You are on page 1of 6

G.R. No.

L-16704 March 17, 1962


VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS
 The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all
employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime
time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.
 The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a
previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
 Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the
employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
 The counsel questioned the validity of the circular stating that they lack authority to promulgate
it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette
 Social Security Commission overruled the objections claiming that it is not a rule or regulation
that requires the approval of the president but merely an administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy as to how the law should be construed
 Victorias Milling Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the
approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act”

HELD
Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.
Except:

 that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;
 bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
 dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required
to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation — All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the interpretation
of the law as amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission
simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not
require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it
renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative
interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
vs.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,INC.,

FACTS:
The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City and Decision of the Court of Appeals which declared Article 2, Section 3.1
of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the
importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay
Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled “PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.” The challenged provision
states:
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before Branch 72 of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent entities,
who or whose members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the
business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.

Southwing Heavy Industries, Microvan, Inc., and Macro Ventures instituted a declaratory relief
against the Executive Secretary by (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional
and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs
and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the
Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone to process
the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry
and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.

G.R. No. 164171: On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
(SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), and Microvan, Inc.
(MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs,
Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land
Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone. SOUTHWING, UNITED AUCTIONEERS and
MICROVAN prayed that judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs,
Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles;
(2) ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic
Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the
unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required
customs duties. The trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment holding that Article 2, Section
3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant to the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A.
Pursuant to the Separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to
the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into
the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used
or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the
Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, on the ground
of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the
importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and
absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is
void.

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature.
By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To
be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;


(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners,


vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF
CEBU, respondent.

FACTS:
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina
Lagcao. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings
against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the
demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters.
During the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

ISSUE:
Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process

RULING:
Yes, Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to
due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this
ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of
demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that
the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a
relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843
for the expropriation of petitioner’s lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The
unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

For an ordinance to be valid:


1) must not contravene the Constitution or any 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
statute;
5) must be general and consistent with public
2) must not be unfair or oppressive; policy; and
3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 6) must not be unreasonable.