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RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused

e trial court failed to inform the accused of his right

to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950] of such right.

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance WHEREFORE, appellant is guilty.
of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the
information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of
Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the
Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently
said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the
presented to indict the latter. appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the
person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty.
trial court. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that his
representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the
without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement
have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of of the hearing.
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A
reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his
violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given judge devoid of merit. An examination of related provisions in the
the opportunity to be heard by counsel. Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference
in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his
Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in
there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the
good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as
had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason and causes delay in the administration of justice.
that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to
it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the court.



Facts: Sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused

was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA the crime of
rape. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after
the complainants desisted from pursuing the same. Eduardo Agbayani
was thus consequently released from jail. Three (3) days thereafter he
molested again Eden, one of his siblings.

The next day, they go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of
Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by
Fedelina and Dodima. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the complaint to
Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previous provisionally
dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.

The trial court convicted the accused. The defense contended that he was
denied of the right to counsel.

Issue: Did the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel
of his own choice?

Held: No. It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively
that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not
sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial
court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed
by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can
only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has
been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was
ACCUSATION acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of
evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE QUITLONG acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document
VITUG, J.: which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the
defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving
Facts: Jonathan Capito (19 yr. old student of Med.Tech in Baguio) and RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
others while on their way home buy fish balls.When Calpito counted the falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was
change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that he had only been handed back not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.
thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fishball vendor did not admit
that he had short-changed. Commotions between group of Capito and Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause
group of Fish ball vendors happened. Capito was stabbed and died. of the crime to which he is convicted

Police officers caught the accused on the act of stabbing Capito. Emelio Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be
Senoto, Salvador Quitlong, and Ronnie Quitlong was charge for murder. informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as
But in the original charge it was not alledge that there was conspiracy. follows:

Issue: Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it is not allege To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
in the original complaint. as will enable him to make his defense;

Held: Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to further prosecution for the same cause;
respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that
such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

No. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of
violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What
offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the
approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of
place where the offense has been committed. the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which
In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has
must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for
culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and was acquitted.
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952;
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of 31 JUL 1984]
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.
[21] Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an
a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co- Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the
accused as well. investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied
Calpito that caused the latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed
Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent. decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft
Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was
or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed, from all indications, the
incident would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the
murder. following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
PECHO V PEOPLE 262 SCRA 518 (1996) other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for has to intervene under the law.
the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under
the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense
of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the xxxx
offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature. Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN
conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
conducted by the petitioner. FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of
the RPC. 1. by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge organizations which became the recipients and/or target
Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to
petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her
the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment. personal gain;
2. by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
was not arraigned. influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned
so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal Republic of the Philippines.
offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the CONTRARY TO LAW.
evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an
arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On
granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At (PGH).
the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm
of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by or indefinite resulting in the serious violation of Enrile’s constitutional right
himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?
General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should
be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the
at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of
impartial trial. particulars.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in
Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all
Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal
nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is
the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
arraignment of petitioner. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning
to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
213455, 11 AUGUST 2015. disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and withholding
others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial.
[BRION, J.] The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring
Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan. about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case
where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital
The Information reads: punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable
period of time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of Leonen, J.
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a Concurring and dissenting: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language
recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all FACTS: Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental former Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer
rights. Benigno Aguas.

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and
particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice
issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors
motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two
of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that former officials of the Commission on Audit (COA).
the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus,
the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he The information read:
already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime
but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead …[the] accused…all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form. respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of
made.That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more
specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of
minimal restrictions, · and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in
may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and
several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their
prepare for trial.
personal gain and benefit;
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with (b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO’s
that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
shall specifically contain the following: and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures; and
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions”
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 people and the Republic of the Philippines.
was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or CONTRARY TO LAW
commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused,
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted
except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA
the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should
assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this
state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the
remains unresolved.
identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
of Enrile’s PDAF projects.” them.
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the
accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as
was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
a particular.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme
Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence – YES.
JULY 19, 2016]

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the
denial of her demurrer to evidence.
Full text of the Decision (Bersamin, J.)
Dissenting opinions:
HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
Sereno, C.J.
discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides, “the order denying the motion for leave of court to (1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or (2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the
by certiorari before judgment.” expenditure; and
(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.
Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the
require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial integrity of its operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
wrong or to do substantial” (citing Ong v. People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]). qualification as to how specific the requests should be made.

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007.
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated to an
operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO’s
A. As regards petitioner GMA revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional
requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional
HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in requests for CIFs.
denying GMA’s demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and
committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and
a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte. would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue
of her power of control over PCSO.
A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution
sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those
all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal true for all litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives issue (compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo [G.R. No. 191805, November 15,
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In 2011]).
other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in B. As regards Aguas
either manner. Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge…is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers
or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit
and/or for former President Estrada.” plunder or any other crime. Without GMA’s participation, he could not release any
money because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the conspiracy to commit plunder.
rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being
made answerable for. 3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all
the elements of the crime of plunder – NO.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should
be fatal to the cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of each A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them. wealth in the total amount of not less than P50 million – NO.

PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired
plunderers. The sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her illgotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or
approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that
of additional intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests in that manner, GMA the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
violated the following:
B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and information was proved by the Prosecution – NO.
intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals
and specifications; and SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury,
the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act;
and that what was necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of coffers.
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request. HELD: The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic
Act No. 7080 together (misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make public funds) is that the public officer used the property taken. Pursuant to the
her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to
accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA’s approval of
Uriarte’s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval
was not by any means irregular or illegal.
Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the
RIGHT TO SPEEDY IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with
emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects
PEOPLE V TEE GR NO. 140546-47 (JANUARY 20, 2003) pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been
made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give
"rights of the accused to speedy trial" way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid
decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be
Facts: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their
Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds
to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.
admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of
allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused
was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]
produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates
thereby slowing down the trial procedure. Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas,
has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel
trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case. at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the
and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite
provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a and impartial trial.
speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
without the party having his case tried. trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived
of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that,
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements
obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period
speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed his freedom.
hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the
constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact
that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable
cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was
capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable
opportunity in prosecuting the accused.


