You are on page 1of 76

BACKGROUND

a. The Philippine Legal System


i. In re Shoop, 42 Phil 213 (1920)

II. PARTS OF A STATUTE AND THEIR ENACTMENT


a. Laws and Statutes

Statutes

National

Acts

Mga Batas Pambansa

Commonwealth Acts

Presidential Decrees

Republic Acts

Statutes or Statutory Law

Statutes are defined as the written enactment of the will of the legislative branch of the government rendered authentic by certain prescr
solemnities are more also known as enactment of congress. Generally they consist of two types, the Constitution and legislative enactm

In the Philippines, statutory law includes constitutions, treaties, statutes proper or legislative enactments, municipal charters, municipal
court rules, administrative rules and orders, legislative rules and presidential issuance.

Jurisprudence or Case Law

Jurisprudence or Case Law is cases decided or written opinion by courts and by persons performing judicial functions. Also included ar
in administrative and legislative tribunals such as decisions made by the Presidential or Senate or House Electoral Tribunals. Only deci
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are printed as House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Reports, volume 1 (January 28
October 3, 1990) to present. They will be available electronically at the Supreme Court E-Library.

b. Classification of Statutes
c. Parts of a Statute
i. 1987 Constitution, Article VI, section 26 (1)
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

ii. Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 29089, October 29,


1967, 21 SCRA
496 (1967)
21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed.
Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton,
Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in
favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title
that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another
province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of
the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from
Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

uberdigest

iii. Tobias v. Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA


106 (1994)
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the
provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show
that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were
not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2014/06/tobias-vs-abalos-gr-no-l-114783-case.html

d. Steps in the Enactment of a Statute


i. 1987 Constitution, Article VI, sections 26 (2) and 27

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names
of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.

ii. Commission of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, GR No. 47421,


May 14,
1990, 185 SCRA 329 (1990)
CIR v Court of Tax Appeals
GR No. 47421, May 14, 1990
(Anj version)

FACTS: Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf
course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members
& guests claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not
for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax
Law".

By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as
operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods
and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the
amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis
because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words "hotel, motels, rest houses" on the ground that it might restrain the
development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of
20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars
and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel
or resthouses.

DECISION:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the
20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest
houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec.
20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.

The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf
and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it.

https://lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com/CD+CIR+v+Court+of+Tax+Appeal,+GR+No.+47421,+
May+14,+1990
Commissioner on Internal Revenue V. Court of Tax Appeals

Facts
In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation
, SC overruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterer’s tax under RA6110 is
illegal because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos and Congress had not
taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in this case that the law has always
imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax Code.
Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is
exempt from the 3% on gross receipts because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A
of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because
according to him it would1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming public
and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry.
The protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec42 was not
entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels, motels, rest houses .” House of Ways
and Means concurred with petitioners stating that veto message only seems to
object with certain portionsof 191-A and that can be gleaned by the reasons given
by the President.
Issue
WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax on gross receipts of
operators and proprietors of eating places withinhotels, motels and rest houses.

Held and Ratio


President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not
have repealed the 2% caterer’s tax. CTA agreed with respondent club that
president vetoed only a certain part. CTA mentioned that President can veto only
an entire item, and not just words. The President intentionally only vetoed a few
words in Sec 191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one provision
but all would render the Presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner.
Inclusion of “hotels, motels, rest houses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are
items. President has the right to veto such item, that which is subject to tax and tax
rate. It does not refer to an entire section. To construe item as an entire section
would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has
objections with or to disagree with an entire section where he only has a portion he
disagrees with
https://www.scribd.com/doc/98127049/Commissioner-on-Internal-Revenue-v-
Court-of-Tax-Appeals-Digest

iii. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, GR No. 115455, 115525, 1155343-44,


115754,
115781, 115852, 115873 7 115931, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)

By: Dennis D. San Diego

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTS

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives
but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

HELD
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
35 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills –
EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings
in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments
to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

uberdigest
iv. Arroyo v. de Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268
(1997)

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997


Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority LeaderAlbano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approvalof the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying
the business of the House.
e. Evidence of Due Enactment of Statutes
i. Enrolled Bill Theory

1. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, No. L-1123, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)


78 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate
due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and
House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to
pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as
an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the
respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were
they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of
the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the
said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not
do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals
behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
Uberdigest

2. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28,


1963, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill


Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank
circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco
however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions.
The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to
Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that
urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is
tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and
formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which
provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be
construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not
the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
“urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Uberdigest
3. Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150
(1968)
26 SCRA 150 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years
but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934
as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido,
Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected
his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the
post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces
for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police
department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the
said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city orwho has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision
was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy
of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC
act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts
of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.Uberdigest

ii. Journal Entry Rule


1.Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 71 4
(1974)

56 SCRA 714 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;When to be Consulted


In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA
4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law”
passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which
referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the
Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the
lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was
the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the
Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures
that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to
the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only
to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein,
the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into
law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

III. Statutory Construction


a. Definition
b. Nature and Purpose
c. Construction and Interpretation, distinguished
i. Chapter II of Statutory Construction by Ruben Agpalo (Construction and
Interpretation)
ii. Caltex v Palomar 18 SCRA 247 (1966)
18 SCRA 247 – Statutory Construction – Construction; defined – Noscitur A Sociis

I n 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The
mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However,
then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the
contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines
through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be
delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning anylottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot
be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for
declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is
missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything – there’s
no consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was
merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts
to call for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said
contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift
enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is
lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under
prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries,
there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the
term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term “lottery”. As such, the principle
ofnoscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a
sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift
enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal
service.
iii. General v Barrameda 69 SCRA 182 (1976)
iv. Molina v Rafferty 38 Phil 167 1918
Molina v Rafferty (1918)
Molina v Rafferty
April 4, 1918

Jacinto Molina- Plaintiff-Appellee


Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue- Defendant- Appellant
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
J. Abreu

I. Definition, Concept, and purpose of Statutory Construction


1. Judge Cooley- The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be
sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found, it should be made to govern…. If the
words of the law seem to be doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them
in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what evil, is any,
was meant to be redressed;…
2. And where the law was contemporaneously been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed
for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, & is not lightly to be overruled, although it isn’t conclusive.
II. Facts:
1. The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail court decision on Feb 1, 1918. The
petition was granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted.
2. Jacinto Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to pay the merchant’s
tax required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
3. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist and not a merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes
imposed by the Internal Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants.
4. Point of contention- Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an
“agricultural product” within the meaning of the term used in paragraph (c) of Section 41 of Act No.
2339 (Now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), enforced when the disputed tax was levied
and that he is exempt from the percentage tax on merchants’ sales established by section 40 of Act No.
2339.
5. Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following commodities shall be excluded:
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in their
original state or not
6. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant to
refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal
interest thereon from November 26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.

