The Rise and Fall of the Indigenous Business Development Center (IBDC) in Zimbabwe.

Tamuka Charles Chirimambowa

Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Economic
History and Development.
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University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Durban, 2006.
Abstract
Economic reform has become one of the major necessities of post-colonial African states,
given years of slavery, apartheid, colonialism and underdevelopment. Many scholars
have argued that Africa’s lack of development is due to the lack of African participation
within the economic sphere, especially as a business class or ‘bourgeoisie’. They contend
that African participation in business has been rare, and where granted it has been mostly
within the peripheries or petty commerce. This study will investigate Zimbabwe’s IBDC
with a view to going some way to answering the major question that arises out of this
argument: is creating a nationalist indigenous entrepreneurial class the answer to Africa’s
development problems? The focus of this study will be on the emergence of the IBDC as
a vehicle for black empowerment. It will attempt to account for its successes, its failures,
and its ultimate demise. The research will also chart how some of Zimbabwe's most
successful black entrepreneurs, some who have managed to establish a global presence,
got their start with this organization, and how they proceeded when the IBDC ceased to
exist.The study will also proceed to examine the Indigenous Business Women's
Organization and the Affirmative Action Group, similar organisations that came after the
IBDC. Crucial within this research agenda is the interrogation of the role of the state in
post colonial Africa: can it be a catalyst for economic empowerment, or is it an inhibitor?
Finally, efforts will be made to investigate the complementarities and contradictions of
efforts to create a black business class with poverty alleviation policies.

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Contents

Chapter 1: Post Colonial Period……………………………………………………….7

Chapter 2: First Decade of Independence……………………………………………..13

Chapter 3: Rise and Fall of the IBDC…………………………………………………22

Chapter 4: Empowerment for whom? ...........................................................................34

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Introduction.

This paper, which takes as its main object some aspects of the emergence of the
Indigenous Business Development Center (IBDC)1 in Zimbabwe, attempts to posit the
Rise and Fall of the IBDC historical, by contextualizing those developments from factors
that gave to, rise and demise, within Zimbabwe’s political economy from the colonial
period of the 1920s, proceeding to the first decade after independence until up to the-
Formation of the IBDC (1989) till its demise (1993-5) and the present (2006).

Therefore, in order to understand the development of the IBDC, it is imperative that we

posit the conditions that gave rise to the need for indigenization within the context of the
generic political economy. Such a feat enables us to appreciate the multifarious factors
influencing and surrounding the four actors involved namely:
i. The State
ii. Institutions-Interest or pressure groups.
iii. Individuals
iv. Market

The relations amongst these factors become of paramount importance specifically the
power relations and at times the ‘bifurcation’2 that existed, and how these impacted upon
each other, giving rise to a love-hate relationship. This attempt is limited by time and
space constraints, and as such any assumption or endeavour it to fully articulate the
history of the IBDC is ‘void abnitio’. The aim of this dissertation is then, to illuminate or
paint a picture on the power plays underpinning the history of the IBDC in Zimbabwe
perceived as an institution and individuals, from a historical perspective, trying to
establish parallels and trends, that gave to the rise, ultimately the fall and the aftermath.

1
A pressure group established in the 90s to advance black economic empowerment in Zimbabwe.
2
The cross cutting nature between individuals institutions; that is when is an institution considered to be
itself and an individual to be his own. The line is thinly veiled and this study as such has never bothered to
attempt to delve into that area for it would be another subject of enquiry that can lead to semantic
stagnation.

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Methodology
The study thus takes a structural frame work in trying to build this account, with the key
questions being the contestation of the state and private individuals in achieving
economic empowerment. This treatise would also seek to establish this relationship by
shedding more on the semantic discourses and philosophical underpinnings. Thus it
assumes much more of a generic or polemic approach with a bit of empiricism from
historical events, at the same time trying to run away from the pitfalls of deductive
causality. This empiricism is attempted through a media scan, primary documents (e.g.
organizational magazines, minutes, policy pronouncements and policy position papers) of
various activities and events in relation to and associated with the IBDC, its membership
and any ancillary organization. The study will therefore focus on the use of both primary
and secondary documents as when they have been available.

Justification

In discussing the role of indigenous capitalists Leys and Berman pose that; “For instance
are “domestic, “internal,” or “indigenous” capitalist classes necessary for development,
and if so what, in what specific ways” (in Leys and Berman 1994: 2). This observation by
Leys and Berman raise significant questions about development in Africa. Given the fall
of the Berlin wall and Soviet bloc as espoused in the end of history by Fukuyama with
the triumph of capitalism the role of domestic capitalist has increasingly gained
prominence within development discourse. In this the question the role of the bourgeoisie
and state becomes under scrutiny. What has been the nature of the relationship and can it
really make Africa claim the 21st century as proclaimed by the World Bank. Leys and
Berman posit the same questions:
Given that the only kind of development that appears immediately practicable is
capitalist development-within the framework of world markets and, at best up till
now, within the constraints of the IMF/World Bank regulation of African macro-
economic policy-the key question have still to be asked: what are the specific
problems that must be solved for such development to take place? What are the
functions that local capitalist are called to perform? And what are the most

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significant characteristics of African capitalist classes for achieving whatever can

be achieved within this framework (1994: 3).
In as much as this paper cannot boldly declare that capitalist development remains the
only viable path of development for African countries, it can not ignore the impact that
the modernity paradigm has had in shaping development theory. However the need to
adjust or tinker with economies in Africa to spur growth is out of question and it is this
tinkering that necessitates this paper with particular focus on business interest groups and
state-capital relationship.

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Chapter 1:

1.1: The concept of Indigenization.

Indigenization of African economies after independence took many varied forms in
different countries. The sole aim was to empower previously disenfranchised blacks with
an opportunity to participate in trade and commerce. Whilst there has been a tendency to
conflate nationalisation and indigenization and at the same time using them
interchangeable, there is a need to distinguish these concepts, since they are two different
terms. Adedeji observes defines indigenisation as:
…the process by which a government limits participation of in a particular
industry entirely or in part to citizens of the country, thus forcing alien owners
either to sell to indigenous entrepreneurs or to withdraw from participation in
certain economic activities (1981: 31)
Indigenisation seeks and promotes private capital, whereas nationalization deals with the
acquisition of the means of production by the state. Thus whilst nationalizations that
proceeded after independence of most African states could have been viewed as
indigenisation this paper has no interest in that. Thus indigenisation in this study is
regarded as the transfer of productive forces into the ownership and control of blacks, in
order to achieve economic independence. The Zimbabwe government defined
indigenization as:
…strategy for the development of a democratic socio-economic system, nation
building and poverty eradication among the majority of Zimbabweans. The
master to key indigenization of the economy includes an increase of indigenous
productive investment in the economy, industrialization, skills development, land
redistribution and mobilization of financial resources.3
The effort to undertake economic indigenisation in Zimbabwe was meant to address
colonial imbalances and more so as a development strategy. This is further observed in
the Government policy framework for indigenisation of the economy that “The
importance of indigenizing the economy arises from the need to eliminate the socio-
economic development of the past, to create employment and more wealth so as to
eradicate poverty among the majority of Zimbabweans and to expand the domestic
market and tax base” (1998:2). Underpinning indigenisation has been the need to achieve
3
State Enterprises and Indigenisation Department, office of the President and Cabinet Harare,
“Government Policy Framework for Indigenisation of the Economy”, February 1998: 3-4.

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economic sovereignty or independence. This assertion is further observed by Adedeji

who pontificates that; “The primary purpose of indigenisation is economic
decolonization, the reduction of economic dependence and the achievement of an ever
increasing measure of self-reliance through internally located and self-sustaining growth”
(1981:31). This partly explains somehow why the indigenisation debates and mostly in
Zimbabwe has been a racial issue. Whilst indigenisation appreciates private enterprise
and sought to promote entrepreneurship, it was also that which was marked by addressing
colonial induced injustice.

1.2: The infancy and exclusion of African Bourgeoisie

The development of an African bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the
colonial days of Southern Rhodesia as early as the 1920s.Nicholas observes that “There is
evidence by 1922 that a stratum of African peasant farmers was poised for transformation
into a class of capitalist farmers” (1994:96). Thus the early accumulating class of
Africans was found to be within agriculture. Even though their agriculture could not be
termed capitalist there was accumulation taking place which created the rich a class that
was consolidating itself within the natives. For instance Nichols observes that “With
settlement in Rhodesia the settlers relied on the indigenous population for their food
supplies to the mines” (Ibid: 95). Nevertheless this process of accumulation was short
lived as European interests preceded particularly after Rhodesia became a self governing
colony in 1923.Nichols identifies colonial legislation namely the Land Apportionment
Act of 1930 (LAA), Maize Control Act of 1931 and Cattle Levy Act of 1931 that played
a critical role in militating against African entrepreneurship (Ibid:96-7). The LAA created
the Native Purchase Areas (NPAs) which different areas where black business and
farmers were obliged to pursue their economic interests. These farms are recorded to
have been acquired by elite, teachers, religious ministers, chiefs’ families, successful
business people, retired policemen and court messenger-interpreters (Ibid:96). According
to Maphosa it has been “One of the most oppressive and discriminatory Acts passed by
the colonial Government’ and ‘…effectively created a cheap labourers out of the
indigenous blacks by pushing them into the ecologically marginal areas of the country,
prohibiting them from owning or leasing property in the lucrative European areas and

