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Proofs as Acts and Proofs as Objects

Some questions for Dag Prawitz.*

University at Leyden

YEARS AGO I carried out an exegetical investigation into
Heyting's original meaning-explanations for the intuitionistic logi-
cal constants and the accompanying notion of a proposition.' Cell-
tral to my analysis was a tripartite distinction with respect to the
notion of construction, which has at least three different meanings,
(1) a construction-act (or process);
(ii) the construction-object constructed in the construction-act;
(iii) the process (i) considered as an object.
The proofs occurring in the meaning explanations are constructions
(ii), whereas what is required for an assertion that a certain propo-
sition is true is that a construction in the sense (i) has been carried
out. Finally, I also suggested that Brouwer's notion of construction
could be understood as an amalgamation of all three notions.
At the time, Dag Prawitz was not convinced that the notion of
proofs as (construction-)objects was needed, or even legitimate. Ever
since, in the course of numerous seminar-discussions and informal
conversations, in and out of Stockholm, I have been trying to per-
suade Professor Prawitz of the legitimacy and utility of the proof-
act/proof-object distinction, so far without much success.
For the past three decades, Professor Prawitz has been one of the
foremost commentators on the relation between proof theory and
semantics. Thus, in his work, he has pinpointed several crucial is-
sues, as well as difficulties, concerning his favoured anti-realist stance.
On the present occasion I wish to confront the rejected distinction

* I wishto thank Professor D. T. Runia. Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at
Lqden University. for putting extra computer facilities at my disposal.
' S~indholm( 1983).


with a number of such topics within the anti-realist philosophy of
logic and mathematics. The issues to be discussed have been raised
by Professor Prawitz himself, or are highly germane to his work. The
tool I use for resolving the quandaries in question will be precisely
the proof-act/proof-object distinction, in the hope that this will make
him concede, if not the legitimacy, then at least the utility of the
distinction in question.
First I consider the historical issue:
How does the distinction fare in the writings of Brouwer
and Heyting?
Furthermore the following points will be dealt with:
the semantic interpretation of natural deduction derivation-
the relation between Conservativeness and Harmony;
the proper formulation of Dummett’s Fundamental Assump-
assumptions and the constructive meaning of implication.

1. Tlie historical issue

This I regard as settled: both notions - proofs as acts and proofs as
objects - can be found in the seminal writings of Brouwer and
Heyting. It is a commonplace that, for Brouwer, proofs are mental
acts.? Already in the second of the theses that were defended to-
gether with his dissertation on February 19, 1907, we read:

Tlie admissibility of complete induction cannot only not be proved, but does also
not deserve a place as a separate axiom or separate intuitively evident truth.
Complete induction is ~ i i iucf ofmutlzenuilic’rrlconstruc/ion, which has its justifica-
tion already in the Ur-intuition of mathematics.’

Not just for Brouwer. really. A proof (demonstration), according to the OED, is
that whereby one acquires knowledge. What but the act (or process) of getting to
know could serve in this office? The unease, or even hostility. with which Brouwer’s
formulations are met. steins. I suppose,from their strongly mentalistic slant that
they exhibit, possibly under the influence of Schopenhauer. With a proper notion
of mental act. taking into account the post-Wittgensteinian primacy of the exterior
aspects of our acts. though. Brouwer’s view ought to be unexceptional.
’ Brouwcr (1981. p. 223). imy translation and emphasis.


Proofs as construction-objects - Beweisfiihrlrngen - are present al-
ready in the early (1924) versions of Brouwer’s famous proof of the
Bar Theorem. They are given mathematical notations and behave
very much like functions or well-founded tree^.^ In Heyting’s origi-
nal treatment from 1930, the construction demanded by the math-
ematical proposition

Euler’s constant C is rational

is an ordered pair of positive integers such that a/b = C, that is, an
object of a certain kind. Such examples could be multiplied; here I
confine myself to the above and refer the reader to my articles (1983,
1993, 1994).
Professor Prawitz has granted these observations, as indeed one
must, I think, as far as history is concerned. He has, however, coun-
tered with the remark that for Brouwer (and perhaps also for
Heyting), given their mentalistic ontology and concomitant idiom,
there is no difference to be made between the construction-object
and the act of construction. Accordingly, it would be improper to
say that both crucial notions occur in early intuitionistic writings in
the sense intended by me: if they did so occur, they would clearly
have separate roles to fill and could not be considered identical.
Brouwer’s notion of construction, on the other hand, seems to oscil-
late between construction-acts and construction-objects.
To what an extent can we accept the rejoinder made by Professor
Prawitz? Matters are reasonably straightforward regarding Brouwer,
but they are more complex as far as Heyting is concerned. A COM-
pleted act is individuated in terms of its agent and time of execu-
tion. Thus, when mathematical construction-objects are identified
with acts of construction, their timeless objectivity is lost: construc-
tions become mental entities. Indeed, it is hard to see how such a
psychologistic position is compatible with an objectivistic, nieaning-
theoretical stance on mathematical language. Conimunicable mean-
ing appears to be ruled out. This, of course, is also the position to
which Brouwer was driven: mathematics is an essentially kri7gurge-
less activity. So, on such a view, what purpose would a meaning
theory serve? In mathematics there is then no such thing as meaning
to be explained, and the Brouwerian intuitionist is able to carry on

rather than the lengthy annotated tabular arrangements pre- ferred by previous writers.5 Thus. p. . who made important contributions to the development of intuitionistic mathematics.6 Professor Prawitz. lead a double life in matters intutionistic: on the one hand. thank you very much. algebra and measure theory. It also inaugurated the renaissance for the use of proof- trees.sub-proofs and all. In the latter work his meaning explanations are formulated in terms of objectiv- ist notions such as those of task. Heyting offered no meaning-theoretical analyses for specifically intuitiotzistic conceptions. Professor Prawitz’s doctoral dissertation. turned See Sundholm (1994. he was the.semanticist of intuitionism. for instance Quine and Fitch. Heyting. Heytirig’s seniuntics is confined to basic constructivism. and. for meaning-theo- retical purposes. 2. on the other hand. Heyting. natural deduction derivations had mainly been used as a pedagogical device. the Brouwerian intuitionist. ‘’ Quine (1950). ’ I n my (1984) I have dealt with these issues at some length. who received his logical nursery-training between the firm covers of Church’s Introduction to Muthematical Logic (in which work the use of natural deduction is scrupulously avoided). began the theoretical study in 1965. however. geometry. Nuturul Deduction. the semanticist of constructivism. he was a straightforward Brouwerian mathematical intuitionist. The math- ematical practice of A. Fitch (1952). Heyting.121) for documentation. in particular. Two styles of natural deduction It took a long time for the theoretical study of natural deduction to come off. who had stayed with the Jaskowski format . one must not draw substantial bills of exchange on Bvouiver ’s writings: such a traffic they cannot sustain. or problem. is not covered by the meaning-theoretical reflections of A. for making the often tedious task of actually finding derivations run smoother. or technique. From the pioneering works of Jaskowski and Gentzen onwards. who developed a constructivist notion of proposition (with concomitant explanations of logical constants).190 GORAN SUNDHOLM very well without. such as choice sequences and quantification with respect to them.

