You are on page 1of 48

Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No.

47800, December 2, 1940 consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of
Meaning of Social Justice their owners but of the riding public as well.

Facts: Issue:

Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a

1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by
taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the
the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
respondents. Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of locomotion?
the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to 2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of
Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
being and economic security of all the people?
Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one Held:
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and the promulgation of the said law and the state in
traffic on national roads. order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940. individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the FACTS
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
means of insuring its preserving.
questions. They will be subject to one common discussion and
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all G.R. No. 79777:
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent  The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano,
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
members of the community, constitutionally, through the question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229,
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra- and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the mentioned lands.
the existence of all governments on the time-honored G.R. No. 79310
principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit
the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National
units of a society and of the protection that should be
Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members).
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined It was granted by the court.
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the  Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of granted by the court.
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of
his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the
PETITIONER. requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer
were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and
cancellation of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,  Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which
rendered his motion moot.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not
its principal purpose and therefore is not required to conform to
the requirements.
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. 4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 the law.
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing 5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
the measures catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution title.
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be 6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement only but not specific action.
that a bill should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title 7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the payment of just compensation unlike in the exercise of police
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.
department of the government. 8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method.
eminent domain As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional
provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution goal.
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle 9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made
to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
RULING owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been payment, other modes of payment shall be permitted as
sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the
229. other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
the Congress was formally convened and took over legislative oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are
power. likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of Subtopic: (LANDMARK CASE - RH BILL CASE)
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is
as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Bill.
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That
is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not
what we shall decree today.)
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 112844, June
2, 1995 (Read also the concurrence of J. Brion)
2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom

Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

TOPIC: Role of the Preamble

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by 2. NO.
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition a.) NO.

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) b.) YES.

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom c.) NO.

6. Due process clause 4. YES.

7. Equal protection clause 5. NO.

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude 6. NO.

7. NO.

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration 8. NO.
(FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the
B. NO.
Essential Drugs List is valid

C. NO.

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
A. they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
1. NO.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a duty to protect it.
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention
cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb”
also support the view that conception begins at fertilization. (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under
upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy
struck down.
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that 2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
and thus constitutionally permissible. devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life
and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting
measure to prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a
their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These
qualified medical practitioner.
provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article
considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
and effective”.
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
freedom. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to
it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
implementation of the law.
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to
dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and 4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even
their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
he/she is employed in the government. autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits
or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of

intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature marriage and the family.

has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of

a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the

nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a development of moral character shall receive the support of the

reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in

even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in

seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall

information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the

of family life without the intervention of the State. right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious
about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental beliefs of the petitioners.
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in

5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health
RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
reproductive health education.
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the procedures.
term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
to that of the State.
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
parents in the moral development of their children. reproductive health.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, 7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards a program for which funding has been provided by the national
the teaching of reproductive health education. government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
the LGU.
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication
marriage in violation of company policies.
by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare.
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to
terminate the services of an employee.

PT&T Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
No. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits
FACTS: discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of,
Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s
C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on
account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with
She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F.
the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy
Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991
that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
the job application form under civil status that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of
her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words,
her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
1992. should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices.
Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
Grace from work. company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine
branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged
Grace attained regular status as an employee Philippine agent of JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status
JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on
for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources
Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150
in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the
days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2,
Tañon Strait. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an
1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary
ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it
project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
There was illegal dismissal Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted
until February 8, 2008. It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among
full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their others, violation of the 1987 Constitution. Protesting the adverse
monetary equivalent. ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait
and they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent
On Stipulation against Marriage JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the
affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against
not held prior to the ECC's issuance. Public respondents, through the
marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46
as the foundation of the nation.
does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the
petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and
regulations. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions
Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been
April 21, 2015) mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008.