"rights of the accused to a speedy trial"

Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by

certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners
dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the
court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate
delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the
facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils.
against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and
without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are
insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that
the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes of the original trial.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy

trial was violated.
Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998 Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is
to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial
becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date
the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other
factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
Congress assembled::
7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity,
the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second
twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from
by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.
Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall,
after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts; (a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties; concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused,
and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or incapacity;
entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and (2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in against the accused;
evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred (3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the (4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions:
agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30)
modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public days,
morals, or public policy. (5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or
proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the transfer from other courts;
accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and (6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a
does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre- valid prejudicial question; and
trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties. (7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to
exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding
concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed (b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability
of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court of the accused or an essential witness.
to prevent manifest injustice.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are
of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid
the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be
a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness
imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are
prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by (c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
Rules of Court.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same
Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not charge had there been no previous charge.
guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by
the court. (e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for
trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state motion for severance has been granted.
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial
justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence. counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or
judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No
such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the (b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she
court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance
of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the
best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
granting of a continuance; or

Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others,
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification
which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a
consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without
continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges
to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. (1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in
connection with the defense of an accused, by
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of
so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect connection with his/her defense of the accused;
adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or
public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted pesos (10,000.00); and
because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent
preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public
prosecutor the right to practice before the court
considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If (30) days.
the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively
detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in
means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term
addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The
of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly: court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court
in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or section.
cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the
prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate
his/her right to demand trial. rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to
accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations,
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against
prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification
his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner consistent with the provisions of this Act.
informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such
person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules,
public attorney. regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the
amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General
seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial. Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary
for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from Appropriations Act.
the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary
custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. -
available to that public attorney. No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of
speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the
Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive
by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of
going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is
Section 10 of this Act.
declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a
circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the
reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of
expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in
justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a Section 9 of this Act.
plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this
Approved: February 12, 1998
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the
public prosecution or public attorney:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing
the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
MANUEL MATEO v. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, GR Nos. L-34756-59, 1973-03-31 Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition
implicated... petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges
Facts: Petitioners are... among those being tried by respondent Judge for the against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge
offense of robbery in band with homicide. until after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against
affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same... offense, but in a
motion for his disqualification separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in
effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its
Rolando Reyes... when called upon to testify as an additional witness for the repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into
prosecution impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed as a the picture, there is apparent... the situation of a judge having to pass on a
result of a threat by a government agent. question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact
became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a
Respondent Judge turned down this plea for disqualification. Hence this matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's...
petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The
convicted of an offense without due process of... law. misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" not being met are more than justified. Hence the conclusion
The facts,... the American Express Bank... was robbed and an American reached by us.
service-man was killed... four (4) criminal actions were... filed against
It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had executed an extra-judicial OF MANILA
statement... h... e Honorable Respondent Judge;... and, in that statement had
implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable FERNANDO, J.:

Respondent Judge was aware of this... and it was for this reason that he had Facts: In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge,
deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and supplemental there were commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions
motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution has presented and rested its against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
evidence as against Rolando Reyes Francisco Lorenzana.

Rolando Reyes,... however, was tried separately from and in the absence of The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial
petitioners; so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted
against petitioner. the request.(as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were
while petitioner Martinez' Motion and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday,
remained unresolved, the... prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional Wednesday and Friday).
Evidence... respondent
On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner
Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling judge order should be reversed.
that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is
within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the presentation Issue: Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
of additional evidence after the... parties have rested their case... the
prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness... and in the course Held:Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in
of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly executed by observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may
him on do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
Rolando Reyes... repudiated it, stated that he had executed it because he had There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of
been threatened by a government agent the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency
or public morals." 21
As soon as the foregoing facts were made of record in... the case, defendants
[petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to enable them WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .
to file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respond-ent Judge... he motion for
suspension was granted:

whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely
Judge... an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene
an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar
intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against HadjiEdris, GumanakOmpa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar
petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity... the Constitution
Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers
Ruling: could urinate. While the car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa,
Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other
To our mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become passengers and divested them of their properties.
apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best
interest... of justice, which he is bound to serve."
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the
The answer must be in the affirmative. precipice (bangin). When the car was near the precipice, Galvez then
stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the car and
Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the
be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such
extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not... in the slightest car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped.
bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was Quiambao, who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez
intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering died in the hospital. The robbers were then apprehended with the
to re-spondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped
circumstances could easily... be blunted. The absence of the requisite due
while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since
process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more
telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him.
Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial
direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. investigation as it is the witnesses who are asked questions during
the line-up. In this regard, the inquiry has not yet shifted from investigatory
to accusatory. Moreover, during the line-up, there was no evidence
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to applythe
that the accused was interrogated by the police, nor were there any
Constitutionalmandate on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond incriminating statements elicited from him.
reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on
the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang. (2) YES. There is no law prescribing a specific manner of
identification in criminal cases. A police line-up is, therefore, an
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is acceptable way for the complainants to identify the suspect in a
that the lower court has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the crime. However, the court also applies the circumstances test
enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee, which had the
latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
following factors:
instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites
of trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over 1. the witness's opportunity to view criminal at the time of
Magumnang. the crime
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in 2. the witness's degree of attention at that time
absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof 3. the accuracy of any prior description given by the
beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the witness
4. the level of certaintydemonstrated by the witness at the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was
time of the identification
not violated. 5. the length of time between the crime and the identification
6. the suggestiveness of the identification process

PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO AMESTUZO, FEDERICO AMPATIN, ALBINO The Court found that the out-of-court identification in this case
BAGAS (ACCUSED- APPELLANT) AND DIASCORO VINAS – GR failed the last criterion because of the police's announcement to the
104383, JULY 12, 2001 complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the crime. This
was considered improperly suggestive because it was not the
FACTS complainants themselves who pointed to or identified the accused-
appellant. There was, therefore, no spontaneity nor objectivity in the
This is an appeal from the decision of the Caloocan RTC Branch 131 identification.
convicting the accused of the complex crime of robbery with a bad and
double rape.
On February 1991, a group of 8 men entered the house of Perlita SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
Lacsamana and stole valuables amounting to Php728K. In the course of the PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
robbery, 2 gang members raped Lacsamana's niece and employee. HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
Four days after the incident, the police, together with Federico Ampatin, RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
went to a handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City to look for a certain vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
“Mario”. The police ordered the factory workers to lie down and, after some PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
threats and hitting him on the neck with the butt of a pistol, told Ampatin to
point at anyone (“magturo ka ng kahit sino”). Ampatin, out of fear, pointed Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
at the first person that he saw, who was the accused-appellant. The police (KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
thereafter brought the accused to the police station to be presented to the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
complainants. President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.The petitioners
invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the
At the station, Lacsamana asked the accused-appellant if he knew Vinas people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be
and Amestuzo, but he answered in the negative. Then the police told the recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the robbery so coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television
the complainants started hitting and kicking the accused-appellant. They coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring
only stopped when the police intervened. the desired transparency in the administration of justice.

