Leroi. Objections To Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations (Digital Copy)

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 DISTRICT OF OREGON
7 PORTLAND DIVISION
9 LEROI ESPIRIQUETZAL, An Individual,) Case No: 18-cv-00157-YY

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10 Plaintiff,)
vs. )
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QUALITY LOAN SERVICE ) PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO
12 CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON, et al., ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Plaintiff hereby submits his objections to the Findings and Recommendations filed by
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Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You on August 6, 2018.
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I. OBJECTIONS
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No. 1. Characterization/summary of the Complaint and Disallowance of Plaintiff’s
19 Responses to Defendants Motions to Dismiss.
20 No. 2. Collective Characterization of “the Trust”.
21 No. 3. The State Court Judgment Is Valid.

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No. 4. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Pursuant To ORS 86.797 Is Valid.
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No. 5. Plaintiff Cannot State Claims Against Defendants QLS, McCarthy Holthus, Realty
24 Trust, McCredie, Deutsche Bank, FATCO, and Morgan Stanley
25 No. 6. Plaintiff Cannot State Claims Against Defendants Sheriff Reese, Governor Brown,
and Federal Defendants
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27 No. 7. Complaint Cannot Be Cured By Amendment.
28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pdxbrownboy@yahoo.com
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No. 8. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Is Moot.
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II. OBJECTION NO. 1
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The portrait of the first amended complaint (“FAC”) painted by Honorable Magistrate
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Judge You does not support a conclusion based on evidence and sound judicial reasoning and
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logic.1 The FAC is characterized as follows:
6 “The Amended Complaint does allege certain relevant facts. Specifically, in 2006,
plaintiff secured an Adjustable Rate Balloon note (“the Note”) secured by a Deed
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of Trust for real property commonly known as 1640 SW Montgomery St., Unit D,
8 Portland, OR 97201 (“the Property”). Id. at ¶¶ 10, 43; Notice of Removal, Ex. C, at
31, ECF #1-3 (Multnomah County Doc. No. 2006-034354). The Deed of Trust for
9 the Note listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERs”) as the
beneficiary. Id. at ¶ 44 (ECF 1-3, at 11). In 2009, the Deed of Trust was assigned to
10 “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley IXIS
11 Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-1.” Id. at ¶ 45. Plaintiff defaulted, ultimately causing a Trustee’s Notice of
12 Sale to be served and recorded. Id. at ¶ 48; ECF #9-1, at 2. See ECF No. 60 at 5-6.
13 Magistrate Judge You also granted Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, ECF No. 59. This
14 simplification of the FAC created huge gaps in the timeline/chronology of events, relevant facts
15 and the evidence on filed with this Court. Moreover, Plaintiff’s responses to the Defendants’
motions and his Declarations in support of Plaintiff’s responses are not included in the Court’s
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analysis of Plaintiff’s claims and whether additional evidence can be produced during discovery
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and during a jury trial. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Declarations are unopposed by all Defendants.
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While the Findings and Recommendations do mention the 2009 Assignment of the Deed
19 of Trust to the Morgan Stanley IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-1, excluded is the fact that in
20 his responses to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and his cross motions for summary judgment,
21 Plaintiff informed the Court that in 2014, MERS recorded a new assignment which informed the
public and all Defendants that Plaintiff’s Note and Deed of Trust was assigned in July of 2013,
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and not in 2009, and which in turn created an issue of standing, not only under the securities laws
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administered by the Federal Defendants, but under the laws of the State of Oregon regarding land
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titles, nonjudicial foreclosures and forcible entry and detainer (FED):
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Before obtaining her current employment, Judge You served as: Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of
Justice from 1992-1994; Senior assistant attorney general, Oregon Department of Justice Trial and Appellate
27 Divisions from 2004-2007; and Circuit Judge, Multnomah County Circuit Court from 2007-2016, among other
employment.
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21 See, ECF No. 29 at 5-7; ECF No. 57 at 11-14; and ECF No. 24 at 6-20. See also ECF No. 13,
22 Plaintiff’s response to Defendant Reese’s Motion To Dismiss, ECF No. 1-6, which is incorrectly
designated as ECF No. 8. Additionally, in paragraphs 94-98 of the FAC, Plaintiff specifically
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reserved his right to seek leave of the Court to amend the FAC in the event the State Defendants
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used their power to unlawfully seize possession of Plaintiff’s home in violation of the Federal
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Constitution:
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21 Plaintiff’s Responses also exposed a scheme to circumvent Oregon’s statute of limitations

