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Roth v. United States 1956 Facts of the Case: Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. Question: Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973). Decisions Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Miller v. California 1971 Facts of the Case: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion:
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against New York v. Ferber 1981 Facts of the Case: A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances. Question: Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against
New York Times v. Sullivan 1963 Facts of the Case: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the
newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. Question: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for New York Times, 0 vote(s) against Gertz v. Welch 1973 Facts of the Case: Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz lost his libel suit because a lower court found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). Question: Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? Conclusion: The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However, continued Powell, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving ordinary citizens as he advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by citizens suing for libel.
Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Gertz, 4 vote(s) against Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 1987 Facts of the Case: A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Question: Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Hustler Magazine, 0 vote(s) against Reno v. ACLU 1996 Facts of the Case: Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Question:
have also urged the Court to review the case in order to clearly define the relationship between federal gun control laws and the Second Amendment. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.5 Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized? Conclusion: Yes. limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact on adults). refused to grant the plaintiffs relief.S. 0 vote(s) against District of Columbia v. or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes? . Question: Whether provisions of the D. The federal trial court in Washington D. such as the National Guard. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions. the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. rather than prohibits. provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications. Code generally barring the registration of handguns.C. Petitioners agree with the trial court's decision that the Second Amendment applies only to militias. gun ownership. voting two to one that the Second Amendment does in fact protect private gun owners such as plaintiffs. protecting only the former. Heller 2007 Facts of the Case: For the first time in seventy years. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. although disagreeing on the merits. and further argue that (a) the Second Amendment should not apply to D. Respondents. requiring licenses for all pistols. a group of private gun-owners brought suit claiming the laws violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms. and not to private gun ownership. The U. and mandating that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for ACLU. After the District of Columbia passed legislation barring the registration of handguns. and (b) that the D. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications.C. holding that the Second Amendment applies only to militias.C. the Court heard a case regarding the central meaning of the Second Amendment and its relation to gun control laws. because it is a federal enclave rather than a state. legislation merely regulates. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed. and requiring all lawful firearms to be kept unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia. prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license.C.
the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia. the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Heller. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract. not for other purposes even if they are lawful. Question: Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court invalidated the New York law. The Court based its holding on the text of the Second Amendment. Justice Stevens argued that the Second Amendment only protects the rights of individuals to bear arms as part of a well-regulated state militia. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. as well as applicable language in state constitutions adopted soon after the Second Amendment. and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer filed dissenting opinions. any law regulating the use of firearms would have to be "unreasonable or inappropriate" to violate the Second Amendment.6 Conclusion: Yes. and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes. each joined by the other as well as Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In Breyer's view.C. the D. such as self-defense within the home. New York 1905 Facts of the Case: The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Lochner. In a 5-4 decision. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law. 4 vote(s) against . Justice Breyer agreed with Stevens' argument but also stated that even if possession were to be allowed for other reasons. 4 vote(s) against Lochner v. laws at issue in this case were both reasonable and appropriate.
Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information. Nebraska violated the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. create a new constitutional right. But these purposes were not adequate to justify interfering with Meyer's liberty to teach or the liberty of parents to employ him during a "time of peace and domestic tranquillity. Fourth. and other medical treatment." Griswold v. instruction. Together. and Ninth Amendments. was convicted under this law. along with other states. The legislature's view of reasonableness was subject to supervision by the courts. Meyer. or zones. the First. Third. and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. who taught German in a Lutheran school. Question: Does the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause? Conclusion: Yes. the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras. The legislative purpose of the law was to promote assimilation and civic development. Connecticut 1964 Facts of the Case: Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.7 Meyer v. the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling. the right to privacy in marital relations. State regulation of liberty must be reasonably related to a proper state objective. prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to grade school children. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void. 2 vote(s) against . Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Griswold. that establish a right to privacy. Nebraska 1923 Facts of the Case: Nebraska. Liberty means more than freedom from bodily restraint. Question: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Conclusion: Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy.
the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. Roe's attorney -. and. 2 vote(s) against Planned Parenthood v. Wade 1971 Facts of the Case: Roe. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. The first time.could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.8 Roe v. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. if minors. Question: Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent. After granting certiorari.Jay Floyd -misfired from the start. without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? Conclusion: . As a result.Sarah Weddington -. the Court heard arguments twice. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Question: Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Conclusion: The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). wait 24 hours.came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. a Texas resident. obtain parental consent. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Roe. Among the new provisions. Her new opponent -.Robert Flowers -. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Casey 1991 Facts of the Case: The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Her opponent -.
