are not giving up their 82
attempts to split the international communist and working-class movement. The
propaganda put out by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the reactionary,
imperialist forces striving to break up the community of the socialist countries.

The erroneous and harmful tenets of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were p
given the status of official Party policy at the Ninth Congress of the CPC, which
was held last year. In effect, the character of the decisions passed by that Congress
was predetermined by the artificially created situation in which the Congress itself
was prepared and held. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the lawfully elected
leading Party organs were uprooted. The "revolutionary committees" headed by the
military took over the management of Party affairs. The old Party cadres and all who
disagreed with the Maoist line or doubted that it was correct were defamed, put on
the list of the "black gang,” and subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything
was done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism and nationalistic passion. In a
situation like this there naturally could be no question of a free discussion of
questions worrying the Party and the country.

Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not elected but nominated from among the p
Maoists. There are grounds for stating that this was not a regular congress of the
Communist Party of China, which has fine revolutionary traditions, but the first
congress of a new political organisation called upon to serve China’s military–
bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though indirectly, by the Maoists
themselves. How else is one to interpret, for instance, their official slogan: "Long 83
live the great victory of the Ninth All– China Congress of the Communist Party of
China"? A victory over whom or over what? All the indications are that this is a
victory over the Party’s healthy forces, over those who make the Party a Marxist-
Leninist organisation that had once occupied a prominent place and enjoyed
recognition in the world communist and working-class movements.

A new situation fraught with serious negative consequences for the cause of p
communism has thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot fail to see this or
pass it over in silence. They feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist, anti-
popular essence of the Maoists’ ideological and political concepts.

New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth Congress of the CPC. There is, of p
course, nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have been adopted. Every
revolutionary party bases its activity on the two main documents-the Programme and
Rules. The Programme determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets out and
scientifically substantiates its aims. The Rules define the Party’s organisational
principles, the norms of its inner life and the methods of work used by Party
organisations. There is a close link between the Programme and the Rules. While the
Programme is the foundation of the Party’s ideological unity, the Rules are the
foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without organisational unity there cannot
be ideological unity and, conversely, ideological unity is inconceivable without
organisational unity.

In working out a more or less long-term strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party p 84
sees to it that its organisational forms, the rules governing its life and the methods
used in its practical work conform to the new political tasks and ensure their
fulfilment. Therefore, from time to time Communist and Workers’ Parties amend or
supplement the operating Rules or adopt new Rules.

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Life introduces corrections into the specific forms of the parties’ organisational p
make-up and into the methods of work employed by them, and this must be
reflected and recorded in their Rules. Organisationally, in the choice of the forms
and methods of its work and in its entire political activity, the Party relies on
revolutionary theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of coucrel?
historical conditions.

Soviet Communists know from their own ex- | perience how important it is to make
sure that I the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I it should conform to the
requirements of the day ’ and enable the Party to successfully carry out its tasks. For
that reason they understand the concern that the fraternal parties show for this I
problem.

I p

In the case of the Communist Party of China, this is a particularly pressing problem p
for a number of reasons. We shall recall only two circumstances. First, although
nearly fifty years have passed since the CPC was founded, it has no Programme to
this day and this adds weight to its Rules as the only basic Party document. Second,
in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier, no Party Congress was convened
for thirteen years. Consequently, it is important to enhance the role of the Rules and 85
introduce into them provisions that would prevent violations of inner-Party democracy
and serve as a guarantee that the principles and norms of Party life are strictly
observed by all its members.

This is the approach that should be taken if the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the p
party is used as the guideline.

What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have been adopted at the Ninth p
Congress? A close scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they flagrantly
contravene the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party and run counter to the views
of the Communists on the questions of party development. In all respects the new
Rules are not an improvement of but a step back from the former Rules, which were
passed in 1956 by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a direct retreat
from the Marxist-Leninist positions that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions so as to turn the party into an
obedient tool of the present leadership for carrying out their greatpower, chauvinistic
policies.

In the former Rules of the CPC the first section was headed "Fundamental p
Provisions of the Programme.” It gave a definition of the Party and the cardinal
principles underlying its development. It outlined the ways and means of achieving
socialist transformations in China and named the tasks that had to be carried out in
the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science and culture and in the matter of
attaining a higher standard of living. Tasks were formulated also with regard to the
national relations, and it was emphasised that "particular attention must be paid to 86
preventing and surmounting greatHan chauvinism.” On the whole, this section
actually filled the void caused by the absence of a Programme. In the new Rules,
this section has been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that the Communist Party
of China has no Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say the least.
Moreover, the content of the new section upsets everything worthy of description as
a Marxist party.

The new Rules of the CPC actually endorse the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet p

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foreign policy of its present leadership. The former Rules stated: "The Party bends
every effort to promote and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace, democracy
and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.”

The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites with genuinely Marxist-Leninist p
parties" and jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism headed by the USA, and
modern revisionism,” it being understood that the Chinese leaders regard the "Soviet
revisionists" as the hub of this revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists mean
by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.” These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting of renegades and turncoats who act
on their instructions. Although they are numerically weak and ill-assorted, they have
inflicted quite a lot of harm on the world communist movement, and for this they
are lavishly praised by Peking. The Peking leaders classify as “revisionists” the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and Workers’ Parties adhering to Marxism-
Leninism and rejecting the theoretically untenable and politically erroneous and 87
harmful Maoist tenets.

They accuse the Communist Parties of France, India, the United States of America, p
Italy, Latin America and many others of the deadly sins of “revisionism” and
"apostasy.” Naturally, they make every effort to slander the Communist Parties of
many socialist countries, above all, the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee,
which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have reached a point where the Chinese
leaders place in the same category imperialism and the Soviet Union, the country that
blazed the road to socialism and is now leading the way to communism. Barefaced,
undisguised anti-Sovietism is one of the major if not the key element of Maoist
foreign policy.

Many of the participants in the 1969 International Conference of Communist and p


Workers’ Parties denounced this line of the Peking leadership. They underscored the
colossal role that the Soviet Union and the CPSU had played in the historic battle
against imperialism, for the triumph of the cause of peace, national liberation,
democracy and socialism.

The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party as being the main obstacle standing p
in the way of their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they have specially written
anti-Sovietism into the Rules as official party policy. Though, formerly, the Chinese
leadership was also free-handed in its anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow opposition to and open acts of
hostility against the CPSU and other communist and workers’ parties.

The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party’s ideological and theoretical foundations p 88
and replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. It was stated in the former Rules: "In
its activity the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Only
Marxism-Leninism correctly explains the laws of social development and correctly
indicates the ways of building socialism and communism.” In the new Rules it is
recorded: "The Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism and the
thought of MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation determining its ideals. The
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism
moves to its total collapse and socialism advances towards victory throughout the
world.” Although the words “Marxism-Leninism” are used there this is nothing more
than camouflage. The only reason they are used is to delude people inexperienced in
politics and ease the transition from Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.

There is not the least doubt that it is a question of precisely such a transition. What p

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else explains the fact that the provision in the Rules about the "thought of Mao Tse-
tung" is assessed by Chinese propaganda as a "great victory of the cultural
revolution"? Mentioning MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the authors
of the new Rules give it an interpretation Which emasculates it completely. In their
view, which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung "inherited, upheld and
developed Marxism– Leninism, and raised it to a new level.” The purpose of these
and similar arguments is starkly clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism and
is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin belong to the past. In the world today there
is only one "leader,” Mao, and one has to follow him without burdening oneself with 89
thoughts about where and how he will lead.

Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means a fossilised teaching. As no other p


theory it is linked with life, with the working-class and national-liberation
movements, with the struggle for socialism and communism. As a science, it
demands that it should be treated as such, that it should be constantly developed and
advanced. But the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in common with a revision
of its basic propositions, with attempts to evolve national variants.

Such attempts are leading to the rejection of Marxism-Leninism as an integral p


science of the laws of social development, of the construction of socialism and
communism. They destroy the very foundation of the internationalist unity of the
international communist and working-class movement, breaking it up into national
"islands.”

Having invented "Sinoised Marxism,” the present Chinese leaders have thereby p
made it clear that “conventional” Marxism, i.e., Marxism in its true and generally
accepted sense, does not suit them. They have gone even further, declaring that the
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the "summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.”
However, no subterfuges over wording can conceal the obvious fact that the "thought
of MaoTse-tung" is a glaring contradiction of MarxismLeninism.

The new Rules of the CPC officially propagate the personality cult, which is alien p
to MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a whole.

It should be remembered that the report to the 8th CPC Congress on the changes in p 90
the Rules said in part that the CPC "rejects the deification of a personality as alien
to its policies.” The former Rules stressed that "activities putting the personality
above the party" are inadmissible within the party, that the party should be especially
concerned with "modesty and discretion.” These lines have disappeared from the new
Rules which, instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader of the Communist
Party of China. Not only is the emperor named, but his successor also. "Comrade
Lin Piao,” say the Rules "is always holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-
tung’s ideas; he is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the proletarian
revolutionary line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the continuer of his cause.” Thus, it
is declared in advance who is to “inherit” and “supervise” the party.

All of these statements of course, directly contradict the scientific, materialistic p


teaching on the question of personality and the role of parties, classes and the people
at large in history. As is known, Marxism-Leninism accords to proletarian parties and
their leaders a high role in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of
society. Without a party and experienced leaders, the working class is incapable of
achieving success in the struggle for the triumph of communist ideals. But Marxism-
Leninism bases its teaching on the decisive role played by the working people in

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history, at the same time paying tribute to those leaders who correctly understand
and express the basic interests of the working class and all working people. This is
the cornerstone of the Marxist– Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.

In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly declared their fidelity to the Marxist- p 91
Leninist doctrine on the decisive role of the working people in social development.
They proclaimed their belief in the people. But later this line was abandoned and a
new policy emerged-one of unrestrained glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung
who was henceforward to be reverently worshipped. Immodesty and self-advertisment
of the CPC leadership know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao with the sun
seems inadequate to some of his worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime,
while Mao Tse-tung "shines always.” Anyone guilty of casting the slightest doubt on
the infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient zeal, is anathematised,
described as a "black revisionists" and persecuted. As for the mass of the people,
Mao Tse-tung said about them the following: the Chinese people are "a blank sheet
of paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can be written and the most
beautiful pictures drawn.” And indeed the Maoists are busily “writing” and
“drawing” for all they are worth. The multi– million people with an ancient culture
are looked upon as being no more than an object of political self-seeking. What is
this if not an outrage against everything that is sacred for all Communists, for their
ideology?

In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions on membership of the Party have been p
drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments is to renew the Party’s
composition in the direction desired by the Maoists. It is suggested that those "who
fail to reform after educational work has been conducted with them" should be
forced to leave the Party, and that "the Party organisations should be constantly 92
improved by removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.” Facts show that the
words "removing the unworthy" are directed not against actual class enemies but
against people who do not share the Maoist ideas, against those who can be
suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists. People linked with "Soviet
revisionism,” i.e., those who have preserved their friendly feelings towards the Soviet
Union and its Leninist Party, are classified as the most dangerous.

Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation within the party, Lin Piao said, p
menacingly, at the 9th CPC Congress: "Anyone who dares to come forward against
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and against his ideas, no matter what the circumstances,
will be censured by the party and punished by the whole country.”

As regards the ruling on "enlisting the new,” its meaning is elucidated by the p
simplified procedures of admission to Party membership and the introduction of new
provisions opening the floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the former Rules it
was stated that only a person who does not exploit the labour of others can be a
member of the CPC. Today this demand has been deleted from the Rules, although
in China, according to the admission of the Maoists themselves, its significance has
not diminished to this day. Under the present Rules the "Chinese worker, poor
peasant, lower middle peasant, revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary
element" can become a member of the CPC. One can understand the purpose of this
wording in the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists regard as genuine
revolutionary elements the hungweipings and tsaofans and all who unquestioningly 93
follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive, anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door
to Party membership precisely for these elements and allows the present CPC
leadership to bring into the Party the forces which it regards as its mainstay.

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No data on the CPC’s social composition or, as a matter of fact, any other data p
characterising the situation in the country have been published for a long time. No
information of this kind is contained even in the documents of the Ninth Congress
of the CPC. It is known that in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members of
whom less than 14 per cent were workers. There are grounds for believing that as a
result of the disbandment of workers’ organisations and the mass injection of "new
blood" into the Party through the admission of hungweipings and other elements, this
percentage is today even smaller. The organisational principles of Marxism–
Leninism require that the Party should be built up on a democratic foundation
allowing for the utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity of Communists.
In all questions of the Party’s policy and practical work, Party members should have
the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only he is worthy of the lofty name of
Communist who independently ponders over his Party’s destiny and bears a personal
responsibility for it.

There was a time when in the CPC this was recognised as an indispensable p
condition of the Party’s militancy. In the former Rules it was stated, for example,
that it was necessary "to take effective measures to promote inner-Party democracy
and to encourage the activity and creative initiative of all Party members.” There is 94
not a word about this in the new Rules, where the accent is on something quite
different. In effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish inner-Party
democracy, enforce barrack practices in the Party and turn Communists into
submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership’s instructions. To justify these
amendments it is stated that in China there "is a threat of subversion from within
and of aggression by the imperialists and modern revisionism.”

The demand that all Party members should be absolutely, categorically and p
unconditionally true to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an atmosphere in the
Party which leaves no room for inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like the old, the new Rules provide for
convening periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses in the localities and
Party meetings, they contain the addition to the effect that "in special cases they
(congresses, meetings.-Author) may be convened earlier or postponed.” Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under what circumstances this may be
done. The door is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a “legal” infringement
of one of the key norms of Party life. True, even when this reservation was non-
existent, the CPC leadership ignored the provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this can be justified with references to
the Rules.

The former Rules envisaged a democratic procedure for forming the Party’s leading p
organs. It stated: "Elections shall be held by secret ballot, and the electors shall be
ensured the right to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.” In lieu of this 95
provision, the current Rules contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the effect
that "the leading Party organs at all levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic
consultations.” Obviously, this can be interpreted in any way and given any
meaning, which is evidently what the Maoists want.

A new provision has been introduced, stating that "the convocation of congresses p
and the composition of the Party committees in the localities and in the Army shall
be approved by higher Party organisations.” This affords the Maoists the possibility
of manipulating the composition of the leading Party organs at their own discretion
and appointing to leading positions persons devoted to them. Significantly, the
provisions on central and local Party control commissions have been deleted

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altogether. The setting up of Party control agencies is no longer envisaged.

There are clauses consolidating the position held by Mao Tse-tung and his p
entourage in the CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the CC, his Deputy
and the Standing Committee of the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it is stated in the Rules that "some
necessary compact and operational organs to conduct the current work of the Party,
the Government and the Army are established under the guidance of the Chairman,
Deputy Chairman and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.” The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the disbandment, in the course of the
"cultural revolution,” of democratically elected Party committees and the setting up
of organs not envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious headquarters for "cultural 96
revolution" affairs, and, second, to give the top leadership a free hand in the future.
If necessary, they will establish "compact and operational" agencies legally and rely
on them in the struggle against any opposition.

The position occuppied by ruling parties such as that of the Communist Parties in p
socialist countries requires that the forms and methods of their work and the
principles underlying their leadership of state and public organisations should be
clearly denned in their Rules. This has been done in the Rules of the CPSU and
other fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC also contained the appropriate
provisions, which specified the functions of Party organs at all levels, spoke clearly
of the need to rule collectively and denned the Party’s relations with state and public
organisations. There were sections headed "Party Groups of the Leadership in
NonParty Organisations" and "The Party and the Young Communist League.” None
of these provisions and sections is to be found in the new Rules. Instead, there is a
provision stating: "The state organs of power of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the People’s Liberation Army as well as the Young Communist League, the
revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor peasants, lowest middle peasants
and Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations shall be subordinate to
the leadership of the Party.”

It is hard to reconcile this provision with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role p
played by the Communist Party and the character of its relations with state and
public organisations. Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of placing all 97
power in the hands of the Party leadership with Mao at the head.

Leninism teaches us that in exercising political leadership of all state and public
organisations the Party does not have recourse to administration by injunction and
does not take over their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist society’s political
structure and coordinating and directing the work of the mass organisations of
working people, the Communist Party at the same time bends every effort to enable
them to operate with self-assurance and confidence within the context of their rights
and functions. This means that in societies building socialism and communism, along
with the growth of the tasks to be carried out, the upswing of the people’s
activeness and the heightening of the Party’s role, a process is under way of the
enhancement of the role played by state and public organisations, and of the
development and improvement of socialist democracy. This is one of the laws
governing the development of socialist society, and one of the many laws the
Maoists are grossly violating.

***

The CPSU’s point of departure is that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have common p

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basic interests, and it is doing everything in its power to sustain fraternal friendship
between them. At the same time, the Soviet Communists and all other Marxist-
Leninists consider it their duty to wage an uncompromising struggle against the
divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line and anti-Leninist and anti-popular
ideological and political tenets of the Peking leaders.

An analysis of the amendments introduced into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as p 98
compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress shows that while formally
retaining the Party’s former name, the CPC leadership is steering towards the
creation of a fundamentally different political organisation. Underlying its structure
and activity are the personality cult, extreme centralism, militarism and the
renunciation of inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this is a nationalistic
and chauvinistic organisation with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.

In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open revision and abandonment of the p
Marxist– Leninist principles of party development. The future will show whether the
CPC has the strength to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the positions of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to rejoin the united front of
the world’s Communist and Workers’ Parties. This would conform to the vital
interests of the Chinese people and to the interests of the world proletariat and the
working people of all countries.

Kommunist, No. 4, 1970

***
 
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Maoism: Its Ideological


TOC
and Political Essence
Card  

Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/199.tx" 100

Text P. Fedoseyeu p
HTML
PS The course of world development and the events in China clearly show the hostility p
PDF towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the special ideological and political
platform set forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental issues of international
T* life and the world communist movement.
19*
The theoretical and practical activities of the Maoists, their efforts to split the p
### revolutionary forces, and their great-power and hegemonic ambitions do serious harm
to the anti-imperialist struggle, to the world communist and workingclass movement,
to the forces fighting for democracy and national freedom and to the entire cause of
socialism and the social progress of mankind.

Strongly rebuffing Maoism, Marxist-Leninists consider it necessary to expose


completely its ideological and political essence and its social roots. Great attention
was devoted to these questions in the Report of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 24th
Party Congress and in his speech at the International Meeting of Communist and
Workers’ Parties in Moscow in June, 1969. Communists all over the world have
studied these questions deeply and are continuing to do so, as was shown by the
speeches of many other participants in the 1969 Meeting and as has also been 101
demonstrated at the Congresses of a number of fraternal Parties.

***

The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a rather narrow group of interdependent p
people, who, in one form or another, are dependent on Mao and his closest
associates. This group carefully conceals its real convictions and aims, seeking to
present Maoism as a certain "development of Marxism in modern conditions.” As
one can see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this kind of camouflage to confuse
the issue of the social support of the current Peking regime.

An analysis of the history and present-day essence of the ideology and policy of the p
Mao Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds support, first and foremost, in the
nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and, to a considerable
extent, declasse strata of Chinese society.

In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic p
trend. However, its non-proletarian essence was not so clearly shown during the stage
of national– liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite different social forces
against imperialism. The differences of principle between Maoism and scientific

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communism were revealed after the victory of people’s power in China, when
fundamental socio-economic changes were in progress.

The experience of many countries shows that the pressure of the ideology and p
psychology of the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front increases sharply during 102
the course of a revolution, and especially when socialism is in the process of being
built, when a drastic breaking-up of old social relations takes place. It is precisely at
such a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go over from a petty-bourgeois
revolutionary stand to one of struggle against the proletarian leadership of society.
And this was what happened in China too.

Literature on Maoism frequently expounds the view that Maoism is an ideology, an p


expression of the interests of the undeveloped, backward peasant masses, which have
for centuries constituted the great majority of the population of China. But this
opinion is unacceptable. To accept it would mean admitting that the Maoists have an
extensive social base in the form of the peasantry, and, by the same token, that the
peasantry is responsible for the anti-popular essence of the Maoist policy.

To regard Maoism as an expression of the views of the entire peasantry means p


identifying the petty-bourgeois, primitive, anarchistic prejudices of the peasantry with
its fundamental interests. Indeed, can it be asserted without deviating from Marxism-
Leninism, that the "cultural revolution,” the smashing-up of the Party, tradeunion,
and YCL organisations, and the destruction of socialist democracy express the vital
interests of the peasantry? Of course not.

The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology of the Chinese peasantry are not p
straightforward. They are of a complicated and contradictory nature, and can be
correctly understood only on the basis of a consideration of the class essence of 103
Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic socio-political trend.

Marx and Engels disclosed the social heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. p
They showed how to distinguish between its prejudices and reason, between its past
and its future, between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and its natural
gravitation, as a toiling class, towards an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in
the struggle for a new life free from exploiters and parasites. Opponents of Marxism
alleged that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois reaction, identified the whole
of the peasantry with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin said: "I was not
attacking the working peasants when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let us
leave the working peasants alone-that’s not what I am talking about. But among the
peasantry there are working peasants and pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty
proprietors at the expense of others; the working peasants are exploited by others,
but they want to live at their own expense.”  [ 103•1  

Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to the crying contradictions in the life and p
activities of the peasantry, which in some conditions spontaneously and energetically
rose up in struggle against the exploiters, and, in others, either humbly let themselves
be led off to be shot or whipped by the police, or else even made up the basis of
the support for the reactionary forces.

This is, to a considerable extent, also true of the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, p
under feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified and, therefore, disunited.
The bulk of the Chinese peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation was 104
common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal ideology with its ruler cult and worship of
the traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being in their mass downtrodden,

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illiterate and scattered, for many years remained very submissive and fully
subordinated to the authorities. The backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national narrow-mindedness and the nationalist
outlook.

At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has rich revolutionary traditions. More than p
once it rose in struggle against the landowners. Furthermore, the peasantry made up
the main force of the revolutionary armies both in the nationalliberation struggle and
in the revolution. The Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative farming on the
road of socialist development of the countryside. It was precisely these peasant
masses, who, under the leadership of the working class and its vanguard, the Party
of MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in working for the triumph
of a genuinely socialist way of development.

But this, regretfully, did not take place. Starting from the late fifties, and especially p
in the course of the "big leap" drive, and, later, in the "cultural revolution,” a serious
blow was struck at the organisations of the working class and the Party. The Party
divorced itself to a considerable extent from the working class and the peasantry,
and disunity was deliberately sown among the working class. As for the peasants,
most of them were deceived by the pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The
rest were intimidated by a terror campaign, and, although they did not accept the 105
"cultural revolution,” neither did they dare to put up any open resistance.

In the process of its moulding and development, Maoism came under the political p
and ideological influence of the urban petty bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of
artisans and handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen. This social
grouping came into being in feudal China, and its members were, for the most part,
distinguished by their conservative views and nationalist outlook.

But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per cent reactionary. A sizable section of p
it took an active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too, under the leadership of the
working class, could have taken the socialist road together with the overwhelming
majority of the people.

The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that in the struggle between the two p
courses-the course of proletarian internationalism and that of petty-bourgeois
nationalism-the latter prevailed at a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was
unable to withstand the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie and to secure the leading
role of the working class.

The national bourgeoisie has still been preserved in China. It was not subjected to p
repressions in the years of the "cultural revolution.” Representatives of the exploiting
classes which, as admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise more than 50 million
people, hold important positions in the management of the economy, and continue to
exert an influence on the economic and political life of the country. Because they
subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the 106
nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas and actions of the Maoists.

A particularly complicated question is that of the attitude of the Maoists towards the p
working class. They keep talking all the time about the leading role of the working
class and the Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the
proletarian revolutionary character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of the
Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian nature, although, in pursuit of their aims,
by means of demagogy, they try to make use of certain sections of the workers.

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It is generally known that the Chinese working class is heterogeneous. Its greater p
part consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not gone through a real
schooling of socialism and internationalism. But it has a militant core, which has
many revolutionary traditions. As was shown by the events in the "cultural
revolution,” it was precisely the militant core of the working class which came to the
aid of the Party organisations which were attacked by the hungweipings. In the
factories and plants the Maoists failed to achieve the scale of the "cultural
revolution" which they desired. Although the working class of China is still
relatively small in number (it barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the backbone of the Chinese revolution and
of the cause of socialism in China and it still is. The working class is the real force
which is exerting a restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation of
Maoism in the life of the country.

The army officers’ circles exerted a great influence on the rise and evolution of p 107
Maoism. These circles have always played an active part in the social and political
life of China.

In the history of China, militarism for centuries represented a relatively independent, p


influential force, and energetically intervened in political life. In the course of
revolutionary wars, many officers went over to the side of the struggling people.
Although they were the opponents of imperialism, and of the landlords and the
comprador bourgeoisie, most of these military men, nevertheless, did not become
either internationalists or Marxists. Many military men joined the Communist Party,
but only some of them acquired Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary training, and
those who did were subsequently purged. A large number of sincere internationalists,
real supporters of socialism, were expelled from the army. Mao Tse-tung, leaning
upon nationalistically-minded elements loyal to him, reformed the army, implanting in
it a spirit of nationalism and great-power chauvinism, a spirit of blind subordination
and idolisation of his personality.

At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue fear the army, especially its p
revolutionary backbone of career officers who went through the crucible of the war
for national liberation. Unquestionably a considerable section of the career command
personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary
traditions and experience in fighting not only the internal counter-revolution but also
international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the fact that the Maoists are
transforming the people’s army into an all-China police force-a force directed against
the people and designed for their suppression. Although drawing the army into the 108
work of the "cultural revolution" did help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the discontent within the Chinese army
and the freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from their illusions and a
fanatical faith in the wisdom of the "great helmsman.” It also enabled many of the
army men to understand, from their own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. Therefore, as was only to be expected,
the army has now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist moods, and that is why
the Maoists are carrying out purge after purge, and repression after repression against
many career military men, ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the antiMaoist
movement in the People’s Liberation Army of China.

Removed from under the control of Party and state bodies, and placed at the service p
of the hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and his group, even before the
development of the "cultural revolution,” the army was preparing to carry out the
role allotted to it. This was the militarisation of all public life-conducted under the

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sham slogan of “revolutionisation”-and the establishment of a military-bureaucratic


order in the country. But, having carried out the " cultural revolution,” in which the
army played the decisive role, Mao then struck a blow at the army leadership, so
that now Lin Piao no longer figures as Mao’s "successor,” as had been announced at
the Ninth Congress of the CPC.

The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao’s is quite clear, although Peking prefers to p
keep silent about it. The revelation of the substance of the intrigues that permeate all 109
of Mao’s activities and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique would not do
the "great helmsman" any good, and this is understood very well in Peking.

Maoism claims to be accepted by different strata of the country as an all-national p


ideology and a political doctrine expressing the national interests of the entire
Chinese people. The nationalistic aims are even advanced as a unifying factor. This
shows the nature of the petty bourgeoisie, which strives to “rise” above the classes
and present its egoistic interests as the interests of the nation as a whole.

The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages its petty-bourgeois class nature and p
tries to manoeuvre between the different classes, taking advantage of the weakness
and lack of organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it difficult to discern
the class nature of Maoism and they also serve as a means of attracting to its side
politically unstable elements drawn from different classes of the population.

Marx and Lenin called such tactics Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the p
revolution and was called on to defend it, although it had actually always served the
bourgeois or pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism, which served as a
cover for an anti-proletarian policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern times.
In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its characteristics as reliance on the military,
manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled social and nationalistic demagogy.

An analysis shows that the policy and tactics of Maoism have quite a number of p
features resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific Chinese setting, of course: 110
firstly, a reliance on army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance on a
combination of different, sometimes diametrically opposed, social forces, on a
manoeuvring between classes, making use first of some social groups, then of others,
first of high-school and college students, then of working youth, and especially of
the petty-bourgeois, backward peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian
elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and political demagogy: the shouting of the
most revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary– chauvinistic policy, verbal calls
for defending the proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home and foreign
policy, appeals to the people in words and their suppression in deeds.

Marx included among the Bonapartist manifestations the deification of the supreme p
leader and the mystical faith of the broad masses in the ruling personality. Mao Tse-
tung exerted every possible effort to have his personality glorified and his views
advertised, and he placed his favourites in the most important posts in the party, the
army and in the machinery of state.

The "barrack-room communism" now being implanted in China is in keeping with p


the moods and needs of the society’s petty-bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian strata.
It corresponds to the hegemonic ambitions of the Maoists, for it helps them to carry
out the militarisation of the economy and the entire life in the country for the sake
of the realisation of the great-power adventurist plans in the international arena.

For an understanding of the essence of Maoism, a consideration of its historical, p

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ideological and theoretical origins is quite important. The lengthy domination of 111
feudalism and militarism, economic and cultural backwardness, the undeveloped
public and social relations, the small number of proletarians and the absolute
predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created special difficulties for China’s
revolutionary development.

The militarists’ traditional participation in ruling the country and the extensive p
dissemination in the course of centuries of one of the reactionary aspects of
Confucianism-the cult of the supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a military-
bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler at the head.

The Maoists made use of historical and demographic facts for their own ends to p
spread great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has rich historical traditions. For a
long time the country held the leading place in Eastern Asia. China is the home of
an ancient culture. The Chinese are the most numerous people in the world. The
existence of a comparatively high civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers
of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the superiority of the Chinese. All
other nations were declared “wild” and "barbarous,” and all "barbarians.” China’s
eternal enemies. For thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China that she was
the centre of the world. That is how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later
acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.

In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle nationalism was the ideological weapon p
of the progressive forces which were fighting for national liberation and social
progress. It was the ideological basis for rallying and uniting the broadest sections of 112
the Chinese population, pushing into the background in some cases social
differentiation and differences in class interests. After the victory of the anti-
imperialist, democratic revolution in China and its growth into a socialist revolution,
nationalism exhausted itself as an ideological basis for uniting the progressive forces
of the nation in its struggle against foreign capital-its struggle for national
independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in Chinese society between nationalism
and internationalism.

In present-day conditions Chinese nationalism, which has grown into great-Han


chauvinism, has been fully adopted as a weapon of Mao Tsetung’s ruling group.
Great-Han chauvinism is the basic motif of anti-Sovietism and the activities of the
Maoists which are designed to disrupt the socialist community and the world
communist, workers’ and anti-imperialist movements.

***

The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien to the Maoists. But they understand p
very well that there is no other ideology capable now of winning over the minds of
the peoples of the world. That is why the Maoists decided to monopolise the right to
interpret and “develop” Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own way and
thereby to turn it into an instrument for achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.

Initially this was called "the creative application" of Marxism-Leninism in China’s p


specific conditions. It was done under the guise of the realisation of Lenin’s thesis to 113
the effect that the peoples of the East have to find their own ways of carrying out
Marxist ideas. Then appeared the formula of "Sinoised Marxism,” which for a long
time was viewed by some Marxists as the process of creative quests for ways and
means of developing the revolution and the transition to socialism in the specific
conditions of China. But the Maoists had their own understanding of this formula.

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For them this was an important step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to reveal itself with the appearance of the
assertion that Mao Tse-tung’s ideas are an interpretation of Marxism for all the
countries of the East. Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its appearance.
The next step was taken during the "cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be the teacher of all peoples, the only
Marxist theoretician of the entire world communist movement, and Mao’s ideas the
apex of scientific thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current epoch. But this
slogan is only a cover. The real meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace Marxism by Maoism. That is how
the concealed, previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic, hegemonic schemes
of the Maoists were revealed.

In their attempt to achieve the recognition of Mao Tse-tung as the only leading p
world theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and the CPC as the centre
of the entire revolutionary movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of degeneration
and revisionism, and of compromise with imperialism, against large and authoritative
Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and against the entire world communist 114
movement. All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are haughtily
“excommunicated” from Marxism– Leninism, from the revolution and from
socialism, and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle covered by Marxist phrases
and revolutionary slogans has been launched against the " dissenters.” And in this
struggle no methods are barred, not even military provocations.

What then is Maoism from the standpoint of its ideological and theoretical content? p

The influence and eclectic mixture of the most diverse doctrines, views, theories and p
concepts are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political, economic, philosophical,
sociological and tactical concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include: 

feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that p
part of this philosophy is taken which is characterised by scholasticism, idealism,
primitive dialectics, the preaching of the spirit of submission, the glorification of
imperial power, and the exaggeration of the role of the subjective factor in history;

petty-bourgeois socialism, especially Proudhonism with its utmost vulgarisation of p


Hegel’s idealistic dialectics and understanding of the unity of opposites as the
mechanical sum of “bad” and “good” phenomena irrespective of their socio-
economic, class substance;

the petty-bourgeois-peasant, semi-Narodnik, semi-avantgardist views ascribing p


spontaneous revolutionism to the peasantry;

the bourgeois-nationalistic, great-power and chauvinistic assertion of the p


exclusiveness of China;

Trotskyite views, which were more or less widespread in the Chinese revolutionary p 115
movement in the twenties and early thirties;

anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable influence in China at the start of the p
twenties. Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission, went in for anarchism quite
actively in that period.

It is through the prism of all these views that Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas p
of MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in general is concerned,

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neither Mao Tse-tung nor his closest associates ever made a systematic study of it,
limiting themselves to reading popular articles. Mao has never had an integral
Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and adapted them to their interests. p
Maoism ignores the objective laws of social development, as does Trotskyism, and
exaggerates the role of the subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in
politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in economics are characteristic for both.
An antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world revolutionary process is a feature
common to both Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic purposes the Maoists made
use of the Trotskyite theory of "the export of revolution,” regarding world war as the
only way of solving the problems of revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is the tactics of splitting the
revolutionary forces, with crude slanderous attacks against the Marxist-Leninist
parties and the socialist states, rabid anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within
the ranks of the international working-class and communist movement. 116

An idealistic-voluntaristic theory of violence (in which a subjective-idealist, p


militarist interpretation is substituted for the materialist interpretation of history) is
the basis of Maoist ideology.

The theoretical construction of Maoism is pivoted on "Sinoised dialectics,” and p


particularly on Mao’s “teaching” on contradictions, which is called upon to serve as
the theoretical basis of the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, as a justification of
their negation of a principled class policy, and of their policy of making unprincipled
deals with the forces of imperialism and all kinds of renegades from Marxism. Most
characteristic in this respect is the way the Maoists artificially devise the "great
contradictions" of our time, declaring as enemies of the peoples fighting for freedom
the "two superpowers" the United States and the Soviet Union: the citadel of
imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction, is placed on the same level as the first
socialist country, this powerful force of world progress. This false concept is further
proof that the Maoists have turned away from the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the
main contradictions of the present day, from a principled class approach to the
alignment of forces in the world arena.

The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon in the “art” of arbitrarily designing p
contradictions. They proclaim a state of “unity” or of "struggle,” of anyone with
anyone, so long as this facilitates the attainment of their greatpower, hegemonistic
aims.

These, in the most general way, are the ideological background of Mao Tse-tung p 117
and his followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and policy of Maoism quite
often link up with the ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no accident, either,
that the theoretical revelations and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded to the
skies by imperialist ideologists and politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of social progress and socialism.

While noting the eclectic nature of Mao Tsetung’s views, it should be borne in p
mind, that, as a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly shows, great-power
nationalism is the leading and organising force behind his miscellany of ideas. From
diverse ideological and theoretical concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested in
taking and using those that serve nationalist and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This
emphasises the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the theory and practice of
Maoism. Mao Tse-tung and his followers advance and uphold those theoretical

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theses and political slogans which directly serve their ends in the present historical
period, and they bury in oblivion those of their own conclusions which have ceased
to be in accord with their utilitarian aims, without showing any concern for logic or
the continuity of ideas.

Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group
goes from one extreme to another in its domestic and foreign policies, as it seeks the
support of both the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or indirectly, of the most
reactionary circles of bourgeois society.

*** 118

Maoism, in its theoretical principles and political practices is in basic contradiction p


with, and hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The essence
of Maoism is certainly not a revolutionary, but a reactionary ideology. Maoism adds
grist to the mill of imperialism and reaction. Therefore the struggle against Maoism
should be regarded primarily from the viewpoint of the incompatibility of the aims
of Maoism-as a form of social-chauvinism-with the objectives of the world
communist movement and the national-liberation movement, and with the basic
principles of Marxism-Leninism on fundamental issues of socialist construction,
world development, and revolutionary strategy and tactics.

The most eloquent and concentrated expression of Maoism was seen in the course p
of the " cultural revolution" and in the resolutions of the Ninth CPC Congress,
which is an important landmark in the development of Maoist policies, strategy and
tactics, and is of decisive importance for an understanding of the innermost
tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.

The recent interpretation by the Maoists of the basic principles of Marxism- p


Leninism, the political course of the Maoists both inside the country and in
international relations, as also in the communist movement, and the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, cannot be explained away as a dogmatic-sectarian “leftist”
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

Maoism is a Chinese version of social– chauvinism, with Chinese social militarism p


as its nucleus. This is an anti-Leninist political trend, which endeavours to adapt 119
Marxism-Leninism to greatHan nationalist aims and to make a demagogicutilitarian
use of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and of the revolutionary and communist movement, to
attain these goals. At the same time the Maoists camouflage their selfish, great-power
designs and plans with clamorous revolutionary phrases.

Even as it declares its irreconcilability with imperialism, the Mao group weakens p
and splits the world’s anti-imperialist forces, undermines the national-liberation
movement and specifically interferes with the establishment of unity of action to
support the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of
conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an antiSoviet foundation.

Although the Maoists shout a lot about socialism, they have launched a wild p
political campaign against most of the socialist countries, have started pursuing a
course of outright hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a situation of war
hysteria.

Although verbally they champion the idea of world revolution, and make much ado p
about their "revolutionary nature,” Mao’s supporters at the same time slander the
working class of the capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist degeneration. They

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also attack most of the Communist Parties, and undermine the workers’ and
democratic movement.

Events of the past decade show that the Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of p
the revolution, if its development does not conform to their great-Han nationalistic
interests. But they understand very well that only an orientation towards revolution
can offer any historical prospect. That is why they are so amazingly insistent-and 120
unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to use the world revolutionary
process for their own ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy a leading
position in it, so as to mould it to the requirements of Chinese nationalism: the
implementation of the ambitious dreams of the supporters of the great-Han policy
contemplating China as the centre of the world. This is the strategic design of the
Maoist leadership.

The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a great discrepancy between their words p
and deeds, and between their theoretical concepts and practice. While proclaiming
themselves the most resolute fighters against imperialism and declaring that
imperialism is a "paper tiger,” they actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the
same time link up with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism.

The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the stand of great-power chauvinism, p
preserves leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese society and in the
world arena there are powerful social, political and ideological forces at work whose
efforts are directed at the protection, strengthening and development of socialist
gains, the restoration and consolidation of the theory and policy of Marxism-
Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism in China.

Maoism is opposed in the first place by the objective tendency of the socialist p
development of the country. This is embodied primarily in the foundations of
socialism built by the efforts of the Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the other socialist countries. The 121
military– bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the political superstructure
does not mean the automatic collapse of the socialist basis. Of course, deformations
in the basis can and do take place under the influence of reactionary changes in the
superstructure.

Broad sections of the Chinese population are interested in carrying out a socialist p
policy in China-the main core of the working class, the progressive part of the
peasantry, broad masses of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary section of the
army. The Maoists cannot ignore the interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed,
Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist sentiments and strivings of the Chinese
working people. A great many Chinese Communists take a socialist stand. Although
genuine Communists have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle against
Maoism, they have not given up.

The world socialist system, its successes and the principled Leninist policy of the p
Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, exert an influence
on the development of the political struggle in China. Broad sections of the Chinese
people remember that the USSR is the first country of socialism, and they remember
the aid which the USSR rendered the working people of China during the years of
the anti– imperialist struggle, the revolution and the construction of socialism. No
anti-Soviet hysteria can do away with this sympathy.

The world communist and working-class movement also affects developments in p

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China. The condemnation of Maoism by the majority of the Communist Parties of


the world and the resolute criticism of Maoism at the International Meeting of 1969, 122
at the Congresses and in the press of the fraternal Parties cannot fail to have an
influence on the situation in China.

The ideology and policy of Maoism do not correspond to the objective course of the p
development of society and the requirements of the socialist development of China.
Maoism suffers one defeat after another and its ultimate failure is historically
inevitable. There can be no doubt that the Communists, the working class and all the
working people of China will find the strength to embark once again on the road of
a close unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries and ensure the
success of the great cause of socialism in the PRC.