ISSUES However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel
filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to
(1) Whether the accused was deprived of the right to counsel from prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of
the time he was arrested to the time he was presented to the protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
witnesses for identification. participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
(2) Whether the manner of out-of-court identification was irregular
and, therefore, inadmissible in court. Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
right to information of public concern be given more weight than the
HELD fundamental rights of the accused.

(1) NO. The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so- Ruling: The petition is denied.
called Miranda rights of the accused may only be invoked while
he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press
begins from the time when the police no longer ask general and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted
questions about the crime, but start focusing on the suspect and power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
attempt to elicit incriminating questions in the course of the conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with
investigation. The object of the Miranda rights is to ensure that the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
the accused is protected from possible intimidation or coercion overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
from law enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
crime that he did not commit. proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor the parties to the cases - the private complainants/families of the victims
made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are and other witnesses - inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada
induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence and basically discusses:
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In they have observed during the proceedings.[26]
the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of
report what they have observed during the proceedings. hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57
victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14 : 2011] RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ] The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that
will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants
Facts: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands
media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom,
to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57 to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to
accused. offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into
the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology
January 12, 2010 letter[14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein
discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that
"matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Court's
attention through appropriate motion."[15] Hence, the present petitions
which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,
right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and
freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

Issue:Whether or not accused is denied of right to a speedy, impartial and

public trial

Held: The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a
live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity
insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v.
Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may

challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding
that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an
aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance
until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge,
and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may
likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the opinion
with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on the old and historic
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year
vs.LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants. 1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol
under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G. N. Trinidad for appellants. dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of
both courts that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the
MALCOLM, J.: defendant not being present when they were taken before the Mayor and so
had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows: alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now
deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone
accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly
valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of
received in evidence in the lower court.
Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to
look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao
had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other
the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on cases, further find this to be reversible error and remand the case for a new
the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the
day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The
carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as
from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
the one seen in the possession of the accused. each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio
correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, third part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo
which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons who Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their
identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs.
the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and
they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In
the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the
Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly CRUZ, J.: It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
believable. defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not
admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The
issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one
respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole
assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of
basis of his conviction.
the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant
Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of
meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken,
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through
defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross- falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal
examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of payments.2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases
Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested,
origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for
accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are separate trials, which were allowed. 3 They then presented their evidence at
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the
give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony
cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned
upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the
the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross- guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by
may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as
testifying. ( U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the guaranteed by the Constitution.
Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provisions on behalf of
accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz separate trial:
[1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the present facts
entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts
fall under some exception thereto. The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We
allowed, upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio
and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the the, prosecution as wen as their own evidence. Evidence offered
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is by the other accused can not be taken up.
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a
witness deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating
to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial
8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things
lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa a dying against the other accused when he took the stand in his own
declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were
granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat why the awards to "D" Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter
because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be were cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.
present when the other accused were presenting their defenses,
the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said
The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino.
three accused. While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the
adequacy of funds may have been ministerial, his failure to
We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity
story related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor in the conspiracy.
to call Ulat and put him on he stand as part f its rebuttal evidence.
Had this been done, there would have been no impediment to the
Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers
consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused.5
(including three made out in favor of "D" Alfenor Repair Shop')
were brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the
a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for
after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that certification as to funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits
Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion "A", "B" and "C" which he had earlier signed but which, according
for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled, Talino claims that he had
be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, examined the supporting documents of the last three vouchers the
as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If
shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective what Talino says is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in
defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the the morning, where "D" Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the
prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of lowest bidder, must have been different from the ones submitted
rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8 together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have raised his
suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was
only that morning that the abstracts containing the name of "D";
circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily
after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the
serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning
bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an
by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
irregular transaction.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the

It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond
Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine doubt the participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro
Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the
them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back
informations. 13
or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by
their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the
why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and
court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court
Court, like the dying declaration. 11 speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against
the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent
court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal
... With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it
U.S. 119111, 221 U.S. 325) that it intends to secure the accused in was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in
the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are determining the petitioner's part in the offenses.
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the
accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial
evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and we agree.
cross-examination.' In other words, confrontation is essential
because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio the petitioner.
[1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Facts: Petitioner Ricardo Bangyan had 2 bank accounts with RCBC
Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) ...
(Respondent) , one savings account and one current account. Both accounts
had auto-transfer feature.
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the
respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the The petitioner also signed a Surety Agreement with RCBC in favor of 9
petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of corporations. This Surety Agreement was to be used as a security guarantee
Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the for any loan obligations, advances, credits and other obligations.
questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the
government. Thus: Petitioner contests the authenticity of the surety agreement and claims that it
has to be notarized.
If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor
Respondent had also issued Letters of Credit LC’s to 3 of the corporations
participation in the conspiracy to defraud, he would have
guaranteed by petitioner. The LCs were used for payment for imports.
questioned this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever
was following up the vouchers why two biddings were conducted,
Bureau of Customs sent a letter to RCBC demanding remittance of import respondent RCBC. These five checks were dishonored by respondent RCBC
duties for 3 shipments for which RCBC had issued 3 LC’s. on the ground that they had been drawn against insufficient funds ("DAIF") and
were likewise returned.
RCBC had informed Petitioner that the BOC had sent a letter demanding
outstanding duties. Petitioner told RCBC that he will take care of matter. Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his
account and indemnify him for damages. Bangayan filed a complaint for
RCBC froze funds in Petitioners accounts due to the BOC demand, since the damages against respondent RCBC. In its defense, RCBC claims that
latter had given authority under the Surety Agreement. RCBC would only draw Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor of several companies that
from petitioners accounts upon order from the BOC. defaulted in their payment of customs duties that resulted in the imposition of a
lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a letter of credit of Lotec Marketing with
Petitioner issued 2 checks, but were returned to with notation of Refer to the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee Lotec
Drawer. Marketing’s obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank
applied Bangayan’s
One of the Corporations included in the Surety Agreement had a LC that was
due and demandable, RCBC went ahead and debited petitioners account to
partially satisfy the loan. After the debit the petitioners passbook reflected a deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketing’s obligation which resulted in the
balance of 45.46. depletion of the bank accounts.

