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Pipeline Operations and Integrity

Management
Module3
Pipeline Integrity Management

Alan Murray 2017 1


Outline

Pipeline Operations
Pipeline Maintenance
Where are we?
Pipeline Integrity management

Inspection and Assessment Methods


Pipeline repairs
Emergency Response Planning.

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Pipeline Integrity Management
Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Measures
External Direct Cathodic
ILI Pressure Pipe Coating CIS Anodes &
Corrosion Assessment Protection
Test Ground Beds
Dependent

Direct Gas Internal Corrosion Site Operational Coupon


Threats

Internal
ILI Pressure Specific Plans Pigging Monitoring
Corrosion Assessment Quality
Time

Test
Stress Cathodic Discharge Field Inspections
Pressure Direct
Corrosion ILI Protection Temperature
Test Assessment
Cracking
Long Seam Defects Pipe Inspection during
Manufacturing Pipe Defects
Pressure Test
Specification Manufacturing
Girth Weld
Construction/ Coupled/Pressure Welds Construction
ILI Pressure Test Patrolling
Threats
Stable

Fabrication Wrinkle Bends Practices


Branch Connections
Gaskets Preventive
Equipment
Relief Maintenance
Valves/Regulators

Third Party One Call System Damage Prevention & Patrolling Marking and Excavation
Independent

Damage Ticket Management Public Awareness Locating Monitoring


Threats

Incorrect Operating Audits


Time

Operations Procedures

Continuing Emergency
Weather and Patrolling
Surveillance Preparedness
Outside Forces
Procedures

INGAA 3
Objectives and aims of pipeline integrity
management
The principal aim of pipeline integrity management is to
efficiently allocate Operating &Maintenance
resources so as to assure the following:
• The safety of personnel (members of the public,
company employees, and contractors),
• Environmental protection, and
• System reliability
If these three aims are met, operating cost, and financial
impact will be minimized, return on investment will
be maximized, and company image will be enhanced

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Alan Murray 2016
What is an IMP (1)?

A program to ensure a “safe and reliable delivery…


to their customers without adverse effects on
employees, the public, customers or the
environment”
“a process... to assess and mitigate risks in order
to reduce both the number likelihood and
consequences of incidents”
ASME B31.8S-2001

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What is an IMP (2)?

“Process to develop, implement, measure, and manage


the integrity of a pipeline through assessment,
mitigation and prevention of risks in order to ensure a
safe, environmentally responsible, reliable service”
The IMP can provide a basis for a five year projection of
integrity related activities and expenditures)

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Alan Murray 2016
Integrity Management Program

Integrity Management
Program Elements

Management
Regulatory Framework Risk Assessment Continuous
of Change
Compliance Of the Plan And Mitigation Re Assessment
Plan

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Integrity Management Program

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Integrity Management Platform
Data Integrity
Management Assessments
ILI
Centerline Models
• MFL
GIS / Spatial Registration
• Caliper, DEF
Align, Integrate, Validate
• INS
HCA + Consequence
• UTCD / WT
Change + Trend Analysis
Direct Assmt
Report Generation
Hydro Test
Other

Integrity
Platform

VALUE =
Efficiency,
Compliance Risk & Decision Support

Threat Identification
Baseline Assessment
Risk Assessment
Prioritization
R&M
Alan Planning
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Integrity Management
• New regulations are predominantly driven by
incidents/accidents. New regulations may also occur
because of changes in technology, new materials,
Congressional mandates, etc.
• The integrity management rules were required by
Congress in various PSIA and PIPES reauthorization acts
• Integrity management rules
– Hazardous liquid pipeline operators (49 CFR 195.452)
– Natural gas transmission pipeline operators (49 CFR 195
Subpart O)
– Gas distribution pipeline systems (49 CFR 192 Subpart P)
– Low stress liquid lines (included in 49 49CFR 195.452)

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Types of Management Systems

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Required Elements (U.S. Hazardous
Liquid)
• HCA Identification
• Baseline assessment
• Risk assessment
• Remediation
• Continual evaluation
• Preventive/mitigative measures
• Performance measures
• Information analysis