This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The November p
Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the Politbureau of the
Central Committee is consistently carrying out the line of the 24th Congress
regarding the People’s Republic of China and expressed full agreement with the
position of the Politbureau in solving associated practical questions. The Soviet
Union is working for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations. This
aim is also promoted by the ideological-political struggle against “left-wing”
revisionism which Lenin called "petty-bourgeois revolutionism.”

Genuine Marxist-Leninists regard the exposure of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic p


ideology and policy of Maoism as essential to the strengthening of the unity of
world socialism, the communist movement and the anti-imperialist movement.

Pravda, December 5, 1971

***
 
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes

[ 103•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 27, p. 311.

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CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST
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<•> Dialectics, 123

Genuine and Spurious


TOC CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST INTERPRETATION
Card AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS
 

Text V. Lektorsky, p
HTML G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu
PS
PDF The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that criticism of bourgeois and revisionist p
concepts remains an important component of the Party’s theoretical work. "The
T* Congress considers,” says the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report
19* of the CPSU Central Committee, "that the creative development and propagation of
the Marxist– Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts to revise it must
###
remain a central task in the Party’s ideological work.”   [123•1  

Revisionist concepts of both right and “left” varieties, and the Maoist ideology in p
particular, are particularly dangerous forms of the many attempts that have been
made to rob Marxist– Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and misrepresent
socialist and communist construction. While posing as defenders of the “purity” of
Marxism-Leninism and employing “Marxist” and “revolutionary” terms, the Maoists
seek to foist on the world communist and workers’ movement an ideological and
political platform of their own which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. They 124
have launched a virulent campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting
out with their divisive policy to undermine the revolutionary struggle and sow
discord in the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters. ”. . .the Chinese leaders,” Leonid
Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party
Congress, "have put forward an ideological-political platform of their own which is
incompatible with Leninism on the key questions of international life and the world
communist movement, and have demanded that we should abandon the line of the
20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.”   [124•1  

Characteristic of the Maoist revision of MarxistLeninist theory is the attempt to p


“substantiate” the splitting actions of the Chinese leaders and their adventurist policy
by references to materialist dialectics. This circumstance makes it imperative for
Marxist scholars to examine such claims critically in order to distinguish between
true materialist dialectics and the distorted versions put out by the Maoists.

Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign was launched in China against the p
"theory of combining two into one" and advocating "the principle of dividing one
into two.” Ostensibly, the campaign was directed against distortions and falsifications
of the core of materialist dialectics, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not scientific, since its purpose was to
justify the special views held by Mao and his adherents. The polemic over the
problem of contradictions, of the unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to be 125
more exact, was artificially produced) precisely when there was a need for
"philosophical substantiation" of the policy of splitting the ranks of the international

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communist and working-class movement and conducting an openly anti-Soviet line.


The "theory of dividing one into two,” which served as philosophical justification of
the need for a prolonged confrontation between classes under socialism, provided
tremendous scope for arbitrary construction of ever new “ contradictions” and
"antagonisms,” and creating a sociopolitical atmosphere for encouraging the
interminable political squabbles and clashes and the use of extreme measures and the
military– bureaucratic dictatorship.

The actual socio-political and ideological aim of the spate of bombast let loose in p
China in 1963–64 around the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is obvious.
It has been exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of Marxist theoreticians,
some of which were printed in the journal Questions ot Philosophy.   [ 125•1   The
Maoist interpretation and application turned dialectics into a political gimmick,
demagogically designed to camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung’s political line. If
this presented a purely historical interest, referring even to the very recent past, there
would hardly be any need to return to an analysis of the specifically Maoist
interpretation and application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is still very much
the practice in present-day China to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the 126
Maoist line of thought.

The most recent and instructive example of the Maoist interpretation and application
of materialist dialectics is provided by the article "The Theory of Combining Two
into One" published in the March 1971 issue of the magazine Hungchi. Coming from
"a group of authors of revolutionary criticism" of the Higher Party School of the
CPC Central Committee, the article criticises the "reactionary and absurd thesis of
’combining two into one’ advocated and spread by the traitor and provocateur Liu
Shao-chi" and gives the “correct” i.e., Maoist, interpretation of the law of the unity
and struggle of opposites. As the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the basic
law of materialist dialectics means that "in human society and in Nature the whole
always splits up into unequal parts" which are engaged in a constant struggle,
leading to "one side overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the other.” For
instance, the revolutionary always destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the
erroneous, etc. "By advancing the proposition of the division of one into two,” the
authors go on to say, "Mao Tse-tung has summed up most profoundly and
laconically the law of the unity and , struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the
very I gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has | demonstrated that both in
Nature and in human I society and consciousness there exist contradictions and
struggle, not the law of ’combining two into one’.” All talk of combining opposites
is , nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- | tion of the "counter-
revolutionary, revisionist line j directed against the socialist revolution with the aim 127
of combining the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and
socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.” The present polemic between
those who adhere to the "theory of dividing one into two" versus those who support
"the theory of combining two into one" is regarded as a "reflection of the bitter and
complex class struggle of that period (the first half of the 60’s) in the ideological
sphere within and without the country. In the final analysis, the point at issue was
whether the dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the socialist system
consolidated or the proletarian dictatorship should be liquidated and the capitalist
system restored.” If one adds to this the opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly metaphysical ’theory of combining
two into one’ has been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50’s as the
interpretation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites and serves as
theoretical justification for the ’restoration of capitalism’ in that country and as an
instrument of ’collusion with the US imperialism’,” one will readily see that the

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latest campaign of “repudiating” the "theory of combining two into one" has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what are these aims and what, in
general, is the place and the real value of Maoist “dialectics” in the present-day
political and ideological struggle?

***

The Maoists have grown very fond of the formula of the need to "divide one into p
two,” which they view as the ultimate philosophical justification of their splitting
policies. They have grown so fond of it that the thesis of the "synthesis of opposites 128
into one" appears to them as out– andout "revisionism.” Characteristically, however,
Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that "the division of one into two" is
progressive and inevitable when they find it politically advantageous, completely
“forgetting” about it when, for some reason or other, they consider it
disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in lauding the benefits of “division”
when it concerns the communist movement, the differences and contradictions within
its ranks, for then the Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One can hardly
deny that, for it is indeed beneficial, only the question is-to whom? General
formulas, however sound, keep “silent” on that question. This accounts for the
predilection of Peking “ dialecticians” for endless repetition of general and abstract
schemes which they stick like labels on concrete and particular cases whenever it is
thought "advantageous,” but which they refrain from using when it appears to be
disadvantageous to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such, in the final
analysis, is the criterion of acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical
proposition employed by the Maoists.

The language of materialist dialectics has, in Maoist hands, become simply a p


euphemism, at once a realisation and a disguise for practical political action, a kind
of instrument kit consisting of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames. The
Maoists’ treatment of the theoretical wealth accumulated by materialist dialectics is a
striking example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic comprehension and use of
ideas which, irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are regarded as 129
very pliant material that does not commit one to anything, and which can be used as
one pleases, turning it inside out if necessary, so long as the desired effect is
achieved. The history of social thought knows a number of examples of a well-
developed social idea being used for two diametrically opposed purposes. One, when
it becomes the property of those social forces whose aspirations and vital needs
accord with the idea, social forces which have achieved a sufficient level of spiritual
development and are able to perceive its inner meaning and make it their ideological
banner. The other, when it is appropriated by people who are far removed from such
an idea, who seize on it, not for its real content, but because of its appeal, the
authority of its originators and the effectiveness of its implications.

Marxism has long emerged as the most influential world outlook of our time known p
for its convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even by those who are not Marxists.
But it has so much to offer it is a tempting inducement to social forces which, alien
to and often far removed from Marxism, lack a banner of their own that will carry
weight and evoke the desired response.

Attempts to “borrow” and use some elements of Marxism have been made more p
than once by various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other circles at crucial
moments or when starved for ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the appeal of
Marxism. "Extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in
formulating their aims,” Lenin wrote in 1910, "had assimilated that doctrine in an

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extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain ’slogans/ 130
certain answers to tactical questions, without having understood the Marxist criteria
for these answers.”   [130•1   Even then Lenin warned against the danger of this
tendency, which leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of Marxism, to the
drowning out of its essence by slogan-shouting, so that "nothing but the phraseology"
remains of it.

However, in those days this tendency had not yet reached the point it has today p
under Maoism; and while the utilitarian tendencies must be described, and were
described by Lenin in his time, as vulgarisation, they may appear as something not
far short of refined thought compared with present-day samples. In the writings of
Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even magazine articles, formulas such as
"division of one into two" and empty slogans do not merely supplant logical
thinking; they go so far as to lend verbal decisions an almost physically tangible
character by their sheer bluntness, their grossness in putting across the practical
political motive.

However, paradoxical as it may seem, it is precisely this extreme down-to-earth p


attitude and practical candidness that causes them to soar to the heights of
abstraction. The most specific is found in close proximity with the infinitely general,
and is, moreover, derived from the latter. So, while appearing to talk about
particulars, they do not merely express particular, ordinary ideas taking shape in
people’s minds and subject to their critical comprehension, but utter incontrovertible, 131
absolute truths. This unlimited universalisation of the most banal things, this constant
performance of dizzying leaps from “ global” generalities to particulars, and constant
attempts to pontificate, uttering "universal truths,” are garbed in the terminology of
Marxist dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous exploitation of some of the
turns of phrase typical of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!

In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one can find any number of such "great p
leaps" from the most general to the most particular. A typical feature of this mode
of thinking is the art of making such "great leaps" without bothering to investigate
the particular cases or to ensure consistency in the transition from the general phrase
to a particular problem or the real state of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each
time there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism’s political actions. In seeking to
substantiate a thesis on the need to split the international communist movement, for
instance, the line of reasoning adopted is as follows: any process in nature, society
or thought develops through the "division of one into two.” No process can take
place without the "division of one into two.” Hence, the international communist
movement, too, must be "divided into two" which is viewed as a triumph of
dialectics.

It is not so difficult to understand why unbridled universalisation-constantly p


recurring flights towards “absolute” and “universal” truths– predominates in Maoist
writings. Absolute universality is proclaimed, not for the sake of disinterested
intellectualism, scientific cognition or ideology, but simply to give these writings the
character of unchallengeable authority. Any particular, concrete proposition can be 132
scrutinised, critically appraised, verified, corrected in some aspects or even rejected
altogether. In the case of particulars, one can dare to sort them out for oneself. But
when the voice of the oracle is heard, when the demands proclaimed are those of the
world absolute which bestows on people "universal truth" through the lips of its
earthly ambassadors, then all other voices must remain silent!

The procedure, then, is simple enough. First, the universe is supplied with a set of p

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abstract formulas and slogans, which are “urgently” needed, a kind of quiver with
appropriate ideological arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is discovered that the
necessary slogan has been “shot” by the universe itself.

It must be remembered that this hovering among the "universal truths" is p


simultaneously called upon to disguise the very earthly political passions which are
the cause of the action being justified and the source of practical slogans. These
passions are presented as the "essence of the world,” which allegedly is responsible
for them and which is garbed in dialectical terminology. As a result the crux of the
matter seems to lie in dialectics, after it has been subjected to such barefaced
manipulation.

When put to such use, the dialectical terminology becomes a device of political p
demagogy, the language of such demagogy, designed to influence people who respect
Marxist-Leninist theory. Direct justification of any act of brazen voluntarism by
abstract universal philosophisms is meant to create a semblance of profound
philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a freakish and essentially harmful 133
policy. You object to the split in the ranks of the international communist movement.
Well, then you are opposed to the thesis of "dividing one into two,” hence also to
dialectics. You maintain that the main law of dialectics is not reduced to the struggle
of opposites but presupposes also “unity” of opposites. Then you are betraying the
line of Chairman Mao and preach capitulation in face of the domestic bourgeoisie
and collusion with international imperialism.

It is hardly necessary to go to any length to prove that genuine materialist dialectics p


has nothing to do with such unprincipled use of it. Nevertheless, some explanations
and comparisons are in order, if only to take a closer look at the patterns of thought
whereby Maoists not only betray the spirit of dialectics, but break even with the
terminological semblance of " dialecticalness,” even with the letter they have
borrowed from the dialectical vocabulary. With this end in view let us go back to
the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" and the bitter, mutually destructive
antagonism between extremes, which they misrepresent as the dialectical law of the
unity and struggle of opposites.

That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul of the letter of Marxist-Leninist p
dialectics, is perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this law unity has been
dropped, so that what remains is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all familiar
with the rudiments of dialectics will know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and
their fusion into a new category."   [134•1   Lenin, too, repeatedly spoke of the need 134
to be able to unite, or synthesise, opposites. In his speech "On the Trade Unions" he
pointed out that those who studied Marxism even superficially "have learned how
and when opposites can and must be combined,” drawing the important conclusion
that ".. .in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined
opposites again and again."  [ 134•2   Moreover, the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites and the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" lie within totally
different frames of reference. Indeed, the two could be compared only if the law of
the unity and struggle of opposites were simply an abstract universal ontological
statement of facts (“everything in the world is such that in the given case or
example this or that takes place”) along with other such statements. However, in
reality the entire spirit of dialectics, especially in its consistent, Marxist embodiment,
its whole message-the message of concreteness-is directed against empirical facts
being “explained” by superimposing on them universalised rules, by-passing the
complex chain of intermediate links connecting the methodological principles of the

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highest order with empirics, bypassing the investigation of the specific whole
whereby, and in the context of which, particular facts can be explained. Dialectical
laws in general and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites in particular, as
Lenin stressed, stem from the whole experience of the cognitive work of man’s
thought: each is "a law of cognition (and . . .a law of the objective 135
world.)”   [ 135•1   Nothing, therefore, is further removed from materialist dialectics
and more alien to it than an attempt to present it as a set of abstract rules covering
everything under the sun and excluding, by their very nature, a creative approach to
anything.

Having shown that the universalised " principle of dividing one into two" is p
incompatible with anything in dialectics, it is only natural to consider if there is
anything, any concept, with which it can be compared, and to attempt to compare
the latter with dialectics to find the connecting links.

Such a concept (if it can indeed be called a concept) exists in the folklore, p
mythology and religions of many peoples-the concept of two world principles locked
in eternal conflict. In such a world, indeed, there is no unity, and strife and absolute
division rule supreme. The question of a whole does not arise for the simple reason
that from the outset two principles are presupposed, which have nothing in common,
are not related in any positive way, hence, the eternal conflict between them can
never be resolved. Being omnipresent, they rend asunder every object into warring
extremes and plunge them into a futile and ruthless universal holocaust. But because
the opposing absolutes are supposed to have nothing in common, precisely by virtue
of their absolute disunity and absolute insurmountable division, the war of extremes
has no perspective of any kind, it does not and cannot result in any progress, any
synthesis, nothing new can emerge from it: the same drama repeats itself over and 136
over again. For the victory of one extreme immediately leads to its being split, in
turn, into the same feuding poles.

It is fairly evident that this archaic mythologem which paints a lurid picture of the p
world as a perpetual St. Bartholomew Massacre sheds no light on the logic and real
problems of real struggle. It can only serve as a means of fanning mass hysteria.

But it is this mythologem which the Maoist ideologists, who have advanced the p
slogan: " Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad thing,” regard as an
example and a model for their world outlook. In accepting the mythologem about the
impossibility of combining extremes, these ideologists devote their current campaign
to “rebuffing” the idea of unity of opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the
word "unity,” which inspires them with mortal fear. As they themselves admit, "the
gist of the theory of combining two into one" lies in the word "combination.”

A devout revolutionist obsessed by "division which is a good thing" has no right to p


practise or contemplate any kind of "combination,” he is even forbidden to
pronounce this heretical and hateful word. This line, if pursued to its logical limit,
could predictably lead the fanatics of interminable division to change the slogan
"Workers of all countries, unite!" into "Workers of all countries, disunite!" And in
this way they would betray their true political motives.

Let us examine, then, the relation between the historical tradition of dialectics and p
the archaic mythology of universal duality, division and destruction. Casting a
retrospective look at the past ages, we see that dialectics proper originated and took 137
root precisely in contrast to the mythologem about the two world absolutes, to the
fatalism of the eternal confrontation of opposites, to the idea that the world is

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doomed to revolve forever in one and the same circle. The core of dialectics has
always been, not dualism, not repetition of fate, not statics, but development spurred
by contradictions, creation of the new in the process of destruction and elimination
of the old.

Denial, too, holds a definite place in dialectics, but it is truly dialectical denial, and p
not a nihilistic one, a denial that draws a clearcut line between the idea of the
struggle of opposites, or, to be more precise, their unity and struggle,  [ 137•1   in the
sense of a general outlook, of dialectical logic; a struggle in the direct social
meaning of the word, implying the interaction of human wills as a result of which
people part with their past, with the obsolete, and build their future, on the one
hand; and the specifically antagonistic forms of the social struggle, on the other. One
of the rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first, nor in the second
interpretations of the concept of contradiction does the struggle of opposites represent
the extrapolation to the entire world of the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to
Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the same time genuine Marxism
essentially differs from the Maoist version in its interpretation of the essence and the
role of antagonistic forms in social development.

Let us explain briefly what it means. In examining antagonisms by themselves it is p 138


impossible theoretically to understand correctly either their nature or the nature of
contradictions generally. For a correct understanding of the nature of antagonisms it
is necessary to reveal scientifically the character of the contradictions (and the
“struggle” of opposites) in general, so as to explain on this basis the specifics of
antagonistic forms. This leads, in Marxism, to the following picture: in an
antagonistic society a class struggle ultimately develops because the progressive, or
revolutionary, class seeks to resolve the contradictions inherent in the old society and
to break through its confines in order to create a new society, while the conservative,
or reactionary, class opposes this solution and this creation (or even strives to restore
the old), attempting to restrict activity to the framework of the obsolete social
structures. Hence, the class struggle is being waged over two alternatives: either to
resolve the contradictions, i.e., the historical tasks and problems, the nature of which
constitutes the "struggle of opposites,” or to reproduce them in the old form and to
obstruct the solution of the historical tasks and problems. So in essence it is a
struggle for the creation, for the synthesis of the new,- hence, consistent
revolutionaries are, by their historical mission, true champions of the creation of the
new, for the sake of which they negate the obstacles standing in their way.

The inability to examine antagonisms from the standpoint of the universal nature of p
contradictions, the inability to understand the specific character of the antagonistic
contradictions, cannot be regarded merely as an innocent gnosiological mistake. In 139
dealing with such an "inability,” one must not forget which social forces are apt to
reduce the antagonistic type of contradictions to some distinct and absolutised
essence, to an ideological principle. It is characteristic of “ultra-left” extremists to
have a tendency to regard as the criterion of revolutionariness, not creation
representing sober-minded historical responsibility, but irresponsible fanatical
militancy blinded by the spirit of total destruction and nihilism. Absolutisation of the
antagonistic form of contradictions provides them with a concept that suits their
ends.

In reality, the antagonistic form of contradiction is an effect of certain objective p


causes– contradictions, historical tasks, etc. And the real sense of this antagonistic
confrontation of hostile class forces ultimately is manifested in whether they fight tor
or against the solution of these contradictions and tasks. It is manifested also in

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whether these social forces seek to transform the objective logic of the "unity and
struggle of opposites" into a logic of building new social relations and structures, or
to destroy the conditions for such creative work. Whenever an antagonistic
contradiction is treated by itself, the objective tasks and problems either disappear
from view altogether or are regarded as some purely derivative thing, as something
artificial, as some enemy scheming. In this case, what is required of a revolutionary
is not a thorough understanding of the real, subtle and intricate dialectics of history,
in its concrete situations, but unbridled bellicosity, a professed determination "to
annihilate the enemy,” as well as a readiness to resort to the most ferocious, most 140
violent measures against those who, unaffected by the passion for " universal division
into two,” try to understand the objective logic of social development instead of
inventing high-sounding slogans. Lenin in his time showed how irresponsible this
"super– revolutionarism" with its extremely “left” phrases was.

By revolutionarism Marxism means not vindictive destruction or bellicose hysterics


justified by the absolutised form of antagonism, but, on the contrary, a form of
social activity which theoretically and practically overcomes the inert framework of
the antiquated antagonistic class society and works out new forms of a socialist and
communist society. Truly revolutionary activity is activity based upon the creative
energy of the masses, so that even at the height of the struggle against the political,
class enemy the inner logic of the historical process is never lost sight of. Genuine
revolutionaries will never allow the real laws of the class struggle to be supplanted
by doctrinaire mythologising. Genuine revolutionaries know how to subject even the
most drastic and rapid breakdown of antiquated social structures to the logic of
creation of the new, the logic of their most humanistic aims-the aims of building the
new society precluding social antagonisms. Absolutisation of the role of antagonistic
contradictions in the process of establishment and development of socialist society
and the cult of militant destruction are phenomena alien to the dialectics of resolving
real contradictions. At the same time ultra-left, nihilist destructiveness denies the
creative, problematic content of the struggle for socialism and communism and is
essentially reactionary. When the Maoists act as preachers of revolutionariness that is 141
tantamount to destructiveness they become apostles of reactionary "revolutionariness.”

***

It will be seen that the "absolute truths" of the Maoist ideologists, when put to the p
test, prove to be mere euphemisms for a situative political tactic mythologically
codified by the symbolics of the political passions of the time. All the “ dialectical”
talk about "division of one into two" and other world ontological depths supposedly
fathomed by them turns out in reality to be nothing but pompous garb disguising
both the splitting policies of the Maoists in the international communist movement
and their repressive measures within the country.

The true dialectics of Marx and Lenin is, primarily, a method used for an objective p
and scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega of it being a concrete
analysis of a concrete subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In contrast, in
the hands of the Maoists, dialectics has become something incompatible with any
kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is out of the question, not to speak of
a thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological heralds of universal truths are
not concerned about a vitally important action to be taken or the reaction to the
difficulties and problems in which the Chinese politicians have become entangled,
but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of attempts to blame everything on
universal rules, of the sleight of hand involving their substitution for the earthly
political passions, has been merely to translate their very concrete failures, their 142

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destructive measures, their internecine strife and splitting policies into the language
of universal recommendations. After causing enormous political harm at home these
ideologists are trying to make a universal law of this mess and to impose this law
upon the world. Having proved totally incapable of drawing any lesson from their
sad experience of "dividing one into two" they undertake to teach others the
universal truths. And so the Maoists accuse our Party of all the mortal sins because
it has “revised” those universal truths, which, they assent, call for world-wide
dissension and strife, violent rebellion and vindictive repression.

“Viewing socialist society from the standpoint of division of one into two, it must p
be admitted,” say the authors of the article referred to above, "that throughout the
socialist stage, from beginning to end, there are classes, class contradictions, class
struggle, a struggle between two paths-the socialist and the capitalist, there is a
danger of the restoration of capitalism.”

The attempts of the present Chinese leaders to practise this theoretical p


recommendation based upon references to the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites show that the Maoist "class struggle" is spearheaded against the working
masses of China, against the world socialist system and the international working-
class movement. Its purpose is deliberate provocation of conflicts between socially
homogeneous classes fanned to the point of class antagonisms.

The progress of a developed socialist society in which the exploiting classes have p
been destroyed is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to introduce into it the 143
methods of “division” into mutually opposed classes, any tendency deliberately to
identify the uncompromising class struggle the proletariat is waging against hostile
bourgeois and revisionist ideologies with the creative quest in the constructive
endeavour to consolidate and develop socialism, are utterly inadmissible and alien to
the nature of socialism, and to the creative dialectics of its development. Such
dialectics has nothing in common with the pitiable myths which the Maoists have
adopted as their weapon and which increasingly reveal themselves as miserable fakes
of Marxist dialectics.

Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, 1971

***
 
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normal
Notes

 [ 123•1]   Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, pp.
235–236

[ 124•1]   Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, p. 15.

 [ 125•1]   E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectics or Eclecticism. No. 7, 1968; L. P. Delyusin,


’Discussion on Socialism in China and Contemporary Reality, No. I, 1969; E. Ya.
Batalov, Destruction of Practice, No. 3, 1969.

 [ 130•1]   Lenin, Coll Works, Vol. 17, pp. 42–43. 130

 [ 134•1]   Marx The Poverty of Philosophy, M., 1955, p. 126.

 [ 134•2]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27.

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 [ 135•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 359.

 [ 137•1]   We may recall here Lenin’s definition: " Dialectics is the teaching which
shows how opposites can be.. . identical.. .” (Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 109), i. e., not
only combined, but in unity leading to identity.

< >
 

<< Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Crisis in the Political Development >>
Essence of China
 

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MAP

<<< A DESTRUcTIVE POLIcY   [ThE ChINESE lEadErShIp aNd ThE @AT LENINIST
cauSES Of SOcIalISm aNd ThE WOrld rEvOluTIONary aNd lIbEraTION (DOT) BIZ
>>>
mOvEmENTS]
<< • >>
<•> Crisis in the Political 144

Development of China
 

TOC [introduction.]
 

Card
L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin p
Text
HTML Developments in China clearly show that the notorious "cultural revolution" is p
PS entering the final stage of its long-drawn-out existence. This is shown particularly by
PDF the political manoeuvres of the Mao Tse-tung group aimed at stabilising and
consolidating its rule, stemming the tide of wanton tyranny, lawlessness and the
T* deliberate derangement of the life of society and state that they themselves let loose,
19* and confining it within the strict and definite limits of the “new” order. No longer
bothering to keep up the pretence of struggle against bourgeois influences in art,
### science and education and against all those "following the bourgeois path,” the
Peking leaders have lately been openly pursuing purely political objectives in order
to maintain their power.

There is no doubt that the political development of China is an extremely involved


process, multi-dimensional and contradictory externally as well as internally. This is
because its essence, forms and trends are due to economic, political and social
factors-which differ as to the force, time and duration of their action-and also to the
special national features and historical traditions of the vast country. Concealed
behind the ample evidence of opposition-often indistinct and even imperceptible-of
the social forces, is shrewd calculation and the cunning political line of the Maoist
ruling clique.

***
 
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Notes

< THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" >


AND THE POLITICAL AND
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
 

<< Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • Maoism Preaches Poverty >>


CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST
INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS
 

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<<< A Destructive Policy   [THE CHINESE lEadErSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
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<< • >>
<•> THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE 145
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
TOC  

Card It emerges more and more clearly that what is now taking place in China is a p
radical restructuring of the entire social-political, and especially state-legal,
Text mechanism that was established after the victorious revolution and the proclamation
HTML of a People’s Republic in China and was fixed in essence in the 1954 Constitution.
PS Much of the political organisation of Chinese society have since been destroyed,
PDF although the Constitution and many other laws, constituent acts, policy documents
and fundamental party decisionsincluding the documents of the 8th CPC Congress-
T* have not been repealed or much amended. At the same time new bodies and
19* organisations are springing up in China, and a political system is emerging which is
evidently called upon to perform the functions of a Maoist dictatorship.
###
It is no accident that Mao Tse-tung and his group should have set out to destroy by p
force the state apparatus and the entire political system of China as they had been
until early 1966, when the notorious "cultural revolution" was unleashed. The fact of
the matter is that the mechanism of people’s government in China was built and
developed on the Leninist principles of socialist statehood, which were studied and
applied in practice, as well as on the basis of the experience accumulated by the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Although the conditions under which China had to develop were extremely p 146
challenging and difficult owing to the economic and cultural backwardness inherited
from the past, to the small working class and to the influence of the semifeudal
habits and customs, the people’s government very soon achieved considerable success
in developing and building up democratic institutions and arousing the political
consciousness of the people. Under the 1954 Constitution, the People’s Republic of
China was declared a people’s democracy led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants. The working people exercised their power through
a system of representative bodies-assemblies of people’s representatives-which were
set up both in town and countryside. The state apparatus was built on the principle
of democratic centralism, a combination of collective and oneman management, and
control by the people. The leading role belonged to the Communist Party of China
which proceeded under the banner of Marxism-Leninism together with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. The CPC relied in
its activities on the United Popular Democratic Front which comprised all the
democratic classes, parties and groups, popular organisations and democratic elements
not in the Party.

But both the structure and the working of such a mechanism had their defects. This p
was due to lack of experience and competent personnel and, particularly to the
Maoist distortions, which were perceptible even at the earliest stages of China’s
post-revolutionary development, although not as clearly as now. As a social-political
and theoretical-ideological current. Maoism did not take shape at once, showing 147
suddenly against the background of the "cultural revolution,” but emerged and gained

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in strength gradually, leaning on the petty^bourgeois element and playing on the


backward nationalistic, hegemonic ambitions of the immature masses. The mechanism
of people’s power that had been developed failed to conform to the Maoist idea of
the content and form of power, being alien to it in principle. Moreover, the
continued existence of such a mechanism even after repeated campaigns for
“amendment” and "improvement,” against the “right-leading” and “bourgeois”
elements, made it impossible for the Maoists to feel politically secure.

The Maoist political-legal doctrine was more than a revision and denial of the p
fundamental primary principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the substance and
political forms of power during the establishment and strengthening of the socialist
system. The doctrine is based primarily on the thesis that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat is a dictatorship exercised by the masses.”   [147•1   This proposition
which Mao Tse-tung laid down as early as 1957,   [147•2   and which was widely
publicised during the "cultuml revolution,” made it possible to disregard the leading
role of the working class and ignore its genuine needs and interests as well as its
views. At the same time it suggested that society should be divided, not on a class
principle but according to political views or, to be more precise, on people’s attitude 148
to the policies of the Maoist rulers. All the social forces that supported the
adventuristic nationalist and hegemonic Maoist line were assumed to be "the people,”
while all those under the least suspicion of being disobedient or disrespectful to the
"great helmsman" were declared enemies of the people and "capitalist– supporters.”

Maoist ideologists often refer to the special features of China’s social development p
and especially to the fact that the peasants form the bulk of the population while the
proletariat is very small. Indeed, this is of importance to social reforms. The Chinese
revolution was carried through and the first successes in socialist construction
achieved largely because the CPC had managed to win over and lead the peasantry.
But the concrete historical conditions should have precisely made it of primary
concern to the government and Party to provide for the leadership of the working
class, to help enhance its leading position in the alliance with the peasants and to
work to introduce proletarian ideology among the rural population. Under such
conditions the bodies of political power must be particularly careful not to let the
influence of the petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry eclipse or distort the
interests and aims of the workers, the genuine exponents of social progress and
consistent fighters for socialism, who although not numerous by comparison, are to
lead society.

The Maoists, however, have no faith in the creative ability and revolutionary energy p
of the people; moreover, they are suspicious of any voluntary activity or initiative of
the workers. Instead, they offer a grotesquely inflated personality cult which serves 149
to suppress the democratic relations and norms of the party and public life, as well
as criticism and control from below, and enforces unquestioning blind obedience to
the will of the absolute "leader.” Nor are the masses required to understand the
meaning and purpose of the decisions for, as the Chinese press points out, you must
"carry out Mao’s instructions no matter whether you have as yet grasped their
meaning or not.”   [149•1  

Taking its cue from the semi-feudal traditions of deifying the supreme ruler, the p
peasants’ ageold habit of obedience to authority, etc., Maoist propaganda is, in effect,
trying to preserve and perpetuate the political apathy of the masses and to implant a
system of bureaucratic administration and handle all social and political issues in a
subjective way.

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These days the Peking leaders never recall what the classics of Marxism-Leninism p
had to say about the role played by the individual in history in general and in
revolutionary change in particular. They try to put it out of people’s minds that V.
Lenin, the head of the Party and the Soviet state, resolutely checked all attempts to
extol his work. The Maoists fiercely attack the resolutions of the CPSU and other
fraternal communist and workers’ parties which condemn the manifestations of the
personality cult in some countries and which preclude subjectivism and arbitrary
action by individuals. Carrying on " unreserved propaganda of Mao’s ideas and
arming the people with them"   [150•1   is declared to be the main point of the 150
Maoist doctrine.

To Lenin’s conception of democratic centralism which he saw as a combination of p


the management of society from a single centre and on a single plan, and of
subordination of the lower to the higher bodies, with an overall development of local
initiative and creative activity of the masses, the ideologists of Maoism oppose a
scheme of their own. It boils down to the most rigorous centralism, the unreasoning
execution of all directives "from the top,” and to a rigid official hierarchy in the
Party apparatus as well as that of the government. Moreover, the very concept of
democracy-which, one might think, presupposes the extensive development of various
forms of government by the people and the enlistment of broad sections of the
population in public activities-is now interpreted in China as something synonymous
with "centralised leadership" and a means of enforcing centrally-made decisions.
"The Most Recent Directives of Chairman Mao,” which are quoted in the joint
editorial of Jenmin jihpao, Chiehfangchiun poo and Hungchi of January 1, 1969,
state that democracy must provide for "proper centralism.”

It is plain that the Maoist political-legal doctrine extremely exaggerates the role of p
coercion in the carrying out of social reforms. It views compulsion as very nearly
the key to all social problems including those (e.g., in the economic field) which
require a different approach, such as reasonable estimates, a wise distribution of
manpower, or provision of the necessary facilities. The slogans "Power comes from 151
the barrel of a gun" and "Politics takes command,” which were adopted long ago at
the time of the armed struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist rulers
retained in peace-time and not only while revolutionary government was being
established but also later on, during the building of socialism. With the start of the
"cultural revolution,” with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the rampage and
the army acting as a shield, violence actually became the Maoists’ sole means of
handling, not only all political issues that presented themselves, but also those arising
in the sphere of science, culture and education.

Of course Marxism-Leninism never denied that proletarian power might have to p


resort to violence in order to carry out its functions. Nevertheless, Lenin often
underlined that ”. . .the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of force
against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force.”   [151•1   The main
thing about the state power of the proletariat is its constructive and creative aspect
which manifests itself in the way it organises the people for the building of
socialism.

As they shift the centre of gravity to the use of force, the Maoists openly ignore the p
Constitution and defy socialist law. The Maoists instituted repressive actions against
the working people long before the "cultural revolution.” They carried out this policy
by sending the local bodies of power obligatory quotas of so many per cent of the 152
population to be dealt with as enemies of the people. The rules concerning the
administration of justice by the courts alone, the independence of the judges, and

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centralised Procuracy were declared harmful and "bourgeois.” Practically nothing was
done to codify laws while proposals for endorsing new codes voiced at the 8th
Congress of the CPC, came to be viewed two years later as "subversion of the
people’s democratic dictatorship”. The Maoist rulers regarded the citizens’ democratic
rights and liberties as empty declarations which, if anything, ought to be limited and
curtailed, not enhanced by legal and material safeguards.

The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers and the entire ideological and
theoretical platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and megalomaniac course
imposed on China by its present Peking leadership, are not in any sense an
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and special features of the vast
country. Still less are they the "acme of revolutionary theory,” as Mao’s followers
claim. Rather, they are a hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and bombastic
slogans betraying lack of faith in the creative capacity of the people and a denial of
the leading role of the proletariat, and put forward to excuse violence, the cult of
personality, and extreme nationalism. And what is most important, these are not
isolated mistakes such as may be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of the
infantile disorder of leftism in communism, but rather a fully-developed system of
anti– Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles and objectives of the world
communist movement.

***
 
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normal
Notes

 [ 147•1]   Jenmin jihpan, July 19, 1968.

 [ 147•2]   See Mao Tse-tung, Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,
M., 1967.

[ 149•1]   Jenmin jihjiao, June 16, 1967.

 [ 150•1]   Jenmin jihpao, January 16, 1969. 150

[ 151•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 419.

< [introduction.] THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS >


CAUSES AND FORMS
 

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<<< A DestructiVe PolicY   [THE CHINESE lEadErSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
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<< • >>
<•> THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS 153
 

TOC The causes, motive forces and forms of the political coup the Maoists are trying to p
bring off under the guise of the "cultural revolution" certainly need to be studied and
Card analysed further. For example, we still have to find satisfactory explanation of why it
was that the Maoists were able to set off the so-called "cultural revolution,” destroy
Text much of the former social-political and state-legal system, and begin to establish the
HTML mechanism of an absolute military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Why was there no force
PS within the Party and the state strong enough and sufficiently well-organised to stand
PDF in the way of Mao Tsetung and his group, to defend the purity of Marxist-Leninist
teachings and provide for China’s successful advance along the socialist road?
T*
19* Of course an examination of these questions will require a most detailed and p
extensive analysis of a variety of social factors.
###
Notwithstanding their boastful declarations, the Maoists have not yet managed to p
achieve complete victory. Chinese developments connected with the "cultural
revolution" are not yet over. At the same time it would be useful to noteeven if only
tentatively and touching mainly on the political-legal sphere-some of the
circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese affairs.

The first thing to point out is the inadequate general development of the political p
life in China, the absence of sufficiently strong traditions and habits of socialist
democratism. This may be explained in part by the historical past of China whose 154
downtrodden people not only suffered from semi-feudal forms of exploitation but
were also deprived of elementary rights and liberties and were oppressed by military
cliques and foreign interference. It is equally noteworthy, however, that after the
Chinese revolution had been accomplished and people’s government established, not
enough was done to end the onerous legacy of the past. The socialist democratic
forms stipulated in the 1954 Constitution were never completely realised. Even at the
time when they were most active, representative bodies never played quite so
important a part as they were legally entitled to. They did not exercise the necessary
control over the executive bodies and their organisational work among the people,
e.g., the relations between deputies and constituents, was nothing more than a
formality.

As is known, Lenin considered the realisation of democratic principles-such as the p


raising of the political and cultural level of the working people sufficiently to ensure
their effective participation in governmetit-of paramount importance. Speaking at the
8th Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks) he stressed that there remained no legislative
”. . .hindrances, but so far we have not reached the stage at which the working
people could participate in government. Apart from the law, there is still the level of
culture, which you cannot subject to any law.”   [154•1   In a situation of this kind
the organising and guiding effort of the Communist Party and socialist state in
developing the political awareness, activities and initiative of the people becomes
particularly important. But in China the party and state development proceeded in 155
such a manner that it not only failed to further the cause of socialist democracy but

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actually held back all progress in that direction.

It must be borne in mind that although at the preceding stages of China’s p


development Mao Tse-tung had not always revealed his political schemes and at
times had been forced to follow the Marxist-Leninist line, he had nevertheless caused
considerable harm in the matter of the formation and building up of people’s
government. As the demagogic "big leap" and " people’s communes" policies
succeeded one another, many bodies and institutions were thrown out of gear, and
many thousands of genuine Communists were dismissed from office and viciously
abused. Nor is it to be left out of account that Mao’s policy led to the isolation and
estrangement of the Party and state from the population so that the working people
came to look at the state bodies, laws, and even important Party and government
officials as a force hostile to the people.

Every now and then the normal course of political life in China has been p
interrupted by vociferous campaigns accompanied by mass-scale repression. For
example, as they were preparing their "big leap,” the Maoists launched a " struggle
against the rightist bourgeois elements.” At first this seemed to be aimed at the
bourgeois liberal intellectuals from the democratic parties but soon spread to the
Chinese Communist Party and to government institutions. The campaign swiftly
developed into a mass persecution of Communists who were sincerely trying to carry
out the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress, democratise the social and political life 156
and establish fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. The policy of "people’s communes" in the countryside, besides dealing a
blow at the agricultural production, actually caused the destruction of representative
bodies in the countryside and discredited a large number of local leaders devoted to
the Party.

Not only did the Maoists disregard the need to observe revolutionary law, but they p
went out of their way to paralyse the very institutions whose function was to
strengthen overall civil discipline and maintain socialist law and order. As early as
the late fifties they started a rabid persecution of the workers in political and legal
institutions, particularly of the courts, procurator’s offices and the people’s control
organisations. Many prominent workers in these institutions, devoted champions of
law and order, were dismissed from office and branded as " counterrevolutionary
elements" who had wormed themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the
fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task groups" was started. These groups
performed the combined functions of the courts, procurator’s offices and public
security bodies. The Committee of People’s Control, which was established soon
after the victorious revolution and which rested on the system of local bodies and on
the active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised into a common ministry, and
later on, both central and local people’s control agencies were finally eliminated.

Already before the "cultural revolution" the part played by the system of p
representative bodies in the country’s life was very small. Most of the important 157
decisions-e.g., on the "big leap" and "people’s communes"-were adopted without
being submitted to the All-China Assembly of People’s Representatives, which was
not even convoked, or to local elected bodies. People’s assemblies were no longer
called regularly, their activities were more and more circumscribed and finally
stopped altogether. Since the launching of the "big leap" policy, elections to
representative bodies have been held only once, in 1964, although under the law
there should have been during that time at least two elections to the AllChina
Assembly of People’s Representatives and four, to the local people’s assemblies.
Real power, both in the centre and at grassroots level, gradually shifted to the

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executive bodies which became increasingly ponderous and unwieldy, and pervaded
by officialism and sycophancy. State administration separated itself from the people
by walls of red tape.

