VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT: THE PRESIDENT (ART VIII) Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
A. QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM, OATH
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.
- Vice President, not given power by the Constitution
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications
and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the
President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.
- VP has the same qualifications
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of
the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any* re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the
Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or
affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President [or Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man,
and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.” [In case of
affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].
*any – cannot be.
“no more re-election” – for incumbency (those incumbent Presidents)
Qualifications of President
1) Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2) Registered voter
3) Able to read and write
4) 40 years of age on the day of election
5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the
election
©MLZLIRedits 1
 Election and Term of President
Regular Election and Term
The President and Vice-President (who shall be elected with and in the same manner
as the President) shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of 6
years, which shall begin on the noon of June 30 next following the day of
election. The regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the 2nd Monday of May. (Art. VII, Sec. 4 pars. 1 & 3).
The six year term for the incumbent President and Vice- President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the
President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the 2nd
Monday of May, 1992. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 5.)
In In re Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, the SC held that the "incumbent
President and Vice-President" referred to above are Pres. Corazon Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador Laurel (even if they were not the ones declared by the
Batasang Pambansa as the winners of the February 7, 1986 Snap Election).
Special Election and Term
If a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and Vice- President more than 18
months before the date of the next regular presidential election, a special election
to elect the President and Vice-President shall be called by Congress, pursuant to
VII, 10. (See discussion under Other Powers of Congress, supra and Succession,
infra.)
A conditional resignation by the incumbent President is not a real resignation that
creates a vacancy for the purpose of calling a special election. But in the
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, the failure of the
SC to issue an injunction on time is already a decision in itself in favor of the
validity of the law calling for Snap Elections despite the absence of vacancy;
only, it is a decision that is not supported by a ratio decidendi. Indeed, a midterm
election in a presidential system of government in response to popular clamor for
it, is a legal anomaly.
The Constitution is silent as to whether the persons elected in the special
election shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term, and whether the new
President can run for re- election if he has not served more than 4 years, which depends
on the construction of the phrase "has succeeded as the President," discussed in the next
section. VV: Only unexpired portion.
Re-election
The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. Furthermore, no person
who has "succeeded" as President and has served as such for more than 4 years, shall be
qualified for any election to the same office (the Presidency) at any time. (Art. VII, Sec.
4, par. 1)
The person who succeeds as President and not just in an acting capacity, could
either be (i) the Vice-President, or (ii) one who was elected President in a special
election. In both cases, if he has served for more than 4 years, he is ineligible for re-
election as President.
If he served for 4 years or less, he can run for re- election, it is submitted, since (a)
the term "succeeded" encompasses election and (b) the general rule prohibiting the
President to run for re-election refers to the President elected during the regular
election. Furthermore, it is submitted that this person may resign on the 4th year
so as to be qualified to run for President, since there is nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits this.
▲FPJ V ARROYO
Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.
Facts:
GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing to
concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Luke‟s Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted
a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased
protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter‟s protest case.
Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal
and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to
the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all
authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is
allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant‟s
widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
©MLZLIRedits 2
▲LEGARDA V DE CASTRO
Facts:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET).
De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the
protest. De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues
that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the
ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or
election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had
done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since
the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it
cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns; that the averments
contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to form a valid
cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also contends that the
Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates
of canvass (COC).
Issues:
1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?
2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?
3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?
Held:
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is
the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest
where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. However, we do
not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the
protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of votes
obtained by both protestant and protestee, and reflected in the election returns. Protestant
merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels
of transposition and addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where
she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form
and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his
office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law,
that need to be proven in due time.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that
nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only
sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her
case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of
ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of
manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution.(Legarda vs De Castro, P.E.T. Case 0003, March 31, 2005)
▲Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011
(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)
Facts:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
“The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.”
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC‟s decision dismissing
the former‟s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as
constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of
the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of
the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for
the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in
crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
“constitutionalized what was statutory.”
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution
and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
©MLZLIRedits 3

▲Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph "Erap" Estrada and Commission on Elections
Facts:
Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph Estrada for
being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by
COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc.
Issue: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May
2010 elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he
President shall not be eligible for any reelection."
Held: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second
time he ran.
The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person
second election as President.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following
the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time.
Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will
serve no useful or practical purpose.
B. PRIVILEGE AND SALARY (Sec 6)
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President
and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during
their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
Sec 6 – Privileges, President‟s official residence & immunity from suit; not during
his tem but during his tenure.
The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law. Unless
the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of
P300,000 and the Vice-President, the salary of P240,000.
a. EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY
▲SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit".
He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of
court or perjury.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder‟s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President‟s
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court‟s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the President‟s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
▲ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2
2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.
©MLZLIRedits 4
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will
not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or
not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the
1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada‟s implied resignation On top of all these,
the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential
seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of
the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner‟s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held
that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that,
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for
his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the
intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term
(time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
▲Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) filed an information before the anti-graft court on July 12, 1989 charging
Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16 to July 29, 1975,
Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos, former president of the Philippines, did
then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of
promoting his self-interest and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract
between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a
private corporation, the majority of stocks of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all
its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops,
quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer
Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some equipment and machineries from
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P 5, 000, 000.00.
Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-
ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp – of former President Marcos.
He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which states that:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall
lie for official acts done by him or by other pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.”
Issue:
Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, Romualdez is immune
from criminal prosecution.
Ruling:
No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art Vii of 1973
Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez because the immunity amendment became
effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied only during the
incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. Romualdez‟s reasoning
fails since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as president. Verily,
the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any
other trespasser.”
©MLZLIRedits 5
 b. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
▲ ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum
was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the
anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum
to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests
of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his
legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling,
tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may
be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.
▲Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777)
Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the
ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and
AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived,
Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that
the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President
has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it
is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering
its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
DAPAT NAAY VALID REASON NGANO MO INVOKE SILA UG EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE SUCH AS CONFIDENTIALITY IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
:)
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature‟s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article
6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is
the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the
President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the
failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
©MLZLIRedits 6
 President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive
privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource
persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does
it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they
cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information
that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely
declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons
for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President
has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might
be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse
of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void.
Section 1(a) are however valid.
Neri vs. Senate
Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours relating to
the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the President discussed
about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him
to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri‟s testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said “that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.” Neri did not appear
before the Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and
ordered his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive Privilege. xxx
“we are convinced that the communications elicited by the questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo‟s cabinet. And third, there
is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the “Right of the
people to information on matters of public concern”. Is the senate correct?
ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it
does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The right of Congress or any of
its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
people‟s right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in
Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant
to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
E.O. 464. Is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of
E.O. 464?
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or
through the Executive Secretary “by order of the President.” Did Executive Secretary
Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the President?
ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly
states that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as
refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is
referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
particularity?
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
(Senate v. Ermita)
©MLZLIRedits 7
 Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?
ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not
comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should
contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with
“the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.” The SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” The respondent Committees‟
issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that
respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as “unsatisfactory”
and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate
arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
C. PROHIBITIONS
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
Compare Prohibitions against other officials
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
 Prohibition against the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants
(a) They shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure,
unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
In Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the
petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations
imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the
measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the
holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the
pressing functions of his positions.
In declaring the EO unconstitutional, the SC held that by ostensibly restricting
the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold
in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and
GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he
should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
(b) They shall not practice any other profession.
(c) They shall not participate in any business.
(d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted.
Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created
or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any
business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor
shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
©MLZLIRedits 8

Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Exceptions to rule prohibiting executive officials from holding additional positions:
a. President
(1) The President can assume a Cabinet post, (because the departments are mere
extensions of his personality, according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
so no objection can be validly raised based on Art. VII, Sec. 13.)
(2) The President is the Chairman of NEDA. (Art. XII, Sec. 9)
b. Vice-President
Art. VII, Sec. 3. xxx
The Vice-President may be appointed as member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
c. Cabinet
(1) The Secretary of Justice shall be an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council. (Art. VIII, Sec. 8[1])
2) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, appointive officials shall not hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government- owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX, B,
7, par. 2)
Art. VII, Sec. 13 talks of "unless otherwise provided by the Constitution." In
the case of Cabinet members, this refers to Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2. Thus, the Constitution
allows a Cabinet member to hold another office provided either (1) such is
necessitated by the primary functions of his position (e.g. Secretary of Trade and
Industry as Chairman of NDC, Secretary of Agrarian Reform as Chairman of the Land
Bank), or (ii) is allowed by law. The validity of EO 284 allowing members of the
Cabinet and their Under-Secretaries to hold 2 additional offices was decided in the case
of CLU vs Exec. Secretary.
Ex-officio capacity (not another office, but an additional duty of one office)
Requirements:
1) Must be required by the primary function of the office
2) No additional compensation
Question: Can a reelected/appointed may be reelected or appointed in the government?