Hardwick 1985 Facts of the Case: Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden. Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. For the first time. Connecticut. Georgia's Attorney General. holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. 1965). Question: Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy. On appeal. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy. 5-to-4 decision. thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? Conclusion: No. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bowers. 4 vote(s) against Bowers v. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy. 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 4 vote(s) against . but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. Bowers." which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices. Connecticut. and that states could outlaw those practices.9 In a bitter. The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. the court dismissed. the Court again reaffirmed Roe. Michael J." Under this standard.
the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. Tyron Garner. but not identical behavior by different-sex couples. Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative state. Director. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. Texas 2002 Facts of the Case: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence. and yes. the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . Hardwick. Accordingly. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. filed dissents. 186 (1986). which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples. controlling. be overruled? Conclusion: No. state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system.S. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner." continued Justice Kennedy." wrote Justice Kennedy. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia.10 Lawrence v. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. the Court overruled Bowers. 186 (1986). Question: Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law. engaging in a private. consensual sexual act. the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. with whom Chief Justice William H. 3 vote(s) against Cruzan v. Kennedy. Missouri Department of Health 1989 Facts of the Case: In 1983. yes. 478 U. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. with Bowers v. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man. violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. 478 U. In affirming. Hardwick.S. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers.
CA 1968 searches incident to an arrest Facts of the Case: Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent patients. the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Missouri Dept.11 Question: Did the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit Cruzan's parents to refuse lifesustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision. the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Chimel. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Director. of Health. 2 vote(s) against . Upon serving him with the arrest warrant. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person. the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse. Question: Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?" Conclusion: In a 7-to-2 decision. 4 vote(s) against Chimel v. State courts upheld the conviction. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn. the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible.
Due process was an admittedly vague concept." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for California. a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner. California 1951 loss of evidence searches Facts of the Case: Rochin swallowed drug capsules to dispose of evidence. it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds. The police pummeled him and jumped on his stomach in a vain effort to make him throw up.12 Rochin v. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted." This nebulous approach was mocked in a concurring opinion by Justice Black. but it prohibited "conduct that shocks the conscience. Justice Brennan argued for a unanimous Court that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Question: Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination? Conclusion: No. 4 vote(s) against . Question: Did the police procedure forcing Rochin to vomit violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: The Court reversed the conviction. The police violated Rochin's right to due process of law. Schmerber v. He vomited the capules and was convicted on the basis of the evidence produced from his vomit. CA 1965 loss of evidence searches Facts of the Case: Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment. They took him to a hospital where a doctor was instructed by the police officers to administer an emetic by forceably passing a tube into Rochin's stomach.
and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. During the search. To investigate the shooting. argued Scalia. New Hampshire (1971). an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. US 1967 Facts of the Case: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states. However. critical to this doctrine. On appeal. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Hicks. the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution. recorded their serial numbers. Question: Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: No. Hicks 1986 plain view doctrine Facts of the Case: A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. The Court granted certiorari. Question: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? . is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. which was done without a warrant. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. Katz challanged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him.13 Arizona v. 3 vote(s) against Katz v. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen. The Court of Appeals rejected this point. noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations. The officer moved some of the components.