The Communist Party of China continued to lose its former standards of p


organisation and efficiency, forfeiting its prestige among the working people to a
considerable extent because, on the one hand, the more progressive cadres were now
and again subjected to persecution, being made the target of “purges” and assorted "
campaigns,” and, on the other hand, because it based its activities on peremptory
army-style commands and one-man decisions instead of on the state bodies. The
principle "The first secretary of the Party Committee is the commander-in-chief,”
which the Maoists have propounded in Party work at all levels since the late fifties
and early sixties, in actual practice meant that many decisions were made by just one 158
individual. This destroyed confidence in collective leadership, and at the same time
caused the state institutions to develop a formal, indifferent and irresponsible attitude.

All the revolutionary triumphs and socialist gains of the Chinese were ascribed to p
Mao, and all blunders and flops were attributed to the machinations of his enemies
or failure to understand his "great directives.” There arose a situation in China where
important Party and government leaders, whose great services to the people were
well-known, could not-if they objected to Mao’s policies and the actions of his
aides-speak out against the Mao personality cult and had no option but to support it
publicly, often excusing their particular view by their concern to see the ideas of
"the reddest sun" translated into life to the very best effect.

At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the Peking leaders increasingly set out p
to make use of young people and even schoolchildren, misrepresenting the outrages
perpetrated by the hungweipings and tsaofans as a largely spontaneous mass
movement. The Maoists deliberately set these young storm troopers upon their own
real or imaginary opponents, encouraging savage acts of terrorism. It is significant
that in the widely circulated resolution of the CPC Central Committee of August 8,
1966, the prospective hungweipings were granted free pardon in advance for any
crimes and offences they might commit "in the course of the movement" short of
murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state secrets and counter-revolutionary
crimes " whereof explicit evidence should be available.”

Still, Mao and his followers depended mainly on the army. China’s armed forces 159
played a decisive role in the progress of events, becoming the Maoists’ "steel wall"
and mainstay. It was not by chance that the army was not broken up, reorganised or
even seriously criticised. The removal of some military commanders and even
disturbances in some army units were due to the political purge reflecting the course
of events in China rather than to any other cause. The special features of the
formation, leadership and ideological guidance of the army were used by the
Maoists, who had seized commanding positions in the army in good time, to divorce
it from the people and educate it in the spirit of iron discipline and blind obedience
to Mao Tse-tung. In actual fact, the army has long been independent of Party and
government control and, as developments have shown, has placed itself above
society.

***
 
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 [ 154•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 183.

< THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE >


AND THE POLITICAL AND MAOIST POLITICAL SYSTEM
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
 

<< Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • Maoism Preaches Poverty >>


CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST
INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS
 

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MAP

<<< A DestructiVe Policy   [THE CHINESE lEadErSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
caUSES Of SOcIalISm aNd THE wOrld rEVOlUTIONarY aNd lIbEraTION (DOT) BIZ
>>>
mOVEmENTS]
<< • >>
<•> PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST 159
POLITICAL SYSTEM
 

TOC
What are the characteristics of the Maoist political system that is developing? Time p
Card is sure to make its corrections in the answer, for the propensity of Mao Tse-tung
and his supporters for shifting ground and turning right about, for dealing in
Text demagoguery and just deceiving the people must naturally leave its mark on China’s
HTML social and public life. Notwithstanding this, the outline of the Maoist dictatorship
PS emerges quite clearly.
PDF
As things stand, political power in China has been seized by a tiny group led by p 160
T* Mao Tsetung. This group is controlling the social and public life and has taken on
19* itself the functions of the top party and government bodies. From the standpoint of
Chinese constitutional law a group of this kind cannot be identified with any of the
### established institutes of the political system and chiefly resembles the half-advisory,
halfruling institutions of a monarchy or an absolute dictatorship. The "Maoist
headquarters,” as the dictator group is officially described, is a vague enough notion,
not fixed in any legal or other act; it has neither a clear-cut structure, nor an
apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of people. Moreover, the circle of Mao’s
followers keeps contracting and extending by turns as the objectionable ones are
kicked out or-as happens more seldom-those who win back their place by
“repentance” or zealous prosecution of Maoist objectives, return.

Placed at the hub of the entire political mechanism is "Chairman Mao,” whose p
moves and decisions are never debated. Mao’s prestige serves to cover unprecedented
infractions of democracy and law, savage repression and outrages against those
suspected of "sedition.” This inflated prestige is used by the Maoists to ensure the
obedience of the multi-million people. Mao Tse-tung has appointed Lin Piao,
Minister for Defence, his official successor, as if Mao were a monarch.

Liu Shao-chi, who had been elected Chairman of the Chinese People’s Republic p
under the Constitution, was persecuted as the "black band leader,” "power-holder
who follows the capitalist path" and finally removed from all his jobs in the party 161
and government without the slightest regard for law. The All-China Assembly of
People’s Representatives and its Standing Committee are no longer convened and
have practically stopped functioning. As for the State Council of China, it is still
carrying on in certain respects but is kept under strict supervision by the Maoist
ruling clique.

In the provinces, autonomous areas, centrallygoverned cities and, more recently, also p
in the countries and communes, "revolutionary committees" have been set up. These
have replaced Party committees as well as local assemblies of people’s
representatives and their executive bodies, people’s committees. To all intents and
purposes, the Maoists hope that the "revolutionary committees,” described in the
Chinese press as an "outstanding victory of the cultural revolution,” will be their
ohief support and will provide the basis for the new political mechanism.
"Revolutionary committees" are formed of carefully picked “loyal” military men, the

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old cadres, and representatives of the "revolutionary masses.” The leading place in
these committees, with respect both to the number of seats and amount of influence,
is, in most instances, reserved for the army. The Maoists have been wary of
announcing an election to the "revolutionary committees,” although in 1966 they
made declarations to the effect that these new bodies of power would be elective.

The army holds a special place in the system of the military-bureaucratic p


dictatorship, and the Peking rulers pay careful attention to keeping it under control.
Today the Chinese armed forces are not so much concerned with national defence as 162
with the management of the state, the economy, and education. They have thus
become the chief instrument of Mao’s policies. The army, which was in the
background early in the " cultural revolution,” is now setting the pace of China’s
social development. With its assistance, Mao Tsetung crushes his opponents and also
deals with those who, like the hungweipings, used to loom large in the political
scene but then got out of hand and even became dangerous to the regime. The army
has become the chief means of maintaining public order and labour discipline, which,
in itself, is without precedent in the history of world socialism. Army units have
invaded the factories, where, under the guise of Maoist propaganda, have taken
charge of production, forcing the workers to work without any material incentive.

The Mao dictatorship relies on a system of brutal suppression and intimidation of p


the people. Apart from the army, punitive functions are exercised by a formidable
apparatus commanding numerous prison camps and prisons. The merger of public
security agencies, the courts and people’s procuracy into the "committees for
stamping out counter-revolution" or "departments of proletarian dictatorship" had
been a flagrant violation of the Constitution. These departments have, from time to
time, staged so-called trials which are held in absolute contempt of the defendants’
rights. These travesties of trials often terminate in public executions.

The military-bureaucratic dictatorship is propped up by numerous prison camps and p


prisons. Besides imprisonment, another current method of suppression practised on a 163
mass scale is the exiling of city dwellers to the country.

In the process of rebuilding the political system the Maoists have uprooted p
influential and strong organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions and the Young Communist League. These organisations, which had extensive
revolutionary experience and were devoted to Marxism-Leninism and friendship with
the Soviet Union, seemed dangerous to the Maoists. Yet, as they would like to pass
off the "cultural revolution" as a popular movement and draw the mass of the
working people into their gambles, the Peking leaders have lately started to organise
"work brigades for the propagation of Mao’s ideas.” These brigades are usually
mustered and directed by servicemen and fulfil auxiliary functions in restoring order
in the provinces. "Work brigades" are eagerly exploited by the Maoists who seek to
show in this way how loyal they are to the slogan of working-class leadership. They
also rely on these brigades to get rid of the hungweipings-so that no blame should
attach to the army-and achieve political stability.

Recently the Maoist ruling clique set some schemes on foot concerning the p
Communist Party of China. It is well known that during the " cultural revolution" the
CPC had to take many hard knocks. More than 130 of 174 members and candidate
members of the CPC Central Committee elected by the 8th Congress were subjected
to persecution. The Political Bureau and Secretariat are not functioning. Party
committees in the provinces, autonomous regions, towns and communes are
paralysed. The "cultural revolution group" while claiming to speak on behalf of the

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Party, actually set the hungweipings and tsaofans upon the Party and attacked and 164
took repressive action against Communist Party officials. However, in late 1968, the
Peking leaders started on another course, setting out to purge the Party, substitute
Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the Party by recruiting new members from
among the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and make further use of the army
style of work. They want to turn the Party into an obedient tool. They mean to turn
to account the Party’s revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war record, its
prestige among the working people, and its immense organisational and educational
potential. For all practical purposes, what they are setting up in China under the
name of the Communist Party of China is a new political organisation which is
intended to serve as a support for Maoist rule.

Soviet State and Law, No. 5, 1969

***
 
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CAUSES AND FORMS
 

<< Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • Maoism Preaches Poverty >>


CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST
INTERPRETATION AND
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<<< A DESTRUCTIVE POLICY   [ThE ChINESE lEadERShIp aNd ThE @AT LENINIST
cauSES OF SOcIalISm aNd ThE wORld REVOluTIONaRY aNd lIbERaTION (DOT) BIZ
>>>
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<< • >>
<•> Maoism Preaches Poverty 165
 

TOC A Arzamastseu p

Card
Poverty is not an inevitable accompaniment of mankind’s development. It is p
unavoidable only as long as the productive forces are not sufficiently developed and
Text the economy has not risen above a production level that meets only immediate
HTML needs. Exploitation in class society, new requirements and the accumulation of
PS wealth aggravate poverty and awaken in the people a desire to put an end to
PDF oppression and privation. However, insufficient economic development has for a long
time prevent the possibility of discovering the correct way for ending poverty. This
T*
became possible only when Marxism came into being in the middle of the 19th
19*
century. Till then numerous Utopias were evolved in a futile attempt to discover the
### laws of social development.

Solution of this problem is a complex and contradictory process. The developed p


production is certainly essential for the elimination of inequality and poverty.
Historical experience shows, however, that advanced production in itself cannot bring
about social harmony. It is necessary only to consider the example of the USA. The
social factor is no less important. On the other hand, the beneficial effect of the
social element may be negligible in the absence of sufficient material prerequisites.
The basic mistake of most Utopian projects was precisely this: overestimation of the
social factor and underestimation of the material one. Many Utopians saw the source
of social evils in the sphere of distribution of the good things of life. They asserted 166
that the wealth created by human labour should immediately be made the property of
all on an equal basis. This demand was best expressed by the sort of egalitarian
communism which praised, for the sake of primitive equality, the "noble simplicity"
of the poor who have no requirements, rejected culture, proclaimed the primacy of
village over town, and regimented everyday life. This doctrine was first advanced by
the preachers of early Christian communities. In the Middle Ages it was promoted by
Thomas Mvinzer, and in modern times by Tammaso Campanella, Gabriel Mably,
Domenico Morelli and other Utopian Communists. The bourgeois egalitarian
socialism of William Godwin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is in spirit close to this
doctrine. However, the experience of primitively-communist sects, fraternities, towns
and communities of various epochs proves that such equality is unattainable.
Economic and ideological alienation assumed unheard-of dimensions in these
communities. The worker had to be satisfied with the bare minimum, while his
whole life depended on the authorities.

The current revival of certain features of primitive communism in China, as p


reflected in the policy of the "people’s communes,” the "both worker and peasant"
course, the setting up of self-sufficient, autarkic economic cells and the "introduction
of rationally lower wages and salaries,” presents a vain attempt to solve the problem
of poverty and hunger with the help of the outdated and fallacious concept of
levelling.

Only socialism which unites the material and social factors is capable of resolving p

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this problem and ending poverty. Socialist revolution cuts the very roots of poverty 167
and ends the glaring inequality of people. The all-round development of production
and the attainment on this basis of complete social homogeneity are essential for the
elimination of poverty. To achieve this takes more than good intentions, since
production has its own laws of development. One must have certain capital, establish
a new labour discipline and a new organisation of labour, teach people new skills
and techniques and make the workers interested in the results of their efforts.

The only way to get rid of poverty is through creating a more advanced mode of p
production and through raising labour productivity.

Beginning the reorganisation of production presents great difficulties, especially in p


economically backward countries where a socialist revolution has occurred. The
discrepancy between the advanced socio-political system and the poor economic base
may result in grave complications, and even in the loss of the socialist gains. The
efforts of the working class in fighting the imminent dangers and endeavouring to
get production going are opposed by all the evils and difficulties inherited from the
past-an underdeveloped economy, famine, poverty and the resultant demoralisation of
certain sections of the people, and their loss of interest in work. This is what the
young Soviet Republic experienced just after the revolution. The imperialist war
followed by the civil war had completely disrupted the country’s feeble economy.
Famine and economic dislocation threatened to destroy the world’s first socialist
state. Higher labour productivity was the only way out, but labour productivity was
falling steadily, and factories and plants were closing down because of famine. Lenin 168
wrote: "We get a sort of vicious circle: in order to raise productivity of labour we
must save ourselves from starvation, and in order to save ourselves from starvation
we must raise productivity of labour.”   [168•1  

The republic could not count on external economic aid. It had to rely on its own p
strength to break the vicious circle. The strength came from the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the people who made sacrifices in the name of victory and a better
future. The accomplishment of tasks, which would be unthinkable at other times, is
made possible by revolutionary heroism each time a new social system is born. The
October Socialist Revolution evoked an unprecedented enthusiasm. For the first time
in history people were making a revolution for themselves, and for the first time in
history they had real opportunity to display their capabilities. The heroism at the
fronts of the civil war was rivalled by the heroism of the workers in the rear, of
which the communist subbotniks were only one example. Conscientious work had a
great effect on the economic life of the country. It raised labour productivity and
improved labour discipline.

An atmosphere of general inspiration and the readiness of the working people to p


sacrifice themselves at the initial stage creates the impression that revolutionary
enthusiasm is enough to put an end to all difficulties. "... We expected to accomplish
economic tasks just as great as the political and military tasks we had accomplished
by relying directly on this enthusiasm,” Lenin said.   [168•2   However, “pure” 169
heroism cannot last forever, and Lenin saw the danger in time. In his speech at the
combined meeting of the delegates of the 8th Congress of Soviets and members of
the AllRussia and Moscow Councils of Trade Unions who were also members of the
Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 30,1920, Lenin pointed to the
need and importance of material incentive for shock work: "The preference part of
priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe
dream, a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists. The workers are also
materialists; if you say shock work, they say, let’s have the bread, and the clothes,

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and the beef.”   [169•1  

It was enthusiasm, bolstered as far as possible by material incentive, that made it p


possible to break the vicious circle. This was an important discovery of Marxism.
The combination of moral and material stimuli will remain an effective lever of
economic development till the time when communism is built.

The problem of socialist changes also faced China after the 1949 socialist p
revolution. Its economy was then even more backward than that of Russia in 1917.
The pulse-beat of economic life could hardly be felt after the many years of
Japanese occupation and the civil war. The few undamaged industrial enterprises
were lost in the ocean of primitive farm production, and were unable to exert any
noticeable influence. The feeble links between various parts of the country were
breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist Party of China set about the task of
ending the famine, the poverty and the rural backwardness, and of attaining 170
abundance. The external conditions were favourable. The country received
comprehensive economic, cultural and military assistance from the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. Neither was popular enthusiasm lacking. The vast country
began socialist construction. Factories and plants were rehabilitated and reconstructed,
and new industries were built with the help of the Soviet Union. The moral uplift
and material incentive promoted labour productivity and a new labour discipline. By
following this road China could build an advanced socialist economy in a few
decades. There were no insurmountable obstacles in the way, since socialism met the
basic demands of both the working class and the peasantry. The danger lay
elsewhere.

Under certain conditions politics is known to conflict temporarily with its economic p
base and hinder its development. State leadership in China fell into the hands of
people whose petty– bourgeois views and sentiments kept them from becoming true
Marxists. The initial successes in China and the people’s willingness to work
selflessly for the common cause evoked adventurist leanings in the leadership who
sought to ignore the laws of social development, which is so characteristic of the
petty bourgeoisie. Primitive petty-bourgeois mentality raised to the level of ideology
culminated in voluntarism, the personality cult, nationalism and anti-Sovietism.

Lenin’s tested formula for successful socialist development-enthusiasm plus material p


incentivehas been altered by Mao Tse-tung to enthusiasm plus poverty. The new
formula flatly rejects all material incentive, making enthusiasm the one and only 171
motive force. Mao Tse-tung’s variety of enthusiasm is evidently devoid of the
element of awareness and reason and borders on fanaticism. Although exaltation
whipped up by extreme nationalism can take hold of a section of the population,
mostly the youth, it cannot be universal or lasting. Reality with its daily cares is a
sobering factor, and the intoxication cannot last.

The second half of the formula, poverty, is inseparable from the first. A person p
seized by “ super-revolutionary” enthusiasm, according to Mao, need not and should
not possess any material benefits beyond the bare minimum. Poverty should be part
of universal self-denial.

It is no accident that the Maoists have made use of this idea. Poverty and equality p
have been always regarded by the oppressed as being as closely related as their
opposites-wealth and inequality. All egalitarian Utopias emphasise and praise poverty
as the key requisite of universal equality. Poverty was lauded by Proudhon, one of
the founders of petty-bourgeois egalitarian socialism, who even developed an

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economic theory to justify the perpetuity of poverty. He held that nature had given
man two opposed qualities-a limitless capacity to consume and a limited capacity to
work. Poverty was therefore claimed to be man’s natural condition to which man
must reconcile himself. "It is clear that we cannot even think of escaping tihis
poverty-tHie law of our nature and our society,” wrote Proudhon. "Poverty is a
boon, and should be regarded as the basis of our joys.”   [171•1   This was said over
a hundred years ago, at the time of the first industrial revolution, and is being 172
repeated by Mao Tse-tung in the age of atomic energy and of turbulent scientific
and technological advancement.

In Maoism the Leninist principle of material incentive gives way to the idealisation p
of " poverty.” But can poverty as it exists in real life serve as a stimulus to work?
Poverty means hunger, cold, disease, stupefaction, humiliation, and a degree of
dehumanisation to which man could never be Teconciled. It invariably evokes
protest, bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless when it fails to provide a
tolerable living for the worker. Real poverty does not go together with construction,
least of all socialist construction. Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of
attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as a blessing. He stated: "In addition to its
other special features, the 600-million population of China is conspicuous for its
poverty. This may seem bad but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes, action,
revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of paper one can write the most beautiful
hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful pictures.”   [172•1  

So the way out of the difficulty was to accept poverty, to adorn it with a halo of p
sanctity and nobility, to turn it into something to be sought after and carried with
pride and delight by everyone. Only then would it become a source of joy, creative
quest, selfless labour and heroism.

Having received this instruction of Mao’s, the Chinese ideological machine swung p
into action. Its main job now was to create a new type of worker who would labour
for the good of society, demanding no material remuneration. All newspapers, 173
magazines and the radio joined in the drive to “emancipate” the individual. The
purpose was to instil in people an aversion to material well-being, comfort and
cultural advancement-to free their souls from the "chimeras of civilisation."’ The
ideal held up was for a man to reduce his requirements to the bare minimum, the
resulting vacuum to be filled with love for the leader and nationalistic ravings about
the hegemony of the "Greater China.” Such a person should derive consolation for
the loss of material and cultural benefits from the grandeur and might of his country.

It is obviously a case of wishful thinking when the Chinese press serves the reader p
with numerous instances of cures from egoism and greed. For example: "Formerly
one young communemember would not do hard work and was angry when he was
given very few work-units. Recently, when the commune-members had to bring
fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he brought more than 50 kilograms on a
yoke. He was asked: ’How many units do you want this time?’ He replied: ’I don’t
care for work-units any more, for I am tilling the land in the name of the
revolution.’  "   [ 173•1   The commune member completely suppressed his egoism
and got rid of the state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously call poverty !

Poverty is often unavoidable in the transitional stage between capitalism and p


socialism. But Mao presents poverty as being a desirable state in itself. Poverty is
claimed to be a force that will lead people to communism. To be sure, this is not 174
the communism o£ which millions dream and which the classics of Marxism
prophesied, but a "special Chinese communism.” The "great helmsman" visualises the

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road to it as a road of moral purification from the vice of material and cultural
requirements. The kingdom of “pure” communism will come when people do away
with all “revisionist” survivals, learn to make do with little, and get rid of their
personal interests; when class distinctions will be removed and social equality
achieved. "And the objective world which is to be remoulded,” Mao Tse-tung wrote
in his article On Practice, "includes the opponents of remoulding, who must undergo
a stage ot compulsory remoulding (i.e. the recalcitrants should go to concentration
camps or do field work in remote areas-A A.) before they can pass to a stage of
conscious remoulding. When the whole of mankind consciously remoulds itself and
changes the world, the era of world communism will dawn."   [174•1   (Emphasis
added-A. A.} When speaking of communism, Mao does not say a word about
economic development or the improvement of living standards. This is only to be
expected, since his kind of communism "is not far distant.” To achieve it the
working people only have to perform a revolution in their souls.

It is not our intention to belittle the importance of "consciously transforming p


oneself.” Communism is not all economy, well-being and cultural development. It is
also a highly organised society. But to reduce one’s "conscious transformation" to
ascetic self-sacrifice and mortification of the flesh and spirit means to violate the
human and social nature of man. Man’s awareness and discipline should manifest 175
themselves, not in suppressing the acquired cultural demands but in regarding himself
as a creator and master who is responsible for everything that takes place in society.

History of social thought knows numerous instances of the artificial transformation p


of real, objective hardship-the constant companion of the working man in the world
of private propertyinto exclusively subjective, idealised hardship existing only in the
human brain. To remove such hardship is not at all difficult-switch your thought to
something else and you will attain peace of mind and tranquillity. This is how the
German Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers, and their followers in their time
fought the Prussian feudal reality. They held that the evils plaguing the workers
existed only in the minds of the sufferers. Real life remains outside the field of
vision of philistine philosophers, its investigation being unworthy of a thinker. The
consciousness of select personalities is proclaimed the creative force of history. Its
beneficial influence on the uncritical consciousness of workers will, it is claimed,
finally free the working people from the slavery of their own ideas, and make them
change their opinion of themselves and the world around them. After this
metamorphosis society will arrive at socialism.

The methodological basis of such transformations is speculative dialectics. Real p


poverty as a phenomenon alienated from man is taken only in a speculative form
and is abstracted into "poverty in general.” This category is then considered as an
independent entity. After that, hunger, privation, and disease, as manifestations of
real poverty, are easily made into the products of our imagination. As a result we 176
have, on the one hand, the general concept of poverty existing as an independent
entity outside the human world, and, on the other, various kinds of poverty (hunger,
privation, etc.) born of "poverty in general.” Having performed this operation, the
critical philosopher finds himself in a purely theoretical medium, beyond the confines
of reality. It is not so hard for the speculative ideologist to attain any victory he
chooses, such as turning poverty into a blessing. All it takes is for a worker to put
out of his mind the thought that he is poor. Marx pointed out that this bravery of the
Young Hegelians stemmed from Hegelian idealism. "He (Hegel-A A.) stands the
world on its head and can therefore dissolve in the head all the limitations which
naturally remain in existence for evil sensuousness, for real man.”   [ 176•1   But
Hegel was a great thinker, and his speculative contradictions often contained

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"elements of the true characteristic of human relations;" the Young Hegelians were
pygmies. That is why the speculative method of Bruno Bauer and his circle was a
caricature of Hegel’s method, devoid of any understanding of the dialectics of social
life.

Let us turn to Mao Tse-tung. To give a semblance of scientific substantiation to the p


idea that poverty becomes a blessing, the "great helmsman" also uses or, rather,
abuses, dialectics. His sayings, couched in Marxist terms, sound very much like the
maxims of ancient Chinese philosophers. That is why a comparison of the Young
Hegelian and Maoist dialectics can only be made on the basis of Mao’s final 177
conclusions. In his speech at the llth enlarged sitting of the Supreme State
Conference on February 27, 1957, Mao said: "In certain conditions bad may lead to
good results and good, in its turn, may lead to bad results.” (Mao Tse-tung, On the
Question of the Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People, M., 1957, p.
43.) Mao illustrates this thesis by the following examples:

The counter-revolution in Hungary was bad, but it became good in the process of its p
suppression. Hungary got rid of its enemies and grew stronger,

Japan’s attack on China was bad. But China learned a great deal in the course of p
the war and was victorious. Thus a bad thing became good.

It will be bad if a third world war breaks out. But a nuclear war conflagration will p
finally do away with the capitalist world, and that is good. .. If one is to employ this
kind of logic, not only poverty, but also war, counter-revolution and disease can be
made out to be good things! In other words, everything that brings misfortune to
people, particularly to working people, and which they vigorously resist, is, according
to Mao, a source of future happiness. Now we can understand these words of
Mao’s: "It is terrible to think of the time when all people will become rich.” To him
this would mean the end of development, for "only poverty calls for change, action,
revolution.” According to Mao, it follows that not the striving to end poverty, but
poverty itself, is an inexhaustible source of creative energy and progress. There is
nothing scientific about this reasoning, not even a thought to exclude or prevent what 178
is bad. The arch-dialectical verbiage camouflages a plain statement of facts and the
unwillingness to analyse them in all their complexity.

The ideal of a poor worker, "as undemanding as a pumpkin,” capable of limiting p


his requirements and making do with very little, meets with little sympathy among
workers and intellectuals. Since not everybody was as quick of comprehension as
Chairman Mao would like, and the souls of many had been thoroughly permeated
with “capitalist” and “revisionist” delusions, the Mao clique had to class them as
enemies of “ communism” and subject them to the severe repression prescribed by
the demands of the "stage of transformation based on coercion.” Concentration camps
were set up all over the country. Millions of people familiar with any cultural and
technological achievements, with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy,
are being banished from towns for "re-education by labour" in the village. Barracks
discipline is introduced at factories and in rural communes, and civil administration
is replaced by military rule. In keeping with the so-called principle of unity of
industry, agriculture and military service, everyone is obliged, besides his main
occupation, to work in agriculture (if he is an industrial worker) or in industry (if he
is a peasant), and also to undergo military training. Conscious discipline is out of the
question and order at production enterprises is maintained exclusively through non–
economic coercion. The military uniform is an indispensable part of every working
collective. The private life of every Chinese is strictly regimented. He must devote

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all his free time to studying the leader’s maxims. Everything that might remind 179
people of material or cultural values is to be destroyed. Monuments are being pulled
down, books are being destroyed, and musical works are prohibited. Universal
levelling is also reflected in clothing-blue trousers and a buttoned-up cloth or quilted
jacket have become a compulsory uniform for everybody. This is how the ideals of
egalitarian communism are put into practice and a regimented society is created.

The attempt to establish barrack-room communism in a country which had social p


ownership of the means of production naturally invited several questions  . Why did
Mao Tse-tung select poverty as a means of implementing his adventurist plans? Is
egalitarian communism possible in practice?

The preaching of asceticism, and of universal poverty as the most effective means p
of ending social inequality, accompanied many actions of peasants and artisans in the
Middle Ages (T. Miinzer, the Taborite movement in Bohemia, etc.). It was also
present in the first actions of the proletariat (the Babouvists). So strong were these
sentiments that Marx paid considerable attention to this trend in communist thinking
at the beginning of his socio-political activity when his materialist and communist
outlook was taking shape. He devoted one chapter of his Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts ot 1844 to the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx’s basic idea
was that this primitive communism, with its praiseworthy intention of doing away
with private property and creating a just society, had not gone beyond, had in fact
not even attained to, private property. It strove not to master all the wealth created 180
in conditions of predominant private property, not to transform and greatly expand
the economic, political and cultural base of man’s liberation from exploitation, of
satisfying the requirements of people, and of the fuller manifestation of their
abilities, but, on the contrary, to discard everything that had been achieved. The
reason given for this attitude is that the available material and cultural benefits
cannot be shared by all because of the limited means required for their production.
Hence the rejection of culture and talent for the sake of primitive, arithmetical
equality. The negative attitude of egalitarian communism to private property is
nothing but envy by poor private property of the richer private property. "How little
this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the
abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the
unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to
go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it,” wrote Marx, adding
that crude egalitarian communism is "in its first form only a generalisation and
consummation of this relationship.”   [ 180•1   That is why it reflects all the iniquity
of the old world. Work is not an end in itself in this society but a means of
obtaining a certain amount of food. A guaranteed food minimum becomes the only
aim in life, the summit of happiness. The production of life’s necessities (bread,
vegetables, etc.) is accordingly declared the most important activity. Physical labour 181
is opposed to mental work as the only worthy occupation. The individual is reduced
to the state of a dumb animal blindly following the orders of the leader of its herd.
Under such a “communism” equality in work and income does not compensate for a
man’s loss of individuality and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed at
transforming the world.

Marx said that the transfer of private property to common ownership would be p
accomplished by a communism which would keep intact all the wealth of previous
development and would return "man to himself as a social (i.e. human)
man.”   [ 181•1   The necessity of its establishment is conditioned by the entire
history of industrial development. Incomplete communism of the egalitarian kind
looks backwards, not forwards, in proving its right to existence, and seeks

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justification in the existing state of affairs. It cannot count on the future and is
destined to share the fate of private property whose prisoner it is. The universal
spread of poverty does not save mankind from social upheavals. ".. .and. with
destitution,” wrote Marx and Engels, "the struggle for necessities and all the old
filthy business would necessarily be reproduced.”   [181•2  

Ideas of equal distribution have been appearing in countries with mainly small-scale p
production both in agriculture and industry, where abundance of products is only a
dream. They have always held a place of prominence in Chinese social Utopia. To 182
many progressive thinkers egalitarianism and poverty seemed the only way of ending
hunger and oppression. These ideas are to be found in the works of the ancient
Chinese philosophers, Lao-tse and Mo-tse, and of the thinkers of modern times, such
as Kung Tse-chen, Hung Hsiu-chuan and others. Still fresh in the people’s memory
is the first peasant state, Tai Ping Tien kuo-the Heavenly State of Great Welfare
(1851–64)-where the first attempt was made to introduce equality in land tenure.
Hung Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping uprising, wrote: "It is
necessary that all inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and jointly the
great happiness granted by our true master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that
land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together, that clothing be used and money
expended jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all should be properly fed
and clothed.”   [ 182•1   Taiping laws obliged every peasant family to give the entire
harvest to the state without compensation, saving only what was absolutely necessary.
The surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans in towns and used for the
upkeep of the army and administration. This organisation of life evoked no protest
among the masses in view of the everpresent danger of returning to bondage under
landlords.

The ideals of egalitarian communism played a progressive role in feudal times. The p
idea of universal equality was an immense mobilising force among the poorest
peasants, based as it was on the demand to confiscate the landlords’ land. The
peasant uprisings undermined the foundations of feudalism and prepared conditions 183
for the emergence of new social relations.

The Maoists’ dependence on poverty as an accelerator of economic development, p


and their narrow petty-bourgeois interpretation of communism as egalitarian, barrack-
room communism, doom the people as a whole to privation and misery. "Regression
to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man" is contrary to the
human and social nature of modern man, and it shackles his freedom and conscious
activity by restricting it exclusively to the satisfaction of primitive needs. This
activity cannot be a life necessity for the individual. It becomes instead a coercive
force, a heavy burden, something that is devoid of any creative element. In this case
the development of production cannot be promoted either by poverty, or by "big
leaps,” or by " cultural revolution.”

This "vicious circle" can be broken only by recognising human dignity. Full p
development of all aspects of human life can be ensured only by socialism whose
productive efforts will be used, in Lenin’s words, not only to meet the daily needs
"but with the object of ensuring full wellbeing and free, all-round development for
all the members of society.”   [183•1   The half-century history of socialism has
borne out this thesis of Lenin’s. The great accomplishments in science, technology
and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new man whose interests coincide with
the final goal of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific conception of
communism has nothing in common either with the pharisical “philosophy” of 184
poverty as a “blessing” or with the bourgeois-philistine cult of things. Material

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wealth in the Marxist– Leninist understanding is created to satisfy the reasonable


requirements of people and is a necessary prerequisite for the development of human
abilities, for the individual to find fulfilment.”   [184•1   The attempt to revive
egalitarian communism in the epoch of the triumphant ideas of scientific communism
and of the scientific and technological revolution, can only be viewed as a
reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia.

Philosophical Sciences, No. 3, 1971

***
 
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes

 [ 168•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 426.

 [ 168•2]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. S3, p. 58.

[ 169•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 28.

[ 171•1]   P. J. Proudhon, Poverty as an Economic Principle, Moscow, 1908, p. 16.

 [ 172•1]   Hungchi, "About One Cooperative,” 1958, No. 1.

 [ 173•1]   China Reconstructs, 1968, No. 9, p. 40.

 [ 174•1]   Mao Tse-tung, Sel. Works, L., 1954, Vol. 1, p. 297.

 [ 176•1]   K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, M. 1956, p. 254.

 [ 180•1]   K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, pp. 93,
94.

 [ 181•1]   K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, p. 95.

 [ 181•2]   K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, M., 1964, p. 46.

 [ 182•1]   Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the Modern Times, M.,
1961, p. 69.

[ 183•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 6, p. 54.

 [ 184•1]   On the Centenary of the Birth of V. 1, Lenin. Theses of the Central


Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M., p. 54.

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<•> Great-Power Chauvinism 185

of Mao Tse-tung
 

TOC
Card T. Rakhimou, V. Bogoslovsky p

The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People’s Republic demonstrated that the p
Text
country’s outlying areas were the most troublesome for its organisers. For instance,
HTML
Tibet and Sinkiang were th^e last provinces in the country to set up the so-called
PS
PDF
revolutionary committees. This happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports
still carry warnings to the effect that "class enemies there have refused to accept
T* their defeat and continue to hinder the country’s progress to socialism.”
19*
The Maoists find it difficult to effectively administer the outlying areas inhabited by p
### nonChinese nationalities, not just because they lie far from Peking, but mainly
because the local people know from long and bitter experience the meaning of the
"nationalities policy" pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group.

Relations between nationalities in a multi– national state are always complicated. p


And China, with her more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups numbering a total
of nearly 45 million people, has a formidable problem. All these peoples are
officially referred to as "national minorities.” But many of them, such, for instance,
as the Uigurs (4 million people), Mongolians (1.5 mln), Tibetans (3 mln), Chuangs
(nearly 8 mln) live in compact groups and outnumber other nationalities over large
areas. Their histories span centuries, and they have had long periods of independent 186
development. Most of the non-Chinese peoples differ greatly from the Hans (the
Chinese) both ethnically and culturally. They also profess different faiths.

The Chinese state became multi-national in the course of centuries of conquest. The p
annexed lands were intensively colonised. Meanwhile the conquered nations were
partly exterminated and partly assimilated by the Chinese. This naturally caused the
non-Chinese peoples to distrust the Chinese.

All this made it necessary for the Communist Party of China and the state to p
proceed with caution in dealing with the nationalities question, to take the interests
of all peoples inhabiting Chinese territory into account, and to strictly observe
Marxist-Leninist theses on the nationalities question.

In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, when Communist- p


internationalists still predominated in the CPC and the Mao group had not yet thrust
its openly chauvinistic course on the Party leadership, a great deal was done to raise
the living standards and the cultural level of the non-Chinese peoples. A number of
industrial enterprises were built in the areas populated by the minorities, an agrarian
reform was carried out and schools and health facilities were opened. State and Party
authorities of the PRC worked out a positive programme for solving the nationalities
question. "All nationalities are equal,” said Article 3 of the Constitution of the PRC
(1954). "Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which
undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited.” The Party Rules adopted by 187

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the 8th Congress in 1956 demanded: "The Communist Party of China must make
special efforts to raise the status of the national minorities, help them to attain self–
government, endeavour to train cadres from among the national minorities, accelerate
their economic and cultural advance, bring about complete equality between all the
nationalities and strengthen the unity and fraternal relations among them. . . Special
attention must be paid to the prevention and correction of tendencies of great-Hanism
on the part of Party members and government workers of Han nationality.”

All this seemed to tend towards solving the nationalities question in the PRC. But p
great-power chauvinistic tendencies, affecting the legal status of the non-Chinese
nationalities in particular, made themselves increasingly felt in the policy of the
Chinese leadership.

From the very first these peoples, numbering 45 million, were denied the right to p
self– determination, to statehood. They were granted so-called regional autonomy.
"The People’s Republic of China,” says Article 3 of the Constitution, "is a unified
multi-national state. . . Regional autonomy applies in areas entirely or largely
inhabited by national minorities. The national autonomous areas are an inalienable
part of the People’s Republic of China.”

But the status of "regional autonomy" (an empty word since autonomous regions are p
as “ independent” as provinces) was granted only to five (out of the one hundred)
national minorities. Among the nationalities denied this right are the Yitsu (3.3 mln),
Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians (2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln). But even the peoples 188
(the Tibetans, Uigurs, Tungans, Mongolians, Chuangs) that were nominally granted
the right to "regional autonomy" were allocated territories demarcated in a rather
peculiar way. The Tibetan people were actually torn apart, and less than half of them
now live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region while the rest reside in the provinces of
Chinghai, Szechwan and Yunnan. The Mongolians in “autonomous” Inner Mongolia
constitute a mere 10 per cent of the local population and may be rightly called a
national minority.

These great-power tendencies in treating the nationalities question have become p


predominant since the about-turn in domestic and foreign policies of the Mao group
in the late 1950’s. The "cultural revolution" made it clear that the CPC policy vis-a-
vis the nationalities inhabiting China is to “sinoise” them against their will.

The non-Chinese peoples are all but divested of political rights. All the people’s p
committees called upon to represent the interests of the national minorities, have
been dissolved. Power has been transferred to the so-called revolutionary committees
set up by the army command on Peking’s orders and under complete army control.
The "revolutionary committees" are headed by Chinese. Thus the "revolutionary
committee" of Inner Mongolia is under Teng Haiching, one-time Deputy Commander
of the Peking Military Area, that of the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Regionunder
Lun Shu-chin, former commander of the Hunan Military Area.

Acts of repression on a mass scale and persecution of the local cadres, party p
functionaries, statesmen, intellectuals have become commonplace. The mass drive to 189
eliminate the so-called Rightist deviation and Pan-Turkism was let loose in 1958 in
the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. Many people were slandered and victimised,
among them Liya Samedi, a prominent Uigur writer. Chairman of the local Writers’
Union, Ibrahim Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a
revolutionary and a staunch fighter for the people’s cause during the time of the
Kuomintang.

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There was wide-spread persecution of the national minorities during the "cultural p
revolution.” Practically all the intelligentsia and Party and state cadres of the
minorities were accused of counter-revolutionary activities and complicity with
imperialism and "Soviet revisionism.” Among those victimised are Ulanfu, Chairman
of the People’s Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Alternate
Politbureau Member of the CC CPC, and Iminov, Vice– Chairman of the People’s
Committee of the SinkiangUigur Autonomous Region.

The notorious "big leap" and the "people’s communes" had an even more harmful p
effect on the minorities than on China at large. Production slumped at the few
factories that were in existence. Farm production declined and famine struck whole
regions.

The economy of China’s outlying areas is largely colonial in character. The few p
industrial enterprises are either put to military use, or the products they manufacture
are shipped to the country’s central areas. The engineers and skilled workers they
employ are the Chinese settlers from central areas. The local nationalities do
unskilled arduous jobs only. In this way the advancement of the working class in the 190
country’s outlying areas is intentionally retarded.

The only type of construction still undertaken there is the building of strategic p
roads, air fields, and atomic-weapon testing grounds. Non-Chinese peoples are forced
to work on these projects en masse.

Communes were set up in the areas populated by the minorities in order to seize as p
much as possible of their produce so as to feed and clothe the countless thousands
of Chinese soldiers stationed in the national areas, and to supply the big cities.

The migration of the Chinese to the national areas undermines the economy of those p
areas and lowers the status of the local population. The Chinese in the Sinkiang-
Uigur and Tibet areas now constitute approximately half the local population. The
proportion of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given
the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always been a shortage of arable land. In
Inner Mongolia pastures are being put to the plough to provide new settlers with
land.

According to official propaganda the Chinese are being resettled en masse, and p
most of the 25 million citizens being sent to the countryside will go to the national
areas. Calls to revert to the communes of the "big leap" period are becoming more
frequent.