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prohibiting them from owning land in the overpopulated native reserves” (1998: 184).
Maphosa further argues that this deprivation partly explains the lack of the development
of an indigenous class since the lack of title deeds has been the most important reason for
the lack of access to finance by many small-scale indigenous businesses (Ibid). The
Maize Control Act of 1931 set up a two tier pricing system that in effect taxed the
produce of African producers to subsidise the Europeans and the same time the Cattle
levy Act of 1931 transferred surplus cattle from the Africans to Europeans. Thus African
accumulation found greater resistance from the colonial state. However accumulation did
occur amongst Africans though in insignificant proportions as compared to their white
counterparts. More so Nicholas further observes that it was not only within agriculture
that Africans were restricted from economic participation. She observes that “On the
other hand African artisanry was banished and the European artisans successfully
petitioned for the exclusion of Africans from their trade” (Ibid: 96). This was actually
achieved through the use of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1931 that excluded
Africans from the term employee, which subsequently led to their exclusion on
apprenticeship programs. This prevented Africans from gaining critical skills that would
have been useful in transforming themselves within the manufacturing sector (Ibid: 97).
It is this economic exclusion that mostly influenced Africans within the discourse of pan-
Africanism and nationalism that was emerging as of then. This discourse, though in its
infancy, manifested itself in the context of racial upliftment. West observes that:
From the outset, proponents of economic pan-Africanism saw business formation
not just as a pecuniary proposition but also as a form of racial uplift’. By
participating in the international capitalist economy at the level of ownership and
management, they argued, black entrepreneurs would at once enrich themselves
and help to raise the prestige of ‘the race’, thereby contributing to the struggle for
political and social rights, both within particular and national states (1993: 264).
Thus racial upliftment (the call for Native participation in the economy) marked the
beginning of blacks demanding a stake in the national economy, and formed the
cornerstone of calls for Africans’ participation in business. Therefore black people in
Southern Rhodesia by then were not inimical to capitalist development. Their major
concern was exclusion and thus they sought inclusion, and this show that despite the
socialist rhetoric that emerged with independence most of the nationalist leaders had an
appreciation for private enterprise. Raftoplous further notes that:

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During the formative years of Nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia, in the

1950s, a central concern emerging nationalist intellectual elite was its desire for
upward mobility. Through its educational achievements, professional aspirations,
and social and cultural practices a significant number of this elite sought to
establish themselves, and to be seen as, an emergent middle class, even as they
sought, and succeeded in presenting themselves as a nationalist leadership (1996:
2).
Thus this nascent elite structure saw an opportunity for the merging of demand for access
into mainstream commerce and nationalist politics. The participation of the likes of
Joshua Nkomo (later became vice president of Zimbabwe) in the advocacy for African
capitalism as chairperson of the Bantu Cooperative Society (BCS), reinforces this notion.
He is actually noted as a ‘businessman’ by West, and this shows the bifurcation of
nationalism and racial uplift of African capitalism (1993: 283). To these emerging
African elite the most important thing to them at that time was absorption or access to
trade and commerce which had remained the preserve of the white minority under the
protectionist policies of the colonial regime. Nevertheless, Raftoplous notes that
“Unfortunately for this nascent elite the structures, ideology of and policies of settler
colonialism seriously constrained their ambitions. However the aspirations remained
even, even during the years of the liberation struggle when the recalcitrance of settler
colonialism, the imperatives of guerrilla warfare and the determining influences of geo-
political alliances, introduced the largely rhetorical adherence to a socialist trajectory
(1996: 2). .According to West this message gained currency mostly during the great
depression years of the 1930s, when would be entrepreneurs, bereft of funds and seeking
resources to capitalize their business, through the cooperative ventures (ibid).
Interestingly this period became more marked on rhetoric on entrance into commerce
rather real business activity. It was much more a period of advocacy by the Africans as
economic participation was a preserve of the minority white sector that enjoyed subsidies
and protection from black competition by the colonial state. This period is what this
paper terms the infancy of the African bourgeoisie. To this effect West further notes that
“It was not until the post-Second World War era, it seems that the idea of business
arrangements involving Southern Rhodesia and the diasapora blacks was even suggested”
(1993: 265). Nevertheless most of these efforts and initiatives failed to have relative
success.

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1.3: Cooperatives and Accumulation

The colonial state of Southern Rhodesia saw no role for blacks in terms of economic
production rather than to be functional cogs in a machine that could be used only as a
source of cheap labour and at the same time easy to replace. West records that; “With
most traditional avenues of capital accumulation thus closed to them, aspiring black
capitalists in Southern Rhodesia as elsewhere in the pan-African world, attempted to get
over this hurdle by turning to cooperative business ventures, both as a means of gaining
access to the savings of Africans and as a way of building up a potential consumer base”
(1993:271). Thus the cooperative idea gained a lot of currency as it provided a viable
working alternative for the black bourgeoisie to accumulate. This saw the strong
emergence of the cooperative language within the pan-African movement. The face of
capitalist accumulation was masked under the banner of cooperatives. Sojini aptly
described pan-African economic thought of cooperatives arguing that:
What we mean by cooperation is to organize the black races on (a) commercial
basis practically. If we go back to the history of all races in the world, we will
find that there is no race that can be recognized without developing itself upon the
lines of wealth. The race that is poor, its voice will not be heard by other races
who have developed their progress upon the lines of wealth. What is needed in the
world of today is that African races should come together. We do not seek in
every possible way to eliminate the name “boy” and substitute the name “man”.
That will be done only by Co-operating on a commercial basis. I have been
through thick and thin and have realized that a race will never prosper without…
industries and wealth (in West, 1993:274).
The above words show that there was a strong quest within the emerging elite blacks to
be involved in mainstream economics. Capital accumulation was seen as a normal
phenomenon as opposed to the period from 1980 where the independent black
government saw capitalism as anathema. Developing a black business class was not thus
seen in only a materialist sense of accumulation but as a development of the black
populace. Thus African businessmen were seen as heroes and there was general
consensus to support them. West further observes that, “African journalist eagerly joined
political activists and publicists in propagating the view that black capitalism was
synonymous with the common good” (1993: 271). This is further buttressed by claims
from Lawrence Vambe4, who admitted that they sought to protect black capitalists in the
4
Editor of the African Weekly, who succeeded Mnyanda.

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most favourable light. “We tried in every possible way to project his image as positively
as we could in the journals we published” (Ibid). These efforts by the black petty
bourgeoisie during the colonial era had limited successes, as they needed up much more
confined to rhetoric or never came to fruition due to the inhibitions laid by the colonial
regime. For instance in accounting for the nature of the attitude and pessimism of
colonial authorities towards black accumulation West observes that “In 1940 one official
bragged to the Prime Minister that, until he explained it to them, Africans in Bulawayo
had no ‘true conception of what a Co-operative Society is, nor much idea of how to form
one’, despite a strong desire to improve their situation by this means” (Ibid: 272).

Chapter 2:

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2.1: A decade of a suppressed bourgeoisie

The repeal of the Land Tenure Act in 1979 had profound effects in facilitating the
accumulation of the black bourgeoisie in independent Zimbabwe. Nicholas observes that:
…African business people were able to rent and own properties an nay business
district and in the first three years following independence, the flood of settler
capital out of Zimbabwe lowered urban land and rental prices, making way for the
movement of African entrepreneurs into the commercial centers of cities”
(1994:100).
Despite the dezoning of urban land, nothing much transpired in terms of the accumulation
of the black people in Zimbabwe. There were still many impediments that prevented
African accumulation, mostly the attitude of the state, intransigence white minority.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe that; “One might have expected that when
independence from colonial rule was achieved, the black, nationalist government would
hasten to adopt a proactive strategy of black empowerment in the economy, providing
support and encouragement in priority to the existing black entrepreneurs” (2004:16).
Thus the advent of independence had high expectation from the Africa petty bourgeoisie
that had formed during the colonial era. Nevertheless ZANU PF had a less appreciation
for private enterprise. A majority of black people during the nationalist struggles had
supported the liberation movement mostly to the chagrin of their exclusion in mainstream
economics. However the Marxist rhetoric adopted by the ZANU PF led government had
great disdain for capitalist accumulation. Private enterprise was seen as greed and thus
the government tended to push more for the cooperatives. This was more amplified in the
ZANU PF leadership code of 1984 adopted at the people’s congress of 8th- 13th of
August. It stated that, “ZANU believes that a leader who concentrates on acquiring
property, or who personally engages in the exploitation of man by man, rapidly becomes
an ally of the capitalists and an enemy of socialism; and of the masses of the
population”5. Therefore accumulation of capital was seen as anti-socialist and counter
productive to the economy by the then leadership and thus provided less incentives in
terms of policy and bureaucratic attitude in creating a conducive environment for
business. The leadership code, further enunciated that leaders within ZANU could not:

5
http://www.insiderzim.com/Zanu-Pf%20Leadership%20Code.html , accessed 15 January 2007.