and rules of both kinds operate only to the right of the arrow. Gentzen did not only design this familiar version of natural de- duction.of the form A l . when the formalism is cast in a natural deduction mould. Thus. . The derivable objects at the nodes of derivation trees are sequents - not well-formed formulae . This formalism constitutes another formulation. As is by now very familiar. but depends on certain assumptions. . the arithmetization of metamathematics. A L C. finally. (iii) (Godel-codes for) the derivations of the preniisses. In the so called First Consistency proof from 1936. for instance. of natural deduction. Church (1956). owing in particular to the writings of Dag Prawitz. Also in the earlier doctoral dissertation there occurs a sequent calculus. ' Gentmi 1934-35. there are elimination rules as well.'" In my opinion. L!ppsala 1976). he pro- vided a sequent-calculus formulation for natural deduction.'J In the original Gentzen format the derivable objects are well- formed formulae. " ' The class at ( v ) o f discharged assumptions will often be empty. Ch urcli. primr focie. as needed in the proof of the Godel incompleteness theorems. in fact even an axiomatization. and. There. (iif (a code for) the rule used in the last step. and. no extra labour is involved. we find only introduction rules that operate on both sides of the (con)sequence arrow. in the First Consistency proof. (v) (a code for) the (finite) class of assump- tion-formulae that were discharged by the last inference. . . Here. " This alleged cluiiisiiiess o f the ensuing arithmetization was the main reason Ihr c'h tircli 's averslo 11t n iia t ural deduc ti oil (personal coiiiiiiuiiica tio ti from Prof. the end-formula of a Gentzen proof- tree is not derived outright. I can vouch for the elegance of the details in the resulting treatment. would become unduly complex." The Godel-code for a natural deduction derivation would be a five-tuple comprising (i) (the Godel-code of) the end-formula. though. PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 191 back to the original format introduced by Gentzen in his disserta- t i on. (iv) (a code for) the (finite) class of assumptions that are still open after the final inference. having taught the Inconi- pleteness theorems on the basis of natural deduction. .

. Note also that the sequent arrow and the sequents themselves are part of the object-language. Diiininett (1977. The proof-act/proof-object distinction that forms the topic of the present discussion must not be confused with the actlobject distinc- tion applied to proofs. The theory of meaning must then issue a meaning theory for the language in question. According to Gentzen. the theorem proved. the act of proving. we consider interpreted formalisms. or by.. . with a natural deduction derivational apparatus. or made. the meaning theory ought to answer the question: What is the semantic value of a natural deduction derivation? The answer will depend on what type of natural deduction style formalism is chosen. sequents are an object-language generalization of propositions. or better... where the formulae have meaning. In particular. This sequential version has been seen as a mere notational variant of the original Gentzen formulation. in. but also for the derivations themselves.. I I In the theory of meaning. formal languages. In short. However. This object .6.or theorem -has the form the construction(-object) c is a proof(-object) for the propo- sition A. 171-122) and (1991. Reinark 1. . and C are well-formed formulae. and Sundholrn (19834).Ak. p. that is. that is.192 GORAN SUNDHOLM where the A. Prawitz (1971. among others by Professors Prawitz and Dummett. The object of an act of proof. use of formula A as an assumption in standard natu- ral deduction corresponds to the use of the axiom A d A in the sequential version.). one would expect such a meaning theory not only to provide meaning for the terms and formulae. p.. is the knowledge gained. express propositions. 248).(. de- monstration.x(Ak2C). 243). From the point of view of an interpreted language. as well as by myself. p. such a sequent carries (what amounts to) the intended meaning A l ~ . .

'~ This trace is what remains when the act has been completed. I have used the example of a written travelogue. but formulations tending in this direction can be found in foundational writings on intuitionism . an act of traveling. that is. 278). autoinatisch seinen ganzen Beweis enthiilt. or object.'"uch an objec- '? Heyting (1958. the object of the construction. the construction. "The proof is the coii- struction.lecture On fhe relutiori hetivecn rnut/icniutics. are not the only objective features of the act of writers belonging to both opposing camps. to a certain object. At this point. possibly comprising several sub-tracks. April 1992. logic c i n d the tlicory ofknoivlc~dge. of the skiing-tour in question. PROOFS AS ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 193 which form was hinted at already by Heyting:I2 Every theorem has the form (if enunciated without abbreviations): "A construction with such and such properties has been effected by a mathemati- cian". I' In an . and the theo- rem proved.Paris. for instance. specifically designed for the purpose of exhibiting the implicit dangers. The traces of acts need not be material (physical). there is also what Per Mar- tin-Lof has called the truce. which is a careful description of a yet unpublished . according to whom jeder Satz. or goal. the object of the proof-act. - Martin-Lof s example . in case there were several stations to be reached under way. the proof-object. p. wenn man ihn erst einmal intuitionistisch eindwandfrei formuliert. that is. that is. . the object of the construction-act that forms part of the proof-act. and which cor- responds to the third of my readings of 'constr~ction'.1 12). which is part of the proof.literally the track resulting from a com- pleted skiing-tour. l 4 This is an extreme example. that is. of the proof-act.'3 The proof-object is the construction-object."I4 However. in the race to the final goal. great confusion would result if the relevant distinctions with respect to proofs and constructions were . that is. as well as by Freudenthal. or truck.neglected. Ii Freudenthal (1937. I am indebted to Professor Martin- Lot' for allowing me to read his notes for the lecture in question. p. I n my (1993).