By colonising the outlying areas, the Maoist group does not merely seek to p
“relieve” the country’s central areas of “redundant” people, or get rid of trouble-
makers. The mass migrations of the Chinese have the objective of turning the local
populations into national minorities by saturating the resettlement areas with the 191
Hans, thereby preparing the ground for an eventual assimilation of the non-Chinese
peoples. Nor do the Maoists intend to postpone the assimilation, and measures are
being undertaken to that end. On numerous occasions girls of Uigur, Kazakh, Tibetan
and other nationalities have been compelled to marry Chinese on pain of severe
punishment.

But measures towards “cultural” assimilation are even more serious. p

For years now the languages other than Chinese have been "sinoised.” The p

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minorities are forced to adopt the Chinese script, and not only internationally
accepted words, but also the basic vocabularies are being superceded by the Chinese
vocabulary. The minorities are no more taught their native languages at school. One
of the charges levelled against Ulanfu was that he demanded that the Mongolian
language be taught at national schools at least on a par with Chinese.

The Maoists have even worked out "theoretical premises" towards assimilating the p
non-Chinese peoples. In 1960 Sinkiang Hungchi wrote that the nationalities of the
PRC were merging into a single entity on the basis of the Chinese nationality. It was
echoed by Sinkiang jihpao which went so far as to claim that the assimilation was
"Marxist and communist.” "Those who oppose such assimilation oppose socialism,
communism and historical materialism.” These are not empty words. Those who
demand that modern industry be built in the outlying areas, that a working class be
formed there, that local engineering and managerial personnel be trained and national
cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of “black” views and supporters for "an
open revision of the fundamental principles of MarxismLeninism.” The implications 192
of such charges are clear enough.

It is very easy to see the essential difference between Marxist-Leninist theses on p


mutual rapprochement and the ultimate merging of nations and these distorted
"theories.” The Maoists deliberately confuse the rapprochement of nations (which
occurs in the period of socialist and communist construction during the full-scale
economic and cultural advancement of socialist nations) with the merging of nations,
which will lead to the creation of a single world language and culture on the basis
of many languages and cultures. This can only happen after communism triumphs
throughout the world.

In this connection it is significant that the new Party Rules adopted at the so-called p
9th Party Congress make no mention of the nationalities policy or the non-Chinese
peoples. The Maoists make believe that non-Chinese peoples no longer exist in the
PRC, that they have already been assimilated.

It is only natural that the great-power, chauvinistic policy pursued by Mao and his p
group is encountering the growing resistance of the nonChinese peoples, which often
takes the form of armed action such as the continuing guerrilla struggle being waged
by thousands of Tibetans, and the numerous instances of armed action by
Mongolians, Chuangs, Uigurs. In January, 1969, over 4,000 people were killed in an
armed clash in Sinkiang.

There is every reason to believe that the “ troublesome” regions will cause Mao p
Tse-tung and his group even more trouble in the years ahead.

The nationalities question in the PRC can be solved only on a genuine Marxist- p 193
Leninist basis The rich experience accumulated in the course ot the economic and
cultural development of the national minorities in other socialist countries could serve
as a useful guide.

Asia and Africa Today, No. 7, 1969

  194
***
 
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<•> III 195
 

The International Communist


TOC
Movement and the Communist
Card
Party of China
IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th ANNIVERSARY
Text
HTML OF THE CPC
 

PS 196
PDF V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, K. Kukushkin, M. Yuryev p

T* Founded fifty years ago, in July 1921, the Communist Party of China radically p
19* transformed the development of the Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle for
national and social emancipation. It led the popular revolution, whose triumph in
### 1949 gave birth to the Chinese People’s Republic. The development of the new
China began with the abolition of feudalism and of the domination of China by the
imperialist powers, with revolutionary changes in town and country, initiated by the
Communist Party of China with the building in the 1950’s of the foundations for
socialist industrial and cultural development, and with collectivisation in the
countryside. The membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60 in 1921 to
nearly 20 million in the mid-1960’s.   [196•1  

The Communist Party of China has traversed a complex and difficult path during p 197
the last half-century. It has known ups and downs at the various stages of its
development, both before the victory of the people’s revolution and also during the
existence of People’s Republic of China. On the way to victory, the CPC had twice-
in 1927 and 1934-experienced the bitterness of defeat. But that did not break the
will of the Chinese Communists to fight. Thousands and millions of new fighters
took the place of the fallen. The Party was outstandingly successful as leader and
organiser of the working people in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949–52)
and of the first five-year plan (1953–57), and enjoyed increasing prestige at home
and in the international arena. In the first half of the 1960’s, the Party shouldered all
the difficulties caused by the adventuristic "big leap" policy that the Mao Tse-tung
group had imposed on the Party and country.

In the course of its history, the CPC has experienced sharp clashes and long periods p
of intraParty struggle, sometimes open and sometimes hidden, which reflected the
confrontation of the two opposing tendencies in the Party development-the Marxist-
Leninist, internationalist line and the nationalistic line.

The Party gained extensive experience of fighting and mass organising during the p
course of the national revolution (1925–27), during the revolutionary struggle under
the slogan of Soviets (1927–36), during the liberation war against the Japanese
invaders (1937–45) and the civil war against the Kuomintang reactionary forces
(1946– 49) and during the construction of the People’s Republic of China. Within
the Party there were experienced organisers and military leaders who were looked on 198
as the backbone of the Party because of their revolutionary staunchness and devotion

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to the people’s cause.

The rich experience of the Communist Party of China forms part of the treasure- p
house of the world revolutionary movement. The names of Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po,
Chang Tai-lei, Teng Chung-hsia, Pen Pai and other prominent leaders of the Party,
its founders, organisers and theorists, are revered by Communists and revolutionaries
all over the world. Their great work cannot be depreciated by the deviations that
have taken place in the development of the PRC and the CPC, by imperialism’s
slander regarding the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communists, or by the
unbridled campaign launched by the Maoists in recent years to defame the Party, its
noble traditions and tested cadres, and veterans of the revolution.

The fifty-year history of the Communist Party of China provides ample food for p
thought in connection with the fate of the revolutionary and communist movement in
China and other countries with a similar socio-economic structure. There is no need
to prove the vast scientific and political significance of analysing the major processes
that determined the essence and paths of development of the CPC. Even our
ideological and political opponents are well aware of this fact. The history of the
CPC and the elucidation cf the key facts and stages in its development have long
been the subject of acute ideological controversy. Since the early 1960’s, when the
divergence of the Mao Tse-tung group from the concerted line of the international
communist movement became conspicuous, the interpretation of Maoism and its 199
course have come to the fore as one of the central problems of the ideological
struggle, in which the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the history of the Chinese
revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is opposed by bourgeois historians of
various persuasions, by Maoists, revisionists and “Left” radicals.

An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist p
Party brings out a common feature: nearly all the works devoted to the general
problems, to separate periods or even to separate events in the history of the CPC
somehow concentrate on the question of its relationships (political, ideological, etc.)
with the international communist and revolutionary movement-with the Comintern
and its largest section, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the
countries and communist parties of the world socialist system.

Since the time when the first anti-Marxist versions of the history of the Chinese p
Communist Party appeared, a certain change has taken place in the bourgeois
treatment of the Chinese Party’s relationships with the international communist
movement. In the 1920’s-40’s, bourgeois authors tended to present the CPC as a
“hand” and “weapon” of the Comintern. After the victory of the Chinese revolution,
the American Sinologists (J. Fairbank, B. Schwartz, R. North, and C.
Brandt   [ 199•1  ) put forward the idea that the Chinese Emacs-File-stamp: 200
"/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/299.tx" people had triumphed
in 1949 because the Party leadership had acted counter to the theory, practice and
recommendations of the international communist movement. Attempts were also made
to reduce the CPC’s political course in the 1940’s to the ideas and principles of Mao
Tse-tung. As the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its
outright attack on the concerted line of the international communist movement, this
view began to predominate in bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and “
deepened” in the works of American and West European Sinologists dealing with the
Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in biographies of Mao Tse-
tung, and in books and articles on Maoism. The “deepened” view consisted in the
tracing, by many American and West European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung’s “
special” course, which had allegedly determined the ultimate victory of the Chinese

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revolution and the opposition of his line to that of the Comintern, back to the 1930’s
and even the 1920’s. The works, published in the 1960’s, of S. Schram, Y.
Chen   [ 200•1   and especially of J. E. Rue   [ 200•2  , all develop this theme.

Setting up the Communist Party of China in opposition to the international p


communist movement shows the attempt to play upon the nationalistic ambitions of
some of the Chinese leaders. In other words, the ideas advanced by bourgeois
Sinologists paved the way for those circles in capitalist countries which counted on 201
the "erosion of world communism" and on the nationalistic degeneration of certain
groups in the leadership of the socialist countries and the communist and workers’
parties. The attacks of our ideological opponents are therefore directed against one of
the major sources of strength of the international revolutionary movement, namely,
the unity of its various contingents of its main streams-the socialist countries, the
working-class and the national-liberation movements. The theories of bourgeois
Sinologists coincide with, and in some cases draw on, the distorted ideas of Maoist
historiography, one of the central themes of which is also the opposition of Mao’s
“special” course (presented as that of the whole Party) to the concerted policy of the
international communist movement.

The essence of the Maoist version of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, p
spelled out in a number of official documents issued by the Maoist leadership and in
books on the Party history circulated in the 1950’s in the PRC and elsewhere, is
this: already in the 1920’s, Mao Tsetung had drawn up his own–"the only correct"–
line for the development of the Chinese revolution; but it did not become the Party’s
policy until the mid-1930’s, until he and his followers came to the leadership of the
Communist Party of China. The entire history of the Party is accordingly divided into
two major stages-the "stage of defeats" (before Mao’s advent to power) and the stage
in which the Party and the revolution in China achieved victory, allegedly by
translating Mao Tse-tung’s “ideas” and "principles" into reality.   [ 202•1   In the 202
1940’s-50’s, the Maoist versions and assessments of the history of the Chinese
Communist Party insisted on the thesis that the Party’s policy, its ideological and
political platform and its best cadres were shaped without any help from the
international communist movement. We quote literally from the resolution of the
Central Committee of the CPC concerning the decision of the Presidium of the
Comintern Executive Committee to disband the Comintern: "The best cadres of the
Chinese Communist Party were moulded without the slightest outside
help.”   [ 202•2   In his report, "On the Party" to the CPC’s Seventh Congress (1945),
which whipped up the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and endorsed his “ideas”
Liu Shao-chi said that the CPC’s platform consists of ”. . . great theories ot their
own. . ." ( ItalicsAuthors). ”. . .Since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party
there has been created and developed unique, integrated, and correct theory
concerning the people’s revolution and national reconstruction in China,” the report
added. "This theory is none other than Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese
revolution-Comrade Mao Tsetung’s theory and policy in regard to Chinese history,
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution.”   [202•3  

Ever since the late 1950’s, when the Maoists began to follow and propagate their p
"special course,” their opposition to the policy of the international communist 203
movement became increasingly evident. Chinese textbooks and other publications no
longer contain even the well-known facts about the interaction of the CPC and the
Chinese revolution with the forces and contingents of the world revolutionary
process; nor do they mention the assistance given to the CPC by the Comintern, the
world revolutionary movement, the CPSU and the Soviet state.   [203•1  

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In the course of the "cultural revolution,” the falsification of the history of the p
Chinese Communist Party, its relationships with the international communist
movement became still more blatant. Earlier Mao Tse-tung was depicted as the
Party’s sole “infallible” leader, whereas now he is also represented as its one and
only founder. "The CPC was founded and fostered by Mao Tse-tung,"  [ 203•2   Lin
Piao said in his report to the Ninth Congress of the CPC. We are presented with a
frankly idealistic outline of the history of the Chinese Communist Party-its successes
are attributed to Mao Tse-tung alone. All the former outlines and works which gave 204
an already falsified version of the history of the CPC and the PRC are now
considered to be “inadequate” and said to "belittle the role of Mao Tse-tung and his
ideas in the history of the CPC and the international communist movement.” Because
they mentioned just a few facts about the assistance of the Comintern and the CPSU
to the CPC, the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese revolution, their authors
are accused in official publications of showing sympathy with "contemporary
revisionism.” The Maoist leadership’s latest directive article, published on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, likewise outlined
the Party’s history without making any mention whatsoever of the international
communist movement.   [ 204•1  

Although Maoist and bourgeois historiographers may have different motives, they all p
exploit the fact that the events connected with the history of the Chinese Communist
Party have been inadequately studied until recently in order to distort the real nature
of the relations between the CPC and the international communist movement.

While examining in the present article the problems of the relationships of the CPC p
with the international communist movement, the authors have based themselves on
recently published Soviet historical works which are the outcome of research into
new factual material concerning the history of the Chinese revolution and the
Chinese Communist Party.  [ 204•2  

In the period of the Comintern’s foundation and formation, V. Lenin worked on the p 205
fundamentals of the relationships of the international communist movement with the
communist and other revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent countries in
the new historical era ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

We shall recall the chief points of Lenin’s approach to the problems of the p
interaction between the international communist movement and its contingents and
other revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries.

When he advanced the policy of establishing the closest international ties between p
the communist and working-class movement in the developed countries and the
communist and nationalliberation movement in the East, Lenin was proceeding from
the fact that the efforts of the Communists of various countries, and their policy of
international cohesion and mutual assistance provided a means for realising the
potentialities stemming from the objective concurrence of the basic interests of the 206
world’s revolutionary forces in their fight against imperialism and all forms of
exploitation.   [ 206•1  

At the same time, Lenin stressed that regulating that interaction and establishing p
stable international ties were by no means an easy process that would take place
automatically. He maintained that in the colonial and dependent countries of the East,
this process, together with the tremendous political development of their
revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, “ secondary” difficulties owing to
the preponderance there of non-proletarian strata and to the various nationalistic

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prejudices of the masses. The experience of the first contacts with the representatives
of various trends of national revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries brought
Lenin to the conclusion that the involvement of the non– proletarian masses there in
revolutionary activity might, besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt the
representatives of these forces to “repaint” the non-proletarian liberation trends and
platforms in the "colour of communism.”  [ 206•2   Lenin pointed to the possibility,
under these circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the principles of the
international communist movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain tactical
slogans without understanding their essence and the reason why they had been
advanced in the first place.

The development of the revolutionary forces in China at all its stages and the p
history of the Chinese Communist Party have borne out Lenin’s prediction about the 207
importance and character of the interaction of the international communist movement
with its separate national contingents. The interaction and close ties of the CPC with
the international communist movement, and the allround assistance it received from
the Comintern and communist parties were a powerful impetus and one of the
decisive prerequisites for the victory of the revolution in China. At the same time,
Lenin’s warning against the possibility of the Marxist doctrine being distorted by
representatives of the nationalistic, non-proletarian forces provides a key to
understanding the social and gnoseological roots of the theory and practice of
Maoism.

China’s revolutionary movement of the 1920” s40’s bore the imprint of the directing p
theoretical, political and organisational activity of the Comintern. At the most
important stages of the development of the Chinese revolution, the Comintern’s
assistance to the Chinese Communist Party and close connection with it, armed the
Party with decisions and conclusions based on the achievements of the theoretical
and political thought of the world communist and liberation movement. The young
Communist Party of China was able to utilise in its struggle the experience of the
Marxist-Leninist parties with the Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on
their support. That is an example of the big part played by the international factor in
the formation and development of the communist parties and the communist
movement in colonial and dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of the
Chinese Communist Party at its First Congress was the first major landmark of this 208
interaction and represented the result of the tremendous work done by the first
Chinese Marxists and the Comintern’s envoys in order to disseminate the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution, and to organise China’s
revolutionary forces that were attracted to Marxism. The first communist groups in
China were founded with the direct organisational and other help of the Comintern.
There can be no doubt that had the Comintern not provided assistance in the form of
instructions, advice, funds, training of leaders, laborious political and organisational
work in which its representatives engaged daily in China, the pre-foundation period
in the history of the Chinese Communist Party would have dragged on for many
years.   [ 208•1  

Without underestimating the role of the objective internal factors favouring the p
dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China, or the importance of the work and
creative search of Chinese Communists, full credit must be given to the immense
help of the Comintern and the CPSU in elaborating the theoretical and political
foundations of the Marxist conception of the 1925–27 revolution in China, and in
building up the Party during the period of the preparation and accomplishment of the
revolution.

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For the Chinese Communist Party, one of the most difficult aspects of the Chinese p
revolution was the theoretical and practical problem of combining and interrelating
the national and class features of the revolutionary movement. To supplement the
theses of the Comintern’s Fourth Congress on the Eastern question with reference to 209
the conditions of China, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted, on January 12,
1923, a special resolution "On the Chinese Communist Party’s Attitude Towards the
Kuomintang,” which proved the necessity for setting up a unified front in China and
elaborated a concrete means by which this might be achieved-by the Communists’
joining the Kuomintang while retaining the independence of the Chinese Communist
Party.   [ 209•1   For the first time the Comintern squarely faced the CPC with the
peasant question. The Directive of the Comintern Executive Committee to the Third
CPC Congress on January 12, 1923, stated: "The peasant question is the central issue
of the entire policy. . . Only by placing the slogans of the antiimperialist front on an
agrarian basis can we hope for real success.” That is why the CPC, being the
political leader of the masses in the unified front, "is obliged constantly to propel the
Kuomintang towards an agrarian revolution."   [209•2   In the same Directive, the
Comintern raised the question of a people’s liberation war in China against the
militarists, feudal lords and foreign imperialists as a means of developing the Chinese
democratic revolution. Proceeding from this general principle and replying to the
request of Sun Yat-sen, the CPSU and the Soviet state actively helped the
Kuomintang to build up the National Revolutionary Army of China, and to plan and
carry out its operations.

On the basis of Lenin’s ideas contained in the resolutions that the Second and p 210
Fourth Congresses of the Comintern passed on the colonial question, the Comintern
Executive Committee, in a number of directives to the CPC and in special
resolutions on the Chinese question-particularly Resolutions VI (March 1926) and
VII ( NovemberDecember 1926) of extended plenary meetingsgave profound
theoretical backing and practical recommendations on such fundamental problems of
the Chinese revolution as the character of a revolution and the place of the various
classes in it, the hegemony of the proletariat and its allies, the agrarian question, the
tactics of the united national front, the role and applicability of armed struggle,
relationship of the national and class features of the revolution, and so on. A
selfstyled theorist, Mao Tse-tung later arrogated some of these instructions to
himself, distorting them in the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic manner.

The Comintern’s help facilitated the spread and consolidation of internationalist ideas p
among the Chinese Communists and the shaping in its leadership of a communist
internationalist group that resolutely combated any manifestations of nationalism and
other anti-proletarian views in the Party. As a result of the interaction of the
Communist Party of China and the international communist movement during the
years of the formation of the CPC, and of the Comintern’s consistent line towards a
united front against both “Left” and Right vacillations in the ranks of the CPC, the
Party had already become an important factor in the country’s political life by the
mid1920’s, i.e., in the period of the 1925–27 revolution.

The elaboration of the revolutionary strategy and tactics by the Chinese Communist p 211
Party in close cooperation with the Comintern was a prolonged and complex process
in the course of which various conclusions and recommendations were tested in
practice, incorrect or obsolete principles were cast aside, the successes of the
revolution were summed up and the causes of its failures (especially in the period of
struggle under the slogan of Soviets) analysed. In Marxist literature these matters are
not made sufficiently clear because the events of this difficult, and at times
contradictory, period in the history of the CPC have been but poorly studied.

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Maoist historiography is largely responsible for that. In the official document of the p
Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "Resolutions on Some Questions in the
History of Our Party,”   [211•1   which set stereotyped patterns for all works on the
history of the CPC published in China, the Maoists have crossed out all the Party’s
experience in those years, and under the pretext of criticising the "Wang Ming-Po
Ku line" they virtually deny any positive role played by the Comintern in mapping
out the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maoists assert that
the Party leadership of those days, headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku, was
“unaware” of the need to build up armed forces for the Party took a wrong approach
to the agrarian question, and did not realise the importance of organising
revolutionary bases in the countryside and of the proper balance between the Party’s 212
work in town and country, i.e., it totally "failed to understand" and “rejected” the
correct line of the Chinese revolution, allegedly already drawn up by Mao Tsetung in
those years.

Furthermore, after the event, the Maoists laid claim to the credit for having critically p
interpreted and summed up the rich and complicated experience of the revolutionary
struggle in that period-credit that legitimately belongs to the international communist
movement and to the Marxist-Leninist forces within the CPC. The Comintern, jointly
with representatives of those MarxistLeninist forces, drew up a number of valuable
conclusions and recommendations on the fundamental questions of the Party’s
strategy and tactics, whose practical implementation ensured the further development
of the Party and its armed forces and the triumph of the revolution in
China.   [ 212•1  

A major milestone in the cooperation between the international communist p


movement and the Chinese Communist Party in that period was the Sixth CPC
Congress (June-July 1928), which took place in Moscow with the participation of the
delegations of the Comintern Executive Committee and the communist parties of the
Soviet Union and other countries. The Sixth Congress summed up the experience and
lessons of the struggle of the CPC during the revolution of 1925–27 and gave a
correct appraisal of its nature and present stage of its development. Embracing all 213
aspects of the Party’s work, the decisions of the Congress became practically the first
comprehensive programme of the Communist Party of China.   [213•1   The ideas
embodied in these decisions and their further development and realisation in the early
1930’s became an integral part of the strategy and tactics of the CPC. Of paramount
importance for all the subsequent activity of the Chinese Communist Party was the
acceptance by the Congress of the Comintern’s assessment of the Chinese revolution
as a bourgeois-democratic one.  [ 213•2   This dealt a blow to the attempts of the
Trotskyite and “Leff’-sectarian elements within the Party to distort the immediate
tasks of the revolutionary struggle and provided the soundly-based forces with a
basis for combating the “Left”-extremist tendencies that constantly showed up in the
Party.

After summing up the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China, the Sixth p
Congress of the Communist Party of China, at the recommendation of the Comintern,
adopted the tactics for the immediate future of making a retreat and rallying its
forces in the towns, while waging fullscale guerrilla warfare and building up
revolutionary bases (Soviet zones) and a Red Army in the countryside.   [ 214•1   The 214
experience of the revolutionary struggle at the time of the Sixth Congress was as yet
uncapable of indicating how the revolution would proceed: whether the revolutionary
struggle would centre in town (as the 1925–27 revolution did), or whether the
revolutionary forces would rally at their bases in the countryside. Subsequent

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developments showed that despite the temporary abatement of the revolutionary


movement in the towns, the revolutionary bases and armed forces of the Party in
many rural areas gained strength.

In 1930–31 the Comintern, having analysed this situation never before witnessed by p
the revolutionary movement, boldly mapped out new ways of development for the
Chinese revolution. The letter of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC
regarding the Li Li-san doctrines (September 1930) and the resolution of the
Comintern Executive Committee Presidium on the tasks of the Communist Party of
China (August 1931) set out the chief task as that of reinforcing the Red Army,
which "shall become the centre for rallying and organising the revolutionary forces
and the key lever for heightening the entire revolutionary movement...”; they
proposed the idea of "encircling the towns, including the major and largest ones, by
a ring of peasant revolts."   [214•2   These objectives, based on the Comintern’s
recommendations, were formulated in the CC CPC decisions of April 4, 1932: "The 215
specific feature of the Chinese revolution is manifested in the fact that the proletariat
is leading the masses and extending Soviet power from the countryside to the towns,
and from small towns to big cities.”   [215•1   These Comintern and CPC documents
demonstrate the inconsistency of Maoist historiography’s assertions that the course
towards unfolding the revolution in rural areas and towards encircling the towns by
the revolutionary countryside was advanced by Mao Tse-tung to counter the allegedly
erroneous lines of the CPC leadership of those days. Contrary to the Comintern’s
course towards achieving proletarian leadership in the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-
tung made an absolute of the importance of peasant war and in effect rejected the
idea of proletarian leadership. Today the Maoists are trying to extend their anti–
Marxist views on the importance of the peasant war in China to the world
revolutionary process.

A big part in building up the armed forces of the Communist Party of China was p
played by the Comintern’s recommendations (worked out by the organisers of the
armed forces of the CPC and Soviet Communists-experienced military leaders)
concerning the foundations for the formation, the strategy and tactics of China’s Red
Army and the principles of its relations with the population. The implementation of
these recommendations allowed the Chinese Communist Party, in 1932–33, to become 216
a major political as well as military force.

The Comintern’s help in exploring the agrarian and peasant question was particularly p
important for the Communist Party of China, which from 1927 to 1949 operated
mainly in rural areas. The decisions of the Party’s Sixth Congress on the agrarian
question and the peasant movement   [216•1   were the first comprehensive,
scientifically-based platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy on the agrarian-
peasant question, laid down in the CPC decisions and Comintern recommendations in
the late 1920’s-early 1930’s, served the Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide
throughout the subsequent period of its revolutionary activity in the countryside. It
was precisely these decisions and the experience of these years (the principles of
determining class appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party’s decisions on
agrarian reorganisation in the late 1940’s-early 1950’s.   [216•2  

The Party’s attention to the agrarian-peasant question, its organisational work in p


preparing the peasantry for the agrarian revolution, and the development in the
countryside of bodies of power, armed forces, the economy, educational and other
institutions, resulted in the fact that by the mid1930’s it had accumulated abundant
experience as practically the ruling party. This experience became one of the chief
sources of strength for the Party and one of the requisites for its victory. 217

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The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) and its historic decisions opened up p
a new stage in the development of the world communist and national-liberation
movements. Its decisions also signified a turning point in the development of the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution. The policy of the united
national front brought the Communist Party allies from the population at large and
turned it into a powerful political force. During the period from the Seventh
Congress of the Comintern to the victory of the people’s revolution in 1949, the
CPC grew into a more than three-million party, having at its disposal a strong army,
vast liberated areas, and enjoying the support of the masses and of the entire
international communist movement, particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

The fulfilment of the decisions of the Comintern’s Seventh Congress proceeded in p


the face of a fierce struggle between the internationalist forces and the petty-
bourgeois, nationalistic forces within the CPC.   [217•1   This was because there was
a massive flow of peasants, petty-bourgeois elements and former members of the
exploiting classes into the Party (they totalled more than 90 per cent of its
membership by 1945), and to the weakness of the proletarian core and the
preponderance of nationalistically-minded elements in the Party leadership.

The struggle within the Party immediately centred on the attitude towards the p
Comintern’s directives and decisions and on the correlation of the national and
international tasks of the liberation movement in China. The Chinese Communist- 218
internationalists, one of whose leaders was Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), defended
the course aimed at the unification of all potential allies into a single national front
for struggle against Japanese imperialism. They interwove into a single whole the
national and international tasks of the Chinese revolution, regarding the cohesion and
support of all contingents of the international communist movement as the most
important factor for the victory of the revolution in every individual country,
particularly in China.

The nationalistic, petty-bourgeois^forces within the Chinese Communist Party, with p


MaS’Tse-tung as their spokesman, took a chauvinist, egoistic approach to the
question of internationalism and international support. For quite a long time,
especially when the Party’s own forces were relatively small (1935–37), they
contended that a direct armed attack by the Soviet Union together with the
Communist Party of China against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek would be the best
international help to the Chinese revolution and the world revolutionary process.
They were not much interested in the Soviet Union’s fate in the face of the growing
threat of attack by Nazi Germany, or in the fate of the international anti-fascist camp
and the united national anti-Japanese front in China itself. During the Second World
War, the nationalistic forces within the Chinese Communist Party sought to make the
best of international support not so much for waging war against Japanese
imperialism as for preserving and increasing their own armed forces.

The development cf the Chinese revolution after the Seventh Congress of the p
Comintern, and until its victory in 1949, proved that, despite all the attempts of 219
Mao’s nationalistic leadership of the CPC to steer the liberation struggle along the
"specific Chinese path,” the revolutionary movement in China triumphed as part of
the world liberation process. This was practical confirmation of the universal
applicability of Marxist-Leninist teaching and the importance of the united action of
all the contingents of the world communist movement.

The victory of the Chinese revolution was the result of the alliance between the p
international communist movement and the national-liberation, mainly peasant,

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movement in China. This alliance materialised in the form of the ideological and
political support given to the CPC and the Chinese revolution by the international
communist movement, as well as in economic, moral, military and diplomatic
assistance from the Soviet Union and later on from the People’s Democracies.

The victory of the revolution in China became possible as a result of the radical p
changes that took place in the international situation after the Second World War.
The aggressive forces of imperialism were checked by the unprecedented might and
prestige of the Soviet Union, the formation of the world socialist system and by the
powerful upsurge of the communist and nationalliberation movements in the world.
The only imperialist power that had gained in strength at the time-the USA-was
compelled under the circumstances to refrain from direct military intervention in
China. Besides, it was more concerned with the rehabilitation of capitalist Europe,
where the influence of the communist parties had increased. 220

The victory of the people’s revolution in China was made possible by the execution p
of the fundamental strategic plans jointly worked out by the Comintern and the
Chinese Communist Party to give impetus to the liberation movement (the policy of
the united national front; the peasant movement as the main part of the democratic
revolution in China; the leadership of the Communist Party in the peasants’ armed
struggle as the basic factor for the victory of the revolution; the alliance of the
Chinese liberation movement with the international proletariat and primarily with the
USSR and the socialist camp). So the Chinese people won their historic victory
against domestic reaction and the foreign forces of imperialism in close fraternal
unity with and assistance of the forces of the world communist movement.

The carrying out of the basic tasks of the people’s democratic revolution in the p
interests of the working people as a whole paved the way for China’s advancement
along the socialist path. The successes scored by China in the early years of the
people’s power-when increased fraternal help was coming from the Soviet Union,
when there was all-round cooperation between the two countries and their parties,
and when there was wide publicity in China of the Soviet example and experience-
created a favourable situation for the further growth of the proletarian, Marxist–
Leninist forces and tendencies inside the Chinese Communist Party. On the other
hand, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist trend in the Party as yet lacked a firm
foothold to mount a counteroffensive. It was manoeuvring, biding time, accumulating 221
strength and searching for a stratagem suited to the new historical situation. This
enabled the Party’s internationalist forces, with the support of the CPSU and the
world communist movement, to take the initiative and put the Party and country on
the path of socialism.

The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 1956) was a p
significant event in the life of the Party and the Chinese people. It summed up the
experience of one of the largest communist parties over a long period, during which
the people’s revolution had triumphed and the first achievements in socialist
construction had been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress the CPC had
10,700,000 members and candidate members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per
cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals).   [221•1   Such a composition was bound to
affect its ideology, policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois, nationalistic tendencies
in the Party continued to exist and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in China
depended on the outcome of the struggle between the nationalistic tendencies and the
proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome could not but affect the interests
of the international communist movement as a whole.

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The main feature of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC is that they p
endorsed the Party’s general line towards socialist construction in conformity with
the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of close cooperation and
fraternal mutual assistance with the world socialist community and all progressive,
revolutionary trends of the day. The consistent realisation of the socialist programme 222
hammered out by the Eighth Congress was to ensure for China continuing social
progress and a speedy growth of the productive forces, which meant a better
standard of living for the working people as a whole.

In the years between 1949 and 1957, the People’s Republic of China, following the p
basic principles of building socialist society, and relying on the help and international
solidarity of the socialist countries and their parties, made the first substantial steps
towards the construction of socialism. But this was fiercely opposed by the petty-
bourgeois forces and trends. The development of the Communist Party of China and
the Chinese People’s Republic in that period was not straightforward, but highly
complicated, contradictory and confused. By the end of the period there was an
unmistakable growth of the pettybourgeois, nationalistic trends, which the Party was
incapable of overcoming.

In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the nationalistic forces interfered with the p
Party’s constructive interaction with the international communist movement, its
course of development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance of the
concerted line of the international communist movement. They imposed the "big
leap" policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one hand, certain weaknesses in the
Party (the disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the personality cult of
Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on the other, by making great use of avantgardist slogans
when the country was in a state of animation and indulging in nationalistic
distortions of the true causes of the successes of the People’s Republic. The basic 223
features of the Mao group’s “special” course were the opposition of the policy of the
CPC to the concerted line of the fraternal parties and the attempt to revise its
fundamental precepts. Soviet party and political literature quite comprehensively and
explicitly shows the sources, causes and essence of that “special” course in the
PRC’s domestic and foreign policy as a continuation in the new conditions of the
confrontation between the two lines, the two trends inside the Communist Party of
China.   [ 223•1   The “special” course and its consequences (sharp economic and
political crisis) ultimately led to the "cultural revolution" and initiated a new stage in
the intra-Party struggle.

An analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s complex development, especially p


after the advancement of the “special” course, prompts certain conclusions concerning
the attitude of the various forces within the CPC to interaction with the international
communist movement, and concerning the influence of the international communist
movement on the positions of different forces within the CPC. The intricate
composition of the CPC and the numerical preponderance of members of non-
proletarian background, influenced by all sorts of nationalistic and pseudo-socialist
theories, brought about differences in the approach to the platform and policy of the 224
international communist movement within the CPC. These differences, with all their
shades, may be classified into two major categories.

The genuine internationalists in the ranks of the CPC-Li Ta-chao, Chang Tai-lei, p
Chu Chiu-po, Yun Tai-ying, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Peng Pai and many
others who had made a decisive contribution to the dissemination in China of
Marxist-Leninist ideas and implanted internationalist traditions in the Party with the
aim of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory and using it as a basis for the political line

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of the CPC– proceeded from the fact that Marxism-Leninism is a universal


internationalist doctrine. Boldly raising the problems of the specific development of
the working-class and peasant movement in China, and taking account of the special
role of the particular forms of political struggle and of the special features of the
Party’s formation and activity, they never considered these special features to be
justification for renouncing the combination of the national and international tasks of
the Communist Party of China and those of the world communist movement as a
whole. When combating nationalism and chauvinism in the Party and elsewhere, they
based themselves on their conviction in the unity of all contingents of the world
communist movement. They have always maintained that the most important factor
for the favourable development of the Chinese revolution is solidarity with the
international communist movement and support from the Soviet people.

The nationalistic forces had a different attitude to international unity and interaction p 225
with the fraternal parties, and to assistance from the Comintern, the CPSU and the
Soviet Government. In the course of the history of the CPC, they have worn all sorts
of disguises, ranging from an attempt to receive help unilaterally from the
Comintern, the CPSU and other fraternal parties, to an almost unconcealed attempt to
play on the contradictions between the forces of socialism, democracy and progress
on the one hand, and international imperialism on the other. They have always
regarded the world communist movement and the forces of socialism, whose help
they sought to use in furtherance the nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as
a “third” force.

As early as the 1920’s and 1930’s, various avantgardist theories and platforms p
became a characteristic ideological cover for such nationalistic view in the CPC. For
example, Cheng Chaolin, subsequently expelled from the Party for his Trotskyite
views, put forward the idea of transferring the centre of the world revolution to
China.   [ 225•1   In 1930 a group of CPC leaders headed by Li Li-san, propagated
and tried to carry through a programme according to which the Chinese revolution
was to become the main seat, the “pillar” of the world revolution. Li Li-san and his
followers counted on an "international war" by which they hoped to “prompt” the
world revolution, thereby “guaranteeing” the successful development of the revolution
in China. Mao Tsetung too backed up these views.   [225•2  

The “special” course persistently imposed by the Mao group on the Party and the p 226
country ever since the late 1950’s has hidden under its avantgardist veil all the
elements involved in the nationalistic approach to relations with the forces of world
socialism and the international communist movement.

However, the policy of the nationalistic forces in the CPC could not completely p
destroy the influence exercised by the ideological and political platform of the
international communist movement, and by its experience and its recommendations,
on the political and ideological positions of the Party.

The status of the CPC as a section of the Comintern and, more important, the entire p
course of the Chinese revolution-which had borne out the correctness of the
Comintern’s main conclusions and recommendations relating to the strategy and
tactics of the Communist Party of China-the high prestige of the Comintern and the
CPSU among the majority of Chinese Communists played an important role in that
even the nationalistic elements in the Party’s leadership had to take the Comintern’s
experience and recommendations into account when choosing the Party’s political
course. Yet the nationalists were either unable to, or did not want to, assimilate
entirely the platform of the international communist movement, although they

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adopted, employed and "crammed,” as Lenin put it, certain tactical slogans. Inside
the Party, covertly or openly, clumsy conceptions and theories were advanced that 227
exaggerated the importance of various aspects of the situation in China and the
experience of the Chinese Communist Party, giving a narrow interpretation of the
results of the Party’s work and those of the entire revolutionary process in the
country-an interpretation that took no account of objective factors, both national and
international. On the other hand, the pursuance of the political courses mapped out
by the international communist movement facilitated the advancement of the CPC in
the general current of revolutionary struggle and at times veiled the real attitude of
the nationalists within its ranks towards Marxism-Leninism and the general platform
of the international communist movement.

The history of the Communist Party of China shows that in the periods when the p
Party’s international ties were weakened (either as a result of objective causes or
vacillations in its leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party increased their
activity. That was precisely the case in 1934–35, when the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat from Kiangsi in the north-west of the
country, had no liaison with the Comintern for some time. The same is true of the
period of the Second World War, especially the years of the Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet people.

The nationalists knew that, in order to improve their own position in the Party, it p
was necessary to weaken the Party’s ties with the international communist movement
and to lessen the influence of its platform and experience on the Party. The
offensives of the nationalistic forces were always accompanied by attacks, 228
camouflaged or open, on the line of the international communist movement, and by
their attempts to discredit and distort it. Li Li-san and his followers imposed their
platform under the slogan "The Comintern misunderstands the situation in China.”
The advent of the Mao group to the Party leadership in the late 1930’s-early 1940’s
was likewise accompanied by attacks on the Comintern’s platform, which were
masked by criticism of the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line,” and by the calls to "do away
with foreign patterns" and to "give Marxism a Chinese interpretation.” The new stage
of the offensive by the nationalistic forces in the CPC in the late 1950’s, and their
imposition on the Party of the "big leap" and "people’s communes" course, were also
prepared and accompanied first by covert, and then by more and more open “
criticism” of the international experience of socialist construction, of the concerted
foreign policy course followed by the socialist countries, and of the international
communist movement’s concerted general line enshrined in the Declarations and
Statements adopted by the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties in
1957 and 1960. The Maoists concentrated their attacks on the USSR and the CPSU
because, as Communists all over the world have correctly noted, the Peking leaders
regard the prestige of the USSR and the CPSU as the chief obstacle to the spread of
their ideas and influence. At the same time, the attacks on the CPSU were meant to
pave the way for revising the general line of the world communist movement.

The historical experience of the CPC prompts another important conclusion. Up to p


1957, the ties of the CPC with the CPSU and other communist parties, the stand of 229
its internationalist forces and the striving of most of its leaders to rely on the help of
world socialism, created the necessary external and domestic conditions for wiping
out the avantgardist and nationalistic trends and the resulting sharp crises within the
Party. The departure of the Party’s leaders in the late 1950’s from the concerted line
of the international communist movement gave the nationalist forces considerable
freedom of action.

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That conclusion is borne out by the lessons of the intra-Party struggle during the
last decade, and by the course and results of the massive Maoist onslaught on the
Communist Party of China, called the "cultural revolution.” Soviet publications have
dealt at length with the causes, development and results of the "cultural
revolution.”   [ 229•1   We should like only to emphasise that one of the causes of
the severe defeat suffered by the Party was the vacillation of a considerable number
of its leaders (including those who became victims of the "cultural revolution”) on
the fundamental questions of the general line, and their departure, temporary though
it may have been, from a number of its basic principles. This circumstance enabled
the Mao group gradually to oppose the Party’s platform to the general line of the
international communist movement, to isolate the anti-Maoists in the Party from the
international movement, and to carry out the ideological re-orientation of the
country’s population, especially the young people who were later charged with the 230
task of destroying the leading bodies of the Party.

***

The history of the Communist Party of China over these past years shows that its p
departure and self-isolation from the international communist movement and from its
general line and experience, led to serious mistakes in the Party’s activity, to great
intra-Party crises and damage, and to the loss of revolutionary gains. The way out of
the critical situation in which the CPC found itself as a result of the actions of the
Maoist group is to restore relations with the international communist and working-
class movement, to return to the latter’s concerted line, and to base the Party’s entire
activity on Marxism– Leninism. The fifty-year development of the Communist Party
of China has borne out the importance and relevance of the Leninist proposition
that.. . "The urgency of the struggle against. . . the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois
national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of
converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing
in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international
one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced
countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a
whole).”   [ 230•1   While combating Maoism as the ideological and political trend of
petty– bourgeois nationalism, it is essential first of all to see that it is incompatible 231
with the objectives of the world communist and liberation movements and with those
of the Chinese Communist Party’s development along the socialist path.