Gant 2003 Facts of the Case: Arizona police went to the home of Rodney Gant in search of drugs and to arrest him for failing to appear in court. and weapons. United States (1969). While Gant was still in his car. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Katz. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection. 3 vote(s) against Arizona v. one of whom was in possession of a crack pipe) but while the police were still at the house Gant pulled into the driveway.14 Conclusion: Yes. not places. but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. other contraband. Gates 1982 Facts of the Case: The Bloomingdale. "The Fourth Amendment protects people." wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause. 1 vote(s) against Illinois v. and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case. police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana. reliability. Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli. Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. When they arrived at the house. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Illinois. an officer shined a . Gant was not there (though two other people were in his home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action. Question: Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play.
was decided by the U. Gant appealed. 2004.S. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.15 flashlight into the vehicle. and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. without that justification. clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. without issuing a decision in the case. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. On May 24. Before trial. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. Safford Unified School District #1 v.S. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy.. the court of appeals held that Ms. The court found that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. an eighth grader at Safford Middle School. ruling the search unconstitutional. The search of the vehicle was therefore not directly connected to the arrest and. Question: When police arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle who got out voluntarily. Gant asked the judge to rule the evidence found in the car unconstitutional because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. the police searched it and found drugs and a handgun. On the initial appeal. The trial judge denied the motion. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances. however. but the police made no other contact with him until he stepped out of the car.S. finding that police could constitutionally search a vehicle even after its occupant has left it voluntarily. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. After he was out of the car. The court ruled that these justifications did not apply in Gant's case because he had left the vehicle voluntarily without being stopped by police or asked to get out of the car. Supreme Court later in the same term. Ms. ruling that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under New York v. Belton (1981). the Court issued a decision in the case of Thornton v. U. Gant was arrested and charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Gant was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison. The issue raised in this case. Redding 2008 Facts of the Case: Savana Redding. Question: . Dean. the Court sent it back to Arizona state court for further consideration in light of the Arizona case State v. can they search the vehicle without a warrant? Conclusion: On October 20. on rehearing before the entire court. 2003. was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. the U. However.
Kennedy. Justice Stevens wrote separately. Terry v. Question: Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision. and Samuel A. Stephen G. search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Ohio 1967 Facts of the Case: Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job." The officer stopped and frisked the three men." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Breyer. Anthony M. With David H." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. However. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. No. and Justices Antonin G. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional. and found weapons on two of them. Alito.C Section 1983? Conclusion: Sometimes.S. the Court reiterated that." Here. based on a reasonable suspicion. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. a stick-up. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers.16 1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? 2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U. the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence . Roberts. Scalia. but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe. school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent. concurring in part and dissenting in part. fact dependent.
by [the Fourth Amendment]." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Mapp." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -. the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior.and controversial -. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.17 against Terry. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Ohio. Leon 1983 Facts of the Case: The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials.decision. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. inadmissible in a state court. A judge concluded that the affadavit for the . Question: Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) Conclusion: The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. Ohio 1960 Facts of the Case: Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. 3 vote(s) against US v. 1 vote(s) against Mapp v. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance.
Decisions Decision: 6 votes for United States. argued the majority. the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule. the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. Question: Does the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment apply to the "knock-and-announce" rule? Conclusion: No. Question: Is there a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule? Conclusion: Yes.18 search warrant was insufficient. but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. and impositions on privacy. because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence. the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation. Thus. 3 vote(s) against Hudson v. In Leon. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence. it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. The police had a search warrant. However. is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The exclusionary rule. not to prevent police from conducting a search for . property-damage. Michigan 2005 Facts of the Case: Booker T. In a 5-4 decision. there is such an exception.
19 which they have a valid warrant. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. and Ginsburg. but was negligently allowed to remain active. In his petition for certiorari. Upon searching Herring's vehicle. 4 vote(s) against Herring v. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches. Souter. the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. Alito Jr." and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. was supposed to have been recalled five months prior. The U. Justice Anthony M. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. however the U. the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply. Scalia. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison." The Court granted certiorari on February 19. 2008. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence. and was joined by Justices Stevens. Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. the Supreme Court affirmed the U. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. . noting that “as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. United States 2008 Facts of the Case: The Coffee County. Question: Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled. at the time of the search? Conclusion: No.. Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Michigan. The warrant.S. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police . stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could “result in appreciable deterrence” of future police misconduct. however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion. However.S. still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A.S. Kennedy.
and whether the right to remain silent has been waived. Justice Goldberg. The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment. Souter. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. Justice David H. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers. in his majority opinion. Breyer. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Escobedo's lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Escobedo. spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent. and Justice Stephen G. emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly. 4 vote(s) against Escobedo v. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for United States. 4 vote(s) against . Illinois 1963 Facts of the Case: Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies.20 mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. Question: Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes.