Yes, if allowed by law.
▲DOROMAL V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and
director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids
to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS)
and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
 An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation
and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
 The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction
of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.
 The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under
the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to
the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.
 A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate
in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings
conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution.
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid
since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed
against him.
 The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation
is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.
©MLZLIRedits 9
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same
subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the
Supreme Court.
RATIO:
 (1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a
business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at
least an indirect interest."
 Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during
(their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
 (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial
over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
 Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that
time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation
must be conducted.
 (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective;
but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the
case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan
shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation.
▲CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXEC. SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of
Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid
down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which
cannot override the constitution‟s manifest intent and the people‟s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
▲Public Interest Center vs. ELMA
*concurrent appointments, incompatible office
N: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG Chair
and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Facts
: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999
during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: There‟s actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was
replaced by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution
of the case, he was appointed SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent
appointments
CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions don‟t cover other
public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
His appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Sec7
The 2 positions are not incompatible
©MLZLIRedits 10
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is
capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench.
whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the
prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was
laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x
Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other
such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the
law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the
word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of
the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and
antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one
with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on
the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review
Decision on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential
appointees with the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC))
whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple
offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
NO if based on position. YES if based on primary functions test.
the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary,
undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as
the latter positions.
*Review ulit CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment.
The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple
offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing
the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of said officials‟ office.
…The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must
be required by the official‟s primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be
exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which “denotes an act done in an official character, or
as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.”[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation
shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory that the second post
is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-
officio capacity.
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the
position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice
versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13,
Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to
the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in
an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an
appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still
prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials,
due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC.
D. SUCCESSION
a. At the beginning of the term
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until
the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or
shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become
President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified,
or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
©MLZLIRedits 11
 The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have
qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o‟clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2,
Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.
This provision refers to the President and Vice-President elected in the regular
election, and so the term referred to begins on June 30 next following the
election on the 2nd Monday of 1992, and every 6 years thereafter.
Vacancy in the Presidency
There are two sets of rules on succession, depending on whether the vacancy
took place before the beginning of the term on June 30, or during the pendency of the
terms that commences on June 30. (The cut-off point is unsettled. One view is that the
cut-off is noon of June 30, as expressed in Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 1. The other view is
that the cut-off is midnight of June 29 when June 30 begins.)
B. Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency during the term
A. Temporary or permanent vacancy in the Presidency before the term
1. If the President-elect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because
i) he has not qualified as yet ( e.g. he had an operation and so he could not take
his oath of office on June 30), ii) or a President has not been "chosen" and
qualified as yet (e.g. there is a tie and Congress has not yet broken the tie), then
the Vice-President shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified, or shall have been "chosen: and qualified, as the case may be. (Art.
VII, Sec. 7, pars. 2 & 3)
2. If the President-elect i) dies, or ii) becomes permanently disabled "at the
beginning of the term of the President" (i.e., before the term), then the
Vice-President elect shall become the President. (Id., par. 4)
3. If both President and Vice-President (i) have not been "chosen" or
(ii) have not qualified, or (iii) die, or (iv) become permanently disabled,
then the President of the Senate, or in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House, shall act as President until a President or a Vice- President
shall have been "chosen" and qualified. (par. 5)
In case both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House are
unable to act as President, then Congress shall by law, provide for the
"manner of selecting" the one who will act as President until a President
of Vice-President shall have (been either "chosen" or "elected" pursuant
to the special election referred to in VII, 10, and qualified.
b. During the term
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death,
permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President.
1. In case of the President's (i) death (ii) permanent disability, (iii) removal
from office (the only way is by impeachment), or (iv) resignation, the Vice-President
shall become President for the unexpired portion of the term. (par. 1)
2. In case of both the President's and Vice-President's death, permanent
disability, removal from office (by impeachment), or resignation, then the Senate
President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House, shall act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall have been "elected" (pursuant to the special
election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. (par. 1.)
©MLZLIRedits 12

When the Acting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Speaker of the House)
dies, becomes permanently disabled, or resigns (but is not removed, because there is no
need to impeach him, his stay being temporary), then the Congress shall by law, provide
"who" shall be Acting President until the President or Vice-President shall have been
"elected" (pursuant to the special election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. This
Acting President shall be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications.(par. 2) according to the Law of Succession passed by the Congress,
to succeed as Acting President until the qualification of the President.
c) The Law on Succession must be passed by the Congress in both cases in the
event that the President, Vice-President, Senate President and the Speaker are all unable
to act as President. But in the case of a vacancy occurring before the term, the law
provides only for the "manner of selecting" the Acting President, while in the case of a
vacancy occurring during the term, it provides for "the person" who shall act as
President. In both cases, the stint of the Acting President is temporary.
d) When the vacancy comes before the term, the Constitution talks of the
successor acting as President until a President has been "chosen" and "qualified"; when
it comes during, it talks of "elected" and qualified. The reason is that before the term,
the vacancy in the Presidency need not be filled up by election, since it may be filled up
by a vote of Congress in case of a tie (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5); but during the term, the
only way to fill up the vacancy is by special election.
e) A special election in both cases is held, pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 10, only
when both offices of President and Vice-President are vacant. However, if the vacancy
occurs before the term, the grounds are limited to 2 (death and permanent disability or
both), while if the vacancy occurs during the term, the grounds are 4 (death, permanent
disability, removal, and resignation).
f) The vacancy that occurs before the term of office may be temporary or
permanent; the vacancy that occurs during the term of office can only be a permanent
one. Thus, a different set of rules applies, to be discussed next following, in case
of the temporary inability of the President during the term of office.
Comparisons and distinctions between the two vacancies:
a) The incumbent President never holds-over the Presidency in any case.
b) The vacancy must occur in the offices of both the President and Vice-President
in order for the Senate President, or the Speaker, or, in their inability, the one
provided to succeed
c. Temporary disability
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise,
the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
President during such illness.
Voluntary declaration of inability by Presidenta. When the President transmits to the
Senate President and the Speaker his written declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-President as Acting President.
©MLZLIRedits 13
b. The Vice-President shall so act until the President transmits to the Senate
President and the Speaker a written declaration that he is no longer unable to
discharge his office
c. Temporary Vacancy of the Presidency during the term (Art VI, Sec 1, supra)
A vacancy in the Presidency arising for his disability can occur in any of the following
ways:
1.) A written declaration by the President
2.) Written declaration by Congress
3.) Finding by Congress 2/3 vote that the President is diabled
In all cases, the Vice President temporarily acts as the President.
Voluntary declaration of inability by President
a. When the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
b. The Vice-President shall so act until the President transmits to the Senate President
and the Speaker a written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his
office.
Contested inability of the President
a. When majority of all the members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President
and Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge his office, then the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
Presidency in an acting capacity.
b. The President can contest this by sending his own written declaration to the Senate
President and Speaker, that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, the
President shall automatically assume his office.
c. Should the majority of the Cabinet insist on their original stand by
transmitting a second written declaration of the President's inability within 5
days from resumption of office of the President, then Congress shall step in.
d. Upon receipt of this second declaration by the Cabinet, Congress shall convene, if
it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call, in accordance with its
rules. (If it is already in session, it must meet right away, as glimpsed from the
fact that they only have 10 days to decide, whereas if it is not in session, it must
convene in 2 days and decide before the 12th day.)
e. Congress shall determine the President's inability within 10 days after receipt of
the second written declaration by the Cabinet if it is in session, or within 12
days after it is required to assemble by its respective presiding officer if it is not
in session.
f. If the President, by a 2/3 vote of both houses voting separately, determined to be
"unable" to discharge his office, then the Vice-President shall act as President. If
less than 2/3 find him unable, then the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office.
Serious Illness of the President
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall
not be denied access to the President during such illness.
Notes:
Sec 7&8 – Succession
S.7 – P “fails to comply”, haven‟t taken oath, P-elect
Jun30 – beginning of term
VP-act as P until P has taken oath
If no P & VP – Senate P acts as P
No P,VP, & SP – Speaker of House
Everyone gone – Congress will provide for succession rule.
S.10 – No P, V, Congress shall at 10:00 on the 3rd day of the vacancy convene to call for
election of P&VP; be certified as URGENT; becomesa law after 3 rd reading
©MLZLIRedits 14
▲Estrada v. Arroyo
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings
in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner
as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case,
praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in
an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call
for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as
well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don‟t want any more of this – it‟s too
painful. I‟m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign
is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of
resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner‟s reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of‟ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner‟s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.
Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.”
Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE NATION‟S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed
Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO‟S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner‟s claim of inability. Even if
petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner‟s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason
that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led
to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution
No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit
or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the
petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand
©MLZLIRedits 15
 as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-
trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable
if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove
this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
E. REMOVAL
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal or public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment according to law.