That is why the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which fully approved the principled p
Leninist course and the steps taken by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in
Soviet-Chinese relations, noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came
out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with
Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split
of the international communist and the whole anti– imperialist movement, the CC
CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of consistently defending the
principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world
communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist
Motherland.”   [ 231•1   The Congress also endorsed the consistent course of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising relations between the
USSR and the Chinese People’s Republic and establishing good– neighbourliness and
friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would meet the vital,
long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of
intensifying the struggle against imperialism.”   [231•2  

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Voprosy htorii, No. 8, 1971

***
 
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normal
Notes

 [ 196•1]   Official data regarding the membership of the Communist Party of China
over the last ten years are not available. In his speech made on June 30, 1961, on
the occasion of the Chinese Party’s 40th anniversary, Liu Shao-chi said the Party had
over 17 million members (Jenmin jihfiao, July 1, 19G1).

 [ 199•1]   C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese


Communism, Cambridge, 1952; R. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford
University Press, 1958; B. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao,
Cambridge, 1958.

 [ 200•1]   S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, L., 1963; Y. Chen, Mao
Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, L., 1966.

 [ 200•2]   J. E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927–35, Stanford, 19G6.

[ 202•1]   For a detailed account of the Maoist historiography of the CPC, see: V.
Glunin, A. Grigoryev, Maoist Falsifications in the History of the Chinese Communist
Party, Moscow State University Gazette, Vostokovedeniye (Oriental Studies), No. 1,
1970.

 [ 202•2]   Chicnhfang jihpao, May 27, 1943.

 [ 202•3]   Liu Shao-chi, On the Party, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.

 [ 203•1]   The influence of the Maoist historiography of the CPC on bourgeois


Sinology during those years is particularly clear in J. E. Rue’s book to which we
have already referred. Written in a quasi-scientific manner (with a multitude of
references, imposing contents, index, bibliography, etc.), it is an absolutely uncritical
reproduction of the basic assertions of Maoist historiography. We need only say that
in his principal conclusions, Rue relies on the 1951–53 editions of Mao Tse-tungs
early works (although at that time practically all of Mao’s works were heavily
revised and re– edited), and on Mao’s own biography authorised by himself and
expounded by Edgar Snow; Rue completely ignores the CPC’s documents and press
of those years—the most valuable and reliable sources.

 [ 203•2]   Jenmin jihpao, April 27, 19G9.

 [ 204•1]   Jenmin jihpao, July 1, 1971.

 [ 204•2]   See B. Liebzon, K. Shirinya, Turning Point in the Comintern’s Policy, M,


1965; Birth Centenary of Sun Yatsen, 1866–1966, Collection of Articles, M., 1966; 0.
Borisov, B. Koloskov, The CPSU’s Efforts for the Unity and Cohesion of Today’s
Revolutionary Forces, M., 1967; The USSR’s Leninist Policy Towards China,
Collection of Articles, M., 1968; Roots of the Present Events in China, M., 1968; M.
F. Yuryev, The Chinese Revolution of 1925–27, M., 1968; 0. Vladimirov, V.
Pyazantsev, Some Questions Relating to the History of the Chinese Communist Party,
Kommunist, No. 9, 1968; The Comintern, A Short Historical Essay, M., 1969; The
Comintern and the East, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; China Today, M., 1969;

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New Documents of the Comintern, Kommunist, No. 4, 1969; The Chinese People’s
Republic, M., 1970; Prominent Soviet Communists and the Revolution in China,
Collection of Articles, M., 1970; L. P. Delyusin, The Dispute Over Socialism, M.,
1970; 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 194.5-70, A Short Essay,
M., 1971.

 [ 206•1]   See Lenin and the Comintern, M., 1970, p. 199.

 [ 206•2]   Ibid., p. 201.

 [ 208•1]   For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 242–299.

 [ 209•1]   See The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial


Revolution as Exemplified by China, M., 1934, pp. 112–113.

 [ 209•2]   Ibid., pp. 114–115.

 [ 211•1]   Adopted by the Seventh Plenary Meeting (sixth convocation) of the CC


CPG in April 1945, on the eve of the Seventh CPC Congress (see Mao Tse-tung,
Scl. Works, London, 1956, Vol. 4, pp. 171–218.).

 [ 212•1]   For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 313– 349.

 [ 213•1]   The Sixth Congress passed the decision to prepare the official programme
of the Party for the next congress. The decision, as everyone knows, remains
unfulfilled up to this day (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 6, Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, M., 1930).

 [ 213•2]   In that period Mao Tse-tung believed that the revolution in China had
entered the socialist stage (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 2, M., 1930, pp. 80–81).

 [ 214•1]   That course was endorsed in the resolutions on the agrarian revolution, the
peasant movement and on the building of Soviet zones and the Red Army (see
Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hook 6).

 [ 214•2]   The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the NationalColoninl Revolution as


Exemplified by China, pp. 289, 296.

 [ 215•1]   CC CPC resolution "On Opportunist Vacillations in the Party’s Ranks Over
the Question of the Primary Victory of the Chinese Revolution," Materials on the
Third “Left” Line, Collected Documents and Materials, Vol. 1, Peking, 1957, p. 85)
(Chinese ed.).

 [ 216•1]   See Policy Documents of Communist Parties in tlte East, M., 1934, pp. 34–
51; Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Book 6.

 [ 216•2]   In 1947–48, several documents of the early 1930’s were re-issued in full to
be used as a guide for the agrarian reform.

[ 217•1]   For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 350–379.

 [ 221•1]   Sec Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Parly of
China, M., 1956, p. 65.

[ 223•1]   Sec B. Xancgin, A. Mironov, Ya. Mikhailov, On Events in China M., 1967;

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Roots of the Present Events in China; A. Bovin, L. Delyusin, ’The Political Crisis in
China, M., 1968; Perilous Course, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; The Anti-
Imperialist Essence of the Views and Policy of Mao Tse-tung, M., 1969; Yu.
Yaremenko, The "Big Leap" and "People’s Communes" in China, M., 1969; Foreign
Policy of the Chinese People’s Republic, M., 1971.

 [ 225•1]   See Hsian Dao, No. 128, November 7, 1925, p. 1182.

 [ 225•2]   For details of the leftist platform emerging in the CPC in 1930, see Letter
of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC Regarding the Li Li-san
Doctrines; The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution
as Exemplified by China, p. 290; The Comintern and the East, pp. 313–349.

 [ 229•1]   See The Present Situation in China and tlic CPC, Kommunist, No. 4, 19G9;
Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group on the International Arena, Kommunist, No. 5,
1969.

 [ 230•1]   Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, p. 148.

 [ 231•1]   24th Congress of the CPSU, Documents, APN Publishing House, M., 1971,
p. 212.

 [ 231•2]   Ibid., p. 213.

< >
 

<< Regarding Peking-Washington >>


Contacts
 

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<•> Regarding Peking-Washington 232

Contacts
 

TOC
Card I. Alexandrou p

As has been reported, talks were recently held in Peking between Premier Chou En- p
Text
lai and the US President’s adviser Kissinger. During the talks, Chou En-lai, on
HTML
behalf of the Government of the Chinese People’s Republic, invited President Nixon
PS
PDF
to visit China, and the invitation was accepted.

Addressing American televiewers. President Nixon called his forthcoming trip to p


T*
19*
Peking a visit in the name of peace. He declared that the purpose of the planned
meeting was to establish new relations with China, adding that this decision would
### do no harm to America’s "old friends,” and was not directed against any country.

Nixon’s statement is being cited by circles close to the Administration as an p


expression of Washington’s “peace-making” policy. Yet, there is a big difference
between the preaching and practice of the US ruling circles. In deeds the United
States continues the aggressive war in Indochina, supports the Israeli extremists, and
hinders a relaxation of tension in Europe. It is not any accident that many people in
the United States itself view the contacts with Peking as a continuation of this
reactionary anti-communist line.

In China there have been no official comments on Nixon’s forthcoming visit. Anti- p
imperialist sentiments continue to be expressed and loud assurances are given about
support for the anti– imperialist movement of nations. At the same time, the anti- 233
Soviet policy and the “splitting” activities against the anti-imperialist, revolutionary
forces do not cease.

The confidential Sino-American talks, the agreement on the US President’s visit to p


China and its possible consequences for international developments-all this has given
rise to lively discussion in the world press. Some sections of the world public
apprehended such a far-reaching advance in Chinese-American contacts as a great
sensation.

Such a reaction to the news can probably be explained by the fact that the true p
political intentions of the two countries are veiled by a dense propaganda screen and
that the declarations and statements of the two governments are quite often in
complete contradiction to their actual political line. All this time Peking is known to
have been calling for an uncompromising fight against US imperialism, and for the
overthrow of the Nixon Administration, while the United States has just as
demonstratively boycotted the People’s China and supported the Chiang Kai-shek
regime in Taiwan.

In the press and speeches, statesmen and public leaders have voiced the most p
diverse opinions and very often given contrasting assessments of the Peking-
Washington contacts.

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Still, a great many of the views expressed have had one thing in common- p
satisfaction at the opportunity to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s
Republic and the United States However, the reasons behind this satisfaction vary
considerably.

Some say that the recognition by Washington of the PRC signifies a turn towards p
realism in the policy of the US Administration. It is also noted that the invitation 234
extended to President Nixon to visit Peking apparently means a desire on the part of
the Chinese leadership to secure a special position in the international arena by
means of a detente with a number of capitalist states, and a prompt one with the
United States.

Reactionary anti-communist quarters link with the Chinese-American contacts the p


hopes to undermine the unity of the anti-imperialist forces and weaken the position
of world socialism.

The most reactionary press of the USA interprets the President’s forthcoming visit p
as a foreign policy manoeuvre dictated by the aims and interests of anti-communism.
The New York Daily News wrote with utter cynicism about the hope that President
Nixon had been pursuing a far– reaching Machiavellian policy of setting Red China
and Red Russia against each other.

The US big press is not quite as frank but, nevertheless, outspoken enough in its p
comments on the direction of Washington’s strategy. The New York Times wrote that
the White House would like to capitalise on the coinciding intention of both Peking
and Washington (although the latter has its own, special reasons) so as to bring
pressure to bear on the USSR and its foreign policy. The newspaper quotes
Washington officials who allege that Nixon’s visit to Peking will become a turning
point in US diplomacy and that the Chinese leaders are worthy partners in such an
affair. The New York Post reported that Washington’s present contacts with Peking
had been the result of the strategic decision that neither China’s interests nor her
potential capabilities were a threat to American might and influence and that
Moscow was the only real danger.

The US bourgeois press also notes that Peking’s invitation has done Nixon a good p 235
turn in his electoral campaign and has helped him to elude the demands that serious
consideration should be given to the new peace initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and an end should be
put to the dirty US war in Vietnam.

While giving its approval to Washington’s and Peking’s move, the West-European p
bourgeois press expresses anxiety that Washington does not hesitate to solve its
problems at the expense of its allies in military-political blocs and to disregard them
by flirting with China. The London Times remarks that the ideological dispute
between Washington and Peking has been put aside by both and that the nationalistic
interests have taken the upper hand. The West German press, along with the
enthusiastic comments of the extreme right-wing newspapers of the Springer concern,
refers to the hegemonic, global aspirations of the United States and points out that
Washington’s move "has dealt a blow at the Third World countries.”

The progressive press stresses that the peoples would like the Sino-American p
contacts to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation
of peace, but notes at the same time that both sides give more than sufficient
evidence to cause serious doubts about their real intentions.

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Rude Pravo, organ of the Central Commitec of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, p
writes:

“As to the attempt to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s Republic p
and the United States, the world public is unanimous that such an act, which, 236
incidentally, has been urged ever since 1969, could only be welcomed if it meant a
policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. For, indeed,
it has been the absurd policy of the United States for many years to ignore the
existence of a new social system in China.”

The Hungarian Nepszabadsag notes that the peoples and the governments of the p
socialist countries more than anyone else have exerted efforts to secure a firm and
lasting peace. The socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have, for over 20
year, been defending the interests of the Chinese people, urging international
recognition of the PRC and the restoration of its lawful rights in the United Nations.
The newspaper says that anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the ChineseAmerican
detente is taking place.

“It is difficult to predict how the relations between the USA and China will develop p
in the future,” writes the Polish Trybuna Ludu. "One thing is, however, clear:
China’s departure from the socialist community and the departure of the Communist
Party of China from the world communist movement were meant, above all, to clear
the way for broader contacts with the imperialist states and the United States in
particular.”

The Bulgarian News Agency in a commentary published by Rabotnichesko Delo p


says: "The implications of the contemplated rapprochement are becoming clearer
against the political background on which it is taking place. On the one hand, this is
a deliberate anti-communist US policy whose essence, just as of the entire policy of
imperialism, is aggressiveness towards the socialist community and particularly
towards its leading force, the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this is the policy of 237
rabid anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by the Chinese leaders and their efforts to
split the international communist and working-class movement and weaken the anti-
imperialist front. Under such circumstances the question can be raised: Isn’t it the
intention to join forces along a definite direction-an intention having nothing in
common with a genuine concern for peace and international understanding-that
underlies the desire for ’ normalisation’?”

Commenting on the US President’s forthcoming visit to China, the communist press, p


together with the entire progressive press, speculates on what effect this step will
have on the situation in Indochina.

L’Humanite, the newspaper of the French Communist Party, emphasises that it is US p


imperialism that is committing aggression in Indochina and has inspired the reign of
terror in Indonesia. The American imperialists waged a scorched-earth war in Korea,
and they were the authors of the notorious "Guam doctrine" which sets Asians
against Asians. "The policy of US imperialism, which is opposed to a relaxation of
international tensions,” says the newspaper, "depends on differences among the anti-
imperialist forces.”

President Nixon’s decision to visit China, says Akahata, the Japanese Communist p
Party newspaper, means the bankruptcy of the aggressive US policy in Indochina.
The present rapprochement with China, according to the newspaper, is a typical
example of the divide-and-rule policy.

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No one should be deceived about Mr. Nixon’s motives, says the Morning Star, the p
newspaper of the British Communists. As before, he is the leadcr of an imperialist 238
power waging a brutal aggressive war in Indochina. One of Nixon’s goals is to
provoke still greater differences between the socialist countries, the newspaper
remarks.

In its editorial on July 19, 1971, the Vietnamese Nhan Dan wrote that the p
implementation of the Nixon doctrine had led to the intensified military activity of
US imperialism in that region of the world. The newspaper added that the US policy
was aimed at scraping together an alliance of counter-revolutionary forces in every
region and also at splitting the socialist countries.

“Nixon’s policy," Nhan Dan pointed out, "has ended in failure. It is driven into a p
corner. The whole of the United States and all the world loudly demand: End the
aggressive war in Vietnam immediately and bring all US soldiers home! Finding
himself in this predicament, Nixon began a feverish search for a way out. But he
went in the wrong direction. The door for exit was open, but he has entered a blind
alley.”

The Daily World of the US Communists, referring to the Peking-Washington p


contacts, writes that the contradiction between the motives and aims proclaimed by
Nixon, and the real policy and actions, gave rise to natural suspicions.

The Lebanese Al-Nida remarks that the interest of the West in China was growing p
as the Peking leadership stepped up its anti-Soviet, divisionist tactics.

The progressive press of Asian, African and Latin American countries assesses the p
moves towards a Peking-Washington rapprochement as testifying to the hegemonistic
aspirations of the ruling quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks
about Nixon’s official visit to China help to expose the Maoist propaganda which 239
served to camouflage the moves taken by the Chinese leaders to reach an
understanding with imperialism. The Cairo AlGoumhouria says that the forthcoming
visit to Peking cloaks the intention of US diplomacy to divide the anti-imperialist
camp and, above all, drive a wedge between the USSR and the People’s China.

Thus, the world comments on the Chinese– American negotiations reflect the p
attitude of modern political and class forces to the basis and aims of the detente
between Washington and Peking. All the progressive, peace-loving forces are
watching closely the manoeuvres of certain circles which would like to use the
normalisation of ChineseAmerican relations to the detriment of socialism, of the
international communist and workers’ movement, and of the peoples which are
fighting imperialist aggression.

The Soviet Union does not see in the ChineseAmerican contacts any cause for p
sensation. Soviet people regard the contacts from the viewpoint of the Marxist-
Leninist analysis of the international situation and of the basic tendencies of world
development that was made at the 24th CPSU Congress. The congress clearly defined
the Soviet Union’s policy in its relations with the Chinese People’s Republic and the
United States, and international developments confirm the correctness of this policy.
The Soviet Communist Party and state support the normalising of relations between
the USSR and the PRC and the restoring of friendship between the two peoples,
which would be in the interests of both countries, of world socialism and would help
to step up the struggle against imperialism. But the Soviet Union is waging a
consistent struggle against the anti-Leninist platform of the Chinese leadership, and 240

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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.2-Regarding.Peking-Washington.Contacts

its splitting tactics aimed at undermining the anti-imperialist front, the socialist
community and the world communist and workers’ movement. It rejects the great-
power chauvinistic policy of Peking and the slanderous fabrications of Chinese
propaganda about the policy of the Soviet Communist Party and state.

The Soviet Union unswervingly implements the principle of peaceful coexistence. It p


is ready to develop relations with the USA as well if this is in the interests of the
Soviet and American peoples and the interests of universal peace. But the Soviet
Union will continue to oppose firmly the aggressive actions of the USA and the
policy of force. Together with the revolutionary, anti– imperialist front, the USSR
will continue the struggle to curb aggressors and frustrate their dangerous schemes.

The Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist states, consistently p
pursues the Leninist foreign policy for consolidating peace, security, freedom and the
independence of nations, and the positions of world socialism. Proof of this is the
support and all-round assistance that the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries give to the heroic people of Vietnam, the patriots of Laos and Cambodia,
the peoples of the Arab East and to all the peoples in their just liberation struggle.
The Soviet Union believes that the well-known proposals put forward by the DRV
Government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam, the United National Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos are
a constructive and realistic basis for solving the Indochina problem. The Soviet 241
people support these proposals.

Future developments will reveal more clearly the actual intentions of Peking and p
Washington. The Soviet Communist Party and state will take into account all the
possible consequences of the Sino-American contacts. Any hopes Peking and
Washington may entertain of using these contacts to bring pressure to bear on the
USSR or the states of the socialist community are unrealistic.

The Soviet Union believes that political decisions should be aimed, not at p
complicating the international situation, but at easing tensions. Undoubtedly, the long-
term interests of the Chinese and American peoples, just as the interests of all
peoples, call for decisions which would strengthen peace and security, and not for
political plotting against other states. As history shows, such plots eventually turn
against those who sponsored them.

The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to cooperate actively with all states, p
including the PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace and the freedom,
independence, progress and prosperity of nations.

Pravda, July 25, 1971

***
 
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes

< >
 

<< The International Communist Questions Requiring an Answer • >>


Movement and the Communist Party CONCERNING THE US-CHINA
of China • IN CONNECTION WITH TOP-LEVEL MEETING
THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF

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THE CPC
 

<<< II >>>

   
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<<< A DESTRUCTIVE POlICY   [ThE ChINESE lEadErShIp aNd ThE @AT LENINIST
cauSES Of SOcIalISM aNd ThE WOrld rEVOluTIONary aNd lIbEraTION (DOT) BIZ
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<< • >>
<•> TITLE: A Destructive Policy
This is a collection of articles from the Soviet press, exposing
TOC the policy of the Chinese leadership for what it is---a policy
SUBTITLE:
harmful to the cause of socialism, and the world revolutionary
Card
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Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/099.tx"

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__EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz

__OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.12.28)

__WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom

__FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+

__ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+

[BEGIN]

__TITLE__
<b>A DESTRUCTIVE
POLICY</b>

__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-12-28T11:24:00-0800

__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"

__SUBTITLE__
[the Chinese leadership
and the causes of socialism and the
world revolutionary and liberation movements]

<p> <b>Novosti Press Agency Publishing House


<br /> Moscow, 1972</b></p>

[1]

[2]

<p> <em>This is a collection of articles from the Soviet press,


exposing the policy of the Chinese leadership for what it
is</em>---<em>a policy harmful to the cause of socialism, and the
world revolutionary and liberation movements</em>.</p>

[3]

[4]

CONTENTS

<b>I</b>

http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked.....
8

<em>0. Vladimiroi', V. Ryazanov</em>, Concerning the 50th


Anniversary of the Communist Party of China . 35

<em>1. Alexandrov</em>, Concerning the 50th Anniversary of

the Communist Party of China . . . . . 64


<em>N. Lomakin, N. Petrovichev</em>, Renunciation of the
Principles of Marxism-Leninism.....80

<b>II</b>

<em>P. Fedoseyev</em>, Maoism: Its Ideological and Political

Essence............100

<em>V. Lektorsky, G. Batishchev, V. Kurayev</em>, Dialectics,

Genuine and Spurious........123

<em>L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin</em>, Crisis in the Political

Development of China........144

<em>A. Arzamastsev</em>, Maoism Preaches Poverty . . 165


<em>T. Rakhimov, V. Bogoslovsky</em>, Great-Power
Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung.......185

[5]

<b>Ill</b>

<em>V. Glunin, A. Grigorycv, K, Kukushkin, M. Yuryev</em>,


The International Communist Movement and the

Communist Party of China......196

/. <em>Alexandrov</em>, Regarding Peking-Washington


Contacts ............232

G. <em>Arbatov</em>, Questions Requiring an Answer . . 242


/. <em>Alexandrov</em>, The Preaching and Practice of the

Chinese Leaders.........2;&gt;4

<em>L. Kirichenko</em>, Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and

Practice............277

<em>Yu. Uladimirov</em>, Concerning the Economic Relations


Between the Soviet Union and China (1950--66) . 285

http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
<em>A. Nadezhdin</em>, Peking Against the Socialist
Community ............320

<em>O. Ivanov</em>, New Strategy for the Same Ends . . 332


<em>D. Vostokov</em>, The Foreign Policy of the People's
Republic of China Since the 9th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party.......357

[6]

__ALPHA_LVL1__
<b>I</b>

__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Pseudo-Revolutionaries
<br /> Unmasked</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970</b>

[7]

__NOTE__ LVL2 moved from here one page back.

<p> The centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has


become a holiday for working people the world
over. It has developed into a convincing
demonstration of the triumph of Lenin's cause, the
vitality of Lenin's ideas and behests. With the name
of Lenin, with his all-triumphant teaching, are
linked all the historical accomplishments of our
agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the
building of socialism in the USSR, the
establishment and consolidation of the world socialist
system, the upsurge of the international working-class
movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse
of colonialism, and the emancipation of the
oppressed nations.</p>

<p> The progressive world public has widely


observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration of the
birth centenary of the leader of the world
revolution has served for the Communist and Workers'
Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism,
as a powerful stimulus in their entire ideological
and political activities. The fraternal Parties have
increased the struggle for the unity of the
communist movement, for the cohesion of all
antiimperialist forces.</p>

<p> In the minds and hearts of revolutionary


fighters throughout the world Lenin's name is
inseparably linked with the first socialist state and
its Communist Party which consistently

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implement his behests and continue his cause. The
keynote of the Lenin celebrations in the majority
of countries was recognition of the outstanding
role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in the world revolutionary process, expression of
gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless
heroic struggle, for its loyalty to the principles
of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless
assistance to all revolutionary liberation
movements.</p>

<p> Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the


world-wide battle for the minds and hearts of
people. It has shown people everywhere the
prospect for deliverance from imperialism, and more
and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of
its economic, social and political organisation.
The community of socialist countries has become
a force without which, and in defiance of which,
not a single major problem of our time can be
solved. The united might of the socialist
countries and their active policy in defence of peace
are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions
of the imperialists and preventing the outbreak
of a world rocket and nuclear war.</p>

<p> The celebration of the Lenin centenary has


vividly reflected the growing tendency
manifested at the International Conference of Communist
and Workers' Parties-the tendency towards
united action of all revolutionary and progressive
forces of the world; it has raised to a new level
their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh
and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary
process which unites the three great forces of our
time-the world socialist system, the international
working-class and national-liberation movements.</p>

<h2 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h2>

<p> It is not surprising that the masters of the


outgoing world are resorting to lies and slander in
an attempt to discredit and belittle the
historical accomplishments of Lenin's homeland, of the
fraternal socialist countries, the world communist
and working-class movement, and the fighters for
national liberation. There is nothing new about
their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of
the CPSU and the Soviet state.</p>

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<p> The Soviet people and entire progressive
mankind know the real reasons for the anti-socialist
actions of imperialism. We first heard them more
than half a century ago. What is worth noting
is something else-the fact that during the days
when the peoples of the world were celebrating
Lenin's anniversary the Peking leaders came out
in unison with imperialism's malicious anti-Soviet
and anti-communist campaign. Peking has timed
for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of
fanning animosity and hatred towards the
Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist
community, and the Communist and Workers' Parties of
the world.</p>

<p> Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are


the successes of the USSR in the development of
socialist industry, agriculture, science and
technology, the steady rise in the living standard and
cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the
defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set
by our Party for further intensification of socialist
production for the purpose of building the
material and technical basis of communism and
strengthening the positions of world socialism. In its
desire to discredit the inspiring example of the

10

Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist


community, Peking propaganda resorts to
incredible lies and distortions, abuses and slander.</p>

<p> Following in the wake of imperialist


propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the ``
aggressiveness'' of the USSR and the ``crisis'' of Soviet
economy; it resuscitates Trotskyite ``ideas'' about
&quot;bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,'' and
equates US imperialism with the Soviet Union
which they call &quot;social-imperialism.''</p>

<p> Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the


principles of socialist internationalism underlying
the relations between the countries of the socialist
community and declare that such community
&quot;does not exist.'' Things reached such a pass that
Hitler's ravings have been dragged out into the
open about the need to ``save'' the peoples from
the &quot;Slav danger.'' Following the leaders of the
nazi Reich the Peking leaders are trying to
portray the Soviet Union as a &quot;colossus on clay legs,''
asserting that the USSR is only a &quot;paper tiger&quot;
and threatening to &quot;pierce it at one go.''</p>

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<p> Such ravings make up the content of a series
of articles published in April in the <em>Jenmin
jihpao, Hungchi</em> and <em>Chiefangchiun pao</em>, and of an
article marking May Day.</p>

<p> These publications show that Peking has made


it a tradition to resort to methods of rabid
political and ideological provocations so characteristic
of imperialist propaganda.</p>

<p> Communists and all those who cherish the


interests of peace and progress are deeply alarmed
by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the
international arena and seriously concerned about the
destiny of the Chinese revolution.</p>

<p> The June 1969 International Conference of

11

Communist and Workers' Parties pointed out


that recent events in China and the nature of the
resolutions adopted at the 9th CPC Congress had
a negative effect on the entire world situation and
on the struggle of the anti-imperialist forces. The
present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular
and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive
activities against the countries of the socialist
community and seeking to split the ranks of anti--
imperialist forces.</p>

<p> The actions of the Chinese leaders following


the International Conference, which Peking terms
a &quot;black gathering,'' show the soundness of the
conclusions drawn by Marxist-Leninist Parties to
the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually
launched struggle against the world socialist
system, the international communist movement and
the revolutionary fighters all over the world.</p>

<p> All this calls for greater vigilance with respect


to Peking's activities in the international arena
and for watching closely which way the Mao group
is leading China.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>

<p> The entire home and foreign policy course of


the Peking leaders is dictated by great-power and
hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of
realizing these aspirations that China was turned
into a proving ground of adventurous
experiments, the burden of which fell heavily upon

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the shoulders of the Chinese people.</p>

<p> The People's Republic of China is going


through an acute crisis in all spheres of its
political, economic and cultural life. The
Communist Party has been broken up. The constitutional
bodies of people's power, trade-unions,

12

Komsomol and other democratic organisations and


unions of artists and intellectuals have been
dissolved. There is nothing left of the Communist Party
except its name, for Mao and his associates are
building up an altogether new political
organisation which will serve as a tool of the
militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in
the country.</p>

<p> State power bodies in China are built on the


militarist pattern inherited from Chiang
Kaishek's rule. All power is concentrated in the hands
of the military, Mao's yes-men, who are the
bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The
commanders of military areas, armies and
garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They
head the &quot;revolutionary committees&quot; and
supervise the ``regulation'' of Party organisation!?. Army
units are quartered at enterprises, educational
establishments and offices. At industrial plants
shops and teams are classed as companies and
squads. The same militarist system is being
introduced at government offices and educational
institutions. The army controls the country's economy
and culture.</p>

<p> Commanding army officers issue orders, which


workers, peasants, office employees and students
must carry out unconditionally. This is the way
society is being run today in China, this is the
way in which the ideas that all Chinese must
be &quot;obedient bulls,'' &quot;eternally unrusting screws&quot;
and &quot;Mao's good soldiers&quot; are translated into
practice. The Chinese people are being driven into
barracks and are denied access to knowledge and
culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, &quot;the more
a person knows, the more stupid he becomes.''
In the last four years not a single work of

13

fiction has been published and no feature film has


been released in the country. All museums and
libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao

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quotation books and his other ``works'' are
circulated in 3,000 million copies.</p>

<p> During these years more than 70 million


children of school age were deprived of normal
education in school. The country fell short of
several million specialists, since the academic process
at institutions of higher learning was broken off.
Such is the result of the practical implementation
of Mao's thesis: &quot;Schools are little tombs out
of which can come nothing but evil; they are
shallow ponds swarming with turtles.'' Developing
this thesis Mao said in 1964: &quot;The course of
science may be cut to half its present length.
Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music,
arrow shooting, chariot driving, holy books and
arithmetic... No matter how many books you
read, you will not become an emperor... The point
today is that, in the first place, there are many
subjects and, secondly, there are many books.''</p>

<p> But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim


they are playing the part of Messiah in today's
world.</p>

<p> Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and


servitude-such is the order of things in China today.
And the Maoists want to thrust it upon other
nations, to &quot;hoist the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas
over the whole world.''</p>

<p> The implementation of &quot;Mao Tse-tung's ideas&quot;


has also led to grave consequences in the
economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy
in a planned and balanced way on the basis of
the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his
supporters, having discarded the Leninist

14

principles of economic management and replaced


them by voluntarism, have caused the country to
embark on the road of &quot;big leaps&quot; and
militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of
industry and agriculture.</p>

<p> The PRC's economy has twice in the last


decade been hurled back below the level it had
reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year
plan wa&gt;3 carried out successfully; this was at a
time when the CPC guided the country's
economic development on the basis of the objective
laws of socialism, drawing on the experience and
relying on the all-round support and assistance

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of the USSR and other socialist countries. At
that time the PRC ranked among the first in the
world in development rates. But the second
fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the &quot;big leap,'' and
the third by the &quot;cultural revolution.'' As a result,
industrial production has not reached the levels
mapped by the second and third five-year plans.
It has been marking time on the 1959 level.</p>

<p> According to Chinese statistics, the People's


Republic of China in 1959 produced 41,500
million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 348 million
tons of coal, 3.7 million tons of oil, and 18.4
million tons of steel, whereas last year it produced
60,000--65,000 million kilowatt-hours of
electricity, 210--225 million tons of coal, 12--13 million
tons of oil, and 12--13 million tons of steel. Grain
production remained at the 1957 level and
amounted to 185--190 million tons, while the
cotton yield does not exceed 1.6 million tons.</p>

<p> It should be taken into account that the


increase in population in the country, according
to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year.
This means that in the last ten years per capita

15

production of many major industrial and


agricultural items has not risen, but decreased.</p>

<p> Basic foods and manufactured goods are being


supplied to the population under a strict
rationing system.</p>

<p> The military-barrack regime in China, which


is pictured by her propagandists as a kind of
kingdom of universal equality, is really a
caricature of socialist relations of production. The
Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the
national economy out of its logjam. Emergency
measures are being taken to remedy the
situation. Certain negative consequences of the &quot;
cultural revolution&quot; in the sphere of production are
being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy
in economic management. But the Peking leaders
are endeavouring to solve this problem primarily
by military-administrative methods,- by methods
of coercion. Meanwhile living standards of the
working people remain to be very low: the wages
of the workers in the last four years have shrunk
by at least 10--15 per cent and working hours have
been increased.</p>

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<p> The hardships of life in China are aggravated
by the Peking authorities' concentration of the
main effort on militarisation of the country. More
than 40 per cent of the national budget is set
for military purposes. This is done to the
detriment of housing construction, which has all but,
stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its
modernisation have been slashed), and education,
health and cultural advancement of the people.</p>

<p> The economy of the People's Republic of China


is actually divided into two parts. One comprises
a narrow group of sectors connected with
military production. This part enjoys overall priority,

16

and has not been subjected to the &quot;cultural


revolution&quot; treatment. The other part of the economy
consists of the civil production sectors, which are
told to &quot;lean on their own resources,'' and not
to expect investments.</p>

<p> This military deformity of the economy makes


China's entire economic and social development
lopsided.</p>

<p> The Peking leaders have distorted the essence


of socialist industrialisation. By relying on
smallscale enterprises they only preserve the country's
economic backwardness. The social consequences
of this policy are also most negative: the growth
of an organised working class is being retarded.</p>

<p> In these conditions, the Peking propagandists


seek to divert the attention of the population
from the disastrous consequences of the economic
policy which the Maoists have imposed on the
nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that
the USSR and other socialist countries are worse
off than China, and thus to neutralise justified
discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes
practically every day articles about an &quot;economic
crisis&quot; in the Soviet Union. The Peking
propagandists turn everything upside down in their attempt
to belittle the achievements of the Soviet people, to
conceal from the population of China the truth
about our country.</p>

<p> The following facts are, of course, known to the


Peking leaders, but they are carefully hidden from
the people. In the 1960--69 period in the Soviet
Union production of electricity went up from
292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000 million

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kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608
million tons; oil, from 148 million to 328 million tons;

__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__
<b>2--193</b>

17

steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and


grain, from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.</p>

<p> The Soviet Union today ranks first in the


world in the extraction of coal, iron ore and
manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe
and second in the world in the extraction of oil,
smelting of steel, production of electricity, and
the output of many key engineering items,
chemicals and other important products.</p>

<p> Major successes have also been scored by the


working people of other countries of the
socialist community. For instance, industrial output in
the member-states of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950--
69 period. During the same period industrial
output in the advanced capitalist states rose only
2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose
populations make up only one-tenth of the world
population, account for about one-third of world
industrial output, and their share in world
industrial production is steadily rising.</p>

<p> In the past few years the socialist countries


took important steps towards raising the
efficiency of social production through its intensification
on the basis of scientific and technological
progress. They are strengthening fraternal
cooperation and working to promote socialist economic
integration. The successes of the socialist world
not only serve the interests of the socialist
countries, but have a tremendous revolutionising
effect.</p>

<p> The rapid development of the national


economy of the countries of the socialist community,
whose economic growth rate <em>is</em> outstripping that
of the capitalist states; the improvement of the
living standard of the working people; the fact

18

that socialism now leads in a number of fields


in science and technology-all these real results
of the creative effort of the peoples of the

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socialist countries most decisively help to ensure
the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and
socialism over imperialism.</p>

<p> This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin's


teaching that we can make the greatest impact
on the world revolution through our economic
policy.</p>

<p> It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth


Congress of the Communist Party of China in
1956 pointed out the following: &quot;The main
purpose of the entire work of the Party is to satisfy
to the utmost the material and cultural needs
of the people. Thus it is necessary, on the basis
of development of production, to improve the life
of the people, which, in turn, is an essential
condition for stepping up the production activity
of the masses.&quot;/Peking now declares that
concern for the people's welfare is &quot;black
economism&quot; and &quot;bourgeois degeneration.''</p>

<p> Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is


being trampled underfoot in the PRC. As a
result, production is made to serve the purpose not
of steadily improving the material and cultural
standards of the working people, but of building
up a military potential necessary for carrying out
expansionist activities in the world-aims totally
alien to the interests of the working masses.</p>

<p> The Peking leaders have weakened the


positions of the working class, undermined its
alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the
socialist superstructure in China, creating antagonistic
relations between the main social sections of
society.</p>

19

<p> Today, four years after the launching of the


&quot;cultural revolution,'' the contradictions besetting
China's society remain acute, although it would
seem that all measures have been taken to
suppress and exterminate the genuinely
revolutionary, internationalist forces in China, against
which the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; was directed. This
is why the Chinese press continues to call for the
rooting out of the &quot;handful of enemies,'' as all
opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called.
Terror reigns in the country. Frame-up trials
continue to be held in large cities ending in group
executions in squares and stadiums in front of
thousands of people.</p>

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<p> The forcible assimilation of national
minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular character
of the present regime in China. Annually millions
of new settlers are being sent from Peking,
Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner
Mongolia and the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous
district. National minorities (that is, 45 million
people!) are doomed to complete forcible
absorption and disappearance as national, ethnic groups.
In the course of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; local
autonomy, already limited, is turned into a fiction.
The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The
districts inhabited by the national minorities have
become centres of &quot;labour armies&quot; and
concentration camps. The age-old culture and distinctive
features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and
others-are being systematically destroyed. This
cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.</p>

<p> More and more troops are being dispatched to

20

break their resistance. Many units are being


brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.</p>

<p> The native population is being driven out of the


districts bordering on the Soviet Union and the
Mongolian People's Republic. Yet despite all this
Peking propaganda finds it possible to praise the
order forced upon the national minorities of China
and at the same time slander the Leninist policy
of equality, friendship and fraternity of the
peoples of the Soviet Union.</p>

<p> Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland&laquo;


tis required to prevent the truth about the USSR
reaching the Chinese people.</p>

<p> The experience of national construction in the


Soviet Union over a period of more than half
a century has shown that the CPSU and the
Soviet state, by implementing the Leninist principles
of national policy, have succeeded in creating and
strengthening the unshakable moral and political
unity of all the peoples of the USSR, have ensured
the genuine blossoming of their economy and
culture. This is proved by data on the development of
the Union Republics, former backward outskirts
of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power

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industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 70 times
over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times.
These were areas with an almost 100 per cent
illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and
academies of sciences and a wide network of
schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.</p>

<p> The solution of the nationalities problem in


the Soviet Union (and this is one of the most
acute and difficult problems of social life) is
a major achievement of our socialist system, an

21

important step in mankind's social development.