Mirandized confession. made oral admissions. United States. Lastly. and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. un- . Several days after the fire. in Westover v." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. New York. the officer took a short break from questioning. and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel.21 Miranda v. Similarly. The prosecution cited Oregon v. interrogated. though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights. Based on this second. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation. including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations. in California v. the petitioner was arrested by the FBI. In all these cases. Seibert 2003 Facts of the Case: Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17-year-old Donald Rector. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. hoping to get a confession from her first. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Miranda. who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Seibert was interogated by a police officer. 4 vote(s) against Missouri v. local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings. Arizona 1965 Facts of the Case: The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances. suspects were questioned by police officers. She appealed. Seibert was convicted. Stewart." In Vignera v. detectives." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects. in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way. Elstad to argue that an initial. Question: Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession. the petitioner was questioned by police. ruled on jointly. Once she had confessed. or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. inadmissable.
The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Elstad that a defendant who has made an un-Mirandized confession may later waive her Miranda rights to make a second confession (admissible in court) still apply when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold her Miranda warnings? Conclusion: No. ignorant. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases. Alabama. Question: Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. 4 vote(s) against Powell v. found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth . Justice Anthony Kennedy. Question: Does the rule from Oregon v. in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote.even if the two-stage interview was unintentional. but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. Alabama and Weems v.22 Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later. and illiterate -. a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible . Then. overturning the conviction. as it was in Elstad . This cases was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama 1932 Facts of the Case: Nine black youths -.young.if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police. In a decision with no majority.were accused of raping two white women. Justice Kennedy wrote." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Seibert.
in doing so. Those familiar with the American system of justice. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice. Gideon defended himself in the trial. Brady. During the jury selection. 0 vote(s) against Batson v. recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities. the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a courtappointed attorney and. Question: Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four blacks from the jury violate Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws? ." Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Gideon. a black man. stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. essential to a fair trial. He lacked funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Kentucky 1985 Facts of the Case: Batson. the court refused. he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison. the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire. Gideon v. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him. Wainwright 1962 Facts of the Case: Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right. not luxuries. commented Black. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for him. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v.23 Amendment. Question: Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion: In a unanimous opinion. was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. he repeatedly implicated that guarantee.
Sheppard. 2 vote(s) against Sheppard v. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with.24 Conclusion: The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Sheppard. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim. Maxwell 1965 Facts of the Case: After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife. widespread. and solemn courtroom setting. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself . alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive. due to context and publicity.which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media . 1 vote(s) against . the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media. who maintained his innocence of the crime. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Batson. the Supreme Court granted certiorari. calm. Question: What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial. but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again. the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective. and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. Alabama (1965).all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial. the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution. as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v.
" Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Richmond Newspapers Inc. challenged the judge's action. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.25 Richmond Papers v. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder. Question: Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? Conclusion: . Louisiana.. the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. Proffitt v. On appeal. the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. 1 vote(s) against Gregg v. Georgia 1975 Facts of the Case: A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. the prosecution did not object. Roberts v. Florida. Question: Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion: In a 7-to-1 decision. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers. and Woodson v." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. North Carolina. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. Inc. a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion. VA 1979 Facts of the Case: After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia. Texas.
who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified. Question: Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Since it last confronted the issue. The jury sentenced Atkins to death. Chief Justice William H. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. due to their lessened culpability. but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. Moreover.retribution and deterrence of capital crimes . In affirming. and capital murder.applies to mentally retarded offenders. Moreover. such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game. the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty ." argued Justice Scalia. the defense relied on one witness. the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders. the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Georgia. a forensic psychologist. specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant. armed robbery. VA 2001 Facts of the Case: Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction. the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances.26 No. the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender. 2 vote(s) against Atkins v. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency. in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded. In a 7-to-2 decision. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial. Decisions ." wrote Justice Stevens. Lynaugh. In extreme criminal cases. the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases.
that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. Question: Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: . Ferguson 1985 Facts of the Case: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. The majority. In 1892. State law restricted access to the university to whites. (The phrase. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown. segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. 3 vote(s) against Plessy v. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission. a black man. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson. the state law is within constitutional boundaries. Herman Marion Sweatt. "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion. Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train." In short. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color. as distinguished from political equality. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine. Painter 1949 Facts of the Case: In 1946. 1 vote(s) against Sweatt v. upheld state-imposed racial segregation.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. or to enforce social. and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either.27 Decision: 6 votes for Atkins. Question: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No.