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Required Elements (U.S. Gas)
• HCA Identification • Performance measures
• Baseline Assessment • Record keeping
• Risk Assessment • Management of Change
• Direct Assessment (DA) Plan • Quality Control
• Remediation • Communication Plan
• Continual Evaluation • Regulatory submissions
• Confirmatory DA • Minimize Environmental &
• Preventive / Mitigative safety risk
Measures • Identification of new HCAs

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Gas Distribution Integrity
Management
• PHMSA published a final rule establishing integrity management
requirements for gas distribution pipeline systems on December 4, 2009
(74 FR 63906). The effective date of the rule was February 12, 2010.
Operators were given until August 2, 2011 to write and implement their
program.
• The regulation requires operators, such as natural gas distribution
companies to develop, write, and implement a distribution integrity
management program with the following elements:
– Knowledge
– Identify Threats
– Evaluate and Rank Risks
– Identify and Implement Measures to Address Risks
– Measure Performance, Monitor Results, and Evaluate Effectiveness
– Periodically Evaluate and Improve Program
– Report Results

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Industry Best Practices
• API Standard 1160 “Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid
Pipelines”
• ASME B31.8S “Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines”
• Both were first issued in 2001 and are periodically updated and re-issued

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API 1160 Objectives
• “An integrity management program provides a means to
improve the safety of pipeline systems and to allocate
operator resources effectively to:
– Identify and analyze actual and potential precursor events that
can result in pipeline incidents.
– Examine the likelihood and potential severity of pipeline
incidents.
– Provide a comprehensive and integrated means for examining
and comparing the spectrum of risks and risk reduction
activities available.
– Provide a structured, easily communicated means for selecting
and implementing risk reduction activities.
– Establish and track system performance with the goal of
improving that performance.”

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API 1160 Guiding Principles
• “Integrity must be built into pipeline systems from initial planning,
design, and construction.
• System integrity is built on qualified people, using defined processes to
operate maintained facilities.
• An integrity management program must be flexible.
• The integration of information is a key component for managing system
integrity.
• Preparing for and conducting a risk assessment is a key element in
managing system integrity.
• Assessing risks to pipeline integrity is a continuous process.
• Mitigative actions are taken for injurious defects.
• New technologies should be evaluated and utilized, as appropriate.
• Pipeline system integrity and integrity management programs should be
evaluated on a regular basis”.

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API 1160
• Flowchart identifies basic
components:
– Identify impact to HCAs
– Initial data gathering,
review and integration
– Initial risk assessment
– Baseline plan
– Assess (inspect) and/or
mitigate
– Integrate results
– Reassess risk
– Revise plan
– Evaluate
program
– Management
change

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ASME B31.8S Purpose and Objectives
• “Managing the integrity of a gas pipeline system
is the primary goal of every pipeline system
operator. Operators want to continue providing
safe and reliable delivery of natural gas to their
customers without adverse effects on
employees, the public, customers, or the
environment. Incident-free operation has been
and continues to be the gas pipeline industry’s
goal. The use of this Standard as a supplement
to the ASME B31.8 Code will allow pipeline
operators to move closer to that goal.”

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ASME B31.8S Principles
• “Functional requirements for integrity management shall be engineered into new pipeline
systems from initial planning, design, material selection, and construction.
• … prevention, detection, and mitigation activities, shall be considered…
• … commitment by all operating personnel using comprehensive, systematic, and integrated
processes …
• … The program shall address the operator’s organization, processes, and the physical
system…
• … continuously evolving and must be flexible.
• … periodically evaluated and modified to accommodate changes…
• … Periodic evaluation is required…
• … utilizes the best set of prevention, detection, and mitigation activities…
• … the effectiveness of the activities shall be reassessed
• … to ensure the continuing effectiveness …
• … Information integration is a key component for managing system integrity…”

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B31.8S
• Process flow
diagram:
– Potential
impact by
threat
– Gather, review,
integrate data
– Assess risk
– Integrity
assessment
– Respond to
assessment
and mitigate

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Integrity Roadmap (B31.8S)

Identifying Potential
Gathering, Reviewing,
Pipeline Impact by
Integrating Data
Threat

Risk Assessment
NO All Threats
evaluated ?