22 for the note and deed of trust by the recordation of alleged fraudulent notices of default. A 2009
23 Notice of Default and Election to Sell, Mult. Doc. No. 2009-039778, noted default began
11/01/08. The Trust, which Defendants Quality Loan and McCarthy claims to represent, by
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operation of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should have
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acquired jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s Note and Deed of Trust on or before the June 30, 2006 closing
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date. If true, more than 11 years elapsed before the 2017 notice of default was recorded and the
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1 December 2017 nonjudicial foreclosure sale was conducted. See, ECF No. 29 at 12-20; ECF No.
2 57 at 13-14; and ECF No. 24 at 12-18.
After removing this action to this Court on January 25, 2018, an action for forcible entry
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and wrongful detainer (“FED”) was commenced in the Multnomah County Circuit Court (“Circuit
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Court”) by Defendant Deutsch Bank on February 8, 2018 under ORS 105.110 against Plaintiff
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following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale provided for in Chapter 86 ORS.
6 On March 1, 2018, the Circuit Court denied Plaintiff’s ORCP 21 A(3) motion to dismiss
7 Deutsch Bank’s FED Complaint. See Exhibit 1, Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) accompanying
8 this Objection. Plaintiff appealed that decision on March 11, 2018 (“the first appeal”).
9 The circuit court’s denial brought the State of Oregon within the “state action” doctrine set
forth in paragraph 97 of the FAC at 23-24. On March 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Oregon Tort
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Claim. See RJN Exhibit 2, accompanying this Objection.
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While the first State court appeal was pending, and notwithstanding this Court’s
12 jurisdiction over this removed complaint, Defendant Deutsch Bank unlawfully obtained an ex
13 parte Order of Default dated March 28, 2018 and an ex parte General Judgment for Restitution of
14 Premises dated April 11, 2018. The first appeal was dismissed by Order of Oregon Appellate
15 Commissioner James W. Nass dated April 6, 2018 because the circuit court Order appealed from
was not an appealable Order.
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On April 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second State Court Appeal (“the second appeal”) to
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appeal the ex parte General Judgment and an Emergency Motion with Oregon’s Appellate Court
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to stay the ex parte General Judgment. The motion to stay was granted by Order of Appellate
19 Commissioner Nass dated April 17, 2018. Commissioner Nass also found judicial error in
20 dismissing the first appeal and further found the ex parte General Judgment to be a “nullity”
21 because the circuit court lost jurisdiction when Plaintiff’s appeal was perfected on March 10,
2018. Notwithstanding the existence of this void judgment, Commissioner Nass granted the
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circuit court leave to reenter the ex parte General Judgment. See RJN Exhibit 3, accompanying
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this Objection.
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Commissioner Nass exacerbated the circuit court’s constitutional errors, when, by Order
25 dated June 18, 2018, he vacated his April 6, 2018 Order dismissing the first appeal, stating that: In
26 the April 17, 2018 Order, “this court should have vacated the April 6, 2018, order dismissing the
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1 [first] appeal, but did not. The court does so now. The order of dismissal dated April 6, 2018, is
2 vacated.” See RJN Exhibit 4, accompanying this Objection.
Commissioner Nass further stated in a footnote to Exhibit 4 that: “because the trial court
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lacked jurisdiction at that time to enter the [ex parte] judgment, the [second] notice of appeal is of
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no legal effect.”
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Notwithstanding the circuit court’s void judgment, the two State appeals and this court’s
6 jurisdiction of this action, Defendant Deutsch Bank and its coconspirators, including its attorneys,
7 obtained an ex parte writ of execution based on the void ex parte judgment, which was executed
8 by Defendant Reese on July 3, 2018 and resulted in Plaintiff being forcibly removed, under arms,
9 from the home he purchased in 2006 by officers of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office under
color of state law, after all of the Defendants were made aware of the unconstitutional proceedings
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of the circuit court.
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On July 4, 2018, Plaintiff received a “Notice of Abandonment and Notice of Sale or
12 Disposal” of his personal property left in his home on July 3, 2018 with instructions to recover
13 Plaintiff’s personal property. As of the date of this pleading, Plaintiff has not been granted access
14 to his personal property and has not been able to locate any person with power to grant access to
15 his personal property and explain the whereabouts thereof.

On June 16, 2018, CNN aired a report claiming, “Trump uses IG report to spread ‘deep
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state’ conspiracy,” by Julian Zelizer, CNN Political Analyst, June 16, 2018,
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https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/16/opinions/trump-ig-report-deep-state-conspiracy-opinion-
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zelizer/index.html.
19 On October 28, 2017, an alias of President Trump known only as “Q,” began using social
20 media technology to communicate unclassified and declassified information to the public
21 regarding a global conspiracy being operated by members of the worldwide “Deep State.” “Q” is
also publicly known as a character in the James Bond films associated with the fictional research
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and development division of the British Secret Service.
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During his July 31, 2018 rally in Tampa, Florida, President Trump, using English Ordinal
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Gematria, verified the existence of “Q,” the 17th letter of the alphabet, more than six times using
25 the number “17” in his sentences, e.g.:
26 You know, I told the story the other day, I was probably in Washington in my
entire life 17 times. True, 17 times…. We have—Mike Pompeo [= 118 and 1
27 minus 18 = 17]….
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But I’m riding down Pennsylvania Avenue [PA = 17]. Again, I’ve only been here
2 about 17 times. And probably seven [7] of those times was to check out the hotel
[1100 = 1] I’m building on Pennsylvania Avenue [PA = 17] and then I hop on the
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plane and I go back. So I’ve been there 17 times, never stayed there at night….
4 https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/08/01/heres-a-full-transcript-of-president-
trumps-speech-from-his-tampa-rally/
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Additional information disseminated by President Trump through “Q” identified an aim of
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the Deep State conspiracy involving the European Union, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel,
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whose bloodline are traced to Adolf Hitler, and the transfer of uranium from the U.S. with the
8 assistance of Iran and North Korea and its “puppet masters,” “House of Saud,” “Soros” and
9 “Rothschild”:
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8 Paragraph 17 of the FAC at 5, alleged Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
9 is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG. President Trump, through “Q” drop 136, has
10 indicated that Deutsche Bundesbank is owned and controlled by Deep State member “Rothschild”
11 and through “Q” drop 524, that Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi is implicated in a pay-to-play
scheme with Deutsche Bank USA involving $8million:
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25 On August 3, 2018, President Trump, through “Q” Drop 1807, caused the release of
26 another aspect of the Deep State Conspiracy involving the DOJ’s/FBI’s “Midyear Investigation”
27 of Hillary Clinton’s email scandal which listed the roles of James Comey, Jim Rybicki, Andrew

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1 McCabe, James Baker, Bill Priestap, Lisa Page, Peter Strzok, Michael Steinbach, John Glacalone,
2 Randy Coleman, Trisha Anderson, Kevin Clinesmith, Tashina Gauhar and Sally Moyer.
On December 4, 2017, President Trump, through “Q” Drop 247, caused the release of
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another aspect of the Deep State Conspiracy involving the DOJ’s/FBI’s “Midyear Investigation”
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of Hillary Clinton’s email and the “promotion” of Peter Strzok’s wife, Melissa Hodgman, to
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Associate Director in the SEC’s “Enforcement Division,” which is currently under the supervision
6 of Defendant Clayton and is responsible for investigation and enforcement of the SEC’s Rules
7 against the Defendants associated with the Trust:
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See also RJN Exhibit 5, accompanying this Objection.
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22 The FAC alleged MERS’ unlawful role in assigning Plaintiff’s original note and
deed of trust to the Trust after the June 2006 closing date and the alleged agreement/
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conspiratorial role of the non-government Defendants in using these assignments to effectuate the
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theft of title to Plaintiff’s real property. See FAC paragraphs: 44 and 45 at 11; 47 a7 11-12; 49 at
25 12; 82 at 19, 126-128 at 28 and footnote 2 at 12. See also, ECF No. 29 at 5-7 (Response to
26 FATCO); ECF No. 57 at 11-14; ECF No. 24 at 6-20 and ECF No. 13, Plaintiff’s response to
27 Defendant Reese’s Motion To Dismiss, ECF No. 1-6.

