LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 1
CRUZ VS SECRETARY (2000)
FACTS:
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted
constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground
that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral domains which may include
natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing
for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also
violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is
unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon
the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and
the constitutionality of the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may
include public domain – somehow against the
regalian doctrine.
2 Separate Opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of DENR
History of Philippine Land Laws
Facts:
In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of
certain provisions of IPRA: a) It allows the
indigenous people/cultural community to OWN
NATURAL RESOURCES ; b) It defines
ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such
a way that it may include private lands owned by
other individuals; c) It categorizes ancestral
lands and domains held by native title as never
to have been public land; d) It violates due
process in allowing NCIP (National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples) to take jurisdiction over
IP land disputes and making customary law
apply to these. In the first deliberation of the SC,
the votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐
deliberated upon.
Issue:
Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?
A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which
have not been registered before, if
granted with a CADT/CALT, will be
recognized as privately owned by the IPs
from the beginning‐ thus, has never been
part of public domain.
B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not
been recognized as privately owned
belongs to the State
Held:
No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to
lack of votes; Law remained valid and
constitutional (7 to grant ‐7 to dismiss).
JUSTICE PUNO’S SEPARATE OPINION: THE
IPRA LAW DID NOT VIOLATE THE
REGALIAN THEORY
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long
been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE;
they have lived there even before the Spanish
colonization. “Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐
conquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back
as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are

indisputable presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish Conquest.”
2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the
Regalian Doctrine: ... Oh Cho vs Director of
Lands: “This exception would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors‐in‐interest
since time immemorial”
3. Native Titles provide a different Type of
Private Ownership
“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. ‐‐‐
Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the
view that ancestral domains and all resources
found therein shall serve as the material bases
of their cultural integrity. The indigenous
concept of ownership generally holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private
but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights.”
4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine:
Natural Sources within ancestral domains
are not owned by the IPs
* The IPs claims are limited to “lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains;”
* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all
the other natural resources found within the
ancestral domains
Discussion related to the topic of the
Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring
Ownership (land):
I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING
LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A. Laws of the Indies
“The Regalian Theory is a Western legal
concept first introduced by the Spaniards into
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 2
the country through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas.”
 By virtue of Spain’s "discovery" and
conquest of the Philippines, its lands
became the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown
 Back then, the Spanish Government
distributed the lands by issuing royal
grants and concessions to Spaniards,
both military and civilian
B. Valenton‐vs‐Murciano Case (1904, American
Regime)
 Long‐time occupation will not necessarily
lead to ownership of the land
 "While the State has always recognized
the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted
that he must make that proof before
the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until
he did that the State remained the
absolute owner."
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens
System
1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926) 3⁄4
Provides rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands
1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874) 3⁄4 more
comprehensive but limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos, Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges
1936: Present Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) 3⁄4 Almost the
same as Act 2874, except that it gave the
Filipino citizens and corporations which were
previously only granted to Americans

**1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496)
3⁄4 It placed all public and private lands in the
Philippines under the Torrens system
3⁄4 almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898
II. TORRENS SYSTEM
Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping
Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
Government’s Role:
The government must issue an official certificate
of title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances
as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves
Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims
to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance
of said certificate.
III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE
 Despite of several legal developments on
land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is
still retained in our Constitution.
 Under this concept, all lands of the
public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether
on public or private land, belong to the
State.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE VITUG:
GRANT THE PETITION.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is
yet incapable of exact equation in its
significance to the nation and its people now
and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise also known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(“IPRA”), enacted into law in 1997 and made
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 3
effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently
intended to be a legislative response to the 1987
Constitution which recognizes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities “within the
framework of national unity and development”
and commands the State, “subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs,” to protect
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands in order to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its
Section 3(a) which defines “ancestral domains”
to embrace “all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources” including
“ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,”
over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (“ICCs/IPs”)
could exercise virtual ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public
domain the so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion
of community property would comprehend not
only matters of proprietary interest but also
some forms of self-governance over the curved-
out territory. This concept is elaborated in
Section 7 of the law which states that the “rights
of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and
protected,” subsumed under which would
encompass the right of ownership (paragraph
a); the right to develop, control and use lands
and natural resources, including “the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for
the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary
laws;” (par. b); the right to stay in the territories
(par. c); the right to return to their abandoned
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 4

lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right Convention were of the unanimous view that the
to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to “policy on natural resources, being fundamental
claim parts of ancestral domains previously to the nation’s survival should not be left to the
reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land changing mood of the lawmaking body.”
conflicts in accordance primarily with customary
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor
law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that
provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
ICCs/IPs shall be given “priority rights in the
thus expresses this regalian doctrine of the old,
harvesting, extraction, development or
and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all
exploitation of any natural resources within the
lands and natural resources belong to the state
ancestral domains.” These provisions of IPRA,
other than those which it recognizes to be of
in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the
private ownership. Except for agricultural lands
context of the fundamental law and virtually
of the public domain which alone may be
amount to an undue delegation, if not an
alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as
unacceptable abdication, of State authority over
well as all other natural resources, of the country
a significant area of the country and its
must remain with the state, the exploration,
patrimony.
development and utilization of which shall be
subject to its full control and supervision albeit
allowing it to enter into co-production, joint
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses
venture or production-sharing agreements, or
that all “lands of the public domain, waters,
into agreements with foreign-owned
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
corporations involving technical or financial
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
assistance for large-scale exploration,
forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
development and utilization.
other natural resources are owned by the State,”
and, with the exception of agricultural lands, The decision of the United States Supreme
“shall not be alienated.” It ordains that the Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government, holding
“exploration, development, and utilization of that a parcel of land held since time immemorial
natural resources shall be under the full control by individuals under a claim of private
and supervision of the State.” ownership is presumed never to have been
public land and cited to downgrade the
These provisions had roots in the 1935
application of the regalian doctrine, cannot
Constitution which, along with some other
override the collective will of the people
specific mandates in the 1935 Constitution,
expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that
forming Article XII under the title “Conservation
sovereignty resides and from them that all
and Utilization of Natural Resources”, were
government authority emanates. It is not then
derived largely from the report of the Committee
for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be
on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is
and other Natural Resources. According to the
for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the
Committee report, among the principles upon
sovereign act that must, between them, stand
which these provisions were based, was “that
inviolate.
the land, minerals, forest and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of
the Filipino Nation,” and should thereby “be
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII
preserved for those under the sovereign
of the Constitution allows Congress to provide
authority of the Nation and for their posterity.”
“for the applicability of customary laws
The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
governing property rights or relations in
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 5

determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains.” I do not see this statement
as saying that Congress may enact a law that
would simply express that “customary laws shall
govern” and end it there. Had it been so, the
Constitution could have itself easily provided
without having to still commission Congress to
do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained
this authority of Congress, during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Convention, thus:
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points,
and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-
examine the law. Indeed, the State is exhorted
to protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands, a task that
would entail a balancing of interest between
their specific needs and the imperatives of
national interest.

“Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of

the customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it
is respectfully submitted that the particular
matter must be submitted to Congress. I
understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is
for the possibility of the codification of these
customary laws. So before these are codified,
we cannot now mandate that the same must
immediately be applicable. We leave it to
Congress to determine the extent of the
ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in
relation to whatever may have been codified
earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead
of the horse.”
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get
Congress to look closely into the customary
laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals,
to hew them to, and make them part of, the
stream of laws. The “due process clause,” as I
so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuverawould
require an apt publication of a legislative
enactment before it is permitted to take force
and effect. So, also, customary laws, when
specifically enacted to become part of statutory
law, must first undergo that publication to render
them correspondingly binding and effective as
such.

ALBA VS. DELA CRUZ
FACTS: The petitioners herein are the the only
heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and
Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-
owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have
registered a parcel of agricultural land in
Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a
plan and technical description of the said lot.
After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908,
entered a decree directing that described in the
petition be registered in the names of the 4
petitioners.
On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed
a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR)
asking for a revision of the case, including the
decision, upon the ground that he is the
absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land
described in said motion and which he alleges
to be included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb.
12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby
depriving him of said lands. For him, the
petitioners deliberately omitted to include in
their registration his name as one of the
occupants of the land so as to be given notice
of registration. He further alleged having
inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero
R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the
same (was duly inscribed in the old register of
property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)
He therefore asked a revision of the case, and
that the said decree be modified so as to
exclude the two parcels of land described in
said motion. The Land Court upon this
motion reopened the case, and after hearing
the additional evidence presented by both
parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its
decision modifying the former decree
by excluding from the same the two parcels of
land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.
From this decision and judgment the petitioners
appealed.
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 6
The court below held that the failure on the part
of the petitioners to include the name of the
appellee in their petition, as an occupant of
these two parcels of land, was a violation of
section 21 of Act No. 496, and that
this constituted fraud within the meaning of
section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The
trial court further held that the grant from the
estate should prevail over the public document
of purchase of 1864.
ISSUE:
1. Did the court below commit an error in
reopening this case in June, 1908, after
its decree had been entered in February
of the same year? YES
2. Whether or not, the petitioners did obtain
the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
NO
HELD: The judgment appealed from should be,
and the same is hereby reversed and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners in
conformity with the decree of the lower court
of February 12, 1908.
1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should
not have been opened on account of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, and could have been
opened only on the ground that the said
decree had been obtained by fraud.
2. The application for the registration is to be in
writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or
by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It
is to contain, among other things, the names
and addresses of all occupants of land and of
all adjoining owners, if known.
The subject land was first rented to Baldomero
de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and
this contract was duly executed in writing.
(While the appellee admits that his father and
brother entered into these rental contracts and
did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land,
nevertheless he insists that the two small