Thereafter the petitioner had issued 5 more checks, but were also dishonored. ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks,
The payees of the dishonored checks were demanding immediate payment. and, consequently, whether petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising
from the dishonor.
Petitioner demanded that RCBC restore all the funds debited from his account
and indemnify him for damages. HELD: Yes. RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not
entitled to damages.
ISSUES: WON RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks and whether
petitioner is entitled to indemnity. Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayan’s interest or reputation from the
dishonor of the seven checks was a consequence of his agreement to act as
WON the Surety Agreement was valid. surety for the corporations and their failure to pay their loan obligations,
advances and other expenses.
WON RCBC violated the Bank Secrecy Law RA 1406, when the BOC made an
investigation of 3 of the companies included in the Surety Agreement and if First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the
petitioner is can claim damages. dishonor of the checks, since its actions were justified by petitioner Bangayan’s
obligations under the Surety Agreement. Both the trial and the appellate courts
HELD/RATIO: RCBC was not in bad faith when it dishonored the checks. The gave credence to the Surety Agreement, which categorically guaranteed the
actions of RCBC were justified by the stipulations of the Surety Agreement. four corporations’ obligations to respondent RCBC under the letters of credit.
Since the petitioner had guaranteed the corporations stipulated in As petitioner failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating that his signature
was forged, there being no positive and convincing evidence to prove such
the Surety Agreement, RCBC had a fiduciary duty to debit the funds from the fact, there is no reason to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts with
petitioners account to settle the loans and duties of the said corporations. respect to the genuineness and due execution of the Surety Agreement.
Second, the mere absence of notarization does not necessarily render the
The Surety Agreement was a valid contract between the Petitioner and RCBC. Surety Agreement invalid. Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement does
The petitioner could not prove his allegations of forgery and lack of consent of not bear petitioner Bangayan’s signature is not a sufficient ground to invalidate
the agreement. The petitioner signed the Surety Agreement in behalf of the 9 the main agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never contested
Corporations. The petitioner also acknowledged the Surety Agreement when the existence of the Surety Agreement prior to the filing of the Complaint. It
he was informed by RCBC of the demand from the BOC and he assured the must be also be emphasized that petitioner Bangayan did not complain against
bank that he was going to solve the problem. the four corporations which had benefitted from his bank account.

RCBC and its representative did not divulge any information in the Affidavit With respect to the first two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already
submitted to the BOC. put on hold petitioner Bangayan’s account to answer for the customs duties
being demanded from the bank by the BOC. On the other hand, the five other
The petitioner failed to prove that there was wrong doing on the part of checks were subsequently dishonored because petitioner Bangayan’s account
respondent RCBC, since the dishonoring of the checks was the product of an was by that time already depleted due to the partial payment of Lotec
surety agreement for the 4 corporations’ LC’s which he voluntarily contracted. Marketing’s loan obligation.

FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory
with one of the branches of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation damages are those awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or
(RCBC). Bangayan purportedly signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
with respondent RCBC in favor of nine corporations. Under the Surety designed to repair the wrong that has been done.
Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayan’s accounts with RCBC would be
used as security to guarantee any existing and future loan obligations, In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right
advances, credits/increases and other obligations, including any and all as a creditor under the Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayan’s
expenses that these corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan funds in his accounts as security for the obligations of the four corporations
contests the veracity and due authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that under the letters of credit. Thus, petitioner Bangayan cannot attribute any
his signature thereon was not genuine, and that the agreement was not wrong or misconduct to respondent RCBC since there was no malice or bad
notarized. Respondent RCBC refutes this claim. faith on the part of respondent in dishonoring the checks. Any damage to
petitioner arising from the dishonor of those checks was brought about, not by
Then occurred different transactions between RCBC with other entities in the bank’s actions, but by the corporations that defaulted on their obligations
relation to the Surety Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in that petitioner had guaranteed to pay. The trial and the appellate courts,
favor of different corporations. Mr. Lao, of RCBC, claimed that the bank would therefore, committed no reversible error in disallowing the award of damages
not have extended the letters of credit in favor of the three corporations without to petitioner.
petitioner Bangayan acting as surety. After all the transactions in relation to the
letters of credit issued by RCBC in relation to the Surety Agreement,
Bangayan’s account was depleted.

Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayan’s
Current Account were presented for payment to respondent RCBC were
returned by respondent RCBC with the notation "REFER TO DRAWER. Five
other checks of petitioner Bangayan were presented for payment to
Facts: Five informations were filed by Cal's Corporation against Domingo
Roco for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The cases were remanded Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the
by the RTC to the MTCC for the reception of petitioner’s evidence. Montenegro Case

During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party
MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889
Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Cal’s Corporation or their duly which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court oand to bring that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation
1993-1999. However, the judge denied his request on the following and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension
grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the requisites.
issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the
criminal cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

Issue: WON the denial of the request for the issuance of the subpoenas is HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
violative of the constitutional right of the accused as enshrined in Art. III, subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution. the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul
Held: Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the
must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a
definiteness). massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to
consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at
documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring
prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation
general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were
of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked
value may not show up, will not be enforced. the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ
In order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is
must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document deemed “final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons”
sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the
issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending
containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may the previous proclamation.
be identified. In the case at bar, the books and documents that petitioner
requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the
with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, suspension on selected provinces/cities.
therefore, is satisfied in this case.
September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the
suspension on selected provinces/cities.

