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1 HEALTH AND SAFETY PRINCIPLES

,
LAWS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Sture Engdahl
Directorate of Labour Inspection

1 INTRODUCTION
The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority is a It is emphasised that the employer must have an over-
governmental agency under the direction of the Ministry view and knowledge of all relevant regulations of parti-
of Labour and Government Administration. The Labour cular importance for the enterprise.
Inspection Authority has approx. 520 employees and
consists of a central office – the Directorate, 11 district Some of the specific regulations are commented upon
offices and 28 local offices throughout the country. The below.
activities of the Labour Inspection are controlled by the
Directorate of Labour Inspection, which supervises the 2.1 Internal Control System
Labour Inspection’s operating strategy, overall planning The concept of the Internal Control System was intro-
and co-operation with central organisations. duced 1992. The purpose of the regulations is to pro-
mote health and a good work environment, and improve
The overall objective of the Labour Inspection Authority safety. The following definition of an internal control
is to create a sound and healthy work environment for system applies:
all, with safe and secure employment conditions and a
meaningful work for the individual. The Labour Systematic measures designed to ensure that the activi-
Inspection Authority shall be proactive in encouraging ties of the enterprise are planned, organised, performed
enterprises to work systematically towards the achieve- and maintained in conformity with requirements laid
ment of specific goals in order to comply with laws and down in or pursuant to the health, environmental and
regulations. safety legislation.

The systematic actions shall be documented in writing
2 STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATION and described in administrative procedures. Internal
The Working Environment Act was introduced in 1977. control shall be adapted to the nature, activities, risks
It stipulates that occupational health and safety (OHS) is and size of the enterprise to the extent required, to com-
primarily the responsibility of the employer. Based on ply with requirements set out in or pursuant to the
this Act, as a framework, the Directorate of Labour health, environmental and safety legislation. Internal
Inspection is responsible for enforcing the Act with sup- control entails that the enterprise in writing has to docu-
plementary regulations. The structure of the legislation ment the following:
comprises about one hundred regulations. The most - the enterprise’s objectives;
relevant regulations concerning tunnelling work are the - an overview of the enterprise’s organisational set-up,
following: including allocation of responsibilities, duties and
- Regulations relating to Systematic Health, Environ- authority;
mental and Safety Activities in Enterprises (Internal - risk assessment;
Control System); - routines to uncover, rectify and prevent breaches of
- Regulations concerning Safety, Health and Work requirements;
Environment on Construction Sites (Construction - a systematic surveillance and review of the internal
Client Regulations or the ‘Owner Regulations’); control system to ensure that it functions as intended.
- Regulations relating to Rock Work;
- Regulations concerning machinery;
- Regulations concerning the use of technical appliances
and equipment.

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N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . 13

The regulations concerning internal control system pro- ferent tasks are to be carried out and how much time
vide a method for enterprises to comply with existing has been allocated to each of them;
laws and regulations. The actual acts: - a description of particularly dangerous tasks and how
- Working Environment Act, they shall be carried out;
- Pollution Control Act, - descriptions of how e.g. personnel rooms, access and
- Acts relating to fire and explosion hazard and fire pre- transport roads, lighting etc shall be organised and sol-
vention, ved;
- Product Control Act, - requirements regarding the contractors that are to carry
- Civil Defence Act, and out construction work;
- Act relating to Electrical Installations and Equipment. - information routines;
- routines for dealing with deviations.
All these acts are supervised by different authorities
who have to cooperate and coordinate their activities See also paper no.5 in this publication
concerning internal control.
2.3 Rock Work Regulations
2.2 Construction Client Regulations The Rock Work Regulations came into force 1998 and is
Construction sites expose workers to high levels of risk. a revision and combination of six older regulations. It is
This may be due to the establishing of a temporary pro- adapted to the EU-directive 92/104/EEC on the mini-
duction organisation, new management, tight schedules, mum requirements for improving the safety and health
inadequate coordination, particularly where various sub- protection of workers in surface and underground mine-
contractors work simultaneously or in succession. It has ral-extracting industries and the ILO Convention no.
therefore been focused on how to improve the coordina- 176 and Recommendation no. 183 concerning safety
tion between the various parties concerned both at the and health in mines.
project preparation stage and when the work is carried
out. The regulations apply to all types of rock works, on sur-
face and underground. Rock works includes i.a. drilling,
An important factor in the regulations is that the client blasting or other types of fragmentation, scaling and all
(the project owner) is assigned tasks and responsibilities types of stabilisation work, loading and transportation.
for ensuring that safety, health and work environment This means that both mines and quarries as well as tun-
matters are taken into consideration right from the start nelling work and other construction work in rock come
of the project. The regulations are intended to help in in under the regulations.
ensuring that the OHS-work is maintained under equal
conditions of competition, accordingly plans for this Under section 4, comments follow on some of the most
work are required to be included in tender documents important requirements in the Rock Work Regulations.
and contracts.
2.4 Blasting Regulations
One of the most important sections is dealing with a Specific regulations relating to blasting, i.e. charging,
plan for safety, health and work environment. The client initiation and handling of explosives are handled by the
or project owner shall ensure that, prior to the mobilisa- Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning
tion of a construction site, a plan shall be made that (dsb previously called DBE)
ensures a totally satisfactory work environment.
This directorate deals with matters falling under the fol-
This plan shall refer to regulations and procedures rele- lowing acts:
vant for different tasks. In order to ensure that relevant - Act relating to Fire and Explosion Prevention
factors are taken into consideration in connection with - Act on Supervision of Electrical Installations and
tenders and contracts, it is very important to include Electrical Equipment
requirements regarding measures or working methods - Act on Control of Products and Consumer Services
that may have time or cost impact during the execution and from June 14. 2002
of the project. The main sections of such a plan may e.g. - Act relating to protection against fires, explosions and
contain the following: accidents with dangerous goods and abut the duties of
- relevant data for the organisation of the construction the fire squads (Fire, explosions and disaster preventi-
site including responsibility and distribution of tasks; on act) and
- a drawing showing the physical arrangement of the - Regulations relating to the handling of dangerous
construction site, with particular emphasis on factors goods. (Regulations on Explosives)
like construction cleanliness and materials handling;
- a schedule showing in detail where and when the dif- See also paper no. 3 in this publication.

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P UBLICATION NO . 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y

3 GOAL-ORIENTED LEGISLATION 4.3 Diesel exhaust underground
The traditional regulatory strategy in Norway, usually The last few years, extensive attention has been given to
called prescriptive regulation, was to specify detailed health damage caused by diesel exhaust in tunnels and
rules for those who create risks, in particular employers. mines. The aim of an ongoing project is to clarify the
This type of regulation prescribes precise, detailed steps health-related consequences of using diesel powered
to be taken by individuals or organisations, leaving litt- equipment underground and to propose measures that
le or no discretion for deviation. reduce the risks.

During the past two decades there has been a shift away For the time being the regulations have no requirements
from this type of strategy towards one that aims on cer- on maximum sulphur content in diesel fuel used under-
tain safety goals for the direct risk control functions. In ground. However in the guidance to paragraph no.14
the literature, this type of regulation has several names, there is a recommendation to use the best quality of low-
i.a. goal-oriented legislation. The goal-oriented legislati- sulphur diesel fuel available on the market and to equip
on specifies what must be regulated within the organi- diesel engines with some type of cleaning device for the
sation and how the authorities outside will check that waste gases, e.g. particle filters. One will find some fur-
this has taken place. By offering rules as a framework, ther info in paper no. 9 'Diesel Underground, project
formulated as goals, it is in principle the responsibility results and recommendations' in this publication
of the organisation to decide how to best achieve the
safety goals. 4.4 ‘Danger zone’
To improve health and safety during the drilling sequen-
Modern regulations do not put detailed requirements in ce there is a requirement in paragraph no. 20 in the Rock
the paragraph text. The level of a requirement is nor- Work Regulations stating that nobody is allowed to stay
mally given in the guidelines to the respective para- within the ‘danger zone’ while drilling (blast holes and
graph, as examples of actions and solutions or referen- other drilling) is going on. The ‘danger zone’ is defined
ces to standards, handbooks, practise, etc. This means as the area between the supports of the booms to the
that the level of a requirement is not permanent. In step drilling jumbo and the tunnel face. This requirement has
with the technical and social development, the level of a been thoroughly discussed with the contractors as it
requirement may increase without any need to change effectively forbids to carry out the charging of explosi-
the text of the paragraph. In other words, the authorities ves when the production drilling is going on. There are
do not want to hinder the technical development. many reasons to forbid people to stay in the danger zone
i.a. the very high noise level, the risk for rock falls and
Fewer and better regulations were a motto for the 1990’s. the risk to drill into explosives (from the previous round)
During the last years all the regulations, for which the that have not detonated. One will find some further info
Directorate of Labour Inspection is responsible, have in paper no. 8 'Automatic charging of emulsion explosi-
been reviewed in order to make them more concise and ves etc' in this publication
easier to understand.
4.5 Ventilation
4 IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS IN It is said that: "The one who does not undertake any
«REGULATIONS RELATING TO measurements does not know anything". Therefore para-
HEALTH AND SAFETY WITHIN ROCK graph no. 24 requires that the employer shall undertake
WORK» (REGULATIONS RELATING regular measurements in order to detect the amount and
TO ROCK WORK) concentration of hazardous gases and particles.
Below are comments on some of the most important Paragraph no. 25 states that all workplaces underground
requirements, which have improved health and safety in shall be satisfactorily ventilated so that the concentrati-
Norwegian tunnelling during the last five years. on of hazardous gases and dust in the air, which is inha-
led, will be as low as possible and shall not exceed the
4.1 Risk assessment Norwegian list of Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL).
The planning of a blast requires a risk assessment and (frequently used is also the identical term Treshold
the mapping of potential accident aspects. Limit Value - TLV)

4.2 Geological investigations The Norwegian OELs are called "administrative norms
An assessment of the geological situation is an impor- for pollution in the working atmosphere" and are based
tant part of the required plans, consequently geological on technical and economical factors in addition to the
investigations are necessary. See also paper no. 4 toxicological and medical documentation. It is stressed
'Geological hazards – causes, effects and prevention' in that the risk of health effects not necessarily is entirely
this publication. avoided even if the exposure is below the OEL. It is the-

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In Norway some new sys- tems have been developed based on micro-waves. 14 'Safety container' in this publication.Proper risk assessment. carbon monoxide. the Labour Inspection. necessary equipment. type of explosives. the fuel quality and whether diesel engines used are equip- ped with some type of cleaning device for waste gases. Paragraph no. construction. conditions can be improved by: as possible below the limit. 4. CO. The OEL-value for CO is 25 ppm and is a time-weighted average con. is no problem. Statistics show that more than 90% of all serious acci- stance is normally nitrogen dioxide. that will be legally binding if used in regulations from . 12 . 13 refore recommended that the exposure should be as far However.7 Personnel underground Paragraph no. Even considering all the efforts the last few years. 7 'Development in ventilation methods' in this publication. The system can also give an alarm if not autho- rized persons without such "tag" try to enter the tunnel.Functional requirements encouraging more extensive Inspection to an employer. it is centration for an 8-hour workday. the amount of engines. Thus it is up to the employ- er to choose an adequate ventilation system depending on i. Further info will be found in paper no. the name of all persons staying under ground and the possible location.a. should not exceed 100 ppm. One will find some further info in paper no. 4. size.not implemented preventive actions means that the concentration should not be exceeded . In tunnelling the most important and problematic sub. depending on the location of the Typical hydropower station during construction fire. The Norwegian dents happens because one has: OEL-value for NO2 is 2 ppm. it may not be possible to bypass the fire in a tunnel drive with only one way out. 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS Mining and tunnelling works have always been recogni- sed as having hard and tough working conditions.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO .not carried out the necessary training. In most cases . maintenance and use of such containers. This is very important in case of an accident or a fire. The OELs are guidelines . or in orders issued by the Labour .Suitable documentation. 30 requires a system which makes it pos- sible to know. The Norwegian Tunnelling Society (NFF) has prepared guidelines regar- ding design. This means that persons wearing a special "tag" automatical- ly will be registered when they move into or out of the tunnel.6 Fire prevention A fire in a motor vehicle or construction machinery develops quickly and. It has always been a problem to control the number of persons who stay underground at every moment. 11 'Electronic access monitoring' in this publication. 27 therefo- re requires some type of a rescue chamber (safety con- tainer) if there is only one way out. See also paper no.not obtained the required permits during any time of the working exposure. use of available guidelines and handbooks. This is a ceiling-value and . Especially today as there is a lot of ‘back front’ work going on parallel to the tunnel driving. at every moment. Short-term exposures therefore still a large potential for improvement.