[A more detailed discussion can be found under Other Powers of Congress:
Impeachment]
Initiation Stage of the House of Representatives:
a. Filing of verified complaint for impeachment of the President or Vice-
President, on the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
b. Inclusion of the complaint in the Order of Business within 10 session days.
c. Referral or complaint to the Committee on Justice within 3 session days
from its inclusion
d. Hearing, voting, and submission of report by the Committee within 60 days
from referral.
e. Placing on calendar of the Committee resolution within 10 days from
submission.
f. Discussion on the floor of the report, then a vote by the membership of the
House of Representatives.
g. If 1/3 vote to affirm a favorable resolution or override a contrary resolution,
the case is forwarded to the Senate for trial.
Trial Stage at the Senate
a. The Senators take an oath or affirmation. The Chief Justice of the SC
presides over the trial, but does not vote.
b. After trial, the Sneators vote to convict or acquit. A vote of 16 (2/3 of all
the members) is required to convict the Pres or VP.
Post-trial
a. If the President is acquitted by the Senate, ,he shall continue in office. No
impeachment proceeding can again be initiated against him within a
©MLZLIRedits 16
 period of one year.
b. If the President is impeached, he shall be removed from office at once, and
shall be disqualified to hold any office in the Republic. His criminal
liability under Art XI Sec 3(7) may be subject to him immunity from suit.
VII. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
A. EXECUTIVE POWER (Art VII, Secs 1&17)
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The executive function is essentially the duty to implement the laws within the
standards imposed by the legislature. Under the Constitution, this power is
exercised by the President. Thus, when the Cabinet and other branches of the
Executive Department implement the law, they are acting under the control of the
President.
Executive Power – The sum total of the specified powers and the residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people.
Specified Powers – those powers specified by the Constitution
- Control, appointment, supervise LGUs, foreign relations, commander-in-
chief, pardon, borrowing, enforce the laws.
- Limitation: being commander-in-chief
Unspecified/ Residual Powers – the power to protect general welfare
▲MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision
to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is
meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers
by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19),treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section
20), budgetary power(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and blind
loyalty of their followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who
is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever
power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
(4)The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the
State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution
the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII,
Sec.
1). However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control
over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
©MLZLIRedits 17
 power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress.
(VII, Sec. 14-23)
The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and
no other?
According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific power enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,
executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
She has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national
interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise
of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as
steward of the people.
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration :
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. Adapted.
▲GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of
rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties
may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict
between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under
the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered
as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
▲DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the
Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12
Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING:
YES.
“ The qualified political agency doctrine” or ALTER EGO princinple all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be
the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
©MLZLIRedits 18
▲BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December
7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to
investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does
not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth
Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it
the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive‟s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials
and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of
the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the
offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state‟s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the state‟s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites:
The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
▲VINUYA v ROMULO
FACTS:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.Petitioners narrate that during the
Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the
women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses
were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered.
Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they
were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions
of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having
endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines.However, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity
and war crimes committed against them.
HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion.
POLITICAL LAW: political questions
Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.One such
category involves questions of foreign relations.It is well-established that "the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."
Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess
the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
©MLZLIRedits 19
 question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951.The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region.For the Court to overturn the
Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed.
The petition is DISMISSED.
B. POWER OF CONTROL (Sec 17)
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
"Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a subordinate (only
because it is as if he is doing such judgment); executive departments, bureaus,
offices.
Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are
mere adjuncts of the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the
President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated to assist him in his
otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the
President in the particular field in which they act. Their acts are presumptively
acts of the "President, until countermanded or reprobated by him". The President
can substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and they cannot complain.
Furthermore, they hold their office subject to the discretion of the President, who
can replace them anytime once he loses his confidence in them.
Thus, in Planas v Gil, since the Civil Service Commissioner, then not an independent
body, was the alter ego of the President, and the President could investigate local
officials, the Commissioner could likewise investigate them.
Action of the Secretary is as if the action of the President.
▲MONDANO V SILVOSA
Facts:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and
concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the
governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then
summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended
Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further
proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part
of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is
with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct
such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of
control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who
ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by
law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over
which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by
law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments
as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already
stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935
Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate
©MLZLIRedits 20
 complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in
his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.”
Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano‟s office.
If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape
or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension
may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because he‟s acting
as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised
Administrative Code.
▲VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted
an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the
latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent recommended the suspension
of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The
Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order
investigation over Villena.
RULING:
YES. The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor
Villena. As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC
that Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under
its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which
granted the said Department of executive supervision over administration of provinces,
municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order
investigation because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render power real and effective.”However, unlike this power to order
investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no
express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless,
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of
suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.
The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The
power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the
Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to
act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are
assistants and agents of the President.
▲FREE TEL WORKERS V MINISTER OF LABOR
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the
Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor
(Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code.
The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue
delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the
Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor
was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an
unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be,
however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory
arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the
basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to
labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is
yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination
of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient
standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest.”
The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such
principle is for petitioner labor union within the competence of the President, who in its
opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such
admission is qualified by the assumption that the President “can make law,” “an assertion
which need not be passed upon in this petition”. What possesses significance for the
purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who “Shall have control of the
ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of
Minister and Assemblyman.
Notes from Political Law Reviewer:
The doctrine on the power of control remained unchanged in the jurisprudence under the 1973
Constitution. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor (108 SCRA 757) had
occasion to reemphasize its continuing validity. Here, the power given to the Minister of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute affecting the national interest or to
certify it for compulsory arbitration was challenged as an undue delegation of a power
which properly belonged to the President. All that was needed to settle the case was to
hark back to the Villena doctrine that the heads of ministries are alter egos of the
©MLZLIRedits 21
 President. Under the presidential system, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Each head of a department is, and must be,
the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority. The President has the constitutional power of control and
direction over such dept. heads and cabinet secretaries.
▲Banda v. Ermita
Facts:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 285by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing
Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalists.Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalist are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector
through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the
private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO‟s appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat
to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that:
(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order
No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative
powers; and
(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners‟ security of tenure, because it paves the way for
the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
HELD: YES
J. Leonardo-de Castro. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
President‟s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing
authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section
31, Chapter 10, Title III, BookIII of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which
in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to
the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive
branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-
created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the
President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with
the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
J. Carpio: RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities
of the government including the acquisition of “items, supplies, materials, and general
support services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or
in the pursuit of any government x x x activity”save for limited transactions. By opening
government‟s procurement of standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding
(except for documents crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed
solely by government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184‟s principle of promoting
“competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who
are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding.
C. POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LGUS
Art. X, Sec. 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. xxx
Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
"General supervision" means the mere overseeing of a subordinate to make sure that
they do their duties under the law. But this does not include the power to overrule
their acts, if these acts are within their discretion.
Pres may disagree, unless illegal. If legal, even if the Pres does not like it, he can‟t
do anything about it nonetheless.
The grant of mere supervisory power over local governments and autonomous regions
is in line with the policy of the State to promote the autonomy of local
governments and autonomous regions. There can be no real local autonomy
while the National Government controls the local governments
Can president terminate subordinate anytime he pleases? Does Control include the
power to remove? No. Substitute only the judgment of subordinate, not remove
the officer. He can, but not within his power of control. It does not include power
to discipline. With regards to LGU Officials, President can impose discipline to
LGU Officials.
Oversees – make sure to perform his actions within the boundaries of the law.
©MLZLIRedits 22
▲Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the
CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter
ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, acting thru the Secretary of Local Government, has the power to
suspend, remove, or both, local officials.
HELD:
Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
Constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right-or the
President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanction against local officials. The Constitution did not…intend
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which
allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President
over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and
extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
Notes from Political Law Reviewer:
The petitioners question the power of the President, acting through the Secretary of
Local Government, to suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitution, the
charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right -- or the President of her prerogative
as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.
The omission of "as may be provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. X) signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control"
over local govt. affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken impression because
legally "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. "Control" has been
defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Adapted.
▲DADOLE VS COA
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and
P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The
additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also
asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 聽1987 Constitution: "The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President.
As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the
local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he
or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over LGUs
©MLZLIRedits 23
 D. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
a. BASIS
Cruz: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested w/ the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v Paredes, the most
eminently executive power, because it is through his appointees that the President
can execute laws.
The power of appointment by the President under the 1987 Constitution has been
significantly curbed.