Integrity Assessment
YES

Responses to Integrity
Assessments &
Mitigation
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Integrity Management Program
Elements
Understand Gather and
potential impacts integrate data
Evaluate
risk
Assess
integrity

Repair and
mitigate
Manage
change
Monitor program
effectiveness
Maintain
records

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Integrity Management Program
Considerations
• A good integrity management program
– Must comply with all applicable codes
– Protect the public and environment
– Minimize environmental impact
– Provide transparency where needed
– Ensure reliable delivery
– Protect asset base
– Manage life-cycle cost
• A long-term goal should be to provide a sustainable, cost-effective
integrity management program that will ultimately achieve zero
failures
• Short-term goals Should be to incur no societal impacts as a result
of pipeline ruptures or leaks.

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Managing an Integrity Management
Program
• Developing, maintaining, and managing an
integrity plan needs to balance regulatory
requirements with all the risks the company
faces

Regulations Safety
Other Burdens Operating Expenses
Compliance Oversight Environmental Protection

Protect & Enable

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Management Systems Approach
• A good integrity
management program
should be a part of a
company’s
management systems.
That is, the integrity
management program
should work together
with a company’s day-
to-day and long-term
business strategies and
practices. It should not
stand alone.

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Management System
• The integrity management program’s ‘management
system’ should consider
– Program scope, description of pipelines, goals and objectives
– Organizational lines of responsibility
– Documented Plans, Programs, Specifications and Procedures
– Training and qualifications of management and staff
– Qualifications of consultants and contractors
– Methods of keeping abreast of industry practices and research
– Change management
– Measurement of the effectiveness of the program

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Links between IMPs and
Management Systems
• Organization The IMP should not
• Budgeting duplicate other
• Engineering practices and
procedures – where
• Operations & Maintenance appropriate, it should
• Emergency planning reference and reflect
them
• Responsibilities and
accountabilities
• Training
• Etc.,

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Who is Responsible for the Plan ?
• Different layers of management have difference
responsibilities. Overall accountability should be at
the management level that sets policies & objectives.
• Coordinating responsibility will depend on the size
and organization of company but should be above
individual operating area / units.
• Day to day implementation responsibility is at the
operational level.
• Everyone in the company should be aware of the IMP.

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Decision Making
• An integrity management program requires a wide range
of decisions to be made.
• Minimum information needed to make decisions should
be included in the program.
• Flexibility is needed and the program should reflect this.
• Decisions should be ‘risk-informed’. That is, the person or
group making a decision needs to consider how the
decision impacts risk to safety, health, and the
environment (SHE risks).
• If the reason for making a decision is not clearly defined in
the program, it must be documented.

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Regulatory Compliance
• It is YOUR responsibility as a Pipeline Owner/
Operator to determine the detailed Protocols
required by your Regulating Authority and to
develop a program that is in compliance.
• In this Seminar we will include examples of
typical content and wording that you may be
able to use directly in your Plan
• In this module we will look at GENERALLY
COMMON requirements of various jurisdictions

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Record Keeping
• It is essential to keep records that:
– Formally record decisions
– Contain plans to inspect, repair or mitigate
• The IMP should clearly define record keeping
requirements and who is responsible for ensuring the
record keeping
requirements are met.
– Missing records must trigger
corrective action
– Written records and reports are hard
evidence that an Integrity Management
Plan is working

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Working Records System
• The integrity management program’s
‘working records system (WRS)’ should
consider
– Requirements of applicable Codes/Standards
such as CFR 192/195 and CSA Z662
– Maintenance of a WRS that allows access to
historical pipeline records
– Identification of applicable Standards and Codes
– Documentation of condition monitoring and
mitigation programs
– Reviews of the integrity management program’s
effectiveness

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Integrity Management
Programs
Implementation
• Integrity Management is implemented through a
series of Programs
• Programs encompass
– Prevention
– Monitoring
– Mitigation
– Trending and Analysis

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Condition Monitoring Program
What is the current condition of my pipeline?
The integrity management program’s ‘condition
monitoring program’ should consider;
– Use of internal in-line inspection tools and data
– Engineering assessment of facilities to address
pipeline integrity
– Use of risk assessment methods
– Where appropriate, monitoring programs for slope
movements, river crossings, depth of cover, etc.
– Program to minimize third party damage
– Procedures used to track, analyze and trend the
condition of the pipeline

