7/26/2017 Risk Assessment: Rupture Disk and PSV in Series

Use of Rupture Disks and Pressure Relief Valves in Series

A rupture disk is frequently installed in series with a pressure relief valve, as shown in the Figure, for a
number of reasons.

These might include:

The material in the vessel may be extremely corrosive, and a relief valve resistant to the material may
not be available, or may be extremely expensive. The rupture disk acts as a protective barrier between
the corrosive material and the relief valve.
The material in the vessel may contain solids that could foul the working parts of the relief valve,
resulting in the relief valve failing to open on demand.
The material in the vessel may be prone to form polymer or other tars due to chemical reaction of
vapors or of liquid condensed from the vapors.
Environmental regulations may require fugitive emission monitoring at the outlet of a relief valve. A
rupture disk under the relief valve may eliminate the fugitive emission monitoring requirements.

In the above situations, the vessel could be protected from over-pressurization by using a rupture disk alone.
However, the rupture disk and relief valve combination offers the potential to minimize the discharge of
material in the event of a vessel over-pressure. The relief valve can close, stopping the discharge, when the
vessel pressure returns to normal. Once the rupture disk bursts, the flow will continue until the vessel
pressure reaches ambient pressure.

These are "good deeds" – when specifying such design, the designer is focused on ensuring that the relief
valve will work if there is a demand on it, and also on minimizing the discharge of hazardous material to the
downstream treatment equipment and potentially the outside environment. But the designer must also
consider the possible punishment for this good deed. If not properly designed, the system can result in nearly
doubling the pressure at which the relief system will activate.

How can this happen? Consider what happens if there is a small, pinhole leak in the rupture disk. The small
leak causes a pressure increase in the pipe between the relief valve and the rupture disk. The pressure there
will eventually increase until it is equal to the vessel pressure. This pressure will remain in the piping
between the rupture disk and the relief valve because the relief valve set pressure has not been exceeded, so
the relief valve will not open.

http://www.processoperations.com/HazIDRA/HZ_Chp04a.htm 1/2
7/26/2017 Risk Assessment: Rupture Disk and PSV in Series

Now consider what happens when a system upset results in an increased in the vessel pressure. A rupture
disk is a differential pressure device, it bursts when the pressure difference between the upstream side (i.e.
vessel pressure) and the downstream side (i.e. in the piping between the relief valve and the rupture disk)
exceeds the specified bursting pressure. Thus, in the worst case, the pressure in the vessel will rise to nearly
double the original set pressure before the safety system is activated.

There are 2 ways to deal with this issue:

Providing a small hole, vented to a safe place at atmospheric pressure, in the pipe between the rupture
disk and the relief valve to prevent pressure build-up. However, fugitive emissions may have to be
monitored for the small hole.
Monitoring the pressure in the pipe between the rupture disk and the relief valve, either with a
pressure gauge which is periodically checked or by a pressure sensor with a high pressure alarm.

Both of these alternatives are recognized as acceptable design options by API 520 (1990) and ASME (1995)
vessel code. Both require a management system to ensure that the protective features are not compromised
by plugging of the hole or failure of the instruments or alarms. It is also essential that personnel understand
the reason for the protective systems so that they know the proper response for an alarm or observation of
high pressure between the rupture disk and relief valve, and so that the systems are not defeated by a future
change.

Back on Top

http://www.processoperations.com/HazIDRA/HZ_Chp04a.htm 2/2