noise. Today much attention is given to ly made stricter. temperature and air humidity. The amount of air pollutants pro. Exposure to pollutants and mining. Abstract The general tendency in Norwegian tunnelling and other underground construction works during the last 10-15 years is improved safety whereas improved health could not be observed. gy. noise. rable. different chemicals. Regulations issued during the recent health damage caused by diesel waste gas (exhaust). etc). Safety work. action groups and others continually diesel and blasting. Dust. lighting etc. but years increasingly set stricter targets for the general also the exposure to mineral dust is in focus. heavy and uncom- fortable working positions with arms over the head. stricter administrative norms for allowable concentrations of pollutants in the air. falls. dust. Counter-mea. The accidents that cause Demands for reducing construction times increase the injuries to personnel may cause damage to material or production intensity. traffic information are crucial factors for the development of a accidents etc are typical. rock types/mineralo- chological stress. soot. 13 . rock and environment. Injuries from rock works can be fatal (rock-falls. focus on factors which may influence neighbourhood radon and radon-daughters. the external environment. gases from ronmentalists. This applies to environmental loads linked to reduced the physical loads. cleaner diesel engines and fuels. chemicals. There are still challenges con- cerning the work environment. especially the chemical The environmental preconditions and requirements for and physical factors such as mineral dust. oil mist. noise and vibration. and put a heavy burden on the better work environment aimed at improving the health workers. and more rigo- 1 INTRODUCTION rous rules and regulations linked to procedures. envi- always been seen as a ‘tough’ trade. fuel/diesel oil. methods Tunnelling. have a high injury frequency rate with a high severity factor. however. drilling into remaining explosives. danger of explosion. sure and safety situation for the workers. standard of the work environment as well as the external environment. better blasting achieved remarkable improvements in their Health & agents and technology. mining and other underground works have and equipment. All such losses are undesi- duced per time unit is increasing as well. Many examples can be found where companies have Examples are new ventilation methods. Increased mechanisation and automation have situation. gas. blasting/explosives. mining and other rock works are continuous- vibrations. tunnelling. temperature. CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL – CAUSES. All types of rock blasting works. sonnel and/or material damage can be prevented. health and safety work. but have increased the psy. including reduced accident rates and general acceptance of the importance of systematic simultaneously experienced good economic returns. EFFECTS AND PREVENTION Tom Myran Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Most accidents. Simultaneously the mass-media. The health aspect is a challenge that must be given increased attention. including tunnelling Figure 1. water.2 UNDERGROUND WORK ENVIRONMENT. gases. causing injuries to per- sures put into effect have positively influenced the expo. Transfer of knowledge and the understanding of new reduced light and visibility.

conditions The work environment is usually described as physical related to psychological pressure or stress can be rather and chemical environmental factors on one side and more dominating in construction activities (tunnelling) psychical and social factors on the other. both Underground excavation has a high and steadily increa. are all is only slightly affected by increased activity behind the useful factors to improve the air quality underground. that includes pos. 13 radioactive radiation and others. This has been confir- considerable differences as to how individual employees med in discussions with employees with experience experience their own work situation and work environ. ased use of electric energy. literally giving a ‘messy' work situation. in- HSE-work. new technology or improved met. This includes increased When bolt hole drilling for permanent rock support. The experienced risk is often different from the actual risk. On the other hand. the air quality underground may be dramati- cally worsened and the workers highly exposed to a vari- Today’s challenge with respect to preventing health inju. will sing degree of mechanisation. mineral dust and vibra. Further. regarding prevention technique and health services. more effective watering of the muck-pile. There can be than is usually the case in mining. the amount of air pollutants produ- cal development may be outbalanced by negative side. dealt with by increased mechanisati- ronment. incre. activity in the completion phase can cause Improved explosives. environmentally harmful activities over the building sary for this development. Otherwise the commercial benefits of techni. ment in relation to protective equipment are important ria and procedures for controlling/monitoring releases to key factors in the work aimed at preventing illness at air. cleaner engines and fuel. These must be safe to handle and use under the prevailing conditions. Particularly. more effective ventilation methods. it is obvious that reduced air quality made clearer and more transparent. MEASURES The stimulation to a greater degree of technical and 2 EXPERIENCE WITH THE WORK medical co-operation aimed at more purposeful and ENVIRONMENT cost-saving supervision and inspection procedures. in line with the society's general expectations. ety of airborne substances. hods are continually introduced. cleaning of footings. more systematic service and maintenance of equipment The work environment and air quality at the tunnel face and roadway. Safety and Environment (HSE). 3 WORK ENVIRONMENT AND sible contamination. drainage etc take place concurrently with exca- legal responsibility of top level management has been vation activities. from both the construction and the mining industry. the tion. Analyses of sick leave and rehabilitation efforts. for tunnel projects. should therefore attempt to eliminate or even out the ved. Those problems cause 3 out of 4 work illnesses in chemical and physical factors such as dust. and also over the shifts during the day. interest and improved attitude and motivation for the concrete. This also inclu. In the context of such development it is important to emphasise the a necessa. Tight construction schedules cause an increasing amount of work to be executed simultaneously behind The general development in tunnelling over the last the face. ced per time unit is increasing. Norway. have in recent years improved the understanding of health pro- 14 . noise. the working patterns in the tunnel positive way. and worsened general safety may easily result. The capacity of available contribute to an improvement of the work environment equipment increases. face. This may worsen the air quality and the work decades has in many ways positively affected Health. trench digging.and carpentry work. a ‘pile-up’ of site clearance work. vibrations. the works. environment related to residual materials significantly.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . period as a whole. blasting agents and blasting tech. To obtain an acceptable work environment for the These efforts also affect productivity and economy in a tunnel as a whole. If the right measures are effects. including the removal niques. of rubbish. and relevant crite. not taken. gas. Effects resulting from blems and methods to reduce the problems. Training and control functions are impro. soil and water must be established. combinations of materials that influence people and the Measurements of work hygiene and product develop- environment must be put into focus. work and personal injuries. A motivated and determined management is neces. ment. on and productivity. The understanding of the relation between filling of roadway sub-base. des grouting materials. ries from rock-blasting activities is about dealing with existing problems due to noise. lighting are very similar in the construction and mining industries. With reference to the work environment generally. Because of the demand for reducing construction time ry balance and measures being taken for the work envi. piping production work and HSE has improved.

flushing of muck piles. workers in tunnelling. In mining this is today a minor pro. particle pol- 4 CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL lution. liquids give less spill. Since the early 1970’s. visibility and other factors concerning the slurry and So far. among others silicosis).may emit radon and radon-daughters. the the tunnel. because of the high ventilation volume applied dust concentrations and increases the visibility. In spite of the introduction of dust-damping efforts and ted to the use of ANFO. testing 15 . Normally. organic par- blow method dominate. dust. radiation is not a problem in Norwegian tun- rable.a. 4. though. when. The liquid is Employees underground is on the average that group of transported directly to the site. Methane is normally a coal mine problem. like taken into consideration when organising the plant and in mining. This applies to the cal investigations on blasting fumes. ly focused. Natural occurring gases can cause risks or health pro. but also carbon monoxide (CO). and the need for transport and storing of concentration of radon can increase rapidly to high explosives is reduced. Today well sized ducts and the ventilation. Today. measuring methods (what is away from the blasting area. It was acknowledged that conditions connected to waste gas/exhaust.1 Blasting and explosive gases conditions. however. Less dust. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y But like other natural gases.4 Particle pollution duced in Norwegian tunnelling in the 1986/87 was adap. which The work environment (air quality) at the face and i. This is caused by the presence of radio- active components in the rocks or the joints. have a decisive influence on the working 4. High ventila- tion intensity will reduce risks for health hazards. like radon and hydrogen sulphide. it may be met also in tunnelling. instruments with direct indication.P UBLICATION NO . as 10 years ago. the lungs (reduced lung function and lung diseases. particle pollution (mineral dust. waste and pollution to the water in If the ventilation is reduced or stopped. the concen- tration will after a few hours return to the background The health risk associated with explosive gases in tun. is produced. We are looking to find one (or a few) exposure indicators that are simple Emulsion explosives in tunnelling have been in com. When starting the ventilation again. to measure using effective techniques. ticles like soot and oil mist) is a dominating air-polluting environmental factor in rock-blasting work. centration of especially nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Investigations show occurrences of illness from dust in blems. carried out. ventilation. however. both total and respi. concentrations of gases when passing through a smoke plug after a blast. etc. to be measured. This gives lower airborne smoke and nelling. Since 1993. During the 1990’s. nelling is clearly reduced in recent years. the focus was exclusively on fuel consumption and waste gas quantity from diesel engines. The blow- exhaust-combination ventilation method that was intro. thoron and thoron-daughters.3 Ionising radiation Today emulsion explosives dominate. level. exposure/emission. 4. loading and transportation). such as light mercial use in Norway since 1996. marginal ends of shifts when the miners are out of the mine or far values. 4. and to some behind is highly improved because of much lower con. were for many years exposed to unacceptable determining operation arrangements. Using for other reasons (blasting. This must be During blasting operations. pumped into the drilled workers in Norway exposed to the highest dose of ioni- holes and subsequently sensitised sing radiation. extent. questions are still blem since blasting takes place at shift changes or at asked regarding threshold limit values (TLV). smoke and work environment as well as the external environment. thus the inherent hazards have to be continuous.2 Diesel exhaust Since heavier wheel-going diesel machines were intro- duced in mines and tunnels. techni. increasingly more attention was directed to pollution and air quality for underground rockwork. the quality of PARAMETERS roadway. and how?). exposure to gases and par- ticles have been among the dominating burdens in these industries. both on and behind the face. For a long period of time. levels. one has not succeeded in finding such a emulsion techniques compared with ANFO have been criteria or proposals for such.