The latter proof has an interesting topological significance. When a philosopher of mathematics speaks about a "proof'. also favoured by Professor Prawitz. It is clearly what is at issue in such examples as: "If you want to know what the theorein means. The notion of a demonstration- trace plays a central role within the philosophy of mathematics. specks of butter.or descriptive in the form of written recipes. chalk-marks on blackboards. from an epistemological point of view." "Euclid's proof of the infinitude of primes is different from. he means a proof-trace.act. Venice. This material part of the trace of an act of mathematical demonstration is often supple- mented with a . It operates with assumption-formulae.. of sheets of scrap-paper. don't look at the fomulation.descriptive part in written form as a piece of mathematical text. it is no more forcing than such objects. or a complex contour-integral. the traces can be material - sets of dirty pans. etc. The mathematical case resembles the culinary one: the material trace of the act of demonstration through which a certain theorem has been obtained. perhaps. culinary art. say. In an inter- preted Frege-calculus. there are two clear alternatives for the interpretation of natural deduction derivation-trees: proof-objects and proof-traces. more elaborately. trace. will consist. if you really want to understand it. whence. simple truth is the property ascribed to the propositions expressed by the (derivable) end-formulae of proof- . and object . or. whereas the last one does not: a proof-object is a mathematical object like any other. and the end-formulae of derivation-trees are ascribed the property of being derivable from (the remaining open) assumptions. for instance. In cook- ery. empty cof- fee-mugs. but look at the proof. twigs of thyme. This component is the important trace of a mathematical proof-act. and less interesting than.194 GORAN SUNDHOLM tive "blue-print'' of travel-acts can be used by someone else for making the journey to the same goal. Eider's proof. as often as not. a func- tion in a Banach space. We shall start our inquiry by considering the standard Gentzen-format." Of the three notions of proof . etc. Against the background of this tripartite distinction.the former two carry an epistemological import. arranged in certain less objective . .

-__ .... that is. is a proof of A .. In a natural deduction calculus in Gentzen’s original format. . See my (1997). is true.ow that A is a proposition: to .)c ~ 1 i d ~ 1 . the proposition expressed by the end-formula of a derivation-tree is not ascribed simple truth. t[c.\ t ~ the t11d o f a sentence is (partly) to know what would be a proof- meaning ( ~ l ~ ~Ibr c c tlie t proposition expressed by the sentence in question. .. . is true. . /irovi(led that x. On my preferred reading of Heyting. is a proof of A.. is a proof of A . proof t is a proof of C.. ?‘he latter enunciation one is entitle!~lio make when the inference- rule c. C is true. provided that A.The f J Proof(A) is given as so011 a s we ki._ ‘. . PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS A S OBJECTS 195 trees. A. one must have exhibited a proof-object for the proposition in question.] is a proof of C is valid.!x. ~ . one must exhibit a hypothetical./x. but the weaker property of truth under the assumed truth of certain propositions. that h~v/~ot/ieticci/. In order to have the right to assert the dependent. .. or dependent. so the rule o f I II fercnce A is a proposition Proot(A) is a type I\ aiialytically valid. cI.. where these matters are spelled 011t a bit mow. ___. that is. or truth of the proposition C. . xi is a proof of A.. the enunciation A is true means the same as Proof(A) is inhabited. . c. . . in order to have the right to ascribe truth to a proposi- tion. .” This enunciation one is allowed to assert as soon as one has demon- strated that c is a proof(-object) of A.. for some c.

'" Professor Prawitz was one of many researchers who strove to formulate such a corre- spondence explicitly: [Nlote a similarity between natural deduction and an extended h-calculus for defining functionals. Ch.196 GORAN SUNDHOLM In an interpreted mathematical calculus. or cnnoniccrl. applications of introduction rules immediately followed by applications of the corresponding elimination rule.?" Thus. we can say. 376-378) which bears the title 'Le theoreme de Gentzen et le calcul de la conversion-h'. 248. a derivation of B from the hypothesis A may be looked upon as an open term t(x) in which x is a variable ranging over proofs of the hypothesis A and which yields a proof t(p) of B whenever a proof p of A is substituted for the variable x. . [A] proof obtained by applying implication elimination to a proof q of A . p. I" See Howard (1980). be they of =+form or not. A partial anticipation of the Curry-Howard insight can be found i n Ladriere (1951. p. For instance. Section 6. This conclusion. . the proof may then be written (hxt(x) )(p). B and a proof p o f A may be identified with the result of applying the function q to p. IV) for more discussion. ( 1 965. several reduc- tions. the formulae express propositions and the terms stand for mathematical objects of cer- tain kinds. that is. where I have changed the iiiiplication-sylllbol). which is identical with t(p). ( I 98 I. or conversions. the 2-reduction introduced by Professor Prawitz is seen to be essentially the same as the law of h-conversion just stated. The situation is exactly parallel to that Note that i n standard Natural Deduction the formulae play a double role: they also stand for assertions. 37) . namely the (dependent) proof-objects that serve to make the proposition expressed by the end-formula of the tree a (depend- ently) true proposition. interpretations of derived end-formulae of proof- trees. gives philosophical content to the so called Curry-Howard Pro~~ositions-us-Tv~es isomorphism between the logical formalism and a typed lambda-calculus. form. If q is written i n the form hxt(x). pp. that is. but see also the earlier (1970) and (1971. may be called for in order to bring it into normal.?' When a proof uses many intertwined maxima. The proof of A 3 B obtained by implication intro- duction applied to the derivation of B from A may then be identified with the function hxt(x) which applied to any proof p of A yields the proof t(p) of B.Ix The derivation-trees themselves also stand for certain objects.

