UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

18 December 2017

(U//FOUO) North Carolina Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project Threat Assessment
(U//FOUO) Prepared by the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) and the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis (I&A). Coordinated with TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

(U//FOUO) Scope: This Field Analysis Report (FAR) provides a baseline threat assessment for the North
Carolina segments of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) project. This FAR is intended to assist security planners
and public safety personnel by providing situational awareness of the strategic threat picture in North Carolina and
in support of organizational standing information needs and stakeholder requirements.

(U) Key Findings
 (U//FOUO) The North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) and the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) have no specific, credible information suggesting international terrorists,
domestic terrorists, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), or other violent actors are actively targeting North
Carolina-based ACP project operations.a,b

 (U//FOUO) Based on historical threat reporting and our analysis of trends in attacks directed against the US
pipeline systems and rail subsectors, we assess that the ACP has the potential to become a regional focal
point for ideologically or politically motivated violent extremist actors inspired to commit acts intended to
disrupt and halt ACP construction. While we assess that most activities motivated by ideological or political
opposition to pipeline construction are likely to be lawful or otherwise nonviolent, some violent extremist
groups or actors could take advantage of lawful gatherings in an attempt to threaten, incite, or commit violent
acts against public safety officers or ACP facility staff. We based this assessment on previous targeting of
energy transportation infrastructure in other areas of the country, specifically with respect to the targeting of
pipeline construction projects.

a
(U//FOUO) The ISAAC and DHS define domestic terrorism as any act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely
within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. This act is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a HVE in that the former is not
inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.
b
(U//FOUO) The ISAAC and DHS define an HVE as a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the
United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities
(including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization,
but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who
engage in unlawful acts of violence or to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from
or influence from a foreign actor.

IA-25678-18
IA-0XXX-18
(U) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the North Carolina ISAAC and DHS and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its
contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without North Carolina ISAAC and DHS authorization is prohibited.
Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first
receiving authorization from the originating agency. [Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website on an unclassified network.]

(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to
the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may not share
this document with critical infrastructure and key resource personnel or private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

(U) All US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov,
IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 (U//FOUO) We assess that unlawful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) directed against other US
pipeline projects are indicative of the TTPs which could be employed against ACP infrastructure and
personnel in North Carolina as the project progresses if violent extremist actors mobilized. Some of these
TTPs may involve attacks on pipelines and/or persons to include; unlawful doxing attacks intended to
encourage targeted threats of violence against government and business leaders or the use of drones, for
pre/post operational surveillance of pipeline project sites ahead of a planned attack to disrupt construction
efforts or for delivering violent instruments of destruction, such as explosive or incendiary devices targeting
infrastructure-related equipment, facilities, or personnel, including law enforcement or private security
personnel.c

(U) Project Overview

(U//FOUO) The ACP project consists of the construction of a 600-mile underground natural gas transmission
pipeline. The construction is planned to start in Harrison County, West Virginia before moving southeast through
Virginia and terminating in Robeson County, North Carolina.1,2 The main conduit of the line consists of 42- to 36-
inch diameter piping.3,4 The ACP will begin in North Carolina after the pipeline crosses the Virginia border in
North Hampton County; from there, it will continue on through Halifax, Nash, Wilson, Johnston, Sampson, and
Cumberland counties before reaching its termination point in Robeson County (see Figure 1.).5 The initial
construction phases that involve surveying and clearing of land that consists of heavily forested, moderately
forested areas, privately held residences, and waterways are anticipated to begin in early 2018 with a date of
completion still yet to be determined.6

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Figure 1. North Carolina route of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project.7

c(U) According to US-CERT, doxing is the act of gathering and publishing individuals' personal information without
permission.

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(U) Violent Extremists, Other Unknown Actors Have Conducted Criminal and Violent Activities
Against Similar Projects

(U//FOUO) The ISAAC is not aware of any specific, credible information indicating that international terrorists,
domestic terrorists, HVEs, or other violent actors intend to sabotage development of or attack personnel
associated with the ACP project. We assess, however, that the ACP may potentially become a regional focal
point for ideologically or politically motivated extremist actors inspired to commit acts intended to disrupt or halt
ACP construction. While we assess that most activities motivated by ideological or political opposition to pipeline
construction are likely to be lawful or otherwise nonviolent, some violent extremist groups or actors could take
advantage of lawful gatherings in an attempt to threaten, incite, or commit violent acts against public safety
officers or ACP facility staff. We based this assessment on previous targeting of energy transportation
infrastructure in other areas of the country, including the specific targeting of other pipeline infrastructure.