III. Issue:
1. WON fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an agricultural
product

IV Decision:
Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed.

IV. Ruling:
1. Purpose of legislative in establishing the exemption – exempting agricultural products from the tax the
farming industry would be favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged.
2. As a consequence, it is fairly to be inferred from the statute that the object and purpose of the
Legislature was to levy the tax in question (merchant’s tax) upon all persons engaged in making a profit
upon goods produced by others but to exempt from the tax all persons directly producing goods from the
land. Products were grouped under “agricultural products”.
3. It is also the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation of food. However, if the artificial
production of fish is held not to be included within the exemption of the statute this conclusion must be
based upon the inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to express its purpose, rather than the
assumption that it was actually intended to exclude producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits
conferred upon producers of other substances brought into the store of national wealth by the arts of
husbandry and animal industry.
4. Court held that the ponds where the fish were grown is agricultural land within the definitions set by
the Acts of Congress, the Philippine Commission, and the Mapa vs. Insular Gov’t case.
5. With regard to the question that that the fish artificially grown and fed in a confined area are
agricultural products and therefore exempt, the Court looked deeper. It said that a man might cultivate the
surface of a tract of land patented to him under the mining law, but the products of such soil would not for
that reason be any the less "agricultural products." Conversely, the admission that the land upon which
these fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of necessity
to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be deemed an
"agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under consideration.
3. Courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the term agricultural products is not limited in
its meaning to vegetable growth but includes everything which serves to satisfy human needs which is
grown upon the land, whether it pertains to the vegetable kingdom or to the animal kingdom.
4. Purpose of agriculture – obtain from the land the products to which it is best adapted and through it will
yield the greatest return upon the expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital. This is similar to the
process of enclosing an area for fish production and one of the diets of the products are marine plants
rooted at the bottom of the pond.
5. Another distinction was made between fishermen and the people artificially growing fish in ponds so as
to delineate the scope of the occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable to the occupation tax. The ones
growing fish in ponds were not included.
5. As the present case related to US vs Laxa, the court held that Laxa wasn’t controlling due to evidence
that the fish subsisted solely upon free floating algae in Laxa while in Molina, the fish subsisted through
plants which grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond, thereby making
Molina’s fish in the real sense a product of the land!
Dissent:
J. Malcolm:
1. illustrates how on the same facts, same law, and the same authorities, judges can arrive at diametrically
opposed conclusions
2. Take the Facts where distinction of marine plants rooted to soil of ponds and floating algae make a
small difference, or
3. Take the Laws the small difference in the meaning of “agricultural products” needs to be ascertained.
Primary duty of the court is to ascertain legislative intention. The decision of the majority on
reconsideration in a laudable endeavor would make this the purpose of the law and would follow this idea
consistently to the end.
On the other hand, the original decision would start with the same presumption but finding that to so
construe the law would result in judicial amendment must then necessarily reach a different result; if the
Legislature had intended to exempt all classes of domestic products which would include fish, it would
undoubtedly have done so in plain language.
4. When it came to the Authorities with regard to the limits of the term “agricultural products”, another
court could very well instead of prolonging the examples ad infinitum merely judicially repeal the word
agricultural and include everything which would fall under the word products.
Suffice it to say that the argument on motion for reconsideration and the decision of the majority have
failed to convince me that fish — or to accede to the critical suggestion of the majority — that fish
produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied, are an agricultural product. The
administrative ruling of the Attorney-General, the decision of this court in United States vs. Laxa and the
original decision in the instant case should not be overturned by granting this motion.
Disposition: Judgment of the lower court affirmed
Definitions:
Agriculture – science and art of the production of plants and animal useful to man
Product – anything that is produced whether as the result of generation, growth , labor or thought. Grow –
raise, cultivate
Agricultural products – included animals which derived their sustenance from vegetable growths and are
therefore indirectly the product of the land
v. Endencia v David 93 Phil 696 (1953)

Administrative Case: Endencia and Jugo vs David, as colector of


Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953. 93 Phil
696
Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Saturnino
David, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-6355-56.
August 31, 1953. 93 Phil 696

Facts:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the
appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice
Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on
his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice
Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on
his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial
officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. It is further held
that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted
in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when
the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
http://thedigester.blogspot.com/2011/10/molina-v-rafferty-1918.html
vi. Angara v Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 (1936)
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Posted by kaye lee on 3:28 PM

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as
the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the
protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;

Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior
to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December
9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

Posted by Edgardo Luardo Jr. at 10:56 AM

Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest


63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between
the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Uberdigest
vii. National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma, G.R. L-61236, January 31,
1984
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with
comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao
manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such
employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3
May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio
Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and
“employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23
May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and
members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that
the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statutein force.
Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money
claims of workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor
arbiters after PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and
since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can
only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts
beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the
writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It
granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever acts in his behalf
in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil
Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining
order issued on 5 August 1982
viii. People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)

PEOPLE VS. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONGG.R. NO. L-22301, AUGUST 30,