ISSUE: (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President
shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND interpose timely objections, if any.
STATUTES II. It is the duty of the court to rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the
CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED Government when executing service contracts involving not
SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL only the Tañon Strait, but also other similar areas. True to the
PROTECTION GRANTED TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE constitutional policy, Section 16 Article 2, that the "State shall
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS. protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature," Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the
RULES: perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
I. Adhering to the below mentioned guidelines, this Court finds protected areas. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected
that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
requirements of the 1987 Constitution. While the requirements unique physical and biological significance, managed to
in executing service contracts seem like mere formalities, they, enhance biological diversity and protected against human
in reality, take on a much bigger role. They are requirements exploitation. Surveying for energy resources under Section 14
placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement
law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract. in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional
requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be
Such service contracts may be entered into only with done in protected areas.
respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which information on the possible energy resources in the Tañon
are these requirements: Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations
relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While
general law that will set standard or uniform terms, Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
terms disadvantageous to the country. through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
the President for signature, it will have been vetted several resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to protected seascape.
law and can withstand public scrutiny.
Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586. judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot
and academic under the following exceptions:
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA, G.R. No. 110120, March
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; 16, 1994
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 (read also the
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
concurrence of J. Feliciano explaining the nuances of the ponencia
Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any
of J. Davide)
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,

including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

Ratio :
Lao Ichong, petitoner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and
liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the Issue: Whether or not Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in
interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject interest of national economic survival and security.
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected
but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of
inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of
Yes, Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in interest of national
the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
economic survival and security.
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security
itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which
and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme Thus, Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in interest of national
welfare of its citizens. The Court is fully satisfied upon a consideration of economic survival and security.
all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of
racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has
unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed

Here, there is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears
to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all
kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic
Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not
2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited
for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762
and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily now allows them to do so under four categories:
become full and complete. But the dangers arising from alien Catego Less than Exclusively for
participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance ry A US$2,500,000. Filipino citizens and
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly 00 corporations wholly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and owned by Filipino
action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act
Catego US$2,500,000. For the first two
in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of
ry B 00 up but lessyears of R.A. 8762s
prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made than effectivity, foreign
available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they US$7,500,000. ownership is
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the 00 allowed up to 60%.
national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy After the two-year
and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, period, 100%
producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. foreign equity shall
be allowed.
Catego US$7,500,000.May be wholly
ry C 00 or more owned by of certain loans.
foreigners. Foreign
investments for (5) There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote
establishing a store monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
in Categories B and
C shall not be less Respondent argue that: Petitioners have no legal standing to file the
than the equivalent petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A.
in Philippine Pesos 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
of US$830,000.00.
Catego US$250,000.0 May be wholly The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
ry D 0 per store ofowned by
foreign foreigners. Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
enterprises R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not
specializing in self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
high-end or
luxury The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
products foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds: does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to
(1) The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Filipino citizens.
Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under
the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, ISSUE:
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino 1. WON petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. constitutionality of R.A. 8762.
2. WON R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
(2) The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the
retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of HELD:
business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must
economy. have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right
of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
(3) Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in
retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage
about more unemployment. of that law.

(4) The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail
the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on
them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The PUNO, J.:
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives I. THE FACTS
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to
pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the
enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
NEDA has not opposed such policy.
§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other
as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus - relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the
categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical
entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the
Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject
Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain which should be expressed in its title.
retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of
mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-
door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar
retailing activities. They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,”
“decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete 4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution
since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil unfair competition?


Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which
proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in
February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180
when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the [The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180
implementation of full deregulation. unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the 1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade
requirement of the Constitution.
and unfair competition

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one

title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue
all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general
II. THE ISSUES subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane
Constitution? to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on
delegation of power? imported petroleum.

3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition

on undue delegation of power.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,”
delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of “declining” and “stable” should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as
the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus: submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of
these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to
There are two accepted tests to determine whether
practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction,
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz:
and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such
of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests 3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it
only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of
Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining,
xxx xxx xxx
and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as
a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world
March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar.
the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging
to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of oil industry is an idle dream.
delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a
mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the
cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF
fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of
market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell
text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No.
Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors
the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a
accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of
of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further
constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180. occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and
enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the

Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is
trade and unfair competition. defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price
unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers
to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision
works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The
[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of
and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and
cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the xxx xxx xxx
entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their future. The monopoly profits will never materialize,
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce as the successful predator attempts to raise its price.
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by contains significant barriers to new entry.
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our
requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to
enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO
R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to
engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not and industrial products, and thus provides new opportunities for the
without reason. service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement. A “free market” as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High “free market” espoused by WTO.
Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the law so permeated its
essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our
differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal
props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
downstream oil industry without these provisions.] powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if
such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999 – timing of
full deregulation not justiciable 1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground

that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition does raise a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997 to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly
on matters of this nature.”
limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing Congress.
the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the with all nations.”
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
establishing the World Trade Organization’ would imply rejection
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
foreign competition that is unfair.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
the rules of evidence.
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
(Read also the dissent of J. Puno)

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation
50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
protected, is self-executing.
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
letter, but which GSIS refused to accept.
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put
such legislation. it in operation.

