ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
◈ LORENZO V. NPC (OCTOBER 2015 - LEONEN, J.)
◈ FACTS:
• Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV Lorcon
Luzon.
• NPC is the owner of Power Barge 104, "a non-propelled power plant barge.”
• Power Barge 104 was stationed at the Makar Wharf in General Santos City when the
MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed it.”
Nelson Homena, who was the Plant Manager of the Power Barge from NPC, filed a
MARINE PROTEST before the Board of Marine Inquiry.
In his testimony, Captain Villarias, who also filed his own marine protest, claimed that:
- At the time of the incident, Captain Villarias served as the Master of the MV
Lorcon Luzon.
- But, the MV Lorcon Luzon was then being piloted by Captain Yape, a Harbor
Pilot from the General Santos City pilotage district — as it was mandatory to
yield navigational control to the Harbor Pilot while docking.
- Despite this, he “always” remained at the side of Captain Yape and and knew of
Captain Yape's orders for he had to repeat them.
- When MV Lorcon Luzon was docking, Captain Yape ordered the vessel to
proceed "slow ahead," making it move at the speed of about one (1) knot. As
it moved closer to dock, Captain Yape gave the order "dead slow ahead,"
making the vessel move even slower. He then ordered the engine stopped.
- When the ship got really close to the wharf, Captain Yape ordered the
vessel to move backward, i.e., go "slow astern," and subsequently "full astern."
- Despite his orders, the engine failed to timely respond.
- Thus, Captain Yape ordered the dropping of the anchor, which led to MV Lorcon
Luzon ramming into Power Barge 104.
Captain Yape filed a Marine Accident Report.
*The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted joint hearings on all of these.
To forestall the prescription of its cause of action for damages, NPC filed before
RTC-QC a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping claiming that:
- Due to the ramming, the nylon ropes attached to hold the barge were
instantaneously ripped off
- The take-off tower of the barge swayed when it was hit, causing flash over on the
69 KV line tripping the line and isolated General Santos City from the Mindanao
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Grid — this caused a blackout, causing generation losses for NPC as there
was a failure to generate electricity immediately after the accident.
- The tanks of the barge were also severely damaged; they were cracked and
caused a leak of waste of oil in the sea.
Lorenzo Shipping filed a Motion to Dismiss grounded on the RTC’s alleged lack of
jurisdiction (should be with Board of Marine Inquiry/Philippine Coast Guard)
over the subject matter and NPC’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies — The
RTC denied this.
Lorenzo Shipping then filed its Answer, emphasizing that:
- MV Lorcon Luzon was commandeered by an official Harbor Pilot to whom it
was “mandatory…to yield operational control” — thus, any liability should be
attributed to the Harbor Pilot and not to the company.
- Furthermore, "Makar Wharf is a berthing place only for self-propelled vessel”,
which the Power Barge 104 was not. Therefore, it had no right to lash itself on
the wharf and upon doing so, it assumed the risk of such ramming because of its
improper presence.
RTC ruling: absolved Lorenzo Shipping of liability due to NPC’s failure to establish
Lorenzo Shipping's negligence.
- While the ramming was found to have been the result of the engine's stoppage,
no malfunctioning was recorded before and after the incident.
- Lorenzo Shipping was sued in its capacity as the employer of Captain Villarias
and that any liability it incurred would have been only subsidiary.
- Nevertheless, as Lorenzo Shipping supposedly exercised due diligence in its
selection and supervision of Captain Villarias, no liability could be attributed to it.
CA ruling: reversed the RTC; ordered Lorenzo Shipping to pay NPC the amount of
P876,286.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
- Though MV Lorcon Luzon was under compulsory pilotage, Captain Villarias, the
vessel's Master, remained to be its overall commander — he was remiss in his
duties as he did nothing in the crucial moments when Captain Yape's orders to
go astern appeared to not have been heeded.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that: an employer's liability is primary and
not subsidiary.
- Here, Lorenzo Shipping failed to show that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Captain Villarias.
*Lorenzo Shipping filed an MR.
ACTUAL DAMAGES
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CA: issued the Amended Decision, noting that the amount of actual damages was
not proven by NPC, so in lieu thereof, P300,000.00 as temperate damages were
awarded to them.
Lorenzo Shipping filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC, arguing that:
- No liability could be attributed to it as the MV Lorcon Luzon was under
compulsory pilotage and that NPC assumed risk when it berthed a non-propelled
vessel in the Makar Wharf.
- Even assuming that it was at fault, the award of P300,000.00 as temperate
damages was still improper.
- It claimed that, from the text of Article 2224 of the Civil Code, “temperate
damages can be awarded only in cases where pecuniary loss may have been
incurred, but whose exact amount, through the nature of the injury suffered, e.g.,
injury to commercial credit or business goodwill, cannot be ascertained.”
- NPC was well in a position to adduce proof of the exact amount of damage
it incurred, but failed to do so.
◈ISSUE/HELD:
1) W/N LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE
SUSTAINED BY POWER BARGE EVEN IF IT WAS UNDER MANDATORY
PILOTAGE BY CAPTAIN YAPE? — YES
Contrary to Lorenzo Shipping's assertion, the MV Lorcon Luzon's having been
piloted by Captain Yape at the time of the ramming does not automatically
absolve Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
- Harbor Pilots are liable only to the extent that they can perform their function
through the officers and crew of the piloted vessel.
- Where there is failure by the officers and crew to adhere to their orders, Harbor
Pilots cannot be held liable.
- Clearing it of liability requires a demonstration of how the Master, Captain
Villarias, conducted himself in those moments when it became apparent that the
MV Lorcon Luzon's engine had stopped and Captain Yape's orders to go "slow
astern" and "full astern" were not being heeded — which were not substantiated.