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1 A result of the faulty portrait of the FAC led Magistrate Judge You to enter an Order
2 denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which was filed on April 19,
2018 as ECF Nos. 51 and 52. This denial led to Plaintiff being unlawfully made homeless on July
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3, 2018.
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The problematic portrait of the FAC flowed from the denial of the TRO which overlooked
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material facts incapable of dispute. For example:
6 (1) No evidence has ever been provided to any court, State or Federal, to support a
7 conclusion that the “express trust” created by Defendant Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., in its
8 capacity as Depositor, under the conformed name as “Morgan Stanley IXIS Real Estate Capital
9 Trust 2006-1” within the jurisdiction of the State of Delaware, hereinafter “the Trust,” had
standing to pursue a claim or remedy of any type under the laws and within the territorial
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jurisdiction of the State of Oregon. Indeed, no evidence has ever been presented to reach a judicial
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conclusion that the Trust is the holder of Plaintiff’s original Note and Deed of Trust executed in
12 February 2006.
13 (2) Plaintiff alleged in paragraph 79 of the FAC that on November 27, 2017, Plaintiff
14 served Defendant Quality Loan, the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus, LLP and all Parties to the
15 June 1, 2006 [Pooling and Servicing Agreement] PSA “with an advance copy of this lawsuit and
further requested the addressees reconvey Plaintiff s deed of trust and the Original Note.” No
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response was ever received from these Defendants and this allegation is not disputed by any of the
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nongovernment defendants.
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On June 11, 2018, the circuit court reentered its ex parte General Judgment which was
19 constitutionally flawed because Plaintiff was never in default and the Appellate Commissioner
20 had ruled the same was a “nullity” since Plaintiff perfected his appeal and the circuit court lost
21 jurisdiction as a result thereof. Plaintiff never received notice of these circuit court proceedings.
In the afternoon of June 20, 2018, Defendant Deutsch Bank filed a Praecipe for Writ of
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Execution and on June 21, 2018, the circuit Court Clerk filed an unsigned Writ of Execution in the
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name of the State of Oregon.
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On the morning of June 22, 2018, Plaintiff requested Defendant Deutsch Bank, through its
25 attorneys, the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP and attorneys Brady Godbout, OSB No.
26 132708 and John M. Thomas, and the State of Oregon, through its Governor and the Oregon
27 Attorney General and the Multnomah County Sheriff, to voluntarily delay enforcement and

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1 service of the alleged void Writ of Execution by Defendant Reese pending final resolution of the
2 two cases pending in the Federal and State courts pursuant to ORS 105.161(2).
On June 23, 2018, Plaintiff caused each appearing Defendant to be electronically served
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with a copy of his “EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER ORAP 7.35, MOTION FOR
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RECONSIDERATION [ORAP RULE 7.55(4)(b)] using the following email addresses:
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bgodbout@mccarthyholthus.com; jthomas@mccarthyholthus.com;
6 crystal.chase@stoel.com; amy.edwards@stoel.com; cpc@hartwagner.com;
7 David.Landrum@multco.us; nathaniel.aggrey@doj.state.or.us;
8 tracy.i.white@doj.state.or.us; tim.simmons@usdoj.gov. See RJN Exhibit 6,
9 accompanying this Objection.

No Defendant responded to Plaintiff regarding the threatened eviction, the unconstitutional
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processes of the circuit court and their power under State law to stay Plaintiff’s eviction.
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The Government Defendants allowed, before their very eyes, the Office of Defendant
12 Sheriff Reese to illegally and unconstitutionally seize possession of Plaintiff’s real property in
13 direct violation of Amendments Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth using a judgment the Appellate
14 Commissioner had ruled to be a “nullity.”
15 On August 1, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Opening Brief in the State Court of Appeals which
identified the several violations of the Constitutions and laws of the United States and the State of
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Oregon intentionally committed by Defendant Deutsch Bank and its attorneys and the numerous
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unconstitutional errors committed by the circuit in what appears to have been designed to aid and
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abet/facilitate the theft of title and seizure of Plaintiff’s home under color of State law. A true and
19 correct copy of Plaintiff’s Opening Brief is set forth in RJN Exhibit 7, accompanying this
20 Objection.
21 III. OBJECTION NO. 2

Plaintiff incorporates Objection No. 1 herein as though fully stated.
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The collective characterization of “the Trust” in the Findings and Recommendations is
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confusing and cannot be allowed to stand because it results in an irreconcilable conflict with the
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June 1, 2006 PSA and the separate and distinct legal entity of each non-government Defendant
25 and the parties to the PSA. Article I of the June 1, 2006 PSA establishes the following definitions:
26 Certificate Owner: With respect to a Book-Entry Certificate, the Person who is
the beneficial owner of such Book-Entry Certificate.
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1 Certificate Register: The register maintained pursuant to Section 5.02.
2 Certificateholder or Holder: The person in whose name a Certificate is registered