October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on

selected areas.

In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under

the suspension of writ of habeas corpus

Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon
vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?

Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and

that flaws attributed thereto

are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to
rise in arms. Second, The

court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes

declared that “when there is a

substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private
rights secured by the
Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review”. Thus, the under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved
grant of power to suspend the inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege
is the least harsh.
privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
wide-scale event, it may be were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth
decision to suspend the writ organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the
was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses
to suppress rebellion. First, to

call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to JACKSON V MACALINO
declare martial law.
Facts: Am information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond
Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary
Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be
deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved. The CID then
Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the
Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections hold departure order in one of the criminal cases.
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the
platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the
were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the
President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there respondents. In their return , the respondents alleged inter alia that the
is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and
political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons the hold departure order of the Makati RTC.
(13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
Issue: WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is if so, WON such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of
to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. deportation.
889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 Held: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a
provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term “court”
Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was Immigration.
suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether
was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the
the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new
that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima
actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based
(e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His
jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute
sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence
of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review.

Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas Case Digest substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas
petition. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
Melissa C. Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
G. R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010, committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
FACTS: Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
United States, she is enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines criminal complicity. Since the application of command responsibility
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan- United States of America presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
immersion, Roxas toured various provinces and towns in Central Luzon
and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
mission. providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her companions, address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
Carabeo amd Jandoc, decided to rest in the house of Mr. Paolo in Sitio rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its
Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
afternoon, however, Roxas, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by
the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—
demanding that they open-up. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
opened the door, banged inside, tied and blindfolded Roxas and her killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then dragged them inside a van parked under the applicable substantive law. It must be clarified, however,
outside the house. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and were that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Roxas, Carabeo and military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts
Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she was in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines – acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), Roxas was separated from her actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the
companions and was escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
from the sound of the metal doors. From there she could hear the sounds
of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction
2. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
bustle. Roxas inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or
police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First.
On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncle’s In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
house in Quezon City. Before being release, the abductors gave her a circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
cellphone with a sim card, a slip of paper cantaining an email address with the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has
password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. She was also sternly warned not to
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
report the incident to the group Karapatan or else something bad will
happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, Roxas continued preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
to receive calls from one of her abductors via the cellular phone given to similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
the safety of her family, Roxas threw away the cellphone. cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench,
Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data.
petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the
The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she
habeas data. However, the appellate court absolved the respondents from managed to see. To the mind of the Court, these cartographic
the petition. Her prayer for the return of her personal belongings and for the sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty
inspection order and production order were denied. Roxas invokes he as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors.
doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in
military authorities. view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain
unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or
(1) Whether or not the principle of command responsibility shall apply in police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
writ of amparo? part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The
(2) Whether or not the respondents are liable in her abduction and claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
torture? adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to
(3) Whether or not her prayer for the return of her personal belongings be reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she
granted? heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court are
(4) Whether or not her prayer for inspection order be granted? not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as
(5) Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper? accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while
she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay
1. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
3. In an order directing the public respondents to return the personal OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU G.R. No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that
can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included
been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed in what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle
Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10thID).
above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary
They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle
amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or
denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s extralegal killings–a real threat to their life, liberty and security.
right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the
general rubric of property rights—which are no longer protected by the
ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga),first came to know of the
writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In
and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO
rights. OUSTPGMAON 30 NOV 2007.

4. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is equivalent On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad),
to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the delivered a privileged speech before the members of the Sangguniang
Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. An Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The
Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its
inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
own investigation into the matter.
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her
duties and functions, she has not committed any act against national
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that
the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also
make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed included on the OB List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his
to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or
not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was human rights lawyer.
detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot
be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial
killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List.
5. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo,
directing the respondents to file a verified written return.
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and
requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the alleged that petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the
alleged threats.
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued
problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to
petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy ISSUES: Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof
required under the Writ of Amparo.
of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were RULING: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by
number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the
evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary
had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only
considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the upon reasonable certainty. Justifying allegations must support the issuance
public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the of the writ, on the following matters:
public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," 1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents 2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the the threat, act or omission;
first place, it was not proven to have.
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal
circumstances and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of
the other known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of
their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of
the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities.

The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims
without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the
suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their
militant affiliations. The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by
substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life,
liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not
sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASESDOMINGO PADUA, any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to
the defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal
DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner, vs.VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO was unwarranted and relief therefrom must be accorded.
ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G. RAMOS, respondents.
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by
NARVASA, J.: Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation Domingo Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon
and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure City. 1 In that action Padua sought to recover damages for the injures
that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being
of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound (private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.
discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that
discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced
attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on
may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only direct exqmination in the course of which reference was made to
after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially numerous documents, marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109. 2 At the close of
where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously
The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all scheduled hearing of December 12,1973 was cancelled, and Padua's
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence cross-examination was reset on December 17, 1973. 3 However, the
and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial
was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974,
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." 4
after trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an
abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of
dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the trial settings, as above narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next
case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59 moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on
[1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an action on March 1, 1974, 5 copy of which was personally served on defendants'
grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised lawyer 6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on March
Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil. 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs.
Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (1960]; Montelibano Mariano Abella, Civil Case No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court
v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio, 105 in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case once and for all," and that the
Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2)
L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he
must be exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No
surrounding each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the
Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts ground that the motion had not been properly set for hearing, the clerk
obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon receipt ... for
same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside ( the consideration of the Court," 7or some other ground. Apart from filing
Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of
Coloma 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974,
appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that
negligent and no injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the
15 ALR 3rd 680). (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of application and dismissed the case. His Honor's Order, dictated on that
Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590, 595). day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows: 8