The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena. library facilities. Elliott and Davis v. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors. Board of Education II 1954 Facts of the Case: After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. This case was decided together with Briggs v. the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. legal writing opportunities." which was to have opened in 1947. the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Brown v. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Board of Education I 1952 Facts of the Case: Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief. would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. curricula. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes. Question: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. course variety. intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. County School Board of Prince Edward County. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced. and teacher salaries. including faculty.28 In a unanimous decision. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas. qualifications. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. and overall prestige. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Brown. Question: . 0 vote(s) against Brown v.
The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness. little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. 3) non-contiguous attendance zones. 0 vote(s) against .000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts. the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. were within the courts' remedial powers. and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions. Board of Education. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Ed. Question: Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for stateimposed segregation? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision. system in which approximately 14. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. as interim corrective measures. the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed." Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Brown.29 What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Conclusion: The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. of Ed.. North Carolina. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. 1970 Facts of the Case: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. 0 vote(s) against Swann v.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. a three-judge panel the U." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling . Bollinger and Gratz v. and 4) the plan had an ending point. Bollinger apply to public high school students? 2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? 3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance? Conclusion: No. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Question: 1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored.S. 1 2006 Facts of the Case: The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Seattle School District no. arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. because 1) the District did not employ quotas. 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races. race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest. Applying a test from Grutter. By a 5-4 vote. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white). Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents). Applying these precedents to K-12 education. A federal District Court dismissed the suit. the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. the racial tiebreaker went into effect. The District then petitioned for an "en banc" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. Grutter v.30 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. sued the District. A non-profit group. On appeal. and yes. no. upholding the tiebreaker. Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education. the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bollinger and Gratz v. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice. Bollinger.
The District Court ruled that the plan was constitutional because the school had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Seattle School District #1. but not all schools could accommodate all applicants." it did not constitute a rigid quota system." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education.31 government interest in university admissions. and random chance. Meredith and other parents sued the school district. as well as race. and Meredith appealed to the Supreme Court. school capacity. Justice Kennedy agreed that the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity. no school was allowed to have an enrollment of black students less than 15% or greater than 50% of its student population. the District's plan involved no individualized consideration of students. Jefferson County Board of Education 2006 Facts of the Case: Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) were integrated by court order until 2000. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Parents Involved in Community Schools. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. (See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. In those cases. The court held that though the plan paid "some attention to numbers. JCPS implemented an enrollment plan to maintain substantial racial integration. 4 vote(s) against Meredith v. Bollinger. No. and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("white" and "non-white"). rigid racial quotas are never narrowly tailored. Bollinger and Gratz v. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-raceconscious means. 05-908) Question: 1) Do Grutter v. but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity. student enrollment was decided on the basis of several factors. Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. including place of residence. Bollinger allow a school district to use race as the sole factor to assign high school students to public schools? . race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest. Bollinger and Gratz v. After its release from the order. According to the Supreme Court's precedents. arguing that the plan's racial classifications violated the students' Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court without issuing an opinion of its own. However. Students were given a choice of schools.
Jefferson County also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-raceconscious means. a black woman. Question: Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: . The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute. Justice Kennedy agreed that Jefferson County's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity. 4 vote(s) against Loving v. Virginia 1966 Facts of the Case: In 1958. and Richard Loving. the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found Jefferson County's enrollment plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jefferson County's plan involved no individualized consideration of students. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. two residents of Virginia. but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter. and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("black" and "other"). Mildred Jeter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education. which banned inter-racial marriages. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. were married in the District of Columbia.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. Jefferson County's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years). Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Meredith. The Court held that Jefferson County's enrollment plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. a white man. By a 5-4 vote.32 2) Can a student enrollment plan that requires each school's student population to be between 15% and 50% African-American meet the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest? Conclusion: No and no.