▲GPI v SPRINGER
FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested
the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized
that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the
House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the
House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning
the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the
Board Members of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing
to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate
President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be
found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative
branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
b. WITH CONCURRENCE OF COA
President – default appointing authority (in the absence of who will appoint)
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Members of the Regional Consultative Council in Art. X, Sec. 18 are according to Sarmiento v
Mison, 156 SCRA 547, supra. also subject to confirmation by the CA, because their
appointment is vested in the President by the Constitution. But J. Mendoza disagrees. For
unlike the Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the regular
members of the JBC, the Constitution in Art. X, Sec. 18 does not say that the appointment is
subject to confirmation. Also, the pattern in the Constitution shows that where the nominees
are already screened either by JBC (for justices and judges) or the multi-sectoral bodies
(Regional Consultative Council), then there is no need for CA confirmation to prevent an
overkill. It is enough that the President made the appointment on the basis of nominations.
Otherwise, it would be too rigid, considering that the duty of the RCC is only to advise
Congress on the autonomous act to be enacted.
Do bureau directors need confirmation? In Sarmiento v Mison (Dec. 1987), the SC held that no
they did not need to be confirmed. The deliberations of the Con Con showed that a draft
similar to VII, 10 of the 1935 Constitution, which included bureau heads in the list of
appointees requiring confirmation, was introduced, but upon motion, bureau directors were
omitted ex- pressly from the draft because they were considered of low rank, and so were
thought to be better shielded from partisan politics.
But the SC added that of the 4 categories of public officers requiring confirmation, the 4th must
be given a restrictive construction because confirmation derogates the appointing power of
the President. Indeed, it said, only a small class of officers needed confirmation.
In saying so, however, it did not try to explain certain anomalies that may arise from such
restrictive interpretation: (a) If a colonel needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary
of National Defense who has a higher rank as line officer? (b) If an ambassador
needed confirmation, why not the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs who has a higher rank?
(c) Why not the CB governor who is so powerful as to plunge the country into bankruptcy?
©MLZLIRedits 24
The following officers appointed by the President require confirmation by
the CA:
i. Heads of Departments
ii. Ambassadors, Public Ministers and Consuls
iii. Officers of AFP from Colonel and Naval Captain
iv. Chairman and members of Constitutional Commission
v. Regular members of JBC [Art. VIII, Sec 8(2)]
vi. Sectoral (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7)
(a) Heads of the executive departments
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
(b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls (Id.)
(c) Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of colonel or
naval captain (because these are officers of a sizeable command enough to stage
a coup) (Id.)
(d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the
Constitution:
Art. XVIII, Sec. 7.
(i) Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners (of the Civil Service
Commission) shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five
years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Id., C, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners (of the Commission on
Elections) shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Id., D, Sec. 1 (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners (of the Commission on
Audit) shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five
years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
(ii) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (composed of
the IBP representative, professor of law, retired SC justice, and representative
of the private sector. Note the ex-officio members: Chief Justice, Secretary of
Justice, and representative of Congress) Art.
VII, Sec. 8. (2) The regular members of the (Judicial and Bar) Council shall
appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor
of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative
of the private sector for one year.
(iii) Sectoral representatives
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2) of Section 5 of Article
VI of this Constitution.
©MLZLIRedits 25
 (iv) Regional Consultative Commission to be made without the review or participation of the CA. They are among the officers of
the govt "whom he (the Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Sec. 2 (c) of EO
163, May 5, 1987, authorizes the Pres. to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR
Art. X, Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
▲Ramos v. Alvarez (97 PHIL. 844) [Compare with Calderon case]
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
F: Before serving his full term as elected member of the Provincial Board of Negros Occ.,
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic
Jesus
act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of
the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be Aritao (LP) resigned his office when he filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman.
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and To fill such vacancy, then President Quirino, acting on the authority of Sec. 21 (b) of the Revised
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution Election code (REC) appointed Agustin Ramos (LP), who assumed office thereafter. In due
and national laws. time, Ramos' interim appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments (CA)
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by for confirmation. But before it could be confirmed, the new President of the Phil., Hon. R.
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the Magsaysay, nominated Rafael Alvarez for the same office. The nomination was unanimously
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas confirmed by the CA after it has rejected Ramos' appointment.
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. Alvarez assumed office as member of the Prov'l Board of Negros Occ. despite vigorous
opposition from Ramos, who thereafter filed the present petition to have himself declared
legally entitled to the office and to have Alvarez ousted therefrom.
▲Bautista vs Salonga 172 SCRA 160
Petitioner contends, among others, that he is still legally entitled to the office because his
F: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 12/17/88. appointment was not subject to the consent or disapproval of the CA. Respondent on his part
She took her oath of office on 12/22 and thereafter entered into the discharge of her contends otherwise.
functions and duties. However, on 1/9/89, she was asked by the Commission on
Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of
her appointment. She refused to do so on the ground that her appointment was not subject
to confirmation. On 1/14/89, the Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the ISSUE: W/N an appointment made by the President under Sec. 21(b) of the REC is subject to the
CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, the CA
consent of the CA. (YES)
disapproved her appointment on 1/25. Petitioner, anticipating the action of the CA, filed a
petition for certiorari w/ the SC.
Sec. 21(b) of the REC, under w/c the petitioner was appointed, provides:
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on
Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death, resignation,
Human Rights (CHR) is to be made with or without CA confirmation.
removal or cessation of the incumbent, the President shall appoint thereto a suitable person
belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the
HELD: (1) Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
recommendation of said party, save in the case of mayor, which shall be filled by the vice-
VII are to be reviewed by the CA, namely, "the heads of the executive departments,
mayor."
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, other officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
Under Par. 3, of Sec. 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are four groups of officers that
this Constitution." All other appointments by the Pres. are to be made w/o the
the President shall appoint, namely:
participation of the CA." Since the position of Chairman of the CHR, an independent
First, the heads of executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of
office created by the Constitution, is not among the positions mentioned in the first
colonel, of the Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or commander;
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation
of the CA, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is
©MLZLIRedits 26
 Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
in the Constitution;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, inferior officers whose appointments the Congress has by law vested in the President
alone.
The Constitution is explicit that for officers of the first, second and third groups, the appointment
made by the President shall be with the consent of the CA. It is only in the case of the fourth
group, that is, of inferior officers whose appointment is by law vested "in the President
alone" that such consent is not required.
On the other hand, examining the provision of Sec. 21(b) of the REC, we find that while it says
that the President shall make the appointment, it does not say that the appointment is not to
be subject to the consent of the CA that is, that it is to be made by the President alone. Such
being the case, the President's appointment must be deemed subject to the general
requirement that the same is to be with the consent of the CA. It would fall then under the
third group of officers mentioned in par. 3 of Sec. 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution.
Thus, in the United States, under a constitutional provision similar to ours, the general rule is
that "when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, it must be by the
President and with the consent of the Senate."
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's appointment as member of the Provincial Board was subject
to the consent of the CA, so that his right to the office ceased when his appointment was
rejected by the Commission. Adapted.
▲Rufino vs Endriga
FACTS:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30)
creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of
seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD
15, the CCP‟s charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public
corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics.” PD 15 increased the members of
CCP‟s Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10
October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the
courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the
Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included
Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”),
and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to
the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other
incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar
N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile
Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the
performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court
questioning President Estrada‟s appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The
Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be
filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x
x.” In case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group claimed
that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill
such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only
one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa‟s term. The CCP Board then had 10
incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the
President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall
enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals
declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other
hand, the appellate court‟s Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to
the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The
law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow
trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b)

©MLZLIRedits 27
 of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared
unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group‟s motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group‟s motion for immediate
execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the authority to appoint
and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended which authorizes the remaining
trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in
the Board, runs afoul with the President‟s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP
from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of
PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the
President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation
x x x.” This provision does not free the CCP from the President‟s control, for if it does, then
it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating
and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities
are all subject to the President‟s power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President‟s control over the CCP
in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President‟s influence. By stating that the
“President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution
empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive
branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
▲ SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary
of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted
rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads
of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Notes from Political Law Reviewer:
In SARMIENTO VS. MISON (1987), the SC construed Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution to
mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16,
Art. VII require confirmation by the CA.
©MLZLIRedits 28
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in par. 2, Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the
"other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution", referred
to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by
the CA.(SARMIENTO VS. MISON)
Implicit in the invocation of par. 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of
petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's
appointment requires confirmation by the CA. Under Par. 2, Sec. 16, Art VII, appointments
made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or
until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral
representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the
constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
President had expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the CA.
Considering that Congress had adjourned without resp. CA having acted on petitioner's
appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Sec.
23 of the Rules of resp. CA and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission." Adapted.
▲CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of
the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA
disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of
her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be
made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested
upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials
without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely
for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress;
but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
▲QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA
to allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing
Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the
confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives
by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be
confirmed by the CoA.
RULING:
Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments
are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison,
supra).
Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records
show that Deles‟ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess
(March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section
16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
©MLZLIRedits 29
"The president shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution x x x".
▲CALDERON VS CARALE
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated
the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for
its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by
the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is
not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of
the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended
by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the CoA.
RULING:
RA 6715 is unconstitutional bec. it transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of
executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights).
There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four groups
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall
within the second sentence of Sec.16, Art. VII, more specifically under "those whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of
the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose
appointments requires confirmation by the CA.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the CA; and
2. it amends by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, by imposing the
confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a
judicial function.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.
©MLZLIRedits 30
 c. UPON RECOMMENDATION OF JBC
i. Members of SC and all other courts (Art VIII, Sec 9)
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from
the submission of the list.
ii. Ombudsman and Deputies (Art XI, Sec 9)
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a
list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall
require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
occur.
d. APPOINTMENT OF VICE-PRESIDENT AS CABINET MEMBER
(Sec 3)
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and
term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He
may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.
e. APPOINTMENTS SOLELY BY PRESIDENT (Sec 16)
Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall xxx also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom, he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
i. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
ii. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
1. Those vested by the Constitution on the President alone (e.g. appointment of Vice-
President to the Cabinet) [Art. VII, Sec. 3(2)]
2. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
3. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
4. Those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in
the President (alone).
The phraseology is muddled.
The meaning of #4 was touched upon in Sarmiento v Mison. In arguing that even
bureau chiefs needed confirmation even if they are of inferior rank, the argument
was the phrase, "The Congress may, by law, vest in the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone" meant that until a law is passed
giving such appointing power to the President alone, then such appointment has to
be confirmed. Only after such law is passed does the necessity for confirmation
no longer hold. The SC dismissed this view however, saying that the inclusion
of the word "alone" was an oversight. Thus, the Constitution should read "The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President."
f. LIMITATIONS TO APPOINTING POWER
i. ART VII SEC 13&15
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
©MLZLIRedits 31
 Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
a. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree of
the President shall not, during his "tenure". be appointed as (i) members of
the Constitutional Commissions, (ii) member of the Office of Ombudsman, (iii)
Secretaries, (iv) Undersecretaries, (v) Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
b. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections (2nd Monday of
March), and up to the end of his "term" (June 30), a President (or Acting President)
shall not make appointments.
Exception: Temporary appointments, to executive positions, when continued vacancies
therein will (1) prejudice public service (e.g. Postmaster) or (ii) endanger public
safety (e.g. Chief of Staff).
This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court
on the validity of "midnight appointments".
(Ad interim appointments could either be "midnight", if made by the President before
he steps down from office or recess, if made by the President when Congress is not
in session.)
▲AYTONA VS CASTILLO
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona
as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same
day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia
administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which
he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for
him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or
to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the
new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
▲JORGE V MAYOR G.R. No. L-21776 February 28, 1964 [Ad interim appointments]
FACTS:
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and
successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of
Lands in December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was
transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim
appointment.
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments
extended and released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on
December 13 1961.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge
that pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment
was among those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands
was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President to be Acting
Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that
he is the legally appointed Director of Lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid
revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.
©MLZLIRedits 32
RULING:
No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record
that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day.
It is a matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that
the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office
hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course
of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by,
Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly
confirmed by the CoA and thereafter, the office never became vacant.
▲QUIMSING VS TAJANGLANGIT
Posted by kaye lee on 11:49 PM
G.R. No. L-19981 February 29 1964
FACTS:
May 16, 1962- Quimsing‟s, as well as other people‟s appointments were confirmed- May 17,
1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all
the confirmed appointments was approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future
date fixed for its next meeting- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo
Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo. Hence this petition for prohibition to restrain
Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of Police to which petitioner
Quimsing had previously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he
was actually discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsing‟s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for
reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon.
RULING:
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void,
because said position was not vacant. The Revised Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provide:“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment
may be laid on the table, and this shall be final disposition on such a motion." “SEC. 22:
Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the President of
the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a motion
for reconsideration is pending."
The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing‟s appointment, it was merely under
reconsideration. It has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing‟s appointment was
delivered to Malacañang. This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that
the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding
the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment.
In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed.
▲ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President‟s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
©MLZLIRedits 33
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‟s or Acting
President‟s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‟s or Acting
President‟s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
ii. INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENTS
Art VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and
the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
Members, to discharge such powers and functions as herein conferred upon it.
Art. VII, Sec. 16. xxx
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
Regular and recess (ad-interim) appointments
The procedure for confirmation has been discussed above under Constitutional
Congressional Committees. To sketch:
Appointments requiring confirmation are of two kinds, (i) regular, if the CA, that is,
Congress, is in session, or (ii) during the recess of Congress (because the
Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session [Art. VI, Sec. 19])
Regular appointments require confirmation before the appointee can take his post.
The President nominates, Congress receives the nomination and forwards this to
the CA for confirma- tion, then the Office of the President issues a Commission,
at which point the appointee can assume his office.
©MLZLIRedits 34

Recess appointments, on the other hand, need no confirmation to be effective, albeit
temporarily. The appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments, or until the next adjournment of Congress (unless
meantime, it is confirmed by the Commission) (Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2)
▲GUVERA VS INOCENTES
Posted by kaye lee on 11:51 PM
16 Scra 379 1996 [Ad Interim Appointments]
FACTS:
On November 25, 1965, Onofre Guevara took his oath as an Undersecretary of Labor after his
appointment was extended ad interim on November 22, 1965. The appointment was
questioned by Rauol Inocentes on the ground that Guevara‟s appointment ceases to be valid
after each term of Congress. At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate adjourned its
session. The House of Representatives continued its session and adjourned upon learning the
Senate‟s adjournment. In the case of Guevara‟s appointment, Congress, through the
Commission on appointments has not acted on it while the special session is being conducted.
ISSUE:
Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid.
RULING:
NO.
Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointment shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress"
The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until disapproval of the
Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress, whether special or regular
session.
In this case, the second mode of termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at
about midnight of January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of petitioner Guevara
ineffective. The contention that the Commission on Appointments should be first organized
before the second mode can be made effective is untenable because they are two different and
separate modes of termination.
Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-known maxim in
statutory construction applies. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.
▲DE RAMA VS CA
Evelyn Abeja run for reelection but lost to de Rama. Before she vacated her office, she extended
permanent appointments to 14 new employees of the municipal government. de Rama, upon
assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these were "midnight
appointments" and, therefore, prohibited under Sec. 15 Art. VII of the Constitution. SC held
that the records reveal that when de Rama brought the matter recalling the appointments of
the 14 employees before the Civil Service Commission, the only reason he cited to justify his
actions that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under the Constitution.
However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibitions applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
▲ “MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec‟s
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March
2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited
during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001,
citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section
261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims
©MLZLIRedits 35
 that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioner‟s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter
its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.”
” In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor
General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision
should be harmonized with the President‟s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President‟s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter
to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.”
iii. TEMPORARY DESIGNATIONS
The President may designate an officer already in the govt. service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of any office in the executive
branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) The officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by
reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or
(b) There exists a vacancy;
In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.
▲ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
©MLZLIRedits 36
 why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President‟s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‟s or Acting
President‟s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‟s or Acting
President‟s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
iv. LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTING POWER OF ACTING
PRESIDENT (Sec 14-15)
Art. VII, Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of office.
Art. VII, Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Art. VII, Sec. 16. xxx
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
©MLZLIRedits 37
 v. POWER TO REMOVE
Does the President‟s power include his authority to remove? When he appoints, he be
the one to remove? No. While he appoints, those appointed are not removable by
the President. The power to remove is limited by law and by the Constitution.
[A.855 – only SC en banc can remove judges; A190 – “Members of civil service]
The Secretaries of various departments are the alter ego of the president who serve at
his pleasure, whose terms depend on the president. When Pres is displeased, your
tem may be ended (not removed) by the President.
E. PARDONING POWER (Sec 19)
Art. VII, Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
It shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
The President may grant (i)reprieves, (ii) commutations, and (iii) pardons, and (iv)
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment, except :
(a) In cases of impeachment, and
(b) As otherwise provided in this Constitution, viz.
Art IX, C, Sec 5 No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence
for viola- tion of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation by the Commission (on
Elections.)
Definitions
Reprieve is a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal penalty
or sentence or a stay of execution. It does not more than stay the execution of a
sentence extended to a prisoner to afford him an opportunity to procure some
amelioration of the sentence imposed. (Black.) It is the withholding of a sentence
for an interval of time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of
execution. (People vs. Vera, infra.)
Commutation is a reduction of sentence. (Black.) It is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed.
(People vs. Vera, infra.)
Pardon is a permanent cancellation of sentence. (Black) It is an act of grace
proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of
the offense. (People v Vera, infra.)