in the Certificate Register, except that, solely for the purpose of giving any consent
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pursuant to this Agreement, any Certificate registered in the name of the Depositor
4 or any Affiliate of the Depositor shall be deemed not to be Outstanding and the
Percentage Interest evidenced thereby shall not be taken into account in
5 determining whether the requisite amount of Percentage Interests necessary to
effect such consent has been obtained; provided, however, that if any such Person
6 (including the Depositor) owns 100% of the Percentage Interests evidenced by a
Class of Certificates, such Certificates shall be deemed to be Outstanding for
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purposes of any provision hereof that requires the consent of the Holders of
8 Certificates of a particular Class as a condition to the taking of any action
hereunder. The Securities Administrator is entitled to rely conclusively on a
9 certification of the Depositor or any Affiliate of the Depositor in determining
which Certificates are registered in the name of an Affiliate of the Depositor.
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11 Closing Date: June 30, 2006.
12 Trust: The express trust created hereunder in Section 2.01(c).
13 Defendant Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., in its capacity as Depositor, certified in
14 Article II, Section 2.01(c) of the PSA to all Defendants that “the Trust” would operate as a
15 separate and distinct legal entity from all the other parties to the PSA:
(c) The Depositor does hereby establish, pursuant to the further provisions of this
16 Agreement and the laws of the State of New York, an express trust (the “Trust”) to
17 be known, for convenience, as “MORGAN STANLEY IXIS REAL ESTATE
CAPITAL TRUST 2006-1” and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company is hereby
18 appointed as Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The
parties hereto acknowledge and agree that it is the policy and intention of the Trust
19 to acquire only Mortgage Loans meeting the requirements set forth in this
Agreement, including without limitation, the representation and warranty set forth
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in paragraph (aaa) of Schedule IV to this Agreement. The Trust’s fiscal year is the
21 calendar year.”
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1365336/000091412106002439/ms9099
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23 Defendant Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., in its capacity as Depositor, has always
24 used the conforming name of the Trust, “MORGAN STANLEY IXIS REAL ESTATE CAPITAL
25 TRUST 2006-1,” each time it has communicated with the Federal Defendants pursuant to the
Securities laws. Article XII, Section 12.08 of the PSA imposes express limits on the rights of
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Certificateholders:
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1 Section 12.08 Limitation on Rights of Certificateholders. The death or
incapacity of any Certificateholder shall not operate to terminate this Agreement or
2 the Trust created hereby, nor entitle such Certificateholder’s legal representative or
heirs to claim an accounting or to take any action or commence any proceeding in
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any court for a petition or winding up of the Trust created hereby, or otherwise
4 affect the rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties hereto or any of them.
5 No Certificateholder shall have any right to vote (except as provided herein) or in

any manner otherwise control the operation and management of the Trust Fund, or
6 the obligations of the parties hereto, nor shall anything herein set forth or contained
in the terms of the Certificates be construed so as to constitute the
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Certificateholders from time to time as partners or members of an association; nor
8 shall any Certificateholder be under any liability to any third-party by reason of
any action taken by the parties to this Agreement pursuant to any provision hereof.
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No Certificateholder shall have any right by virtue or by availing itself of any
10 provisions of this Agreement to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity or
11 at law upon or under or with respect to this Agreement, unless such Holder
previously shall have given to the Trustee a written notice of an Event of Default
12 and of the continuance thereof, as herein provided, and unless the Holders of
Certificates evidencing not less than 25% of the Voting Rights evidenced by the
13 Certificates shall also have made written request to the Trustee to institute such
action, suit or proceeding in its own name as Trustee hereunder and shall have
14 offered to the Trustee such reasonable indemnity as it may require against the
15 costs, expenses, and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby, and the Trustee,
for 60-days after its receipt of such notice, request and offer of indemnity shall
16 have neglected or refused to institute any such action, suit or proceeding; it being
understood and intended, and being expressly covenanted by each Certificateholder
17 with every other Certificateholder and the Trustee, that no one or more Holders of
Certificates shall have any right in any manner whatever by virtue or by availing
18 itself or themselves of any provisions of this Agreement to affect, disturb or
19 prejudice the rights of the Holders of any other of the Certificates, or to obtain or
seek to obtain priority over or preference to any other such Holder or to enforce
20 any right under this Agreement, except in the manner herein provided and for the
common benefit of all Certificateholders. For the protection and enforcement of the
21 provisions of this Section 12.08, each and every Certificateholder and the Trustee
shall be entitled to such relief as can be given either at law or in equity.
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23 Pursuant to the PSA, each Seller/Lender certified to the Trust that each loan sold to the
Trust was covered by “pool insurance policy, primary mortgage insurance policy, bankruptcy
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bond or alternative arrangements.” The availability of this loan insurance made it unnecessary for
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the Trust to seek foreclosure of a loan which was paid off by an insurance policy. Under this
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arrangement, the insurer and not the Trust, would acquire ownership and holder rights to
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1 Plaintiff’s original not and deed of trust and would be the sole entitled to seek judicial or
2 nonjudicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s real property.
Article II of the PSA governs the conveyance of mortgage loans purchased by the Trust
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and the representations and warranties required to be made by the parties to the PSA. Section
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2.01, in part and among other things, specifically charged Defendant Morgan Stanley ABS Capital
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I Inc., in its capacity as Depositor, to deliver to Defendant Deutsche Bank, in its capacity as
6 Trustee for the Trust:
7 “(i) the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening endorsements, endorsed
“Pay to the order of _____________, without recourse” and signed (which may be
8 by facsimile signature) in the name of the last endorsee by an authorized officer.
9 To the extent that there is no room on the face of the Mortgage Note for
endorsements, the endorsement may be contained on an allonge, unless the Trustee
10 is advised in writing by the applicable Originator (if required by the applicable
Purchase Agreement), IXIS or the Depositor, as applicable, that state law does not
11 so allow;
12 (ii) the original of any guaranty executed in connection with the Mortgage Note;
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(iii) the original Mortgage with evidence of recording thereon or a certified true
14 copy of such Mortgage submitted for recording….”
15 If the original note and deed of trust had been delivered to the Trust and its Trustee before
16 the June 30, 2006 closing date of the Trust, MERS never held such documents and could not
17 assigned the same to the Trust in 2009 and 2014.