It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff
postponement and the setting aside of orders previously nor counsel appeared. The plaintiffs wife, however, appeared in
issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the judge Court and informed the Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to
to whom they are addressed, but always predicated on the attend to a very important case in the provinces.
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open
fairness would be served thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. court after consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not
Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no grant the postponement on the ground that the plaintiffs
substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not counsel had a very important case in the provinces. Neither did
manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing the plaintiff himself appear.
having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to
allow them (Rexwell Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30, In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.
1961). (Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708,
712). Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was denied.10 Hence, this
In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for
cancellation of one of three (3) hearing dates, the very first such plea The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel
made by that party, upon a ground not entirely unmeritorious in the had twice applied for and been granted postponements of the trial; that
premises, and under such circumstances as would not be productive of plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for postponement five (5) days
prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the very first the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court
such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement could but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to
have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the
was not surprising considering that their counsel had himself already offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as
obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground for cancellation was not a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged
entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court crime and even failed to identify the 2 accused.
scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been pending
since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the
terminate; that the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without anything being done,
only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case to proceed on the two (2) petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate
subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been verbally reiterated by delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was
plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last
circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening order being a denial of a second MR dated
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was
unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not properly captioned
annulled. as “People of the Philippines” and without “Court of Appeals” being made
a party to the petition.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the Court a
quo dated March 6, 1974, dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
Order dated March 13, 1974 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; Civil Case No. HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to
Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which has dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal
replaced Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which the action Case against petitioners was dismissed.
was pending at the time of dismissal, is DIRECTED to continue with the
trial of the petitioner's action and decide the same on the merits in due Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious,
course. capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
FLORES V PEOPLE commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The
Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the
Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.
dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the “Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the authorized to be commenced”.
facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils.
against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There
without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are should not be too much significance attached to the procedural defect
insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that (refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular
the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of
notes of the original trial. discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy

trial was violated.

Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the

constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with
emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects
pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been
made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give
way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid
decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be
accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their
right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds
merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

FACTS: Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused

for robbery. Information was filed in December 1951. They were found
guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in
December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA—
a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a
rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the
disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959
which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for
the defense on new facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of
SECTION 17 – RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property
and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used
United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] First Division, against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be
Johnson (J): 5 concur required to give testimony against himself.
Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] En Banc, Malcolm (J):
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, 5 concur
staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of
Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city
house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the
Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First
to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two
private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to
and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a
week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to
suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
morning of September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to
find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined
called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any
who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was criminal case to be a witness against himself.
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and
as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely
body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such
of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure
showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the
with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an
the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the
substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense,
testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless
Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy
as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again
him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The
Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of
has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against self-incrimination. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or
without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as
Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable
in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] First Division,
whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if Romualdez (J): 6 concur
material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a for a writ of prohibition.
crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose
result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of
privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and
limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's
is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that
evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson
fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that
that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the
petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same
present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who
so serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left
says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of
Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez.
person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it
or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later,
witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Right after the
his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the protection meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day
of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City,
against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez,
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging"
write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were
permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-
crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a 143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories worth
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor
obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of, apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before the
that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in City. When trial opened, the prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial proceeded, with "Fiscal
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February
for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge and 1965, the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused
the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not
more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun
Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] En Banc, imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties
Sanchez (J): 7 concur prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the
custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose
Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, The sentence was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to
Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals resolved to
and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968,
Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its
said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila
Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court
indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending
Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the
one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a petition for a writ
Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative
money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the reason that he
would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be was raising purely questions of law.
a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee
who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for
telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the the court’s disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-
afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. incrimination.
Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected
the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
purchase price (P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl.
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked
not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel
already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. crime of rape with homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997,
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the
is withheld from the person entitled thereto." Further, a void judgment is in lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having been
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde
claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
responsible as trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and
valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his
habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and
convicted. Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against
People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] First Division, Davide self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
Jr. (CJ): 4 concur communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in
Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held
Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled
and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body
suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have
whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and
road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but
Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] En
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2 on official leave
Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan
informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing
and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his
the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same
squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual
house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he
Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question, could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual,
"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that
impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await
Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the
with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador
field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an
noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in
When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of
Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to
be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the
decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were
of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said own fault.
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and
the Gatbontons appealed. Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity
granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power to grant immunity.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
witness against himself.
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection.
Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to By its grant the witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a 2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or
right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as
1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."
Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine
anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand—with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.


FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices.However he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related
to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as witness
against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs
Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife,
Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of
Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella,
the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby
acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended
that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the
record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to
the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in
effect and force.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant
immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the
conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or
criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the
expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa
was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given
by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of
the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by
SECTION 19 – Prohibited Punishment which the death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has
appealed or not, for review and judgment. These rules were taken from
People v. Estoista the General Orders itself. The 1973 Constitution did not also prohibit death
G.R. No. L-5793 | August 27, 1953 penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review of death
Art.19 – Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment penalty cases by the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of review and even
Facts: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by the Court.
imprudence and convicted for illegal possession of firearm under one
information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the withdrawal of
charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his appeal by a death convict does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to
father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son live & review his conviction. In People v. Cornelio (1971), which involved the
in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to escape of a death convict, the Court held that said escape does not
the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and relieve the Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban
second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from (1972), the Court said, speaking about convictions by TC of death penalty
the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon on the defendant, that until after the Court has spoken en consulta, no
Dima, a la- borer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and finality could be attached to said decision. This automatic review cannot
whose presence was not perceived by the accused. Estoista is assailing be waived by the accused nor by the courts. The mere fact of escape of
his conviction saying that the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession the accused cannot be a bar at all. In People v. Saliling (1976), the Court
of firearms is cruel and excessive. said that it is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an
accused who is at large. In People v. Buynay (1984), the Court reiterated
Issue: WoN the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is the rule that escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the
excessive. dismissal of his appeal.