(6!/8) + 3 = (72018) + 3 = 90 + 3 = 93.A. that is. but sequents. a sequent holds when there exists a suitable verification. * C. PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 197 of arithmetical computation.. For the derivations in the sequential formulation from the First Consistency proof.. .. A sequent expresses that the consequent proposition is a consequence of the propositions that serve as antecedents. it is not clear to me why he does not accept proofs as ordinary mathematical objects and that the semantic value of an interpreted natural deduction derivation is a (possibly dependent) proof-object for the proposition expressed by the end-formula of the derivation in question... a function taking proof(-objects) for the propositions A. is true.. form as an (Arabic) numeral. then if A2 is true .. a number whose expression contains defined rather than primitive function-symbols.. where a number in noii-primitive form. . really ale true. that is.A. then if A. a function f of the type (Proof(A. ... or canonical. then C is true. It should be stressed that it is for derivations in the standard Gentzen-format that the Curry-Howard isomorphism runs smoothly and it is such derivation-trees that provide notations for proof-ob- jects. .. " S e e Mni tin-Lot' (1994) .22 From the passage just quoted it is clear that Professor Prawitz grants that proofs are (isomorphic to) terms ("functionals") in an extended Lcalculus.. The sequent S: A. Here the derivable objects are not formulae..)) Proof(C). may need evaluation through several computation-steps before it reaches standard.. expresses the relationship that if A. in the case of S. matters are different.A.. irrespective of whether the antecedent propositions A. When matters are as the sequent states we say that S Izokds. Given this.)) (. For instance. The Curry-Howard isomorphism can be extended to sequents so that.. namely. just as propositions are true when suitable proof-objects exist..(Proof(A.

as is well-known. The nodes in a sequential natural deduction derivation-tree are occupied. A contentual difference between the two formulations of natural deduction IS now clear: standard derivations stand for dependent proof-objects. The correctness of (*) only ensures us that it cciii be iiemonstruted. as such. not by formulae. In particular. show us how to set about in order to obtain the desired demonstration in question. This is where the proof-object c comes in handy. consider an objectively correct "state- ment" (enunciation) in the fully explicit form (*) c is a proof-object for the proposition A We have no right to assume. (ii) the inferentially relevant components out of which the proposition A was built. that the enunciation (*) has been demonstrated. we easily find a corresponding sequential derivation. from a derivation in the Gentzen standard format. and . but by sequents. out of which the deriva- tion is composed. indicate separate acts of inference from claims that certain sequents hold to other claims of this forh. Thus. whereas sequential derivations are act-traces. just in the same way that a proof given in a mathematical text allows us to do so. The claim made in the theorem that is demonstrated by such a derivation is that the end- sequent holds. but it does not. the proof-object c comprises information as to (i) the rule according to which it was formed. we can readily step from one to the other. How- ever. The execution of the corresponding act of demonstration results in the claim that the consequence-relationship expressed by the end-sequent holds. whereas the individual steps.198 G O R A N SUNDHOLM into a proof-object for the proposition C . meaningful formalisms? In order to spell this out. Such proof-objects are meaningful counterparts to Godel-codes of the sort that was described above. From an epistemological point of view. Possession of such a derivation allows one to carry out a demonstration for oneself. the sequential form is the proper one in which to display natural deduction derivations: they are the representations of the demonstrations through which theo- rems become known. of course. irrespective of whether there are any proofs of the propositions in question. A sequential derivation-tree provides a notation for an act-trace. What significance does this metamathematical observation carry on the level of inter- preted.

For instance.from below . the various branches of the edifice that has been gener- ated will break off in suitable axioms. for instance. a formal structure is spanned. Also. In this fashion. PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 199 (iii) proof-objects for the premises of the rule in (i) according to which the object c was formed. In the simple case of &I. where A aiid B are the propositions out of which the coiljunction A&B is formed aiid where a aiid b are proof-objects of the proposi- tions A and B. those corresponding to an 2-1. b) is a proof of A&B This structure can be extended upwards by means of suitable simi- lar steps. from top to bottom. a. the first step will be: a is a proof of A b is a proof of B &I(A. however. or of the form x is proof of B. in the very simplest case. which can be read with content as a proof-trace P with ( * ) at its conclusion.aiialytically evident from the concepts they contain.B. When consid- ered in the direction opposite to that of its generation. because of the presupposed correct- ness of (*). It should be noted that a certain stages of this process. for ~ instance. All steps. the information contained in such a proof-object allows us to span . provided that x is a proof of B. but a verification-object for a sequent. that is. claims that are imme- diately . that is. of the form 0 is an element of N. Eventually. will be completely deterministic. that depend on the particular forms of the objects and propositions involved. respectively.a formal structure. owing to the careful design of the proof- object machinery. that of a proof formed by &-introduction (*) has the following form: &I(A. then. it can be read as a blue-print for acts of denionstra- tion with the claim ( * ) as its object. at some steps what might be required is not a proof-object of a proposition. Accordingly. the re- quired steps will produce dependent proof-objects. a. . b) is a proof of A&B.B.

whereas the Dunimettian demonstrations are the traces of proof-acts. which in fully explicit form has the shape (**I c is a proof of A. for obtaining a canonical proof. not be canonical: it can certainly contain defined. demonstration-traces. on its own a demonstration of the claim (**). li Dummett (1975) at (1978. parts. but takes the form proposition A is true see my (1998. section 3). non-primi- tive. Dummett’s observation calls for emendation. !‘For some reasons that the logical form of an assertion is not propositional.a canonical proof . one does not assert a proposition.200 GORAN SUNDHOLM Michael Dummett has drawn a distinction between a proof proper . to this extent it is. A demonstration is just as cogent a ground for the assertion of its conclusion as is a canonical proor. The proof-object c need. But it is in terms of a canonical proof that the meanings of the logical constants are given. just as a number(-expression) must be evaluable to the canonical form of a numeral. that is. The canoni- cal/non-canonical dichotomy applies to proof-objects for proposi- tions. proof-objects and proof-traces. p.?~ I must have demonstrated such a claim in order to have the right to make it. an argu- ment which we may call a ’demonstration’. are traces of proof-acts. on the other hand. and is related to i t in this way: that a demonstration o f a proposition provides an effective nieans for finding a canonical proof. how- ever. but an enunciation that a proposition is true. It is not. . or ’effective means’. where A is the proposition in que~tion. indeed. It must however. be determinately evaluable to canoni- cal form. On my view. 240).and the sort of argu- inent which will normally appear in a mathematical article or textbook.” Armed with the distinction between proof-acts. a program. The written demonstrations occurring in mathematical texts.