The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a

remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
Cruz v. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
that it was not intended to be self-executing.

The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does

not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the
past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that FACTS:
of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions
has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
constitution are self-executing. registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
other countries, and he has a platform of government. amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
RULING: Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply
to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. which they create.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
"equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
cause of action before the courts. the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no 1.) The International Concept of Association; “A state within a
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually state”
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which
are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body 2.) Right to self-determination (but it does not extend to unilateral
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the right of secession except under the most extreme of cases, under
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance carefully defined circumstances); distinction between internal and
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. external self-determination; countervailing principle: right to
territorial integrity; UN DRIP does not authorize MOA-AD
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is
both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign on August
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception 5, 2008 a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of the Ancestral Domain
of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly (AD) Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. But this was assailed by various petitioners and
69 of the Omnibus Election Code. consolidated by the court as per below.
 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol
on its petition to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD
disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare
international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the
Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1)
natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to  GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from
read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec.
and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.  GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying
to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
was disqualified.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a
judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the
Phils., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 <--- FOCUS ON Full MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading
Disclosure of Public Transactions (Sec. 28)
Memorandum of Agreement-Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to
Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental
have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the
they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as ancestral domain.
"the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government
having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the
It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly
a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build,
subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be
which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another discussed in the comprehensive compact
separate agreement.
The BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms 1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe
from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial for adjudication.
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the 2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information
baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of 1991)
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal 3. Whether or not by signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic
waters. of the Philippines would be binding itself;
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to recognized by law;
enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those MOA;
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
& Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided
DOMAINS). by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD are a matter of paramount public concern
RULINGS: involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by E.O. No. 3 (DEFINING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any FOR GOVERNMENT’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE EFFORTS) itself is
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
proper matter for judicial review. local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
v. Macapagal- Arroyo. 3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held: separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the recognized by law;
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our The concept of association is not recognized under the present
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to Constitution.
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national
ripeness. government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local independence.
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 Art III) The right to information guarantees the right of the people The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a discussed standards.
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in
the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
relations with other states. party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all
and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and
even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
with it. including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA: Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-
AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall
the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath part of the public domain.
of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential
power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or In re Dick, G.R. No. L-13862, April 15, 1918
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of In Re Sotto, January 21, 1949 (Read also the concurrence of J.
inhabitants from their total environment. Perfecto)

The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process,
as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and In re Integration of the Philippine Bar
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and Santiago v. Vazquez, G.R. Nos. 99289, January 27, 1993
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.

Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011 (Read also the respective
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950 dissents of JJ. Carpio and Sereno)
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic, G.R. No. SPCMB Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016
177857-58, September 17, 2009

Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953

Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928) (Read the oft-quoted dissent of J. Holmes regarding Topic: Propriety of Construction
blending of powers)
Subtopic: Power to Construe as a Judicial Function

Case: Endencia v. David

GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)

Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955 En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected

income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in
De La Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent,
through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done
Lagman v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not
a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
otherwise. conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to
give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore,
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate the Judiciary.
a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In
the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 – the six characteristics of a political
The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and question
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more
true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution,
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the (NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws.
The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority
to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946 (NOTE: ruling no
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the
the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one
had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947 (NOTE: enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule
ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution) → IMP’T: such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict
Read also the scathing dissent of J. Perfecto, especially on the with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the
two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
political question doctrine
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
“shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
enactment thereof.”
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . .
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
(2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress,
allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
Arnault v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955 – SC cannot
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two review the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in their legislative prerogatives

Whether or not B.P. Blg. 883 is unconstitutional;

Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960 – political
question: whether a legislator’s action constitutes “disorderly Whether or not the Court should stop the holding of the snap elections for
behavior” or “disorderly conduct” the office of President and Vice President.