IV. OBJECTION NO. 3
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Objection Nos. 1 and 2 are incorporated herein as though fully stated.
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The State Judgment upon which the Findings and Recommendations rely is not valid for
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purposes of “claim preclusion.” Both the circuit court and the Findings and Recommendations
21 engage in the same erroneous construction and interpretation of ORS 12.080(1), which applies to
22 a “liability” such as the payment of a loan, Griffin by & Through Stanley v. Tri-County Metro.
23 Transp. Dist., 318 Ore. 500, 508, 870 P.2d 808 (1994)2 and ORS 88.110, which applies to the
duration a mortgage lien may encumber real property and when a suit for foreclosure pursuant to
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“Liability” commonly means, inter alia, a “duty to pay money or perform some other service,” Black's Law
27 Dictionary 914 (6th ed 1990), a “legal responsibility,” id., or “an amount that is owed,” Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1302 (1976).
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1 the lien is barred. The judgment is not supported by the face of these statutes and the judgment is
2 not based on any admissible evidence.
The closing date of the Trust, June 30, 2006, which is also the purchase date for all loans
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received by the Trust; the acceleration of the Note in 2008 by Defendant Deutsch Bank and its
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servicer; the MERS assignments in 2009 and 2014; and the legislative scheme of ORS 12.080(1)
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and ORS 88.110 are fatal to the validity of the State court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
6 First, the Legislature did not “split” the deed of trust from the note/debt owed. Doing so
7 would run afoul of our Supreme Court holding in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872):
8 The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an
incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an
9 assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.
10 Second, the limitations established by the Legislature in ORS 88.110 follows the
11 limitations set forth in ORS 12.080(1). ORS 88.110 states:
12 “Except as provided in ORS 88.120 (When foreclosure not barred by ORS 88.110),
no mortgage upon real property shall be a lien upon such property after the
13 expiration of 10 years from the later of the date of maturity of the mortgage debt,
the expiration of the term of the mortgage debt or the date to which the payment
14 thereof has been extended by agreement of record; and after such 10 years the
15 mortgage shall be conclusively presumed paid and discharged, and no suit shall be
maintainable for its foreclosure. If neither the date of maturity nor the term of the
16 debt is disclosed by the recorded mortgage or recorded memorandum thereof, then
the date of the execution of the recorded mortgage or recorded memorandum
17 thereof shall be deemed the date of maturity and expiration of the term of the
mortgage debt for purposes of this section. If the mortgage and a memorandum or
18 memoranda thereof are of record and no date of maturity or statement of the term
19 of the mortgage is contained in the mortgage or memoranda, then the date of
execution of the earliest document of record shall be used to determine the date of
20 maturity and the expiration of the term of the debt.”
21 The plain language of the statute does not create a split between the note/debt and the deed
22 of trust. In interpreting a statute, “words of common usage typically should be given their plain,
23 natural, and ordinary meaning.” Griffin by & Through Stanley v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist.,
318 Ore. at 508. In relevant part, ORS 12.080(1) provides: “An action upon a contract or liability,
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express or implied…shall be commenced within six years.”
25
In Beckhuson v. Frank, 97 Or.App. 347, 775 P2d 923 (1989), an action was brought on
26
promissory note in Multnomah County Circuit Court before the Honorable Judge Charles S.
27 Crookham. On appeal, the Court held that the trust deed securing the note did not limit remedies
16 (971) 512-2917
1 on default of the note and that ORS 86.735(4), since renumbered ORS 86.752(7), permits a trust
2 deed beneficiary to sue on the note and thereby waive his priority and security, or he may
foreclose on the deed of trust and waive his right to collect a deficiency. “The statute precludes an
3
action on the debt only after a trustee’s sale or a judicial foreclosure,” Beckhuson at 351, citing
4
Siuslaw Valley Bank v. Canfield Assoc. Ore. Ltd., 64 Or.App. 198, 202, 667 P.2d 1035 (1983).
5
In Sovereign v. Deutsche Bank, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D. Or. Portland Div. 2012),
6 this Court, relying on Magistrate Judge Stewart’s analysis of Oregon law, agreed that:
7 “Simply put, the security interest embodied in the trust deed follows any transfer of
the note in favor of the lender and its successors, such that the trust deed does not
8 become split or separated from the note.”
9
Third, the breach of contract analysis set forth in the State court judgment is untenable,
10 because an action for a breach of contract was covered under ORS 12.080(1) until September 1,
11 1991, when this cause of action was removed to ORS 72A.5060. See, Federal Recovery of
12 Washington, Inc. v. Wingfield, 162 Ore. App. 150, 153, 986 P.2d 67 (1999).
13 The Court in Federal Recovery of Washington, Inc. v. Wingfield, further held that the
statute of limitations begins to run on the cause of action when the exercise of the “acceleration
14
clause” is enforced. Id. at 156-157 (“Where an instrument gives the creditor an election to
15
accelerate maturity of the debt and it is accelerated, the statute of limitations begins to run from
16 the time of the election to accelerate….”). See also, Harrison v. Beals, 111 Ore. 563, 571, 222 P.
17 728 (1924) (“An acceleration clause is not one providing for a forfeiture but that it is one of the
18 terms of the contract to be construed like any other of its conditions and enforced accordingly.”).
19 Carpenter, supra, holds that the note and mortgage must remain “inseparable.” Sovereign,
supra, holds that under Oregon law, the note and deed are never split. In 2009, Defendant Deutsch
20
Bank recorded an acceleration of Plaintiff’s debt on behalf of the Trust Defendant in the
21
Multnomah County property records as Mult. Doc. No. 2009-039778. See ECF No. 24 at 12.
22
Under Carpenter, Sovereign and ORS 88.110, the acceleration of the debt limited suit on the note
23 to six years after acceleration.
24 Even if Oregon law splits the note and deed of trust for statute of limitations purposes,
25 which would raise constitutional due process issues, the Trust Defendants breached the express
terms of the deed of trust regarding acceleration of the debt. Plaintiff and the original Lender and
26
27

17 (971) 512-2917
1 its successors and assigns, agreed that Plaintiff would have “the right to bring a court action to
2 assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale”:
9
The “right to bring a court action” is required by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as standard
10
language in deeds of trust nationwide and in D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See
11
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Security Instruments on line at
12 http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html. See, also, e.g.:
13 CALIFORNIA: WASHINGTON:
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
OREGON:
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