Held: It is of the court’s opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for But finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. It prohibits the imposition of
possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. as determined by Congress. On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed
The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous
security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to crimes. This revived the procedure by which the Court reviews death
promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment penalty cases per the Rules. It remains automatic, does not depend on the
which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment whims of the death convict, continues to be mandatory, and leaves the
from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of Court without any option.
certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for
this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an appeal when the
judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the appellant jumps bail, does not apply to cases where the death penalty is
heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is
is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a the text and tone of Sec. 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule.
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the There is more wisdom in mandating the review by the Court of all death
penalty. penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the
will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. An
appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of
People v. Esparas (1996) his wrong perception of the law, or because he may want to avail of the
J. Puno more speedy remedy of pardon, or because of his frustration and
misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its
shabu. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail jurisdiction when a convict escapes. The Court has the duty to review all
and was tried in absentia. She was found guilty and was sentenced to death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is
death. She remains at large at present. This is the issue. bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which
the Court has to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s citizen is the main concern especially in crimes that that shock the
death sentence despite her absence. conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review An accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction.
a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the This principle is implicit in the Constitution which recognizes that an
accused or by the courts. There, the Court said, mainly, that the judgment accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right
of conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final, to be wrong.
cannot be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until the cause
has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED IS GIVEN A NEW PERIOD OF 30 DAYS
who takes the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its FROM NOTICE HEREOF TO FILE THE BRIEF OF ESPARAS.
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until
it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with
the highest penalty is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all
the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the
Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the end that its justice and
legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the
accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 50,
Gen. Orders No. 58.)

A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review
by the Court of death penalty cases. Both the Rules of Court of 1940 and
1964 require the transmission to the Court of the records of all cases in
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of
lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading
Facts: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites
recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to
lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid
violation of the Philippines’ obligations under international covenants, 4. an inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion inhuman punishment. “In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to
the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the go unpunished.” The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, humanely.
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International 2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Issues: Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was subject to
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations? 3. Is it the limitation that it be imposed for the “most serious crimes”. Included
discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)? with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied. Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.
The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to 3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is
provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage unconstitutional for being discriminatory. “SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF
for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are uncertain as to the injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any
of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death
the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
renders lethal injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.”
that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- “punishments are cruel injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659,
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person
mere extinguishment of life.” Would the lack in particularity then as to the over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law “cruel, amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
degrading or inhuman”? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within
Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which “court” will fix the time one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the
and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the “court” which sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
accused. The procedure is that the “judgment is entered fifteen (15) days which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded is, in petitioner’s view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination. Being
to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead remain
Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement.
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing
rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
“not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the
time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory,
without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times.” Hence, the death convict is in effect
assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also
contends that the infliction of “wanton pain” in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an
Section 20 – Non – imprisonment for debt the banking community.

Serafin vs. Lindayag The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not the public interest.
present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent 2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to
dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. enter into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are
Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.) not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it
it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt? forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is
considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no 3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies
collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the
spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is
demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without
promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the
Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying
complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning
warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude
probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment
his duties properly. under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Lozano vs. Martinez

Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang

22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected thus appealed.

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-
imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an

amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a
representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the
check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the
bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have
become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity
or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy
ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/PEOPLE OF that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally
THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET. AL, G.R. No. guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in
176864. Dec. 14, 2010 executing her mother and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the
GR No. 176389 Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner, vs. analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific
G.R. No. 176864 evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, decision in the case.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants. longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to
the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not
December 14, 2010 among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the
Facts: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,
nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit
Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital
group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus,
the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the Controlling Issues:
public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what
everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. 1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime
and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica
M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. 2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi
She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the Other Issues:
culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the
10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found
against Webb, et al. on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his
innocence; and
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio 2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian,
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed
Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who Held:
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan
Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s
husband. Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright
acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did
bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting
the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events admissibility as evidence.
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial
undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court specimen in the meantime.
rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing
on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA
penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least
of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an
years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case.
None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants
test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time. RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
Suspicious Details
Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines / People of the
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No.
1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against 176864. January 18, 2011.
drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to Post under Political Law at Sunday, October 16, 2011 Posted
the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and by Schizophrenic Mind
Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo
gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave
her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the Bill of Rights; Double Jeopardy (J. Abad)
privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased
the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, however, a motion for
her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told
reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are
Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the
exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused
Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring
gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a
that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and
mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the
Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well
decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, although
assume the role of her informant.
complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring his
pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. Complainant Vizconde
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
cited the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan as authority that the Court
can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the Court
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the
observed that the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was
travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US
deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was
sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive
“dictated, coerced and scripted.” It was a sham trial. In this case, however,
identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision
of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and
such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who
satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time
dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through
of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible
the process.
for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over
the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic
and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason
that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime,
City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place,
Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must
necessarily fall.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the
suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the
is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send
ordered his arrest.
an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner
being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion
to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on
arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition,
the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take
the motion remained unresolved.
the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court
appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s
Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
RULING: The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior elements in the first criminal case:
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction;
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled (b) The court had jurisdiction;
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not." (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.[15]
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is
notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy
of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
penal laws, is nothing new. exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The
jeopardy as applied to Article 365. trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally “not guilty” pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a respondent spouses.
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]ny party may
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of placed thereby in double jeopardy.”
non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or,
as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing
so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect
the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of
penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Facts: On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the
PSB VS. BERMOY alleged crime, ErlindaDollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents,
CiriacoDollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery against the
(“petitioner”), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (“respondent defendant Obsania. After the case was remanded to the Court of First
spouses”) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial
in the Regional Trial Court. fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the
allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded “not guilty” to the charge offense was committed "with lewd designs".
and the case was set for trial. The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint
a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the
respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case. subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did
not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed
denied petition holding that the trial court was correct in granting the by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused
demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the
proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal. The appeal
erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on was then questioned by the defendant on the grounds of double jeopardy.
appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the
accused against double jeopardy. Issue: Does the appeal of the Government violated the constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be
Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was
ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the
defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.Correlatively, case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners.
section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar,
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and innocence of the petitioners.
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of
the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was
offense charged in the former complaint or information. correctly applied.