454) and (1991. ’7 Prawitz (1965. 396-397). Dummett’s point is. p. 147). the first to observe that har- mony . and the consequences of an utterance of it. Conservativeness and harmony Dummett has also noted that there are always two aspects of the use of a given form of sentence: the conditions under which an utterance of the sentence is appropriate. suggests . ”Prawitz (1987. .. For instance. that the requirement of haimony between the two as- pects of the use of an expression can be made more precise by saying that it is equivalent to requiring that the addition of the expression to a language should not license a use of the old vocabulary which was not already licensed in the original language. pp. p. but see also (1985. It is plain. what counts as an acceptable ground for asserting it.2x Professor Prawitz was.. .*’ Now.. that we may legitimately demand a certain consonance between the two aspects of the use of a given form of expression. . what he is entitled to infer from it if he accepts it. however.and elimination-rules that per- mit inversion . including in the case of assertion. the resemblance of the Dummett harmonycondition to the inversion principle of Prawitz should be manifest. because from Godel’s ~ ’’ Dummett (1973.~~ A clear state- ment can be found in his (1994) review of Dummett’s The Logical Busis of Metuphysics: Dummett . 33) ’’ Belnap (1962). p. it is plain that the requirement of consonance may be expressed as the demand that the addition of the given expression to the language yields a con- servative extension of it.26 For those familiar with Natural Deduction. which includes.. that harmony should impose conservativeness of the expanded language over the old one..’S Later Dummett came to replace the term ’consonance’ with that of the form of introduction.does not suffice for c~nservativeness. p. taking his cue from Belnap’s response to Prior on Tonk.. .166) and (1987a. in the case of an assertoric sentence. pissim). at (1973... 476-477). PROOFS AS ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 20 1 3. . however.. around 1985. This can hardly be correct. In the simplest cases. which comprise both what the speaker commits himself to by the utterance and the appropriate response on the part of the hearer.. .

p. in either case the rules for the novel concepts are in harmony: both higher-order arithmetic and the theo- ries of inductive definitions satisfy the Prawitz inversion-principle. in order to obtain a truth-predicate for the sentences of arith- metic. with the following properties: (i) if the formalism is consistent. over and above the arithmetical means of proof. I concur in their rejection of impredicativity. Constructivistic purists might here object that these higher-order concepts are impre- dimtive. in the language of the chosen formalism.202 G O R A N SUNDHOLM incompleteness theorem we know that the addition to arithmetic of higher order concepts may lead to an enriched system that is not a conservative extension of the original one in spite of the fact that some of these concepts are governed by rules that must be said to satisfy the requirement of harmony. for instance. the constructive con- tent of which is not open to doubt. non-constructive. 375) . therefore. Consequently. Much weaker principles of inductive definition. Godel's proof of his Incomplete- ness theorem is perfectly constructive."' Surely Professor Prawitz is right here. through the use of certain higher order concepts. whence the whole reason- ing is null and void. as Professor Prawitz rightly remarks. Be that as it may. In the case of arithmetic. We are contentually . the truth of the (proposition expressed by the) formula G cannot be demonstrated therein. It is also applicable to con- structive systems such as Heyting arithmetic. for instance. This can be obtained. the truth of the proposition G has not been demonstrated solely according to the rules and axioms of the original formalism.inhuftfich. Prawitz ( 1 994. suffice for the required demon- stration. and. and (ii) the proposition (expressed by) G is true. and the point is a substantial one that is well worth spelling out. quan- tification with respect to propositional functions. The Godel proof pro- vides a specific closed formula G.convinced of the consistency of the chosen formalism. what is called for. but. there is no need to opt for full second-order quantification. is the use of the concept of truth for sentences in the arithmetical language.

these would then be defined or derived. is the route that the demonstration would take also in the other cases. or founded upon. and the latter enunciation is coilstrued as an ellipsis . rather than using the T-predicate as primitive and the T-schema as a postulate. that is. a complete coniniuiiication of the above form that a '' Detailed references to Weyl. In the words of Herman Weyl. together with the relevant instance of the T-schema (T(G#) t)G) is true. concerning the provenance of Ptrrriulurt~ilo. respectively. plus the so- called Tarski T-schema. a partial judgement or incomplete communi- cation. using either second-order quantification or inductive definitions. .incomplete communications.i' Such an incomplete communication is grounded in. and so on. This. depending on the means chosen for extending the original formalism. however. and others. such a theorem means the same as Proof(A) is inhabited. are given in in m y (1994). The use of this theorem T(G#) is true.for a completed assertion of the form c is a proof of the proposition A.or "incom- plete communication" . that the proposition A is true is a Urteilsabstrakt that is. which apparatus would then be used to show that the Godel-number G# of the Godel-sentence G falls under the T-predicate. in fact. yields our desired conclusion G is true. PROOFS AS ACTS A N D PROOFS A S OBJECTS 203 The original arithmetical formalism could also be extended with a truth-predicate for sentences of the original language. that the proposition expressed by T(G#) is true. The Godel incompleteness phenomena presuppose that the theo- rems of the interpreted formalism have the form: proposition A is true From an intuitionistic standpoint.

where proof-objects are suppressed. for a certain proof-object d. the proof-object d cannot even be formulated in the theory T. in which Dag PI-awitz also participated. His Godel-based examples. That is. do not work when theorems are not incomplete communications of the form proposition A is true. whereas with their inclu- sion. . the claim that d is a proof of G. the addition of certain harmonizing principles of exten- sion may yield a non-conservative extension with respect to the origi- nal language. Daniel lsaacson (1987) is also relevant. when this claim is established using suitable definition-principlesfor the stronger concepts that are needed for proving the truth of the (proposition expressed by the) Godel-sentence G. So when the proof-objects are suppressed. we do not have a violation of. that is. we must have demonstrated its truth. Professor Prawitz is certainly right that. ': My analysis of tlie Godel theoremin the context of proof-objects follows that o f Martin-Liif (1994). Furthermore. though. on the level of the Partiulurteile. it does not.204 GORAN S U N D H O L M certain construction is a proof for A. the Godel-theorem provides a refutation of the entail- ment from Harmony to Conservativeness. does not belong to the language of T. In the course of this demonstration we have to have used various principles of definition (and perhaps also of demonstration) that are not available in T.'2 Accordingly. I first heard him make the point in 1978 in discussions at Stockholm. we must have demonstrated that d is a proof of G. since the claim that is demonstrated using the stronger principles is not even formulated in the language of the old theory: the proof- object d cannot be expressed there. but complete communications to the effect that a certain construc- tion(-object) is a proof of A. We can describe the situation arising from the Godel theorem in the following way: since the proposition expressed by the Godel formula G for the chosen formalism T is known by us to be true.