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Mitigation Program
How can I restore the condition my pipeline?
The integrity management program’s ‘mitigation
program’ should consider
– Criteria and procedures for defect assessment
and prioritization of repairs
– Criteria and procedures used for
• Pipe replacement (cut-outs)
• Repair (grinding, sleeve, re-coating)
• Hot work, hot taps, welding and
maintenance welding
• Excavation procedures
• Hydrostatic testing
• Operating pressure reductions (temporary
or permanent)
– Outline of short-term (1-3 yr) and long-term (4-
10 yr) mitigation program plans and priorities

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Change Management Process
➢ Documents are developed through the
use of 1) a standard operating procedure
template,
➢ 2) by re-using existing documentation or
➢ 3) developing new information
➢ A specific controlled process for
implementing revisions must exist.
Continuous Reassessment

Current
Objectives
Conditions

Gaps
Opportunities

Continuous Performance
Risk Monitoring
Prioritisation Metrics

Processes
Annual
Integrity Plan
Technology
Implementation
Systems
Results
Resources

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Facets of Integrity Management
• Safety of the Public, Employees and the Environment
• Reliability for Customers and Suppliers
• Cost Minimization While Maintaining Safety and Reliability
Safety

RISK INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT

Operational Excellence
Cost Reliability
CONSUMER NEED

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Typical IMP Outline
• 1. Introduction
– Management Commitment
– Program Overview
– Definitions
• 2. Roles and Responsibilities
• 3. HCAs
• 4. Data Collection
• 5. Threats
• 6. Risk Assessment
• 7. Integrity Assessments
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Framework (Continued)
• 8. Remediation and Repair
• 9. Mitigation and Prevention
• 10. Continuous Improvement
• 11. Performance Measures
• 12. Management of Change
• 13. Recordkeeping
• 14. Incident Investigation Procedures

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Statement of Authority
• Many companies begin their IMP documents with a
signed and dated statement by the company officer who
is accountable to the Senior Management for the IMP
• The statement expressly states the Objectives of the
Program and Management support for IMP
• It provides certainty as to who is ultimately responsible
for deciding any Pipeline Integrity issue which cannot be
resolved satisfactorily by staff

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Summary Description
• The introduction of an IMP typically includes a
written description of the IMP and its alignment
with the company’s management systems and
appropriate regulatory requirements
• Often this section links the IMP to the
Company’s Pipeline Maintenance
Planning and budgeting process.
(The IMP can provide a basis for
a five year projection of integrity
related activities and expenditures)

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Summary
• The beginning a a good
IMP should
– State management’s
commitment to the IMP,
– Summarize the
program,
– Give a process flow
diagram,
– Clearly state the
purpose and scope of
the IMP, and
– Define key words or
phrases used in the plan

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Threats
Failure Modes
Material/
Metal Geotechnic External Construction
Loss Cracking al Failure Damage Defect Other
External Hydrogen Wash Out / Company/ first Defective long Seam Fire
Corrosion Induced Erosion party damage weld

Internal Stress Slope Contractor / Defective girth weld Over


Corrosion corrosion Movement Second party pressuring
damage
Gouging Delayed Undermining / Third party Defective Spiral SCADA
Cracking Subsidence damage seam weld malfunction
(Mechanical
damage)

Immediate Earthquake Vandalism Wrinkle /Buckle Lightning


Cracking
(Mechanical
damage)
Corrosion Terrorism Defective pipe body
fatigue

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Identify Potential Threats
Stress
Internal
Corrosion Manufacturing
Corrosion
Cracking

External
Corrosion
Time Dependent

Potential
Threat
Weather &
Outside
Forces Stable
Identified
Segment
Time Independent

Construction

3rd Party
Damage Incorrect
Equipment
Operations
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Pipeline Threats Classification
1. When They Appear
– Manufacturing
– Construction
– Pipeline Service