Both versions have advantages the employees. Use of The objectives have been both a documentation of the TBMs has. more than three times as much 4. diesel exhaust. Investigations nelling was highlighted by The Directorate of Labour indicate that the danger of silicosis must still be regar. with 24. as well tunnelling reduced or completely eliminated environ- as determination of the background level in different mental pressures like blasting fumes. The length of the tunnel matters. work intensity in tunnelling operations often are higher repetitive work. or will become 16 . underground working has normal hearing. A similar observation can be made in important.8 Long tunnels and ventilation In 1995 the longest road tunnel in the world. In the following a summary is given of a number of other relationships which are important.5 Noise loped further. This is especially linked to differences in the following environmental factors as most onerous: noise. 2. the Lærdal tunnel. Investigations show that the threshold limit values (TLV) are reached more frequently in tunnelling than in Questionnaires show that TBM operators perceive the mining. noise and ventilation. mechanical character or pressure injuries. quartz content as shown in Fig. and especially concerning the choice of an optimal ven- tilation method. This includes sampling of dust.6 Whole body vibration and lighting air (expressed in tons) as rock has been transported Whole body vibration and lighting (poor light) are through the tunnel. exposure of blasting fumes in tun- varies between 0 % to more than 50 %. 13 and documentation of dust and other air pollutant have 4. nearly all tunnels and even mines in Norway.5 km length. block-falls. environment and safety. This relates in particular to suppression of mineral dust.to 60-year old worker within rock blasting and double-tube systems were used. but has at the same time resulted in increa- sed pressures elsewhere. This could be implemented either by the single- information.and 50. In the Lærdal tunnel the single-tube versions were deve- 4. The TLV for rock dust depends on the and disadvantages.7 Tunnelling Boring Machines (TBM) been carried out. 4. As a consequence attention was drawn ded as real in a number of tunnelling situations. and ergonomic pressures. mobile fans and auxiliary fans that reduced injuries at work. Both the single. It was a great challenge Figure 2. work situations and areas. but also to the fact that the mineral dust. In the tunnelling and mining hardly any frictional losses through these fans. was commenced. to check and apply preventative efforts or the double-tube technique. noise and vibration more than the risk of acute. by means of a bypass air system for sur- Noise is probably the individual factor that causes most face fans. compared with conventional drill & blast level of exposure to dust for individual workers. load and carry trucks) combined with 5 DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBLE poor roadways/foundations can cause heavy whole-body FUTURE PROBLEM AREAS vibrations. rity fear health risk on account of long-term effects of dust. but often neglected environmental factors. heat (when changing cutters). towards the application of the two-way ventilation met- Therefore it is necessary to use available knowledge and hods. tent in the dust. A clear majo- than in mining. The tun- nel was completed in year 2000. Since then some 320 km has been bored. The great majority is more or less hearing-impaired. quartz content in the dust. with The first regular tunnel boring in Norway started in measurements of quartz content and types of particles. The content of alpha-quartz in the dust from the tunnels Some years ago high. There is still a potential for improvements to be obtained with relatively small adjustments and modification of current operating methods. Inspection. In parti- cular rubber-wheel mounted production equipment (loa- ding machines. vibrations. to the efforts towards health. which can cause personal injury and accidents.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . It is interesting to notice that during the 5 years of the excavation of the tunnel. 1972. supplemented by the use together with regular and proper health supervision of of mobile fan systems. The relation between TLV and the quartz con.

choose a solution that gives the maximum utilisation personal protective equipment against gases. Different procedures for spirometry – will be complied with through a collective and respon- standing or sitting – will give different results.is a research organization with more than 1700 dedicated employees. including calibration routines for both medical and technical monitoring. resource. the industry has competent workers and lea- ters/lung function meters may give different volumes ders who will ensure that the laws and regulations with poor quality assurance and lack of meaningful required for conforming to the environmental standard calibration. greatly in frequency.P UBLICATION NO . e. However. equipment and optimisation of operations must be • Methods for control. Equipment and procedu- res must be homogenous and harmonised. • During excavation ventilation is a crucial factor. parallel measurements. different software for the calculation of results from lung function measurements. Environment and Safety (HES) in tunnelling. tive and synergistic effects with the introduction and • Concrete spraying and grouting work are very deman- use of the summation formula for consideration of air ding work operations underground. dust.g.g. They must be better utilised. human Rock and Soil Mechanics behaviour. faces and faster cars lead to generally increased speed ority as planning. during tunnelling. mining and other rocks works. as may sible effort. NTNU. and care must be taken to tions for various types of protective equipment. Different types of spirome. important that savings are not attempted on the ventil- • Reduction in administrative norms. chemical and physical. for every cubic metre of air that is brought in. Use of protective quality underground. . Gas and dust The industry is confronted with many difficult and chal- monitoring instruments give different results with lenging HSE tasks linked to underground work. sampling NO-7465 Trondheim and analysis of pollutants. monitoring and sampling vary improved. and increased risk for traffic acci- • HSE ‘Safety Delegates’ are an important and positive dents. but over-complex ventilation solutions can also dioxide and soot particles.watn@sintef. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y of importance for HSE work in the time to come: • Improved air quality and visibility.sintef. content and quality both relating to medical and exposure research studies. representing more than 40 nationalities. improved road sur- • HSE work must be become an activity with equal pri. e. ventilation. Or contact us: SINTEF Technology and Society effects and prevention. causes.no human beings and environment. . rock Telephone: +47 73 59 46 00 support etc. • More information on the use. for nitrogen ation. Greater weighting of addi. Fax: +47 73 59 71 36 e-mail: arnstein. It is noise. working in close co-operation with the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. active in literally all aspects of technology and human-technological interaction. Typical fields of working are potential hazard and risk for Visit us on: www. Ventilation is expensive. progress and economy.no 17 . service value and limita.is providing research activities within Health. give other effects than those desired.

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loading rigs. such as deto- nators and fuses. others ignite under high temperature only. to maintain production efficiency with the chosen working methods. there is a possibility of explosion with potential severe consequences. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS – CAUSES. Prevention of all The main objective in safe behaviour and handling of explosives is to keep primary explosives. The con. All safety aspects must be Fire can be caused if flammable material is present. tractor is given the responsibility for identifying and from falling objects or rock fragments from walls and assessing the risk elements. This system called Explosives are dangerous goods though and represent a internal control is based upon the principle of targeting major risk in case of fire. 2 SOURCES OF FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS 3 STORAGE AND HANDLING OF In underground operations sources of fire could be EXPLOSIVES flammable goods. electrical equipment of In Norway the authorities have introduced a system of all kinds. at safe distance from other explosives. tions concerning health and safety. at the safety planning. EFFECTS AND PREVENTION Hans-Jørgen Eriksen Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning 1 REGULATIONS REQUIRE INTERNAL kinds of risk is a major objective in safety planning. to handle incidents or accidents is another part of the eve maximum safety for the tunnel workers and. temporary maintenance workshops under- regulations which gives a great deal of freedom for the ground. same time. already from a temperature of 100°C. with explosives and/or stored together with other explo- sives. Detonators become unstable 'as low level of risk as practicable possible'. explosives and gas. These regulations give spe- cific instruction as to: • Where to place the storage • How to build the storage • How to run the storage • What type of explosives can be stored in the same place • The trustworthiness of the responsible person • The skill and age of the persons handling explosives • How to rebuild/repair the storage in a safe way Fig. Transient currents from electrical equipment and document the complete internal control system in a writ. e. is based on risk assess. CONTROL Preparation for and establishing emergency procedures Modern tunnelling requires competent planning to achi. tunnelling. Unwanted explosions may occur due to fire in the sur- ments related to specified acceptance levels. January 2000. Some explosives are project owner and the contractor to choose suitable solu. called ALARP. In addressed during the early stage of the planning process. dumpers. New regulations regarding storage of explosives came into force 1. flammable.g. 1: Principle of ALARP 19 .3. ventilation ducts and more. Other sources can be sudden impacts. lightning can initiate detonators. and has to describe and roof. This method. roundings. If these are primed ten report. flammable material will be found in drilling jumbos.

13 4 RISK ASSESSMENTS AND ACCEPT. Or one can take the number of fatalities from different kinds of accidents in The acceptance levels for group risk given in the regula- the country and find the rate that society does not react tion are: upon. one can e. A quantitative risk assessment includes the expected accident frequency. RG = PE × r×λ×ν Individual risk means the risk a person have to tolerate where: from e. and is expres. A disaster is a disaster. it is natural to compare the These acceptance criteria are including the aversion fac- acceptance criteria for such storage to the level that is tor. The regulations state that the applicant must do follows: a quantitative risk assessment to show that the storage Category 1: 2×10-5 yr-1 meets the requirements. 2 and 3 : 3×10-4 yr -1 Category 2 and 3 : 2×10-4 yr -1 Taking into account that storage of explosives is a neces. To allow for this effect. for a child to die from an accident. Group risk or collective risk is the risk persons in the neighbourhood of an explosive storage has to tolerate. The aversion factor starts at 1 for 0 expected fatalities and flattens off at 16 To find what would be an acceptable risk for Category 3 when the expected numbers of fatalities reach 25. levels for individual risk from storage of explosives as lations. To deal with this matter the equation: persons have to be divided into three different categories: Expected risk = incident frequency × consequences × aversion factor Category 1: Directly involved Category 2: Not directly involved In Norway. as a function: f(blast. when cal- person has any benefit from the activity and who is culating the expected risk one has to use the following responsible for the safety.g. When doing this it was found that in Norway a risk on ABLE RISK LEVELS 2×10-7 yr-1 could be acceptable for those not involved The alternative to demonstrate compliance with the (Category 3). Thereby. or While developing risk criteria.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . debris) one have to consider the maximum expected number of dead persons from a detonation in the storage. rate a risk ten times higher then those not involved. the aversion factors φ is taken as 2(Fn/5) Category 3: Not involved where Fn is the fatality number. and ves. RG = Group risk sed as follows: PE = Probability of detonation involving the contents of ri = PE × ρ × λ a storage yr -1 where: ρ = Presence factor that is the maximum frequency of ri = Individual risk presence of persons in exposed objects PE = Probability of detonation involving the contents of λ = Lethality. The regulations give criteria Category 2: 2×10-6 yr-1 both for acceptable ‘individual risk’ as well as ‘group Category 3: 2×10-7 yr-1 risk’. whether the ty increase even more. it had to be established in other words. the reactions from socie- other factors. a specific storage of explosives. count the number of children that die from beyond this number of fatalities the reaction from soci- accidents in one year. are. Category 1. amongst number of fatalities increases. and then establish the probability ety will not increase. Those partly involved should have to tole- Q/D-tables (Safe distance related to quantity of explosi. the lethality for exposed persons. If the What makes risks acceptable for a person. one gets an accident level that society actually accepts. the group risk (RG) is the totalised indi- certain 'risk levels' assumed acceptable to the society at vidual risks for the specific storage: large. This gives acceptance storage meets the safety standard specified in the regu. Category 3 : 1×10-4 yr -1 sary element in the utilisation of a product that has cer- tain dangerous properties. his involvement in the activity.g. as a function: f(blast. otherwise accepted in society. see also appendice 'Definitions and explanations') those involved should have to tolerate even ten times is the use of risk assessment to show that the applied more then those partly involved. debris) a storage yr -1 ν = Number of persons exposed ρ = Presence factor that is the maximum frequency of presence of a person in an exposed object When establishing an acceptance criteria for group risk λ = Lethality. It was also necessary to establish acceptance cri- teria for both individual and group risk. 20 .

Burning explosives rapidly become very handling. Being hit by accepted risk one must multiply the expected number of loose fragments is probably the most frequent injury fatalities with an aversion factor and then with the inci. can be a large risk. Facilities for people outside the tunnel must be placed away from the blast effect sector in front of the tunnel. cars and all kinds of loose supplies. but evacuate the area im- pile and subsequently during the other steps of muck mediately. detonators with emulsions. improved visibi- equipment must meet a certain technical standard to lity and work environment. If explosives are burning. criteria. Remaining explosives in blast holes in the sensitive and may explode. or otherwise remaining unex. The drilling Emulsions give less smoke. Safety con- tainers equipped with breathing equipment and air bott- les can serve as safe haven to trapped crew for at last 6 hours. If exposed to flammables. Through the introduction of the bulk systems the risk for fires or unplanned explosions has decreased significant- 6 FIRES ly. 5 DRILLING AND CHARGING Drilling blast holes and charging explosives simultane- ously at the work face is now prohibited. Up to a certain number the response from society regarding one accident compared In cases of explosion in a tunnel. one Firstly. less gases. The wide use of electricity and electrical com. divided into 2 equal Safe ignition of all blast holes is important also from a units. cause. need for ordinary explosives for tunnel blasting. invert are a safety problem especially if the cross secti- on has to be enlarged with a lower bench. An oil leakage towards a hot surface or a broken glass on a heavy sear- chlight can start a fire. the charging operation shall allow a fast evacu- ploded in the rock or muck pile. electrical elements. The pressure wave will destroy almost everything dent frequency. gives more safe solutions.g. from ANFO and slurry to site sensitised If electric detonators should be used. e. avoid electrical faults. lighting equipment or hot parts of engines. Bulk systems exist. In case of emergency during use of a charging res in the ignition pattern. very low sensitivity to electric current (HU) intended for the use in tunnelling must be supplied. The air station must be dimensioned so that everyone connected can get Figure 2. ation from the work face. Each individual needs from 10 to 100 litre air pr minute depending on physical activity. based on mixing raw material on site. explosion inside 21 . To account for the tubes. such as ventilation between the numbers of fatalities. one. The maximum amount of explosives allowed to be sto- red in a tunnel system is 3000 kg. the pressure wave to another accident increases more than the difference could destroy most of the inventory. In most cases non-electrical detonators are used in tun- nelling. In the regulations the criteria for acceptable risk Therefore it is very difficult to get in or out of the tun- reflects the risks that society accept in other areas. Remaining explosives from misfi.P UBLICATION NO . An explosion in one unit must not ignite the other safety point of view. Fire in a tunnel or an underground plant without ventil- ation will take many hours to overcome. Example of damage outside a tunnel after an enough air for the period they are in need of extra air. in the tunnel exit. for the people involved in loading of the muck shall not try to extinguish. but there are still some incidents. A fire in a dril- into account the storage of explosives’ part of GDP ling jumbo can last for hours. taken nel system during the time gases occur. New technology. hence no 7 EXPLOSIONS source to accidents. truck. any hot surface may be a source of ignition.detonators and primers excepted . If the staff shall be rescued they must be supplied with fresh air. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y expected presence in different situations and acceptance The fire gases will reduce the visibility in a tunnel. (Gross Domestic Product). A self- rescuer gives protection for a limited time.no ponents are no longer the source of unwanted ignition. Today there is .