 (U) The ACP has routinely been compared to other pipeline projects in open source reporting that have
been targeted by violent activities.8 Similar concerns about the project’s environmental impact, and its
potential to fracture communities, have been widely noted in media and open source articles. 9 In some
cases, open source reporting has also cited comparisons between the projects when referencing how they
negatively affect sacred sites and sovereign Native American territory. 10

(U//FOUO) We assess that similar energy transportation infrastructure projects in other areas of the country have
experienced sustained acts of violence and unlawful malicious cyber activities to include unauthorized doxing
campaigns to incite targeted violence against security and law enforcement personnel responsible for protecting
infrastructure sites. Some of the tactics used have included infrastructure damage or destruction, using drones for
preoperational surveillance and deploying explosive and incendiary devices to create delays in construction,
maintenance, or general operations at infrastructure sites. While ACP will run underground, the initial construction
phases will be similar in nature to overhead pipelines being built in other areas of the country such as the Dakota
Access Pipeline (DAPL), with expansive construction sites, the grouping of equipment, and multiple staging areas,
that some pipeline foes who intend on disrupting the project might see as a “target rich” environment. We assess
that the ACP project, which consists of similar infrastructure to other pipeline projects, could be met with similar
opposition to its construction and be targeted by violent actors using TTPs that were observed during construction
of other pipeline projects. We base this on media reporting drawing parallels between the ACP and other targeted
projects coupled with attacks directed at those pipelines.11

• (U//LES) In mid-March 2017, suspected actors used a cutting torch to penetrate a pipeline. This tactic was
observed five other times in different areas of the same network. In one case, an unknown individual cut
through a fence to gain access to a pipeline site, and graffiti was found at this same site, identifying the intent
of the actors, according to DHS reporting.12

• (U//FOUO) In November 2016, an identified business based in North Carolina that provided a direct service
for pipeline operations was subjected to an unauthorized Distributed Denial of Service attack against its
information technology systems, which resulted in the shutdown of operations for multiple business days.
Accompanying social media postings from an individual who claimed responsibility for the attack stated that
the incident was motivated by the business’ association with an identified pipeline project, based on DHS
reporting.13

• (U//LES) In October 2016, an unidentified operator used a small drone to interfere with a helicopter that was
monitoring identified pipeline construction operations elsewhere. The drone was also used to conduct post-
operational surveillance on law enforcement officers who were near the operations area of the project,
according to state law enforcement officer with routine access to information through the course of official
duties.14

• (U//LES) In September 2016, unidentified actors sabotaged five pieces of heavy equipment near a pipeline
construction site. The unidentified actors damaged the equipment by placing rocks and debris in the swing
box of two excavators, which cut the electrical wires of two bulldozers and placed dirt inside the engine of a

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third bulldozer, according to DHS reporting. Subsequent social media postings that included pictures of the
equipment along with unidentified persons also displayed anti-pipeline project messaging.15

(U) Targeting of Third-Party Persons, Organizations, and Property by Violent Extremists or Other
Unknown Actors

(U//FOUO) We assess that third-party persons, organizations, and critical infrastructure associated with the ACP
have the potential to be targeted by violent extremists and other unknown actors based on historic reporting that
indicates associations with primary target companies has been the motivation for targeting and attacks directed
against third-party organizations.16,17

 (U//FOUO) During mid-February 2017, violent extremist actors claimed responsibility for disrupting the rail
transport of oil in Washington State as a show of support against an identified pipeline project. The
disruption was caused by the common tactic of using jumper cables or other wires to send a signal that the
rail is blocked ahead, creating significant delays until the source can be identified and removed. That
particular rail line was targeted because it was a key transport route for crude oil, according to DHS
reporting.18

 (U//FOUO) During December 2016, an unidentified individual posted content online that provided
instructions on how to disrupt rail traffic using the previously mentioned technique using wires, in support of
criminal anti-pipeline operations according to DHS reporting.19

 (U//FOUO) During November 2016, actors posting online claimed credit for multiple attacks against critical
infrastructure in the financial services sector. The violent extremists targeted critical infrastructure because
the corporations were providing support for pipeline construction operations according to DHS reporting.20,21

(U) Evidence of Similar Targeting of Infrastructure in North Carolina by Violent Extremists and
Other Unknown Actors

(U//FOUO) North Carolina has experienced incidents related to the targeting of persons and other critical
infrastructure sectors associated with the energy sector, some of which were determined to be motivated by the
victim’s support to energy projects in other states.22,23,24,25 We assess that violent extremists and other unknown
actors have the potential to target persons or critical infrastructure in North Carolina based on the past presence
and activities of these actors targeting similar infrastructure and associated businesses in the state, as well as the
possibility that individuals could travel from out of North Carolina to conduct attacks—similar to what was directed
against other pipeline projects in the United States.