parcels in question were not included in these
contracts)
The subsequent State grant was obtained by
Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’
parents and while the petitioners were minors.
So it is clear that the petitioners honestly
believed that the appellee was occupying the
said parcels as their lessee at the time they
presented their application for registration. They
did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent
intent, when they omitted to include in their
application the name of the appellee as one of
the occupants of the land. They believed that it
was not necessary nor required that they
include in their application the names of their
tenants.
Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that
all occupants be named in the petition and given
notice by registered mail. However, this did not
do the appellee any good, as he was not
notified; but he was made a party defendant, as
we have said, by means of the publication “to all
whom it may concern. ”Every decree of
registration shall bind the land and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description “to all whom
it may concern.”
As to whether or not the appellee can
successfully maintain an action under the
provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land
Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366,
Compilation) we do not decide.
NOTES:
1. The main principle of registration is to
make registered titles indefeasible.
1. The element of intention to deprive
another of just rights constitutes the
essential characteristics of actual – as
distinguished from legal-fraud
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 7
1. Looked at either from the point of view of
history or of the necessary requirements
of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing
with a tangible res may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal
service upon claimants within the State
or notice by name to those outside of it,
and not encounter any provision of either
constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by
the power of the court over the res. As we
have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible, were this not so, for it hardly
would do to make a distinction between
the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs.
Judges, supra.)
1. action in rem vs. action in personam:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a
claim against some particular person, with a
judgment which generally, in theory at least,
binds his body, or to bar some individual claim
or objection, so that only certain persons are
entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in
personam, although it may concern the right to
or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other
hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who
might be minded to make an objection of any
sort against the right sought to be established,
and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true,
show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding
is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to
reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific,
intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of
his right, or in some manner injure him, must be
alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual
or positive fraud as distinguished from
constructive fraud
6. Advantages of the Torrens System:
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 8

1. It has substituted security for insecurity. law

library
2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from
pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days. law library
3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for
obscurity and verbiage. law library
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he
who has mastered the “three R’s” can transact
his own conveyancing. law library
5. It affords protection against fraud.
6. It has restored to their just value many
estates held under good holding titles, but
depreciated in consequence of some blur or
technical defect, and has barred the
reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on
Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband
MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are
owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila.
Between their lots is a stone wall which is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2,
1906, Consuelo and her husband presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration to
register their lot. The registration was allowed
on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an
original certificate and the title was registered.
Both included the wall.
On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M.
Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for registration. The court
decreed the registration of the land which
also included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo
and Mauro, her husband, discovered that the
wall has also been registered to N.M. Saleeby.
They presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for adjustment and correction of the
error where the wall was indicated in both
registrations. However, the lower court
contended that during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the defendant’s
land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the
name of the defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is the owner of the
wall and the land occupied by it? NO.
RULING:
NO. The lower court’s decision would call for the
plaintiffs to be always alert and see to it that no
other parties will register the wall and its land.
Else, if they spotted someone registering such
wall in their own name, plaintiff must
immediately oppose. Such would become
defeat the real purpose of the Torrens system of
land registration.
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 9
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title
to land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration,
in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
So who owns the land? According to Torrens
system, the plaintiffs. Under our law, once a
party registers the land, final and in good faith,
no third parties may claim interest on the same
land. The rights of all the world re foreclosed by
the decree of registration. The registration,
under the Torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. The
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar
to future litigation over the same between the
same parties. It is a notice to the world and no
one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more
in consonance with the purposes and the real
intent of the Torrens system, we are of the
opinion and so decree that in case land has
been registered under the Land Registration Act
in the name of two different persons, the earlier
in date shall prevail. The presumption is that
the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. This presumption is
IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by proof
of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very
purpose and object of the law requiring a record
would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must
be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
DECISION:
Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The
wall and the land where it sits is awarded to the
plaintiffs.
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 10