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Work crew. EFFECTS AND PREVENTION Olav Torgeir Blindheim Dr ing O T Blindheim Abstract Whether such potential hazards are allowed to develop In ‘hard rock’ tunnelling on the Norwegian mainland. in or outside the tunnel has to be prepared for.4 GEOLOGICAL HAZARDS – CAUSES. or health risks. • ‘Actors and roles’: . of the contract. even loss of the tunnel actions at the work face. However. crus- hed or blocky rock masses. low production. rocks stress problems. and preventive • Delays. It may be difficult to tell ahead veyors. interpretati- to human activity. foremen. quality and quantity sur- ment of unpredictability.Observations from probe drilling. supervisors. the ever present pressure for • Rock stress. shift bosses. there were examples where safety was com- • Gas promised for production and profit.e. spraying of concrete) ‘geological conditions’. i. • Loss of life • Damage to health This paper describes the most common features that one • Damage to property. not at • Unconsolidated clayey or sandy zones least the time factor. differing viewpoints. not at least by the 23 . .Owner’s costs • Water under pressure Some factors may apparently contradict safety.Varied experience. neither to planners. and how the situation can be dealt • Damage to the external environment with by pre-treatment ahead of the face. the safety slogan "Accidents do . poor confinement. • Lack of relevant experience and if appropriate preparations are not made. geological map- not happen. high. They may appear to have an ele. become exposed at the face. crew nor anybody else involved. The suitable organisation and the This paper focuses on the first two aspects. but may also excuse for lack of safety precautions. and in a few cases. • Insufficient preparation.g. contractors. equipment. procedures lies to risk of flooding. • Economic interests: . are present: owners. This app. Such in most tunnels.Owner’s representatives. into accidents depends not only on the severity of the the geological conditions are often favourable. if they • Lack of clear allocation of responsibility are not recognised during planning and construction. It is however ‘unforeseen’. During the hydropower boom in the 1960’s • Crushed or blocky rock mass to 1980’s. or in the transport. Problems and practical soluti- ons are discussed. However.Subcontractors for special activities (e. specialist advisers of time if and when a specific geological feature may be • Information and evaluations: hazardous. 2 THE TUNNEL FACE The geological hazards are ‘looming’ ahead of the tun- Unforeseen geological conditions cannot be used as an nel work face. muck Geological hazards have their causes in nature.Work crew bonus system Typical geological features that represent hazards to the . cost overruns. If a feature is cause accidents further out in the tunnel. even The consequences of accidents may be: natural gases. tunnel management 1 ACCIDENTS ARE CAUSED . they are caused" applies to geological ping hazards as well as to other types of accidents connected . importance of a focused decision process are highligh- ted.Contractor’s profit safety and health in tunnelling are: . there is a potential for geological ‘organisational’ causes may be: hazards to develop into accidents. but the excuse of ‘surprises’ must not be where many tasks are performed and different interests allowed with respect to safety. geological engineers. but to a large extent on our actions. conditions. Accidents may be caused by lack of ons and evaluations preparation or caution. this may apply to the economic conditions useful to look first on the situation at the work face. collapse in unconsolidated • Lack of or wrong decisions zones.

but applies in principle also to tunnel boring • Prepared procedures (TBM). methane pressure dated zones stresses ment rock mass Effects or • Flooding • Immediate • Rock spalling • Block falls • Block falls • Explosion potential con. Since the conditions vary continuously as tunnel. for better safety. • Cave-in cave-in or bursting • Cave-in • Delay of sequences • Dangerous • Cannot be • Slab or block work activi- drill rod controlled at falls ties changing face Warning signals • Water in • Water. • Probe drill to • As for ‘Water • Scaling. Although sometimes less obvious. EFFECTS AND PREVENTION from questionnaires to the TBM operators that they fear Norway is basically a ‘hard rock’ province. • Drilling prob. sprayed bolting dilution and and/or drain. lacking in blocky gas • Karstic fea. It is known 3 CAUSES. noise and dust more quently associated with favourable tunnelling conditi. geological replaced by the realisation that safe tunnelling is also hazards are indeed present in most tunnels. ling progresses. form-ations rock tures • May be lacking! Preventive ac. their effects or potential consequences and pre- face. Hazard Water under Un-consoli. under pres. See also paper no. sprayed ‘spiling’ contour: sprayed • Increased tential inflow sure’ concrete • Scaling. water • Inflow • Noises. circulation age ahead of face water present: • Measure- • Do not blast cast-in-place ments and until treat. involving a more ’factory-like’ production. mud. Crushed or blocky Gas. ning signals may be few or not so obvious. It cannot be emphasised enough that probe dril- ling ahead of the face is a crucial element in risk pre- As in many other situations. health risks connected to vibration. Due to the complexity of factors at the work face. High rock Poor con-fine. bolt. this applies to the could lean itself to a different learning curve allowing health aspects as well. 13 tunnelling crews themselves. safety at the tunnel face can vention or reduction for most of the hazards. bolt. ing. an 5th column). crack. It does not this publication Table 1 Overview of main geological hazards with potential for accidents (swelling material may be involved in 2nd. The slogan "Lack of accidents does not prove presence Table 1 gives an overview of the main geological of safety" applies well to the situation at a tunnel work hazards.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO .• Drilling prob. than the risks of acute accidents. Some features may be easier to handle by D&B • Quality in execution due to the better access to the face. which may dominate in some tunnels. • Drilling problems • Bubbles in probe or blast sand in probe lems in stress lems in open in crushed rock seepage holes or blast holes release cracks joints • Drizzling contin. concrete and ventilation for • Pre-grouting • Ground • Drill stress ing. 2 in ons. concrete lining monitoring ment is done 24 . There are however no figures available from Norwegian tunnelling to support this. ventive actions. one can never let the guard down. freezing release holes concrete ribs • For lost contour. only be achieved by: • Determined management The table is directed mainly to drill and blast (D&B) • Conscious attitudes tunnelling. 4th. one may This simplified overview focuses on the situation at the coin another slogan: "At the tunnel face incidents may tunnel face and the practical measures that can be taken easily become accidents". • Pre-bolting • For intact • Probe drill tions localise po. there. but the war- cost efficient [1]. One could expect that TBM tunnelling. Such attitudes have been mean that adverse conditions are not met.• May be ues with time • Rotten smell through joints ling ‘shots’ lacking! • May be of associated in the face • Visible de. and the flexibility to • Thorough follow-up change between techniques. This is fre.

it 4. and was driven through with 25 . months) and could cause potentially dang- sufficient in such cases. often standing under mechanical scaling. These incidents happened before it became more incidents occurred at the face.2 Unconsolidated zones may be necessary to apply sprayed concrete after Zones of unconsolidated material. It is also justified less brittle rocks the deformations may go on for a long to take a close look at whether sprayed concrete lining is time (weeks. It contained crushed rock and swel- tered. also be very dangerous. water pressure. The effect could also be delayed. but collapsed after the face had progressed further. Other spectacular examples of unconsolidated zones The Lærdal tunnel also offered another example of the have been found in subsea road tunnels. in the form of squeezing in a the Bjorøy tunnel. high tangential stresses occur also close to valley-sides. moderately high rock stresses may deliver concrete for rock support and killed the driver. extensive site investigations and probe western and northern Norway. accidents and one permanent injury occurred. or delayed problems in with fibre-reinforced sprayed concrete and end-ancho- work areas further out in the tunnel where the workers red rock bolts [5]. The zone was tunnelled through after heavy con. this author is not aware of any accidents with loss of life in these situati. On the worst sections. cially due to cold water. Several smaller more or less filled with clay or other loose materials. the tunnels would The working conditions during large water inflows may have been catastrophically flooded. not have been recoverable. This applies also to the more than 500 lake taps High rock stresses do not only occur under high cover as (‘underwater tunnel piercing’) performed below someti. On some sections or permeable ‘chimneys’ along faults. mes high water pressure. in the drainage holes and heavy pre-bolting. This includes influence of high stresses. providing a false solidate the loose material if possible. where an exceptional and unexpected fault zone [6]. ling clay. and detected at a safe distance ahead of the face by systema- caused significant delays [2]. In both cases. A water-bearing crushed zone had been supported bolts and sprayed concrete. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y 4 EXPERIENCES solidation grouting [3]. However. A major fault zone was met at more than zone of 4m width of completely loose sand was encoun. erous situations further out in the tunnel. and spalling could occur from the face during charging of explosives. However. 120m water pressure. One example is an accident in a road tunnel a few years Under such conditions. manual scaling may become impos- are addressed in the following. The sequencing of the rock sup- port becomes important. The stress release may cause spalling or rock burst (violent crushing) of the rock. Especially in the mountainous fjord landscape of In all these cases. such conditions are com- drilling are performed as preventive measures. could be thrown up to 20m from the face. apparently after the water The more intense spalling and rock bursts may be pressure had built up over time against the rock support accompanied by crackling or gun-shot sounds.P UBLICATION NO . the face was supported with rock ago. 1000m rock cover. and to the application of this or even at low cover depending on the tectonic conditi- technique for piercing for landfall of subsea pipelines. as the poor ground was common to apply probe drilling ahead of the face. in par. by sprayed concrete at the face. under very intense spalling.5km long Lærdal road tun- in hard rock tunnelling. tic percussive probe drilling. represents some of the most difficult and potentially dangerous ground conditions which are met A recent example is the 24. 4. Most frequent are narrow zones nel. Had such zones been expo- sed at the face by a blasting round. rock stress problems are not intense. before rock bolting. provi- without giving any clear warning signs. Recently. This results in dangerous The combined hazards of water and stability problems work conditions. The prevention of such accidents depends on the more Fatal accidents have occurred in circumstances where systematic use of pre-treatment by pre-grouting to con. which may be very intense rock spalling occurred. as there could be a lack of the warning signals that may follow the high rock stresses. no plants. less safe and unhealthy. necessita- These may cause immediate collapse at the tunnel face ting a very cautious approach and heavy rock support if exposed before treatment. ons.3 High rock stress ons. mon. but no water. sible to perform safely. The collapse hit ding a dramatic effect and sometimes acting as warning a concrete transmixer that was waiting in the tunnel to signals. rock flakes assume that they are safe. with rock cover up to 1450m. and would perhaps become very unpleasant.1 Water under pressure met a fault zone that had been eroded to unexpected Flooding due to large water inflows in open joints or depth and filled in with loose glacial deposits under karst has occurred in several Norwegian tunnels. espe. This zone had to be frozen over ticular in declining access tunnels for hydropower 30m length to become passable [4]. combined with feeling of safety. the Oslofjord tunnel 4.