- In his testinomy, Captain Villarias admitted that about six (6) minutes had
passed before he even realized that there was an engine failure, let alone
acted on this fact.
- During the he just stood besides the harbour pilot waiting for a response from the
engine department, he could have called the attention of Capt. Yape on his
miscalculations in the docking maneuvers of the vessel.
6 minutes were more than enough time for Captain Villarias to have done
something to remedy the situation, but he did nothing.
JRPR
- As Master of the MV Lorcon Luzon, he should have been on his toes, keen and
ready to make decisions in a split second, especially in an evidently precarious
situation.
- Lorenzo Shipping tried to argue that within those 6 minutes, there was a
battle of control as to how to successfully maneuver the ship between the
master and the harbor pilot, but both Captain Villarias and Captain Yape must
be presumed to have been disciplined officers who knew fully well how to conduct
themselves in such a situation.
- The crew must also be presumed to have been trained in the same manner
— Lorenzo Shipping tried to argue that the crew were confused also on
how to act because they did not know whose voice was ordering them to
work.
- But, from Captain Villarias' quoted testimony, the crew was already
listening to both his and Captain Yape's voices. He admitted that he repeated
Captain Yape's orders. The crew was, thus, properly disposed to heed
instructions coming from him. If at all, his failure to timely act despite the
crew's presumptive readiness to heed his command only highlights his
negligence.
There is no basis for holding that Power Barge 104's presence in the Makar Wharf
was improper and tantamount to an assumption of risk.
- Lorenzo Shipping could have very easily adduced proof attesting to Makar Wharf's
supposedly being exclusive to self-propelled vessels, but it did not produce a copy
of any appropriate regulation, if any, that restricts the use of Makar Wharf to self-
propelled vessels or absolutely prohibits NPC from using it as a berthing place for a
power barge.
If at all, the MV Lorcon Luzon's ramming of a stationary object is even more
damaging to Lorenzo Shipping's cause.
- Such accidents simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things unless the vessel
has been mismanaged in some way.
2) ASSUMING THAT LIABILITY IS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO LORENZO SHIPPING,
WHAT DAMAGES, IF ANY, MAY BE AWARDED TO NPC? — TEMPERATE
The CA correctly ruled the award of P300,000.00 as temperate damages to NPC.
Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
The STANDARD for proving pecuniary loss for ACTUAL DAMAGES:
- Must be duly proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
- The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne — A court cannot merely
rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
NPC tried to argue that the CA erred in disregarding their competent testimonial
and documentary evidence for the actual damages of P876,826, namely:
- The testimony of the manager of Power Barge 104 who testified on the damages
sustained by said barge as a result of the ramming incident for P1M.
- The "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair" prepared by PHILSECO was
presented which clearly enumerated and itemized the actual damages sustained
by Power Barge 104 and repaired by PHILSECO.
- NPC Disbursement Voucher for P6,775,839.02 proof of payment to PHILSECO
for drydocking repairs.
But, NPC still failed to establish the precise amount of pecuniary loss it suffered.
- Manager of the Power Barge’s testimony — INSUFFICIENT; all he did was give
an estimate of P1M but, a mere estimate does not suffice as proof of actual
pecuniary loss.
- "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair” — INSUFFICIENT; was not
identified nor authenticated and no witness came forward to attest to its
authenticity.
- NPC Disbursement Voucher — INSUFFICIENT; all it attests to is a release of
funds in favor of PHILSECO in the total amount of P6,775,839.02, covering no
specific transaction but a period extending from January 14, 1994.
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the
nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
Lorenzo Shipping asserts that under Article 2244, temperate damages can be
awarded only in cases where pecuniary loss may have been incurred, but whose
JRPR
exact amount, through the nature of the injury suffered, e.g., injury to commercial
credit or business goodwill, cannot be ascertained.
- It argues that because the circumstances of this case are such that NPC could
have pleaded and proved a specific—i.e., ascertained—amount of pecuniary loss
but failed to do so, temperate damages should not be awarded.
BUT temperate damages may be awarded even in instances where pecuniary
loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty, due to the inadequacy
of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
- The damage in this case is susceptible to financial reckoning — but NPC
failed to establish the precise amount of its pecuniary loss.
- This vice of precision notwithstanding, it would be improper to completely
turn a blind eye to the loss suffered by NPC and to deny it, as Lorenzo
Shipping suggests, of any form of recompense.
EVID
A bill of expenses, such as National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F",
is considered a private document as it does not fall under what the
Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public documents.77
Accordingly, for it to have been admitted by the Regional Trial Court
as authentic, Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
must have been complied with. National Power Corporation failed in
this respect. Thus, in the words of the Regional Trial Court, it:
3. Denies the admission of Exhibit "F" and its submarkings for not
HAVING BEEN PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
It is of no consequence that the substance or contents of Exhibit "F" are
such that they specify an amount. It is of no consequence that it is
purportedly of such evidentiary weight that it could definitely
establish National Power Corporation's claims.
Admissibility of evidence and weight accorded to evidence are two
distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
governs admissibility and provides that "[e]vidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules."
When evidence has "such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence," it is said to be relevant. When
evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be
competent.
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
The weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after
evidence has been admitted. To this end, courts evaluate evidence in
accordance with the rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence,80 consistent with basic precepts of rationality and guided
by judicially established standards. It is improper to even speak of
evidentiary weight when the piece of evidence in question has not
even been admitted.
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply
with Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the standard of competency.
Consistent with this, reliance on National Power Corporation's Exhibit
"F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of National Power
Corporation's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted,
Exhibit "F" does not form part of the body of evidence worthy of
judicial consideration.
As National Power Corporation cannot rely on the "Total Incidental Cost
for Drydock and Repair," it is left to rely on the testimony of Nelson
Hpmena and on NPC Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304.
HERRERA v ALBA
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit
against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support
Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In the
year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a
(deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera
is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera
questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has
not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom
JRPR
will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional
for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs
CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the
time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing
doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no
question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object
evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case
of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as
admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight
and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides,
which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine
adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More
specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before
paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the
there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological
father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never
possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result
being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically
become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera,
is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable
or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo
Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that
the alleged father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not
violative of the right against self-incrimination. The right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of
DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-
incrimination
Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 157294-95, 30 November
2006 MARCH 16, 2014
RA 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. At all events,
the Ombudsman is not barred from requiring the production of
documents based solely on information obtained by it from sources
independentof its previous inquiry.
Facts: Joseph Victor G. Ejercito is the owner of Trust Account No. 858
which was originally opened at Urban Bank but which is now
maintained at Export and Industry Bank, which is the purchaser and
owner now of the former Urban Bank and Urbancorp Investment, Inc.
He is also the owner of Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 which was
originally opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export
JRPR
and Industry Bank, the purchaser and owner of the former Urban Bank
and Urbancorp Investment, Inc.
Estrada was subsequently charged with Plunder. The Sandiganbayan
a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of
a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB,
formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce
various document related to the investigation.
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized
representative of Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account
pertaining to certain accounts in the name of “Jose Velarde” and to
testify thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution and
subpoenas were accordingly issued. The Special Prosecution Panel
filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum for the President of EIB or his/her authorized
representative to produce the same documents subject of the first
Subpoena Duces Tecum and to testify thereon on the hearings
scheduled and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony.
The request was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly issued. Ejercito filed
various motions to quash the various Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum previously issued. In his Motion to Quash, he claimed
that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated
therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents
in the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts,
could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure
thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The
disclosure being illegal, he concluded, the prosecution in the case may
not be allowed to make use of the information. Before the motion was
resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed another
Issue: Whether or not a Trust Account is covered by the term “deposit”
as used in R.A. 1405;
ACTUAL DAMAGES JRPR
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
same plunder case. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine or the
Held: R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858. exclusionary rule is inapplicable in cases of unlawful examination of
However, the protection afforded by the law is not absolute. There bank accounts.
being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2
provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Ejercito contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of
duty, his accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405.