18 (971) 512-2917
1 State laws, court rules and judicial proceedings which deny homeowners this contractual
2 right violate Federal and State due process and the obligation of contracts set forth in U.S. Const.
Art. I, Section 10, Clause 1. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) and Trustees of
3
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall
4
opted strongly for the broader reading of the Clause to restrain conduct by government—reneging
5
on grants—that would be regarded as unacceptable if done by any private individual.
6 In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court struck down efforts
7 of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to nullify bond covenants that prohibited it
8 from using bond proceeds to support mass transit and in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
9 438 U.S. 234 (1978), refused to allow Minnesota to impose retroactively more-stringent financial
obligations on an employer in the winding up of its pension plan.
10
The Findings and Recommendations further overlook the fact that this action was filed
11
first pursuant to the deed of trust, only to have Plaintiff’s liberty and property right denied by the
12 sale of his home on December 28, 2017. The foreclosure was clearly wrongful. Thus, the unlawful
13 racketeering conspiracy exploits weaknesses and gaps in State laws, judicial and executive
14 oversight and the right of all homeowners to use the deed of trust to vindicate their rights.
15 A leading role in the unlawful conspiracy/agreement is performed by Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”); MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (“MERSCORP”) and its
16
mortgage electronic registration system (“MERS®”), a national electronic database that tracks
17
changes in mortgage servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in loans secured by
18
residential real estate.
19 On August 16, 2018, an Anon posted on the “Q Research Board,” hosted by “8Chan,” a
20 link to an article discussing how the “Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) bankers joked about
21 destroying the US housing market and [how] senior staff described the loans they were trading as
‘total f***** garbage.’” The article was based on transcripts released by the U.S. Department of
22
Justice. 3
23
In Annex 1, the Federal Government explained a fraudulent scheme involving RBS and
24
“Option One,” among others. Annex 2 listed the loans associated with Option One, Defendant
25 Wells Fargo, Countrywide Home Loans, a participant named in the June PSA, Fannie Mae,
26
3
27 Royal Bank of Scotland Agrees to Pay $4.9 Billion for Financial Crisis-Era Misconduct,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/royal-bank-scotland-agrees-pay-49-billion-financial-crisis-era-misconduct.
19 (971) 512-2917
1 Freddie Mac and RBS, among others. The June 1, 2006 PSA explained the role and relationship of
2 Option One Mortgage Corporation to the Defendant Trust in: (1) Section 7 of the Second
Amended and Restated Mortgage Loan Purchase and Warranties Agreement between Morgan
3
Stanley Mortgage Capital Inc. and WMC Mortgage Corp.; (2) Schedule 9.01(g) of the “Litigation
4
Schedule;” and (3) Section 31, “Compliance with Regulation AB.”4
5
The Government stated in Section IV of its “Statement of Facts” that: “RBS’s misconduct
6 reached its height in the fall of 2007 in two RMBS, Soundview 2007-OPT4 (“OPT4”) and
7 Soundview 2007-OPT5 (“OPT5,” and together with OPT4, the “Deals”), that were backed by
8 loans originated by Option One.”5
9 “Many Americans suffered lasting economic harm as a result of the 2008 financial crisis,”
said Acting Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio in the August 14, 2018 press release.
10
“This resolution—the largest of its kind—holds RBS accountable for defrauding the people and
11
institutions that form the backbone of our investing community,” said Andrew E. Lelling, U.S.
12 Attorney for the District of Massachusetts.
13 “The actions of RBS resulted in significant losses to investors, including Fannie Mae and
14 Freddie Mac, which purchased the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities backed by defective
15 loans,” said Associate Inspector General Jennifer Byrne of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Similar financial crisis misconduct is before this Court.
16
In James v. ReconTrust Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148, 1157 (D. Or. 2012), Judge
17
Simon of this Division held that MERS could not meet the definition of “beneficiary” set forth in
18
the OTDA because MERS is “neither a lender nor a lender’s successor…notwithstanding any
19 contractual agreement among the parties in the loan and related security documents declaring that
20 MERS is a beneficiary.”
21 Notwithstanding Oregon law requiring the public recording “of all assignments of the trust
deed before a non-judicial foreclosure sale may be held,” Id., at 1148, the assignments recorded
22
by MERS in 2009 and 2014 demonstrated MERS lacked factual knowledge as to the true identity
23
24 4
In December 2004, the S.E.C. adopted its first comprehensive body of regulations relating to asset-backed securities
(ABS), referred to as “Regulation AB.”
25 5
The Statement of act continued: “Loans that Option One originated served as security for Option One’s repayment
of the RBS warehouse line; if Option One failed to repay, RBS would own the loans.” RBS did not want to own these
26 loans. “By the summer of 2007, RBS Executives believed that Option One soon would go out of business and be
unable to repay the warehouse line. In an August 29, 2007 call, a senior RBS executive told RBS’s Head Trader, “I’m
27 very nervous about Option One. It’s over basically in my opinion . . . so I think there’s a pretty good chance we’re
going to own those loans.”
20 (971) 512-2917
1 of the “beneficiary” and knowledge when the note and deed of trust were transferred by operation
2 of law. This same confusion was exhibited by Defendant QLS in its Trustee Notice of Sale. See
FAC paragraphs 47-54 at 11-12 for context and allegations.
3
The alleged fraudulently recorded assignments and notices of trustee sale by the Trust
4
Defendants and the right of Plaintiff to bring an action pursuant to the deed of trust raises the issue
5
whether the Trust Defendants had “standing” to (1) conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure and (2)
6 whether these Defendants could sell Plaintiff’s home and use the State of Oregon and Defendant
7 Sheriff Reese to evict Plaintiff while this lawsuit was pending before this Court and while the
8 appeal was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeal. Clearly the answer is negative.
9 Going forward, the dominant question to be resolved by Plaintiff and this Court pivots on
identifying who, among the non-government defendants or others not named as defendants,
10
directed the attorneys representing the Trust Defendants to sell Plaintiff’s home and then use
11
Defendant Reese to forcibly evict Plaintiff while he was pursuing his rights under the deed of
12 trust, this lawsuit and his State court appeal.
13 Section 11.01 of the PSA identified an association of the Trust to “the survivor of the
14 descendants of Joseph P. Kennedy, the late Ambassador of the United States to the Court of St.
15 James’s, living on the date hereof.” At this stage, it is unknown whether a descendant of the
Joseph P. Kennedy dynasty is among the Defendant Certificateholders or whether any of the
16
Certificateholders or the Trust would have directed the attorneys for the Trust Defendants to sell
17
Plaintiff’s home and evict Plaintiff while he was seeking judicial resolution of his rights under the
18
same deed of trust which the Trust is claiming it has a right to foreclose.
19 It is therefore permissible to conclude that the sale of Plaintiff’s home and Plaintiff’s
20 eviction during State and Federal judicial processes downgraded the deed of trust to a worthless
21 piece of paper and a fraud on the land title records system.