A fatal block fall the crew evacuated. It is the- zones. which frequently has a group north of the Norwegian mainland is a necessary loose blocky appearance between released sub-horizon. Further instability was indicated by sounds and the by-pass tunnel dust coming out of cracks in the sprayed concrete. In itself. When a Pre-Cambrian intensely crushed to free a stuck drill rod. The zone was extremely dry. during an attempt wer project. thus the combined effect may become critical. Especially in large cross sections these fall-outs can be ter crushed and swelling material was detected during dangerous. 13 heavy rock support in the form of rock bolting and One dramatic example of a collapse without influence sprayed concrete.1 Combined effects Pattern bolting with normal length rock bolts may not be Combination of hazards. this may be detrimental to the stability of zones erous block-falls. especially if unforeseen. This attitude can be achieved by the use of heavy pre-bolting. For example. no harm to application of sprayed concrete to the unstable area. it collapsed and filled a certain lowed by two more fall-outs of the same size. only 1m2 in the face. close to portal areas or adjacent to fault may increase the connected risks unnecessary. 5 OTHER ASPECTS mation measurements before deciding on rock support. so that measurements can be zones releasing the stresses. The presence of the sof. mica-schist. it is the immediate before proper rock support has been installed. One example is a coarse applied before exposure. methane in the coal mines on the Spitsbergen island ben (the Drammen granite). In a TBM tunnel. needed. In retrospect. of water occurred in tunnel on the Sira Kvina hydropo- After driving 20m through the zone. 26 . clay coating. but more frequent examples are filled up with concrete. combined with rock bands and is occurring unexpectedly and extra ventilation time is radial bolts. one can see that the table.5 Crushed or blocky rock mass Collapses or larger cave-ins have occurred on a number of occasions in modern Norwegian tunnelling. methane gas has only occurred in very few cases warning whatsoever. may effective. Earlier it was not uncommon to blame such drilling. less dramatic. tal benches and sub-vertical clay-filled joints or clay gouges. with in formations otherwise dominated by phyllites and respect to joint orientations. Water 100m3 came down and hit the far end of the manipula. as the immediate stand-up time was incidents on human error by the face crew for not sho- sufficient (presumably because of lack of natural water). if gas pre-bolting (‘spiling’). explosive gas is the At the opposite end of the scale. the source rock was likely black schist layers the observations about the conditions at the face.4 Poor confinement Of the hazards mentioned in Table 1. moisture etc. Because of the infrequent occurrence in Norwegian tun- Situations with poor confinement could occur in almost nelling. which was later applied in motivation. there is a possibility that lack of preparedness any tunnel. routine. wing sufficient caution. During length of the tunnel with debris. Experienced personnel must make both cases. Today. the crew occurred. Fortunately. A stepwise process of applying small fall-out of crushed or blocky rock from the face rock support allowing for deformations was started. smoothness. the remaining part of the fault zone. proper training and follow-up. or from the crown and walls close to the face. In this situation it is critically necessary not to rely on defor. No fall-out occurred during blasting. occurred at the face without any damage or injury. providing no or little interlocking effects. the safety systems shall not allow chances to be warning signals were there and should have triggered taken at the work face. 4. for refore important at the planning stage to consider the example in large ‘blocks’ of rock mass between fault possibility of occurrence.6 Gas 4. no explosion occurred and ding rock support in blocky ground. becomes necessary to avoid large and dang. It can be more widespread in certain areas. In contrast. the handling of grained often partly weathered granite in the Oslo gra. 4. situation that is of most interest. However. with low stand-up-time. Systematic easily increase the risk significantly. This is why it is not possible to rely [7]. The potentially unstable area was evacuated and the cave-in Other. This was fol. as the fall-outs may be very deep.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . low rock stresses or least frequent one in tunnelling on the Norwegian main- lack of confinement may cause block falls without any land. One case involved occurrence of methane at the face only on deformation measurements for decisions regar. connection with the present paper. had to be injected during freezing of the same zone in tor arm. this attitude is not accep- tunnelling progressed. of an Alimak driven shaft. a small explosion may occur without any warning in the form of measu. 5. In rable deformations. a fall-out of 10m3 occurred and diabase dyke under 300m rock cover was exposed over tore the mid boom off the drilling jumbo.

For radon it helps to reduce the degree of road tunnel on the Ålesund project.leaving necessary to limit the exposure by limitations to the 2/3 of the rock cover intact.3 Pre-treatment • Hydrogen sulphide (H2S). it still poses significant challeng- the years.g. if the problem has 6. and may cause cancer from alpha radiation. This may include break- down of equipment when no spare parts are available etc. the potential health effects ming’ further out in the tunnel. hough they may get attention as a risk for the operation form ground freezing was included and priced in the phase of a tunnel.2 Other gases the safe side’. 5. or rather the ‘radon daughters’. by practise or contractual regulation. is crucial for the work signal fades with exposure time. poisonous. The zone caved ters to monitor the exposure. fault zones etc. if checking is not performed ‘to be on 6. the Oslo graben. 12]. The hazard of dust from quartzitic rocks has been under- tunately been the cause of several fatal accidents over stood for a long time. Radon is also found in syenites. e. It A delayed effect may also apply to gas. it may be necessary to apply personal dosime- pre-bolting in a major fault zone. after it dries out [11. suction ventilation from the cut- terhead and dust filtration is now standard equipment. 6 HEALTH EFFECTS While it is necessary to focus on the hazards connected 5. which mostly must take reduced by the more consistent use of and complete place by minimising the spreading of respirable dust coverage by rock bolting and fibre-reinforced sprayed (e. This has become a standard contingency since the sup- port of a face collapse had to be improvised in the first Good ventilation is the obvious preventive measure for subsea road tunnel at Vardø. res for these needs are now available on any Norwegian tunnel face. In some cases it may be upwards at a rate of 1 metre/hour. which has no colour and is As discussed. Depending on the expected proved useful to stabilise a cave-in caused by the lack of exposure. dust supp- take place. peg- ment for all subsea road tunnels to prepare a movable matites. Preparations were made to redu- contribute significantly to increase the risks. This applies to: 5. This has unfor. [8]. due to the foreseen possibility of extremely counted as being part of the risk during tunnelling. by watering the blast pile before and during loa- concrete in situations where long-term stress relief may ding) and sufficient ventilation. The equipment and procedu. work time underground. the low probabi.2 Delayed effects to adverse conditions and the potential for dramatic One also has to remember that the hazards may be ‘loo.5 Ground freezing Ground freezing is normally not mobilised ahead of tun. This includes • Radon. 5. they are delaying preventive actions. It smells like rotten eggs. Gases other than methane may present health risks. Again. 27 . In the recent case of the Frøya subsea tunnel Hazards connected to earthquakes are normally not however. Such formwork shall be mobilised ready 1/3 of the average level in 1972. especially if ce mobilisation time for the freezing equipment. ression during boring. lity of hitting gas in some rock formations may represent a hazard in itself. in alun schist in An example of preparations is the contractual require. ral increase in ventilation [7]. accidents at the tunnel face. with the possibility to close and plug the face Norwegian tunnels and mines has been reduced to about with concrete. not only at the face. Hydrogen sulphide is not uncommon in limestone for- mations. This threat to work safety has recently been es with respect to prevention. but stopped .4 Movable formwork for ‘face plugging’ but occurs also in other rock types. the decisions whether to implement pre. not always by frequent washing to avoid spreading of settled dust noticeable visually or by smell. rock support in zones with low stand-up-time. As due to geological conditions must not be forgotten.g. alt- poor ground conditions in fault zones.1 Quartzitic dust been underestimated or not recognised. e.P UBLICATION NO . may tender documents [9]. not normally connected to hazards. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y Trivial factors. the option to per. which could is important to keep the equipment and work space clean seep in over longer sections of the tunnel. 7 SEISMIC AND LANDSLIDE RISKS nelling. safety and for the success of the project. slow rock stress redistribution may cause large rock slabs to loosen and fall. primarily due to a gene- for use before the tunnel face is driven out under the sea. In the Ellingsøy subsea these gases. such a formwork rock crushing (if possible). which are pre-grouting and/or drainage or pre-bolting (‘spiling’) heavy respirable particles that can settle in the lungs depending on the situation. mentioned. but this warning treatment ahead of the tunnel face. Radon is relatively common in granitic rock. The radon exposure in formwork.g. On TBMs.

Their tasks may be close by the walls. This means that These characteristics allows for cost-efficient tunnel- sufficient temporary protection around and above the ling. by perfor.1 Skilled tunnelers. e.2 Decisions are crucial Decisions for adaptation of permanent rock support The decision process is crucial. This necessitates proper proce- irrespective of the amount of site investigations. In connection with safety. One has to take into consideration the different focus of pretations of the investigations been too high. which has been highlighted in numerous papers in portal areas should be in place before tunnelling starts. the basis for achieving safety is laid. it may be crucial not to postpone pre-tre- ming relevant and thorough site investigations. These atment ahead of face or stabilisation at the face until are not discussed further here. which may work-teams lead by experienced shift bosses. but it is emphasised that after a weekend brake. • Choose the suitable stabilisation measure • Dimension robustly • Include stabilisation in the work cycle • Not delay the stabilisation: keep rock support up to the 8 GENERAL PREVENTION progressing face • Watch out for ‘warning signals’. The applied rain. one of the tunnels in the face. • Responsibility and authority must be allocated and • High capacity modern equipment. but may pay less atten- occur. expose them to block falls from the walls. organised in autonomous crew. For example. remember that the more common earthquake damage to tunnels is landslides at the portal areas. close follow-up and timely decisions. 28 . which includes: • Reduced blasting rounds • Excavation of part cross sections (pilots) • Mechanised scaling. to be conveyed to eve- 8. tech- In a country with repeated freezing/thawing and heavy nical conferences about rock support [10]. out in the tunnel may be less observant of the varying nally performed with: conditions and less familiar with rock works than the face • Multi-skilled face crews. which is now concrete. attention. With a skilled workforce. For example: the face crew is naturally concer- ties involved. bolting • Mobile concrete formwork with face closure possibilities In relation to the focus on the activities at the tunnel Celebrating breakthrough. sprayed concrete (including rein- forced ribs). adherence to practical and thorough procedures. positive attitudes and suitable payment systems. flexible procedures understood.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO .g. Other workers further Norwegian drill and blast (D&B) tunnelling is traditio. one dures. by all par. it is emphasised that one has to: OSLOFJORD PROJECT. 13 The probability of accidents due to earthquake during for efficient changing between various techniques for construction of a tunnel is naturally reduced due to the pre-treatment of the ground and rock support at the limited construction time. unless the pro- one has to be prepared. cedure calls for permanent rock support (including the walls) to be performed at the face. and the owner. Normally the primary rock support is designed to become part of the permanent support. One must however drilling’. tion to the detailed stability of the walls. VERPEN. Such risks can • A high degree of co-operation between the contractor easily be minimised by adherence to proper procedures. Too often has the confidence in the inter. like rock bolts and fibre reinforced sprayed • Extensive use of probe drilling is normal. and unexpected conditions or ‘surprises’ ned about face and roof stability. provide excellent protection against earthqua. Modern ductile rock support face. increasingly supplemented by ‘measurement while ke damage in the form of block falls. such potential stability problems around the portal techniques provide safe tunnelling if they are utilised in must anyway be dealt with. 8. the right manner. co-operation and flexible rybody involved techniques The prevention starts at the planning stage. this is not acceptable. must always maintain the respect for the potential varia- tions of nature. this series of publications as well as other fora. The frame of this paper does not allow a detailed dis- cussion about all aspects of the available techniques. This includes: are taken round by round at the tunnels face. measures.