'? Dummett devotes a whole chapter of his work to an examination of the plausibility of this fundamental assumption. to show that we can dis- pense with the rule up for justification: if we have a valid argument for the preniisses of a proposed application of it. 260). it depends on the plausibility of what he dubs the fundamental as- "(1991. But the justification depends heavily upon what we may call the 'fundamental assumption': that. with respect to the notion of 'canonical'. and at the end of his examination he has to concede that the assumption has been left 'very shaky'. PROOFS AS ACTS AND PROOFS AS OBJECTS 205 4. we already have a valid argument.this project . (b) all its initial preinisses are closed atomic sentences. .. if we have a valid argument for a complex statement.3s Professor Prawitz comments on the attempt to base a meaning theory 011a verificationistic conception of the use of sentences in his re- view: Dummett makes several interesting contributions to .34Similarly. but. ( 1 991. p. namely that of the Fundamental As- sumption for Dummett's meaning-theoretical project: The strategy of proof-theoretic justifications . the result reached at the end of a protracted discussion is of a disap- pointing complexity: an argument is cviwnicd if: (a) its final conclusion is a closed sentence. ... trace and object. not appealing to that rule.. An issue raised by Dag Prawitz serves to pinpoint another area where such use can be made. p. p. is . (d) every closed complex sentence in the main stem is dei-ived by means of one of the given set of introduction rules. 254). as he points out. (c) every atomic sentence in the main stem is either an initial premiss or is derived by a boundary rule. for the conclusion. . we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator. "(1991. Dummett's %itndamental Assumption' Harmony is not the only topic where good use could have been made of the distinction with respect to proof: act. 277).. .

The ambiguity of “statement” would then be accounted least one ! where all five notions are conflated under the ~ statement-umbrella. or with an assertion? That is. The list is probably not complete. This term. (ei) and (eii). the ‘’ (1994. (d) the act of statinghsserting. since. tliat is.’x With respect to the matter un- der discussion. j7 The most common use of ’statement’ is to serve in the same roles as proposition. but one which also takes phenomena of indexicdlity into accot1nt. 375). The reviewer completely agrees with this and shares some (although not all) of Dummett’s doubts about the fundamental as- sumption. but I do not wish to imply that Michael Dummett I S one of them. Indeed. p.sfufernivm seem to oscillate between (b). (eii) the assertion made. . that a true complex statement always has a verification that ends with an application of an introduction rule. Examples of all of the following uses of ’statement’ can be found in the not too ancient Oxford literature: (a) meaningful sentence.I6 These complexities can largely be avoided through a use of the proof- trace/proof-object distinction. However. indeed. a failure of this assumption is more serious than the book suggests: it probably means a failure of verificationism since we have hardly any other idea of the form of verifications of logically complex sentences.. In his writings Dummett prefers to use the term ’statement’. but stripped of its assertoric force.206 G O R A N SUNDHOLM sumption. ‘)(Thereare authors . His . viz. has had quite a good innings in recent British philoso- phy. the point i s moot whether Dummett would admit a distinction between (b) and (eii). Fregean Gi&mke. thus depends on the extent to which it can be incorporated into a verificationistic medning- theory of the language as a whole. (b) propo~ition. as has already been remarked. we may ask: does an argument (for a statement) end with a proposition. should ’arguments’ be understood as proofs for propositions or as demonstrations of assertions? A possible answer seems to be that Dummett’s state- merits are his contentual counterparts of formulae.~’ (c) state of affairs. The viability of this . . whence an argu- riieiit f o r a statement would have to be the contentual counterpart of a derivation of a formula. (ei) the assertion made. (e) what is asserted in an act of assertion.

41 The term i w l f . A non-canonical verification(-object) is a means. this means that a verification d of A can be found. that a certain propo- sition I S true. namely those of being the formalistic simulacra for propositions. so that (0) d is a proof-object for A. arguments for the logical constants. tripartite distinction between (i) the act of verification. m t i o / z is particularly apt as an alternative term here. PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 207 formulae of a standard Gentzen natural deduction formalism serve in two roles. When the claim that (a) A is true is demonstrable. The matter is dealt with at some length i n my (1994). and (iii) the trace of the verification-act. can be obviated through the use of basic distinctions under consideration. since the ensuing notion of propositional truth. such an application criterion is not enough. that is. (ii) the verification-object resulting from that act. When a non-canonical verifica- tion d has been found. and other difficulties. that is. I must exhibit a verification-object . such as proof-objects of other proposition^. . the countentual counterparts of the de- rived end-formulae. namely what is verified. is given a so called truth-maker analysis. according to which proposition A is true = there exists a proof for A. and for asserted theorems. execution. for instance. that is." These. or evaluation. but possibly not yet demonstrated. or progrrmz. which on execution yields a canonical proof. we also have to provide an identity criterion. in order to explain the proposition fully. It also admits of a similar. we must explain what it is for two such canonical verifications to be equal verifications of the propo- sition in question. such that "' I n this context it is also interesting to note that Professor Prawitz inakes use of the tern1 w i f k r i m i n the quote above. In order to have the right to make the assertion that a certain proposition A is true. In order to explain a proposition we must lay down what its canonical proof-. There is also the object of the act of verification.not necessarily canoni- cal .for A. of the program d will yield an object d' in canonical form. as well as the complexities in the explanation of canonicity.^^ Since the verifications are meant to form a type of objects. or verification-objects are and how they would be put together out of certain parts.

In the case of our cat we have the following situation: the perception-object (verification-object) the cat's sitting on the mat makes the proposition that the cat sits on the mat true. a theory based on the distinction between proof-acts and dem- onstration-traces can be given a very smooth formulation. at least. I cannot pretend that all problems that such a theory would have to over- come. namely. In the mathematical case. and thus we may rightly conclude (6) d' is a proof of A. say. and its suc- cess as a so called logical framework in computer science. . So my demonstration of the truth of the proposition that the cat sits on the mat will comprise a verification-act that issues in the percep- tion-object. In that area an act of demonstration will be an act of perception. concerning ordinary empirical discourse.~' 'I Note the difference between the object of the verification-act and the veritica- tion-object. namely. then a canonical verification can be found. the complexities in Dummett's for- mulation of canonicity can be put down to his using argument for both proof-objects and proof-traces. that is the difference between the object of the proof-act. and the verification-object will be the object of the act of perception. From the present perspective. or s makes A true. a certain state of affairs. have been re- solved. which makes the proposition that the cat sits on the niat true. that is. The verification-object serves as the truth-maker for the prop~sition. what is perceived in the act in question. and the proof-object .208 GORAN SUNDHOLM (y) d and d' are equal proof-objects of A. In this formulation c is CI proof of A is replaced by (the state of affairs) s is a tr-uth-maker for A . as is wit- nessed by the development of Martin-Lof s type theory. that is. that is. the theorem proved. So we have found a canonical verification of A. as soon as the existeiice of any verification whatsoever for the proposition A is demonstrable. That is. as soon as the truth of the proposition A is demonstrable. the cat's sitting on the niat.