2. How They Grow and Fail (ASME B31.8S)


– Time (Typical: Corrosion, SCC)
– Non-Time Dependent (Typical: Third Party)
– Stable (Typical: Manufacturing)
“Risk assessment, integrity assessment and mitigation activities
shall be correctly addressed according to the time factors and
failure mode grouping”
ASME B31.8S Section 2.2
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Pipeline Integrity Threats
When They Appear
1. Pipe Manufacturing Imperfections
– Seam weld imperfections/defects
• Hook cracks, lack of fusion, shrinkage cracks, voids,
under-trim
– Pipe body imperfections/defects
• Laminations, roll-in, slivers, laps, hard spots
2. Construction Features
– Mechanical Damage - Gouges, Grooves, Scratches
– Arc Burns
– Dents, Buckles, Wrinkles
– Girth weld Imperfections

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Pipeline Integrity Threats
3. In-Service
3.1 Product and Operation-related
• Corrosion - Internal and External inc MIC
• Stress Corrosion Cracking
• Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC)
3.2 Third-Party Damage (excavation equipment)
• Denting with or without metal loss and/or cracking
• Metal Loss by Gouging with or without cracking
3.3 Outside Forces
• Earth Movement/Subsidence –buckling/wrinkling
• River Scouring and Spanning

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Pipeline Integrity Threats
Growth and Failure-related Classification

Threats may move within ASME Classification


• Active to Inactive (I.e. Corrosion, SCC)
• Manufacturing activated by Operation (i.e.
Seam weld anomalies under over-pressure or
pressure cycling)
• New Threats on Old Threats (i.e. Corrosion or
SCC on Construction Dents)

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Susceptibility

 Expected Threat given the pipe condition


 Active External and Internal Corrosion
 SCC: >50% Stress level, Tape or Asphalt,
high residual stress, Age > 10 Years
 Wrinkling and Buckling
 Manufacturing under Over-Pressure or
Pressure Cycling (Fatigue)

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Susceptibility: Pipeline Database
Infrastructure (Fairly Static)
• Geo-referenced Pipe Tally (minimum)
– UNIQUE Chainage and UTM Coordinates (Northing, Easting,
Height) : Rio Zulia-Coveñas
– Feature Description (pipe, valve, station)
– Feature Characteristics (i.e. pipe joint length, SMYS, Charpy
V-Notch, pipe wall thickness, type of seam weld: ERW, DSAW
)
– Installations (i.e. Pump Stations, Traps, casings, river crossing
start and end, Rectifiers, repairs)
– Soil Mapping (start and end, type, pH)
– Type of Coating

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Susceptibility: Pipeline Database
Maintenance Records (Dynamic)
• Geo-referenced Inspections and Survey
– High Consequence Areas: population, environment and
waterways (Oil Spill or Dispersion Model)
– CP Surveys (CIS, DCVG, PCM)
– Excavation Findings, recoating, type of repair
– Hydraulic Gradient Model (I.e. flow, pressure and
temperature)
– Pressure Cycling and Over-Pressure
– Geotechnical Sensitivity Areas
– Product Transportation History (Corrosivity)
– In-Line Inspection Data (I.e. corrosion, geometry and cracks)

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Higher Likelihood Categories
• External and internal corrosion,
• Third party damage,
• Operator or procedures error,
• Equipment failures,
• Natural forces damage,
• Stress corrosion cracking,
• Materials defects
• Construction errors

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Weather and Outside Force (from B31.8S)
• The following minimal data sets
should be collected for each
segment…
– Joint method (mechanical
coupling, acetylene weld, arc
weld)
– Topography and soil conditions
(unstable slopes, water
crossings, water proximity, soil
liquefactions susceptibility)
– Earthquake fault
– Profile of ground acceleration
near fault zones (greater than
0.2 g acceleration)
– Depth of frost line
– Year of installation
– Pipe grade, diameter, and wall
thickness (internal stress
calculation added to external
loading; total stress not to
exceed 100% SMYS)

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Geotechnical and Weather-Related:
Construction, Operation & Abandonment
Refer to settlement, frost heave (freezing and thawing),
landslides/slope movement, earthquake,
wash outs erosion and lightning