The attempts of the Peking leaders to discredit
the Soviet Union's national policy only succeeded
in exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han
policy.</p>

<p> The barrack ``communism'' which they try to


establish in China runs counter to the
requirements of a socialist society-the development of
the productive forces and utilisation of the results
of the scientific and technological revolution; it
runs counter to the vital interests of the
masses-improvement of their material and cultural
standards, development of socialist democracy,
and provision of genuine equality of nations; it
runs counter to all the objective processes of
social development which spell victory of
scientific socialism.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>

<p> The anti-Leninist course of China's present


leadership is reflected in the field of foreign policy
as well. Preparation for war has been declared a
long-term political course for the entire nation.
``Legalised'' at the CPC's 9th Congress was Mao's
thesis which boils down to the idea that war is
inevitable and even desirable. &quot;As for the question of
world war,'' Mao said, &quot;it is a case of either war
provoking a revolution, or revolution preventing
war.'' In explaining the meaning of this formula,
Lin Piao at the CPC's 9th Congress, and later the
Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution with
war. Thus, the newspaper <em>Chieh tang jihpao</em> said
that revolution &quot;must of necessity develop into
war.'' According to this thesis war is not only
something that cannot be avoided; it is even some-</p>

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22

thing that should be sought. The paper deplores


the fact that for a quarter of a century now there
has been no world war.</p>

<p> In one of their publications Chinese


propagandists bluntly state: &quot;The theory that war can be
avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt
that there will be a war. The question is only when,
whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to
avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged
against views claiming that war can be avoided in
the obtaining situation.''</p>

<p> By preaching war the Maoists are writing off


the interests of world socialism, the working
people in all lands, and the world revolution. The
Peking strategists proclaim that &quot;a civilisation
hundreds of thousands of times better&quot; will be
built up on the ruins of &quot;crushed imperialism and
social-imperialism.''</p>

<p> Thus at a conference of Party workers in


Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: &quot;If, for instance,
the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one
can do except start building anew after the war
when we may possibly obtain somewhat better
results than now.'' In the last ten years whenever
there was a heightening of international tensions,
the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve
ona aim: that of heating up the situation still more
and of prodding the world towards war.</p>

<p> After the CPC's 9th Congress the position of the


present Chinese leaders on the issue of war and
peace has been stated time and again in anti--
Soviet tirades which include the most recent articles.
The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the
Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US
imperialism. The current campaign of nation-wide
militarisation conducted by the Maoists is

23

accompanied by calls for preparing for war against the


USSR and the other socialist countries, for struggle
to overthrow the socialist system in these
countries.</p>

<p> The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the


people's attention from the deep social and political
crisis that has seized the country by whipping up

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a rabid campaign of jingoism and of hate towards
the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and
some of China's non-socialist neighbours. They are
trying to lay the responsibility for all the suffering
and misery which Mao's adventuristic course has
caused the Chinese people on &quot;external enemies,''
among whom Peking puts first not imperialism,
but the Soviet Union and other countries of the
socialist community. The intensity of the false and
provocatory Peking propaganda about the &quot;threat
of an attack on the PRC from the North&quot; is a
matter of common knowledge. Also common
knowledge are the unfounded territorial claims that the
leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China's neighbours including the USSR.</p>

<p> To further these claims and stir up hate toward


neighbouring nations the leaders of the PRC
engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the
smokescreen of the war hysteria that has been
created in China, a policy is being carried out at
an intense pace of suppressing popular resentment,
speeding up the country's militarisation and
propagandising the inevitability of war.</p>

<p> In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify


this policy. One such pretext has been discovered
in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about
China's exclusiveness, about its historically
ordained role of leader &quot;beneath the heavens.'' This
chauvinistic rubbish is clothed in the form of an &quot;ultra--

24

revolutionary&quot; struggle to assert the &quot;thought of


Mao&quot; in the world.</p>

<p> Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are


petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal
greatpower concepts, ``super-revolutionary''
phrasemongering and what is actually anti-revolutionary
practice.</p>

<p> The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill


and cunning in passing themselves off as
revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of
the world revolution. If we were to believe even
for a moment the newspaper tirades and the
speechifying of the Peking leaders, one might think
that there they were working round the clock to
promote the cause of the world revolution.</p>

<p> If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful


to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian

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internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the
actions of the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces,
and imperialism would have a more limited field
for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks
against the revolutionary forces. However, Peking
has made a different choice. China's present
leaders must answer to the socialist countries, the
international working-class and national-liberation
movements for having placed the PRC in
opposition to the common front of anti-imperialist forces.</p>

<p> In an attempt to hold back the world


revolutionary process, the imperialists are uniting their
efforts on an international scale. The Chinese
leaders, however, are spearheading their foreign
policies against the cohesion of the countries of the
socialist community, they are trying to undermine
the allied relations of the socialist states-members
of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the
implementation of the plans for the further

25

development of socialist economic integration. And this,


precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to
achieve.</p>

<p> In the last few years there has not been a


single instance where, in a crisis world situation
caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the
PRC has joined the socialist community and the
anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the
forces of reaction and aggression.</p>

<p> The leaders in Peking are responsible for


dooming some detachments of the communist and
national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa
to defeat by imposing on these detachments their
adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of
courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from
Peking lost their lives, and the revolutionary
movement in some countries suffered serious
setbacks and great losses-such is the bloody result
of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of
the Peking &quot;ultra-revolutionaries.''</p>

<p> The escalation of the US imperialist aggression


in Indochina, the continuation of Israel's
aggressive actions against the Arab states, the military
intervention of the imperialist powers in the
domestic affairs of some states-all these actions are
spearheaded against the national-liberation
movement and the social progress of nations.</p>

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<p> The Soviet Government's Statement of May 4,
1970, noted that &quot;the escalation of the US
aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the
need for unity and the strengthening of cohesion
of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace
forces in the struggle against aggression.''</p>

<p> Such is the stand of our Party and Government


and of the Soviet people. Such is the stand to which

26

the fraternal socialist countries and the


MarxistLeninist Parties of the world adhere.</p>

<p> Under these conditions the negative


consequences of Peking's adventurist and splitting policies,
aimed at undermining the bonds between the main
detachments of the anti-imperialist front, become
particularly clear.</p>

<p> Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been


conducting for some years a course of
undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking
conflicts between states, of isolating the national--
liberation struggle of peoples from their real
alliesthe countries of the socialist community and the
international communist and workers' movement.
Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied
by attempts to slander the Soviet Union's
internationalist policies. The &quot;friends of people&quot; from
Peking are trying to present the political, economic
and military support given by the CPSU and the
entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist
countries, to peoples fighting against imperialist
aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a &quot;
social-imperialist policy''; they even concoct
monstrous lies about &quot;Soviet neocolonialism.''</p>

<p> According to their logic, it would have been


better for the nations fighting against imperialism
to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces
of our time and left to deal single-handed with a
strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is
actually what the imperialists are dreaming of as
they plan their adventures.</p>

<p> In acting in this manner Peking is telling the


imperialists that it does not intend to take joint
measures with the USSR and other socialist
countries against imperialist aggression. Such a
stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the

27

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imperialist circles and encourages them to
continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and
designs. Yet another proof of this are the recent
events in Indochina.</p>

<p> The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear


by their actions that they are endeavouring to
use the heroic struggle of the peoples for
freedom for furthering their own global intrigues,
for they proceed from great-Han dreams of
becoming some new emperors of &quot;great China&quot; that
would rule at least Asia, if not the entire world.</p>

<p> Such a policy contradicts the interests of the


world socialist system, the international
communist and workers' movement, the national--
liberation struggle of the peoples; it contradicts the
real interests of the Chinese people. &quot;Super--
revolutionariness&quot; in word and betrayal of the class
interests of the working people in deed-such is
the meaning of Maoism in international
relations.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>IV</em></h3>

<p> The current Chinese leadership is compelled to


reckon with the tremendous prestige enjoyed by
Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that
he will not be able to win the masses and keep
them under his control with his name and his
``ideas'' alone. For a certain period he disguised
himself as a Marxist, and now he is even trying
to pass himself for a successor to Marx and
Lenin.</p>

<p> There was a time when many of the notions


that constitute Mao Tse-tung's ``thought'' were
regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to
Mao's lack of experience and theoretical
background. Mao himself admitted that he &quot;had

28

various non-Marxist views&quot; and that he had &quot;only a


cursory bookish knowledge of Marxism.'' Mao
often came under criticism in the CPC and in
the Comintern.</p>

<p> The developments in China have revealed the


real essence of Maoism, a reactionary Utopian
petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the
theoretical plane, is an eclectic hotch-potch of widely

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different views including elements of
Confucianism, anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois
nationalism.</p>

<p> Mao took the most conservative aspect of


Confucianism-the preaching of submissiveness, the
glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the
supreme ruler.</p>

<p> From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the


ideas about the special revolutionary character of
the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of
the working class. Reactionary Utopian ideas,
born of historical backwardness, are elevated by
Mao to the rank of a new theoretical discovery.</p>

<p> Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist


doctrines great-power and chauvinistic views,
transforming them into a Messianic theory about
China's exclusiveness.</p>

<p> To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about


the precedence of political aims over the
objective laws of social development; about the &quot;
tightening of the screws&quot; and the militarisation of
society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph
anywhere before the victory of the world
revolution; the theory of export of revolution,
according to which a world war is the only way of
carrying out a revolution on the world scale; and,
finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of
conducting subversive activities in the ranks of

29

the international communist and working-class


movement.</p>

<p> Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend


based on ``Sinoised'' social-chauvinism, the &quot;
Sinoised Marxism&quot; which was declared at the Ninth
CPC Congress &quot;an entirely new stage of
Marxism-Leninism,'' accompanied by the suggestion
that Mao be placed &quot;on a much higher level than
Marx and Lenin.'' This is an open attempt to
replace Marxism-Leninism by Mao's ``ideas'' and
political directives, which, in their class nature,
are alien to the theory and practice of scientific
communism.</p>

<p> But this attempt is doomed to failure. The


anti-socialist character of Maoism, its theoretical
impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty
cannot be compensated for by the Mao cult.</p>

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<p> However ``ultra-revolutionary'' they may
sound, Mao's ideas boil down to aggressive
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring
of Peking's entire home and foreign policy. And
this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for
the cause of socialism in China.</p>

<p> The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in


Peking was caused by Mao himself; this was to be
expected and is now confirmed by the press.
Recent articles from the Chinese press contain
direct references to Mao's pronouncements aimed at
creating hate towards the Soviet Union among
the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles also
quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties
when he came out with protestations of
friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.</p>

<p> In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central


Committee's Plenary Meeting that &quot;on the whole,
Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet

30

Union.'' Exactly a year later he said the


following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet in Moscow devoted to the 40th
anniversary of the Great October Revolution: &quot;By
creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the
solution of practical problems, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the
Soviet people continuous victories in the building
of a new life. The programme of the construction
of communism in the USSR, put forward by the
20th Congress of the CPSU, is a great model.''</p>

<p> What is all this if not cynical perfidy as


regards our Party and people?</p>

<p> Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest


hopes on ideological subversion in the struggle
against socialism, the subversive activities of the
Maoists aimed at the weakening and collapse of
socialist countries, at splitting the communist
movement and mass progressive organisations,
are actually making things easier for the class
enemies of the working people. In this the
Chinese leaders are steadily drifting towards
anticommunism. A &quot;shuttle communication&quot; is under
way between the Peking propagandists and the
bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each
other's methods, terminology and &quot;arguments,''
and both use the poisoned weapon of anti--

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communism. No renegade or hireling of the
proletariat's class enemies has ever done bigger damage
to the world revolutionary process than the
Peking leaders are doing today.</p>

<p> The latest articles from the Peking press and


the Maoists' actions in the international arena
show that Peking has renewed its subversive
activities against the Marxist-Leninist Parties. The
knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups

31

in various countries for fighting the Communist


and Workers' Parties and carrying out
provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class
and national-liberation movements has become
one of the basic elements of the tactics of the
Peking leaders.</p>

<p> The interests of the world revolutionary


movement call for resolute action to rebuff the
subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for
maximum unity in the struggle against
imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism.</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> For China there is only one way of socialist


development, and this way was tested in practice
by the Chinese people themselves in the years of
their struggle for freedom, in the years of
creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist
community. It is the Leninist way to which, as
developments in China have shown, the most
experienced and mature sections of Communists and
non-Party people, genuine internationalists,
remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal
Communist and Workers' Parties have been
calling on the Chinese people to follow.</p>

<p> Unity and solidarity with the forces of the


world socialist community and the revolutionary
liberation movement, rehabilitation and
consolidation of the truly socialist basis of Chinese society
-this is the only course that accords with the
interests of the Chinese people.</p>

<p> The CPSU and the Soviet Government have


been consistently pursuing a policy aimed at
restoring and promoting friendly relations with

32

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China. It is not through our fault that these relations
have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The
present state of relations between the PRC and
the USSR and other socialist countries is a result
of the chauvinist policies conducted by the
Chinese leadership, <em>a</em> result of its departure from the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.</p>

<p> While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular


essence of the political and ideological directives
of the present-day rulers of China, waging a
principled struggle against their factionalist
activities within the communist movement and their
great-power foreign policy, the CPSU Central
Committee and the Soviet Government have been
constantly striving to prevent ideological
differences from affecting inter-state relations.</p>

<p> The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and


unambiguous stand on the Peking negotiations on the
question of normalising the situation along the
Soviet-Chinese borders. Our country believes that
it is necessary to reach an agreement that would
permit turning the borders into a line of
goodneighbourliness. As it has been repeatedly
emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and
the Soviet Government, we, while not retreating
from our just and principled positions and while
defending the interests of our socialist homeland
and the inviolability of its frontiers, will continue
doing everything in our power to normalise our
inter-state relations with the People's Republic of
China.</p>

<p> We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact


that Peking is bent on whipping up militaristic
psychosis, demanding that the people &quot;prepare
for famine, prepare for a war.'' Even the

__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__
3--193

33

launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless


efforts of Chinese scientists, engineers and
workers, is used as an occasion for fanning
nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our
country.</p>

<p> If all this is being done with a view to


bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, one

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must say in advance that these are vain efforts.
The Soviet people have strong nerves. Our people
possess everything necessary to uphold the
interests of our homeland.</p>

<p> We proceed from the belief that the vital and


long-range interests of the Soviet and Chinese
peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact
they coincide.</p>

<p> ``In jointly following the road charted by


Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against the
sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph
of the sacred cause of socialism and communism,''
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, said in his report at the
meeting marking the centenary of the birth of Lenin,
&quot;lies the correct path for the future development
of relations between China and the Soviet Union,
and between China and other socialist countries.''</p>

<p> The Soviet people proceeding from this


historical path, retain a friendly attitude towards the
Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and
internationalist policy is bound to triumph in China.
Such is the objective logic of historical
development.</p>

<p> <em>Pravda</em>, May 18, 1970</p>

[34]

__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Concerning the 50th
<br /> Anniversary of the Communist Party
<br /> of China</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <em>O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov</em>

<p> July 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of


the foundation of the Communist Party of China.
In the past half-century it has traversed a long and
devious road of great achievements as well as
grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists
united to form the Communist Party of China.
Relying on the support and experience of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire
international communist movement, the Communist
Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the
Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and
led the Chinese people to an historic victory in
October 1949.</p>

<p> People's China led by the Communist Party


became part of the socialist camp, and established

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friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other
fraternal states. With their help the Chinese
people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the
national independence of the People's Republic of
China, eliminating the remnants of the semi--
colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad
democratic reforms. In accordance with the will
of the multi-million working masses the
Communist Party of China led the country along the road
of building a socialist society, as defined in the
decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in
September 1956. The first five-year plan for the

__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__
3*

35

country's economic development was fulfilled in 1957.


The Communist Party of China emerged as a major
contingent of the world communist movement and
enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the
international meetings of communist and workers'
parties in 1957 and 1960.</p>

<p> But in the late 1950's the CPC leadership


initiated a foreign and home policy which deviated from
Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the
principles of proletarian internationalism and the
basic laws of socialist construction. It began to
pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois
adventurism with great-power chauvinism,
camouflaged with ``left'' phraseology; it openly embarked
on a course of undermining the unity of the
socialist community, of splitting the world communist
movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups
in a number of countries, in an obvious attempt
to unite them and turn them against the world
communist movement. This resulted in a
considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist
Party and the working class within China and an
upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist elements.</p>

<p> After adopting an ideological and political line


which is incompatible with Leninism, on the main
questions concerning the international situation
and the world communist movement, the Peking
leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union abandon the line adopted by the 20th
CPSU Congress and the CPSU Programme. They
conducted intensive anti-Soviet propaganda,
presented territorial claims to the Soviet Union and
even brought the matters to armed border clashes
in the spring and summer of 1969.</p>

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<p> The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties,
resolutely countered the attempts to distort the

36

Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in


the socialist community, the world communist
movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU
Central Committee and the Soviet Government
displayed restraint and refused to be provoked
while doing everything they could to improve
relations with China. The last one and a half years
have seen some signs of a normalisation of
USSRPRC relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts
of the Soviet Union. At the same time the Chinese
leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line
in their propaganda and policy; the 9th CPC
Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti--
Marxist course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. Peking's actions in the
international arena testify that the foreign policy of the
PRC has in fact broken away from proletarian
internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.
</p>

<p> General Secretary of the CPSU Central


Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at the 1969
Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties: &quot;It is a
big and serious task to make an all-round
MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events
in China over the last few years, and of the roots
of the present line of the CPC leaders, which is
jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese
people.'' It is all the more appropriate, on the 50th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, to
review the path it has travelled, to consider its
glorious and hard destiny.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h3>

<p> The Communist Party of China was founded as


a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. At its First
Congress the party set the task of carrying out a

37

socialist revolution, establishing the dictatorships


of the proletariat and building a classless,
communist society. The Congress adopted a decision on
the party's joining the Comintern. In early 1922
Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.</p>

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<p> The emergence and development of the
Communist Party of China proceeded in extremely
complex conditions as a result of China's economic,
social, political and cultural backwardness and the
insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese
proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in
China comprised three different currents: the
struggle of the peasantry and the petty national
bourgeoisie against the survivals of feudalism, the
nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist
oppression, for national independence, and the
proletariat's struggle for socialism.</p>

<p> At the time when the CPC came into being the
working-class movement in China was just
beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary
experience in class struggle. The November 1927
Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: &quot;The CPC began to take shape as a
political trend and as a party at a time when the
Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself
as a class and when the <em>class</em> movement of
workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge
of the <em>national-liberation</em> movement in China, in
which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the
earlier period, took place long before the class
awareness and class struggle of the exploited
masses assumed an appreciable scale.''</p>

<p> The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of


the Chinese proletariat was adversely affected by
the fact that prior to the Great October Socialist

38

Revolution in Russia Marxism was unknown in


China. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the gun
salvoes of the October Revolution brought
MarxismLeninism to China.</p>

<p> In his <em>`Left-Wing' Communism - an Infantile


Disorder</em> Lenin wrote the following with regard to
the history of the establishment of a proletarian
party in this country: &quot;Russia achieved
Marxismthe only correct revolutionary theory-through the
<em>agony</em> she experienced in the course of half a
century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of
unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible
energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial,
disappointment, verification, and comparison with
European experience. ...Russia, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of
international links and excellent information on the forms

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and theories of the world revolutionary movement,
such as no other country possessed.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such


experience.</p>

<p> Thus the formation of the Communist Party in


China proceeded in extremely difficult conditions.
But nevertheless it was a <em>natural</em> and <em>necessary</em>
result of the revolutionary movement which
emerged in China under the mighty impact of the
October Revolution, which awakened the revolutionary
activity of the working class, the broad working
masses, including the peoples of the colonial and
dependent countries, in all parts of the world.</p>

<p> The &quot;May 4 Movement&quot; was a response to the


October Revolution and showed that the working
people of China were ready for a decisive struggle
against imperialist oppression. It was necessary
then to merge the Marxist circles into a party

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 31, pp. 25--26.</p>

39

capable of leading the struggle of the young working


class, and the democratic and national-liberation
forces against social oppression, against
imperialism. Such a party came into being in the 1920s.
Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed
within the communist movement in China with the help
of the Comintern, which set a correct political
course.</p>

<p> The Second Congress which took place in July


1922 confirmed the CPC's striving to become a
truly proletarian party. &quot;We must be a real political
party created by the proletarian masses, imbued
with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for
the interests of the proletariat and lead the
proletarian revolutionary movement,'' said the <em>
Resolution on the CPC's Rules</em>. The Congress called for
organisation of the party after the Bolshevik
model and adopted a resolution on joining the
Comintern, which subsequently guided the political
and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists.
The world communist movement invariably came
to the help of the Chinese revolutionaries
whenever they made mistakes.</p>

<p> The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and

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4th (January 1925) Congresses regarded the
proletariat as the party's mainstay, the vanguard and
then the leader of the revolution, and the
peasantry as the proletariat's chief ally whose active
support was vitally important for the Chinese
revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress (April-May
1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more
than 50 per cent of whom were workers and about
19 per cent peasants.</p>

<p> The 6th Congress was an important landmark in


the development of the Communist Party of China.
It was held in June and July 1928 and was

40

attended by a delegation of the Comintern Executive.


In February of the same year the 9th plenary
meeting of the Comintern Executive adopted a <em>
Resolution on the Chinese Question</em> which summed up
the current developments and the specific features
of the revolutionary movement in China and
pointed out that &quot;the Comintern Executive has
directed all its sections to support the Chinese
revolution in every way.'' Guided by this resolution the
Congress adopted documents which in effect
constituted the first comprehensive programme of the
CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese
revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and
unification of the country, complete elimination of
landlord ownership of land and liberation of the
peasantry from all feudal bonds, struggle for the
power of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers'
deputies as the best form of government for
implementing the democratic dictatorship of the
working class and peasantry in China. On the
advice of the Comintern Executive delegation the
6th CPC Congress gave special attention to the
development of the peasant movement and guerrilla
struggle under the slogan of agrarian revolution,
with the aim of creating a regular Red Army of
workers and peasants based on guerrilla
detachments.</p>

<p> This showed a truly Marxist approach to the


problems of the Chinese revolution, the solutions
to which were worked out by the Communists--
internationalists.</p>

<p> But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend


in the CPC another, essentially petty-bourgeois and
nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of
the upsurge of the national liberation movement
radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined

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41

the party in great numbers. &quot;Lifted by the wave


of revolutionary enthusiasm of the initial period,
lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling,
ignorant of the experience of the international
proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited
lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken
no part in the class struggle of the workers and
peasants, a considerable part of these
revolutionary petty-bourgeois elements, far from being
assimilated by the party and becoming consistent
proletarian revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all
the political instability, inconsistency and
indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian
habits and traditions, prejudices and illusions
characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,''
stressed the November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the
CPC Central Committee. This tendency, associated
mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into
a petty-bourgeois and nationalist trend which
came to be known as Maoism.</p>

<p> The struggle between the Marxist,


internationalist trend guided by the ideas underlying the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the petty--
bourgeois, nationalist trend marked the entire history
of the Communist Party of China. This struggle
was reflected in the decisions of the party
congresses, in the theories and the practical activity
of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these
two trends has been and remains characteristic of
the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and
his historiographers seek to distort the true
picture, to confuse the issue. To this end they oppose
the &quot;true line&quot; of Mao Tse-tung to a host of
``wrong'' lines, whose number grows in Peking
publications every year. Recently most of the party
cadres have been labelled &quot;those vested with

42

power in the party and following the capitalist


road.''</p>

<p> The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the


CPC was guided by the theses set forth in Lenin's
works and in the documents of the international
communist movement. These theses include the
definition of the essential feature of the Chinese
revolution as a combination of the struggle against
feudal survivals and the struggle against
imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement

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and the revolutionary struggle in the countryside
and to set up strongholds when the revolution is
in decline; the expediency of an alliance with the
petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that
in China armed revolution is fighting against
armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union
of the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and
others. It was the implementation of these theses
by the Communist Party of China that made
possible the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949.
The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
faction was quite different. It did not and could not
make any positive contribution to the development
of the communist movement in China. The
revolutionary movement suffered setbacks and defeats
whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists
wittingly or unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist
theses.</p>

<p> Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the


Maoists from time to time attempted to make the
party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had
to retreat. It is significant that Mao Tse-tung
attended only three out of the six CPC congresses
held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was
deprived of the right to vote. The Maoists launched

43

fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with


difficulties.</p>

<p> After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in


April 1927 the Communist Party of China
functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides
-from the central Kuomintang government and
the separatist military cliques, from the troops of
the Western imperialist colonialists and the
Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy losses
when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the
remote north-western regions of the country following
the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the
party gave their lives in the struggle for the cause
of the working people. The loss of the tried cadres
devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism seriously weakened the position of
the CPC.</p>

<p> This was used to advantage by the


representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In early 1935 they
conducted the &quot;enlarged session of the CPC
Central Committee Politbureau&quot; in Tsungyi and
captured important posts in the party leadership.

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In the autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union
and the entire international communist
movement were concentrating their efforts on the
struggle against nazism, they launched a &quot;drive to
streamline the style of work&quot; in the CPC. The aim
of the campaign was to turn the Communist Party
of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand to a
petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political
platform (the 22 works selected for compulsory
study during the ``campaign'' were mostly articles
and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and
other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the
opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and
moral terror. After more than three years of struggle

44

the petty-bourgeois nationalists managed to get


the upper hand-the 7th CPC Congress held in
1945 was conducted in an atmosphere of
deification of Mao Tse-tung and it approved &quot;Mao
Tsetung's ideas&quot; as the ideological platform of the
Communist Party of China.</p>

<p> At the same time the obtaining situation and the


revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people
forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in
the mainstream of the revolutionary struggle.</p>

<p> In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced


the idea of a united anti-imperialist front, stressing
its particular importance for countries in colonial
bondage at a time of imperialist expansion. In
keeping with this thesis <em>a</em> united front of the
Communist Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of
resistance against Japanese imperialism (1937--45)
was proclaimed in China, which furnished the
basis for rallying all segments of the Chinese people
for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The
petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united
front, seeking every opportunity to undermine it.
Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the
Chinese national-liberation movement, the
courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of
the CPC leadership for consistent implementation
of the Comintern line, and were forced to retreat.
The united front policy helped to make the CPC a
mass party, the vanguard of the Chinese people, a
political force of nation-wide significance.</p>

<p> The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler


nazism and militarist Japan was of tremendous
importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945--49
the centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement

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shifted to Manchuria where active preparation
began with Soviet assistance for the final phase of

45

the struggle for liberating China from colonial and


social oppression.</p>

<p> The routing of militarist Japan, in which the


Soviet Union played a decisive role, strengthened
the revolutionary forces in China. The People's
Liberation Army had then a safe rear and was able
to reorganise and improve its combat equipment
with the Japanese arms and materiel captured by
the Soviet troops.</p>

<p> The revolutionary forces of China received


extensive material assistance from the Soviet Union.
In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian
organisations helped in every way to rehabilitate
the economy, to repair communication lines
destroyed during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the
main railways in central and southern Manchuria
were restarted in a short time and large formations
of the People's Liberation Army of China were able
to regroup and concentrate, which helped to
complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its
expulsion from Manchuria, and furnished favourable
conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.</p>

<p> The Chinese people were able to express their


will freely in the areas liberated from the Japanese
by the Soviet Army and began to set up people's
democratic bodies of power.</p>

<p> At that time the USSR Government did


everything to prevent open military intervention by the
United States in China, above all in Manchuria.</p>

<p> The visits by Chinese delegations from the


people's democratic regions of Manchuria to the
Soviet Union in 1945 and 1949 and other forms of
consultation (a group of Soviet party officials
stayed in Manchuria from 1945 to maintain close
contact with the North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC
Central Committee; in early 1949 a responsible

46

representative of the CPSU had a meeting with the


Chinese leaders) were of great importance to the
CPC for elaborating a correct political line. This
assistance was all the more valuable since the
petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of the CPC

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leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one
extreme to another in assessing the forces in the
Chinese revolution. In 1945--46, for example, they
overestimated their forces and displayed &quot;
revolutionary impatience,'' ignoring the need to conserve
forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive
blow and the need to combine the political and
diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of
the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948--49,
after the Kuomintang offensive and the loss of
Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC
leadership showed disbelief in the possibility of an early
victory and proved helpless in dealing with
practical questions connected with the establishment
of people's power all over China.</p>

<p> Manchuria with its well-developed industry and


the large share of the country's working class, its
strong party organisations, and also thanks to the
fact that it borders on the Soviet Union, became in
1945--49 a strategic bridgehead from which the
People's Liberation Army was able to launch a
powerful offensive and quickly liberate the whole
country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their
imperialist patrons.</p>

<p> The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese


people was crowned with a glorious victory. In the
vanguard were Communists true to Marxism--
Leninism and proletarian internationalism. At every
stage of that struggle the Communist Party of
China had leaders who represented everything best in
the Chinese revolutionary movement. These were

47

the Chinese Communists whose real role was


subsequently ignored or wilfully distorted by the
Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung as
the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary
movement and creating a myth about his infallability.
Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or
were forced out from the CPC leadership, but their
glorious memory lives on.</p>

<p> The fraternal union of the Chinese


revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for the relative
weakness and disunity of the Chinese working
class; it promoted the consolidation of the internal
forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them
against the import of counter-revolution. The
victory of the Chinese people convincingly proved the
correctness of Lenin's thesis that ''. . .this
revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can

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now develop effectively, can reach a successful
issue, only in direct association with the
revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against
international imperialism.''~^^1^^</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>

<p> The formation of the People's Republic of China


and the establishment in China of people's demo- :
cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i
ist Party, the extensive and disinterested assistance I
of the USSR and other fraternal countries, and the
changed balance of class forces in the international
arena in favour of socialism opened before the
Chinese people broad possibilities of successful
building of socialism. In the first years after the
establishment of the People's Republic of China the

_-_-_

<p> ^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 30, p. 151.</p>

48

Communist Party drafted concrete ways of


carrying out socialist construction. In 1953 the CPC's
general line in the transition period was made
public, which called for mobilising all the forces for
making China a mighty socialist state.</p>

<p> In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and


endorsed the course of building a socialist society
in the People's Republic of China. At the same
time the Congress proclaimed that &quot;the Communist
Party of China is guided in its activity by
Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly
interprets the laws of social development, shows
the correct ways of building socialism and
communism.'' This thesis did away with the idea of
&quot;Sinoised Marxism&quot; and with &quot;Mao Tse-tung's
thought&quot; as the CPC's ideological platform set
forth at the 7th Party Congress in 1945.</p>

<p> The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired


a strong foundation in China. But the petty--
bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay
down their arms. They continued to deal
underhand blows at the section of the party leadership
and rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.</p>

<p> In the mid-50's the People's Republic of China

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entered &quot;the core of the revolutionary course,'' to
use Lenin's expression. Radical changes were
carried out in the non-socialist economic sectors. The
achievements of the first five-year plan period
furnished the basis for further advancement, for
organising large-scale socialist production under strict
government control. The prospect of complete
elimination of the petty-owner element became quite
real. This naturally aroused the resistance of that
element, greater vacillations, which, in turn,

__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__
<b>4--193</b>

49

affected the petty-bourgeois, nationalist elements in the


CPC leadership. &quot;In April 1956 ... we began to
advance our own line of construction,'' Mao
Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC Central
Committee in 1958.</p>

<p> Lenin characterised the vacillations of the


pettyowner element as follows: &quot;This wavering flows
in two `streams': petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e.,
servility to the bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of
sentimental democratic and `Social-Democratic'
phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois
revolutionism-menacing, blustering and boastful
in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption
and brainlessness in deeds.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the


road of petty-bourgeois reformism. Even within
the framework of CPC's general orientation to
scientific socialism they advanced &quot;new political
stipulations,'' which reflect right-wing opportunism.</p>

<p> In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a &quot;course


of prolonged coexistence of the Communist Party
with bourgeois-democratic parties and <em>reciprocal
control between them</em>&quot; (italics added) which in
practice undermined the CPC's leading role in
society and provided the bourgeois parties which
remained in the People's Republic of China with an
effective instrument for struggle for power. In
practice the Maoist slogan &quot;May hundred flowers
blossom&quot; amounted to legalising anti-Marxist,
anti-socialist views and undermined the authority of
the proletarian ideology in the country. The
theory of &quot;contradictions within the people&quot; which
considered the contradiction between the working
class and the national bourgeoisie as non--
antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people

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_-_-_

<p> ~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 33, p. 21.</p>

50

and played into the hands of the enemies of


socialism.</p>

<p> The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these


&quot;new stipulations&quot; to launch an open attack on
socialism in the spring of 1957. The social and
political system in the People's Republic of China, the
system of economic management, all public
organisations were being criticised and discredited.
Demands were made to annul the changes that had
been carried out in capitalist industry, handicraft
production and agriculture. Calls were made for
physical extermination of Communists, for
smashing the CPC and its leadership. The petty-bourgeois,
nationalist CPC leaders, concerned about their own
safety, above all else, hastened to introduce
corrections in their &quot;new stipulations.'' The working class
and the Communists beat back the bourgeois
onslaught. But the shift in the CPC leadership's
policy to the right, the proclaiming of opportunist
``courses'' and ``slogans'' had done their job-they
further increased the influence of the petty--
bourgeois ideology.</p>

<p> The successful completion of the first five-year


plan, the growth of the country's economic and
military might and of the international prestige of the
Communist Party of China and the People's
Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist leaders
from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they
turned eagerly to petty-bourgeois revolutionism,
reflected by the so-called three red banners policy
announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC
general line which provided a definite plan of
socialist construction a new &quot;general line&quot; was
proclaimed in the form of a vague appeal: &quot;To strain all
forces, to strive forward, to build socialism
according to the principle 'more, faster, better and more

__PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__
<b>4*</b>

51

economically.'~&quot; The &quot;great leap&quot; and the setting


up of &quot;people's communes&quot; were declared the
basis of the country's economic policy. In the

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international arena the line was to heighten tension,
attain world hegemony, worsen relations with the
USSR and other socialist states.</p>

<p> The Communist Party of China found itself


unable to cope with the consequences of these &quot;
innovations,'' and a considerable portion of its
membership began to waver. This happened not only
because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist
cadres had been paralysed and ousted from leadership
by that time. The fact is that owing to the specific
conditions in which the party had developed, and
to the cadres policy that had been pursued for
many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the
party, the petty-owner elements had become the
dominating trend in the Communist Party of China.</p>

<p> According to official Chinese data, in the late


50s the share of workers among party members
was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.</p>

<p> We must not forget in this connection Lenin's


warning that ''. .. we constantly regard as
workers people who have not had the slightest real ex- I
perience of large-scale industry. There has been
case after case of petty bourgeois, who have
become workers by chance and only for a very short
time, being classed as workers''.~^^1^^ Thus it happens
that the proletarian character of a party does not
rule out <em>a</em> possible predominance, and in a very
short time, of petty-owner elements.</p>

<p> Neither should we forget Lenin's teaching that


whenever former small owners join the party in
vast numbers ''. . .the proletarian policy of the

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 33, p. 254.


</p>

52

party is not determined by the character of its


membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige
enjoyed by the small group which might be called
the Old Guard of the Party.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> To be sure, the difficulties faced by the


Communist Party of China were not insurmountable. As
experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be
coped with if the party follows the Marxist--
Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it
tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the

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working class and the peasantry under the leadership
of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests
of the working people. Yet the Maoists staked on
petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the basic
interests of the working class, the peasantry and the
working intelligentsia. Moreover, the systematic
``purges'' struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist
cadres.</p>

<p> The home and foreign policy advanced by the


petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in the CPC
leadership had a disastrous effect on China's economy
and brought about real calamities in the country.
Added to this were severe droughts and floods for
three years in succession. As a result, according to
various estimates, the gross national product in the
People's Republic of China fell by one-third,
industrial output was halved and the national income
shrunk by more than one-quarter.</p>

<p> In the face of this the CPC leadership made


changes in its home policy, although the &quot;three red
banners&quot; slogan was not officially retracted. At the
cost of tremendous efforts of the working people
and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to

_-_-_

<p> ^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 33, p. 257.</p>

53

socialist economic forms, the People's Republic of


China managed to regain the 1957 level of
industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964.
But the country's population grew considerably
during this period. In 1964 China exploded its first
atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms
race despite its limited resources. Enormous sums
had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for
propaganda and subversion against the world
communist movement and for pursuing its great-power
foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC's
cooperation with socialist states did irreparable damage to
the country. As a result, difficulties continued to
mount in China.</p>

<p> The strife inside the CPC leadership was further


aggravated. The key issue now was the question
of the country's further development. The choice
was between returning to the time-tested practice
of socialist construction in close cooperation with
the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and

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following the petty-bourgeois, nationalist road. In
his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung
admitted that attitude to the Soviet Union
represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.</p>

<p> It should be stressed that the positions of the


working class in the PRC were seriously
weakened at that time. The destruction, during the &quot;big
leap,'' of large-scale industry which Lenin called
the proletariat's &quot;vital basis&quot; and the curtailment of
industrialisation deprived it of its class strength
and undermined its ability to resist petty-bourgeois
vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the
pettyowner, anarchist element on developments in the
country and its fluctuations continued despite the
fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative

54

basis. Lenin thus characterised the main features of


this element: &quot;It will take collectives, collective
farms and communes years to change this.''~^^1^^ The
Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get
the upper hand in the CPC leadership.</p>

<p> Quite obviously this course of events was not


fatally inevitable, even in the complex conditions
of the People's Republic of China. After the
successful completion of the first five-year plan in 1957
the country was on the threshold of new
achievements in economic and cultural development, in
promoting democracy, and in foreign affairs. Such
achievements would undoubtedly have taken place
had the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely
Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded and
enhanced the party's leading role, had it promoted in
every way the growth of the ranks of the working
class, its political awareness and its influence in
society. But it was China's misfortune that the
party and the country came to be guided by the
representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views
and aspirations. Their activity furnished conditions
for further attacks by the small-owner element
against the working class, which gradually turned
into a frontal assault. It began at a signal from
Mao Tse-tung who called for &quot;opening fire at the
headquarters&quot; (i.e., party organisations). It
became the notorious &quot;cultural revolution.''</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>

<p> Lenin wrote the following with regard to the

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possible outcome of the struggle against the
anarchist element represented by the small owner:

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 32, p. 27fi.</p>

55

<p> ``Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our


control and accounting (we can do this if we
organise the poor, that is, the majority of the
population or semi-proletarians, round the politically
conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will
overthrow our workers' power as surely and as
inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the
Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this
very soil of petty proprietorship. That is how the
question stands. That is the only view we can take
of the matter. . .''~^^1^^</p>

<p> The negative results of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot;


are generally known. The situation in the People's
Republic of China developed in the direction of
the second variant predicted by Lenin. In the
course of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; the political system
of the People's Republic of China as a state
governed by the working class was destroyed. The bodies
of people's power ceased to function. The
Communist Party of China itself as a party of the
Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to
bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist
League, all other public organisations, including the
young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of
socio-political, economic and cultural life were put
under the army's control. The result was what
Lenin called a &quot;<em>shitt of power</em>,'' the ousting of the
working class from the real bodies of power and the
loss by its party of the leading position in society.
A military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into
being in China. The proletarian ideology--
MarxismLeninism-was deprived of its leading role in
society and replaced with &quot;Mao Tse-tung's ideas.''</p>

<p> In order to step up and legalise this process of

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 32, p. 332.