” (1 837. Bolzano’s explana- tion of truth for his Sutze an sich proved controversial. demand that explanations be given of what a canonical truth-maker is. that much further work is needed in order to have a viable theory. Fierce discussion would often result from my presentations and.4’ (1984). 5. or perhaps the rain’s falling. to conduct a seminar on Truth in the Philosophical Institute at Stockholm University. that serves as a truth- maker for the proposition that it is raining.42This is a matter for further investigation. in particular. and by Prawitz. For in- stance. a canonical proof-object would be what is seen in an act of watching the rain’s falling. So it is the falling rain. verification(-object)s would. According to Bolzano. a proposition (Sutz an sich) has the form A has b. at the invitation of Dag Prawitz. PROOFS AS ACTS AND PROOFS AS OBJECTS 209 An elaboration of this idea.that are used by Mulligan. the falling (of the) rain. if the parallel between the empirical and the mathematical cases is going to hold. It is equally the case for the alternatives advo- cated by Dummett. and how it may be put together out of certain constituents.but then conceived of constructively . namely. the moments . $ 25). where A and b are suitable Vorstellungen an sick For such proposi- tions Bolzano explained truth in the following way: The proposition A has b is true if and only if A really has b. that is. Clearly. . where states of affairs serve as truth- makers. Assumptions and the constructive meaning of implication During the first half of 1994 I had the privilege. Possibly. In the present section I was mainly concerned to show that the neglect of the proof-act/proof-object distinction is a source of considerable complexities which are read- ily avoided through its observation. much remains to be done in order to provide a constructivist theory of states of affairs. Simons and Smith in their seminal article will serve also in the constructive case.

in fully explicit form. and would not commit himself. under this assumption. can be registered regarding their re- spective behaviour in assumptions. x : Proof(A) 3 x : Proof(A). In an interpreted formalism. with proof-objects. the conclusion b : Proof(B). and (ii) the proposition A is really true. where the colon has been used to indicate the relation between ob- ject and type. under the assumption that the proposition A is true. or. In the sequential form such an assumption corresponds to the axiom A is true A is true. using the notation just introduced x : Proof(A). It was first recast into the question whether there was a difference between: (i) the proposition A is true. will take the form x is a proof of the proposition A or. Assumptions of the form (i) are. among whom Peter Pagin. on balance. an assumption in a Gentzen derivation. as far as my recol- lection goes. including proof-objects. This b is a dependent proof-object for the proposition B. The realists that followed my seminar presentation. will be reached. say. together with Per Martin-Lof. was uneasy with both options. in fully explicit from. . Using the battery of distinctions now at our disposal. leaned towards the Bolzano position. as we saw above. Subsequently. made in natural deduction derivations of the stand- ard format. at least one difference between (i) and (ii). argued that there was a difference. joined their mentor Bolzano in finding the occurrence of really superfluous: according to them there is no relevant differ- ence between (i) and (ii). Dag Prawitz. but.210 GORAN SUNDHOLM The controversial point was whether really really has to occur in the definiens of the definition. I myself.

44The former type of assump- tions. so that a proof-object can be found. that is. PROOFS A S ACTS A N D PROOFS AS OBJECTS 21 1 Thus proposition B is dependently may even be known to be false . true is construed as an assumption that a proof-object for A can be found. the proposition AI>A&A. an assumption that x is a proof-object for which case the type Proof(A) will be empty. In an assumption of this ordinary Gentzen type. This situation we could not have when we assume that A is really true. so that it is impossible to find a proof of A. A use of 3-introduction then yields 2I(A. An alterna ti1. then (the enun- ciation) A is true . under the assumption in question. is not an assumptioil that it is possible to find a proof for A. that is. in fully explicit form.such that ((x)b)(a) = b[a/x].B. assumptions that propositions are true occur in the case of consequences: sequents have antecedents of this form. (x)b)) : Proof(AIB). when a : Proof(A). An assumption that the proposition A is reulfj. The proposition A may turn out to be false . an element of the fuiiction-type (Proof(A))Proof(B). say. nothing is as- sumed about what is actually the case: an assumption that A is true. Then we assume that reality is as !5 required for the truth of A. that is. The assumption that x : Proof(A) still inakes good sense and can be use for establishing the truth of. where (x)b is a function from Proof(A) to Proof(B).c formulation can be made in terms of enunciations: if a proof-vbject for the proposition A can be found.

The reul truth of the proposition A coincides with the demonstrability of the enun- ciation that A is true. including entailment theory and belief-revi- sioii theory. Valid inference. is as an attempted propositioiialization of the relation that obtains between the propositions that serve as coii- teiits of the premiss. when it holds. that is. I n order to do that one has to explain what a canonical proof of AEB is and when two such proofs are equal proofs of AEB.and conclusion-judgements of a valid infer- ence. that is. The theorems reached from assumptions that proposi- tions are true serve to establish that certain consequence-relations - ”sequents” . on the other hand. I an1 indebted to his paper foI my understanding of how rcti//. and seeins to oscil- late between proposition. “’ Meinong’s notion of an Ohjckrit~is also notoriously slippery. and assuming that it is really true. That is. a sequent. the proposi- tion AEB would have to be4’ true. but serve instead in attempts to validate rules of inference. but stripped o f its assertoric force. when the inference Per Martin-LBt (1998) has convincingly argued that the knowability of truth pertains to i.~functions in combination with truth. and it would be a worthwhile historical task to sort it out against the spectrum of distinctions drawn in the present Within the philosophy of logic. A is true is demonstrable. seems to be of considerable impor- tance in the history and philosophy of logic. or relevant implication.hold.45 This distinction between assuming that a proposition is true. . using ”E ” as an entailment-connective. Meinong’s seminal work Uber Aiznukmen is vitiated by its neglect. Assumptions that the truth of propositions can be known do not serve to establish that sequeiits hold. state of affairs and assertion/judeeiiient made. One way in which to make sense of intensional propositional entailment. On the historical side. preserves propositional truth from its antecedents to the consequent. Indeed. ‘’ Note that this explanation does not provide a constructive meaning for E. preserves knowability in the step from its premisses to the conclusion. assuming that the truth of the proposition A can be known.rd truth. the distinction between the two sorts of assumptions seems to have considerable relevance for the theory of conditionals.212 G O R A N SUNDHOLM can be known.