1967FACT:Defendant Mario Mapa Y Mapulong was charged and convicted of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition by the Court of the First
Instance of Manila. That on or about August 13, 1962, the said accused did and
then wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver, without a serial number, with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor
from the corresponding authorities.The accused defended (with proper
documentation) that he is duly appointed is duly appointed secret agent of then
Governor of Batangas dated June 2, 1962 and at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he had a confidential mission to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City. On November 27, 1963, the lower court convicted the
accused of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:WON the appointment and holding of the position of a secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

RULING:Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative


Code states that:"it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition.”
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code states:“firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties."The law is clear that there is no exemption for a secret agent in the
above mentioned provisions.Thus, the accused defense in the case of People v.
Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on theappeal on the assumption
that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order puts him under the category of a “peace officer” who’s covered in
the Sec. 879 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is not within the power of the
Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the
extent therefor that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.Therefor, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed.

http://docslide.us/documents/people-vs-mapa-mapulong-grl-22301.html
ix. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. De Garcia, G.R. No. 25659, October 31, 1969, 20
SCRA 111
(1969)

Luzon Surety Co vs de Garcia

Facts:

1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co Inc, executed a


surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted
by the latter to Chavez inthe sum of PhP9,000.

2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as


guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily liable
to indemnify Luzon Surety Co Inc against any and all damages, costs and and
other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of
having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, computed and compounded quarterlyuntil fully paid; and to pay 15% of
the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or
connected therewith for attorney's fees.

3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and
Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s
fees and other costs.

4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint


against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.

5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and


Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered
the third party defendantsChavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co.
the amount to be paid to PNB.

6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the
claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying and
garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar plantation.

7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor of
them.
Issue: WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by
the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement

Held: No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
theconjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose,in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or
income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute acharge
upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for
mere preservation made during the marriage upon theseparate property of
either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not becharged to the
partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the
children of bothhusband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the
spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional,
vocational or othercourse. (1408a)

http://docslide.us/documents/luzon-surety-co-vs-de-garcia.html
x. Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 28771, March 31, 1971, 38
SCRA 284 (1971)
Matabuena v. Cervantes Case Digest
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister,
Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at
the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue
influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-
law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed
property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
xi. People v. Nazario, G.R. No. 44143, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 186
(1988)
Case Digest: People vs Nazario
Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to
Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended.
He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966.
Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty
thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and
uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with
the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only
leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The
dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started
operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under
Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made
punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

IV. Effect and Application of Statutes


a. When Statute Become Effective
i. Civil Code, Article 2
ii. Executive Order No. 200 (1987), as incorporated in Executive Order No. 292
(Adm. Code of 1987), section 18.
iii. Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

b. When Regulation Becomes Effective


i. Executive Order NO. 292 (rev. Adm. Code of 1987), Book VII, sections 2-9
ii. People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954)

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law – Publication of Bank Circulars and
Regulations)
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank
Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect
because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed
to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do
not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of
a law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and
effect.

HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
People vs Que Po Lay
TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of
the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to
be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
iii. Tañada v. Tuvera, supra
iv. Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 84111, December 22, 1989,
180
SCRA 591 (1989)
Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest
GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989

Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which
were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of
Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner
but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms
Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1,
which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the
Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review.

Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not
published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official
Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect

NO.

Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring
collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a
class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need
not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.”

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official
Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive,
administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability.
Yaokasin (pet.) v Commissioner of Customs et. al. (resp.)
G.R. No. 84111, December 22, 1989
180 SCRA 591

FACTS:
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were
being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the
petitioner Yaokasin.

On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still
subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the
Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This section 12 states that a decision of a
Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the
Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by
either commisioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and
executory.

The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87
on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:
Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87
valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette?

DECISION:
Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of
the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth
Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative
orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO
No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance
which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability
therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.
c. When Ordinance Takes Effect
i. Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160 [1991]), sections 54-59
ii. Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306 (1976)
Bagatsing v Ramirez
GR No L-41631, December 17, 1976

FACTS:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public
markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The
Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others
the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-
Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:

1. What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which
requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only
demands publication after
approval?
2. Is the ordinance valid?

RULING:

1. The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general
law because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the
other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However,
the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which
the general statute treats in particular. The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the
publication of “ordinance” in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the
publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges” in particular.

2. The ordinance is valid.

Bagatsing v. Ramirez
 A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later
statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its
particular provisions.
 A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter
provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of
the state.
 Statute remains supreme in all matters not purely local.
 A charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state.
d. Language of the Statute That Shall Prevail
i. 1987 Constitution Article XIC, sections 6-8

LANGUAGE

Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be


further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the
Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of
official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.

Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the
Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.

The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall
serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.

Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.

Section 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be
translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish.

ii. Executive Order No. 292 (Adm. Code of 1987), section 20


Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the
interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided.
In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.

e. Manner of Computing Time


i. Civil Code, Article 13
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and
nights from sunset to sunrise.
ii. National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, August 27, 1969, 29 SCRA
70 (1969)
GR no. L-20131
27 August 1969
Facts:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil
case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation,
against the same defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization
Corporation vs. Tecson). Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint
upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of
action.

More than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff
forgot that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed
it was filed two days too late.

The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the
civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment “must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues,” the issue thus
confined to the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 had expired.

However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same “is erroneous because a
year means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year,
December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its
conclusion with the appellant’s theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article
13 of the civil code.

Issues:

Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365
days.

Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365
days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through
legislative process and not by judicial decree.
Civil Code Article 13:

When the law speaks of years, months or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
365 days each; months of 30 days; days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

National Marketing Corporation Plaintiff, Appellant


Vs.
Miguel Tecson, et. Al defendants, Miguel Tecson defendant-appellee, The Insurance
Commissioner, petitioner

Facts: On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all
properties, assets, rights, and chooses in action of the Prize Stabilization Corporation, filed
for the revival of the judgment rendered in Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved
to dismiss said complaint on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and prescription.

Issue: Whether or not there is prescription of complaint.