56</p>

56

``shift of power&quot; the Maoists broke away

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completely from the ideological and organisational
principles formulated by the Communist Party of China
at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the
9th CPC Congress held in April 1969. The
Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the army
whose representatives headed the &quot;revolutionary
committees&quot; that replaced the elective local bodies of
power in the course of the &quot;cultural revolution.''
The army actually seized the highest party organs
set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate
members of the Central Committee Politbureau
(15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee
(145 out of 279); this did not include persons who
formerly served in the army or were closely
connected with it. The Congress advanced as a
programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the
country. The Party Rules adopted by the Congress
proclaim &quot;Mao Tse-tung's thought&quot; to be
Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch. Though the
Maoists use the term &quot;democratic centralism&quot;
quite often in the official press, in reality all their
activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party.
The Party Rules in effect envisaged the creation,
under the name of the Communist Party of China,
of a new political organisation which would serve
as an obedient tool of the military-bureaucratic
dictatorship.</p>

<p> However, the formation of such an organisation


dragged out in the face of serious difficulties. Thus
Peking propagandists are forced to return once
again to the question of &quot;streamlining and
upbuilding the party organisations,'' &quot;cleaning up the

57

party,'' etc. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of


the Communist Party of China the work of
forming provincial party committees was stepped up,
although many district and other local party
organizations had not yet been established. The
delegates to the conferences (called ``congresses'' by the
Chinese press) which form provincial party
committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the
respective &quot;revolutionary committees.'' The latter
became the leaders of the new party
committeesnearly all of them being representatives of the
army.</p>

<p> One indication that the petty-bourgeois


nationalists are running into difficulties is the fact that

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they are forced to restore the former organisational
structure which was crushed during the &quot;cultural
revolution&quot; under their instructions. The party
Central Committee continues to exist, though only
formally, as does its Politbureau, and medium--
level and lower party links are being formed, though
slowly. They have been and are being &quot;set up&quot; by
methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist
party norms. Their members are predominantly
servicemen, while the Politbureau includes people
closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his
private secretary, his former bodyguard, etc). But
this structure may come to play a positive part
should conditions in the party and the country
take a favourable turn. Besides, the present CPC
leadership is faced with the necessity of
reinstating some of the former party cadres, who were
persecuted or discredited during the &quot;cultural
revolution.''</p>

<p> Another indication of such difficulties


encountered by the Maoists is that despite the many years
of propaganda and mass ``brainwashing'' and the

58

``re-cducation&quot; of the CPC members and party


functionaries in the &quot;May 7 schools,'' which differ only
slightly from concentration camps, and the worst
manifestations of the personality cult, the attempt
to inculcate &quot;Mao Tse-tung's thought&quot; in the minds
of the Chinese Communists and the advanced
sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with
resistance. Only this can explain why, in the
conditions obtaining in the People's Republic of
China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun
pointing out the need to study the works of Marx,
Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main
purpose of this ``study'' is to bolster the influence
of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideology-&quot;Mao
Tse-tung's thought&quot;-under the slogan of &quot;
disseminating Marxism-Leninism.'' The People's
Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung's
works, ten million copies of the works of Marx
and Lenin. This is, of course, a mere drop in the
ocean, considering the enormous population of the
People's Republic of China and the fact that
during the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; the number of copies
of Mao Tse-tung's ``quotations'' and other works
exceeded the astronomical figure of three thousand
million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung's
works is continuing.</p>

<p> The resistance encountered by the Maoists in

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implementing their plans testify to the unceasing
opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the
CPC. The true Communists of China are in a
difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive
programme for China's development along the socialist
road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress,
which the 9th Congress had nothing to counter
with.</p>

59

<p> However complicated the present situation in


China may be, the resurgence of the Communist
Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist
type, its reunification with the world communist
movement, the return of the People's Republic of
China to the road of scientific socialism and
friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with the socialist
community-these are objective demands of
Chinese society. All the more so since there remain
elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite
the fact that these surviving socialist elements in
the economy and social structure are neutralised
by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and
deformed by the anti-socialist policy, so long as the
economic basis of society has not undergone
qualitative, radical changes, it can serve as the basis
for China's development in a positive direction.</p>

<p> General Secretary of the CPSU Central


Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 1969
Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties: &quot;We
do not identify the declarations and actions of the
present Chinese leadership with the aspirations,
wishes and true interests of the Communist Party
of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply
convinced that China's genuine national renascence
and its socialist development will be best served
not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, against the whole communist
movement, but by alliance and fraternal
cooperation with them.''</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The 50-year experience of the Communist Party


of China is highly instructive not only to the parties
functioning in countries whose level of
development is similar to that of China, but to the entire

60

communist movement. The main conclusion to be

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drawn from this experience is that a Communist
Party must constantly strengthen its combat
efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need
for a determined struggle against the forces and
traditions of the old society: &quot;The force of habit
in millions and tens of millions is a most
formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been
tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the
confidence of all honest people in the class in
question, a party capable of watching and
influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle
cannot be waged successfully.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> The fate of the Communist Party of China


confirms once again Lenin's thesis that the struggle
&quot;.. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois
national prejudices, looms ever larger with the
mounting exigency of the task of converting the
dictatorship of the proletariat from a national
dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and
incapable of determining world politics) into an
international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the
proletariat involving at least several advanced countries,
and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon
world politics as a whole).''~^^2^^ These words deserve
special attention in our time when the world
socialist system is emerging as a decisive factor in
mankind's development.</p>

<p> Maoism as an ideological and political trend is


essentially hostile to Marxism-Leninism; it
substitutes sophistry and eclecticism for materialist
dialectics and voluntarism, for a materialist
interpretation of history. A parasite drawing sustenance

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 31, pp. 44--45.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 148.</p>

61

from socialist ideology, this trend in effect denies


the guiding role of the working class in the
socialist transformation of society, the role of the
Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class,
and in every way belittles the role of the masses
in history. While employing anti-imperialist
verbiage the Maoists are in fact opposed to the
international communist movement; they engage in
subversive activities against the Marxist-Leninist
parties and seek to force their nationalist
programme on the latter.</p>

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<p> That is why in waging a struggle against
Maoism one must proceed from an awareness of the
incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of
social-chauvinism with the aims of the world
communist and liberation movement, with the basic
principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning
socialist construction, international affairs and
revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of
violence and overestimation of the power of the bayonet,
great-power chauvinism and claims for world
hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of
superstructure, which means substitution of a
military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people's
democratic social system, and militarisation of
society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.</p>

<p> That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully


approved the principled Leninist line and the
concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and
the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations.
It noted: &quot;In a situation in which the Chinese
leaders came out with their own specific ideological--
political platform, which is incompatible with
Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist
countries and at creating a split of the international

62

communist and the whole anti-imperialist


movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct
stand-a stand of consistently defending the
principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening
of the unity of the world communist movement,
and protection of the interests of our socialist
Motherland.''</p>

<p> Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the


slanderous fabrications of the Chinese
propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the
Soviet Government, borrowed from the arsenal of
Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist
fanatics.</p>

<p> At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed


the CPSU's course of normalising relations between
the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good--
neighbourly relations and friendship between the
Soviet and Chinese peoples.</p>

<p> On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the


Chinese Communist Party Soviet Communists send
fraternal greetings to the Communists and

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working people of China. The Soviet people are
convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations and
friendship will be restored between the USSR and
the People's Republic of China, since this meets
the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet
peoples, the interests of the world socialist system, of
the revolutionary, liberation movement of all the
oppressed, the interests of universal peace.</p>

<p> <em>Kommunist</em>, No. 10, 1971</p>

[63]

__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Concerning
<br /> the 50th Anniversary
<br /> of the Communist Party of China</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <em>I. Alexandrov</em>

<p> Half a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the


inaugural congress of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the
foundation of the Communist Party of China, a
proletarian party of a new type. The congress
documents stated that the Party's aim was to bring
about the dictatorship of the proletariat, build
socialism and fight for communism, and that the
Party was connected with the Communist
International.</p>

<p> Since then the CPC has traversed a long and


thorny path. It headed the struggle of the Chinese
people for national and social liberation, led them
to the victory of the revolution, and directed
China along the socialist road of development. The
Party was able to fulfil this task because the
Communists, guided by the great Marxist-Leninist
teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and
waged an unremitting struggle against
imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords,
against petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing
and right-wing deviations, chauvinism and
nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist--
minded members of the Party constantly fought against
the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring
about the triumph of the ideals of scientific
communism.</p>

64

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h3>

<p> The founding of the Communist Party of China

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was a result of the stepped-up political activity of
the rising working class and the upsurge of the
revolutionary democratic and national-liberation
movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of
young Soviet Russia.</p>

<p> Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and,


later on, a co-founder of the CPC and one of its
leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist,
said the following about the significance of the
October Revolution for China:</p>

<p> ``We should greet the Russian revolution with


pride as the beacon of a new world civilisation.
We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from
new Russia which is being built on the principles
of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we
keep up with world progress.''</p>

<p> In China, the struggle for social emancipation


of the working people was closely tied in with the
tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main
obstacle to the revolution at the time was imperialism
which had made the country its semi-colony.
Lenin's view that capital is &quot;an international force&quot;
was confirmed in the course of the liberation
struggle which developed in China under the Party's
guidance. An international alliance of workers,
their international brotherhood, is needed to
vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party
and the people of the Soviet Union, the world
communist and workers' movement became a reliable
ally for the CPC and the working people of China.</p>

<p> The Communist International and the Soviet


Communists gave the Chinese revolutionaries the

__PRINTERS_P_05_COMMENT__
<b>5--193</b>

65

necessary practical assistance in organising the


first Marxist groups which appeared in China
after the anti-imperialist &quot;Fourth of May
Movement&quot; of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis
of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology. The
decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist
International and Lenin's speeches at this congress
on the national and colonial questions served as an
impetus and ideological basis for the unification
of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The
Communist International gave considerable assistance to

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the Chinese revolutionaries in assimilating
Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the
Leninist Party of Bolsheviks.</p>

<p> Right from the first the CPC found itself in the
crucible of the national-democratic revolution and
put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
programme. The period between the first and third
congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was
a period of Party organisational and ideological
growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted to the
Communist International. At its Third Congress
(1923) the Party advanced the policy of building
a united national-revolutionary front with the
Kuomintang then headed by the great revolutionary
democrat Sun Yat-sen.</p>

<p> The anti-imperialist action of the people, with


the working class as its chief force, kept
mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for
the CPC to ensure proletarian hegemony in the
national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong
and Canton sailors' strike, the general strike of the
Shanghai workers, and the growth of the peasant
movement in the country showed that the
proletariat was the main support of the Party, the
vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was

66

the principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without


whose support the victory of the revolution in
China was impossible.</p>

<p> The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927


by the right wing of the Kuomintang headed by
Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united
front. The Communist Party of China and those
supporting it were subjected to bloody terror.
Hundreds of thousands of sons and daughters of
the Chinese people were victimised. Among those
who perished were such outstanding leaders of the
CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa and Chu Chiu-po, CPC
Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai,
a prominent leader of the peasant movement;
Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser of the
Young Communist League of China; Su
Chaocheng, leader of the famous Canton Commune, and
Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first
revolutionary bases of the CPC.</p>

<p> Another feature that complicated the situation


was the right-wing deviation that developed in the
CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party's

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ties with the masses, hampered making use of the
experience of the world communist movement and
implementing Comintern recommendations. The
Sixth CPC Congress (1928), convened at such a
critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the
Party in the new situation. The Congress
resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement
and dealt with basic problems such as the strategy
and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution,
the building of the armed forces and the
establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of
developing the Chinese revolution.</p>

67

<p> The late twenties and first half of the 30's again
proved quite complex for the Party. The
Communists were constantly persecuted by the
reactionaries. In the Party proper petty-bourgeois elements
became active and in the mid-30's seized the key
Party positions.</p>

<p> The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against


the CPC, while conducting an anti-Soviet
campaign, followed by armed provocations on the
Soviet-Chinese frontier. The Chinese Communist--
internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary
meaning of Chiang Kai-shek's slogan calling for
war against the Soviet Union and slanderously
trying to accuse the USSR of &quot;red imperialism.''</p>

<p> Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell


the Chinese people as a result of this counter--
revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that
every time the enemies of China, the enemies of
socialism inside the country attempted to weaken
the revolutionary movement, to make it deviate
from the right course, they inevitably whipped up
a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the
years of the struggle for the liberation of China.
The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois
elements later on.</p>

<p> In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet


Communists initiated a mighty international
movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The
Comintern called upon all the Communists of the
world to render &quot;every kind of support to the
Chinese revolution.''</p>

<p> The Japanese imperialist aggression against


China caused a reshuffling of forces in the

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country, and made the question of saving the nation
paramount. Speaking at the Comintern in 1936,

68

G. Dimitrov stressed that the task of the CPC, was


to &quot;achieve unification of the overwhelming
majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese
invaders.'' The CPC Central Committee took the
initiative in establishing a united anti-Japanese front.
This slogan conformed to the main interests of the
Chinese people and, because of its importance in
the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became a
very influential national force.</p>

<p> The war against Japan was long and hard. The
defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese
militarism made possible China's final liberation from
the Japanese invaders. The decisive part in
winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This
provided highly favourable conditions for the
victory of the people's revolutions in a number of
countries of Europe and Asia, including China. The
liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the Far
East, the routing of Japan's crack Kwangtung
Army, the liberation of Manchuria with the active
participation of the troops of the Mongolian
People's Republic, the Chinese and Korean
guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan
and ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also
predetermined the possibilities for the subsequent
defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the
Soviet Union, US intervention of China was
prevented.</p>

<p> The military-revolutionary base set up by the


Chinese Communists with the assistance of the
Soviet Army and Soviet civilian specialists in
Manchuria greatly contributed to the victory of the
Chinese revolution. This was the bridgehead from
which the completely reorganised, trained and
rearmed National Liberation Army under the

69

leadership of the Communist Party of China drove out


the Kuomintang reactionaries from China.</p>

<p> The victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal


democratic revolution in China was a major event
which greatly influenced world development. The
success of that revolution marked the victory of
Marxism-Leninism in China. International

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solidarity, the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with
the international communist and working-class
movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet
Union and other countries of the world socialist
system ensured the victory of the Chinese people,
the Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in
the many-year selfless struggle they had waged
under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>

<p> The victory of the revolution paved the way for


the Chinese people to radical political, social and
economic transformations. The objective
requirements of the further development of the revolution,
with China taking the socialist road, as well as the
threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative
for China to establish the closest friendly ties with
the USSR and other socialist countries which could
render the PRC the necessary political, military
and economic support and assistance.</p>

<p> True to the great principles of proletarian,


socialist internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet
people, just as during the years of revolutionary
struggle, rendered the Chinese people all the
necessary support in building socialism. With the
assistance of the USSR more than 250 large modern
industrial enterprises and other projects were built

70

in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these


enterprises became &quot;the backbone of China's
industry.'' &quot;The assistance of the Soviet Union in the
economic construction of our country,&quot; <em>Jenmin
jihpao</em> wrote at that time, &quot;both quantitatively and
in scale is unprecedented in history.''</p>

<p> During the first decade following the founding


of the PRC, the basis of socialism was laid in the
country-an economic basis which provided
opportunities for further socialist construction.</p>

<p> The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the


banner of strengthening the Marxist-Leninist
forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the
Party's history, in the life of the Chinese people.
It confirmed the general line of building socialism
in close alliance with the countries of the world
socialist system.</p>

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<p> The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff
to the nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in
ideology and policy which had been manifested in the
Party and the country. In the &quot;Fundamental
Theses of the Programme&quot; of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical
foundation of the Party was resolutely stressed: &quot;The
Communist Party of China is guided in its
activities by Marxism-Leninism.''</p>

<p> Having mapped out concrete ways and means


of continuing socialist transformations and having
determined the major tasks in developing the
country's national economy, the 8th Congress stressed
that the basic aim of the Party's entire activities
is &quot;the fullest satisfaction of the material and
cultural requirements of the life of the people.''</p>

<p> In the foreign policy sphere the Congress


defined as the major task the need &quot;to continue to
strengthen and consolidate the eternal and

71

inviolable fraternal friendship with the great Soviet


Union and all People's Democracies.''</p>

<p> Aware of the complex tasks of socialist


construction facing the Party and the country, and
mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the
Congress urged the Party to be vigilant and resolutely
combat all manifestations of great-power
chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology. The
resolution of the Eighth Congress read: &quot;If we
submit to the influence of non-proletarian ideology,
display conceit and complacency, fancy ourselves
infallible, and stop learning with all modesty, we
shall, as before, fail to avoid the evil of
subjectivism.'' Further developments showed how timely
this warning was.</p>

<p> Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance


with the line of the Eighth Congress, the
greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC
considered the time was not ripe to implement them and,
concealing their true intentions, had to vote for
the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on,
however, Mao Tse-tung and his following took
action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened
the lock-gate to the surging wave of petty--
bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class.
Capitalising on the Chinese people's desire to build
socialism in the shortest possible space, advocates
of this course used ``left''-revolutionary slogans to

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plunge the country into the voluntarist &quot;great
leap&quot; experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist
forces in the Communist Party of China characterised
this line as an expression of &quot;petty-bourgeois
fanaticism,'' for which even then the Chinese people
had paid dearly.</p>

<p> The nationalist group in the CPC leadership

72

kept enforcing their own platform on the Party


and the country. By working up nationalist and
jingoist sentiments, they sought to gear Chinese
home and foreign policies to the attainment of
hegemonic aims in the international arena.</p>

<p> The present leaders of the Communist Party of


China spoke out against the world communist
movement line jointly evolved by communist and
workers' Parties, the CPC included. They put forth
their own ideological and political platform,
inconsistent with Leninism on major questions
concerning international affairs and socialist
upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties
upholding Marxism-Leninism had effectually
thwarted all attempts to revise this science from
``left''-opportunist and nationalist positions, the
Peking leadership launched an unprecedented
smear campaign and subversive activity against
our Party and other fraternal parties. This activity
was extended to include not only the socialist
system and the communist movement but also the
entire anti-imperialist front.</p>

<p> Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC


ranks and among the vast masses of the Chinese
people. To do away with this opposition, Mao
Tsetung and his followers started a fight against
Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the
CPC, against politically-conscious workers,
peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary goal
of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; which dealt the CPC a
telling blow and during which many outstanding
Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of
Communists fell victim to reprisals.</p>

<p> At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung


and his entourage tried to legalise their home and
foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile

73

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to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in
China they, at the same time, came up with the
thesis on the ``impossibility'' of the victory of
socialism before the triumph of the world revolution.
Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of &quot;
preparing for war&quot; and turning the entire country into
a military camp the goal of China's economic
development and the country's socio-political life.
Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic
task.</p>

<p> The objective laws of socio-economic


development, as well as the basic interests of the Chinese
people require a genuinely socialist policy based
on the principles of scientific communism.</p>

<p> However, the economic foundations of socialism,


laid in the first decade of the PRC, are now
subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the
policy pursued by the present Chinese leadership
who seek to place the country's resources at the
service of their great-power and hegemonic aims.
This policy imperils the socialist gains of the
Chinese people and impedes the country's progress.</p>

<p> The attempts of the present Chinese leadership


to cast aspersions on the experience of the USSR
and other fraternal parties, and statements made
against the socialist community create additional
obstacles to building socialism in China.</p>

<p> As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU


policy and the Soviet state, they are resolutely
rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful
to sow discord between the USSR and China when
the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities
against the socialist countries and freedom-loving

74

peoples. US imperialism and Japanese militarism


nurture aggressive plans against China as well as
the USSR. Therefore, the policy of using anti--
Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting
territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists
encourages the reactionary circles of the United States,
Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the
anti-imperialist front. Now, more than ever before,
the situation in the world and in Asia demands
solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and
revolutionary forces. This was stressed again at

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the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties. The trend of present-day world
development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.</p>

<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>

<p> The Soviet people and our Communist Party


have regarded and continue to regard the
development of friendship and cooperation with the
Chinese people and the Chinese Communists as an
important prerequisite for strengthening the positions
of world socialism and promoting the unity of the
international communist movement and the entire
anti-imperialist front.</p>

<p> It is precisely this that determines the principled


and consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet
state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and
essence were clearly described in the decisions of
the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at
plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and
in speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.</p>

75

<p> After thoroughly analysing questions pertaining


to Sino-Soviet relations, the 24th CPSU Congress
fully approved and confirmed the principled
Leninist course and concrete steps taken by the CPSU
Central Committee and the Soviet Government
with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations. When
Chinese leaders advanced their ideological-political
platform which is incompatible with Leninism and
spearheaded against the socialist countries and at
splitting the international communist movement
and the anti-imperialist movement in general, the
CPSU Central Committee took to the position of
consistently upholding the principles of
MarxismLeninism, making every effort to strengthen the
unity of the world communist movement and
protecting the interests of the socialist community of
nations.</p>

<p> At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against


carrying over existing serious ideological
differences to inter-state relations. It strives to normalise
relations between the USSR and the PRC, and does
everything to restore the good-neighbourly,
friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese
peoples.</p>

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<p> The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that
the objective requirements of China's
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for
this normalisation. The long-term vital interests
of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash;
on the contrary, they make it imperative to restore
and develop their cooperation and friendship.</p>

<p> The numerous constructive steps for normalising


relations with the PRC which were taken by the
CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet
Government, are widely known and approved of.</p>

76

<p> Soon after the meeting of the heads of


government of the two countries held in Peking in 1969
on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks
on border questions began. Taking a constructive
approach to this matter, the Soviet side proposes
that measures be taken to promote mutual
understanding and a final solution of all border disputes
be achieved by concluding a new border treaty.
However, in order for the talks to be successful
both partners must show goodwill and seek to
reach an agreement.</p>

<p> Of late the PRC Government, too, has made


statements to the effect that ideological
differences &quot;should not interfere with the maintenance of
state relations between China and the Soviet Union
on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.'' We take into consideration the statements
by the Chinese side of their willingness not to
carry over ideological differences to inter-state
relations.</p>

<p> Expressing the will of our Party and the people,


Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the Report of the
CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:</p>

<p> ``We shall never forsake the national interests of


the Soviet state. The CPSU will continue tirelessly
to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries
and the world communist movement on a
MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and the
Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an
improvement in relations between the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China would be in
line with the fundamental, long-term interests of
both countries, the interests of socialism, the
freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is
why we are prepared in every way to help not
only to normalise relations but also to restore

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77

neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet Union


and the People's Republic of China and express the
confidence that this will eventually be achieved.''
This just and constructive stand of the CPSU
and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets
with the understanding and approval of fraternal
socialist countries, communist and workers' parties,
all progressive and peace-loving forces, including
the Chinese people.</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The difficult half-century road of the Communist


Party of China confirms that Marxism-Leninism
alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear
understanding of the objective laws and trends of
social development and a scientific approach to
evolving strategy and tactics in the struggle for the
transformation of the world and the construction
of socialism and communism. Fidelity to
MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism
guarantees the success of the activities of the Communists.
Inversely, when a detachment of the world
communist movement departs from these principles it
is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause
of the world army of the Communists.</p>

<p> Chinese Communist-internationalists have


invariably stressed that unity with the CPSU, the
Soviet Union and the international communist
movement is of vital importance for the victory
of the revolution and successful advancement
along the road of socialism. On the 50th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the
Soviet Communists, the Soviet people pay their
respects to the heroism and selflessness of the

78

Chinese Communists, to all who, fighting for the


implementation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism, have not spared
and do not spare efforts for the Chinese
revolution to triumph, for China's advancement along
the road of progress and socialism.</p>

<p> <b><em>Pravda</em>, July 1,</b> 1971</p>

[79]

__ALPHA_LVL2__

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<b>Renunciation of the Principles
<br /> of Marxism-Leninism</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
<br /> THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
<br /> PARTY OF CHINA</b>

<p> <em>N. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev</em></p>

<p> The International Conference of Communist


and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June
1969 was a major success of the communist,
working-class and liberation movements. It was
an important step towards greater international
cohesion of Communists on the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.</p>

<p> Immense importance attaches to the conclusion


made at the Conference to the effect that
Communists must consistently uphold their principles,
work for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and,
depending on the specific situation, combat right
and ``left'' opportunist distortions of theory and
policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand
against revisionism, dogmatism and ``left'' sectarian
adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism is a vital condition
for the correct orientation and successful
activity of the Communist and Workers' Parties.</p>

<p> The harm that can be inflicted on the world


communist movement by a departure from
Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with
internationalism is shown by the actions of the present
leadership of the Communist Party of China. This

80

was thoroughly analysed at the Conference by


L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation.
&quot;Almost ten years ago,'' he said, &quot;Mao Tse-tung
and his supporters mounted an attack on the
principles of scientific communism. In its
numerous statements on questions of theory the CPC
leadership has step by step revised the principled
line of the communist movement. In opposition
to this it has laid down a special line of its own
on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .</p>

<p> ``The facts show that the Chinese leadership


speaks of struggle against imperialism while in
fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by
everything it does. It helps the imperialists by
seeking to split the united front of the socialist
states. It helps them by its incitement and its

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obstructions to relaxation of international tension
at| ttmes of acute international crises. It helps
them by striving to hamper the emergence of a
broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split
the international mass organisations of youth,
women and scientists, the peace movement, the
trade union movement, and so on.</p>

<p> ``Naturally, the imperialists make the most of


Peking's present orientation in the field of
foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle
against world socialism and the liberation
movement.''</p>

<p> The actions of the CPC leaders were also


criticised by the heads of delegations from the
absolute majority of other Parties represented at
the Conference.</p>

<p> It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want


to listen to this criticism. They continue to stand
in the way of the unity of the socialist countries,
unity based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian

__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__
6---193

81

internationalism, and are not giving up their


attempts to split the international communist and
working-class movement. The propaganda put out
by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the
reactionary, imperialist forces striving to break up
the community of the socialist countries.</p>

<p> The erroneous and harmful tenets of the


Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were given the
status of official Party policy at the Ninth
Congress of the CPC, which was held last year. In
effect, the character of the decisions passed by
that Congress was predetermined by the
artificially created situation in which the Congress
itself was prepared and held. In the course of the
&quot;cultural revolution&quot; the lawfully elected leading
Party organs were uprooted. The &quot;revolutionary
committees&quot; headed by the military took over
the management of Party affairs. The old Party
cadres and all who disagreed with the Maoist
line or doubted that it was correct were defamed,
put on the list of the &quot;black gang,'' and
subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything was
done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism
and nationalistic passion. In a situation like this

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there naturally could be no question of a free
discussion of questions worrying the Party and
the country.</p>

<p> Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not


elected but nominated from among the Maoists.
There are grounds for stating that this was not
a regular congress of the Communist Party of
China, which has fine revolutionary traditions,
but the first congress of a new political
organisation called upon to serve China's military--
bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though
indirectly, by the Maoists themselves. How else is one

82

to interpret, for instance, their official slogan:


&quot;Long live the great victory of the Ninth All--
China Congress of the Communist Party of China&quot;?
A victory over whom or over what? All the
indications are that this is a victory over the Party's
healthy forces, over those who make the Party a
Marxist-Leninist organisation that had once
occupied a prominent place and enjoyed recognition in
the world communist and working-class
movements.</p>

<p> A new situation fraught with serious negative


consequences for the cause of communism has
thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot
fail to see this or pass it over in silence. They
feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist,
anti-popular essence of the Maoists' ideological
and political concepts.</p>

<p> New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth


Congress of the CPC. There is, of course,
nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have
been adopted. Every revolutionary party bases
its activity on the two main documents-the
Programme and Rules. The Programme
determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets
out and scientifically substantiates its aims. The
Rules define the Party's organisational principles,
the norms of its inner life and the methods of
work used by Party organisations. There is a
close link between the Programme and the Rules.
While the Programme is the foundation of the
Party's ideological unity, the Rules are the
foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without
organisational unity there cannot be ideological
unity and, conversely, ideological unity is
inconceivable without organisational unity.</p>

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__PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__
<b>6*</b>

83

<p> In working out a more or less long-term


strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party sees to it
that its organisational forms, the rules
governing its life and the methods used in its
practical work conform to the new political tasks and
ensure their fulfilment. Therefore, from time to
time Communist and Workers' Parties amend or
supplement the operating Rules or adopt new
Rules.</p>

<p> Life introduces corrections into the specific


forms of the parties' organisational make-up and
into the methods of work employed by them, and
this must be reflected and recorded in their Rules.
Organisationally, in the choice of the forms
and methods of its work and in its entire
political activity, the Party relies on revolutionary
theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough
analysis of coucrel? historical conditions.</p>

<p> Soviet Communists know from their own ex- |


perience how important it is to make sure that I
the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I
it should conform to the requirements of the day '
and enable the Party to successfully carry out its
tasks. For that reason they understand the
concern that the fraternal parties show for this I
problem.</p><p>
I</p>

<p> In the case of the Communist Party of China,


this is a particularly pressing problem for a
number of reasons. We shall recall only two
circumstances. First, although nearly fifty years have
passed since the CPC was founded, it has no
Programme to this day and this adds weight to its
Rules as the only basic Party document. Second,
in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier,
no Party Congress was convened for thirteen years.
Consequently, it is important to enhance the role

84

of the Rules and introduce into them provisions


that would prevent violations of inner-Party
democracy and serve as <em>a</em> guarantee that the
principles and norms of Party life are strictly
observed by all its members.</p>

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<p> This is the approach that should be taken if
the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party is
used as the guideline.</p>

<p> What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have
been adopted at the Ninth Congress? A close
scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they
flagrantly contravene the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on the party and run counter to the views of
the Communists on the questions of party
development. In all respects the new Rules are not
an improvement of but a step back from the
former Rules, which were passed in 1956 by the
Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a
direct retreat from the Marxist-Leninist positions
that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions
so as to turn the party into an obedient tool of
the present leadership for carrying out their
greatpower, chauvinistic policies.</p>

<p> In the former Rules of the CPC the first


section was headed &quot;Fundamental Provisions of the
Programme.'' It gave a definition of the Party
and the cardinal principles underlying its
development. It outlined the ways and means of
achieving socialist transformations in China and
named the tasks that had to be carried out in
the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science
and culture and in the matter of attaining a
higher standard of living. Tasks were
formulated also with regard to the national relations, and
it was emphasised that &quot;particular attention must

85

be paid to preventing and surmounting


greatHan chauvinism.'' On the whole, this section
actually filled the void caused by the absence of
a Programme. In the new Rules, this section has
been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that
the Communist Party of China has no
Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say
the least. Moreover, the content of the new
section upsets everything worthy of description as
a Marxist party.</p>

<p> The new Rules of the CPC actually <em>endorse


the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet foreign
policy</em> of its present leadership. The former Rules
stated: &quot;The Party bends every effort to promote
and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace,
democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet
Union.''</p>

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<p> The new Rules declare that the CPC &quot;unites
with genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties&quot; and
jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism
headed by the USA, and modern revisionism,'' it
being understood that the Chinese leaders regard
the &quot;Soviet revisionists&quot; as the hub of this
revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists
mean by &quot;genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.''
These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting
of renegades and turncoats who act on their
instructions. Although they are numerically weak
and ill-assorted, they have inflicted quite a lot
of harm on the world communist movement, and
for this they are lavishly praised by Peking. The
Peking leaders classify as ``revisionists'' the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and
Workers' Parties adhering to Marxism-Leninism and

86

rejecting the theoretically untenable and


politically erroneous and harmful Maoist tenets.</p>

<p> They accuse the Communist Parties of France,


India, the United States of America, Italy,
Latin America and many others of the deadly
sins of ``revisionism'' and &quot;apostasy.'' Naturally,
they make every effort to slander the Communist
Parties of many socialist countries, above all,
the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee,
which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have
reached a point where the Chinese leaders place
in the same category imperialism and the Soviet
Union, the country that blazed the road to
socialism and is now leading the way to
communism. Barefaced, undisguised anti-Sovietism is one
of the major if not the key element of Maoist
foreign policy.</p>

<p> Many of the participants in the 1969


International Conference of Communist and Workers'
Parties denounced this line of the Peking
leadership. They underscored the colossal role that the
Soviet Union and the CPSU had played in the
historic battle against imperialism, for the triumph
of the cause of peace, national liberation,
democracy and socialism.</p>

<p> The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party


as being the main obstacle standing in the way of
their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they
have specially written anti-Sovietism into the Rules

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as official party policy. Though, formerly, the
Chinese leadership was also free-handed in its
anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow
opposition to and open acts of hostility against the
CPSU and other communist and workers' parties.</p>

<p> <em>The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party's</em>

87

<em>ideological and theoretical foundations and


replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism</em>. It was
stated in the former Rules: &quot;In its activity the
Communist Party of China is guided by
Marxism-Leninism. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly
explains the laws of social development and
correctly indicates the ways of building socialism
and communism.'' In the new Rules it is
recorded: &quot;The Communist Party of China is guided
by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of
MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation
determining its ideals. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is
the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when
imperialism moves to its total collapse and socialism
advances towards victory throughout the world.''
Although the words ``Marxism-Leninism'' are used
there this is nothing more than camouflage. The
only reason they are used is to delude people
inexperienced in politics and ease the transition from
Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.</p>

<p> There is not the least doubt that it is a


question of precisely such a transition. What else
explains the fact that the provision in the Rules
about the &quot;thought of Mao Tse-tung&quot; is
assessed by Chinese propaganda as a &quot;great victory of
the cultural revolution&quot;? Mentioning
MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the
authors of the new Rules give it an interpretation
Which emasculates it completely. In their view,
which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung
&quot;inherited, upheld and developed Marxism--
Leninism, and raised it to a new level.'' The
purpose of these and similar arguments is starkly
clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism
and is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin
belong to the past. In the world today there is

88

only one &quot;leader,'' Mao, and one has to follow


him without burdening oneself with thoughts
about where and how he will lead.</p>

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<p> Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means
a fossilised teaching. As no other theory it is
linked with life, with the working-class and
national-liberation movements, with the struggle for
socialism and communism. As a science, it
demands that it should be treated as such, that it
should be constantly developed and advanced. But
the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in
common with a revision of its basic propositions, with
attempts to evolve national variants.</p>

<p> Such attempts are leading to the rejection of


Marxism-Leninism as an integral science of the
laws of social development, of the construction of
socialism and communism. They destroy the very
foundation of the internationalist unity of the
international communist and working-class
movement, breaking it up into national &quot;islands.''</p>

<p> Having invented &quot;Sinoised Marxism,'' the


present Chinese leaders have thereby made it
clear that ``conventional'' Marxism, i.e.,
Marxism in its true and generally accepted sense, does
not suit them. They have gone even further,
declaring that the thought of Mao Tse-tung is
the &quot;summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.''
However, no subterfuges over wording can
conceal the obvious fact that the &quot;thought of
MaoTse-tung&quot; is a glaring contradiction of
MarxismLeninism.</p>

<p> The new Rules of the CPC officially <em>propagate


the personality cult, which is alien to
MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a
whole</em>.</p>

<p> It should be remembered that the report to the

89

8th CPC Congress on the changes in the Rules said


in part that the CPC &quot;rejects the deification of a
personality as alien to its policies.'' The former
Rules stressed that &quot;activities putting the
personality above the party&quot; are inadmissible within the
party, that the party should be especially
concerned with &quot;modesty and discretion.'' These lines
have disappeared from the new Rules which,
instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader
of the Communist Party of China. Not only is the
emperor named, but his successor also. &quot;Comrade
Lin Piao,'' say the Rules &quot;is always holding high
the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas; he

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is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the
proletarian revolutionary line of Comrade Mao
Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the
continuer of his cause.'' Thus, it is declared in
advance who is to ``inherit'' and ``supervise'' the party.
</p>

<p> All of these statements of course, directly


contradict the scientific, materialistic teaching on the
question of personality and the role of parties,
classes and the people at large in history. As is
known, Marxism-Leninism accords to proletarian
parties and their leaders a high role in the struggle
for the revolutionary transformation of society.
Without a party and experienced leaders, the
working class is incapable of achieving success in the
struggle for the triumph of communist ideals. But
Marxism-Leninism bases its teaching on the
decisive role played by the working people in history,
at the same time paying tribute to those leaders
who correctly understand and express the basic
interests of the working class and all working
people. This is the cornerstone of the Marxist--
Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.</p>

90

<p> In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly


declared their fidelity to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
on the decisive role of the working people in
social development. They proclaimed their belief in
the people. But later this line was abandoned and
a new policy emerged-one of unrestrained
glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung who was
henceforward to be reverently worshipped.
Immodesty and self-advertisment of the CPC leadership
know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao
with the sun seems inadequate to some of his
worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime,
while Mao Tse-tung &quot;shines always.'' Anyone
guilty of casting the slightest doubt on the
infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient
zeal, is anathematised, described as a &quot;black
revisionists&quot; and persecuted. As for the mass of the
people, Mao Tse-tung said about them the
following: the Chinese people are &quot;a blank sheet of
paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can
be written and the most beautiful pictures drawn.''
And indeed the Maoists are busily ``writing'' and
``drawing'' for all they are worth. The multi--
million people with an ancient culture are looked
upon as being no more than an object of political
self-seeking. What is this if not an outrage against

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everything that is sacred for all Communists, for
their ideology?</p>

<p> In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions


on membership of the Party have been
drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments
is <em>to renew the Party's composition in the
direction desired by the Maoists</em>. It is suggested that
those &quot;who fail to reform after educational work
has been conducted with them&quot; should be forced
to leave the Party, and that &quot;the Party

91

organisations should be constantly improved by


removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.''
Facts show that the words &quot;removing the
unworthy&quot; are directed not against actual class
enemies but against people who do not share the
Maoist ideas, against those who can be
suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists.
People linked with &quot;Soviet revisionism,'' i.e., those
who have preserved their friendly feelings
towards the Soviet Union and its Leninist Party,
are classified as the most dangerous.</p>

<p> Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation


within the party, Lin Piao said, menacingly, at
the 9th CPC Congress: &quot;Anyone who dares to
come forward against Chairman Mao Tse-tung and
against his ideas, no matter what the
circumstances, will be censured by the party and punished
by the whole country.''</p>

<p> As regards the ruling on &quot;enlisting the new,''


its meaning is elucidated by the simplified
procedures of admission to Party membership and
the introduction of new provisions opening the
floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the
former Rules it was stated that only a person
who does not exploit the labour of others can
be a member of the CPC. Today this demand
has been deleted from the Rules, although in
China, according to the admission of the Maoists
themselves, its significance has not diminished to
this day. Under the present Rules the &quot;Chinese
worker, poor peasant, lower middle peasant,
revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary
element&quot; can become a member of the CPC. One
can understand the purpose of this wording in
the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists
regard as genuine revolutionary elements the

92

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hungweipings and tsaofans and all who
unquestioningly follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive,
anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door to
Party membership precisely for these elements
and allows the present CPC leadership to bring
into the Party the forces which it regards as its
mainstay.</p>

<p> No data on the CPC's social composition or,


as a matter of fact, any other data
characterising the situation in the country have been
published for a long time. No information of this
kind is contained even in the documents of the
Ninth Congress of the CPC. It is known that
in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members
of whom less than 14 per cent were workers.
There are grounds for believing that as a result
of the disbandment of workers' organisations and
the mass injection of &quot;new blood&quot; into the Party
through the admission of hungweipings and other
elements, this percentage is today even smaller.
The organisational principles of Marxism--
Leninism require that the Party should be built up
on a democratic foundation allowing for the
utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity
of Communists. In all questions of the Party's
policy and practical work, Party members should
have the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only
he is worthy of the lofty name of Communist who
independently ponders over his Party's destiny
and bears a personal responsibility for it.</p>

<p> There was a time when in the CPC this was


recognised as an indispensable condition of the
Party's militancy. In the former Rules it was
stated, for example, that it was necessary &quot;to
take effective measures to promote inner-Party
democracy and to encourage the activity and

93

creative initiative of all Party members.'' There


is not a word about this in the new Rules, where
the accent is on something quite different. In
effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish
inner-Party democracy, enforce barrack practices
in the Party and turn Communists into
submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership's
instructions. To justify these amendments it is
stated that in China there &quot;is a threat of subversion
from within and of aggression by the
imperialists and modern revisionism.''</p>

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<p> The demand that all Party members should be
absolutely, categorically and unconditionally true
to the &quot;thought of Mao Tse-tung&quot; creates an
atmosphere in the Party which leaves no room for
inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like
the old, the new Rules provide for convening
periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses
in the localities and Party meetings, they
contain the addition to the effect that &quot;in special
cases they (congresses, meetings.<em>-Author</em>) may
be convened earlier or postponed.'' Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under
what circumstances this may be done. The door
is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a
``legal'' infringement of one of the key norms
of Party life. True, even when this reservation
was non-existent, the CPC leadership ignored the
provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this
can be justified with references to the Rules.</p>

<p> The former Rules envisaged a democratic


procedure for forming the Party's leading organs.
It stated: &quot;Elections shall be held by secret
ballot, and the electors shall be ensured the right

94

to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.''


