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Mercado v.

Manzano – GR 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother(Jus sanguinis). He was born in the United
States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen
under US Laws(jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

Issue: Whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy

Ruling: No. The COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992,
1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.

Tabaso v. CA 500 SCRA 9

Facts: petitioner was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. when petitioner was seven years
old, his father, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization
(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72. Tabasa, was
accused of violating the 1987 Administrative Code for the reason that passport has been revoked
because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest. The BID ordered
petitioner’s deportation to his country of origin, the United States
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a
Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.

Issue: whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.

Ruling: No. RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born
Filipinos.

In the case at bar, Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation
as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity.
This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation". The privilege
under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition
for repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to
political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic
or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not
his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos
who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he
can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

David v. Agbay

Facts: petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.


Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. they purchased a lot
along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, they
came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage
zone.

petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR-
CENRO. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s re acquisition of Filipino citizenship 6 months later cured the defect
in his MLA application wherein he declared himself as a Filipino Citizen where in fact he is a
Canadian Citizen.

Ruling: Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not
err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC

Facts:Petitioner was a foundling and later adopted by Sps Poe. At 18, she became a registered
voter in San Juan. She then married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and
the U.S., And became a naturalized American citizen

When she came back to the PH, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and executed
an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA.

petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy
on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. Comelec
affirmed.

Issue: Whether Petitioner is a Natural born citizen.

Ruling: yes. The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens
as implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’ determination.

Vilando v. HRET

Facts: Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental. She won, was proclaimed and thereafter assumed office.
Meanwhile, a petition for disqualification was filed against her questioning her citizenship. It
was dismissed and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition
for Quo Warranto.

Petitioners, in filing the quo warranto case, asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and
ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a
father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the
Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred
that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had
already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such
citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.

Issue: Whether the validity of citizenship may be attacked collaterally in a quo warranto
proceeding

Ruling: In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity; The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of a naturalized citizen
should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.—Vilando’s argument,
that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichong’s father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is
devoid of merit. In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she
is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of
naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. The proper proceeding to
assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473.

Bengson v. HRET

FACTS: Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the
US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. In 1994, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for re-election. Petitioner
Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto claiming that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance
to the United States, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not a natural-born Filipino who became and American citizen can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

RULING: Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen.

A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.

Civil Service Commission v. Sojor

Facts: respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the
Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City.

Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty
members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:

Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.

He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of
the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President. He also contends that the assumption by the
CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom

Issue: Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state
university violate academic freedom?

Ruling: Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of
action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the
freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study.

That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary
to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic
freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil
service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable
with suspension or even dismissal.

This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution
the unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a
school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit
violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under
the principle of academic freedom.