Ruling: Judgment affirmed. There is prescription as years are to be understood as 365


days; hence, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that ten years of 365 days each or an
aggregate of 3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19, 1965.
f. Territorial Extent of Operation
i. 1987 Constitution, Article 1 ARTICLE I

NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines.

ii. Civil Code, Articles 14 & 15

Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to
treaty stipulations. (8a)

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

iii. Revised Penal Code, Article 2


Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;chan robles virtual law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One
of Book Two of this Code.
g. Prospective and Retrospective Operation of Statutes
i. Constitution, Article III, section 22
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
ii. Civil Code, Article 4
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided
iii. Adm. Code of 1987, section 19
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the
contrary is expressly provided. chanrobles virtual law librar y

iv. Revised Penal Code, Article 22


Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
v. People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946)
People v. Sumilang
77 SCRA 764 (1946)

FACTS:
Petitioner Guillermo Sumilang was convicted of the crime of arson by the CFI of Laguna. Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence. A petition for certiorari was filed but denied by the Supreme Court. A
motion for reconsideration of the said decision for certiorari was also denied on July 17, 1944. The copy
of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed on the same date, July 17, 1944, to
the address of the petitioner’s attorney. The attorney now alleged that he did not receive the notice
because “he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings guerilla”.
Hence the prayer for petition to file pleading or motion to the Court with a basis of the suspension,
through a resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945, of Sec 8 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. The
resolution provides that judgment shall be entered upon expiration of the fifteen days from notice of such
judgment to the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Should the resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945 be given retroactive application to decision
made on July 17, 1944 thus allowing petitioner to file a motion or pleading?

DECISION:
No. The decision of the Court on July 17, 1944 already became final before the resolution took effect on
October 1, 1945. Procedural laws, of which the Rules of Court and the resolution are examples, are
retroactive in the sense and to the extent that it applies only to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage.
FACTS:
The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to theindeterminate penalty
from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 yearsand 1 day of prision
mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of thelower court. Based on the
records, a copy of the resolution of the SC denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to
the petitioner’s attorney. However, the attorney alleges in hispetition that he did not receive the
notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the
Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of thesentence be suspended and that
petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may beallowed by this Honorable Tribunal
necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motionshould be
granted.
RULING:
No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating theprocedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined atthe time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
HELD:
The petition is denied.

vi. Salcedo v. Carpio, 89 Phil. 254 (1951)


Salcedo vs Carpio
Fact: On July 16, 1949, petitioners Dr. Alfonso Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio were appointed
members of the Board of Dental Examiners by Acting Secretary of Health under the provisions
ofSec 2 and Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 417. On June 17, 1950, Republic Act No. 546 was
approved and making Commissioner of Civil Service an Executive Officer of all the Boards of
Examiner who will conduct the examinations given by the said Boards according to the rules
and regulations promulgated by him and approved by the President. Upon its effectivity, the
President by the recommendation of the Director of Civil Service appointed Dr. Gervasion Erana
as Chairman of the Board of Dental Examiners and Dr. Germanico Carreon and Dr. Diosdado
as members. Hence, it caused conflict on the petitioners’ appointments.

Issue: WON in enacting RA No. 546, it was the intention of the Congress to abolish all pre-
existing Board of Examiners appointed prior to the enactment.

Held: SC ruled that the new appointments were valid. Although there was no express provision
in RA No. 546 on abolishing the pre-existing Board of Examiner members, the intention of the
Congress was obvious as the provisions of the the newly enacted law was inconsistent with
those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007 and RA No. 417
applying the ruling in the case of Erana vs Vergel de Dios. The new statute raised the
qualification of the member of the board and the number of years in profession from 5 to 10
years. Their tenure was fixed every three years and their appointment should now be made by
the President as recommended by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Petitioners contention that the law was being applied retrospectively which violates the general
principal that provision of the law should be used prospectively. SC rejected this contention as
applying the law is not making it retrospective but merely making the said law effective as it will
only affect their continuance in the office. And even if it would be applied retrospectively, the Act
will still be valid because it would not devoid them of any vested right.
Ruling: Petition denied.
vii. Tiu San v. Republic, 96 Phil. 817 (1955)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953
by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of
Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the
decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged
that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case
at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the
said R.A. No. 530.

ISSUE:
Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?

DECISION:
Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the
petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section
of the Act provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases
pending in court and to those
where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship...

viii. Buyco v. PNB, G.R. No. 14406, June 30, 1961, 112 Phil. 588 (1961), 2 SCRA
682
(1961)

Buyco vs. PNB, 2 SCRA 682


Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real
property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than
sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956.
Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the
authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16,
1956 as RA 1576. Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept
his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4,
New Civil Code).
This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any
provision regarding its retroactivity. Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law
at the time the offer in question was made.

Buyco v. PNB
RA 1576 which divested the PNB of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans
Held: does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act.
ix. Chavez v. Court of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. 17814, October 31, 1963, 9
SCRA 412 (1963)

Chavez vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 9 SCRA 412


Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the intention of working it himself but
he could not take possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did
not want to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio
Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already. Aquilino de los Reyes
filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said
tenant but suit was dismissed. Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21,
1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199.
Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner
Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death.
On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A.
No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, the amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship
in the event of the tenant s death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the
tenant s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree
of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally .

Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively?

Held: Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively.


Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic
Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was
terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not
operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant.

In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by
Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant
s
death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenant s immediate farm
household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall
cultivate the land himself personally which took effect on 19 June
1959, cannot be applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision
of
the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right
that
has already become vested.

x. Tac’an v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 38736, May 31, 1984, 12 SCRA 319 (1984)
G.R. No. L-38736 May
21, 1984
FELIPE G. TAC-AN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELEUTERIO ACOPIADO, MAXIMINO ACOPIADO,
the
SPOUSES JESUS PAGHASIAN and PILAR LIBETARIO, respondents.
FACT:
As payment for legal services, Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximino Acopiado conveyed a parcel of
land to Tac-An through a document entitled, “Deed of Quitclaim”. After the execution of the
deed, the Acopiados told Tac-An that they were terminating his services. Moreover, Eleuterio
sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An.