Without entering into the details of his treatment. f.stock of knowkedge and arguing on that basis about q. P. that its truth is demonstrable. my emphasis. assumptions of the form that a proposition is really true. and (ii) implication as the soundness of a rule. namely (i) implication as the existence of a chain of thought. ’I’ ( I 963). I note that the latter notion corresponds quite well with the notion of the holding F.. that is. To explore this matter in full. 11. 143. Since the validity of inference is explained in terms of the preservation of knowability the required intensionality of the entail- ment connective E is ensured. Professor Prawitz himself has touched on such matters in an in- teresting early paper ”On Constructive Logic and the Concept of Implication”.49I only make the suggestion here in order to exemplify the importance of the distinction between the two kinds of assumption. the so called Ramsey-test is pre-emi- nent: I f two people are arguing ’If p will q?’ and both are in doubt as to p. it is one’s stock of knowledge that one must extend hypothetically. quoted after ( I 978. .SOThere he considers two notions of implication.. In the light of the foregoing discussion. The English version of the Swedish title is mine. I ) . ’General Propositions and Causality’ ( I 929). in an essay. j‘’ To judge from the avalanche of recent material. Ramsey. would lead far outside the scope of the present essay. seems to be called for in order to do justice to this topic. or even known. a sizable monograph. however.4x The hypothetical additions involved here are clearly not assump- tions of the Gentzen standard form that a proposition is true. PROOFS AS ACTS A N D PROOFS AS O B J E C T S 213 A is true B is true is valid. rather than a brief paragraph . they are adding 12 liypotlidcully to their . . In Belief-revision theory. p. seem worthwhile candidates here for explicating Ramsey.

F.that is. 1977. Gro- ningen. under the present perspective corresponds most naturally to the validity of an inference. Princeton.. 1987. BROUWER. qouted from the reprint in Dummett (1978).. Symbolic. ISAACSON. Duckworth.L. 1975.214 GORAN SUNDHOLM of a sequent.Oxford University Press. Princeton Uni- versity Press. J. It is with great pleasure. Vol. M. von Seidel. on the other hand. Alonzo. that I submit this apologia pro obiecto verificationis to the scru- tiny of Dag Prawitz. . valid when there exists a chain of thought (of itnniediately valid steps) from the premisses to the conclusion. The immediate validity of an inference step I has to be analytically grounded in the mean- ing of the terms . Daniel. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. 1907. Amsterdam. A.. permit me to observe that I am not unaware that several (Quinean) bullets have been bitten here. an "implication" from premisses to conclusion . 4.M. Conzposirio Muthetnoticu. quoted from the edition with additional material: Dirk V A N DALEN (editor) Mathematisch Centrum. 1952. DUMMETT. An inference from the premisses J.. J. The Logical Busis of' Metapliysics. E. E. B. A . London. 1937. CHURCH. A sequent holds when it preserves propositional truth.M . . M. FITCH. Lest anyone be convinced that I commit an elementary error at this point. 1956.. The existence of a chain of thoughts. Nordhoff. Duckworth. Logic.. The Ronald Press Company. D~JMMETT. Over de Grondslugen van de Wiskunde. E... London. in 'IThe notion of inferential validity has been dealt with at length along these lines in my ( I 997) and ( 1 998).out of which I has be built. A. 1991. 1978. 1981. Sulzbach. Truth and Other Enigmus. Wissenschaflslehre.. A. and with my warmest thanks for what I have learned from him. E. DUMMETT. "Zur intuitionistischen Deutung logischer Formeln'. FREUDENTHAL. 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic'. DUMMETT. Eleinents oflntuitionisn?. 'Arithmetical Truth and Higher Order Concepts'. 112-1 16. Bernard. pp. References BOLZANO. J.5' With this example my discussion comes to an the nature of the concepts . in the hope that it might provoke him to con- tinue our discussion. E. Hans. . to the conclu- sion J .

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B.216 GORAN S U N D H O L M PRAWITZ. B. Pliilosopliiu Mutliemuticu. F.) SUNDHOLM. New York. proofs and the meaning of the logi- cal constants’. ’Inference. G. G. F.103. Reidel. Vol. Review of Dummett (1991). 1984. 178-1 94. Syntliese 73. G. 6. pp. Vo1. Dag. B. London. 1993. proof and truth-making: a perspective on the intuitionistic conception of truth’. Mind. Hundboolc of’ Philosophicul Logic. 1984-85. pp. B.. Dordrecht. ’Existence. 1983.. pp. ’Brouwer’s anticipation of the Principle of Charity’. G. Foundutions. RAMSEY. 1997. 1978. ’Questions of proof. ’Systems of deduction’. ’Constructions. (The paper was delivered in the 1983-84 session. in: RAMSEY. W. SUNDHOLM. ’Some remarks on verificationistic theories of mean- ing’. PRAWITZ.. 373- 376. G. P. and F. ’Implicit epistemic aspects of constructive logic’. 1929... Dag.. 117-26 SUNDHOLM. implication: a constructivist’s approach’. Journul of Philosophicul Logic 12. 47-70. pp. consequence. P. SUNDHOLM. Vol 13. pp. Lunguuge und Injormution.. . pp. 1983a. 471477. Vol 6 . pp. 1994. TOPOI. Vol. V. ’General Propositions and Causality’. B. GUENTHNER. G. Joumul of’ Logic. Volume I. SUNDHOLM. I987a.. Munuscrito (Campinas). 1998. Routledge and Kegan Paul. B. Holt and Company. but could only be printed in the subsequent volume owing to a Dutch mail strike. 1994. I9 1-2 12. 151-72. i-xiv. 16. Methods oj’Logic. G. B. D. 1950. pp. chapter 1:2 in: GABBAY.. Procecdings of’ the Aristoteliun Society. SUNDHOLM. QUINE. SUNDHOLM.. .