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• own a business, a share or an interest in a business organised for profit; provided

that this shall not be interpreted as prohibiting such petty side-line activities as
chicken runs, small plots and gardens on one's residential property;
• receive more than one salary;
• serve as a director of a private firm or business organised for profit;
• own real estate or other property, or an interest in real estate or other property
from which he receives rents or royalties;
• own more than one dwelling house; except as dictated by family requirements,
but in no event shall additional houses be for purposes of earning rents;

• except with respect to interest received on account of monies deposited in a

savings bank or similar institution, receive interest or other income on account of
money loaned to another; "No leader shall indulge in Chimbadzo"6;

• own or have beneficial interest in more than 50 acres of land;

• in addition to a salary, receive fees on account of lectures or professional
activities in excess of $1 000 a year;

• nothing in this section prohibits a leader from receiving a fee/ or a royalty on

account of a book or work of art or patent that he personally wrote, created or
invented7.

Nevertheless this code had its own problems as the ruling elite within ZANU PF never
observed this policy, but one reality that it did was to create an anti-capital mentality
within the general populace. Thus cooperatives ‘Mushandirapmwe’8 were seen as the way
forward and at this period the government encouraged a lot of cooperative formations.
For instance for rural farmers to access loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC), they had to be organised into groups.

6
Some form of informal money lending which happens amongst people and is mostly common within
African communities.
7
http://www.insiderzim.com/Zanu-Pf%20Leadership%20Code.html , accessed 15 January 2007.
8
Shona word that means working together

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In as much as Compagnon and Raftouplos acknowledge the limitations imposed by the

Lancaster house agreement on speeding up access of the economy to black entrepreneurs,
they contend that the excuse was highly symbolic (2004: 17). Thus the to them the
government could have done more in terms of dealing with the empowerment of black
people mostly within land resettlement. They further argue that “ But legal and financial
constraints do not account for all policy short comings, in particular the government’s
ability to provide enabling conditions for resettlement operations to succeed as crucial
factors were overlooked” (Ibid). The government lacked clear policy objectives in terms
of empowerment of black people and focused more on consolidation of its powerbase.
Thus there was little incentive to the government to advance the accumulation of black
people. Most notable was that even the resettlement programme undertaken did little to
incorporate the modest but vibrant black small-scale farming sector, which would have
formed foundation of black farmers that would have pioneered into commercial farming
(Ibid).

More so various scholars have raised the sincerity of the Mugabe led government
to lead a genuine economic empowerment of black people. Mostly this non-commitment
to genuine indigeniosation has largely been ascribed to the fear of an economic
independent black entrepreneurial class that might later turn on to give problems to the
government. Raftouplos observes that “Government feared that an autonomous black
private sector would provide alternative power-bases” (Raftopoulos and Compagnon,
2004: 20). Thus the government tended to suffer from a siege mentality and as a
preventive measure sought not to promote black entrepreneurship. Indigenisation became
a rhetoric issue for the Zimbabwean government. Wild pontificates that “As a result, the
publicized policy of promoting small- and medium-scale black business through the
Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) was at best half hearted (Ibid).
Surprisingly the government was actually more pro-White accumulation, and creating
some form of alliance between the state and the white bourgeoisie. Ostergaard states that
“It turned out that despite the history of ninety years of apartheid-like racial
discrimination prior to independence and the ideology of the new government, the
relationship between the new state and the settler fraction of the internal bourgeoisie was

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not contradictory. On the contrary, during the 1980s the Mugabe government, like the
Smith regime before independence, favoured the settler fraction over the interests of both
indigenous and foreign capital” (1994:115). Therefore the much popular phrase in
Zimbabwe ‘we gave them the banks and remained with the politics’ 9. There have been
various reasons advance or to explain government’s non-committal to the empowerment
of black business people. The Lancaster house constitutional limitations which privileged
white interests during the first decade of independence provided a major stumbling
especially on key sectors such as agriculture. Moyo observes that the most particular was
section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution of 1980 that entrenched white privileges
on land through entrenching procedures that restrict state action on land (1992). The
government had to adapt to the willing buyer willing seller basis which had a fare share
of its problems in transferring land ownership to the majority black people.

In trying to account for the government’s failure to promote a black entrepreneur

Ostergaard argues that whilst the state has been perceived as an instrument of the ruling
class that could have been easily accepted during the colonial era. In this case the
government’s position could thus be understood in what Hirsh refers to as basic structural
constraints that shape the policy making process and to the situational logic that
predisposes government discriminate in favour of capital10. Thus among the basic
structural constraints, he emphasizes the following:

a. the general exclusion of the state from the essentially “private”

productive core and of the capitalist economy,
b. the dependence of state expenditure on revenues withdrawn from the
total surplus created within the capitalist economy; and

c. the “governing groups” in charge of the political system (notably

officials and politicians), who have a vested interest in securing capital

9
This has usual been attributed to whites commenting on their continued dominance of mainstream
economics whilst blacks ere contented with political leadership rather control and ownership of the means
of production.
10
Ostergaard, 1994:116 in Colin Leys and Bruce Berman.

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accumulation as a basic precondition of their own reproduction as

people living off politics11.

Thus according to Ostergaard this observation by Hirsch provide a useful analysis, since
the state is an excluded from the core productive processes it could only be able to accrue
revenue only when the industries were operating efficiently and productively (1994: 116).
Thus there was reluctance from the state to tamper with the clothing industry. The textile
industry also played a pivotal role in foreign currency earning, job creation as Ostergaard
observes that it employed about one quarter of the manufacturing industry sector as
whole (Ibid). Thus he terms it the goose that lays the golden egg.

On the other hand Nicholas observes that “One major reason the new regime did
not begin to promote the interests of African capitalists was that, for purposes of racial
reconciliation, it abandoned a racial perspective” (1994: 102). It would have seemed
naïve on the Mugabe regime to go on an indigenous drive by then for there was a
possibility of it unsettling the colonial settlers and white capital. Despite by this period
there was flight of white capital uncertain of black rule and to avoid a repeat of the
Mozambican scenario every assurance had to be given to the settlers. For instance this
was the case when the government established the Venture Capital Company, in trying to
provide capital for indigenous businesses. Nicholas observes that “The response from the
settler bourgeoisie was sharply against this development. They reminded the government
that racial discrimination was against the constitution of Zimbabwe and that some whites
were in fact indigenous. The government, it said had abandoned its policy of
reconciliation in favour of reverse discrimination” (Ibid: 109). Therefore it was difficult
for the government to embark on any policies that could have been misconstrued as
racially motivated and this put the black bourgeoisie at a disadvantage. Ostergaard
concurs with this assertion and records that Mugabe acknowledged the difficulties he
faced in striking a balance between maintaining white confidence and also satisfying the
expectations of the independent blacks (Ibid: 118). State policy by then was more
interested in stabilizing the state and thus seemed to be more of a compromise nature. It

11
Ostergaard, 1994:116 in Colin Leys and Bruce Berman.

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these impediment that resulted in policy Luke-warm response towards the drive to create
a black entrepreneurial class.

More so Nicholas argues that the Political orientation of the Mugabe government
had disdain for capitalism. She observes that Marxist ideology was used to express and
explain the suffering of the African masses and their alienation from land during the
liberation struggle (1994: 102). This created major problems as Nicholas further observed
that there were some committed socialist among the members of Mugabe’s cabinet and in
the civil service. The ZANU PF Leadership Code of 198412 is a clear example of this, and
thus development could only been seen within the confines socialism rather than
capitalism. The Mugabe government also sought to redistribute national wealth
particularly from the urban areas to the rural areas. This saw the government controlling
and owning a huge stake in the economy. Thus Nicholas comments that the government
saw itself as the indigenous entrepreneur (1994: 102). Government policy by then saw or
perceived less if any room for the private black entrepreneur. However Nicholas argues
that “This is not to say that the government neglected indigenous business entirely. In
1983, the government created a Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO), a
parastatal that combined previous government lending institutions aimed at the
development of small-scale African enterprise” (Ibid). In as much it could be observed
that the African bourgeoisie were a suppressed class and lacked support from government
during the first decade of independence, there were overtures towards its development.

It was not only within agriculture where the settler bourgeoisie had domination or
favours from the state over the black entrepreneur. In the clothing industry the same trend
is observed as this sector was not only dominated by settler fraction but it also received
tremendous support from the state. Ostergaard observes that the local textile companies
generally felt that the government was supportive of their industry as seen in the
statements of the manager of Cone Textiles at a function who publicly stated that, “We
are very pleased with the way the ministry of Industry of Technology has responded to
our projects” (1994: 131). This tended to be a trend within the textile industry as attested
12
The leadership code spoke against the accumulation of capital, and thus made the state apprehensive to
business. See http://www.insiderzim.com/Zanu-Pf%20Leadership%20Code.html , accessed 15 January
2007.

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to by the chairman of CATMA (Central African Textile Manufacturers Association), who

said that, “We feel government has greatly assisted us” (Ibid). Generally speaking the
textile industry received a lot of support from state while there seemed to less support for
black business. Most interesting is that most of these firms that enjoyed protections of the
state against foreign capital were white owned. Riddell argues that “Perhaps the most
striking feature of the post-independence period has been the continuity in policy towards
the manufacturing sector with the UDI-period” (Ibid: 127). Ostergaard further argues
that despite the government assuming and expanding regulatory power it had inherited in
several areas, the operational environment for black industrialist did not improve. This
was more apparent in the import allocation system that divided foreign currency
allocation based on a quota system of 1966, as late as up to 1990 (Ibid: 127). The
business environment within the textile industry thus rewarded the old industry while at
the same time penalized new entrants. Ostergaard further argues that “ In addition to this
small-scale enterprises were up against a series of government regulations biased in
favour of large enterprises, they lacked access to capital , and they had insufficient
marketing and management skills-to mention but few constraints” (1994: 128).
Nevertheless, the disdain for black capitalism did not preclude accumulation of black
business people. Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe that:

…but evolved into numerous business links between members of the embryonic
state bourgeoisie and the white corporate sector. Many former civil servants and ZANU
(PF)’s political clients were recruited during the 1980s as middlemen for white-owned
corporations at a time when political connections had become vital to operate a business,
and were later co-opted as junior partners in the same companies (Ibid:19).