Wash outs / Scouring Landslides/Slope Movement

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Threat Summary
• Identifying threats and hazards is key to integrity management
• Consider a wide range of sources of information.
• Tailor your data collection to the most important threats and the
data that most strongly impacts your risk and likelihood
calculations
• Use documents like ASME B31.8S to provide guidance on common
threats.
• Use a consistent methodology for estimating the relative
likelihood that each type of degradation will lead to a release.
• Various methodologies include relative (index) models,
quantitative models, and semi-quantitative models.
• Specialize the models to your pipeline systems and segments and
use SME input

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Gas Pipelines
• For gas pipelines, areas that could be affected
by a release are based on a “potential impact
circle” and “identified sites”
• Potential impact circles are meant to consider
the potential for injury or death from the
radiant heat of a fire
• Identified sites are similar to High
Consequence Areas or “HCAs”

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ASME B31.8S Consequence
Identification
• ASME B31.8S (for gas pipelines) addresses
consequences using the C-FER Technologies
equation for a damage radius equivalent to a
heat intensity of 5000 Btu/hr ft2 for natural
gas
• Impact radius =0.69 (D * P 0.5)
• A similar formula is used for NGL plume
dispersion with a different scaling factor
found in B31.8S Section 3.2

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High Consequence Area (HCA)
Gas Transmission (Generic)
• (i) A Class 3 location
• (ii) A Class 4 location
• (iii) If Class 1 or Class 2 location
– Potential Impact Radius > 660 feet (200 meters),
AND Potential Impact Circle contains > 20 or more
buildings intended for human occupancy; or
– Where the potential impact circle contains an
identified site (Defined in Section 192.903)

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HCA for Gas Transmission (ASME B31.8S)
Potential Impact Area (Pipeline-Specific)
PIA
1000 ft.
School
660 ft.

300 ft
r r

Pipeline

Note: This diagram


r = 0.69 * d p
represents the results for a 30” pipe with an MAOP of 1,000 psig.
2 1/2
= 0.69 (30 in) (1000 lb/in )
= 654.6  Potential
ft3-1
Figure 660 ft.Impact Area (PIA)
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C-FER HCA determined by Pres. & Diameter

1,700
1,600
3"
1,500
1,400 4"
1,300 6"
1,200
8"
1,100
Distance (ft)

1,000 10"
900 12"
800
16"
700
600 20"
500 24"
400
30"
300
200 36"
100 42"
0
0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500

Maximum Operating Pressure (psig)


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Constant Consequence
Pipeline diameter “d” (inches) = 18”

Pipeline diameter “d” (inches) = 36” MAOP 600 psig: PIR = 304 ft

MAOP 1650 psig: PIR = 1000 ft Pipeline diameter “d” (inches) = 30”
MAOP 1000 psig: PIR = 655 ft

660 ft.
r = 1009 ft.

660 ft.

20 houses within circle


PIR = 0.69 pd2

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HCA - Utilizing GIS

Identified Site

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ASME B31.8S Consequence Evaluation
• For gas pipelines the following should be
considered when performing an evaluation
inside the impact radius:
– Population density
– Demographics –population with limited mobility
e.g., hospitals schools, prisons etc;
– Proximity of pipeline to exposed population
including any natural protective barriers

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ASME B31.8S Consequence Evaluation
• Consequence evaluations for gas pipelines
should also consider the potential for
– Property damage
– Environmental damage
– Effects of un-ignited gas releases
– Security of gas supply (e.g., impacts resulting
from interruption of service)
– Public convenience and necessity
– Potential for secondary failures

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Identified sites include the following
• An outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20)
or more persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12) month
period. Examples include playgrounds, recreational facilities,
camping grounds, outdoor theaters, stadiums, recreational areas
near a body of water, or areas outside a rural building such as a
religious facility ;
• A building that is occupied by twenty (20) or more persons on at
least five (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)
month period. Examples include religious facilities, office
buildings, community centers, general stores. 4-H facilities, or
roller skating rinks;
• A facility occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired
mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate. Examples include
hospitals, prisons, schools, day-care facilities, retirement facilities
or assisted living facilities.