On October 7, 1964, Tac-An filed a complaint praying that he will be declared owner of the land
under consideration, that the sale of land belonging to Eluterio be nullified and that he be paid
damages, attorney’s fees, etc. But Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An on
the ground that the contract is not in accordance with the requirements of Administrative
Code of Mindanao and Sulu for Contracts with Non-Christians. The Acopiados are Non-
Christians, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu applies. The petitioner
asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has
no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested.
The petitioner also argues that the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on
June 19, 1965 by Republic Act No, 4252, hence the approval of the Provincial Governor
became unnecessary.
Issue: Are the requirements of Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu still required?
Held:
When the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the
repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the requirements of Administrative
Code of Mindanao and Sulu still required in contracts involving non-christians.
TAC-AN vs. CA
G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984
FACTS:
Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document
entitled “Deed of Quitclaim” as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados
told Tac-an that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree that the
land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them.
But Tac-an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land
previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario.
On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the
“Deed of Quitclaim”. And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers,
Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of
the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be paid for
damages, attorney ‘s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiado’s, et.al
appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section 145 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu – “Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites”.
On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte,
revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiado’s as non-
Christians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the
Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested.

ISSUE:
Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is
already repealed by RA 4252?

HELD:
Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor
was given and when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot
be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary.

xi. Eugenio v. Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, January 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 106 (1996)
Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.Private respondent
suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property.
Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under
their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the lot to him.
Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree , the Human
SettlementsRegulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private Respondent s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the
payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the
Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect
and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is
to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law.

xii. Alunan III v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 108399, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 501 (1997)
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997
Facts:
•LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7
members, a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections were
to be held 30 days after the next local elections. The Local Government Code was
enacted January 1, 1992.
•The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC
provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,
1992, which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of
DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After postponements, they were
held December 4, 1992.
• Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21
registered, 15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passed
the necessary appropriations for the elections.
• September 18, 1992 – The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolution
exempting Manila from holding SK elections because the elections previously held on
May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILG
acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB (Kabataang Barangay) City
Federation of Manila and a member of the City Council of Manila, which stated that
elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26, 1990. In this resolution,
DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt those barangay chapters which
conducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992 from the
forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended to coincide
with the terms of those elected in the SK elections
• Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no
power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs,
and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.
• RTC – issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the
order of the DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election
activities in order to implement the general elections. The case was reraffled to a
different branch of the same court, and the new judge held that DILG had no power
to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that power rests solely in
COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously held

elections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manila
violated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that previously
held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and supervision
over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections
Held:
• Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
• DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK
elections.
o COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for
SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way
that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of COMELEC.Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated
that
the provision in the Omnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contest involving elective barangay
officials only refer to elective barangay officials under the laws in force at the
time the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.
o Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to the
framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of
COMELEC. Although it is argued that no barangays were named in the
resolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because they merely
used the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating exempted
barangays. Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be curative, and thus
should be given retroactive effect, giving the mayor the authority to call
elections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and void for being
conducted without authority.
o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not be
determined from the records of this case. The mere showing that there were
other barangays that held KB elections during the set period but were not
exempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to prove that violation.
An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan did not have
elections in 1992 because they held elections on January 1, 1988.

V. AMENDMENTS, REVISIONS, REPEALS


a. Amendments
i. Estrada v. Caseda, 84 Phil. 791 (1949)

Estrada v Caseda
Edit 0 1…

ESTRADA, vs CASEDA
G.R. No. L-1560
Facts:
On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married
daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave.
On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with
order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being
appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court
correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was
not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-
mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same
"shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October
18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This
Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval."
Issue:

Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.
Held:
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The
provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to,
and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The
period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily
to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the
amended form had been adopted in its stead.

Estrada v. Caseda

Where a statute which provides that it shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval, the four
years is to be counted from the date the original statute was approved and not from the date the
amendatory act was amended.
ii. Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107 Phil. 151 (1960)
Facts:
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law
on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for
12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of PATS - 1
Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays.
However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but
without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, GAB
resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six.
Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the
President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday
and Legal Holiday.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays.
(2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated in the
House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502.

Held:
(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except
holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing
and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes
draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to
make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by
any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their
races, subject to licensing and determination by GAB.
(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate
that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress
were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of
any such indication.
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary
written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or
authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to
give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author
meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that
meaning.
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular
sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes
draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular
races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing,
inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the
same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional
sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club
races.
Manila Jockey Club v Games and Amusement Board
107 Phil 151 (1960)

FACTS:
RA 1502 increased the sweepstake draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they
are to be run. Respondent GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals
and entities by 6. Petitioner Manila Jockey Club protested as they claim they have the right to the
unreserved Sundays stated in Sec 4. of RA 409, as later amended by RA 983.

ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have a vested right to the unreserved Sundays?

DECISION:
No. The wordings of Sec 4 RA 309 as amended by RA 983 are merely permissive since the GAB
reserves the right to determine the holding of any event thus they have no vested right to the unreserved
Sundays. The claim by petitioner that RA 1502 is intended by Congress to be run on the same Sunday
cannot be supported by the Legislative debates since these debates are only expressive of the views
and motives of the individual members and not the whole Congress.

iii. Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853
Sarcos v. Castillo

G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)

FACTS:
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in
office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged
dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private
individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of such administrative complaint,
Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185,
otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension
under the Decentralization Act of l967.
HELD:
The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. The
purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one
person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have
the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor.