2.1: Implications of the Market Economy

The triumphalism of ‘liberalism’ that followed the ‘collapse’ of the Soviet Union meant
economic policy could only be driven in one direction, neo-liberalism. No were this
evident than in the grand ‘end of history’ thesis13. Any alternatives that might have been
imagined and attempted seemed to fizzle out, especially in the third world 14. In
13
Fukuyama, Francis 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press
14
One such alternative was the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Policies for Socio-
Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF SAP) developed by United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa

19
 20

Zimbabwe a decade (1980-1990) of expansion in social services and infrastructure was

pressuring the national fiscus and the government seemed to have no other way than to
turn to the Bretton Woods Institutions15, the loans and the attendant policies. More so the
failure by white capital to expand and generate more jobs and over bloated of the civil
service constrained government’s resources. There were a lot of school leavers that were
coming into economy that were being churned each and every year, who needed
employment. Moyo observes that, “By the late 1980s, the expansion of facilities had
begun to have a negative impact on the economy in so far as 250,000, secondary school
leavers were entering the labour market which had more than 30,000 jobs to offer a year”
(1992:318). The informal Sector thus offered an alternative of hope. By then white
capital particularly through institutions such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe industries
were busy advocating for market approach to the economy against the central planning
socialist model adopted at independence. Brautigam et al observe that “The major player
in the successful negotiations over adjustment policies in the late 1980s was the
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI). Known until independence as the
Association of Rhodesian Industries, CZI is an `encompassing' umbrella organisation
representing manufacturing interests (predominantly large, white-owned firms) in a
number of sectors” (2002: 15). When the IBDC came in as well pressing for
liberalization of the economy and arguing for a stake for black farmers it gave a major
push to government from business. This fitted in well with the government’s adoption of
the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 199116. That turn impelled a
radical reform of the economy entailing the liberalisation of markets, privatisation of
state owned enterprises and utility companies, and to focus the role of the state on policy
development, regulation, and the provision of basic services17.
Chapter 3:

3.1: The Emergence and Rise of IBDC and the 1990s

15
Others argue that Zimbabwe could still have avoided courting the WB/IMF. See Manyanya, Simba and
Bond Patrick 2002, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neo-Liberalism and the search for
Social Justice, Weaver Press, Harare
16
It was soon euphemised as the ‘Accelerated Program for the Suffering of African People’ as de-
industrialisation set in, retrenchments followed and real wages dropped.
17
Government of Zimbabwe 1992, A Framework for Economic Reform, 1991–1995, Harare

20
 21

Taylor records that “…an initiative called the Indigenous Business Development Center
was launched in 1990 by a group of Harare-based businesspeople with the endorsement
of government” (249). Raftopoulos and Compagnon pontificate that “When originally
approached by a group of black entrepreneurs as early as 1988, Mugabe jumped at the
idea to act as an official godfather to the creation of the indigenous Business
Development Center IBDC in 1990” (2004: 21). The formation of the IBDC has been
credited to government in some circles (see, Nicholas, 1994:108). The IBDC managed to
popularize the indigenization debate and it was soon adopted by government as a policy
and led to various initiatives being undertaken within the state. Raftopoulos concurs with
this assertion and contends that, “Indeed, the IBDC's lobbying interventions have been, to
a significant extent, the catalyst which brought indigenization to the forefront of
Zimbabwean political debate” (1996 :).For the government to adopt the discourse of
indigenization it could thus be argued it was mostly to the efforts of the IBDC given that
the government had been apprehensive to the growth of an African business class. The
adoption of ESAP and Market driven economic policies created an opportunity for the
accumulation of the black bourgeoisie, as the anti-capital attitude of the government that
characterized the first decade of independence had faltered away. Indigenisation became
a major issue with the introduction of ESAP. It became clear that, due to historical
reasons, most blacks could not participate in expanding economic activity. The
government established the Indigenous Business Development Corporation in 199018.
There was need for the government to address economic questions that it had negated,
nevertheless it had no capacity by then to deal with the issues at stake and the discourse
of economic Indigenisation provides a relief to it. According to Raftouplos there were
three major factors that gave the impetus to the rise of the indigenization debate in
Zimbabwe. These were mainly:
• First, the clear limitations of the 1980s accumulation model were placing
pressures on the state to redirect its economic policies. An increasing budget
deficit, limited foreign investment, and growing unemployment were some of the
major factors which increased internal business forces' criticism of the state and
external pressure from international financial institutions, resulting in the 1990
introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme [ESAP].The new
legitimacy which this program provided for capital accumulation meant that
frustrated aspirations of the emerging African elite could no longer be
18
http://www.ulandssekretariatet2.dk/site/oplysning/Zimbabwe%20report.pdf

21
 22

ideologically repressed. The way was opened for the forces of indigenous
accumulation to press their demands with greater openness and legitimacy.
• Second, demands for greater African participation in ownership of the economy
were made against a background of continuing racial inequalities in the post-
colonial economy. For example, by 1991, 50% of the population received less
than 15% of total annual incomes and about 15% of total consumption, while the
richest three percent of the population received 30% of total incomes and were
responsible for 30% of total consumption19
• Finally, the retreat from socialist rhetoric linked to the broader international
consequences of the 1989 debacle in Eastern Europe left the ruling party without
a mobilizing ideology. The ideology of Indigenization combined certain
continuity with nationalist demands of the past, with renewed attempts to capture
and control the more recent demands of, an aggressive and expanded African elite
for a greater share of the post-colonial promise. For the ruling party, this was also
a political imperative as the emergence in the late 1980s of opposition parties
such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement and the Forum Party had demonstrated
the potential for political opposition from disconcerted sections of the African
middle class (1996).

Kanyenze observes that the government’s policy for Indigenisation was the deliberate
economic empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans through economic expansion and
the strategy included;
• creating an enabling macro-economic environment;
• industrialisation of the economy;
• land redistribution;
• increasing indigenous private investment in the economy;
• mobilisation of financial resources;
• skills development;
• review of legislation that constrain indigenous participation.20
The government had managed to jump on to another rhetoric mantra that would have
resonated with the people as the socialist ideology had been swept away by the fall of the
eastern block as well emerging global political and economic relations. Maphosa states
that in 1991 the government set up a deregulation committee to explore ways of relaxing
various laws and regulations which inhibit the development of small scale indigenous
business sector (1998:183). These policy initiatives at government level as seen through
the establishment of such a committee shows that there was now a shift in government
policy and attitude towards the creation of a black business people. The deregulation
committee played a crucial role in identifying various pieces of legislation that were
19
. [ World Bank, Poverty in Zimbabwe: Current Knowledge and Issues for the Future, 1995.]
20
http://www.ulandssekretariatet2.dk/site/oplysning/Zimbabwe%20report.pdf

22
 23

impeding the emergency of a black middle class. Maphosa further observes that in 1993,
a Deregulation Project Team was set up to identify among other things, all legislation
affecting the entry and growth of businesses in the private sector and to make
recommendations to the Deregulation committee to either amend, outright repeal or
improving the legislation in question (Ibid). As of February 1994 the Deregulation
Committee identified 28 Acts that presented obstacles to the entry of indigenous-business
people into private business. It observed the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was
largely responsible for the underdevelopment of a Black entrepreneurial class in
Zimbabwe. It further observes that out of the 28 Acts 13 of them needed urgent priority
attention and these included:
• Companies Act of (Chapter190)
• The Factory Act (Chapter 218)
• Urban Councils Act (Chapter 241)
• Rural District Council Act (No. 8 of 1988)
• Regional Town, and Country Planning Act (No. 22 of 1976)
• Liquor Act (No. 9 of 1984)
• Public Health Act (Chapter 328)
• Food and Food Standards Act (Chapter 321)
• Traditional Beer Act (No. 25 of 1984)
• Second Hand Goods Act (Chapter 293)
• Land Survey Act (Chapter 147)
• Banking Act (Chapter 188)
• Customs and Excise Act (Chapter 117), and
• Income Tax Act (Chapter 181), (Maphosa 1998: 184)

These pieces of legislation mainly inhibited the entry of small scale sector through
cumbersome bureaucratic procedure and at the same time excessive demands on
standards. Thus the Deregulation Committee found these to perpetual entrench white
privileges at the expense of indigenous business people. This is further alluded to by a
World Bank Discussion Paper No. 379 which observed that; “Although a program is in
place to address the myriad outdated regulations and restrictions that evolved during the
colonial era, progress have been slow and piecemeal. These regulations include building
codes, health regulations and zoning regulations, with small scale sector generally unable
to meet the high costs of compliance, with the small sector generally unable to meet the
high costs of compliance, both in terms of time and money” (Kapoor et al 1997 16). The