De Castro v. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. L-71688, September 3, The Court failed to secure 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg 883
Unconstitutional. Seven Justices DISMISSED the petitions in this case
1985 – political issue: whether the action of the Committee on
(along with the other similar cases) and DENIED prayer for issuance of
Justice of the Batasan in dismissing, for insufficiency in form and an injunction restraining respondents from holding an election on
substance, the impeachment complaint against President Marcos February 7, 1986.
was valid
With what appears to be a popular clamor to hold a snap election, amidst
supervening events, the People of the Philippines from which all
sovereignty emanates must be given a chance to decide, either to re-elect
the incumbent or choose a new leader. Having the issue turned political,
the Supreme Court should not stand in the way.
Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December
20, 1985 – political issue: whether the “snap” presidential
elections of 1986 should be enjoined

Facts: Romulo v. Yñiguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986 – political

issue: whether the Supreme Court should order the Committee on
This case (along with other similar cases and petitions, 140 SCRA 453) Justice to recall from the Batasan archives the impeachment
was filed against holding of a snap election for the office of President and resolution and complaint against President Marcos and the
Vice President through enforcement of B.P. Blg. 883 due to lack of actual Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained therein
vacancy in the Office of the President in reference to a provision in Article
VII, Section 9 of the 1973 Constitution. FACTS
The incumbent president’s conditional resignation demanded for himself Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the
to stay in office until a new president is proclaimed and qualified. Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of
President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment.
Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the ISSUEs
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG).
The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the

to warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?

dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then

2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for
submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to
Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for
conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint?
the recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint
attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The
3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?
present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent
provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the Batasan to HELD
determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for
to approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for
pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing
complaint attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that
contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes
because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the
complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically
Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the
whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a members. It would serve no purpose to proceed any further when it is
collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained.
that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A
precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint
trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members for impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case –
of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The
of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings. impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the
violation of the Constitution.
CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved
produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the
it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
provisions are constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
had already been consummated. They are fait accompli. respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 – Political: Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Whether a law is void because the House failed to comply with its
own internal rules (read also the concurring and dissenting
opinion of J. Puno)
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure Metrobank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012 – principle
to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if of non-interference
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But
this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved. Spouses Balangauan v. CA, G. R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008 –
exception to the principle of non-interference: when Secretary of
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of Justice commits grave abuse of discretion
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 (decision);
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Tañada could deliver
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate
and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who
continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco,
as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings
against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected
because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 – legislative policy required of the 24-member Senate.
underlying the enactment of a statute not reviewable by the Court;
Court rejected argument that, because R.A. 9262 is intended to ISSUES:
prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse—which could very (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
well be committed by either the husband or the wife—gender alone
is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it
under the law involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the
judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of
elect its own president. the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the a quorum would result in the respondent's election as Senate President,
other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes
resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the For this reason, he believes that the group has done enough to satisfy the
business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in
because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in interest.
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J.
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious
to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on
office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the question of jurisdiction but concurs on the question of quorum.
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on
that on that of quorum.
Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821,March 14, 1949 (resolution) →
(Read also concurrence of J. Perfecto to the March 14, 1949 Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and
reserves his vote on the question of quorum.
resolution, especially his critique of the judicial “hands-off” policy)
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R.
L-2821, Jose Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice
to writing later an extended opinion, has resolved, by a majority of
seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957” in the
events which justify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in
the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by
Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in their
separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session
where respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973 Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof.
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the
as amended by Resolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
to propose amendments to the Philippine Constitution. Said Resolution The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for the election of delegates aforementioned case.
of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional Convention began
to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-

session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as

1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next
day, January 13, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring the

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed respondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent motion"

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being

30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. heard, the Secretary of Justice called on and said that, “upon instructions

73, which is an order for setting and appropriating of funds for a of the President, he is delivering a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which

plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution as had just been signed by the President earlier that morning.”

drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was
conducted, and that the result shows that more than 95% of the members
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission
of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and
on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to
majority also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that
enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered as a vote in a
Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President does not have the
plebiscite. The then President of the Philippines, Marcos, hereby certify
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and the appropriation of public
and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
funds for the purpose are lodged exclusively by the Constitution in
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the
Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said
votes cast by the members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the 3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been
Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. approved by a majority of the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly
held throughout the Philippines.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive 4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance,
to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from 5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found
in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. Ruling:

Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are
including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro,
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition.
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to
of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the First Issue
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices
the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6)
election, hence null and void." members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo

involves a justiciable or political question. qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution. affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's
will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the
legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,
complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts
members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
ambit of judicial inquiry." effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the
Second Issue Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial
compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of Third Issue
the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the
Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached
way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance by the Court.
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the Constitution."
1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold
maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no
and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of
specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of Martial Law.
the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that
factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in

considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of

the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the

constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a acceptance thereof;
concomitant feature of martial law." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of Constitution; and
martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare
that the new Constitution is not in force.
Fourth Issue

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It
in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these is so ordered.
cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,
Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and
to give due course to the petitions. Facts:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos proposes amendments to the present

Fifth Issue Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has
not been convened.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling The Solicitor General filed the comment maintains that petitioners have
for a national referendum for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period,
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
Twenty days he issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring Whether or not the acts of the President to conduct a Referendum-
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of Plebiscite which was alleged as unconstitutional is political in nature and
voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) is beyond the judicial cognizance of the Court.
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.

On the same date he issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued The Court ruled that issue raised is a judicial question. Under the terms
opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
commenced an action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of
treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending,
like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within members. 2
its limits.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing
of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed
legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to member from the LDP.
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is The petitioner challenge his removal from the Commission on
therefore a downright justiciable question. Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the

interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not
Wether or not petitioner'sremival from the Commission on Appointments
and replacement by respondent was valid.

Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF
represented in that chamber, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority
the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not
only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party,
the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant
the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held Issues/Held:
by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely
affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the 1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition does raise a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former

Facts: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our on matters of this nature.”

National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO 2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing
opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
and industrial products, and thus provides new opportunities for the (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
the agreement. A “free market” as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
“free market” espoused by WTO. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the with all nations.”
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
establishing the World Trade Organization’ would imply rejection
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
foreign competition that is unfair.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
the rules of evidence.
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly

limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November
Congress. 10, 2003

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative accordance with the guidelines set in this Decree and its implementing
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second rules and regulations. (Underscoring supplied).
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Section 3 of the same law empowers the Commission on Audit (COA) to
Members of the House of Representatives. make a quarterly audit of the JDF:

The second impeachment complaint charges the Chief Justice with SECTION 3. The amounts accruing to the Fund shall be deposited by the
alleged unlawful underpayment of the cost of living allowances of Chief Justice or his duly authorized representative in an authorized
members and personnel of the judiciary and the unlawful disbursement of government depository bank or private bank owned or controlled by the
the JDF for certain infrastructure projects and acquisition of motor Government, and the income or interest earned shall likewise form part of
vehicles. the Fund. The Commission on Audit through the Auditor of the Supreme
Court or his duly authorized representative shall quarterly audit the
Issues: receipts, revenues, uses, disbursements and expenditures of the Fund,
and shall submit the appropriate report in writing to the Chairman of the
Whether or not congress can assail the wisdom and legality of the Commission on Audit and to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, copy
allocation and utilization of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). furnished the Presiding Appellate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and all Executive Judges. (Underscoring supplied).
It is clear from PD 1949 that it is the COA, not Congress, that has the
power to audit the disbursements of the JDF and determine if the same
comply with the 80-20 ratio set by the law.
Section 1 of PD 1949 imposes the following percentage limits on the use
of the JDF:

That at least eighty percent (80%) of the Fund shall be used for cost of
living allowances, and not more than twenty percent (20%) of the said
Fund shall be used for office equipment and facilities of the Courts
located where the legal fees are collected; Provided, further, That said
allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary shall be
distributed in proportion of their basic salaries; and, Provided, finally,
That bigger allowances may be granted to those receiving a basic salary
of less than P1,000.00 a month.

Section 2 thereof grants to the Chief Justice the sole and exclusive power
to authorize disbursements and expenditures of the JDF:

SECTION 2. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall administer and
allocate the Fund and shall have the sole exclusive power and duty to
approve and authorize disbursements and expenditures of the Fund in