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Roth v. United States 1956 Facts of the Case: Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. Question: Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973). Decisions Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Miller v. California 1971 Facts of the Case: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion:
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against New York v. Ferber 1981 Facts of the Case: A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances. Question: Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against
New York Times v. Sullivan 1963 Facts of the Case: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the
newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. Question: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for New York Times, 0 vote(s) against Gertz v. Welch 1973 Facts of the Case: Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz lost his libel suit because a lower court found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). Question: Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? Conclusion: The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However, continued Powell, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving ordinary citizens as he advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by citizens suing for libel.
Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Gertz, 4 vote(s) against Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 1987 Facts of the Case: A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Question: Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Hustler Magazine, 0 vote(s) against Reno v. ACLU 1996 Facts of the Case: Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Question:
have also urged the Court to review the case in order to clearly define the relationship between federal gun control laws and the Second Amendment. prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license. Code generally barring the registration of handguns.C. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for ACLU. The U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed. the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. although disagreeing on the merits. provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications. Heller 2007 Facts of the Case: For the first time in seventy years. refused to grant the plaintiffs relief. Question: Whether provisions of the D. gun ownership.C. 0 vote(s) against District of Columbia v.S. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues. and further argue that (a) the Second Amendment should not apply to D. because it is a federal enclave rather than a state. legislation merely regulates. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions. limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact on adults). and (b) that the D.5 Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized? Conclusion: Yes. The federal trial court in Washington D.C. a group of private gun-owners brought suit claiming the laws violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms. voting two to one that the Second Amendment does in fact protect private gun owners such as plaintiffs. but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes? . requiring licenses for all pistols. such as the National Guard. protecting only the former.C. and requiring all lawful firearms to be kept unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia. or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. rather than prohibits. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications. Respondents. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. Petitioners agree with the trial court's decision that the Second Amendment applies only to militias. and mandating that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked. holding that the Second Amendment applies only to militias. After the District of Columbia passed legislation barring the registration of handguns. the Court heard a case regarding the central meaning of the Second Amendment and its relation to gun control laws. and not to private gun ownership.
the D. as well as applicable language in state constitutions adopted soon after the Second Amendment. In a 5-4 decision. laws at issue in this case were both reasonable and appropriate. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Lochner. New York 1905 Facts of the Case: The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. such as self-defense within the home. the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor. Question: Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court invalidated the New York law. each joined by the other as well as Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.6 Conclusion: Yes. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer filed dissenting opinions. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Heller. 4 vote(s) against Lochner v. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law. 4 vote(s) against .C. not for other purposes even if they are lawful. any law regulating the use of firearms would have to be "unreasonable or inappropriate" to violate the Second Amendment. Justice Breyer agreed with Stevens' argument but also stated that even if possession were to be allowed for other reasons. Justice Stevens argued that the Second Amendment only protects the rights of individuals to bear arms as part of a well-regulated state militia. In Breyer's view. and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes. the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia. and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court based its holding on the text of the Second Amendment. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract.
the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras. along with other states. was convicted under this law. and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Question: Does the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause? Conclusion: Yes. Meyer. and Ninth Amendments." Griswold v. or zones. 2 vote(s) against . that establish a right to privacy. Nebraska violated the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. Together. the First. prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to grade school children.7 Meyer v. State regulation of liberty must be reasonably related to a proper state objective. instruction. create a new constitutional right. Question: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Conclusion: Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy. But these purposes were not adequate to justify interfering with Meyer's liberty to teach or the liberty of parents to employ him during a "time of peace and domestic tranquillity. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void. to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. who taught German in a Lutheran school. Fourth. The legislature's view of reasonableness was subject to supervision by the courts. and other medical treatment. Third. Connecticut 1964 Facts of the Case: Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. The legislative purpose of the law was to promote assimilation and civic development. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling. Liberty means more than freedom from bodily restraint. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Griswold. Nebraska 1923 Facts of the Case: Nebraska. the right to privacy in marital relations. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information. the Nebraska law is unconstitutional.