 (U//FOUO) During early November 2016, a security firm based in North Carolina, that was directly
supporting an identified pipeline project’s operations, received violent threats directed at leadership from an
individual who made references to anti-pipeline operations according to DHS reporting.26

 (U//FOUO) In mid-May 2015, an unidentified individual intentionally disrupted critical infrastructure when
manipulating a natural gas pipeline system’s inlet valves after gaining access to an unguarded facility. In
another instance that same day, an unknown individual cut the system’s sensing lines, resulting in a product
leak and the evacuation of residences, according to DHS reporting.27

 (U//FOUO) In April 2015, an unidentified individual gained access to, and intentionally tampered with, two
natural gas pipeline regulator stations in North Carolina after attempting to adjoin a high pressure line to a
low pressure line. A few hours later, similar tampering was discovered at another unguarded regulator
station according to DHS reporting.28

(U) DHS and the North Carolina ISAAC are interested in receiving tips and information on activities related to
threats to homeland security, terrorism, and extremism. Comments, requests, or shareable intelligence should
be directed to the ISAAC (for North Carolina activities 888-NCISAAC) or DHS.

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(U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) The information in this FAR is based on a review of a wide body of reporting from DHS Components, law
enforcement, and open sources, including government bulletins based on sworn testimony or provided for the purpose of public
safety. We have medium confidence in information obtained from these sources, which include media reports and raw
reporting, where the information is credibly sourced and plausible but may contain biases or unintentional inaccuracies. We
have medium confidence in the assessments presented in this FAR due to the scope of the project that will span several
years.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers
should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious
activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action.
For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.6, HSEC-8.8, HSEC-8.10, HSEC-08-NCISAAC, HSEC-09-
NCISAAC, HSEC-11-NCISAAC, HSEC-12-NCISAAC.

1 (U); Atlantic Coast Pipeline; “Project Overview”; JUN 2017; https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/resources/docs/resources/acp-
project-overview-june-2017.pdf; accessed on 07 NOV 2017.
2 (U); Atlantic Coast Pipeline; “Good to Know”; JUN 2017; https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/resources/docs/resources/acp-

good-to-know-june-2017.pdf; accessed on 07 NOV 2017.
3 (U); Atlantic Coast Pipeline; “Project Overview”; JUN 2017; https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/resources/docs/resources/acp-

project-overview-june-2017.pdf; accessed on 07 NOV 2017.
4 (U); Atlantic Coast Pipeline; “Good to Know”; JUN 2017; https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/resources/docs/resources/acp-

good-to-know-june-2017.pdf; accessed on 07 NOV 2017.
5 (U); North Carolina Environmental Quality; “Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project”; Date UNK;

https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/energy-mineral-land-resources/acp; accessed on 07 NOV 2017.
6 (U); Atlantic Coast Pipeline; “Pipeline Construction”; Date UNK;

https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/resources/docs/resources/acp-pipeline-construction-june-2017.pdf; accessed on 08 NOV
2017.
7 (U); North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality; “Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project”; Date UNK;

https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/energy-mineral-land-resources/acp; Assessed 12 DEC 2017.
8 (U); S.E. Smith; Truthout; “The Atlantic Coast Pipeline Could Be the East Coast’s Dakota Access Pipeline”; 24 OCT 2016;

http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/38107-the-atlantic-coast-pipeline-could-be-the-east-coast-s-dakota-access-pipeline;
accessed on 16 NOV 2016.
9 (U); Robert Walton; Utilitydive; “Atlantic Coast Pipeline in the ‘homestretch’ despite continued protests”; 26 JUN 2017;

https://www.utilitydive.com/news/atlantic-coast-pipeline-in-the-homestretch-despite-continued-protests/444788/; accessed
on 26 JUN 2017.
10 (U); Justine Frerichs; Medium; “Challenging Atlantic Coast Pipeline”; 02 OCT 2016; https://medium.com/noö-south/another-

deal-that-stinks-american-indians-and-the-atlantic-coast-pipeline-d2d031926d2a; accessed on 28 NOV 2017.
11 (U); Jonathan Sokolow; Huffpost; “Echoes of a Dark Past At Virginia’s Standing Rock”; 17 JUL 2017;

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/echoes-of-a-dark-past-at-virginias-standing-rock_us_596d21c0e4b010d77673185a;
accessed on 16 NOV 2017.
12
(U//LES); DHS: IIR 4 017 0059 17; 281717Z MAR 17; DOI 15 to 17 MAR 2017; (U//LES); Suspected Environmental
Extremists Sabotaging Dakota Access Pipeline Aboveground Valves in South Dakota and Iowa; Extracted information is
U//LES; Overall document classification is U//LES.
13 (U//FOUO); DHS; IIR 4 015 0060 17; 232034Z JAN 17; DOI 23-24 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO): Security Firm Subjected to