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or

dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of
cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as
to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a
public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with
the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to
public scrutiny. Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained
wealth. The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder
are crimes committed by public officers, noble idea that “a public office
is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so
with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open
to public scrutiny” applies with equal force.

Also, the plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan

necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount
purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada.
Republic Act No. 1405 allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases
where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.
Hence, these accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable in
this case, namely: (1)the examination of bank accounts is upon order
of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, and (2)the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending
against former President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction
of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money deposited in
Ejercito’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the
ACTUAL DAMAGES
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MARQUEZ V. DESIERTO (G.R. NO. 135882)
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to produce several bank documents for
purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at the bank where petitioner is the branch manager. The
accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v.
Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain George Trivinio purchased
trail managers check and deposited some of it to an account maintained
at petitioner’s branch. Petitioner after meeting with the FFIB Panel to
ensure the veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera inspection.
Petitioner being unable to readily identify the accounts in question, the
Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank
documents. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the
court due to the clear conflict between RA 6770 and RA 1405.
Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in contempt before the
Ombudsman.
JRPR
The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the
account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office
of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would
wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no
pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.
*In contrast to Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan. Interestingly, time is of the
essence. A different ruling in Ejercito was enunciated because there
was already a pending investigation months before the ruling made in
this case as to the exemption in the power of the Ombudsman.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera

inspection of the accounts is an allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling: NO.

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the

subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No.
3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement
between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must

be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the
account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject
matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
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Ganaan
FACTS:
A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by
complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said
complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for
withdrawal of their complaint.
Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to
come to his office to advise him about the proposed settlement. When
complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen
to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to
hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After
enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm
if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the
complainant's wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways.
But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.
After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents
of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the
exchange.
Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.
In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent.
Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1
of RA No. 4200.
JRPR
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the
Republic Act No. 4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic
devices contemplated by law.
However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced
and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set
of a telephone apparatus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices
in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
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prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone.
It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 4200.
RAMIREZ V CA
7
NOV
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
JRPR
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the
Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in
a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive
to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later
on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the
petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties
in the conversation
Held:
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports
the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in
the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
JRPR
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is
it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations”
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which
are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22,
1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the
phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
Bill.
BSB GROUP V. SALLY GO (G.R. NO. 168644)
Facts:
Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its
representative, Ricardo Bangayan, husband of herein respondent Sally
Go. Respondent was employed as a cashier, and was engaged, among
others, to receive and account for the payments made by the various
customers of the company. Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor’s
Office a complaint for estafa/qualified theft against respondent alleging
that several checks issued by the company’s customers in payment of
their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company’s
coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Requisites - Must be alleged and proven with certainty
personal banking account maintained at Security Bank. Accordingly,
respondent was charged and the prosecution moved for the issuance
of subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum against the respective
managers or records custodians of Security Bank and Asian Savings
Bank. Respondent opposed and meanwhile, prosecution was able to
present in court the testimony of one Security Bank representative.
Petitioner moved to exclude the testimony but was denied by the trial
court. CA reversed and set aside the order.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony on the particulars of respondent’s account
with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the
checks allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable
inquiry under R.A. 1405.
Ruling: YES.
The Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which
later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute
confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well
as the amount of the deposit in any given bank account.
JRPR
involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said
Information make mention of the supposed bank account in which the
funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that
the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution’s
inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly
alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case
is the money alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the
money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in
evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with
its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary
evidence relative to respondent’s Security Bank account serves no
other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature
and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution
at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and
confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the
objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have
indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was
raised before the trial court.

What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to

Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in which the Court
noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405
must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account
is itself the subject of the action. Given this perspective, we deduce that
the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined
from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not
from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the
records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by
abusing petitioner’s trust and confidence and stealing cash. The said
Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way