After granting certiorari. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.Jay Floyd -misfired from the start. and. without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Her opponent -. As a result. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Roe. Wade 1971 Facts of the Case: Roe. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Roe v. a Texas resident. Casey 1991 Facts of the Case: The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989.Robert Flowers -. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Question: Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Conclusion: The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Question: Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent.could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. Roe's attorney -. wait 24 hours.Sarah Weddington -. if minors. the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. Her new opponent -. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. The first time. Wade? Conclusion: . obtain parental consent. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). Among the new provisions.came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. the Court heard arguments twice. 2 vote(s) against Planned Parenthood v.
" Under this standard. Bowers. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy. For the first time. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim. appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. On appeal. 5-to-4 decision. thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? Conclusion: No. the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. 1965). The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy. the court dismissed. and that states could outlaw those practices. Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Georgia's Attorney General. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bowers. 4 vote(s) against . the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v." which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. 4 vote(s) against Bowers v. holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Connecticut. the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. Connecticut. the Court again reaffirmed Roe. Michael J. Hardwick 1985 Facts of the Case: Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home.9 In a bitter. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood. Question: Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia. engaging in a private. In affirming. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment. Texas 2002 Facts of the Case: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence." wrote Justice Kennedy.S. be overruled? Conclusion: No. with Bowers v. state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. 3 vote(s) against Cruzan v. Hardwick. Kennedy. consensual sexual act. Missouri Department of Health 1989 Facts of the Case: In 1983. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples. Director. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers. filed dissents. the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . 478 U. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner.10 Lawrence v." continued Justice Kennedy. Hardwick. 186 (1986). Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man.S. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. controlling. the Court overruled Bowers. Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative state. and yes. Question: Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined. with whom Chief Justice William H. 478 U. 186 (1986). the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. Tyron Garner. the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. but not identical behavior by different-sex couples. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. yes. Accordingly." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube.
incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant. the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Chimel. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. Question: Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?" Conclusion: In a 7-to-2 decision. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse. of Health. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent patients. the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn. the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. CA 1968 searches incident to an arrest Facts of the Case: Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. 2 vote(s) against . the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect.11 Question: Did the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit Cruzan's parents to refuse lifesustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision. Missouri Dept. 4 vote(s) against Chimel v. and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Director. they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. State courts upheld the conviction.
Question: Did the police procedure forcing Rochin to vomit violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: The Court reversed the conviction. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted. 4 vote(s) against . Due process was an admittedly vague concept. Justice Brennan argued for a unanimous Court that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. They took him to a hospital where a doctor was instructed by the police officers to administer an emetic by forceably passing a tube into Rochin's stomach. Question: Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination? Conclusion: No. CA 1965 loss of evidence searches Facts of the Case: Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. but it prohibited "conduct that shocks the conscience. a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. California 1951 loss of evidence searches Facts of the Case: Rochin swallowed drug capsules to dispose of evidence.12 Rochin v. Schmerber v." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for California. The police violated Rochin's right to due process of law. During his treatment. He vomited the capules and was convicted on the basis of the evidence produced from his vomit." This nebulous approach was mocked in a concurring opinion by Justice Black. The police pummeled him and jumped on his stomach in a vain effort to make him throw up. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner. it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.
Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Hicks. New Hampshire (1971). On appeal. police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. However. The officer moved some of the components. which was done without a warrant. an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. recorded their serial numbers. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations. argued Scalia. During the search. US 1967 Facts of the Case: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen. Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. To investigate the shooting. Hicks 1986 plain view doctrine Facts of the Case: A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. 3 vote(s) against Katz v. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court granted certiorari. the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution. and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.13 Arizona v. Question: Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: No. Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. The Court of Appeals rejected this point. noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. critical to this doctrine. Katz challanged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. Question: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? . Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami.
A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection. not places. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Illinois. Gant 2003 Facts of the Case: Arizona police went to the home of Rodney Gant in search of drugs and to arrest him for failing to appear in court. 3 vote(s) against Arizona v. and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause. other contraband. Question: Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case.14 Conclusion: Yes. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli. United States (1969). Gant was not there (though two other people were in his home. Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Katz. 1 vote(s) against Illinois v. reliability. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action. one of whom was in possession of a crack pipe) but while the police were still at the house Gant pulled into the driveway. police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana. Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity." wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. While Gant was still in his car. When they arrived at the house. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. Gates 1982 Facts of the Case: The Bloomingdale. and weapons. an officer shined a . "The Fourth Amendment protects people. but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied.
Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. ruling that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under New York v. On May 24. ruling the search unconstitutional. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Safford Unified School District #1 v. After he was out of the car. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. Question: When police arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle who got out voluntarily. Gant asked the judge to rule the evidence found in the car unconstitutional because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Gant was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison. on rehearing before the entire court. The court ruled that these justifications did not apply in Gant's case because he had left the vehicle voluntarily without being stopped by police or asked to get out of the car. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Redding 2008 Facts of the Case: Savana Redding. the U.S.S. Dean. Gant appealed. The issue raised in this case. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. Ms. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances. without that justification. U. The court found that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. an eighth grader at Safford Middle School. was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms.15 flashlight into the vehicle. the police searched it and found drugs and a handgun. however. finding that police could constitutionally search a vehicle even after its occupant has left it voluntarily. Question: . The search of the vehicle was therefore not directly connected to the arrest and. the Court sent it back to Arizona state court for further consideration in light of the Arizona case State v. Gant was arrested and charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. the Court issued a decision in the case of Thornton v. without issuing a decision in the case.. was decided by the U. the court of appeals held that Ms. can they search the vehicle without a warrant? Conclusion: On October 20. but the police made no other contact with him until he stepped out of the car. However. On the initial appeal. and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.S. 2004. The trial judge denied the motion. Supreme Court later in the same term. Before trial. Belton (1981). 2003.
Breyer. but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. concurring in part and dissenting in part.16 1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? 2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. and was joined by Justice Ginsburg.S." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. and Samuel A. Terry v. Scalia. Stephen G. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional. the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence . Roberts. and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. fact dependent. Question: Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision. Alito.C Section 1983? Conclusion: Sometimes. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. the Court reiterated that. school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. a stick-up. Kennedy. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. With David H. and Justices Antonin G. search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe. Anthony M. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. based on a reasonable suspicion. Ohio 1967 Facts of the Case: Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job. Justice Stevens wrote separately. No. and found weapons on two of them." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. However." Here." The officer stopped and frisked the three men. largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent.
Leon 1983 Facts of the Case: The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Ohio 1960 Facts of the Case: Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. 1 vote(s) against Mapp v.and controversial -. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. inadmissible in a state court. A judge concluded that the affadavit for the . the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs.17 against Terry. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Ohio." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. This was an historic -. Question: Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) Conclusion: The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Mapp. 3 vote(s) against US v.decision. by [the Fourth Amendment].
Question: Does the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment apply to the "knock-and-announce" rule? Conclusion: No. Question: Is there a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule? Conclusion: Yes. However. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for United States. not to prevent police from conducting a search for . In Leon. where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge. and impositions on privacy. it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. The exclusionary rule. argued the majority. the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule. 3 vote(s) against Hudson v. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found. but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial. because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used. the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation.18 search warrant was insufficient. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon. is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. Michigan 2005 Facts of the Case: Booker T. the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. there is such an exception." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence. In a 5-4 decision. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. property-damage. The police had a search warrant. Thus.
the Supreme Court affirmed the U. .S. stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could “result in appreciable deterrence” of future police misconduct. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. The warrant. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.19 which they have a valid warrant. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion." and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A.S. and was joined by Justices Stevens. 4 vote(s) against Herring v. Kennedy. but was negligently allowed to remain active. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches. Justice Anthony M. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Michigan. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits. Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way. however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Alito Jr. noting that “as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems. Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. however the U. and Ginsburg. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police . The U." The Court granted certiorari on February 19. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence. at the time of the search? Conclusion: No. was supposed to have been recalled five months prior.S. However. Scalia. officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. Question: Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled. In his petition for certiorari. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Upon searching Herring's vehicle.. the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office. Souter. United States 2008 Facts of the Case: The Coffee County. 2008. the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply.
and Justice Stephen G.20 mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly. in his majority opinion. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Escobedo. Illinois 1963 Facts of the Case: Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Souter. spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent. and whether the right to remain silent has been waived. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers. Question: Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for United States. Justice Goldberg. Breyer." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule. Over several hours. Justice David H." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. 4 vote(s) against Escobedo v. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies. 4 vote(s) against . Escobedo's lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client.