Kinds of Pardon .-- Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary
or partial. An absolute pardon is one extended w/o any strings attached, so to
speak, whereas a conditional pardon is one under w/c the convict is required to
comply w/ certain requirements. A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas partial pardon
does not.
Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject the same since he
may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be
remitted. But in the case of an absolute pardon, the pardonee has no option at all and
must accept it whether he likes it or not. In this sense, an absolute pardon is similar to
commutation, w/c is also not subject to acceptance by the offender.
Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to
a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition,
rebellion), and who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often
conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (Black;
Brown v Walker, 161 US 602).
Probation is a disposition under which a defendant after conviction and sentence is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer. [Sec. 3 (a), PD 968.]
Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after
serving the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a
pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended.
a. PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM PROBATION
▲People vs. Vera, 65 P 56 (1937)
Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually
distinct and different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the
©MLZLIRedits 38
 probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment w/c the law
inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by
the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer, during the
period of probation, remains in legal custody-- subject to the control of the
probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of
the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to
serve the sentence originally imposed upon him.
Notes:
In both cases, there must be a final judgment of conviction, and the convict must be
exempted from service of sentence. But pardon is granted by the Chief Executive
for any crime, while probation is granted by the court after investigation by a
probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years
and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not against the security of the State,
where there was no previous conviction for an offense punished by arresto mayor,
and where there was no previous availment of probation.
In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, including the accessory penalties, are
abolished upon the grant of pardon. In probation, the restoration of the probationer
to his civil rights takes places only after his final discharge after the period of his
probation. (Secs. 14 & 16)
b. PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM PAROLE
Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution and formerly the
Administrative Code, at any time after final judgment of conviction, even before
service; while parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the minimum term of
his sentence.
In pardon, the convict becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because
although he his released from the custody of the law, he must submit to periodic
examination by the Board of Parole.
In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, 68 Phil 154 (1939), the SC dismissed the contention
that because parole is not mentioned in the Constitution, then the power to
grant parole is also deemed repealed. The Court said that parole is part of the
pardoning power of the President. Justice Fernando points out, however, that this
is not accurate. If ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because
the law grants him that power, and not because parole is part of pardon.
"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional
or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the
discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may
impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole,
or suspension of sentence."
▲Torres v Gonzales
F: Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on
Nov. 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition
that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition
be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was released.
On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner
had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted of sedition w/c is the subject of an
appeal, and a letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the
petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by
final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He also contends that he
was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and
thus deprived of due process.
ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelas v. Prov'l Warden of Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir.of
Prisons and Sales v. Dir. of Prisons.
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
©MLZLIRedits 39
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the
President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court,
in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for w/c he was conditionally pardoned, sec. 64 (i), RAC, is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
In short, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged
to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept. has 2 options: (i) to proceed
against him under Sec. 64 (i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under the RAC. That
choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to judicial scrutiny. Adapted.
c. PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM AMNESTY
1. Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty, for political
crimes.
2. Pardon is granted to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class, or community
generally.
3. Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even
before trial.
4. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment; amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which the convict is charged that the person released stands
precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v
Fernandez, infra.)
5. Pardon is a private act of the President w/c must be pleaded and proved
by the person bec. the courts do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is
a public act of w/c the courts take judicial notice. (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1991 ed.)
6. Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty
requires such concurrence. (id.)
▲ Barrioquinto et al v. Fernandez 82 Phil 642
F: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware
of Procl. No. 8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period Dec. 8, 1941 to the date when
each particular area of the Phil. where the offense was actually committed was liberated
from enemy control and occupation. The petitioners submitted their cases to the Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission (GAC).
The GAC returned their cases to the CFI-Zamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they are
entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of
the petitioners have admitted to committing the offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the
amnesty.
HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
Amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is
a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
"not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (Art 36
RPC). While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
ISSUE: W/N in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Procl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it
is necessary as a condition precedent that he should admit having committed the criminal act
with w/c he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense.
HELD: NO. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or of the accused, shows
that the offense committed comes w/n the terms of said Amnesty Procl.
It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of the amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him,
he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, w/n he admits or confesses having committed the offense w/ w/c he is charged,
©MLZLIRedits 40
 the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be "regarded as a patriot or hero who has rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
ISSUE: W/N the benefits of amnesty may be waived.
HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by
the prosecution or the defense, cannot be waived, because it is of public interest that a person
who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent,
for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense
because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, cannot be punished as a criminal.
Dissenting Opinion:
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not
committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the
Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the
accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a
plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before
he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action.
The 4th distinction (pardon is forward looking while amnesty is backward looking) is not accurate
on the basis of decided cases.
It can be seen from several cases, therefore that the effect of pardon retroacts to the day of the
crime. It is not simply forward-looking.
Pardon is still useful, then, even if the convict has already served his full sentence, because there
may be accessory penalties that are perpetual in extent. Adapted.
Notes:
The fifth distinction bet. pardon and amnesty is that pardon is a private act of the President, and so
must be impleaded in court; amnesty is a public act by the President and Congress, and so the
court is enjoined to take judicial notice of it. (supra)
The 5th distinction (pardon is a private act while amnesty is a public act) is not true in Philippine
law. The case holds that pardon must be raised as a defense, otherwise the court cannot take
judicial notice of such pardon. But under Art. 89 of the RPC, absolute pardon extinguishes
criminal liability. And under the Constitution, pardon can only be granted after final
conviction. If so, once, a convict has been granted pardon, this implies that he has already been
convicted, and that precisely he has been exempted from the penalty arising from
conviction. Why would he still have to invoke it? This seems to contemplate a situation where
he is being charged again of the same crime, and that he needs to invoke the pardon as a
defense, which is impossible because of double jeopardy.
The error in the Barrioquinto ruling is that it borrowed this distinction from American law, which
allows the President the power to grant pardon even before conviction (thus, Ford was able to
pardon Nixon even without a trial.)
Such was our law under the Jones Law of 1916. But under the 1935 Constitution, this rule was
changed: pardon could only be granted after conviction, In 1973, it was made stricter: pardon
could be granted only after "final" conviction. Then, in 1981, the phrase "after final
conviction" was dropped, thus going back to the rule under the Jones Law and the President
could grant pardon anytime. In 1987, the phrase reads: "after conviction by final judgment."
Aside from extinguishing criminal liability, pardon also works to remit fines and forfeitures paid
in favor of the Government.
But it does not automatically restore the public office forfeited, nor relieve the pardonee of civil
liability and other claims pertaining to the private offended party
d. EFFECT OF PARDON
In Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa
through falsification of public documents was granted an absolute pardon,
and thereafter claimed she was entitled as a consequence to reinstatement as
assistant city treasurer, the SC held that a pardon cannot mask the acts constituting
the crime. These are "historical facts" which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into
account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." Pardon granted after
conviction frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind, lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege. Thus, pardon does not ipso facto restore a
convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office
▲Monsanto v Factoran
A Pardoned Convict is not Entitled to Reinstatement to a Public
Office.
©MLZLIRedits 41
F: Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to 4 yrs., 2 mos. and 1 day of
prision correcional, as minimum, to 10 yrs. and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; to
pay fine (P3,500) and to indemnify the govt (P4,892.50) in a decision of the SB. While
her case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and "restored to
full civil and political rights" by then Pres. Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to
reinstate her w/o necessity of a new appointment provided this was done not earlier than the
date of her pardon. However, on 4/15/86, the new administration held that she was not
entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon granted her. As her MFR was
denied, petitioner brought this action to the SC. Petitioner's theory is that the gen. rule on
pardon does not apply to her bec. she was extended clemency while her case was still
pending in the SC. She contended that w/o final judgment on conviction, the accessory
penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach.
HELD: (1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973 Consti., as amended, w/c, by deleting
the requirement that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly
authorized it to be granted even before conviction. The 1987 Consti. reverted to the former
rule, requiring final conviction as a condition for the grant by the Pres. of pardon. However,
it is immaterial when the pardon was granted, for the result would be the same. By
accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have abondoned her appeal, w/ the result
that the judgment of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute
disqualification from holding public office) became final.
(2) The modern trend of authorities reject the unduly broad language of Ex Parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333 (1867) to the effect that in the eyes of the law, the offender who is pardoned is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. While we are prepared to concede that
pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give
meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the view that pardon blots out the
guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive
how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character
and conduct w/ one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Accordingly, pardon does not ipso facto restore him to public office may have been forfeited
by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office. Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her
qualifications, the facts constituting her conviction should be taken into account to
determine whether she can again be entrusted w/ public funds.
(3) Nor can petitioner be exempted from the payment of the civil indemnity. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, if for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. VV.
Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded
on the person's innocence (w/c is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege. xxx"
e. DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES?