a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority. the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. Wilmington Parking Authority 1960 Facts of the Case: In August 1958 William H. 0 vote(s) against Shelley v. Decisions Decision: 9 votes for Loving. The Virginia law. However. entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe. 0 vote(s) against Burton v. The Kraemers went to court to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Shelleys. This was a private agreement that prevented blacks from owning property in the Kraemers' subdivision. the Court found. racially restrictive covenants violate no rights.33 Yes. their enforcement by state court injunctions constitute state action in violation of the 14th Amendment. had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination. The Shelleys were a black couple who moved into the Kraemers neighborhood. In a unanimous decision." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. Burton. Standing alone. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Shelley. Question: Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: State courts could not constitutionally prevent the sale of real property to blacks even if that property is covered by a racially restrictive covenant. an African-American. . Kraemer 1947 Facts of the Case: The Kraemers were a white couple who owned a residence in a Missouri neighborhood governed by a restrictive covenant.
private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. had "made itself a party to the refusal of service. Question: Did the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's refusal to serve Burton constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision. the Court concluded that the restaurant. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Clark. via the Parking Authority. 107 v. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received . 107. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt. Irvis 1971 Facts of the Case: K." Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Burton. arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action." As such. clearly benefited from the city's aid and "constituted a physically and financially integral and. 3 vote(s) against Moose Lodge No. was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. Leroy Irvis. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him." Question: Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No. and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city.34 and was denied service solely because of his race. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. indeed. as a recipient of assistance by the Parking Authority. indispensable part of the State's… plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit. the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. the Court found that the state. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C.
[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. According to the Probate Code. After the death of their adopted son. Question: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Moose Lodge No. the Court reasoned. Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. The Court found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building. water. all private associations that received electricity. . otherwise. both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). Curtis Craig. . the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. Question: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? .35 benefits or services from the government. 0 vote(s) against Craig v.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18." Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Reed. a male then between the ages of 18 and 21. and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits." and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause. 107. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other. Boren 1976 Facts of the Case: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3. Reed 1971 Facts of the Case: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 vote(s) against Reed v.
2 vote(s) against US v.36 Conclusion: In a 7-to-2 decision. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. In a 7-to-1 decision." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny. the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. Decisions Decision: 7 votes for Craig. the Fourth Circuit reversed. faculty. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan. financial opportunities. Furthermore. Finally. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. Question: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy. the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal. requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. facilities. the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI. as a comparable program to a male-only academy." Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so . The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. Virginia 1995 Facts of the Case: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy. satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: No. courses. Virginia. the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL.
so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest. Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause. In his opinion for the Court. In a 6-to-3 decision. it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. lesbian. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons. practices or relationships. violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: Yes. 1 vote(s) against Romer v.37 it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything. forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation. the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. Question: Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties. legislative. conduct. even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group." Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Evans." Amendment 2. 3 vote(s) against . or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.] Decisions Decision: 7 votes for United States. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American public. Evans 1995 Facts of the Case: Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial. the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. or bisexual orientation. by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest.
"the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states. acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts. The San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD). Rodriguez 1972 Facts of the Case: In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school. 4 vote(s) against Plyler v. therefore. Question: Did the law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. though not citizens of the United States or Texas. are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and.38 San Antonia Independent School District v. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of . challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children. are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education. The reliance on assessable property. This case was decided together with Texas v. caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures. Doe 1981 Facts of the Case: A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. Question: Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts? Conclusion: No." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for San Antonio Independent School Dis.. SAISD claimed. Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Question: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bakke. that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. by denying them the right to an education. Powell joined that opinion as well. as part of the university's affirmative action program. in an effort to redress longstanding. had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis." the Court struck down the law. first in the California courts. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities. There was no single majority opinion. However. Jr.. 4 vote(s) against Regents of University of CA v. Bakke contended. Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Doe.39 illegal aliens. 4 vote(s) against . and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest. the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action. Bakke 1977 Facts of the Case: Allan Bakke. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He was rejected both times. casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. agreed. Justice Lewis F. by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Conclusion: No and yes. unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. in his opinion. a thirty-five-year-old white man. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Powell. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. then in the Supreme Court.