23
 24

key entrant strategy for the IBDC was to solicit government support to promote black
entrepreneurs through creating enabling policy framework as well as availing
concessionary financial loans to deal with issues of capitalization and finance.
Raftopoulos notes that:
…the IBDC sought the decisive support of the state to promote black
entrepreneurs through state-led policy reforms and the allocation of state
resources to blacks on preferential terms. Their demands included: the
deregulation of laws and procedures hindering black enterprises; directives to
financial institutions to finance black businesses; access to finance at well below
market interest rates; preferential allocation of government contracts and markets
to blacks; land redistribution designed to build a strong black commercial class in
the agrarian sector; and anti-trust legislation to control the monopoly position of
white capital (1996:)
The IBDC thus played a pivotal role in giving voice to an African bourgeoisie that had
been suppressed for a long time. It was through the IBDC efforts that the Business
Extension Advisory Service (BESA) was created. BESA was an organization meant to
facilitate the training of small-scale enterprises. According to Moyo the IBDC has been
relatively successful using what he terms the ‘entryst’ approach to lobbying, involving
close contact with top level state and party officials, members of parliament and business
executives in the private sector (in Raftopoulos 1996: 4). It is further observed that during
the 1995 cabinet reshuffle the IBDC managed to have two members appointed to deputy
ministerial posts (Ibid). Nevertheless nothing much is record on the contribution of these
IBDC members back in advancing the embourgeoisement of the African. It could
however be possible that the adoption was rather more of Mugabe’s carrot strategies in
dealing with dissent as happened with the war veterans when they became vociferous.
Taylor alludes to this position and observes that Mugabe co-opted the IBDC leadership
and left calls it starved of funds and hijacked the indigenization agenda (1999: 254).
Raftopoulos argues that the gains made by the IBDC have been negligible (ibid). He
however concedes that the IBDC managed to push the state to advocate for partnership
mostly in the construction sector. “Although the IBDC counts several state initiatives -
such as the Set-Aside program in the construction sector which requires that at least 30%
of the contract value of all large-scale building contracts be sub-contracted to small- and
medium-sized enterprises - among its successes…” (Ibid). Nevertheless Raftopoulos
further contends that these initiatives were seen as insufficient by the indigenous business

24
 25

people. The IBDC also managed to build itself into a credible organization and managed
to attract the support of the donor community. This was largely credited to its educated,
technocratic leadership which had the likes of Strive Masiyiwa (Taylor, 1999: 254).
However, the success of the IBDC has been difficult to asses given the limited nature of
available data on the institution’s activities. It could thus be argued that its best
achievement has been the popularization of the debate and placing the African
bourgeoisie at center of the national economic development question as opposed to the
previous eras where they have played a secondary role to settler capital.

3.2: The fall of the IBDC and mushrooming of splinter groups.

The fall of the IBDC is attributed to various factors ranging from party politicization of
the pressure group, hostile economic environment, lack of political will from government
and an intransigence white capital. Raftopoulos and Compagnon note that part of the
reasons that led to the power struggle within the IBDC has mainly been interference from
various factions within the ruling party ZANU PF as they sought control (in Darnolf and
Laakso, 2004: 21). The motive sucking in the ruling party could not be clearly
established, but mostly it could be speculated that as power positioning of factions within
ZANU PF to maintain influence over society. The internal feuding within the IBDC got
nasty as factions sucked in the ruling party. Taylor observe “One IBDC official who had
supported the Siziba faction pleaded to a reporter: ‘My friend, I want to live peacefully in
this country. Right now my life is at stake and I have been ordered [by a cabinet minister]
to stay out of IBDC business’ (1999: 253). With such kind of threats flying in within the
feuding parts it actually did scare some members and affected the organization.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe “…the fact that it was perceived correctly and or
not- as ethnically polarized, leading the late Joshua Nkomo to support Chemist Siziba’s
faction publicly, and the amount of abuse exchanged in public meetings or through
government press report suggest that there was more to it than the usual wrangling
between rival ambitions” (Ibid). Raftopoulos and Compagnon further state that it seemed
the confrontation was precipitated by high ranking politicians in ZANU PF. For instance
Kamushinda is noted to have had close links with Mugabe and his aides. Taylor observed
that “It is widely believed that the government helped to instigate the struggle by backing

25
 26

alternative candidates (namely, the Kamushinda faction) and forcing individuals whom it
opposed out of the of the leadership and eventually out of the IBDC altogether” (1999:
253). There were several reasons of the motives of government to delve into the IBDC
power struggles. Thus at this juncture the IBDC started to lose its legitimacy it had
managed to build and more so with the taking over of the like s of Kamushinda the scope
changed focusing much more on assets of white capital. Thus there was a diversion from
the original, charter of the IBDC, as nationalism took center stage. As the IBDC grew in
its influence and became popular, changing from a mere political grouping to a potent
organization, interest for organizational leadership from members grew. This created a
ripe situation for internal feuding as parties sought control of the organization.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe “…other factors fuelling the conflict might have
been the ability to attract funding from foreign donor agencies, hence its potential central
role in accessing financial resources, and the perception that the IBDC was a channel for
political appointment within the power structure”. Thus these potential incentives created
a tussle within the leadership with the hope of controlling resources. Taylor also concurs
with this position and observes “Throughout these debates, widespread accusations of
mismanagement of funds persisted, as did speculation that the cause of the leadership
wrangle was a dispute over which individuals would control the disbursement of funds”
(1999: 253). In as much as the state played a role in the demise of the IBDC its prospect
as a vehicle of accumulation played resulted in tensions amongst the African bourgeoisie.
It is observed that the World Bank earmarked Z$700Million dollars loan scheme to
small-scale business (Raftopoulos 1996: 6). Whilst it can not be exactly stated that these
resource might have acted as a catalyst for the feuding within the IBDC, its history of
acting as a springboard for businessmen associated with the ruling party vindicates the
assertion. One factor that also led to the demise of the IBDC is poor membership, and
institutional weakness. Raftopoulos observe “In addition the actual membership base of
the IBDC is not clear. Attempts to obtain a list of members and their actual economic
activities proved fruitless” (1996: 4).
The general economic conditions of the 1990s were one of the undoing factors to
the efforts of the IBDC. The economy was generally declining and the country was also
hit by a drought during the 1992-4 season which further compounded fiscal and monetary

26
 27

problems. Nicholas concurs with this position and observes “The government switched to
supporting the African capitalists at a time when the economy was undergoing
liberalization, thus submitting new enterprises to international competition, whereas
protectionist policies have generally been needed to nurture the development of infant
domestic industries” (1994: 109). Thus while the initial IBDC leadership sought a market
driven reform, it was apparent that the neo-liberal paradigm adopted by government as
espoused in ESAP was very limited in scope. It exposed small firms to competition from
established foreign corporations and multi-national corporations and consequently led to
the pushing out of smaller players as they struggled to survive in business. The required
state intervention to nurture and incubate African enterprises till they reach a competitive
stage was no-existent, and this was contrary to the observation that Ostergaard made in
the development of textile industry in Zimbabwe. He observes that the government acting
on complains by the Zimbabwe Clothing Council on the impact of competitive imports
from Botswana on sectors of the clothing industry imposed some restrictions (Ibid: 125).
The then minister of Industry Simba Makoni is quoted having said that government
“adopted several measures to support and maintain the production level in the industry.
One of these was to wage ‘an ongoing battle’ against the importation of clothing” (Ibid).
It is this crucial support that was lacking to the IBDC, which would have been necessary
to ensure easy entry and development of the small-scale entrepreneurs.
The IBDC also faced competition from other interest groups within the economy
as competition for increasingly scarce resources intensified. The World Bank called for a
restrain on indigenisation with emphasis on adopting market led economic reform. The
World Bank stated that “it is important that changes to assets ownership are based on
efficiency criteria, but there are no mechanisms built into the proposals so far put forward
that would ensure that new owners of such assets would be efficient managers - an issue
which generally the market is much better at revealing than any administrative
mechanism. There is therefore a risk that such asset reallocation will lead to individuals
with privileged access to decision makers being favoured . . .” (in Raftopoulos, 1996: 6).
Whist the argument raised by the World Bank that reallocation might lead to cronyism
had some credence; the argument that the market could deliver was somehow misplaced.