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of
an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original AURELIO G. ICASIANO, JR., petitioner vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or Facts:
otherwise terminated without his express consent. 1. Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint against Judge
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; Icasiano for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and
the court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; incompetence.
the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. 1. The case arose from two orders of detention issued by the
Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal Judge against Magbago for her refusal to comply with fifth writ
of the case was without the express consent of the accused. of execution
2. However, Supreme Court dismissed this administrative case.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the 2. Meanwhile, Magabago also filed in the Ombudsman against Judge
trial judge upon his motion to dismiss. The controverted dismissal was Icasiano for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint (docketed as TBP 924)
was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, 3. Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case for lack
and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the of merit. Such recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan.
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case The resolution was released on April 1988.
now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits. 4. However, Office of Tanodbayan received another complaint from
Magbago which no was docketed as TBP 546. The date of filing is
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two not shown but the case was among those transmitted to the newly
sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by created Sandiganbayan; and unfortunately, these records didn’t
the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such contain the records of the dismissal of TBP 924.
dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to 5. Prosecutor Cruz was assigned to investigate TBP 546 and he
an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery recommended filing of information in January 1990. Special
of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus Prosecution Officer adopted recommendation
of our jurisprudence. 6. Hence, an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan, docketed
as Crim. Case 14563.
The order appealed from is set aside. 7. Icasiano filed a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that he has
already been exonerated in Admin. Matter No. MTJ-87-81. Hence,
the court ordered the prosecutor to look into administrative matter
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ 8. Special Prosecutor Querubin responded that there were no records
of such administrative matter. Hence, Sandiganbayan denied motion
Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were for reinvestigation because seeing that the special prosecutor had no
smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by record, petitioner failed to present documents regarding the
Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the administrative matter.
latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby 9. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the following grounds:
security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, a. Double jeopardy because he was already exonerated in
while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. MTJ-87-81
Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block b. No cause of action
road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police,
c. No jurisdiction
petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
10. Sandiganbayan denied motion to quash:
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal a. MTJ-87-81 cannot serve as defense for double jeopardy
Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the as it is an admin case and the instant case is criminal
petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. b. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction for violations of Anti Graft
Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief and Corrupts Practices Act.
of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition
is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and Issue: W/N double jeopardy applies in this case
ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Held: Yes. Sandiganbayan should continue proceedings.
Issues: 1. Distinction between an administrative and criminal case should be
(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal. upheld. One is not a bar to the other.
(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double 2. An Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical
jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207. rules and substantial evidence is sufficient. A Criminal Case in the
Sandiganbayan, although may involve same acts as in the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond
administrative case, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which
3. To avail of the double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of
a. a valid complaint or information; another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of
b. a competent court; double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second
c. a valid arraignment; would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to
d. the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously
e. the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There
without his express consent was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused
Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused
issued earlier is LIFTED; the Sandiganbayan is ordered to proceed with pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case
Criminal Case No. 14563. used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to
acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the
1966] dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second,
when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the
Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the
Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was
he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the
present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double
in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.
voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the
accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]
Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to
an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them
plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment,
Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due
quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that to the priest’s request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge
a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed
there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick.
there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge
dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused
and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 it in order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in
DEC 1976] order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a
motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On
Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case
Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and on the ground of double jeopardy.
1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was
weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial, would
be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three place the accused in double jeopardy
accused then were charged with “Falsification by private individuals and
use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for
respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the
the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present
dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant
do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same
revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be
earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second,
double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the
because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the
other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as
of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and
will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three
and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and
appeal of the plaintiff. the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent
constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense
Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked
accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed
Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res
for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to
merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be
motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the
equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence,
prosecution. the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to
prosecute its case.

PEOPLE VS. PINEDA The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In
several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute
FACTS: That on or about the 17th day of August, 1971, in the municipality is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution for the same
offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the
of Pasig, province of Rizal, Philippines, the above-named accused, being
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of
then private individual did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
feloniously falsify a public document by making untruthful statements in a proceedings.
narration of facts, committed as follows: the said accused on August 17,
1971, executed a document entitled "Application For Registration" for
parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that She is the
exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated in Malaking MELO VS PEOPLE
Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she "does DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT
not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever DOCTRINE
affecting said land or that any person has estate or interest therein, legal
or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having
result of which the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent
herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring
from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in fact medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating
the herein accused has already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time.
Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be gleaned from a
document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same
Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already day, during the night, the victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death
paid partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused. of the victim was available to the prosecution and the information was
On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to
quash the information for falsification, premised, among other things, on Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double
the apprehension that she is in danger of being condemned for an jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition.
identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge
levelled against her for falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a ISSUE: Whether or not the amended information constitutes double
quo denied her motion to quash. jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may in its discretion entertain at any time HELD: Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of jeopardy. If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint
HELD: It would now appear that prior conviction or acquittal in the first or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
case, as long as the accused had entered his plea therein is no longer provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
required in order that the accused may move to quash a second may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the
prosecution for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy." trial.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without offense”. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the
the express consent of the accused." case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense.
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL [244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY 1995]
The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same
Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only
same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been
private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and
Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large. construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same
as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial identical.
Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to
contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a
the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense
the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL
prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the
his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the latter; vice versa.
Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by
respondent judge. This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution,
accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where the
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.
accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not
Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of put him twice in jeopardy.
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What are violative of
the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was defendant is responsible, which charges the character of the offense and,
together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable
distinct offense. by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Adil and Fama Jr., G.R. No. L-41863, 22 April 1977. Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the
second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs
FACTS: On April 12, 1975, Fama Jr., attacked Viajar by throwing a piece of Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy.
stone upon his right cheek, inflicting physical injuries which would require The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If
medical certificate of the physician. A criminal complaint for slight physical
an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal
injuries was filed against Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975, docketed as Case No.
shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it
3335. Meanwhile, Viajar filed another complaint on July 28, 1975, docketed as
Case No. 5241, for the same instance of throwing a stone but this time for was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on
serious physical injuries because it left permanent scar and deformation on his the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates
right face. The first case proceeded and Fama Jr. pleaded not guilty during double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that
arraignment. After several postponements by the prosecution, Fama even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge
Jr.successfully sought dismissal of the first criminal case invoking the constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a
constitutional right to speedy trial. Fama Jr. now moves for the dismissal of the violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges
second case on the ground of double jeopardy. sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either
the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus
ISSUE: Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia
in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against
case out of the rule of identity resulting in double jeopardy. him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged
against Mr.Opulencia.
HELD: YES. This rule of identity does not apply… when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy.

[Here], when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had
passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and
there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered
by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had
already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that
the alleged deformity became apparent. In other words, in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent
Fama Jr., cannot hold.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the

Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon.
Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the
ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel
of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued
by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the
Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They
discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority
from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of
the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The
case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was
filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to
discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in
court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by
the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting
damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16.
Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double
jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and
necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by
an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second
offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double
jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the