In lieu of this provision, the current Rules
contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the
effect that &quot;the leading Party organs at all
levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic
consultations.'' Obviously, this can be
interpreted in any way and given any meaning, which
is evidently what the Maoists want.</p>

<p> A new provision has been introduced, stating


that &quot;the convocation of congresses and the
composition of the Party committees in the localities
and in the Army shall be approved by higher
Party organisations.'' This affords the Maoists
the possibility of manipulating the composition
of the leading Party organs at their own
discretion and appointing to leading positions persons
devoted to them. Significantly, the provisions on
central and local Party control commissions have
been deleted altogether. The setting up of Party
control agencies is no longer envisaged.</p>

<p> There are clauses consolidating the position


held by Mao Tse-tung and his entourage in the
CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the

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CC, his Deputy and the Standing Committee of
the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it
is stated in the Rules that &quot;some necessary
compact and operational organs to conduct the
current work of the Party, the Government and the
Army are established under the guidance of the
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.'' The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the
disbandment, in the course of the &quot;cultural
revolution,'' of democratically elected Party
committees and the setting up of organs not

95

envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious


headquarters for &quot;cultural revolution&quot; affairs, and, second,
to give the top leadership a free hand in the
future. If necessary, they will establish &quot;compact
and operational&quot; agencies legally and rely on
them in the struggle against any opposition.</p>

<p> The position occuppied by ruling parties such


as that of the Communist Parties in socialist
countries requires that the forms and methods
of their work and the principles underlying their
leadership of state and public organisations should
be clearly denned in their Rules. This has
been done in the Rules of the CPSU and other
fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC
also contained the appropriate provisions, which
specified the functions of Party organs at all
levels, spoke clearly of the need to rule
collectively and denned the Party's relations with state
and public organisations. There were sections
headed &quot;Party Groups of the Leadership in
NonParty Organisations&quot; and &quot;The Party and the
Young Communist League.'' None of these
provisions and sections is to be found in the new
Rules. Instead, there is a provision stating: &quot;The
state organs of power of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the People's Liberation Army as well
as the Young Communist League, the
revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor
peasants, lowest middle peasants and Red Guards,
and other revolutionary mass organisations shall
be subordinate to the leadership of the Party.''</p>

<p> It is hard to reconcile this provision with the


Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role played by
the Communist Party and the character of its
relations with state and public organisations.
Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of

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96

placing all power in the hands of the Party


leadership with Mao at the head.</p>

<p> Leninism teaches us that in exercising


political leadership of all state and public
organisations the Party does not have recourse to
administration by injunction and does not take over
their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist
society's political structure and coordinating and
directing the work of the mass organisations of
working people, the Communist Party at the
same time bends every effort to enable them to
operate with self-assurance and confidence within
the context of their rights and functions. This
means that in societies building socialism and
communism, along with the growth of the tasks to be
carried out, the upswing of the people's
activeness and the heightening of the Party's role, a
process is under way of the enhancement of the
role played by state and public organisations, and
of the development and improvement of socialist
democracy. This is one of the laws governing the
development of socialist society, and one of the
many laws the Maoists are grossly violating.</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The CPSU's point of departure is that the


Soviet and Chinese peoples have common basic
interests, and it is doing everything in its power
to sustain fraternal friendship between them. At
the same time, the Soviet Communists and all
other Marxist-Leninists consider it their duty to
wage an uncompromising struggle against the
divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line
and anti-Leninist and anti-popular ideological and
political tenets of the Peking leaders.</p>

__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__
7--193

97

<p> An analysis of the amendments introduced


into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as
compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth
Congress shows that while formally retaining the
Party's former name, the CPC leadership is
steering towards the creation of a fundamentally
different political organisation. Underlying its
structure and activity are the personality cult, extreme

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centralism, militarism and the renunciation of
inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this
is a nationalistic and chauvinistic organisation
with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.</p>

<p> In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open


revision and abandonment of the Marxist--
Leninist principles of party development. The
future will show whether the CPC has the strength
to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the
positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism and to rejoin the united front
of the world's Communist and Workers' Parties.
This would conform to the vital interests of the
Chinese people and to the interests of the world
proletariat and the working people of all
countries.</p>

<p> <em>Kommunist</em>, No. 4, 1970</p>

[98]

__ALPHA_LVL1__
<b>II</b>

__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Maoism: Its Ideological
<br /> and Political Essence</b>

[99]

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<p> <em>P. Fedoseyeu</em></p>

<p> The course of world development and the


events in China clearly show the hostility
towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the
special ideological and political platform set
forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental
issues of international life and the world
communist movement.</p>

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<p> The theoretical and practical activities of the
Maoists, their efforts to split the revolutionary
forces, and their great-power and hegemonic
ambitions do serious harm to the anti-imperialist
struggle, to the world communist and
workingclass movement, to the forces fighting for
democracy and national freedom and to the entire
cause of socialism and the social progress of
mankind.</p>

<p> Strongly rebuffing Maoism, Marxist-Leninists


consider it necessary to expose completely its
ideological and political essence and its social
roots. Great attention was devoted to these
questions in the Report of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 24th Party
Congress and in his speech at the International
Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in
Moscow in June, 1969. Communists all over the
world have studied these questions deeply and
are continuing to do so, as was shown by the

100

speeches of many other participants in the 1969


Meeting and as has also been demonstrated at
the Congresses of a number of fraternal Parties.</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a


rather narrow group of interdependent people,
who, in one form or another, are dependent on
Mao and his closest associates. This group
carefully conceals its real convictions and aims,
seeking to present Maoism as a certain &quot;development
of Marxism in modern conditions.'' As one can
see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this
kind of camouflage to confuse the issue of the
social support of the current Peking regime.</p>

<p> An analysis of the history and present-day


essence of the ideology and policy of the Mao
Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds
support, first and foremost, in the
nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and,
to a considerable extent, declasse strata of
Chinese society.</p>

<p> In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group


represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic trend.
However, its non-proletarian essence was not so

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clearly shown during the stage of national--
liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite
different social forces against imperialism. The
differences of principle between Maoism and
scientific communism were revealed after the victory
of people's power in China, when fundamental
socio-economic changes were in progress.</p>

<p> The experience of many countries shows that


the pressure of the ideology and psychology of

101

the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front


increases sharply during the course of a revolution,
and especially when socialism is in the process
of being built, when a drastic breaking-up of old
social relations takes place. It is precisely at such
a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go
over from a petty-bourgeois revolutionary stand
to one of struggle against the proletarian
leadership of society. And this was what happened in
China too.</p>

<p> Literature on Maoism frequently expounds the


view that Maoism is an ideology, an expression
of the interests of the undeveloped, backward
peasant masses, which have for centuries
constituted the great majority of the population of
China. But this opinion is unacceptable. To
accept it would mean admitting that the Maoists
have an extensive social base in the form of the
peasantry, and, by the same token, that the
peasantry is responsible for the anti-popular essence
of the Maoist policy.</p>

<p> To regard Maoism as an expression of the


views of the entire peasantry means identifying
the petty-bourgeois, primitive, anarchistic
prejudices of the peasantry with its fundamental
interests. Indeed, can it be asserted without
deviating from Marxism-Leninism, that the &quot;cultural
revolution,'' the smashing-up of the Party,
tradeunion, and YCL organisations, and the
destruction of socialist democracy express the vital
interests of the peasantry? Of course not.</p>

<p> The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology


of the Chinese peasantry are not straightforward.
They are of <em>a</em> complicated and contradictory
nature, and can be correctly understood only on
the basis of a consideration of the class essence

102

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of Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic
socio-political trend.</p>

<p> Marx and Engels disclosed the social


heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. They
showed how to distinguish between its prejudices
and reason, between its past and its future,
between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and
its natural gravitation, as a toiling class, towards
an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in
the struggle for a new life free from exploiters
and parasites. Opponents of Marxism alleged
that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois
reaction, identified the whole of the peasantry
with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin
said: &quot;I was not attacking the working peasants
when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let
us leave the working peasants alone-that's not
what I am talking about. But among the
peasantry there are working peasants and
pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty
proprietors at the expense of others; the working
peasants are exploited by others, but they want to
live at their own =

__NOTE__ Footnote marker definitely missing from end of this quote.

expense.''^^1^^</p>

<p> Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to


the crying contradictions in the life and activities
of the peasantry, which in some conditions
spontaneously and energetically rose up in struggle
against the exploiters, and, in others, either
humbly let themselves be led off to be shot or
whipped by the police, or else even made up the
basis of the support for the reactionary forces.</p>

<p> This is, to a considerable extent, also true of


the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, under
feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified
and, therefore, disunited. The bulk of the Chinese

_-_-_

<p> ^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll. Works</em>, Vol. 27, p. 311.</p>

103

peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation


was common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal
ideology with its ruler cult and worship of the
traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being

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in their mass downtrodden, illiterate and
scattered, for many years remained very submissive and
fully subordinated to the authorities. The
backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national
narrow-mindedness and the nationalist outlook.</p>

<p> At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has


rich revolutionary traditions. More than once it
rose in struggle against the landowners.
Furthermore, the peasantry made up the main force of
the revolutionary armies both in the
nationalliberation struggle and in the revolution. The
Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative
farming on the road of socialist development of
the countryside. It was precisely these peasant
masses, who, under the leadership of the
working class and its vanguard, the Party of
MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in
working for the triumph of a genuinely socialist
way of development.</p>

<p> But this, regretfully, did not take place.


Starting from the late fifties, and especially in the
course of the &quot;big leap&quot; drive, and, later, in
the &quot;cultural revolution,'' a serious blow was
struck at the organisations of the working class
and the Party. The Party divorced itself to a
considerable extent from the working class and the
peasantry, and disunity was deliberately sown
among the working class. As for the peasants,
most of them were deceived by the
pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The rest
were intimidated by a terror campaign, and,

104

although they did not accept the &quot;cultural


revolution,'' neither did they dare to put up any open
resistance.</p>

<p> In the process of its moulding and


development, Maoism came under the political and
ideological influence of the urban petty
bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of artisans and
handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen.
This social grouping came into being in feudal
China, and its members were, for the most part,
distinguished by their conservative views and
nationalist outlook.</p>

<p> But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per


cent reactionary. A sizable section of it took an
active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too,

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under the leadership of the working class, could
have taken the socialist road together with the
overwhelming majority of the people.</p>

<p> The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that


in the struggle between the two courses-the course
of proletarian internationalism and that of
petty-bourgeois nationalism-the latter prevailed at
a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was
unable to withstand the pressure of the petty
bourgeoisie and to secure the leading role of the
working class.</p>

<p> The national bourgeoisie has still been


preserved in China. It was not subjected to
repressions in the years of the &quot;cultural revolution.''
Representatives of the exploiting classes which, as
admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise
more than 50 million people, hold important
positions in the management of the economy, and
continue to exert an influence on the economic
and political life of the country. Because they
subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are

105

advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the


nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas
and actions of the Maoists.</p>

<p> A particularly complicated question is that of


the attitude of the Maoists towards the working
class. They keep talking all the time about the
leading role of the working class and the
Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the
proletariat, about the proletarian revolutionary
character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of
the Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian
nature, although, in pursuit of their aims, by
means of demagogy, they try to make use of
certain sections of the workers.</p>

<p> It is generally known that the Chinese


working class is heterogeneous. Its greater part
consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not
gone through a real schooling of socialism and
internationalism. But it has a militant core, which
has many revolutionary traditions. As was shown
by the events in the &quot;cultural revolution,'' it was
precisely the militant core of the working class
which came to the aid of the Party organisations
which were attacked by the hungweipings. In
the factories and plants the Maoists failed to
achieve the scale of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot;

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which they desired. Although the working class
of China is still relatively small in number (it
barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the
backbone of the Chinese revolution and of the cause
of socialism in China and it still is. The working
class is the real force which is exerting a
restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation
of Maoism in the life of the country.</p>

<p> The army officers' circles exerted a great

106

influence on the rise and evolution of Maoism.


These circles have always played an active part
in the social and political life of China.</p>

<p> In the history of China, militarism for


centuries represented a relatively independent,
influential force, and energetically intervened in
political life. In the course of revolutionary wars,
many officers went over to the side of the
struggling people. Although they were the opponents
of imperialism, and of the landlords and the
comprador bourgeoisie, most of these military
men, nevertheless, did not become either
internationalists or Marxists. Many military men
joined the Communist Party, but only some of them
acquired Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary
training, and those who did were subsequently
purged. A large number of sincere internationalists,
real supporters of socialism, were expelled from
the army. Mao Tse-tung, leaning upon
nationalistically-minded elements loyal to him, reformed
the army, implanting in it a spirit of nationalism
and great-power chauvinism, a spirit of blind
subordination and idolisation of his personality.</p>

<p> At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue


fear the army, especially its revolutionary
backbone of career officers who went through the
crucible of the war for national liberation.
Unquestionably a considerable section of the career
command personnel of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary
traditions and experience in fighting not only
the internal counter-revolution but also
international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the
fact that the Maoists are transforming the
people's army into an all-China police force-a force
directed against the people and designed for

107

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their suppression. Although drawing the army
into the work of the &quot;cultural revolution&quot; did
help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the
discontent within the Chinese army and the
freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from
their illusions and a fanatical faith in the
wisdom of the &quot;great helmsman.'' It also enabled
many of the army men to understand, from their
own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage.
Therefore, as was only to be expected, the army has
now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist
moods, and that is why the Maoists are carrying
out purge after purge, and repression after
repression against many career military men,
ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the
antiMaoist movement in the People's Liberation
Army of China.</p>

<p> Removed from under the control of Party and


state bodies, and placed at the service of the
hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and
his group, even before the development of the
&quot;cultural revolution,'' the army was preparing
to carry out the role allotted to it. This was the
militarisation of all public life-conducted under
the sham slogan of ``revolutionisation''-and the
establishment of <em>a</em> military-bureaucratic order in
the country. But, having carried out the &quot;
cultural revolution,'' in which the army played the
decisive role, Mao then struck a blow at the
army leadership, so that now Lin Piao no longer
figures as Mao's &quot;successor,'' as had been
announced at the Ninth Congress of the CPC.</p>

<p> The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao's is


quite clear, although Peking prefers to keep

108

silent about it. The revelation of the substance of


the intrigues that permeate all of Mao's activities
and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique
would not do the &quot;great helmsman&quot; any good,
and this is understood very well in Peking.</p>

<p> Maoism claims to be accepted by different


strata of the country as an all-national ideology
and a political doctrine expressing the national
interests of the entire Chinese people. The
nationalistic aims are even advanced as a unifying
factor. This shows the nature of the petty

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bourgeoisie, which strives to ``rise'' above the classes
and present its egoistic interests as the interests
of the nation as a whole.</p>

<p> The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages


its petty-bourgeois class nature and tries to
manoeuvre between the different classes, taking
advantage of the weakness and lack of
organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it
difficult to discern the class nature of Maoism and
they also serve as a means of attracting to its
side politically unstable elements drawn from
different classes of the population.</p>

<p> Marx and Lenin called such tactics


Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the revolution
and was called on to defend it, although it had
actually always served the bourgeois or
pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism,
which served as a cover for an anti-proletarian
policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern
times. In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its
characteristics as reliance on the military,
manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled
social and nationalistic demagogy.</p>

<p> An analysis shows that the policy and tactics


of Maoism have quite a number of features

109

resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific


Chinese setting, of course: firstly, a reliance on
army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance
on a combination of different, sometimes
diametrically opposed, social forces, on a manoeuvring
between classes, making use first of some social
groups, then of others, first of high-school and
college students, then of working youth, and
especially of the petty-bourgeois, backward
peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian
elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and
political demagogy: the shouting of the most
revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary--
chauvinistic policy, verbal calls for defending the
proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home
and foreign policy, appeals to the people in
words and their suppression in deeds.</p>

<p> Marx included among the Bonapartist


manifestations the deification of the supreme leader
and the mystical faith of the broad masses in
the ruling personality. Mao Tse-tung exerted
every possible effort to have his personality

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glorified and his views advertised, and he placed
his favourites in the most important posts in the
party, the army and in the machinery of state.</p>

<p> The &quot;barrack-room communism&quot; now being


implanted in China is in keeping with the moods
and needs of the society's petty-bourgeois and
lumpen-proletarian strata. It corresponds to the
hegemonic ambitions of the Maoists, for it helps
them to carry out the militarisation of the
economy and the entire life in the country for the
sake of the realisation of the great-power
adventurist plans in the international arena.</p>

<p> For an understanding of the essence of


Maoism, a consideration of its historical, ideological

110

and theoretical origins is quite important. The


lengthy domination of feudalism and militarism,
economic and cultural backwardness, the
undeveloped public and social relations, the small
number of proletarians and the absolute
predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created
special difficulties for China's revolutionary
development.</p>

<p> The militarists' traditional participation in


ruling the country and the extensive dissemination
in the course of centuries of one of the
reactionary aspects of Confucianism-the cult of the
supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a
military-bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler
at the head.</p>

<p> The Maoists made use of historical and


demographic facts for their own ends to spread
great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has
rich historical traditions. For a long time the
country held the leading place in Eastern Asia.
China is the home of an ancient culture. The
Chinese are the most numerous people in the
world. The existence of a comparatively high
civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers
of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the
superiority of the Chinese. All other nations
were declared ``wild'' and &quot;barbarous,'' and all
&quot;barbarians.'' China's eternal enemies. For
thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China
that she was the centre of the world. That is
how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later
acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.</p>

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<p> In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle
nationalism was the ideological weapon of the
progressive forces which were fighting for
national liberation and social progress. It was the

111

ideological basis for rallying and uniting the


broadest sections of the Chinese population,
pushing into the background in some cases social
differentiation and differences in class interests.
After the victory of the anti-imperialist,
democratic revolution in China and its growth into a
socialist revolution, nationalism exhausted itself
as an ideological basis for uniting the
progressive forces of the nation in its struggle against
foreign capital-its struggle for national
independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in
Chinese society between nationalism and
internationalism.</p>

<p> In present-day conditions Chinese nationalism,


which has grown into great-Han chauvinism, has
been fully adopted as a weapon of Mao
Tsetung's ruling group. Great-Han chauvinism is
the basic motif of anti-Sovietism and the
activities of the Maoists which are designed to disrupt
the socialist community and the world
communist, workers' and anti-imperialist movements.</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien


to the Maoists. But they understand very well
that there is no other ideology capable now of
winning over the minds of the peoples of the
world. That is why the Maoists decided to
monopolise the right to interpret and ``develop''
Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own
way and thereby to turn it into an instrument for
achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.</p>

<p> Initially this was called &quot;the creative


application&quot; of Marxism-Leninism in China's specific
conditions. It was done under the guise of the

112

realisation of Lenin's thesis to the effect that the


peoples of the East have to find their own ways
of carrying out Marxist ideas. Then appeared the
formula of &quot;Sinoised Marxism,'' which for a
long time was viewed by some Marxists as the
process of creative quests for ways and means

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of developing the revolution and the transition
to socialism in the specific conditions of China.
But the Maoists had their own understanding of
this formula. For them this was an important
step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to
reveal itself with the appearance of the assertion
that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are an interpretation
of Marxism for all the countries of the East.
Thus the concept of &quot;Asian Marxism&quot; made its
appearance. The next step was taken during the
&quot;cultural revolution&quot; and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be
the teacher of all peoples, the only Marxist
theoretician of the entire world communist
movement, and Mao's ideas the apex of scientific
thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current
epoch. But this slogan is only a cover. The real
meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace
Marxism by Maoism. That is how the concealed,
previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic,
hegemonic schemes of the Maoists were revealed.
</p>

<p> In their attempt to achieve the recognition of


Mao Tse-tung as the only leading world
theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and
the CPC as the centre of the entire revolutionary
movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of
degeneration and revisionism, and of compromise
with imperialism, against large and authoritative

113

Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and


against the entire world communist movement.
All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are
haughtily ``excommunicated'' from Marxism--
Leninism, from the revolution and from socialism,
and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle
covered by Marxist phrases and revolutionary
slogans has been launched against the &quot;
dissenters.'' And in this struggle no methods are
barred, not even military provocations.</p>

<p> What then is Maoism from the standpoint of


its ideological and theoretical content?</p>

<p> The influence and eclectic mixture of the most


diverse doctrines, views, theories and concepts
are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political,
economic, philosophical, sociological and tactical
concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include:~</p>

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<p> feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly
Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that part of this
philosophy is taken which is characterised by
scholasticism, idealism, primitive dialectics, the
preaching of the spirit of submission, the
glorification of imperial power, and the exaggeration
of the role of the subjective factor in history;</p>

<p> petty-bourgeois socialism, especially


Proudhonism with its utmost vulgarisation of Hegel's
idealistic dialectics and understanding of the
unity of opposites as the mechanical sum of
``bad'' and ``good'' phenomena irrespective of
their socio-economic, class substance;</p>

<p> the petty-bourgeois-peasant, semi-Narodnik,


semi-avantgardist views ascribing spontaneous
revolutionism to the peasantry;</p>

<p> the bourgeois-nationalistic, great-power and


chauvinistic assertion of the exclusiveness of
China;</p>

114

<p> Trotskyite views, which were more or less


widespread in the Chinese revolutionary
movement in the twenties and early thirties;</p>

<p> anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable


influence in China at the start of the twenties.
Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission,
went in for anarchism quite actively in that
period.</p>

<p> It is through the prism of all these views that


Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas of
MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in
general is concerned, neither Mao Tse-tung nor
his closest associates ever made a systematic
study of it, limiting themselves to reading
popular articles. Mao has never had an integral
Marxist-Leninist world outlook.</p>

<p> The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and


adapted them to their interests. Maoism ignores
the objective laws of social development, as does
Trotskyism, and exaggerates the role of the
subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in
politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in
economics are characteristic for both. An
antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world
revolutionary process is a feature common to both

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Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic
purposes the Maoists made use of the Trotskyite theory
of &quot;the export of revolution,'' regarding world
war as the only way of solving the problems of
revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is
the tactics of splitting the revolutionary forces,
with crude slanderous attacks against the
Marxist-Leninist parties and the socialist states, rabid
anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within the

115

ranks of the international working-class and


communist movement.</p>

<p> An idealistic-voluntaristic theory of violence


(in which a subjective-idealist, militarist
interpretation is substituted for the materialist
interpretation of history) is the basis of Maoist
ideology.</p>

<p> The theoretical construction of Maoism is


pivoted on &quot;Sinoised dialectics,'' and particularly
on Mao's ``teaching'' on contradictions, which is
called upon to serve as the theoretical basis of
the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, as a
justification of their negation of a principled
class policy, and of their policy of making
unprincipled deals with the forces of imperialism
and all kinds of renegades from Marxism. Most
characteristic in this respect is the way the
Maoists artificially devise the &quot;great contradictions&quot;
of our time, declaring as enemies of the peoples
fighting for freedom the &quot;two superpowers&quot;~the
United States and the Soviet Union: the citadel
of imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction, is
placed on the same level as the first socialist
country, this powerful force of world progress.
This false concept is further proof that the
Maoists have turned away from the Marxist-Leninist
appraisal of the main contradictions of the
present day, from a principled class approach to the
alignment of forces in the world arena.</p>

<p> The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon


in the ``art'' of arbitrarily designing
contradictions. They proclaim a state of ``unity'' or of
&quot;struggle,'' of anyone with anyone, so long as
this facilitates the attainment of their
greatpower, hegemonistic aims.</p>

116

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<p> These, in the most general way, are the
ideological background of Mao Tse-tung and his
followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and
policy of Maoism quite often link up with the
ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no
accident, either, that the theoretical revelations
and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded
to the skies by imperialist ideologists and
politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of
social progress and socialism.</p>

<p> While noting the eclectic nature of Mao


Tsetung's views, it should be borne in mind, that, as
a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly
shows, great-power nationalism is the leading
and organising force behind his miscellany of
ideas. From diverse ideological and theoretical
concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested
in taking and using those that serve nationalist
and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This emphasises
the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the
theory and practice of Maoism. Mao Tse-tung
and his followers advance and uphold those
theoretical theses and political slogans which directly
serve their ends in the present historical period,
and they bury in oblivion those of their own
conclusions which have ceased to be in accord with
their utilitarian aims, without showing any
concern for logic or the continuity of ideas.</p>

<p> Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the


Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group goes
from one extreme to another in its domestic and
foreign policies, as it seeks the support of both
the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or
indirectly, of the most reactionary circles of
bourgeois society.</p>

117

__*_*_*__

<p> Maoism, in its theoretical principles and


political practices is in basic contradiction with, and
hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism. The essence of Maoism is
certainly not a revolutionary, but a reactionary
ideology. Maoism adds grist to the mill of
imperialism and reaction. Therefore the struggle
against Maoism should be regarded primarily from
the viewpoint of the incompatibility of the aims
of Maoism-as a form of social-chauvinism-with
the objectives of the world communist movement

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and the national-liberation movement, and with
the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism on
fundamental issues of socialist construction, world
development, and revolutionary strategy and
tactics.</p>

<p> The most eloquent and concentrated expression


of Maoism was seen in the course of the &quot;
cultural revolution&quot; and in the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, which is an important
landmark in the development of Maoist policies,
strategy and tactics, and is of decisive importance
for an understanding of the innermost
tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.</p>

<p> The recent interpretation by the Maoists of the


basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the
political course of the Maoists both inside the country
and in international relations, as also in the
communist movement, and the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, cannot be explained away
as a dogmatic-sectarian ``leftist'' interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism.</p>

<p> Maoism is a Chinese version of social--


chauvinism, with Chinese social militarism as its
nucleus. This is an anti-Leninist political trend, which

118

endeavours to adapt Marxism-Leninism to


greatHan nationalist aims and to make a
demagogicutilitarian use of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and of
the revolutionary and communist movement, to
attain these goals. At the same time the Maoists
camouflage their selfish, great-power designs and
plans with clamorous revolutionary phrases.</p>

<p> Even as it declares its irreconcilability with


imperialism, the Mao group weakens and splits the
world's anti-imperialist forces, undermines the
national-liberation movement and specifically
interferes with the establishment of unity of action
to support the just struggle of the peoples of
Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of
conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an
antiSoviet foundation.</p>

<p> Although the Maoists shout a lot about


socialism, they have launched a wild political
campaign against most of the socialist countries,
have started pursuing a course of outright
hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a
situation of war hysteria.</p>

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<p> Although verbally they champion the idea of
world revolution, and make much ado about their
&quot;revolutionary nature,'' Mao's supporters at the
same time slander the working class of the
capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist
degeneration. They also attack most of the Communist
Parties, and undermine the workers' and
democratic movement.</p>

<p> Events of the past decade show that the


Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of the
revolution, if its development does not conform to their
great-Han nationalistic interests. But they
understand very well that only an orientation towards
revolution can offer any historical prospect. That

119

is why they are so amazingly insistent-and


unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to
use the world revolutionary process for their own
ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy
a leading position in it, so as to mould it to the
requirements of Chinese nationalism: the
implementation of the ambitious dreams of the
supporters of the great-Han policy contemplating
China as the centre of the world. This is the
strategic design of the Maoist leadership.</p>

<p> The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a


great discrepancy between their words and deeds,
and between their theoretical concepts and
practice. While proclaiming themselves the most
resolute fighters against imperialism and
declaring that imperialism is a &quot;paper tiger,'' they
actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the same
time link up with imperialism on the basis of
anti-Sovietism.</p>

<p> The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the


stand of great-power chauvinism, preserves
leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese
society and in the world arena there are
powerful social, political and ideological forces at work
whose efforts are directed at the protection,
strengthening and development of socialist gains,
the restoration and consolidation of the theory
and policy of Marxism-Leninism and the
principles of proletarian internationalism in
China.</p>

<p> Maoism is opposed in the first place by the


objective tendency of the socialist development

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of the country. This is embodied primarily in the
foundations of socialism built by the efforts of the
Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the

120

other socialist countries. The military--


bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the
political superstructure does not mean the automatic
collapse of the socialist basis. Of course,
deformations in the basis can and do take place under
the influence of reactionary changes in the
superstructure.</p>

<p> Broad sections of the Chinese population are


interested in carrying out a socialist policy in
China-the main core of the working class, the
progressive part of the peasantry, broad masses
of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary
section of the army. The Maoists cannot ignore the
interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed,
Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist
sentiments and strivings of the Chinese working
people. A great many Chinese Communists take
a socialist stand. Although genuine Communists
have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle
against Maoism, they have not given up.</p>

<p> The world socialist system, its successes and


the principled Leninist policy of the Soviet Union
and the other countries of the socialist
community, exert an influence on the development of
the political struggle in China. Broad sections of
the Chinese people remember that the USSR is
the first country of socialism, and they remember
the aid which the USSR rendered the working
people of China during the years of the anti--
imperialist struggle, the revolution and the
construction of socialism. No anti-Soviet hysteria can do
away with this sympathy.</p>

<p> The world communist and working-class


movement also affects developments in China. The
condemnation of Maoism by the majority of the
Communist Parties of the world and the resolute

121

criticism of Maoism at the International Meeting


of 1969, at the Congresses and in the press of
the fraternal Parties cannot fail to have an
influence on the situation in China.</p>

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<p> The ideology and policy of Maoism do not
correspond to the objective course of the
development of society and the requirements of the
socialist development of China. Maoism suffers
one defeat after another and its ultimate failure
is historically inevitable. There can be no doubt
that the Communists, the working class and all
the working people of China will find the strength
to embark once again on the road of a close
unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist
countries and ensure the success of the great cause of
socialism in the PRC.</p>

<p> This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU


and the Soviet state. The November Plenary
Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted
that the Politbureau of the Central Committee is
consistently carrying out the line of the 24th
Congress regarding the People's Republic of
China and expressed full agreement with the
position of the Politbureau in solving associated
practical questions. The Soviet Union is working
for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state
relations. This aim is also promoted by the
ideological-political struggle against ``left-wing''
revisionism which Lenin called &quot;petty-bourgeois
revolutionism.''</p>

<p> Genuine Marxist-Leninists regard the exposure


of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic ideology and
policy of Maoism as essential to the strengthening
of the unity of world socialism, the communist
movement and the anti-imperialist movement.</p>

<p> <em>Pravda</em>, December 5, 1971</p>

[122]

__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Dialectics,
<br /> Genuine and Spurious</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST INTERPRETATION
<br /> AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS</b>

<p> <em>V. Lektorsky</em>,


<br /> <em>G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu</em></p>

<p> The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that


criticism of bourgeois and revisionist concepts remains
an important component of the Party's
theoretical work. &quot;The Congress considers,'' says the
Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report
of the CPSU Central Committee, &quot;that the creative
development and propagation of the Marxist--

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Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts
to revise it must remain a central task in the
Party's ideological work.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> Revisionist concepts of both right and ``left''


varieties, and the Maoist ideology in particular,
are particularly dangerous forms of the many
attempts that have been made to rob Marxist--
Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and
misrepresent socialist and communist construction.
While posing as defenders of the ``purity'' of
Marxism-Leninism and employing ``Marxist'' and
``revolutionary'' terms, the Maoists seek to foist
on the world communist and workers' movement
an ideological and political platform of their own
which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism


Publishers, pp. 235--236</p>

123

They have launched a virulent campaign against


the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting out with
their divisive policy to undermine the
revolutionary struggle and sow discord in the ranks of the
anti-imperialist fighters. ''. . .the Chinese leaders,''
Leonid Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU
Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress,
&quot;have put forward an ideological-political
platform of their own which is incompatible with
Leninism on the key questions of international
life and the world communist movement, and have
demanded that we should abandon the line of the
20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.''~^^1^^</p>

<p> Characteristic of the Maoist revision of


MarxistLeninist theory is the attempt to ``substantiate''
the splitting actions of the Chinese leaders and
their adventurist policy by references to
materialist dialectics. This circumstance makes it
imperative for Marxist scholars to examine such claims
critically in order to distinguish between true
materialist dialectics and the distorted versions put
out by the Maoists.</p>

<p> Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign


was launched in China against the &quot;theory of
combining two into one&quot; and advocating &quot;the
principle of dividing one into two.'' Ostensibly,
the campaign was directed against distortions and
falsifications of the core of materialist dialectics,

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the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not
scientific, since its purpose was to justify the
special views held by Mao and his adherents. The
polemic over the problem of contradictions, of the
unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to

_-_-_

<p> ^^1^^ Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism
Publishers, p. 15.</p>

124

be more exact, was artificially produced)


precisely when there was a need for &quot;philosophical
substantiation&quot; of the policy of splitting the ranks
of the international communist and working-class
movement and conducting an openly anti-Soviet
line. The &quot;theory of dividing one into two,''
which served as philosophical justification of the
need for <em>a</em> prolonged confrontation between
classes under socialism, provided tremendous scope
for arbitrary construction of ever new ``
contradictions'' and &quot;antagonisms,'' and creating a
sociopolitical atmosphere for encouraging the
interminable political squabbles and clashes and the use
of extreme measures and the military--
bureaucratic dictatorship.</p>

<p> The actual socio-political and ideological aim


of the spate of bombast let loose in China in
1963--64 around the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites is obvious. It has been
exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of
Marxist theoreticians, some of which were printed in the
journal <em>Questions ot Philosophy</em>.~^^1^^ The Maoist
interpretation and application turned dialectics into
a political gimmick, demagogically designed to
camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung's political
line. If this presented a purely historical interest,
referring even to the very recent past, there
would hardly be any need to return to an
analysis of the specifically Maoist interpretation and
application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is
still very much the practice in present-day China

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ E. V. Ilyenkov, <em>Dialectics or Eclecticism</em>. No. 7, 1968;


L. P. Delyusin, <em>'Discussion on Socialism in China and
Contemporary Reality</em>, No. I, 1969; E. Ya. Batalov, <em>Destruction
of Practice</em>, No. 3, 1969.</p>

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125

to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the


Maoist line of thought.</p>

<p> The most recent and instructive example of the


Maoist interpretation and application of
materialist dialectics is provided by the article &quot;The
Theory of Combining Two into One&quot; published
in the March 1971 issue of the magazine
<em>Hungchi</em>. Coming from &quot;a group of authors of
revolutionary criticism&quot; of the Higher Party
School of the CPC Central Committee, the article
criticises the &quot;reactionary and absurd thesis of
'combining two into one' advocated and spread
by the traitor and provocateur Liu Shao-chi&quot; and
gives the ``correct'' i.e., Maoist, interpretation of
the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. As
the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the
basic law of materialist dialectics means that &quot;in
human society and in Nature the whole always
splits up into unequal parts&quot; which are engaged
in a constant struggle, leading to &quot;one side
overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the
other.'' For instance, the revolutionary always
destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the
erroneous, etc. &quot;By advancing the proposition of
the division of one into two,'' the authors go on
to say, &quot;Mao Tse-tung has summed up most
profoundly and laconically the law of the unity and ,
struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the very I
gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has |
demonstrated that both in Nature and in human I
society and consciousness there exist
contradictions and struggle, not the law of 'combining two
into one'.'' All talk of combining opposites is ,
nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- |
tion of the &quot;counter-revolutionary, revisionist line j
directed against the socialist revolution with

126

the aim of combining the proletariat with the


bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and
socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.''
The present polemic between those who adhere
to the &quot;theory of dividing one into two&quot; versus
those who support &quot;the theory of combining two
into one&quot; is regarded as a &quot;reflection of the
bitter and complex class struggle of that period (the
first half of the 60's) in the ideological sphere
within and without the country. In the final
analysis, the point at issue was whether the
dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the

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socialist system consolidated or the proletarian
dictatorship should be liquidated and the
capitalist system restored.'' If one adds to this the
opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that &quot;the reactionary and thoroughly
metaphysical 'theory of combining two into one' has
been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50's
as the interpretation of the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites and serves as theoretical
justification for the 'restoration of capitalism' in
that country and as an instrument of 'collusion
with the US imperialism','' one will readily see
that the latest campaign of ``repudiating'' the
&quot;theory of combining two into one&quot; has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what
are these aims and what, in general, is the place
and the real value of Maoist ``dialectics'' in the
present-day political and ideological struggle?</p>

__*_*_*__

<p> The Maoists have grown very fond of the


formula of the need to &quot;divide one into two,'' which
they view as the ultimate philosophical
justification of their splitting policies. They have grown

127

so fond of it that the thesis of the &quot;synthesis of


opposites into one&quot; appears to them as out--
andout &quot;revisionism.'' Characteristically, however,
Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that
&quot;the division of one into two&quot; is progressive and
inevitable when they find it politically
advantageous, completely ``forgetting'' about it when, for
some reason or other, they consider it
disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in
lauding the benefits of ``division'' when it concerns
the communist movement, the differences and
contradictions within its ranks, for then the
Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One
can hardly deny that, for it is indeed beneficial,
only the question is-to whom? General formulas,
however sound, keep ``silent'' on that question.
This accounts for the predilection of Peking ``
dialecticians'' for endless repetition of general and
abstract schemes which they stick like labels on
concrete and particular cases whenever it is
thought &quot;advantageous,'' but which they refrain
from using when it appears to be disadvantageous
to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such,
in the final analysis, is the criterion of
acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical
proposition employed by the Maoists.</p>

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<p> The language of materialist dialectics has, in
Maoist hands, become simply a euphemism, at
once a realisation and a disguise for practical
political action, a kind of instrument kit consisting
of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames.
The Maoists' treatment of the theoretical wealth
accumulated by materialist dialectics is a striking
example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic
comprehension and use of ideas which,
irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are

128

regarded as very pliant material that does not


commit one to anything, and which can be used
as one pleases, turning it inside out if necessary,
so long as the desired effect is achieved. The
history of social thought knows a number of
examples of a well-developed social idea being used
for two diametrically opposed purposes. One,
when it becomes the property of those social
forces whose aspirations and vital needs accord
with the idea, social forces which have achieved
a sufficient level of spiritual development and are
able to perceive its inner meaning and make it
their ideological banner. The other, when it is
appropriated by people who are far removed
from such an idea, who seize on it, not for its
real content, but because of its appeal, the
authority of its originators and the effectiveness of its
implications.</p>

<p> Marxism has long emerged as the most


influential world outlook of our time known for its
convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even
by those who are not Marxists. But it has so
much to offer it is a tempting inducement to
social forces which, alien to and often far
removed from Marxism, lack <em>a</em> banner of their own
that will carry weight and evoke the desired
response.</p>

<p> Attempts to ``borrow'' and use some elements


of Marxism have been made more than once by
various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other
circles at crucial moments or when starved for
ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the
appeal of Marxism. &quot;Extremely wide sections of the
classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating
their aims,'' Lenin wrote in 1910, &quot;had
assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and

__PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__

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9--193

129

mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote


certain 'slogans/ certain answers to tactical
questions, <em>without having understood</em> the Marxist
criteria for these answers.''~^^1^^ Even then Lenin
warned against the danger of this tendency, which
leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of
Marxism, to the drowning out of its essence by
slogan-shouting, so that &quot;nothing but the
phraseology&quot; remains of it.</p>

<p> However, in those days this tendency had not


yet reached the point it has today under Maoism;
and while the utilitarian tendencies must be
described, and were described by Lenin in his time,
as vulgarisation, they may appear as something
not far short of refined thought compared with
present-day samples. In the writings of
Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even
magazine articles, formulas such as &quot;division of one
into two&quot; and empty slogans do not merely
supplant logical thinking; they go so far as to lend
verbal decisions an almost physically tangible
character by their sheer bluntness, their
grossness in putting across the practical political
motive.</p>

<p> However, paradoxical as it may seem, it is


precisely this extreme down-to-earth attitude and
practical candidness that causes them to soar to
the heights of abstraction. The most specific is
found in close proximity with the infinitely
general, and is, moreover, derived from the latter.
So, while appearing to talk about particulars,
they do not merely express particular, ordinary
ideas taking shape in people's minds and
subject to their critical comprehension, but utter

_-_-_

<p>~^^1^^ Lenin, <em>Coll Works</em>, Vol. 17, pp. 42--43.


130</p>

130

incontrovertible, absolute truths. This unlimited


universalisation of the most banal things, this
constant performance of dizzying leaps from ``
global'' generalities to particulars, and constant
attempts to pontificate, uttering &quot;universal truths,''
are garbed in the terminology of Marxist

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dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous
exploitation of some of the turns of phrase typical
of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!</p>

<p> In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one


can find any number of such &quot;great leaps&quot;
from the most general to the most particular. A
typical feature of this mode of thinking is the art
of making such &quot;great leaps&quot; without bothering
to investigate the particular cases or to ensure
consistency in the transition from the general
phrase to a particular problem or the real state
of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each time
there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism's
political actions. In seeking to substantiate a
thesis on the need to split the international
communist movement, for instance, the line of reasoning
adopted is as follows: any process in nature,
society or thought develops through the &quot;division
of one into two.'' No process can take place
without the &quot;division of one into two.'' Hence,
the international communist movement, too, must
be &quot;divided into two&quot; which is viewed as a
triumph of dialectics.</p>

<p> It is not so difficult to understand why


unbridled universalisation-constantly recurring flights
towards ``absolute'' and ``universal'' truths--
predominates in Maoist writings. Absolute
universality <em>is</em> proclaimed, not for the sake of
disinterested intellectualism, scientific cognition or ideology,
but simply to give these writings the character

__PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__
<b>9*</b>

131

of unchallengeable authority. Any particular,


concrete proposition can be scrutinised, critically
appraised, verified, corrected in some aspects or
even rejected altogether. In the case of
particulars, one can dare to sort them out for oneself.
But when the voice of the oracle is heard, when
the demands proclaimed are those of the world
absolute which bestows on people &quot;universal
truth&quot; through the lips of its earthly
ambassadors, then all other voices must remain silent!</p>

<p> The procedure, then, is simple enough. First,


the universe is supplied with a set of abstract
formulas and slogans, which are ``urgently''
needed, a kind of quiver with appropriate ideological
arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is

http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
discovered that the necessary slogan has been ``shot''
by the universe itself.</p>

<p> It must be remembered that this hovering


among the &quot;universal truths&quot; is simultaneously
called upon to disguise the very earthly political
passions which are the cause of the action being
justified and the source of practical slogans. These
passions are presented as the &quot;essence of the
world,'' which allegedly is responsible for them
and which is garbed in dialectical terminology.
As a result the crux of the matter seems to lie in
dialectics, after it has been subjected to such
barefaced manipulation.</p>

<p> When put to such use, the dialectical


terminology becomes a device of political demagogy, the
language of such demagogy, designed to
influence people who respect Marxist-Leninist theory.
Direct justification of any act of brazen
voluntarism by abstract universal philosophisms is
meant to create a semblance of profound
philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a

132

freakish and essentially harmful policy. You object to


the split in the ranks of the international
communist movement. Well, then you are opposed to
the thesis of &quot;dividing one into two,'' hence also
to dialectics. You maintain that the main law of
dialectics is not reduced to the struggle of
opposites but presupposes also ``unity'' of
opposites. Then you are betraying the line of Chairman
Mao and preach capitulation in face of the
domestic bourgeoisie and collusion with
international imperialism.</p>

<p> It is hardly necessary to go to any length to


prove that genuine materialist dialectics has
nothing to do with such unprincipled use of it.
Nevertheless, some explanations and comparisons
are in order, if only to take a closer look at the
patterns of thought whereby Maoists not only
betray the spirit of dialectics, but break even
with the terminological semblance of &quot;
dialecticalness,'' even with the letter they have borrowed
from the dialectical vocabulary. With this end in
view let us go back to the Maoist &quot;principle of
dividing one into two&quot; and the bitter, mutually
destructive antagonism between extremes, which
they misrepresent as the dialectical law of the
unity and struggle of opposites.</p>

http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
<p> That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul
of the letter of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, is
perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this
law <em>unity</em> has been dropped, so that what remains
is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all
familiar with the rudiments of dialectics will
know that, according to Marx, &quot;what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two
contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion

133

into a new category.&quot;~^^1^^ Lenin, too, repeatedly


spoke of the need to be able to unite, or synthesise,
oppos