27
 28

The white settler capital was very intransigent to change and much more keen to protect
its privileges than advance any major economic reforms. Raftopoulos observe that:
On the one hand, white business takes the perspective which leaves indigenization
largely at the discretion of the private sector and totally subordinate to market
driven growth. State interventions into the process are considered largely
disruptive of the white business view of `racial harmony' which is centrally
concerned with the least possible disruption to white privilege in the Zimbabwean
economy (1996: 7).
This presented the state and the indigenisation lobby groups in dealing with challenges of
black embourgeoisement and at the same time without any racial overtones perceived.
However this was the case. For instance Nicholas observe that, when Barclays announced
intention to sell 25% of its shares to the public, the director of the IBDC Mercy Zinyama,
argued that the government should buy the shares and eventually turn them over to the
IBDC, to allow indigenous business people greater control over the financial sector. The
reaction from the CZI was that it was outrageous and defeated the logic of a limited
government. More so the settler bourgeoisie was quick to point out how this militates
against the policy of reconciliation (1994: 109). These factors mirror how intransigent the
settler bourgeoisie, and given their control of the economy it was bound to create
problems for African capitalists to have easy entry. This was more evident in the racial
spats that came over mainly from the blank indigenous pressure groups. Taylor states that
“The current IBDC leadership claims that a media smear campaign led by the
government-owned herald newspaper and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company, under the
influence of white backer, undermined the relationship. Specifically, they claim that the
campaign against the IBDC was backed by foreign interests and local whites, but
spearheaded by ministers in the government who benefit from connections to local
whites” (1999: 252). Even though there has not been empirical evidence, this might not
be surprising given sometimes the hostile relations between the IBDC and white
dominated business groups, since they were rivals in competing for a stake in the
economy. Taylor also asserts this position and observe that “One implication that emerge
from this and other studies is that white business interests allied with certain
governmental/ state interests to undermine the potential of the IBDC to act as a vanguard
of an indigenous bourgeoisie class” (1999: 254). However Taylor acknowledges that
evidence to support this assertion has been very limited.

28
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Nicholas observe “…that the governing group feared a challenge from the rise of
a black industrial bourgeoisie. Had an indigenous black bourgeoisie arisen, however, it
might have been able to penetrate the state apparatus and contest the protected position of
the governing group” (1994: 117). The creation of independent African elite had the
potential to challenge the incumbency in terms of state power and while the state
appreciated the need for indigenization the potency of this threat might have led it to be
less committed to the full development of the IBDC. Thus the state would have only been
comfortable with the development of the IBDC so long as it could control and influence
the organization. For instance when Phillip Chiyangwa21 was asked why the IBDC had
failed to assist Strive Masiyiwa in the fight for a licence to operate mobile cellular; he
replied that “We have advised Strive Masiyiwa not to confront the government. Rather, if
you cannot beat the ZANU PF system, join it. That is the only option and that is how the
system works. We told him so”22. This shows that the government was not really
committed to the growth of indigenous entrepreneur, as it would reduce their dependency
on the state. Taylor records that “When the organization began to flourish and became
more independent of state influence, however, Mugabe government moved in quickly to
weaken its popular appeal and diminish its potential threat” (1999: 250).
The relationship between the government and IBDC soured as time progressed
due to differences over policies and implementation of programmes. This saw the IBDC
becoming more vocal and criticizing government. Taylor observes that a series of public
disputes soon put the IBDC and the government at loggerheads. These disputes centered
on NERF. Government was insisting that 75 percent of the disbursement should go to
new business, a constraint that disqualified existing black entrepreneurs, who formed the
core of the IBDC membership and in need of capital injection (1999: 251). This created
animosity between the IBDC leadership and the state and gave the government more
determination to destabilise the IBDC. Criticism of government was viewed as rebellious
and confrontational as seen in Chiyangwa’s prior comments and the government was
only willing to work with those who do not criticize it. IBDC main contention was the
interest rate and time taken to disburse the funds were unfair as compared to the
21
Affirmative Action Group Founder (AAG) (an empowerment lobby that emerged towards the decline of
the IBDC), Former Mashonaland West ZANU PF Province Chairperson, Nephew to Mugabe and one of
the businessmen strongly connected to the ruling party.
22
Matikinye, Ray “Young Achievers defy state cronyism to make it to the top” Daily News 15 April 2002

29
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favourable treatment that there white counterparts had got. Taylor states that “…the rate
of interest on NERF loans was set at 15 percent. The IBDC and its constituent argued that
the conditions placed on the NERF facility were unfair, especially when compared with a
similar loan scheme that benefited the white community…The farmers were able to
borrow at a rate of 5 percent, well just below market rate. Furthermore, the farmers’
facility was disbursed in just two days, whereas the NERF took two years” (1999: 251).
This gave the IBDC the impression that they were being misled by government and the
banks. Therefore the IBDC started to become critical of government and ruffled many
feathers in government. Chemist Siziba23 commenting on ESAP IN 1993 stated that “We
have already demonstrated that we are fearless when it comes to criticizing shortcomings
in the implementation of ESAP. [At first,] we were treated as heretics, but we were
vindicated when President Mugabe recently repeated similar concerns about the
management of our national economy” (in Taylor 1999: 252). Such kind of talk did not
endear Siziba with to the cabinet, and Taylor records a minister telling the IBDC
leadership that “You are a threat to ZANU PF” (Ibid). This might have marked the
drawing of daggers towards the IBDC leadership, and thus put pressure to reform the
institution and put in more compliant and loyal leaders. Thus the power struggles that
ensued within the IBDC drew in the factional fighting n ZANU PF. The undermining of
pressure groups through funding of factions is not a new strategy to ZANU PF.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon note that “Indeed, the stimulation of factionalism is one of
Mugabe’s preferred techniques of control both within the ruling party and towards civil
society, as experienced by trade unions, student unions and various NGOs in the past”
(2004: 22). For instance after facing increasing criticism and worker protests from the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU); ZANU PF sponsored the formation of the
Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU)24 and has also been keeping on trying to
undermine the ZCTU Leadership.
Raftopoulos states “The continuing debilitating crisis within the IBDC and
apparent stasis in new government initiatives on the indigenous program led to the

23
IBDC Vice President.
24
This was led Alfred Makwarimba and by war veterans leader Joseph Chinotimba a municipal policeman
and one of Mugabe’s lieutenant leading the farm invasions. The ZFTU has been getting preferential
treatment within the state media and always held counter programmes to ZCTU, whilst the latter has
always been always been pilloried in the state media.

30
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formation of a new organization of indigenous business persons in July 1994” (1996:4).

This saw the birth of the Affirmative Action Group (AAG), led Phillip Chiyangwa a
Mugabe relative and Roger Boka of the Unite Merchant Bank. The AAG was very
radical and adopted anti-white rhetoric as part of it advocacy campaigns to acquire stake
in white owned firms. Selby notes “At the heart of the AAG was Roger Boka,
who leapt to prominence as a champion of black empowerment. Boka’s
demands for access to the gold, finance and tobacco sectors became
symbolic of calls for wider ‘economic nationalism’, and attracted support
from black business and broader society” (1996: 249). The AAG served
more as a vehicle just to champion the accumulation of individuals rather
than the empowerment of black Zimbabweans. Raftopoulos notes “In a
statement reminiscent of the Malcolm X, the AAG president warned:
‘Those who wish to become ‘uncle Tom’ or the field Negroes or the
window-dressed or the Mr. Nice Guys’ …are using their sense of
professionalism to defend the indefensible at the expense of the
nation25…be warned…AAG will expose them…’Thus the AAG sharpened
more the anti-white rhetoric that had been adopted by the IBDC, and even
managed to get the nod of President Mugabe. Block notes “ President
Mugabe defended Mr. Boka's often hate-mongering language and praised him in
speeches as a patriot and black-empowerment pioneer. The state-controlled media
whipped up support for his endeavors”26. Not much was done by the AAG rather than
going on anti-white crusade. Raftopoulos observe “Once again the beyond the bravado of
public statements the membership base of this organization remain unclear. Indeed, not
only is the AAG program similar to that of the IBDC but they appear to be attempting to
forge an even closer alliance with the ruling party” (1996: 5). It was not just only the
membership base that was unclear, even a perusal into the archives showed that there was
no clear programme that could have been attributed to the AAG besides the intimidation
of white capital.

25
The AAG thus saw itself as defender of black interest and did this invoking limited historicism without
qualifying whose nation they were talking about.
26
Robert Block, September 8, 1998 http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_623.htm , accessed on
22/01/07

31
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The Indigenous Business Women Organisation was an empowerment Lobby

group set up to advance the cause of women business founded in 199427. IBWO identified
itself as a non-governmental, non-profit making organisation whose main existence is to
economically empower Zimbabwean women28. This was more expressed in its mission
statement that read “creation of wealth for all indigenous women through economic
empowerment”29. Raftopoulos and Compagnon record it as an affiliate organisation of the
IBDC that associated itself with the wave of politically connected leaders and the
creation of satellite organisations (2004: 23). This organisation did not change much, if
anything in terms of the indigenisation discourse in Zimbabwe. It was rather much more
a feminization of the racial diatribes pushed by ZANU PF and IBDC. Just like its
predecessors IBWO argued that the financial sector imposed stringent requirements and
blocking previous disadvantaged groups from access to capital. For instance Jane
Mutasa30 commenting on the disbursement of a world Bank $700 million loan stated that
“The women of Zimbabwe cannot be expected to stand by and watch while they are
being disadvantaged by the recently released $700 million World Bank facility whose
lending conditions are designed to maintain the status quo”, and she further argued that
“As women we should fight for our rights by boycotting those financial institutions that
seek to discriminate against the majority of the people by imposing unwarranted ending
rights which prohibit the participation of the indigenous sector in such facilities”.31
Saunders records IBWO arguing that government “has gone out of its way to protect
multinationals and ex-settler businesses against competition from outside, so that they
can consolidate their hold on this economy” (1996: 4). Thus ‘old wine in new wine
skins’. IBWO claims to have benefited a lot of women in its programmes, mostly rural,
but a perusal through most of the projects it boasts of were mainly in the informal sector
the usual cross boarder trade, poultry, piggery and dress making trade32. During its
operations IBWO established a trust fund with Zimbank 33. The trust fund was to be used

27
IBWO Mirror (organization’s official magazine), Volume 3, March/April/May 1997: 7
28
Indigenous Business Women Organisation Proposal for pre-Budget Discussion (Undated document).
29
Ibid.
30
IBDC founding president and still president. She is also a top ranking ZANU PF member.
31
IBWO Mirror (organization’s official magazine), Volume 3, March/April/May 1997: 2
32
See, “Rural Women Benefit from IBWO”, and “Women Find Hope in IBWO”, IBWO Mirror, Volume 3,
March/April/May 1997:8 and 9.
33
A commercial bank in which the government has a stake.