▲Llamas vs Executive Secretary, 202 SCRA 844
(1991)
"Conviction" may be used in either a criminal case or in an administrative case.
F: Pet. Llamas was Vice-Gov. of Tarlac who assumed the position of gov. when Gov. Ocampo
was found guilty by DILG of a viol. of RA 3019 and meted a penalty of 90 days suspension.
Administrative conviction was based on complaint filed by petitioners and others charging
Ocampo w/ executing loan agreement w/ Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M,
w/c is a non-stock and non-profit org. headed by the gov. as chairman and his brother-in- law as
executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be disadvantageous to the govt.
MFR by Ocampo was denied by DILG. On 3/19/91, Ocampo issued "admin. order" wherein he
signified intention to continue in office at his residence in the belief that pendency of appeal to
the Exec. Sec. precluded finality as executory of the DILG order. W/o ruling on the MFR, the
Exec. Sec. issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition
claiming that executive clemency could only be granted by the Pres. in crim. cases, not in
admin. cases.
HELD: According to petitioner, "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to crim. cases."
But, he himself describes the governor as one "convicted in an admin. case" and thus actually
concedes that "conviction" may be used either in a crim. or admin. case. The Const. does
not distinguish bet. w/c cases executive clemency may be exercised by the Pres., w/ the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases.
If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. However, the power
of the President to grant executive clemency in administrative cases refers only to administrative
cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the govt.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive departments
are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the
President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this case, the President in the
©MLZLIRedits 42
 exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of
the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a
ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration
of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive
clemency was granted. Adapted
Sec. 53, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987
Sec. 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities.-- In
meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the (Civil Service) Commission, the
President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon
officers or employees in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he
may impose in the interest of the service
f. WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY
The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and
obedience to the constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits
and occupation. This objective cannot be expected to meet with full success
without the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have become more
embittered by their capture, prosecution and incarceration.
Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon
includes amnesty. Pardon and amnesty are both construed most strictly against the
state.
▲Macaga-an vs People
Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents by the Sandiganbayan. They claimed that they had been granted amnesty by
President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan claimed that the benefits of amnesty were never
available to petitioners under PD 1182. The SC agreed with the Sandiganbayan that in fact the
petitioners were expressly disqualified from amnesty. The acts for which they were
convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting only of
diversion of public funds to private profit. The amnesty proclamation covered only acts in the
furtherance of resistance to duly constituted authorities of the Republic.
F. MILITARY POWERS
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in- Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guild is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
As Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the President has
©MLZLIRedits 43
 the following powers:
a. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.
b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof.
Subject to: Art. VIII, Sec. 1 par. 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Govt.
Call out the AFP to prevent
lawless violence
This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution
does not regulate its exercise radically
Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer
to inform the court (i) if he has the person in custody, and (ii) what his basis in
detaining that person.
The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to
show cause why he should not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is
suspended, not the writ itself.
Requisites:
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2. The public safety requires the suspension.
Effects of the suspension of the privilege
1. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons "judicially
charged" for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5) Such persons suspected of the above crimes
can be arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.
"Judicially charged" as used in the Constitution is imprecise. For if one were already
judicially charged, his detention would be legal and so he could no longer petition
for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus precisely contemplates a situation in which a
person is being detained without being charged in court. Thus, the provision
should read "one who is suspected of complicity in" the two crimes above.
As a general rule, no person could be arrested without a warrant of arrest (validly
issued upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, (cf.
Art. III, Sec. 2), unless (i) the arrest was made in connection with a crime
committed in the presence of the detaining officer, or (ii) the privilege of the writ
was suspended. If the public officer arrests him without a warrant, the officer
becomes liable for "arbitrary detention" under Art. 124 of the RPC, and a petition
for habeas corpus can be filed to seek his release.
The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without warrant legal. But
the military is, in effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the
suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against such unlawful
arrest (arbitrary detention). The arrest without warrant is justified by the
emergency situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the
time and the number of persons to be arrested.
But the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the
invasion. As to other crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply.
2. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be
released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 6).
In other words, the public officer can detain a person without warrant of arrest, but
he can only do so for 72 hours. Before the lapse of 72 hours, an information must
have been filed in the proper court charging him of the offense for which he
was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a
preliminary investigation to be first conducted by the fiscal, he must sign a waiver
of the effects of Art. 125. (delay in the delivery of detained persons)
The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to extend the periods
during which he can be detained without a warrant. Under Art. 125, as amended
by EO 272, the public officer can only detain him for 12, 18 or 36 hours
depending on the gravity of the offense of which he is charged; within this time,
he must be judicially charged, otherwise, he must be re- leased. When the
privilege is suspended, the period is extended to 72 hours.
©MLZLIRedits 44
 What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released after 72 hours? The
public officer becomes liable under Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery of detained
persons." As to the detainee, it is submitted that he or someone else in his
behalf can file a petition for habeas corpus. For even if the suspension has a
lifetime of 60 days in general, as to that person, the suspension only has an
effectivity of 72 hours, so that after this time, the suspension is lifted as to him.
3. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. (Art. III, Sec. 13)
[What is suspended is the privilege, not the writ. So the judge can still ask for writ.]
Art. III, Sec. 13. xxx The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of HC is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This new provision abrogates the ruling in Morales v Ponce- Enrile which held
the contrary.
Proclaim Martial Law
Requisites:
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any
part thereof.
Effects of the proclamation of martial law
The President can:
1. Legislate
2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.
But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies.
The principle is that martial law is proclaimed only because the courts and other civil
institutions like Congress have been shut down. It should not happen that martial law
is declared in order to shut down the civil institutions.
3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where
civil courts are unable to function.
This is the "open court" doctrine which holds that civilians cannot be tried by
military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. But if the civil courts
are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial laws
usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed and the civil
institutions have already crumbled, that is a "theater of war." If the courts are still
open, the President can just suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect.
4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
This overrules the holding in Aquino v Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), that
when the President proclaims martial law, he also impliedly suspends the privilege of
the writ.
Under the present rule, the President can still suspend the privilege even as he proclaim
martial law, but he must so suspend expressly.
The Role of Congress
a. When the President proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, such
proclamation or suspension shall be effective for a period of 60 days, unless sooner
revoked by the Congress.
b. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in
session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24
hours following the proclamation or suspension.
c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit
a report, in person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the
action he has taken).
d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options: (i)
To revoke such proclamation or suspension.
When it so revokes, the President cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as he
normally would do in the case of bills. If Congress does not do anything, the
measure will expire anyway in 60 days. So the revocation must be made before
the lapse of 60 days from the date the measure was taken.
(ii) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.
Congress can only so extend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the
President. The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress
©MLZLIRedits 45
 would determine, based on the persistence of the emergency. If Congress fails to act
before the measure expires, it can no longer extend it until the President again
redeclares the measure, for how do one extend something that has already lapsed?
Note that Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or suspension, because it
is already valid. It is thus restricted to the 2 measures above.
If Congress extends the measure, but before the period of extension lapses, the
requirements for the proclamation or suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the
extension, since the power to confer implies the power to take back. If Congress
does not review or lift the order, this can be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to the next section.
The Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the extension thereof. It must
promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par.
3)
This is because judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2)
The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case. A petition for
habeas corpus is one such case. When a person is arrested without a warrant for
complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in his behalf has the
standing to question the validity of the proclamation or suspension. But before the
SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of
the proclamation or suspension.
The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in
proclaiming or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of
arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but
whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.
Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not
there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which is now made part of judicial power by Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs
radically the application of the political question doctrine.
This test was taken from the case of Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The
issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos
had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his
decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed
door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the
President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts,
but one cannot say that it is without basis.
[In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the SC held unanimously that it has the authority to
inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional
sufficiency thereof. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]
With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of Garcia-
Padilla v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be
so always. In that case, the SC held that the President's proclamation of martial law
is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the President acts in
good faith. The cases of Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castaneda, which ruled
that the validity of the suspension of the privilege was a political question, are
likewise buried in the grave of judicial history.
There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1) Lifting by the President himself
2) Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
4) Operation of law after 60 days
▲Sanlakas vs. Reyes
o The President's Commander-in-Chief Powers: (1) the calling out power, (2) the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) the power to declare martial law
o The President‟s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers
as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers.
o Legal significance of declaration of state of rebellion: Such a declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
o Declaration of a State of Rebellion vis-a-vis Declaration of Martial Law
©MLZLIRedits 46
FACTS:
In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both declaring a
“state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long
negotiations, the Oakwood occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state
of rebellion.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional
RULING:
President‟s Commander-in-Chief Powers
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In
the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, “[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only
criterion is that „whenever it becomes necessary,‟ the President may call the armed forces „to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.‟”
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
xxx the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address
exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of
the State. Xxx
Thus, the President‟s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers
as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. Xxx
Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state
of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state
exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Court‟s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For
all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any “confusion” generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the
mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason
that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any
rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion “with due
regard to constitutional rights.”