SUBJECT
: AMENDMENTS
DOMINGO SARCOS
, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur petitioners
vs
HON.RECARELO CASTILLO,
Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon.Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur
respondents
FACTS:
Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, asMayor of Barobo,
Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act
alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling
of the timber cut, for own use andbenefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the
municipality of Barobo, Surigaodel Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the
government.As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of
officialpower in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filedagainst
petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of thisadministrative complaint
that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediatesuspension of Sarcos from position as
Mayor saying that the acts committed bymayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition
was in accordance with theSec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.
ISSUES:
WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of MayorS arcos
under RA 5185
HELD / RATIONALE:
No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of thePetitioner,
Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly theparagraph dealing with
preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Boardand City or Municipality Council, as
the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after
receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power
to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by
theDecentralization Act of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a
cause for the order by Governor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an
independent candidate thus of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by Castillo is annulled and set
aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.*The Decentralization Act, to which the
decision in this case is based, amended /repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law
provides that the provicnical gorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola officaial was
municipal official wasone affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension.
It was

repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincialboard which has
been granted the power to order preventive suspension
iv. Erectors Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 104215, May 8, 1996, 256 SCRA 629 (1996)
Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi
Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be
entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his
vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the
position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another
contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per
month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in
Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his
contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid
to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-
payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797
vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving
employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In
view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's
appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by
Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint
against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No.
1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising
out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of
the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
b. Revisions and Codifications
i. Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228 (1955)
Facts:
In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased a lot to
Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the
Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him
to eject from the said lot. However, Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to
Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by
Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then
filed to the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant
of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326, section 22
(Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal
Court of Bacolod.

Held:
No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they
received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such
status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect.
Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like
interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under
consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion.
In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it was held that
in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive
authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter
found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially
identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same.
Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be
annulled.
ii. American Bible Society v. Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
Facts:
 American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898
 City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
 American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
 City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for
operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the
permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
 To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license
fees under protest
 American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529
and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
 City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the
Ordinances in question
 Trial Court dismissed the complaint
 American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO
 Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of
the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and license
from the City Treasurer. American Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated
 However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation
not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
 Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax
said business, trade or occupation.
 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is
empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including
importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some
other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale
dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be
classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential
commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but
where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory
for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by
ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
 The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee
that a retail dealer has to pay per annum
 As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these
freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this
Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray
the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax
levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is
almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.
 Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make
its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who
do not have a full purse
 Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue
Code, Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from
any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
 The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
 Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible
Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
from it

American Bible Society v City of Manila (1957)


American Bible Society v City of Manila GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

FACTS:
In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign, non-stock, non-
profit, religious,
missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout
the Philippines. The acting City Treasurer of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business
of general merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028
and 3364. The society paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances
under which the fees are being collected.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid
2. Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar
RULING:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from
introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of his religious
system. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff society.

2. The ordinance is inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Even if
religious groups and the press are not altogether free from the burdens of the government, the act of
distributing and selling bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27e of the Tax
Code (CA 466). The fact that the price of bibles, etc. are a little higher than actual cost of the same does
not necessarily mean it is already engaged in business for profit. Thus, the Ordinances are not applicable
to the Society.

iii. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52306,


October
12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142 (1981)

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged in the business of
telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of
one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued
General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned
over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was
in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from
30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” In
1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income
tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did
not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be
retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so
apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive
application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years
after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three
years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to
withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no
longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.
iv. Ortiz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 78957, June 28, 1988, 62 SCRA 612
(1988)
Facts:
The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then President Marcos for a term
expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquino government, the petitioner
submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted by President Aquino. The petitioner
requested for payment of retirement benefits by invoking RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595
and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by the respondent on the ground that he is "not
entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason
therefor.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA 1568 and re-
enacted by RA 6118.

Decision:
YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should be liberally construed
and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby. This is, as it should be,
because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.

Ortiz v. COMELEC
ISSUE: Whether a commissioner of COMELEC is deemed to have completed his term and entitled to full
retirement benefits under the law which grants him 5-year lump-sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who
“retires from the service after having completed his term of office,” when his courtesy resignation submitted in
response to the call of the President following EDSA Revolution is accepted
RULING: Yes. Entitled to gratuity
Liberal construction
Courtesy resignation – not his own will but a mere manifestation of submission to the will of the political authority
and appointing power

v. Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992, 216
SCRA 500 (1992)
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC
had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that
the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of
1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker
that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of
the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be
read in pari materia.

Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on AuditGR No. 103982December 11, 1992


Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Mecano, a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed a petitionfor
certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in the 7th
Indorsement denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php 40,831.00. Earlier, the petitioner was hospitalized
because of cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount.
Under Sec. 699 of RAC, he is entitled to allowances in case of injury,s ickness, death incurred in the
performance of duty. Hence, the petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director
Alfredo Lim forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. The request was returned due to the
comments of the COA Chairman stating that the RAC being relied upon was already repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987. The petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the Administrative
Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including Section 699. Director Lim
transmitted the request to the Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the COA Chairman.
The COA Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that Section 699
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. According to the COA Chairman,
the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of
Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, the
request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter in the Supreme Court
if he so desires.

Issue:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated the Revised Administrative Code
including Section 699

Decision:
In determining whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent which is manifested in the incorporation of a repealing provision which expressly
and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions that are intend edto be repealed.
Scrutinizing the repealing clause will determine if the new law really supplants the old law. The repealing
clause of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. ² All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The repealing clause of the Administrative Code of 1987 is repeal by implication because it failed to
identify which specific laws shall be repealed. The failure to indicate specific laws reveal that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist
in the terms of the new and old laws.The two categories of repeal by implication are as follows: a)
where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later
act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and b) if the later act
covers the wholesubject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal theearlier law.

In this case, the new Code (Administrative Code of 1987) does not cover nor attempt to cover the
entirety of the old code¶s (Sec 699, RAC) subject matter. There are matters included in theold Code
which are not found in the new one, like the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public
bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section699, and others.
Apparently, COA failed to prove that RAC has conflicting provisions with the Administrative Code of
1987 that may warrant the former¶s repeal.The rules of statutory construction state that repeal of
statutes by implication are not favored.The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
the legislature is presumed toknow the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.The Court explained that it is presumed that laws are passed with
full knowledge of existinglaws related to the matter. In passing a statute, it is reasonable to presume
that it does notintend to interfere with or abrogate with previously passed laws, unless there are
irreconcilableand conflicting provisions between them. Hence, every effort must be exhausted to make
allacts stand and if possible, reconciled; the later act will not operate as a repeal of the
earlier.Wherefore, the Court granted the petition and ordered the respondent to reimburse
thepetitioner¶s claim for benefit

c. Repeals
i. Civil Code, Article 7
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.

ii. Adm. Code of 1987, sections 21 and 22 (Chapter 5)


Operations and Effects of Law

SECTION 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.—When a law which expressly


repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived
unless expressly so provided.