Rock Mechanics Conference. • Mobile formwork • Extra water pumps 4.. 1989: "Ventilation and Dust on TBM" Rock Blasting Conference Oslo 1989 (in Norwegian). O. Concluding report from research programme Tunnels and Underground Works 1989- 91. This applies to the necessary pre-treatment and checking 5. 9 REFERENCES under which conditions excavation may proceed or 1.. in underground construction – occurrence and treat- ment". grout mate. O. Holter. 9. 3. L. E. ITA World Tunnel Congress ’99. subsea road tunnel.g.. 2002: "Natural gases ewing the contractor’s reports. 1999: "Crossing of exceptionally poor weakness zones in three subsea tunnels. T... technically and contractually)". relieve the owner of his overall Oslo (in Norwegian). T & Johannessen. T. it does not. Although the contractor to a large extent will have the 6. This requires active participati- on on his part. T. BJERKAN. Lillehammer. & Olsen. December 1999. Blindheim. the Norwegian method of tunnelling". & Blindheim. Tunnels & Tunnelling. 2000: "The squeezing rock surprised the executive responsibility for safety. Garshol. and rock stresses. Norwegian Tunneling Society.E. 1996: "Tunnelling through a sandzone: Ground treatment Preparation is mandatory for contingency measures. & Myran. responsibility for safety. under high water pressure by freezing". Oslo (In • A delayed decision may aggravate problems. Rock Blasting Conference.Working Environment and Ventilation". the focus of the effort has to be on the prevention. 1999: "The Oslofjord • Spare supplies of rock support measures. & Blindheim. Publication No. O. 10. D. • Criteria for mobilisation of contingency or emergency measures must be clear. K.. Proc. Blindheim. 12. Myran. (in Norwegian). Oslo. T. This applies to: Proc. Experience with probe drilling. T. Norwegian). not only in the form of receiving and revi. 11. Johansen. T. 8. Grimstad. T. Tunnels experienced geological engineering follow-up.13 • The need and procedures for ‘feed-back’ of observati. Myran. to Norwegian laws. Int. October 2003. ITA World Tunnel Congress ’99. sta- bility control and pre-grouting in the Ålesund-Giske subsea road tunnels". O. Oslo.D. March 1989. 7. This necessitates skilled contractors and crew. place.. & Hegrenæs. Norway".P UBLICATION NO . Backer.. O. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y • Delegation of tasks has to follow clear criteria. A. 1981: "Water inflow at extreme pressu- ons must be clarified. Also published in While contingency measures and procedures must be in Tunnels & Tunnelling. 2003: whether it is sufficient before the next blasting round is "Learning from the Lærdal tunnel (Dealing with high taken. 2004: "Health and Safety Systems" shall be stopped. res". Colorado. Crossing of a weakness zone rial etc. "TBM in Norway . Oslo (In Norwegian). E. Symposium on Rock Support. according experts on rock burst". Aagaard. North American Tunneling ’96. 29 . 1997: "A review of NMT. B. A. & Tunnelling International. e. T. experiences from the Bjorøy subsea road tunnel". 2.. Blindheim. Blindheim.. 1989: "Prevention is better than cure. Proc. Rock Mechanics Conference. R.. K. O. B. Applied solutions for under- ground structures. G.

UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY www.com .norplan.

31 . improved safety procedures.Safety. Preventive actions is the basic approach in safety introduced.g. within the industry: thorough planning.a. philosophy and should be the guiding principle in under- ground excavation. Important regulations under the Working Environment Some of these clients will examine the proposed H&S Act regarding concerning rock blasting and tunnelling plans. During the 1990s rial damage than to cover loss in the aftermath of acci. we repeat: as closely as they will examine the technical solutions and the price setting. priority number by an overall changed attitude to safety. health and environmental issues. The new regu- regulates the responsibility of the employer towards lations require a 'Rock blasting plan'. In the period of the last 20 years the Accident an independent responsibility to secure that project Rate (H) in one of the largest construction companies implementation meets laws. strict conduct of quality Industrial enterprises and authorities which more or less requirements and keen interest from company top exe- continuously retain contractors to execute projects have cutives. save health. In June 2002 the new 'Act relating to fire and explosion hazard and fire prevention' and the new 'Regulation on The Working Environment Act put into force 1977. several new regulations under above mentioned act were dents. Health and Working Environment on Building- during the last two decades and Construction Sites (1995). struction projects reached the zero vision of H = 0. The latter requires the Owner (Client) to prepare Health 2 LEGISLATION AND THE and Safety Plans for his projects based on Risk CONSEQUENCES Analyses. some of these within tunnelling. in first hand through active work and material goods. Handling of Explosives' came into force. some 40 fatal accidents per year. A good saying goes "If you think Enhanced emphasis and awareness have further decrea- Health & Safety work is too costly. e. This approach (H = number of accidents causing absence from work is vital for the overall progress of complex projects. the relevant resources and previous achievements sites are referred to before. Rock Engineering 1 INTRODUCTION aspects were put into focus and practical results could be It is less expensive to spend time and other resources to recorded. health and environmental are i. risk analyses. During the period from 1988 till 1995 fatal prevent accidents. loss of lives. regulations.5 plans as part of the tendering documents. Bjerkan Consultant Health & Safety. That is a bonus. also per one million working hours). tidy worksites. health and envi- one must always be to avoid accidents. These plans shall be included as cost items in Before 1977 the construction industry in Norway had the tender documents submitted to the contractors. quality control and assurance tioned company recorded H = 2. . down to 4 in 2001.Regulation of Health and Safety in Connection with Rock Work (1997) The suggestions and thinking as found below reflects observations and experience from safety management . Common practise is to submit requirements as to quali. try an accident!" sed the number of fatal accidents in the building and construction industry. of importance for reputation and public support.5 HEALTH AND SAFETY SYSTEMS Reidar Kr. accidents were reduced to 10 per year. standards with decreased from H = 35 to H = 8. During the year 2002 the construction division of men- fication of personnel. Several large con- emphasis on safety. Input to such plans employees and society. Safety. Through active H & S efforts several tunnelling con- tractors have experienced increased productivity and It seems obvious that the positive development is caused economical benefits. health injuries or mate. lives ronmental matters.

N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . 13

Previously the shotfirer carried the responsibility for responsible for Risk Analysis and his Rock Blasting
blasting operations, a situation long overdue. Today all Plan as part of his H&S Plan for the project tender).
parties are responsible. The Owner, if not himself com- • Documents.
petent, is responsible for retaining qualified contractors - List of applicable laws and regulations.
with skilled personnel. The contractor as legal entity, its - List applicable Norwegian Standards NS.
top management, the project administration and the
shotfirer are all exposed to responsibility. Hence, 3.3 Organization. Responsibility.
owners and contractors which do not employ rock blas- The full responsibility for H&S work lies with the line
ting specialists have to hire competent personnel. management.The H&S personnel are managing their
tasks on the project on behalf of the site manager and his
The Owner`s plans, defining the responsibilities and superiors.
requirements to plans, reports and execution shall be
part of the tender papers, thus demanding price setting • Employer responsibility.
for the different safety precautions. That shall secure - The board and the managing director of the company
that relevant contracts allow costs for processes and pro- have full responsibility on behalf of the company
cedures required by laws and regulations. owners.
- The responsibility is delegated to the site manager
level (Working Environment Act §§ 4 and 14).
3 GENERAL HEALTH AND SAFETY - Risk Analysis and the drawing up of the Rock
PLAN FOR TUNNEL PROJECTS Blasting plan is the full responsibility of the employ-
As an introduction to the required health and safety er as part of the H&S plan. (Regulation of Handling
efforts, one will below find the typical content of an of Explosives § 10 – 9 and Regulation of Health and
overall H&S plan. The plan outlined below complies Safety in Connection with Rock Work § 5).
with the already mentioned 'Regulation of Internal • Work Supervisor responsibility.
Control', 'Regulation of Handling of Explosives' and - Hands-on managers assigned responsibility by the
'Regulation of Health and Safety in Connection with site manager may be classified work supervisors /
Rock Work'. It should once more be underlined that foremen / gang leaders / operators etc. It is their
governmental agencies and major private sector compa- responsibility to ensure that the work they are in
nies within general infrastructure and oil development charge of is planned as required and executed in
put emphasis on the Health and Safety plans submitted agreement with the plans, i.e. in a safe and respon-
by potential contractors as integral part of the tender. sible manner (Working Environ-ment Act § 16.2).
General reputation and achieved results concerning • Employee responsibility.
health, safety and environmental issues are other impor- - The employees` responsibility is to assist in the
tant aspects when selecting the successful tenderer. The implementation of the actual plans and to safeguard
low bidder is not always winner of the contract.. that all precautions introduced to create a healthy
and safe working environment are utilised and also
3.1 Table of contents - Distribution list (plans, reports to participate in the employer's health and safety
etc.) - General information work (Working Environment Act § 16.1).
• Contractor’s own expectations: - The Shotfirer is especially responsible for the tech-
- To execute the project within the framework of the nical execution of the blasting according to the blas-
contract in terms of economy, progress, quality and ting plan. He shall also be a member of the planning
safety. team. He shall check that all safety precautions are
- To execute the project without personal injuries or according to plan, he is also responsible for the cor-
harm to the external environment. rect drilling of holes. He shall inspect the holes and
- To maintain the site and rig area tidy and orderly at check the report from drilling before charging. After
all times. the round is blasted, he shall prepare the Blasting
- To maintain good co-operation with the client, other Round Report (Regulation of Handling of
contract parties, third parties like neighbours, lan- Explosives § 10 – 8).
downers • Organisation Chart.
• List of addresses and phone numbers. - Organisation charts shall be available showing
responsible management and H & S personnel and
3.2 H&S Plan names. This is an important part of the documen-
The project H&S plan is based on the contractors tation necessary in case of accidents and subsequent
Quality and Internal Control System and is adapted to investigation of the incident.
the project in compliance with laws and regulations,
standards and the Owner`s requirements. (The Owner is

32

P UBLICATION NO . 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y

• Job descriptions with respect to H&S work on site. Other activities:
- Everybody at the site, managers on all levels and • Surplus explosives, detonators etc have been brought
operators, H&S personnel, the Safety officers and to intermediate store and locked up. Return to produ-
Safety delegate have their personal job description in cer or other store as the case may be. Transportation of
respect of responsibilities in the H&S field. explosives and detonators to take place in agreement
• Coordination of H&S work on site with more than one with the ADR. specifications. Internal transport and
employer. stationing (placing) of explosives and detonators.
- Organization and tasks for the main contractor Special machines and equipment related to explosives
(coordinator) and his subcontractors or others with and blasting to conform to EU-regulation, CE mar-
contract with the client. The objective is to ensure king.
that all H&S measures are taken care of by all parti-
es on site (Working Environment Act § 15 and 3.6 General Emergency Preparedness Plan. Contin-
Internal Control Regulation § 6). This is very impor- gency Plan.
tant when a contractor uses a subcontractor on the • Introduction. Risk analyses.
blasting part of the contract. The drawing up of blas- • Emergency preparedness areas.
ting plan shall be done in cooperation. • Emergency preparedness organization. Responsi-
bilities.
3.4 General H&S Routines and Procedures on the • Emergency preparedness equipment.
project. • Heliport. Map references.
• H&S activity plan. • External resources. Ambulance. Fire brigade. Police.
• Action plan. Showing every person`s responsibilities. • Notification procedures.
• Evaluation of tasks. • Training of own personnel together with external
• Job Safety Analysis. resources.
• Reporting of near misses, dangerous actions and con- • Action Plans. Team training, how to proceed effec-
ditions. tively.
• Reporting of accidents and injuries. • Information procedures internal and to media.
• Safety inspections with reports. • Telephone lists always available.
• Daily Safety Planning at team level.
• Handling of H&S issues. 3.7 Special Addition to Emergency Plan for tunnels
• Health and environmentally hazardous substances. and caverns.
• Mechanical equipment. Underground fire fighting and rescue procedures.
• Chain lifting tackle • Organization chart. Responsibilities.
• Certificates of personnel and mechanical equipment. • Escape routes if any, including shafts and tunnels.
• Operating permits, for example Hot Work Permit. • Personnel access control system, in operation at all
• External environment. times.
• Fire extinguishers on all machines and trucks.
3.5 Special Additional H&S Routines and Procedures • Self Savers (light active coal filter masks) for every
of Handling of Explosives and Blasting Operations person underground and on the different machines.
• Drilling. To check correct drilling versus plans. This is • Safety (rescue) container.
extremely important for drilling on high benches and • Communication system to the surface
long rounds in tunnelling. Blasting Round Plan. • Drawings of the whole underground system with mar-
• Charging of blast holes in accordance with Blasting king of niches, safety containers, escape routes, elec-
Round Plan showing types and quantity of explosives, trical installations etc. for the use of the management
ignition system and stemming. and external resources (smoke divers) etc.
• Protection to prevent fly rock (where applicable). • Emergency plans for ventilation. Usually one should
• Warning procedures, postings. not stop the ventilation if personnel is trapped.
• Immediate action subsequent to firing: Check if suc-
cessful shot, if successful release area, adequate sig- 3.8 H&S Instructions and Procedures.
nal, continue work • Breach of safety regulations must lead to disciplinary
• In case of misfire, activate relevant procedure. actions.
• The use of personal protective equipment supplied by
Normal shot: the employer shall be used. (Hard hats, protective eye-
• Scaling by hand ore by machine. glasses, ear-protection, booths, special cloths)
• Finish and submit Blasting Round Report • Drugs, licquer etc banned from site
• Personal tidiness

33

N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . 13

4 GENERAL COMMENTS is of importance that personnel working underground
The Safety Plan as outlined in key words is of general recognise the special risk factors, that everybody
nature. A full plan with details is beyond the scope of the depends on the behaviour of their colleagues, that the
paper. It should be read as guidelines and help in the managers care for the work force, that top priority is
preparation of a rather complex programme where local given to health and safety aspects.
conditions, scope of work, available machinery, equip-
ment and technology must be considered.