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to seek independent investment, on behalf of members who would have joined it.
However little is know about the trust fund and its investment activities and what became
of it, but IBWO, is noted to have made investment in companies such as Telecel
Zimbabwe34. There is less information available on IBWO since the organisation fizzled
out just like AAG and IBDC, and a visit to its offices in showed that there was no
business taking place with office equipment just heaped in one room where it was being
auctioned slowly. More so the offices are being manned by a care taker without any
administrative staff.

Chapter 4:

4.1: Clientilism, Neo-patrimonialism, The State and Accumulation

34
See, Herald “Mystery surrounds War Vets Association’s Telecel Shares” 12 January 2007.

33
 34

The embourgeoisment of the Africans in Zimbabwe can be best understood within the
context of clientlism and patronage developed by ZANU PF. The potential of the IBDC
as a harbinger fro the economic advancement of the African bourgeoisie has been
surprising given the period the impact it managed to make. This paper however posits
that this fall was precipitated by the adoption of neo-patrimonial strategies by the ZANU
PF. Taylor argues that “Neo-patrimonial regimes facilitates and strengthen the
development of a dependent state based capitalist class-a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’-
rather than an independent class…As a result they set about weakening all independent
centers of power” (1999: 240). This aptly sums the fairytale of the IBDC as certain
officials within government perceived the indigenous lobby group as a threat to ZANU
PF35. Van de Walle identifies neo-patrimonialism as:
…the thesis that most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial
practices coexist with modern bureaucracy. Outwardly the state has all the
trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction between the
public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order.
However, this official order is often subverted by a patrimonial logic, in which
office holders almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own
uses and political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including
patronage, various forms of rent-seeking and prebendalism36.

However Taylor concedes that labeling Zimbabwe as a neo-patrimonial state can be

misgiving since Zimbabwe contradicts Braton and van de Walle’s classification of the
country as a multiparty polyarchy in the sense conveyed by Dahl (1999: 240). Taylor
mainly argues that Zimbabwe is multiparty and polyarchic in name, as elections are
proscribed, and the ruling party using intimidation, harassment, and fraud to restrict
participation to political interests (Ibid). Therefore Taylor argues that there is need to
adapt Bratton and van de Walle’s model to fit the post 1989 period and the Zimbabwean
case in particular. This construct helps in understanding the political economy of
indigenization process in Zimbabwe post independence and mostly post 1990. At the
same time it also tries to give accounts and make one understand the tensions that ensued
between the government and the IBDC and subsequently its demise. It further helps to
account for the emergence of a parasitic bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe as seen in the growth
35
See Taylor “Race, Class and Neo-patrimonialism in Zimbabwe”, 1999: 252.
36
Nicolas van de Walle, “The Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”
http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Walle.htm

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of the empire of the late Roger Boka and at the same time the struggle of Strive
Masiyiwa’s Econet to get a mobile phone operating license. Thus this paper concurs with
Taylor that neo-patrimonialism was one of the major factors that led to the demise of the
IBDC, and this provides us with insights on why the state never seized such an
opportunity to embark on a serious programme of indigenization to augment the rhetoric
of its new found gospel.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe “However, for the new power elite, the
long-term socialist transformation of the economy was no longer the primary aim of the
state control: the bloated public sector was above anything else, a valuable resource for
Mugabe’s political patronage, as it offered a good number of lucrative positions for party
cadres, political cronies and family members” (2003: 20). Thus Mugabe saw black
advancement as channel to enrich his party and family members. It was more of a
strategy of buying loyalty and so long as you were in favour, with him your business
would easily get away with a lot of illegal activities. Thus the patronage was embedded in
some kind of corruption and illegality by a parasitic bourgeoisie dependent on the ruling
party rather than entrepreneurship. This was more evident in the operations of Roger
Boka who had close links with the Mugabe regime and got a lot of preferential treatment
from authorities. Robert Block a staff reporter of the Wall Street Journal observes:
Mr. Boka also financed politicians and the ruling Zanu-PF party, according to
family members and Zimbabwean investigators. An official at the Zimbabwean
Reserve Bank, which led an investigation into United Merchant Bank and other
Boka companies, says Mr. Boka approached cabinet ministers to ask whether they
needed any financial assistance. Mr. Boka, his associates and his family have
repeatedly referred in government correspondence and in interviews to prominent
people who owed his bank money. He also often boasted to journalists and friends
that he financed the political campaigns of important politicians in the last general
election.37
The activities of Mr. Boka in the development of his business empire have been well
publicized in Zimbabwe’s media and the collapse of his United Merchant Bank (UMB),
confirms that a large number of ZANU PF and cabinet officials benefited in preferential
loans from the UMB. In providing such financial assistance to the ruling elite, he
managed to have a parasitic relationship in which he managed to have preferential
treatment through the awarding of tobacco merchant’s license, and the easing of
37
Robert Block, September 8, 1998 http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_623.htm , accessed on
22/01/07.

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conditions for him in 1995 to acquire a banking license38, (see Raftopoulos and
Compagnon, 2003: 27). Thus the state has acted as a vehicle of accumulation for this
parasitic bourgeoisie, and it is quite evident in the conduct of their business. For instance
during the trial of some ENG Capital directors Phillip Chiyangwa standing in as witness
told the magistrate “I am wealthy enough, if I wanted I could have paid all their creditors.
The excited policeman who brought these allegations, I will deal with him at some stage”
(Herald 2004)39. Most notable in this statement is the intimidation of the judiciary and
law enforcement agency by a ZANU PF official and also self-styled indigenous
proponent. The indigenization debate in Zimbabwe has thrust to the centre mostly two
types of entrepreneurs that is one dependent on the state and the other on its own business
acumen. Raftopoulos and Compagnon observed that Mugabe’s patronage gave Boka’s
business ventures a tremendous boost. Mostly the political protection at the highest level
saved from public scrutiny for various deals that he committed (2003: 27). They further
state that this was achieved mostly by granting generous loans to the ruling class (Ibid).
Thus Boka owed the expansion of his bank largely to patronage; otherwise it would not
have enjoyed the rapid rise it had.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon observe that in a bid “To avoid insolvency, Boka
resorted to forgery and sold Z$1 billion of fake commercial paper in the name of the
government-owned Cold Storage Company, and at the same time illegally transferred
US$21 million to an offshore bank account (2003:27). These shoddy dealings exposing
the extend to which the indigenous discourse was used by Mugabe’s clique to accumulate
wealth. Thus liberalization of the 1990s provided an opportunity for Mugabe to reward
his cronies who have been loyal to him. Moreover the indigenization agenda driven by
Boka was highly racialised and focused more on denigrating white capital. This fitted in
well with Mugabe rhetoric and endeared him with the state. For instance Selby observe
that Boka “On 31 March 1996, he published a full-page advert in several national
newspapers, reproducing an old photograph of a black Kenyan man carrying a white man
across a swollen river. The caption read ‘White Zimbabwean’s idea of a good African,’
adding. ‘We want our country Zimbabwe and our economy. No dogs or guns will stop
38
Robert Block, September 8, 1998 http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_623.htm , accessed on
22/01/07.
39
The Herald, http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2004/01/20/news/n26_20012004.htm , accessed 23/01/07

36
 37

the people’s revolution” (1996:250). Thus Boka managed to exploit race relations as a
way of getting preferential treatment from government for his various business dealing.
By then government rhetoric on indigenization had swung towards dishing out racial
diatribes on the increasingly insecure white capital as a strategy to divert the nation from
its failed economic policies. Carmody and Taylor observe “…there was a concerted
attempt to capture urban support in the 1996 presidential election by resorting to an
increasingly virulent anti-white rhetoric as President Mugabe and his handlers sought to
shift the blame for urban decline to white farmers and industrialists. This effort did not
convince many, as the government commitment to indigenization was by that time highly
discredited and seen to benefit only a narrow black elite”40. However this period
epitomized the collapse of the indigenization agenda in Zimbabwe’s political economy.

4.2: Indictment of Indigenisation Agenda.

The case of Econet Wireless has been a drama of shuffling between the judicial chambers
and law firms as it sought to acquire an operating license. This case shows government’s
determination to thwart an initiative by a black Zimbabwe and also former founder
member to establish a telecommunications company. The case of Econet Wireless was an
indictment to the whole Indigenisation agenda in Zimbabwe. This included all the
business pressure groups that purported to represent black businessmen, as well as the
state. Taylor notes “The PTC, like most parastatal organizations in Africa, is notoriously
inefficient and incompetent. Although Zimbabwe is relatively more developed than many
of its neighbours, its communication infrastructure is among the worst in sub-Saharan
Africa, with fewer than 12 telephone main lines per, 1000 people” (1999: 256). Given the
huge demand of telephone services that was within the country Masiyiwa’s established a
company called Econet, which according to Taylor offered made two distinct advantages
to Zimbabwean economic and social development, namely:
i. Consistent with the spirit and letter of ESAP, Econet was an example of a
private sector individual, using privately secured funds, to initiate a business
that would provide employment and vital infrastructure.