SECTION 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed.—When a law which impliedly repeals
a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing
law provides otherwise.

iii. US v. Soliman, 36 Phil 5 (1917)

Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he,
with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material
allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in
support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his
guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured
by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who
presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for
reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in
Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915,
section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the
Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that
the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that
statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the
effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under
the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the
Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the
commission of the crime of perjury.
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar
than those imposed by the trial judge.
Held:
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury,
repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury,
not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697
revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such
cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the
repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3
of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the
provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not
expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of
Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the
penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed.
Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

US v. Soliman
FACTS:Gabino Soliman, the defendant/appellant, was found guilty for false testimony(perjury)
in another criminal case, for falsely imputing to some other persons the commission of the crime
of estafa. The trial judge on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt acquitted him.
However, appellant was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and P300 fine was imposed by the
trial judge for there can be no doubt that the accused was guilty of the crime of perjury as
defined and penalized in Act No. 1697 Sec .3 . The enactment of the Administrative Code (Act
No. 2657) was alleged to have expressly repealed Act No. 1697 Sec.3 where the former became
effective on July 1, 1916. On the other hand, the judgment was entered on November 23, 1915.
It was suggested that the repealed Act No. 1697 Sec.3should be held to have the effect of
remitting and extinguishing the criminalresponsibility of the accused incurred under the
provisions of the repealedlaw prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:WON the enactment of Administrative Code repealing Act No. 1697 Sec.3 relieved
Soliman of his penalties.

HELD: The repealed Act No . 1697 does not have the effect of relieving an offender in whole
or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the
defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the
extent to which the new law is favorable to the offender.It will not be presumed that in the
absence of an express language, that it was the intention of the legislator to let false swearing as
to a material matter in a court of justice go unpunished, and such would be the effect of the
repealed Act No. 1697, unless it be held that the repeal had the effect of reviving the old statute
(Act No. 2142).
The Administrative code (Act No 2657 Sec. 12) which repealed Act No. 1697dealt with the
form and effect of laws in general, providing that “when a law which expressly repeals a
prior law is itself repealed the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless
expressly so provided." The court ruled that the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal
Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but byimplication,
by the enactment of Act No. 2657. Comparing the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code,
Soliman should be given the benefit of the provisions of Act No. 2142
wherein the penalty prescribed therein is less than that imposed upon him under Act No. 1697.
The enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing
clauses, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try,convict and sentence persons charged
with violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the
new law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in
the repealed law. The court therefore concluded that “in any case in which a statute prescribing a
penalty for the commission of a specific offense is repealed, and in which the new statute
provides new and distinct penalties for the commission of such offense, the penalty which must
be imposed on one who committed the offense prior to the enactment of the repealings
tatute is that one which is more favorable to the convict”. The judgment of conviction entered
in the trial court was affirmed but the sentence imposed was reversed giving the accused the
benefit of the provisions of Act No. 2142, a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and
a fine of P75 with subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed by law shouldinstead be imposed.

iv. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 24022, March 3, 1965, 13
SCRA 377 (1965)
Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 (Quico's version)
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric
tons of rice, thru a government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the
president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to
bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a
certain provision in republic act 2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing
rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon
A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents.

Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?

Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there
is shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to
RA 2207. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
in existing and prior Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby
dissolved. Cost against petitioners.
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric
tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for
consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4,
1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters
Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and
tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is
prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from
doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by
the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate -
is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national
emergency is repealed by RA 3452

Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not
an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied
repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are
different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being
applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied
repeal does not ensue.
v. Lagman v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 23305, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 479 (1966)

Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to operate for
public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of
passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the name
and style of “Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line.
On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18,
paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled “an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets
within the City of Manila, and for other purposes”, which the city mayor approved. The pertinent
provisions of said ordinance includes;
“Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown
to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx”
Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional,
illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and
traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public
Service Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public
convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.

Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth Act
no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)?

Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548 and
the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of
the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend,
modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which
can be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or
control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof.
On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public
service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the said city
under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of public
works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and
streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted
as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and special
law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.
vi. National Power Corporation v. Arca, G.R. No. 23309, October 31, 1968, 24
SCRA

National Power Corporation vs Arca


Facts:1)
On December 26, 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company(PPDC) and the
Dagupan Electric Corporation (DEC), in their own behalf and on that of all the electric plant
operators, who are members of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners'Association (PEPOA), filed
an injunction suit to restrain enforcement by the NAPOCOR of a revised rate of charges for
electric power and energy sold by the latter, which was scheduled to take effect on January 1,
1964. The petition alleged that:
a) The disputed revised rates which would increase the cost incurred by PPDC(24%) and by DEC
(30%) are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary.

b)The revised rates had not been approved by the Public Service Commission.

c)That the unilateral revision by NAPOCOR of the rate and its imposition upon PPDC and DEC of
the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration,
was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them

PPDC and DEC prayed for a TRO to prevent scheduled enforcement and implementation of
NAPOCOR’s revised rates. The Court the nissued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for.

2) NAPOCOR moved to dissolve the injunction based on the following reasons, amongothers:

a)That the enforcement of the new rates will not violate any of the rights of thep laintiffs (PPDC
and DEC)

b) That the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the reasonableness or necessity of the revised
rates, the authority therefore allegedly belonging to the Public Service Commission. A motion
to dismiss the petition was also filed, based on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction by the
court. Motions filed by NAPOCOR were all denied.
3) Hence, NAPOCOR filed a petition of certiorari charging respondent judge Arca with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case and in not dissolving the TRO issued
therein.Petitioner alleged that for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a case, it is not enou gh
that it should have jurisdiction "over a portion of the subject matter of the complaint,"but
upon all the issues brought up by the pleadings. According to petitioner, since the court below
cannot determine the reasonableness of the disputed revised rates, which is one of the issues
raised in the petition, because the matter allegedly pertains to the
Public Service Commission pursuant to Republic Act 2677, it is contended that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the case and to dissolve the
writ of preliminary injunction involved in this controversy.