Within the last ten years, the real property belonging to San Diego, California resident
22
Abderrahim Saddas was sold using California’s nonjudicial foreclosure procedures during the
23
pendency of his lawsuit challenging the default and proposed sale of his home.
24
Within the last ten years, the real properties belonging to Vancouver, Washington
25 residents Jerzy Gruca and Pamela S. Owen were sold using Washington’s nonjudicial foreclosure
26 procedures during the pendency of their lawsuits challenging the default and proposed sale of
27 their homes.

21 (971) 512-2917
1 On December 22, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this action in Multnomah County Circuit
2 Court challenging the recorded defaults and proposed sale of Plaintiff’s home. After being served
with a copy of the lawsuit and the notice of lis pendens, the Trust Defendants sold Plaintiff’s
3
home on December 28, 2017. See FAC, paragraphs 39 at 10; 48 at 12; 84 at 19-20; 90 at 21; 95 at
4
23 and 130 at 28-29.
5
On January 25, 2018, the Defendants removed this action to this Court. On February 8,
6 2018, the Trust Defendants filed a FED action to take advantage of the wrongful foreclosure sale
7 conducted on December 28, 2017. While the FED was being appealed, the Trust Defendants went
8 behind the back of Plaintiff, the law and the jurisdiction of this Court and the Oregon court of
9 appeals and obtained an ex parte Order of Default and Default Judgment, which were held to be a
“nullity” by the Oregon Appellate Commissioner.
10
Notwithstanding the “nullity” of their actions, the Trust Defendants, in conspiracy/
11
agreement with officers of the State of Oregon, and using the police power of the State, seized
12 possession of Plaintiff’s home on July 3, 2018 using the agency of Defendant Sheriff Reese, who,
13 along with Defendant Governor Brown, were aware the Trust Defendants were engaged in
14 unlawful conduct which directly violated Plaintiff’s deed of trust and Oregon’s laws.
15 The Court now has a situation where the State of Oregon was aware the Trust Defendants
were engaged in conduct which amounted to an actionable breach of contract and which violated
16
the laws of the State, but nevertheless unlawfully conspired/agreed to aid and abet the theft of
17
Plaintiff’s title and home by the Trust Defendants using the agency of Defendant Sheriff Reese.
18
The conspiracy/agreement to steal title and possession of homes in violation of the
19 covenants of the deed of trust flows from the broader “Deep State Conspiracy” announced by
20 President Trump in his “Q” drops and the conspiracy to steal profits from Freddie Mac and Fannie
21 Mae, see FAC paragraphs 33, 34, 36 and 38, and forms the basis for the nationwide racketeering
conspiracy involving the Trust Defendants which is successful in its purposes and objectives only
22
because of the direct participation of “state actors” such as Sheriff Reese as shown herein.
23
Fourth, Plaintiff found no case law supporting a court amending a complaint on its own by
24
inserting a new cause of action and then dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on this
25 new cause of action created by the Court. Moreover, the circuit court never gave Plaintiff notice
26 and an opportunity to object to this judgment until it was entered in the court’s records.
27

22 (971) 512-2917
1 “Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense.”
2 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972). “Either a judgment is void or it is valid.” Estate of
Hutchins v. Fargo, 188 Ore. App. 462, 469, 72 P.3d 638 (2003). A “void judgment,” as stated by
3
the Court of Appeals in Estate of Selmar A. Hutchins v. Fargo, 188 Or.App. 462, 466, 72 P.3d
4
638 (2003), relying on case law and Black’s Law Dictionary 1412 (5th ed. 1979), is:
5
“One which, from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null,
6 without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal
force and effect whatever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or
7 enforcement in any manner or to any degree.”
8 The finding that the State court judgment is valid cannot be sustained. Had the Defendants
9 thought this judgment to be valid, it would have been unnecessary for Plaintiff’s case to be
10 removed to this Court only to seek dismissal on grounds of claim preclusion when the same could
11 have been accomplished in the same court that issued the judgment. Nor would Defendant
Deutsch Bank engage in ex parte communications in obtaining a default judgment which the
12
Appellate Commissioner held to be a nullity if the circuit court’s judgment was valid. In this
13
sense, the Defendants are asking this court to engage in appellate review of a state court judgment.
14 A unanimous Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 US 280
15 (2005), held that while 28 U. S. C. §1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, it “does not authorize
16 district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has
17 reserved to this Court….” Id. at 292. The Court further held that:
“If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim… which he was a
18 party..., then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant
19 prevails under principles of preclusion.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 293.
20 The circuit court never required the Defendants before it to produce the original note and
21 deed of trust; the assignments of the note and deed of trust; and the notices of default. Most
importantly, the letter accelerating the maturity of the debt in 2009 is not mentioned at all in the
22
circuit court’s judgment, which, according to the court in Federal Recovery of Washington, Inc. v.
23
Wingfield, at 156-157, is material to establishing when the statute of limitations began to run on
24
the cause of action at issue in the state court and in this Court.
25 Thus, the circuit court violated due process of law and the obligation of contracts when it
26 converted Plaintiff’s cause of action under ORS 12.080(1) to ORS 88.110 without affording
27 Plaintiff an opportunity to object before entry into the court’s records.

23 (971) 512-2917
1 “[A] state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without ‘notice and
2 opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Portland GE v. Ebasco Servs., 353
Ore. 849, 860-861, 306 P.3d 628 (2013). When the notice ‘is so defective that it does not satisfy
3
the requirements of due process,’” the court does not have authority to enter a judgment and any
4
judgment entered is void. Id. at 861.
5
V. OBJECTION NOS. 4 THROUGH 8
6 Plaintiff incorporates Objection Nos. 1 through 3 herein as though fully stated.
7 Fraud, which is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity, “needs no
8 definition.” United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 727 (9th Cir. 2012). The human ingenuity
9 of the non-government Defendants is manifest. Nonjudicial foreclosure under ORS Chapter 86