The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547).. and other minorities.40 Adarand Constructors v. and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. She was denied admission. state." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. a white resident of Michigan. Hispanic Americans." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage. Moreover. Pena 1994 Facts of the Case: Adarand. Under the terms of the federal contract. Question: Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone. they "must serve a compelling government interest. the Court held that all racial classifications. submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors. and consequent allocation of favored treatment. since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment. Asian Pacific Americans.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny. However. 4 vote(s) against Grutter v. Barbara Grutter. It was certified as a minority business. was awarded the work. would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. Native Americans. even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. whether imposed by federal. Grutter applied with a 3. or local authorities. In other words. all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard.. rather than race. the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the . Bollinger 2002 Facts of the Case: In 1997. Another subcontractor. must pass strict scrutiny review. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body. Adarand was not.. a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans. Gonzales Construction Company.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants. 438 U. Question: Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Conclusion: No.S. and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results. no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant. The U." Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.S.S. Justice O'Connor wrote. In reversing. the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants. 265 (1978). 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. Governor George Bush and his running mate. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. Bakke. filed a request for review in the U. the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Richard Cheney.S. on December 8. constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. Question: . Gore 2000 Facts of the Case: Following the U. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. It heard oral argument two days later. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. 4 vote(s) against Bush v. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.41 admissions process. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. The Court reasoned that.
were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities. Because of those and other procedural difficulties. Loathe to make broad precedents. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Conclusion: Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment. under the Attorney General's jurisdiction. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law. believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Federal examiners. the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Katzenbach 1965 Facts of the Case: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. and county to county. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. 4 vote(s) against SC v. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot. the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Moreover.42 Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Bush. which only the state legislature may do. the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Question: Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections? Conclusion: . but they dissented with respect to the remedy. Even if the recount was fair in theory.S." the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. the Florida decision was fundamentally right. precinct to precinct. the Constitution requires that every vote be counted. it was unfair in practice.
43 The Court upheld the law. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting. 1 vote(s) against Crawford v. 3 vote(s) against McConnell v. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent. the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests. the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870. the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law’s requirements. concluding that the photo I. a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during--political campaigns culminated in the passage . The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. Question: Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens’ right to vote? Conclusion: By a vote of 6 to 3. the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions." Although there was no majority opinion. Decisions Decision: 6 votes for Marion County Election Board. Marion County Election Board 2007 Facts of the Case: In 2005. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Katzenbach. the Court upheld the law. At trial. which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory. Federal Election Commission 2003 Facts of the Case: In early 2002.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates. the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. However.
will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. unions. or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause? Conclusion: With a few exceptions. Do regulations of the source. Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1. or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials. The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I. the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Section 4 of the Constitution. the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions. Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls. corporations. not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection). In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions).. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for McConnell. 4 vote(s) against . It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and. and nonprofit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election. and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures"). Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak? 2. by-passing the typical federal judicial process. the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens.44 of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). content. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections. Question: 1.. the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. b) limits on the advertising that unions. like water.
O. The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each county was entitled to at least one representative and that there were to be as many senatorial districts as there were senators. challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable. According to the 1990 decennial census. and other voters from Jefferson County. Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat. Alabama.. prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts.45 Reynolds v.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. not community. political.. Sims.. Decisions Decision: 8 votes for Sims. regardless of population variances? Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision. was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6. Question: Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system. In short. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts. the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system.784. holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens. David J. "the social. This district. Sims 1963 Facts of the Case: In 1961. Population variance ratios of as great as 41-to-1 existed in the Senate. the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. Johnson 1994 Facts of the Case: Between 1980 and 1990. John McConnell (McConnell v. however. M. and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity. Baggett). only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black." Question: Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause? . Baggett)." the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. Vann (Vann v. 1 vote(s) against Miller v.
In some instances. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. 4 vote(s) against .46 Conclusion: Yes. Decisions Decision: 5 votes for Johnson. a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. predominant force" in the redistricting process.
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