" The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects. In all these cases. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Seibert was interogated by a police officer. Similarly. She appealed. Seibert 2003 Facts of the Case: Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17-year-old Donald Rector. Elstad to argue that an initial. and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. Based on this second. ruled on jointly. and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Stewart. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Miranda. Question: Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. the petitioner was questioned by police. the officer took a short break from questioning. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings. 4 vote(s) against Missouri v. Arizona 1965 Facts of the Case: The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances. in California v. detectives. United States." In Vignera v. in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way. charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession. made oral admissions. Mirandized confession. Lastly. in Westover v. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation. inadmissable. hoping to get a confession from her first. un- . though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights. interrogated. Several days after the fire. Once she had confessed. New York." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. Seibert was convicted. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. the petitioner was arrested by the FBI.21 Miranda v. who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. suspects were questioned by police officers. including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations. local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel.
Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases. ignorant. the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made.young.if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police. Question: Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth . Alabama and Weems v. Justice Anthony Kennedy. overturning the conviction. as it was in Elstad . Alabama. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. Then. Question: Does the rule from Oregon v. "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Elstad that a defendant who has made an un-Mirandized confession may later waive her Miranda rights to make a second confession (admissible in court) still apply when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold her Miranda warnings? Conclusion: No. a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible . found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally.were accused of raping two white women. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. In a decision with no majority.22 Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later. and illiterate -. This cases was decided together with Patterson v. in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote. Alabama 1932 Facts of the Case: Nine black youths -. Justice Kennedy wrote. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert.even if the two-stage interview was unintentional. 4 vote(s) against Powell v." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Seibert.
recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities. Brady. During the jury selection. stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. Those familiar with the American system of justice. a black man. overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Gideon defended himself in the trial. Gideon v. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for him. the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a courtappointed attorney and. he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice. Kentucky 1985 Facts of the Case: Batson. resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Question: Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: In a unanimous opinion. which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. not luxuries. the court refused. was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 0 vote(s) against Batson v. commented Black.23 Amendment. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him. he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. Question: Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four blacks from the jury violate Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws? . essential to a fair trial. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right. He lacked funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense." Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Gideon. Wainwright 1962 Facts of the Case: Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. in doing so.
due to context and publicity. and solemn courtroom setting. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Sheppard.24 Conclusion: The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media. Alabama (1965). who maintained his innocence of the crime. 2 vote(s) against Sheppard v. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Batson. Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury. Question: What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim. When Sheppard appealed again. as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Maxwell 1965 Facts of the Case: After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife. the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media . Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude. the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with. 1 vote(s) against . alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive. widespread. but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Sheppard. the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself . Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. calm.
The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder. Texas.25 Richmond Papers v. On appeal.. Question: Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion: In a 7-to-1 decision. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. Georgia 1975 Facts of the Case: A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers. Louisiana. claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. challenged the judge's action. VA 1979 Facts of the Case: After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia. Proffitt v. Florida. Defense counsel brought the closure motion. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. 1 vote(s) against Gregg v. the prosecution did not object. and Woodson v. Question: Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? Conclusion: . Inc." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas." Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Richmond Newspapers Inc. North Carolina. the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. Roberts v.
and capital murder.applies to mentally retarded offenders.' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified. Since it last confronted the issue. the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty . Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately.retribution and deterrence of capital crimes . Chief Justice William H. due to their lessened culpability. the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders. who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens. but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. Question: Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes.26 No." wrote Justice Stevens. In extreme criminal cases. In affirming. and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Decisions . but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. 2 vote(s) against Atkins v. The jury sentenced Atkins to death. the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Georgia. Lynaugh. the defense relied on one witness. VA 2001 Facts of the Case: Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction. the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game. the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Moreover. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. a forensic psychologist. the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." argued Justice Scalia. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial. in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded. Moreover. In a 7-to-2 decision. specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant. armed robbery. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both.
Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson. The majority. Painter 1949 Facts of the Case: In 1946. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine. segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. 3 vote(s) against Plessy v. applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. as distinguished from political equality. in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown. and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. or to enforce social. Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. In 1892. that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. a black man. Question: Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: . He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission. Ferguson 1985 Facts of the Case: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. upheld state-imposed racial segregation. "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.27 Decision: 6 votes for Atkins. or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. State law restricted access to the university to whites. Herman Marion Sweatt. the state law is within constitutional boundaries. 1 vote(s) against Sweatt v. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color. (The phrase. Question: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No.
Board of Education I 1952 Facts of the Case: Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena. Elliott and Davis v. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas. library facilities. course variety. 0 vote(s) against Brown v. would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. Brown v." which was to have opened in 1947. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. qualifications. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes. legal writing opportunities. County School Board of Prince Edward County.28 In a unanimous decision. Question: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. Question: . Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Brown. the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. and overall prestige. This case was decided together with Briggs v. Board of Education II 1954 Facts of the Case: After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional. and teacher salaries. curricula. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. including faculty. the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief.
0 vote(s) against . Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.. the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. system in which approximately 14.29 What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Conclusion: The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions.000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. were within the courts' remedial powers. Board of Education. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed. 0 vote(s) against Swann v. 3) non-contiguous attendance zones. North Carolina. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed. Question: Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for stateimposed segregation? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision. and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions. as interim corrective measures. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness. 1970 Facts of the Case: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision." Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Brown. the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Ed.
the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. Bollinger. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Applying a test from Grutter. Bollinger apply to public high school students? 2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? 3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance? Conclusion: No. Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents). because 1) the District did not employ quotas. the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored. sued the District. A federal District Court dismissed the suit. the racial tiebreaker went into effect. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. Grutter v. race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest.30 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. Bollinger and Gratz v. a three-judge panel the U. upholding the tiebreaker. no. Bollinger and Gratz v." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling . The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The District then petitioned for an "en banc" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges.S. By a 5-4 vote. the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. and yes. Seattle School District no. 1 2006 Facts of the Case: The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. and 4) the plan had an ending point. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white). Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education. the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives. A non-profit group. Question: 1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. On appeal. Applying these precedents to K-12 education.
and Meredith appealed to the Supreme Court. Jefferson County Board of Education 2006 Facts of the Case: Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) were integrated by court order until 2000.31 government interest in university admissions. Bollinger allow a school district to use race as the sole factor to assign high school students to public schools? . JCPS implemented an enrollment plan to maintain substantial racial integration. Students were given a choice of schools. Meredith and other parents sued the school district. Bollinger. student enrollment was decided on the basis of several factors. In those cases. The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-raceconscious means. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Parents Involved in Community Schools. rigid racial quotas are never narrowly tailored. but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter. The court held that though the plan paid "some attention to numbers. According to the Supreme Court's precedents. but not all schools could accommodate all applicants. Bollinger and Gratz v. school capacity. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court without issuing an opinion of its own. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment." it did not constitute a rigid quota system. Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest. as well as race. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. including place of residence. the District's plan involved no individualized consideration of students. The District Court ruled that the plan was constitutional because the school had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. No. no school was allowed to have an enrollment of black students less than 15% or greater than 50% of its student population." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education. The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity. 4 vote(s) against Meredith v. and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("white" and "non-white"). Seattle School District #1. Bollinger and Gratz v. (See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. However.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. Justice Kennedy agreed that the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity. arguing that the plan's racial classifications violated the students' Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. and random chance. 05-908) Question: 1) Do Grutter v. After its release from the order.
a black woman. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Mildred Jeter. Jefferson County's plan involved no individualized consideration of students. The Court held that Jefferson County's enrollment plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. By a 5-4 vote. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years). two residents of Virginia." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions. Question: Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: . and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("black" and "other"). The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. Jefferson County also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-raceconscious means. which banned inter-racial marriages. Justice Kennedy agreed that Jefferson County's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education. Virginia 1966 Facts of the Case: In 1958.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. 4 vote(s) against Loving v. Jefferson County's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.32 2) Can a student enrollment plan that requires each school's student population to be between 15% and 50% African-American meet the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest? Conclusion: No and no. a white man. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Meredith. the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found Jefferson County's enrollment plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. were married in the District of Columbia. and Richard Loving.