Cyber Attack Due to Company’s Operational Support for the Dakota Access Pipeline Operations; Extracted information is
U//FOUO; Overall document classification is U//FOUO.
14 (U//LES); DHS; IIR 4 017 0021 17; 222248Z DEC 16; DOI 23 OCT 2016; (U//LES); Drone Used to Disrupt and Surveil Law

Enforcement near Mandan, North Dakota; Extracted information is U//LES; Overall document classification is U//LES.
15 (U//LES); DHS; FIR/SD-0001-17; 26 SEP 2016; DOI 25 SEP 2016 ; (U//LES); South Dakota-Environmental Extremists

Sabotaging Five Pieces of Construction Equipment near Winfred, SD to Inhibit Construction of Dakota Access Pipeline;
Extracted information is U//LES; Overall document classification is U//LES.

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

16 (U//FOUO); DHS; FIR/NC-0002-17; 04 NOV 2016; DOI 4 NOV 2017; (U//FOUO); North Carolina-Security Firm Threatened
Due to Company's Operational Support for Dakota Access Pipeline; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall document
classification is U//FOUO.
17 (U//FOUO); DHS; OSIR-4001-0275-17; 14 FEB 2017; DOI 11 FEB 2017; (U//FOUO); Website posts names and addresses

of persons associated with the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall
document classification is U//FOUO.
18 (U//FOUO); DHS; OSIR-04001-0274-17; 15 FEB 2017; DOI 11 FEB 2017; (U//FOUO); Anarchist extremists claim credit for

disrupting oil transport trains in Washington State; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall document classification is
U//FOUO.
19 (U//FOUO); DHS; OSIR-04001-0125-17; 162108Z DEC 16; DOI 13 DEC 2016; (U//FOUO); A Video and Article Stating

solidarity with the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests Provides Instructions on How to Disrupt Rail Traffic; Extracted
information is U//FOUO; Overall document classification is U//FOUO.
20 (U//FOUO); DHS; OSIR-04001-0093-17; 021153Z DEC 16; DOI 18 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO); Chicago Area Bank Branch

Targeted by Anonymous Anarchists in Protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall
document classification is U//FOUO.
21 (U//FOUO); DHS; OSIR-04001-0096-17; 021156Z DEC 16; DOI 23 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO); Second Chicago Area Bank

Targeted by Anonymous Anarchists Who Call for More Attacks on Banks in Protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline;
Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall document classification is U//FOUO.
22 (U//FOUO); DHS IIR 4 015 0074 15; 041220Z JUN 15; DOI 22 May 2015; (U//FOUO); Intentional Damage to Two Natural

Gas Regulator Stations, Which Caused Gas Leaks and Residential Evacuations; Extracted information is U//FOUO;
Overall document classified higher than this product.
23 (U//FOUO); DHS IIR 4 015 0060 17; 232034Z JAN 17; DOI 23-24 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO); Security Firm Subjected to

Cyber Attack Due to Company’s Operational Support for the Dakota Access Pipeline Operations; Extracted information is
U//FOUO; Overall document classification is U//FOUO.
24 (U//FOUO); DHS; FIR/NC-0002-17; 040000ET NOV 16; DOI 4 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO); North Carolina-Security Firm

Threatened Due to Company's Operational Support for Dakota Access Pipeline; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall
document classification is U//FOUO.
25 (U//FOUO); DHS IIR 4 015 0074 15; 041220Z JUN 15; DOI 12 May 2015; (U//FOUO); Intentional Damage to Two Natural

Gas Regulator Stations, Which Caused Gas Leaks and Residential Evacuations; Extracted information is U//FOUO;
Overall document classified higher than this product.
26 (U//FOUO); DHS; FIR/NC-0002-17; 040000ET NOV 16; DOI 4 NOV 2016; (U//FOUO); North Carolina-Security Firm

Threatened Due to Company's Operational Support for Dakota Access Pipeline; Extracted information is U//FOUO; Overall
document classification is U//FOUO.
27 (U//FOUO); DHS IIR 4 015 0074 15; 041220Z JUN 15; DOI 22 May 2015; (U//FOUO); Intentional Damage to Two Natural

Gas Regulator Stations, Which Caused Gas Leaks and Residential Evacuations; Extracted information is U//FOUO;
Overall document is classified higher than is product.
28 (U//FOUO); DHS IIR 4 015 0069 15; 221605Z MAY 15; DOI 21 APR 15; (U//FOUO); Identified Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures Attempted at a Natural Gas Facility Could Cause Catastrophic Failure of the Pipeline System; Extracted
information is U//FOUO; Overall document classified higher than this product.

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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Product Title: (U//FOUO) North Carolina Atlantic Coast Pipeline Project Threat Assessment
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Product Serial Number: IA-25678-18 REV: 01 August 2017