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Determing Liquid HCAs
• Determining significant consequence
locations with liquid releases can be more
complicated than for gas releases
• Overland spread and waterborne transport
has to be taken into account
• Locations that appear remote from the
pipeline route can be affected because of
these transport mechanisms

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Directly Affected Areas
• Segments located within an HCA are presumed
to affect the HCA, unless a solid risk analysis
demonstrates otherwise
• In addition, portions of the pipeline that are
outside the HCA, but that could affect the HCA,
must also be identified. Typically this results in a
single segment of pipe that includes all of the
segment that intersects an HCA plus additional
portions of pipe that are adjacent to that portion
within the HCA.

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Hydrotechnical Assessement

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Directly Affected Areas

Pipeline

Segment That
Could Affect
HCA

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Indirectly Affected Area?
49CFR195 Appendix C gives guidance on
factors on determining whether a pipeline
can affect an HCA. Factors are:
• The product the pipeline is transporting
• Pathways from the pipeline to an HCA (refined products, crude oils, highly
• Terrain volatile liquids, etc.)
• Drainage systems such as small streams • Pipeline supports
and other smaller waterways • Operating conditions
• Farm tile fields • The hydraulic gradient of the line
• Roadways with ditches along the side • Pipe diameter, potential release volume,
• Potential natural forces inherent in the and the distance between the isolation
area (flood zones, earthquakes, points
subsidence areas, etc.) • Response capability (time to respond,
nature of response)

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Segment Identification Release
Locations
P/L

Streams
Downstream

HCA

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INDIRECT High Consequence Area (HCA)
for Liquids
1. Terrain – a spill on the pipeline could migrate over
terrain and either enter an HCA directly, or enter a
flowing watercourse that leads to an HCA.
2. Conduit – a conduit such as an active stream or
river crosses the pipeline and then flows into an
HCA.
3. Buffer – the pipeline, or segment, is immediately
adjacent to an HCA (and could affect the HCA) but
not inside it.

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GIS Desktop Review

• Develop High Impact Spill Index


• Algorithm can be based on the following
primary indices:
– Waterbodies
– Stakeholder sensitivity
– Access for repair teams
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Overland Flow Modeling
• Drainage systems (i.e
creeks, rivers)
• Crossing of Farm
Tiles Fields
• Crossing of Roadways
with Ditches Along
side
• Product Nature (i.e.
Volatile/vapour cloud)
• Spill Volume (EFRD)
• Emergency Response
Time
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Ranking HCAs
• Safety
– Number of possible injuries and deaths
– Age of the people affected
– Mobility of the people affected
• Health
– Severity of the health effect
– Number of people exposed to harmful health effects
– Age of people affected
• Environment
– Cost to remediate (as a measure of the amount of damage done)
– Age and fragility of the area impacted
– Rareness of the species impacted

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“Business” HCAs
• Business risks should never be equated with
SHE risks.
• Nonetheless, it makes sense to recognize that
some areas pose a far greater risk to a
company stability than others. If a company
cannot tolerate releases in certain areas, it
should NOT operate in those areas.

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Group Practice
 HCA (NPMS)
Data to
 Pipe Diameter
Define HCA
for  Type of Product

 Pressure

 Gas  Topography

 Liquids  Streams

 Geotechnical & Earthquake


Hazards
 Class 3, 4 and Occupancy

 Environment
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HCA Summary
• Both gas and liquid pipelines pose significant
risks to safety, health, environment,
commerce, business, and reputation.
• An operator should recognize and understand
all risks. Mitigation efforts should balance
with the potential consequences of a release.
• A company should integrate with its IMP and
management systems and structures.

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Model Types
• Index Models
– The most common approach
– These types of models have also been called
“decision-support” models. Such models are
designed to provide guidance or “decision support”,
as well as identification of areas with relatively
higher likelihood
• Estimation Models
– Produces a quantitative assessment & requires more
complex calculations than many index models

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Index Models
• Information on pipeline characteristics
assigned numerical scores
• Scores are weighted and combined
• Likelihood index is calculated
– This index is meant to include the effects of
barriers and mitigation

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Index Model:
Combining Probability Factors

• How do threats combine? Are they additive?