Table 1 indicates the large variety of potential hazards
that present dangers of personal injuries in tunnels,
based on risk analyses made by domestic contractors. It

Table 1: Risk factors concerning personal injuries in tunneling (The Shotfirer's Manual, Norwegian Tunnelling Society, NFF
2003)

Item Block Explo- Fire Rock Objects Gas, Injury Topp- Traffic Pinch
fall sion burst or into eye Dust due to ling, fall injury
fly rock elec- injuries
tricity
Drilling X X X X X X X
Charging holes X X X X
Blasting X X X X
Loading X X X X X X X
Scaling from X X X X
pile
Machine scaling X X X X
Watering pile X X X X
Transportation X X X X X X
Scaling from X X X X
basket
Storing of X X
explosives
Placement on X X
site of explo-
sives
Internal X X
transport of
explosives
Storing of fuel X X
and oil
Storing of gas X X X
Ventilation X X X
work
Grouting of X X X X X
bolts *)
Electrical work X X X X
Hot work X X X

*) Some chemical additives for grouting may cause skin injuries

34

which gives the six key safety ele- represents a higher level of performance. The Safety Element Method (SEM) is a tool for columns of the matrix. 35 . Presentation of current state of organisation (profile A) and sures and activities in the organisation. they shall work out strategic plans and measures suited to attain their goals. assess their own organisation based on the matrices. industry has previously had high accident rates combin- ed with high severity of the accidents. and plans of action will be worked out and implemented in the organisation. compared to other Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 industries. The application of a formal tool makes the Documentation HSE work more systematic and effective. Having to would be best served to reach (profile A and B in Figure work within a potentially hazardous environment. Provided the group members have defined an improvement on is today. developed for avoidance of acci. SEM presents an improvement process The general model in Figure 1 shows the framework of as a ‘stairway’ with five steps. where each next step the main matrix. Goals / ambitions Management This fact has emphasised the need for a structured and Feed back systems adapted tool for internal HSE development and impro- Safety culture vements. The served to reach. and how to get there. there is a difference between the current state and the desired future state. Briefly summa. Details within the elements are considered in of an organisation co-operate to determine which level sub-matrices. The members ments. the desired future state (profile B). one for each of the main safety elements.6 BUILDING A HSE SYSTEM STEP BY STEP Bodil Alteren SINTEF Civil and Environmental Engineering Abstract 2 THE SAFETY ELEMENT METHOD There is a potential for improvement of the HSE situati. potential. to occupational accidents are a persistent problem of decide which stage they are on. Elements on in Norwegian tunnelling and other underground essential for safety performance are listed in the work. constitute the SEM. the 1. i. The method is founded on the principle of 1 INTRODUCTION consensus. measurements sub-matrices are not presented in this article. or matrices.e. Based on these results. the method helps to find out where the organisati. rised. they are on today. An internal group in the enterprise shall Although matters have improved the last few years. and which level they would be best The content of the main matrix is shown in Table 1. see Figure 1. (A) (B) The Safety Element Method (SEM) has been developed to motivate for internal HSE improvements and for Figure 1 The general model of the Safety Element Method. and which stage they Norwegian tunnelling and construction work. formance within these elements are defined in the rows. where it should go. Five stages of per- such improvements. see also Table 1). dents and loss. Tables. development and implementation of positive HSE mea. The main issue of the stages is to visualise improvement potentials to guide enterprises towards organisational development. and insures Result indicators that important factors are addressed.

work. control. and measures are Thorough proc- worked out. ture ideal. Documenta- tation formal routines. actively engaged in prioritised and ment commitment from management. Casual transfer Simple statistics. mum requirements. Documen. tion is well known. 13 Table 1 Internal analysis by the Safety Element Method. 6. 2. personnel damage quality management. reactions for eve. models. Systematic characterise safety ment is good safety work. safety work. fluence and improve tions regulations. Extensive and Feedback of experience. following revisions. For every stage. are taken. (Sub-matrices are however not presented here. Ambitions are to Goals and ambi. ing for improve. ess when working Time schedules out action plans. Small amount of Satisfies mini. Result No result Absenteeism Extensive use Co-ordinated Has received indicators indicators (except and accident sta. views and system. best. each other’s experi. and other losses are visualised through result indicators. It is more essential sometimes chances The employees never breach of to finish fast. Focus on techni. work actively to obtain a working environment with- out losses. Relations between for the HSE and result indicators. followed-up as pro. are accepted. Weak HSE man. 36 .N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . Proactive seek. and obligations agement gives small Breach of HSE duction and quality. satisfaction. Improvements Procedures always up to date. other enterprises. preventive meas. Mainly short tistics. of HSE-results as and integrated goals. cal documentation. Comprehensive Plain and practi. tions go beyond regulations. main matrix. Strong focus cal and human on organisational failures. followed by most employees. Com. tistics are the only result indicators. international awards economic ones). 3. are kept. continuous of experience with learning actions. ing safe behaviour. Safe behaviour is Always safe Safety cul. working methods. All employees ence. and management factors.) STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 STAGE 4 STAGE 5 1. No self- line managers. systematic exchange systems/ term corrective Deviation ment. to improve safety consequences for instructions brings Comprehensive culture. challenges is the done to work safely. 4. Modest obliga. are actively seeking routines. and and followed. satisfy regulations. Sub- matrices are connected to each element. pany matches the regulations. Action plans ures. fulfilment of the previous stages is presumed. Thorough sta. ing. atic approaches Line manage- treatment of risks. Goals beyond Working to in- Goals/ambi. 5. documentation. Mainly local ryone. Current status should be marked by ✘ and the desired situation by ✔ in the windows (■ ■). Goals are miss. a matter of course. Mastering risky Little extra Mainly seek. Follow-up of Management Safety is equally Strong manage- Management tions to safety work accidents.

The WEC must finding practical solutions. step by step. The indivi. By using SEM all the companies prepared well department. depending on which part of LOPMENT OF MEASURES the company they are going to represent. 1999). the tool must be relevant for working out mea- will take place through group processes. dual judgements. the improvement measures that shall be implemented in The results show that most of the measures were classi- the company. experiences of the participants are brought forward. introduction of the method inuous internal process. employees and the safety supervisor. 5 FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: DEVE- Composition of the group. or a whole enterprise. development process. without the year. the problems measures directly introduced through the sub-matrices are not always easy to identify. founded action plans. give the framework and define whose responsibility it is to manage the process. where the first part is the three main areas for investigation: assessment of the current situation and the desired state • First of all: Does the method generate any activities (profile A and B in Figure 1).e.P UBLICATION NO . Positive development should also preferably be definition of the states A and B ensure that the local reported. If the users are not satisfied. any dominant participants controlling the common The questions were: Are there correlation between the assessment. in order to optimise efficiency and creativity. be used. and certainly. There was one overall research question in this evaluati- on study: "How does the Safety Element Method func- The enterprises’ internal improvement activity will be tion in the companies?" This question was divided into carried out in two parts. one month or even a SEM is made for internal use in enterprises. must be deci. internal assessments and the safety results of the orga- nisations? Do the internal assessments correspond to Participators in the assessment should come from diffe. The group assessments valuable and trustworthy? The opinion of the users is will be introduced by an individual evaluation of the essential. they are of SEM. i. members of the internal SEM group will have an equal what are their experiences? Do they find the method chance to express their views. form the basis for the group discussions. Thus the intention is to make (Alteren. available knowledge and common sense from different organisational levels interact. 4 EVALUATION OF SEM ded as an important part of the tool. SEM also contains a check list of safety fied as preventive measures with expected long term measures to help during this part. 37 . the tool will not current and desired state of the organisation. and both these parts Thus. process should be rooted in the Work Environment ground and experience should have better chances in Committee (WEC) of the enterprise. as a supplement to the effect. adapted to their own conditions. including workers. The mutual sures. The point is that people with different back. an external review? What about internal changes – are rent places and levels of the organisation. All together the companies have worked out 56 measu- res during the process. The first research question addressed the generation of ded beforehand. managers The SEM assessment and the subsequent development and staff. The • Secondly: How do the participants evaluate the tool. No enterprises should try to reach the top of the mountain in one day. line mana. 3 ACCOMPLISHING THE ASSESSMENT The way of accomplishing the SEM assessment is regar. for promoting internal discussions. The group may represent a single activity. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y In managing safety and preventing loss. The tool has been constructed improvement activities to obtain better safety results. However. help of experts. The HSE system must be built up through a cont. two (or more) tightly connected depart. not easy to solve. and start of the work function best with the help of a per- son who knows the method and its process well. they reflected in the assessments? gement. ments. and the second part is the and change? The intention of the tool is to generate compilation of measures. These measures were classified The next step of the internal improvement is to work out to find out how effective they can be expected to be. The SEM process is performed in a structured group setting. A basic assumption Through the work of a doctoral thesis at the NTNU (the of SEM is that a common realisation about the situation Norwegian University of Science and Technology) SEM of today and about future goals is a necessary basis for was implemented and followed in four enterprises organisational change. The recommended size of a working group is five to seven persons. The WEC must also evaluate and SEM focuses the importance of improvements during a confirm the results from the internal group. which are applied to reduce the risk of • The third area discussed was the validity of the tool.

no matter what system the enterprise choose. in those you are bringing up (leading). PANTS’ EXPERIENCES The second research question dealt with the experience The lost time injury frequencies of the companies were of the users. SEM hout the help of SEM. They were very confident with their own re any expensive investments. They also required more effort from management. Most of these desired future state had given them a broader under- measures were simply correction of deviations. It is reminded that there is one factor that has the most vital importance to the results of the HSE efforts. 1999: The Safety Element Method – an approach to improving safety in the mining industry (doctoral thesis). the results indicate correlation in order to investigate their opinion. has resulted in more effective preventive measures that They felt that they did something useful for their colle- give more long term solutions to safety problems. Thus the results in general indicate ween management and employees. 13 These measures were compared to measures that were • Several of the participants mentioned that SEM had a worked out as a result of incident investigations in the motivating and useful approach to organisational deve- same four companies. The participants expressed that the measures they had developed aimed at the most important areas for impro- vement of their own organisation.e. B. The method proved to be a contribu. their own company. Trondheim 38 . other data collected. as well as a more correlation between the internal subjective assessments common insight in internal problems and challenges. NTNU. That is mana- gement commitment and management excellence in HSE matters. All the involved persons were interviewed. The focus on the present situation and on the measures had less long term perspective. SEM made rather realistic assessment of themselves and The SEM process had given better co-operation bet. time and attention paid to the safety area.. foun- ded on genuine interest. 8 CONCLUDING REMARKS SEM has proven to be a valuable approach in building and improving the HSE system of an enterprise. and the other data collected. It feels natural to compare the role of management to the role of parents: you need to invest time and effort.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . The results showed that these lopment. a credible way. Without active management involvement. external expert review of the companies. Literature Alteren. In general. standing of safety management and organisational development. also studied. agues and for the whole organisation – i. any HSE tool or system will fail. building a better HSE system for the company. which they claimed presented their company in require was. This suggests that the company groups with the help of tion to bridge gaps between managers and operators. a nutshell. They meant: between the internal subjective assessments and the • The method had presented a new arena for constructi. They also told that 7 THE THIRD QUESTION:VALIDITY OF these measures would not have been implemented wit. The groups’ own judgement actually agreed with an 6 THE SECOND QUESTION: PARTICI. The analysis suggests that the Safety Element Method Altogether the participants found the work rewarding. ve dialogue about internal safety practices and com- mon challenges. What they however did profiles. The participants meant that the judgement of the current status presented the HSE conditions of the company in It is emphasised that these measurements did not requi.