40
Padraig Carmody and Scott Taylor, “Industry and the Urban Sector in Zimbabwe’s Political Economy.
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a3.htm ,accessed on 18/06/06

37
 38

ii. Econet would also relieved the overburdened, overtaxed and inefficient state
run monopoly, perhaps even improving it by introducing market competition
(1999: 256)
The economic benefits being provided by Econet were no less insignificant and to a
government that had been on the forefront of calling for the empowerment of blacks this
should have been a welcome initiative. Nevertheless this was not the case, as the ruling
class was not prepared to let Masiyiwa operate his business. Whilst several reasons could
be proffered for the government’s reluctance to award Masiyiwa a license, the whole
fiasco could best be understood in ZANU PF’s clientilist and neo-patrimonial strategies.
Raftopoulos and Compagnon pontificate that “For Mugabe Indigenisation is a means to
retain control over the polity through patronage, and arbitrate between the rival clientele
networks of his long-time associates of the Politburo through the divisions of spoils”
(2004: 25). Thus business opportunities were used as rewards for political loyalty, by the
Mugabe regime.
The Masiyiwa debacle to get a license also revealed the extend of acculturation of
corruption in ZANU PF. Raftopoulos and Compagnon argue that; “More importantly he
incurred the government’s wrath with his refusal to grant some Politburo members free
shares in Econet, the company which he created to operate a cellular phone network”
(2004: 26). This is further echoed by Chemist Siziba who lamented that “…people with
the right connections are getting state ahead of those without…A black person without
the capacity to handle the project wins a tender. He does not have the technology or
capacity to do it, but just because of his close association with government he gets it” (in
Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 1999: 258). Thus the rules of the game dictated that you
had to give a stake to the ZANU PF ‘bigwigs’41 so as to have a green light to operate
business. Most interesting was the invoking of presidential powers by Mugabe in 1996 to
try and stop Masiyiwa from operating. This was despite that Masiyiwa had won a case in
the court against government challenging the Posts and Telecommunications Company
(PTC) monopoly. According to Raftopoulos this threatened Econet as it stood to lose
about Z$17 million per month, and the government through David Karimanzira, the
minister of posts and telecommunications coaxed Telecel International to withdraw its
41
A term used to describe the political heavy weights in ZANU PF. Those with influence over policy and
the state.

38
 39

40% stake in Econet (1999: 257). The government strategy was to frustrate Econet
through the creation of a hostile environment. The government through Joyce Mujuru the
minister of Information Posts and Telecommunications threateningly declared: “We will
jail Masiyiwa if he defies government order. Cabinet was unanimous that Masiyiwa
should sell his equipment to Telecel or surrender it to government for no
compensation”42. Interestingly the company that Masiyiwa was being directed to sell his
equipment had the likes of James Makamba and Leo Mugabe43, as shareholders former
being a ZANU PF Central Committee and Politburo member and the latter a relative of
Mugabe.Even when the Supreme court went on to award an operating license to Econet
against the whims and wishes of Government, the then Minister of telecommunications
Joyce Mujuru had a public spat with the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo, over the
Econet operating license. Taylor aptly sums this up this “The state’s response reveal that
the durability of neo-patrimonialism and the centralization of state power have broader
implications for the prospects of a middle class development and democracy in
Zimbabwe” (1999: 257).
The phenomenal growth of Econet and its achievement from its establishment up
to date serves as an indictment to Mugabe’s indigenisation policies. They show hypocrisy
of a government that can not walk its talk. One would have expected that given the
government’s strong rhetoric on indigenisation, it would have sought to learn rather than
antagonize Masiyiwa’s company. Raftopoulos and Compagnon, argue that “Mugabe was
less interested in promoting broad-based indigenisation project than in expanding ‘crony
capitalism’ which serves the particularistic interest of his extended family and the
families of his political allies and clients” (2004: 25). The silence adopted by the
indigenous lobby groups as Masiyiwa’s fought with government in the courts serves to
make the indigenisation debate in Zimbabwe a farce. It thus posits the question whose
indigenisation? Nevertheless this study is not able to address that question for it is
broader and out of its scope, but is tempted to conclude that it was just another gravy
train for the ZANU PF elite besides having started with a noble agenda.

42
Matikinye, Ray “Young Achievers defy state cronyism to make it to the top” Daily News 15 April 2002.
43
See Brian Mangwende, “Mugabe eyes Telecel”, Financial Gazette, 26 February 2004. In this issue
Makamba is reported to have been a business partner of Solomon Mujuru who is the husband of the Joyce
Mujuru the Minister who was directing Econet to sell its shares to Telecel.

39
 40

4.3: Conclusion: The Cart that lost its wheel.

The embourgeoisment of the Africans has always met a lot of obstacles, and chief
among them has been the state and settler bourgeoisie. Whilst this paper concedes that
the African bourgeoisie has never been a coterminous class and has been imbued by in
fighting the tale of the IBDC projects another history. One common trend emerges that
both during the colonial and independence period the state has always acted as n inhibitor
to black accumulation. Ostergaard aptly observes this trend and concludes that the
relationship between the new state and settler capital did not. It was just a continuity of
the Smith regime that presided before independence (1994: 115). The paper attempted to
contextualize the Rise and fall of the IBDC in three historical phases. The first phase
dealt with the colonial period. This history sought to paint the organisation of
accumulation of the native businessmen. Accumulation was much proscribed, and this
was achieved through legislation. Efforts to undertake business ventures by this time
were highly informed by nationalist politics as the state excluded the Africans. This
period marked the infancy of the African bourgeoisie that was dominated by teachers,
religious ministers, messenger of courts and nurses. Most of this African petit bourgeoisie
was confined into petty commodity trading and general dealership. The era of the
cooperative formation and their advocacy show the engendering of the Africans to
capitalize their businesses. The second phase which marked the decade after
independence presents another history that still showed hostility to the embourgeoisment
of the Africans.
At independence black business people had high hopes after having endured
exclusion from commerce during the colonial era. Nevertheless that dream never
materialized until after the first decade of independence. The government had inherited a
centralized economy and that fitted well with its Marxist ideology. Thus capitalist
accumulation was seen as an act of greed and exploitative, and there was a general
disdain for black businessmen within Mugabe’s government. 1984 saw the creation of
SEDCO that was meant to promote small-scale enterprises. Nevertheless the institution
was under funded and there was a tendency to promote cooperatives which were seen to
be in line with cooperatives. More so the Lancaster house Constitution, protected white

40
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privileges for the first decade of independence and prohibited the government from
embarking on any indigenisation that would be seen to threaten white property. More so
considering the government’s policy of reconciliation structural constraints persisted that
hindered the growth of the African business class. This is more profoundly outlined by
Ostergaard using the case study of the clothing industry. Nevertheless these obstacles
accumulation amongst Africans continued though at a slow pace. The paper thus posits
that from the 1920s to about 1989 a nascent class of African bourgeoisie was in
formation.
The end of the first decade that is from 1989 marked a new era (third phase), as
the government adopted the IMF/World Bank sponsored ESAP project. The Business
class in Zimbabwe notably the CZI strongly pressurized government to adopt a market
oriented approach of economic management. Black business took opportunity at this
chance and marketed the formation of a black empowerment organisation to Mugabe,
which he quickly accepted and became its patron. Thus the IBDC came to birth and
started to champion the promotion of black businesses. The IBDC managed to build itself
into a credible institution and attracted support from the donor and business community.
The IBDC sought to create new wealth as observed by Taylor: “The IBDC’s leaders
expressed an interest in increasing the absolute size of the economic pie, not diminishing
the relative share thought to be controlled by whites” (1999: 249). Thus in its primary
agenda the IBDC was to transform the fortunes of black business people. This however
was short lived as the cart lost its wheel after a leadership coup which saw the elevation
of Enoch Kamushinda no later turned to be Mugabe’s campaign team in the 1995
presidential elections. This saw a protracted battle within the high court and efforts by
ZANU PF to undermine the IBDC leadership and place in a more compliant and loyal
one. By then the indigenisation debate had shifted from creation and expansion of
business into firing racial salvos at the minority whites. ZANU PF adulterated the
indigenisation agenda initiated by the IBDC to suit its electioneering and rent seeking
objectives. As the chaos prevailed the AAG and IBWO came emerged. These also
became co-opted into the ZANU PF anti-white crusade. The tale of the IBDC shows a
government that was never committed to indigenisation, as business contracts and tenders
are awarded on the basis of patronage. It is within this context that the question of the

41
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role of a national bourgeoisie in development arises. Can poverty and unemployment

reduction, and wealth redistribution occur in such an environment? The chances looks
bleak as ZANU PF seeks to control all sectors of the economy, through its chaotic
policies. To date there is no clear indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe that has been
legislated besides talk of an impending policy that seeks to cede 50% of mine ownership
to the locals. The question still remains whose indigenisation again? With the sorry story
of the IBDC and Masiyiwa’s uphill task to obtain a license, Black economic advancement
in Zimbabwe is still a milestone.

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