Issue:
WON Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has been repealed by R.A. 2677

Held:
NO. The petition for a writ of
Certiorari is denied, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved. Costs against

petitioner NAPOCOR.

Contrary to petitioners assertion, the authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services
rendered by the NAPOCOR does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission
. The enactment of R.A. 2677 which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or
withdrawn Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120. A special statute, for a particular case or class
of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. In the case at bar, there
is no indication of a legislative intent to repeal or abrogate provisions of the earlier special
law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030,that later became Republic Act No.
2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Commission
over the public utilities operated by government-owned or controlled corporations is to be
confined to the fixing of rates of such public services,
" in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to
the public interests.
"In the harnessing and distribution and sale of electric power to the consuming public
performed by NAPOCOR, the contingency intended to be met by the legal provision under
consideration would not exist. As stated in Manila Railroad Company vs. Lafferty, where there
are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general - the terms of the general broad
enough to include the matter provided for in the special - the fact that one is special and the
other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general: one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular
case

231 (1968)
vii. Gaerlan, Jr. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 23964, June 1, 1966, 17 SCRA 376 (1976)
viii. People v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 100210, April 1, 1998, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
ix. Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 242
(1995)
x. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No.
137174,
July 10, 2000

VI. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION


a. Intrinsic Aids
i. Title
1. Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920)

ii. Preamble

1. People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050-66, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA


542(1978)

iii. Punctuation Marks


1. U.S. v. Hart, 26 Phil. 149 (1913)
iv. Definition Sections and Interpretation Clauses
1. People v. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536 (1925)
v. Capitalization of Letters
1. Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253 (1956)
b. Extrinsic Aids
i. Legislative History Prior to Enactment
ii. Contemporaneous Circumstance
1. Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131
(1927)
iii. Policy
1. Sarcos v. Castillo, supra
iv. Legislative History of Statute
1. Oliva v. Lamadrid, G.R. No. 23196, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 737
(1967)
v. Contemporaneous and Practical Construction
1. Nestle Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, November 13,
1991, 203 SCRA 504 (1991)
vi. Other Aids (dictionaries, documents, scientific and political writing, legal
treatises etc.)
VII. OBJECTS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION
a. Verba Legis or literal interpretation/plain meaning rule
i. Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787, January 28,
1961, 1 SCRA 267 (1961)
b. Ratio Legis or interpretation by considering the spirit and reason of the
law/Golden Rule
i. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. Nos. 25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 195 (1970)

c. Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule


i. US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910)
ii. Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. 27489, April 30, 1970,
32
SCRA 553 (1970)
d. Equity of the Statute
i. Civil Code, Articles 9 and 10
ii. Amatan v. Aujero, AM No. RTJ-93-956, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 511
(1995)
VIII. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE
a. Common Meaning Rule
i. Kuenzle & Streiff v. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. 510 (1915)
ii. Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 102 Phil. 477
(1957)
iii. Tan, et. al. v. People, G.R. No. 115507, May 19, 1998, 290 SCRA 117 (1998)
b. Terms with Legal Meaning
i. Bernardo v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 5872, November 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 202 (1954)
c. Terms with Multiple Meaning
i. Malanyaon v. Lising, G.R. No. 56028, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 237 (1981)
d. Doctrine of Associated Words or Noscitur a Sociis
i. Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993
e. Ejusdem Generis Rule
i. Vera v. Cuevas, G.R. Nos. L-33693-94, May 31, 1979
f. Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius Rule
i. San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 147749, June 22, 2006
g. Casus Omissus Rule
i. People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
h. Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos
i. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA
590 (1995)
i. Doctrine of Last antecedent
i. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil. 969 (1956)

j. Reddendo Singula Singulis


i. People v. Tamani. G.R. Nos. 22160-61, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 153 (1974)
k. Doctrine of Necessary Implication
i. DAR v. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, G.R. Nos. 152640,
June
15, 2006
l. Verbal or Clerical Errors
i. Rufino Lopez & Sons v. CTA, G.R. No. 9274, February 1, 1957, 100 Phil. 850
(1957)
m. Number, Gender and Tense
i. Santillon v. Miranda, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)
n. Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words
i. Amon Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158585, December 13,
2005, 477 SCRA 552 (2005)
o. Use of “Shall” and “May”
i. Office of the Ombudsman v. Macabulos, G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008
p. Provisos, Exception and Saving Clauses
i. See Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 341-350 (2009)
IX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE, ITS PART AND OTHER
STATUTES
a. Araneta v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 9667, July 31, 1956, 99 Phil. 709 (1956)
b. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 14526, March 3, 1965,
13 SCRA
449 (1965)
c. Magtajas and City of Cagayan de Oro v. Pryce Properties Corporation and
PAGCOR, G.R.
No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)
d. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120865-
71,
December 7, 1995, 251 SCRA 42 (1995)
e. National Tobacco Administration v. COA, G.R. No. 119385, August 5, 1999,
311 SCRA 755
(1999)
f. Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
420 (2004)
X. STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
a. People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648 (1983)
b. Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999, 370
SCRA 769
(1999)
c. Chapter VII and VII – Statutory Construction by Agpalo (Strict or Liberal
Construction/Mandatory and Directory Statutes)
XI. THE STATUTE AND THE CONSTITUTION
a. Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987,
152 SCRA
284 (1987)
b. People v. Muñoz, G.R. Nos. 38969-70, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
c. Ordillo v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 93054, December 1990, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)
d. Calderon v. Carale, G.R. Nos. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254 (1992)
e. Manila Price Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
(1997)
f. Chapter XI of Statutory Construction by Agpalo (Constitutional Construction)