But Declaration of State of Rebellion is not Declaration of Martial Law; Exercise of
Emergency Powers by President does not necessarily follow
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation
of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has
exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President
has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
©MLZLIRedits 47
 President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are Constitution.
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

▲IBP VS ZAMORA ▲Lacson vs. Perez

o Power of the president to declare a state of rebellion
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President o In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate of persons suspected of rebellion.
with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The
IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP FACTS:
in law enforcement.
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent mob armed with
ISSUE: explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
to judicial review. state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military. the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which allegedly
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed
may be established by law. before the Court. Prior to resolution, the “state of rebellion” was lifted in Metro Manila.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there ISSUE:
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
o Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
RULING:
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
As to warrantless arrests
the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
As to petitioner‟s claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being used by the
authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the “rebellion.” Xxx
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
With this declaration, petitioners‟ apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
on the declaration of a “state of rebellion.”
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
©MLZLIRedits 48

Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers?
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People‟s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues
that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to “determine or interpret” what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation
of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…” thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security
of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Xxx
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this
power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
lifted.
▲Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and
other consolidated cases)
DECISION
(En Banc)
ABAD, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of
Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response
to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of
the President‟s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could
act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
II. THE ISSUES
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in
Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT
and ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in
Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should
be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive
or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution
of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic
duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx.
©MLZLIRedits 49
 xxx xxx xxx
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They
exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based
on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit
that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic
rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President‟s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which
had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have
become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that
obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully
implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government
units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao
that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly
charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her
action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her
judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself
adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.
G. EMERGENCY POWERS
Art. VI, Sec. 23. xxx
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period, and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
This grant of emergency power to the President is different from the Commander-
in- Chief clause. When the President acts under the Commander-in-Chief clause,
he acts under a constitutional grant of military power, which may include the law-
making power. But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts
under a Congressional delegation of law- making power.
The scope of the grant is such "powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy." Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to
issue rules and regulations to carry out the declared policy. The 1987
Constitution, it is submitted, does not change the scope. "Power necessary and
proper" should mean legislative power, because Congress is only allowed to
delegate legislative power, being its only inherent power. Its other powers are only
granted to it by the Constitution, and so it cannot delegate what has only been
delegated to it.
This power is (1) for a limited period, and (2) subject to such restrictions as Congress
may provide. The power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such resolution, (b) upon the next
(voluntary) adjournment of Congress. For the fact that Congress is able to meet in
session uninterruptedly and adjourn of its own will proves that the emergency no
longer exists is to justify the delegation.
This rule or the termination of the grant of emergency powers is based on decided
cases, which in turn became Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the 1973 Constitution.
▲DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
©MLZLIRedits 50

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
[calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the
armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection
or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo‟s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II
of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that.
In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
State‟s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo‟s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President‟s authority to declare“a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to
the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
©MLZLIRedits 51
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
▲Ampatuan vs Puno Case Digest
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
Calling Out Power, Emergency Powers, Local Autonomy
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not
the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to
him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in
AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the
DILG).
Claiming that the President‟s issuances encroached on the ARMM‟s autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials,
filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President‟s
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM‟s autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM‟s operations and to seize the regional
government‟s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring
a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking
over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President‟s emergency powers.
Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy
under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
©MLZLIRedits 52
Held:
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of
the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of
ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM
Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the
rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale,
Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the
administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her
to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
3. The President‟s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from
the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President‟s exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination
was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President‟s
judgment. Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary
to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security
of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence
must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President‟s exercise of the
“calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under
the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was
too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both
high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the
people‟s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She
called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the
armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
©MLZLIRedits 53
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President‟s actions.(Ampatuan
vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
H. CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING FOREIGN LOANS
Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government, or government-owned or controlled corporations, which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters
provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law
and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or
guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.
I. POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.
By reason of the President's unique position as head of state, he is the logical
choice as the nation's spokesman in foreign relations. The Senate, on the
other hand, is granted the right to share in the treaty-making power of
the President by concurring with him with the right to amend.
Treaty distinguished from executive agreements
Executive agreements entered into by the President need no concurrence. The reason
is that although executive agreements are a kind of international agreements, when
the Constitution intends to include executive agreements, it says so specifically,
as in Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 2, when it speaks of the power of the SC to
review final judgments of lower courts in cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, is in question.
In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval
of the Senate, while executive agreements become binding through executive
action without need of a vote by the Senate, the SC in Commissioner of Customs v
Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said that the difference between a treaty
and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving
political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character, while an executive agreement is an
international agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature.
Examples of treaties are an agreement on tax, extradition, alliance. Examples of
executive agreements are agreements relating to postal conventions, tariff rates,
copyright, most- favored nation clause.
Nature of Executive Agreements : There are 2 classes : (1) agreements made purely as
executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative
authoriza- tion, which may be termed as presidential agreements, and (2)
agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or Congressional-
Executive Agreements. The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of
these two classes, for precisely on Sept. 18, 1946, Congress specifically authorized
the President to obtain such indebtedness w/ the Govt of the US, its agencies or
instrumentalities. Even assuming, arguendo, that there was no legislative
authorization, it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was
legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category. This 2nd
category usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary
claims of citizens.
a. DEPORTAION OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS
President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a
reading of Sec. 69 of the RAC w/c provides for "a prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent xxx the Deportation
Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the
Pres. xxx
Power to arrest aliens.-- Sec. 69 of the RAC does not provide for the exercise
of the power to arrest. The contention xxx that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when
there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the Pres. obviously has the power to order the arrest of the
©MLZLIRedits 54
 deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that
the alien be arrested.
Power to order arrest of alien may not be delegated to Deportation Board by
President.-
- Conceding w/o deciding that the Pres. can personally order the arrest of
alien, yet such power cannot be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the
exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether
under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is
warranted. xxx And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties
may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and
judgement may not be so delegated. RAM.
In Go Tek v Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1976), the SC upheld the
President's power to order the deportation of an alien under Sec. 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. He need not wait for the pending case to end in
conviction. He may, even during the pendency of the case, order the
deportation if he thinks he is undesirable to national interest. This decision to
deport, said the Court, is an act of State.
▲Go Tek vs. Deportation Board
F: Petitioner was arrested for possession of fake dollars and prosecuted under Art. 168
RPC. At the same time, deportation proceedings were brought against him. He filed a
petition for prohibition against the Deportation Board, contending that he could only be
deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c possession
of fake dollars is not) and only after conviction. The CFI-Mla sustained his contention.
HELD: The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code w/c
does not specify the grounds for deportation of aliens but only provides that it be ordered
after due investigation. The intention is to give the Chief Executive full discretion to
determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or inure
the security, welfare, or interest of the State. The Chief Executive is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of facts w/c warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed
in an investigation. VV.
J. POWER OVER LEGISLATION
a. TO ADDRESS CONGRESS (Sec 23)
Art. VII, Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
Every 4th Monday of July, the President delivers the State of the Nation Address,
which contains his proposals for legislation. Through this speech, he can
influence the course of legis- lation that Congress can take during the regular
session.
b. PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF BUDGET (Sec 22)
Art. VII, Sec. 22. The President shall submit to Congress within thirty
days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.
The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b)
sources of financing, and (c) receipts from revenue-raising measures.
This budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be passed by
Congress. Through the budget, therefore, the President reveals the
priorities of the government.
▲PIMENTEL v AGUIRRE
Facts:
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and
agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998
that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of
10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO
43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
©MLZLIRedits 55
Issues:
1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt
a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments
Held:
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule
out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the
President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1)
an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the
presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and
the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the
national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did
they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments.
Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section
1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
theautomatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated
by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the
release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter
of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command
that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel
vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
c. VETO POWER
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objection to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
As a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President before they
become law, except when (i) the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3
©MLZLIRedits 56
 vote, and (ii) the bill passed is the special law to elect the President and and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
Vice-President. This gives the President an actual hand in legislation. national development program of the Government.
However, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it as a
whole. (See Legislative Power of Congress)

d. EMERGENCY POWERS The reason for the delegation is the highly technical nature of international
commerce, and the need to constantly and with relative ease adapt the
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it rates to prevailing commercial standards.
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objection to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.

As a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President before they
become law, except when (i) the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3
vote, and (ii) the bill passed is the special law to elect the President and
Vice-President. This gives the President an actual hand in legislation.
However, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it as a
whole. (See Legislative Power of Congress)

e. FIXING OF TARRIF RATES

Art. VI, Sec. 28. Xxx The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage

©MLZLIRedits 57