was not available as to the facts and the evidence. Unconstitutional manipulation of State laws,
10
with the active assistance of the State circuit court and Defendant Reese, resulted in Plaintiff
11
being unlawfully evicted from his home on the day before America celebrates her independence
12 from the Kingdom of Great Britain.
13 The unlawful agreement/conspiracy between Defendants QLS, McCarthy Holthus, Realty
14 Trust, McCredie, Deutsche Bank, FATCO, and Morgan Stanley is similarly manifest and
15 culminated with Plaintiff being unlawfully evicted from his home on July 3, 2018 by Defendant
Reese under color of state law and further unable to recover his personal and business property to
16
continue to earn a living while his claims are being litigated—completely contrary to the deed of
17
trust and State laws. Plaintiff is still unable to reclaim his personal and business property from his
18
home and none of the Defendants are communicating with him regarding this property.
19 Defendants QLS clearly marked its correspondence with the notice that it was attempting
20 to collect a debt and its had held out to the public that it meets the definition of a “debt collector”
21 as defined in the statute prohibiting unfair debt collection practices. Moreover, when considered
against the closing date of the Trust and the inability of the Trust to produce the original note and
22
deed of trust, the agreement/conspiracy to steal title to Plaintiff’s home is also manifest.
23
On July 3, 2018, the Government Defendants allowed Defendant Reese to physically
24
remove Plaintiff from his home using an ex parte Judgment which was held a nullity by the State
25 Appellate Commissioner. The finding that the FAC cannot be amended to state any cause of
26 action is untenable. The sale of Plaintiff’s home, his eviction and the refusal to return his personal
27

24 (971) 512-2917
1 and business property, while two lawsuits were pending, exposes a critical flaw in the paradigm of
2 judicial interpretations that nonjudicial foreclosures and evictions are constitutional.
On January 29, 2007, Defendant Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc., in its capacity as
3
“Depositor” for the Trust, informed the Federal Defendants that the Trust was terminating its duty
4
to file reports pursuant to SEC Rule 15d-6 since the approximate number of investors of record
5
was “less than 300 Holders.”
6 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1365336/000105640407000990/0001056404-07-
7 000990.txt
8 In addition to the limitations placed on the Certificateholders and the Trustee, Section
9 11.01 of the PSA provided further limits as to when the Trust and any other trusts could terminate
their activities:
10
“In no event shall the trusts created hereby continue beyond the expiration of 21
11 years from the death of the survivor of the descendants of Joseph P. Kennedy, the
late Ambassador of the United States to the Court of St. James’s, living on the date
12 hereof.”
13
The attorneys associated with the Trust Defendants claim to represent approximately 300
14 Certificateholders and the Trust, among others. The closing date of the Trust, June 30, 2006; the
15 June 1, 2006 PSA; the acceleration of the Note in 2009 by Defendant Deutsch Bank and its
16 servicer; the MERS assignments in 2009 and 2014; and the legislative scheme of ORS 12.080(1),
17 ORS 88.110 and the Oregon Deed of Trust Act (ODTA) combine to raise considerable doubt
whether the trust-related attorneys have authority to litigate on behalf of the 300 individual
18
investors. Such an authority can only be provided by each individual investor as set forth in the
19
2006 PSA.
20
The fact that the State of Oregon, Defendant Sheriff Reese and Defendant Deutsch Bank
21 and its partners violated the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Oregon to
22 gain unlawful title and possession of Plaintiff’s home on July 3, 2018 using procedures that were
23 declared a nullity by the Appellate Commissioner, raises grave constitutional and legal issues.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
24
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
25
moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material
26
fact. Id., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
27

25 (971) 512-2917
1 After the moving party makes a properly supported motion, the responding party must
2 present specific facts showing that a triable issue remains for trial. British Airways Bd. v. Boeing
Co., 585 F.2d 946, 950-52 (9th Cir. 1978). “[L]egal memoranda and oral argument are not
3
evidence, and they cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary
4
judgment motion where no dispute otherwise exists.” Id., at 952.
5
If the non-movant fails to set forth specific facts to support an essential element in that
6 party’s claim and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, then summary
7 judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
8 No evidence is offered to this court by any of the Defendants. They failed to produce the
9 original note and deed of trust; evidence of any payment received by them from Plaintiff;
evidence of the use of an insurance policy to compensate for Plaintiff’s default on a loan; or the
10
date Plaintiff’s loan was purchased by the Trust. This becomes a case of “willful suppression of
11
evidence.” ORS 40.135(1)(c); Smitson v. Southern Pac. Company, 37 Or. 74, 85-86, 60 P. 907
12 (1900) (Willful suppression of evidence creates a presumption that such evidence, if produced,
13 would be adverse to the party suppressing it.).
14 CONCLUSION
15 WHEREFORE, having set forth his objections to the Magistrate’s Findings and
Recommendations, Plaintiff pray the Objections be sustained; the Defendants’ motions denied;
16
full or partial summary judgment be granted; leave be given to amend the complaint; and the
17
defendants, as appropriate, be recommended for disciplinary review appropriate to these
18
objections and the pleadings filed with this Honorable Court.
19
20 Dated this 16th day of August, 2018.
21
s/LeRoi Espiriquetzal
22 (971) 512-2917
23
24
25
26
27

26 (971) 512-2917

Leroi. Objections To Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations (Digital Copy)

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1

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 LEROI ESPIRIQUETZAL, An Individual,) Case No: 18-cv-00157-YY

20 No. 2. Collective Characterization of “the Trust”.

21 No. 3. The State Court Judgment Is Valid.

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

21 Plaintiff’s Responses also exposed a scheme to circumvent Oregon’s statute of limitations

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

15 his personal property and explain the whereabouts thereof.

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

9 accompanying this Objection.

21 III. OBJECTION NO. 2

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

2 Certificateholder or Holder: The person in whose name a Certificate is registered

11 Closing Date: June 30, 2006.

12 Trust: The express trust created hereunder in Section 2.01(c).

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

5 No Certificateholder shall have any right to vote (except as provided herein) or in

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

17 assigned the same to the Trust in 2009 and 2014.

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

15 A leading role in the unlawful conspiracy/agreement is performed by Mortgage Electronic

21 piece of paper and a fraud on the land title records system.

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

9 of the non-government Defendants is manifest. Nonjudicial foreclosure under ORS Chapter 86

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

20 Dated this 16th day of August, 2018.

28 PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO LeRoi Espiriquetzal

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