MATEO CARIÑO VS INSULAR The US Supreme Court also noted that even the
GOVERNMENT Solicitor General admitted that the Igorots were
hardly ruled by the Spanish government. That
Political Law – Regalian Doctrine – Due Process
being, it is unlikely that the Spanish government
– Property Rights
would grant land titles to the Igorots even if they
FACTS: In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition will register their land under the old Spanish
for him to be granted a certificate of title over a Law. The US Supreme Court also ruled that to
40 hectare land in Baguio, Benguet. He claimed follow the stand of the Solicitor General is to
that he and his predecessors in interest had deprive the land titles of the natives (not only
been in possession over said parcel of land Igorots but all native inhabitants of the Philippine
since time immemorial; that the Igorot Islands). Under the Constitution: “no law shall
community where the said land was located had be enacted in said islands which shall
always considered Mateo Cariño and his deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
predecssors/ancestors as the owner of said without due process of law, or deny to any
land; that said parcel of land had been person therein the equal protection of the laws.”
transferred to his predecessors and unto him in The term “any person” includes the natives (in
accordance with the Igorot custom. this case, the Igorots). All lands held under
private ownership during the Spanish era shall
The land registration court granted his petition therefore be presumed to be such. Failure to
but the government through the Solicitor register under Spanish Law did not revert said
General opposed said grant on the ground lands to the public domain.
that Mateo Cariño and ancestors failed to
register said land during the Spanish Era. It was
argued that in 1880, the Spanish government
decreed that all privately held land must be
registered or else they will be reverted back to
the public domain (pursuant to the regalian
doctrine).
The case reached the Philippine Supreme
Court. The latter ruled against Mateo Cariño
hence Cariño further appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo Cariño’s should
be granted.
HELD: Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the decision held by the Philippine Supreme
Court. Mateo Cariño cannot be deprived of his
land simply because he failed to comply with the
formalities required by the Spanish law (or by a
Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he acquired
from his ancestors predates, by more than 50
years, the establishment of the American
government in the Philippines (in fact, even
before the establishment of the Spanish
government in the Philippines).
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 11

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central
implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed
lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.

ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and
PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA vs.
REPUBLIC
Facts:
Petitioners then filed an Application for
Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the
RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property,
more particularly described as Cadastral Lot No.
5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, located in San
Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Petitioners alleged that they and their
predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the
said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer, and
possession as owners of the same since time
immemorial and/or within the period provided for
by law.
The court a quo issued an Order granting the
application for registration of title of the subject
property. However, the Republic appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
According to the Republic, petitioners failed to
prove continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-
interest and by themselves.
The Republic further argues that petitioners’
own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable
because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
except for agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic,
thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo,
and the parcel of land subject matter of the
application is declared public land.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Decision, but it was denied for lack
of merit. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue 1: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial
LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 12
court confirming petitioners’ title over the
subject property for not being allegedly
supported by substantial evidence as
required by law.
YES. The Court found out that petitioners
offered in evidence a certification from the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, National Capital Region dated 29
October 2001, to prove that the subject property
was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Said certification is sufficient to
establish the true nature or character of the
subject property. The certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.
Issue2: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the subject
property as pubic land and ignoring
petitioners’ evidence of over 50 year
possession in the concept of an owner and
completely unmolested by any adverse
claim.
YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands
of the public domain commenced only after 12
June 1945, application for registration of the
said property is still possible by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which
speaks of prescription. Hence, because of
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
those who are in possession of alienable and
disposable land, and whose possession has
been characterized as open, continuous and
exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the
right to register their title to such land despite the
fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945.
In the present case, while petitioners’
possession over the subject property can be
reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date
when according to evidence, the subject
property became alienable and disposable, they
can still have the subject property registered in
their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
 LAND TITLE AND DEED ACJUCO 1ST MEETING 13

WHEREFORE, the court granted petitioners’

application for registration of the subject
property and directing the issuance of a decree
of registration in petitioners’ favor.