However. their enforcement by state court injunctions constitute state action in violation of the 14th Amendment. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Shelley. Wilmington Parking Authority 1960 Facts of the Case: In August 1958 William H. In a unanimous decision. the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. . an African-American. Standing alone. Kraemer 1947 Facts of the Case: The Kraemers were a white couple who owned a residence in a Missouri neighborhood governed by a restrictive covenant. This was a private agreement that prevented blacks from owning property in the Kraemers' subdivision. The Virginia law. the Court found. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Loving. a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority. had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination. The Kraemers went to court to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Shelleys. 0 vote(s) against Burton v. 0 vote(s) against Shelley v.33 Yes." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe. Burton. racially restrictive covenants violate no rights. The Shelleys were a black couple who moved into the Kraemers neighborhood. Question: Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: State courts could not constitutionally prevent the sale of real property to blacks even if that property is covered by a racially restrictive covenant.
Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received . the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action." Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Burton. Leroy Irvis. via the Parking Authority. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities. was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. indeed. the Court found that the state. In a 6-to-3 decision. indispensable part of the State's… plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." As such. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C." Question: Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. Clark. as a recipient of assistance by the Parking Authority. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Irvis 1971 Facts of the Case: K. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him. had "made itself a party to the refusal of service. Question: Did the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's refusal to serve Burton constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes.34 and was denied service solely because of his race. 107. 107 v. the Court concluded that the restaurant. and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. 3 vote(s) against Moose Lodge No. clearly benefited from the city's aid and "constituted a physically and financially integral and.
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits." Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Reed. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other. both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Moose Lodge No. a male then between the ages of 18 and 21.35 benefits or services from the government. . 0 vote(s) against Craig v. Curtis Craig. is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause. and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. Question: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? . water. According to the Probate Code. 107.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. all private associations that received electricity. and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. Question: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision.[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. otherwise. Boren 1976 Facts of the Case: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3. . Reed 1971 Facts of the Case: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. the Court reasoned. 3 vote(s) against Reed v. The Court found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building. After the death of their adopted son.
the Fourth Circuit reversed. Furthermore. the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications.36 Conclusion: In a 7-to-2 decision. facilities. the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Question: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy. satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: No. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. financial opportunities. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny. in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal. Virginia. Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Finally. requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy. the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL. as a comparable program to a male-only academy. 2 vote(s) against US v. In a 7-to-1 decision. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Virginia 1995 Facts of the Case: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Craig. courses." Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so . faculty. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.
1 vote(s) against Romer v. Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause. the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. or bisexual orientation. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything." Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Evans." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties. the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons. practices or relationships. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American public. by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest." Amendment 2.37 it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause.] Decisions Decision: 7 votes for United States. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position. forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation. it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group. Question: Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution. In his opinion for the Court. so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest. legislative. imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. conduct. In a 6-to-3 decision. 3 vote(s) against . lesbian. violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: Yes. or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual. Evans 1995 Facts of the Case: Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial.
The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children. therefore. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education. SAISD claimed. are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Doe 1981 Facts of the Case: A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. Question: Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts? Conclusion: No. it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures. acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts. challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD). though not citizens of the United States or Texas. Rodriguez 1972 Facts of the Case: In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.38 San Antonia Independent School District v. "the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of . Question: Did the law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. 4 vote(s) against Plyler v.. are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. This case was decided together with Texas v." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for San Antonio Independent School Dis. The reliance on assessable property.
. unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Doe. Jr. in an effort to redress longstanding. by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Conclusion: No and yes. Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. first in the California courts. casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. then in the Supreme Court. Bakke 1977 Facts of the Case: Allan Bakke. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. in his opinion. Justice Lewis F.39 illegal aliens. 4 vote(s) against . contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. Question: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. agreed. Powell. by denying them the right to an education. However. Powell joined that opinion as well. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bakke. There was no single majority opinion. as part of the university's affirmative action program. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities. Bakke contended. and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest." the Court struck down the law. the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action. 4 vote(s) against Regents of University of CA v. a thirty-five-year-old white man. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
and other minorities. all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. 4 vote(s) against Grutter v." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage. Hispanic Americans. the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work. She was denied admission. whether imposed by federal. Pena 1994 Facts of the Case: Adarand. a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. In other words. Adarand was not. Gonzales Construction Company. However. and consequent allocation of favored treatment. state. since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment. they "must serve a compelling government interest. or local authorities. Question: Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone.. Moreover. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny. the Court held that all racial classifications." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans. It was certified as a minority business.40 Adarand Constructors v. applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School.. Asian Pacific Americans. even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. Another subcontractor. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors. submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547). rather than race.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. Grutter applied with a 3. Bollinger 2002 Facts of the Case: In 1997." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. was awarded the work. must pass strict scrutiny review. and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the .. Under the terms of the federal contract. a white resident of Michigan. Native Americans. Barbara Grutter.
Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The U.S. The Court reasoned that.S. and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results. Governor George Bush and his running mate. 265 (1978). In reversing. "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants.S." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants. Question: . Richard Cheney. 438 U. It heard oral argument two days later. Bakke. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.41 admissions process. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision.S. filed a request for review in the U. on December 8. because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. Gore 2000 Facts of the Case: Following the U. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Question: Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Conclusion: No. 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Justice O'Connor wrote. 4 vote(s) against Bush v.
42 Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism. the Florida decision was fundamentally right. Because of those and other procedural difficulties. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bush. were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.S. but they dissented with respect to the remedy. precinct to precinct. 4 vote(s) against SC v. believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. which only the state legislature may do. Even if the recount was fair in theory. it was unfair in practice. Question: Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections? Conclusion: ." the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Moreover. the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Federal examiners. Loathe to make broad precedents. the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Katzenbach 1965 Facts of the Case: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. and county to county. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Conclusion: Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment. the Constitution requires that every vote be counted. under the Attorney General's jurisdiction.
Marion County Election Board 2007 Facts of the Case: In 2005. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. concluding that the photo I. the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law’s requirements. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent. Federal Election Commission 2003 Facts of the Case: In early 2002. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates. the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. 1 vote(s) against Crawford v. a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during--political campaigns culminated in the passage .D. which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory. However. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Marion County Election Board. the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana." Although there was no majority opinion. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Katzenbach. the Court upheld the law. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. At trial.43 The Court upheld the law. 3 vote(s) against McConnell v. Question: Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens’ right to vote? Conclusion: By a vote of 6 to 3. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests.
will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits. Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations. b) limits on the advertising that unions. The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I. like water. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls. corporations. In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions). content. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals. 4 vote(s) against . Section 4 of the Constitution.. by-passing the typical federal judicial process. the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. unions. not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection). and nonprofit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election. Question: 1. or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and. Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1. the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions. Do regulations of the source. or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause? Conclusion: With a few exceptions. The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.44 of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures"). Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money. the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for McConnell. Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak? 2..
O. "the social." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system. the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. M. the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system." the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. and other voters from Jefferson County. 1 vote(s) against Miller v. only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Alabama. John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett). Sims 1963 Facts of the Case: In 1961. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Sims.. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts. According to the 1990 decennial census. regardless of population variances? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision. Johnson 1994 Facts of the Case: Between 1980 and 1990.784. however. The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each county was entitled to at least one representative and that there were to be as many senatorial districts as there were senators. not community. prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. Baggett). This district.45 Reynolds v. Question: Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators.. and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity. was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6. political. Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat. In short. Population variance ratios of as great as 41-to-1 existed in the Senate. holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens. Sims. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable." Question: Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause? .2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. Vann (Vann v.. David J.
a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race.46 Conclusion: Yes. predominant force" in the redistricting process. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Johnson. In some instances. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. 4 vote(s) against .
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