Probability Factor
(100 points)

Third Party Index Corrosion Index


(25%) (25%)

Design Index Operations Index


(25%) (25%)

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Index Model:
External Corrosion Factors

• Effectiveness of cathodic protection • Casings


• Cathodic protection history • Protective coating type
• Cathodic protection monitoring • Protective coating condition
• Cathodic protection test stations • Field joints protective coating
• Cathodic Interference • Recoats and repairs
• Environment type
• Environment condition
• Age of Pipeline
Index Profile: • External corrosion leak history

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External Corrosion (EC)
Index Details

Index Description Criteria Points


(CP) Effectiveness Meeting criteria at all points 10
of cathodic Not meeting criteria at all 5
points
protection No cathodic protection applied 0
(10 points)
(CPH) Cathodic Installed <1 yr. After 6
Protection construction
Installed 1-10 yrs. After 3
history costruction
(6 points) Installed >10 yrs. After 0
construction
EC = (CP CPH+ PM + CTS + CIS + CAS + PCTPCC + PCJ + ET +
EC + APL + ECLH)

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Index models
• Most index models assign weights to many variables, then add the
results together to estimate the likelihood that a threat will cause
a release as a function of distance along a line
• Some models include interacting factors – e.g., CP has a larger
effect if the coating is in bad shape than if it’s in good shape.
• Often, when all possible factors that
could affect a threat or considered,
there may be hundreds of variables,
each with its own weighting.
• With too many variables, it’s hard to
manage the threat – i.e., it is hard to
decide what to do to minimize the
likelihood your pipeline will fail by a
given threat.

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RISK Models - Threats

Relative
Risk Score

Leak Impact
Factor

Index Sum

Third Party Corrosion Design Incorrect


Damage Operations

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Porter & Marr IPC 2004
Considerations
• Likelihood is not static, it changes with time
• The relative importance of each threat may
change with time
• Index or other methods of estimating likelihood
should account for change and uncertainties
• Likelihoods may change due to maintenance and
operation. For example, improvements to a
cathodic protection system will reduce the
likelihood of external corrosion

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Impact of Uncertainties
• Uncertainties exist due to gaps and/or limited data or
information, or due to limitations of the risk analysis
approach, tools, or structure

• Uncertainties also include


– Model Parameter Uncertainties
– Differences in expert Opinion or
index model weights

• Variability is not the same as


uncertainty, or is it?

91 Alan Murray 2016


Variability
• Murray’s law: Just about everything associated with a pipeline is variable
• Examples – Physical characteristics
– Material properties (e.g., yield, tensile strength, toughness)
– Wall thickness
– Depth of cover
• Examples – Operating conditions
– Pressures
– Temperatures
– CP effectiveness
• Examples – Inspection results
– Actual defect geometries
• A good IMP should separate variabilities from
uncertainties due to gaps or missing information.

92 Alan Murray 2016


How you handle uncertainties is
important
• Many pipeline companies make “conservative”
assumptions when data or information is missing. For
example, if the yield strength is unknown, most
companies assume the pipe is Grade A.
• If you assume a portion of an X52 pipeline is Grade A
when it is really X52
– The stresses pipe look higher in terms of %SMYS
– Calculated critical flaw sizes are smaller
– The severity of existing flaws is over estimated
– The calculated likelihood of a failure is higher than it should be
– The relative risks are overstated
– Excavation and mitigation priorities are skewed!

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Handling Uncertainties
• Use sensitivity studies to determine the
important of the missing data
– If a parameter is not important, move on
– If the parameter is important, find a way to get the
data you need
• For example, the example given in the previous
slide, run the index model assuming the material
is Grade A, B, X42, X52, etc. Examine the
relative priorities between threats. If they
change, the effect of the parameter is important.

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Handling Variabilities
• Don’t treat variations the same as uncertainties, and don’t use
all lower bound values. Why? Doing so almost always leads to
overly conservative likelihoods and risks
• Making conservative (say lower bound) choices is
the same as assuming the lower bounds all occur
at the same location. Almost always, this is not
the case. It is extremely unlikely a location
will have the smallest wall thickness and the
lowest yield strength and the lowest toughness
and the largest defect at the same location.
• Add statistics and probabilities to your toolkit.
These are powerful tools that consider natural
variations and the likelihoods that
they occur simultaneously.

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Alan Murray 2016 96
Questions?

Alan Murray 2016 97