Whether or not an order of collation is a final order and failure to appeal therefrom makes it

unassailable.

The answer is in the negative. A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate
or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and that due
to petitioners’ failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not feasible.

The Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is
because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC
and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the
subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. The order of exclusion (or
inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for
all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not a surviving spouse whose marriage to the decedent is assailed on the
ground of prior marriage may be considered an interested party in the settlement of the decedent’s
estate.

The answer is in the affirmative. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the propertiesthat were acquired through their joint efforts during
their cohabitation.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
took effect, Article 148 governs.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not estate is considered settled upon payment of inheritance tax.
(2) Whether or not the share of the heir who died pending the settlement of the
estate of predecessor decedent may be settled in the said pending settlement
case of the decedent.
(3) Whether or not the intestate court has the authority to determine questions of
ownership over properties covered by the estate.

No. Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax cannot be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not
settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—
an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the
estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax.
The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.