Table 1: Norwegian administrative norms for acceptable concentrations Substance ppm mg/m3 CO carbon monoxide 25 29 CO2 carbon dioxide 5000 9000 SO2 sulphur dioxide 2 5 NO2 nitrogen dioxide 2 3. However. the development towards less polluting and economical evaluations. there are three ways of satisfying these norms: Sufficient ventilation is crucial for the work environ.e. Mesta as Olav T Blindheim. the maximum concentration (‘ceiling value’) is given. This paper covers methods of ventilation and case stances with risk of acute poisoning or irritating effects stories. are determined by the Directorate of Labour This paper is concentrating on the latter.g.5 0. tions during the rest of the shift. However. . fumes during meal breaks.2 Administrative norms . trucks) with protected cabins.27 Formaldehydes 0. as a Inspection. Dr ing O T Blindheim Abstract The limits are normally given as the highest acceptable Good ventilation.to provide sufficient ventilation to thin out the pollu- The so-called ‘administrative norms’.6 NO nitrogen oxide 25 30 NH3 ammonium 25 18 Nitroglycerin 0. 9 in this publication). Toxic gases and particulate explosives with less pollutants. a result of a well designed and well average concentration over an 8 hour work shift. An overview is given in explosives is commented upon briefly below. Ventilation is also paper no. for some sub- ces. ventilating the blasting dust increases safety risks. by using ment with respect to health. 1. e.to reduce the exposure.03 0. if compensated by lower concentra- values for acceptable concentrations of various substan. Higher established ventilation system.g.1 Health risks Basically. using cleaner diesel fuels (see concentrations for too long time. i. The norms are set from medical. limits for acceptable concentrations of gas.6 Dust: 10 total dust (all dust < 10µm) 5 respirable dust (75% of all dust < 5µm) 39 . e. Administrative norms give ceiling minutes per shift). watering the blasting pollution create health hazards if breathed in too high round to suppress dust. reduced sight due to . dust and fumes. important for other factors. which represents tants to acceptable concentrations. This applies to NO2 with limit 2ppm and aldehydes with limit 1ppm.to reduce the pollutants to start with. Table 1.7 DEVELOPMENT IN VENTILATION METHODS Jan Lima. 1 BACKGROUND 1. concentrations are allowed as short time peak value fying work environment while excavating underground (aggregate time with high concentration less than 15 tunnels and openings. using machinery (loaders. is paramount for a satis. technical background.

a later time. A disadvantage is high requirements to also paper 8 in this publication) the tightness of the duct to avoid pollution of the tunnel air due to leakage.emulsion explosives also reduce the outlet of blasting the blow-out duct is important. along the tunnel. and in down-sloped tunnelling. but has been tried for long- were first used in 1994 for a test programme in the er tunnels as well. (Elvøy et al. Figure 1: Picture shows a mobile ventilation unit. and the work environment.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . 1996. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration considers the use of emulsion explosives as preferable in long tunnels and for projects in cities. e. Department of Working Environment and Safety for tunnels with cross section above 32 m2 and at the same time being longer than 1km. In 1994-1995. and blows out the blasting fumes Department of Construction Engineering at NTNU per. of particular cantly higher than for one duct solutions. 2 TWO-WAY VENTILATION 2. The advantages are fast removal of the blasting fumes. tance. as sons between emulsion and ANFO show that: the dust otherwise could be blown back into the face at . This solution utili- continued in the Lærdal tunnel. emulsion explosives are rapidly taking over the tunnelling market in Norway.by water inflow. The costs are signifi- fumes to the external environment. Since then. the ses a mobile platform with a mounted fan.emulsion and anfo explosives have comparable blas.1 Requirements and principles.3 Emulsions and slurries Two-way ventilation can be achieved by one or two Slurry explosives have been used for more than 30 year ducts. It requires more space. see duct solutions. is a suitable solution for long tunnel drives (> 4-5km). the tightness of . ting effects.5km Lærdal road tunnel was constructed 1995- to be blown out all the way along the tunnel drive.g. 2003). Dyno Nobel and close to the work face. one for blowing in and one for blowing out. in above-ground mining and quarrying in Norway. During the 1990s two-way ventilation used to be required by the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration. where emulsion explosives were used for the removal of the blasting fumes. 13 1. in a short time through the same duct as used for the formed a development project in the Hanekleiv tunnel in normal ‘blow-in’ ventilation. The advantages are fast Vestfold. and lower costs than two- first time for regular tunnelling. completed in 2000. which could be limited by the available cross section. emul. by evacuating the blasting fumes rapidly by blowing them out through a duct. In the 7.2 Case story Lærdal tunnel when it takes too long time to wait for the blasting fumes The 24. . typically 50%. in particular by reduced concentra. Rapid 2000. the contract specified the use of emulsion explosives (Øvstedal. . possibility of turning the air flow in the second ventila- tions of NO2 and CO2 and by reduced dust from the tion tube to improve conditions both at the face and blasting round resulting in improved sight. Two ducts. Also for this solution. for the 11. importance for tunnelling in built-up areas. The contractors were NCC Eeg-Henriksen evacuation allows work activities at or behind the face to Anleggs AS from the Lærdal side and the Public Roads start with less delay.2km Oslofjord subsea road tunnel.5km drive from the Masfjord tunnel in Hordaland in western Norway. Administration. Sogn og Fjordane Construction 40 . so that they do not pollute the tunnel air behind the work face.emulsion explosives gives a significantly improved continuous supply of fresh air from the surface. This requirement was adapted to the use of ANFO. sion explosives are advantageous due to its water resis. This southern portal of the Lærdal tunnel. which is used Public Roads Administration. Emulsion explosives underground cally 5km to the work face. good water resistance and One duct is sufficient for tunnel drives with up to typi- good handling safety. This is especially useful 2. It is characterised by high effects. The blow-out air velocity must be The results from the tests and the production compari. The pur- pose was to improve the work environment in the tunnel. high to avoid settlement of dust in the two-way duct.

blowing towards improvement of the work environment and finally to the face through both ducts. (except the top layer).Several safety functions were built into the system: e. A large part of the permanent technical installations were installed while excavating of the drives took place. the two outer fans were geared down Development Fund (SND).g. 8. 3. 70 and 230kW). exhaust than usual for older loaders (Nilsen. NO2 and CO. channel for elec. (with effect steps of 30. 1998). locking ventilation fans. For each of the two tunnel drives two ducts of diameter 2.P UBLICATION NO . the blasting fumes. i. This period lasted until the blasting fumes were gy). saved energy. The access tunnel.After 5 minutes. normally at a dis. emergency stop function. ITV installations etc. manual operation etc. lity as to choice of equipment and adaptation of the ven- 41 . towards the end of the drives the air needed was approx.The outer fans then took over again. During some short periods of 5 to 15 minutes the gas Behind the face. blowing out 3 INTELLIGENT TUNNEL VENTILATION. Through monitors at the site office. modern machines emitting less gases in the results were satisfying with generally good air quality. Directorate and their Hordaland Construction Division. ated and ran at full blow (step 3) in both ducts for 5 (2) The ventilation equipment supplier Protan AS and minutes. rock support. concentration exceeded the administrative norms. the outer fans were initi. als. as recording of air quality and automatic control of the prevention of fans blowing towards each other. the other used also for blowing the blasting fumes out by a movable Gal 14. establish documentation of the achieved results (Lima et port were took place. The operation of the fans and the regulators was controlled by a radio-system. air pressu- The explosive used were anfo. that would contribute to cost effective ventilation. permanent drainage. however. One duct was used for blowing towards the face. The experience presen. including asphalt de sufficient space for the ducts and the truck transport. 1999). to .e. The main drainage ditch was blasted together with the face. The development project "Intelligent Tunnel Ventilation" was based on an agreement of co-operation The ventilation cycles typically ran: between (1) The Public Roads Administration’s Central . as well . other less demanding activities took place. enlarged from a cross section of 56m2 to 64m2 to provi- vals the roadway was laid down. which inclu- ded an access tunnel down to the 1/4 point of the tunnel The air quality was measured in 24-hour periods for and two drives of 6 and 7 km respectively. Figure 2: Large fan. 110kW fan for each face. This took place several times each week at different locations in the drives. . This trical lines.1 Development project management could observe which activity were on. The shovel). The ventilation was indeed a challenge.0m supplied air to the face pushed by two fans AL 17 of 230kW through Protan Ventiflex ducts.5m3 side-tipping tic maintenance and planned ventilation capacity. (3) The Norwegian Industrial and Regional . Additionally. or they were geared down while al. ted here refers to NCC Eeg-Henriksen’s lot.When the round was blasted.000m3 per minute. had to be tance of 600m-800m behind the face.All these functions were remote controlled and could The project included development of new duct materi- be operated by computers in the site office. At regular inter. transport. drilling. This reduced the overall con- struction time for the long drives. but put extra demands on the ventilation. In this way the tunnel crews could adapt the ventilation to the actual activities. as well as a high voltage line. The were Telenor (telecommunication) that supplied the con- movable face fan started blowing out through the other trol system and Argo/Sichon and BBU (tunnel technolo- duct. were installed happened during loading only. new duct jointing and new hook-up systems. The loading machines re and air check for any leakage. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y Division from the Aurland side. The large duct diameter in parallel with the work at the face. The project target was to develop a total concept out. Other companies involved to step 2 and both directed to one duct only. Emphasis was put on increased flexibi- function to use during duct installation and repair. while loading and trans. loading. to safeguard systema- were Volvo L330 C (60 tons with 6. initiated by push-button panels installed at different locations in the tunnel.

which allowed the crew to approx. with an expectation of emissions of 1/25 of After the initial development and testing of the prototy- NO2 and 2/3 of CO as compared to ANFO.5%. ter in the site office for logging and display of all mea- tion is 80m2 and the maximum grade is 8. emulsion explosives were used. the shot. The main PLC was connected to a compu- on the southwest coast of Norway. but with relatively large differences for the NO2 The control system recorded measurements of gas (NO2 measurements. 150m into the tunnel (in a cabinet). a The project utilised as test arena the 4. An electric pe recording and control system. The latter. The other experiences were positive: The ventilation was supplied by two AL 17. More importance was put on the possibili.8km long Bømlafjord subsea road tunnel er than 2km. 250kW fans .0m diameter ducts. only part of the potential to the pollution of the tunnel air was the 35 tons dump for power cost savings were realised. as well as alarm picture. tunnel. which at that time had been driven 3km of the creting jumbo was also electric. Because of this.000 USD per year. The main contributors 4. The recorded data were transferred (UHF low band) to the main PLC.the handheld radios (manual controllers) worked well blowing through two 2. over-rule the automatics and control the fans manually. while improving the work environment and the Controller located outside the portal. 13 tilation to the different techniques of the drill & blast the fans were controlled by a Programmable Logic cycle. being in the range and CO) content in the tunnel and air pressure and vel. of fractions of one ppm. it was installed in the Brøyt 70 ton excavator was used for loading.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . spread pollution from the trucks. Due to the in the tunnel environment. The effect of PLS/ RADIO OFFICE 2000 m.the electro-chemical sensors in the container (installed ventilation was considered suitable: the capacity was outside the container) and in the cabinet (in the tunnel) 100m3 per second. documentation thereof. FAN Ventiflex SENSORS LINK PLS RADIO SENSORS RADIOS Figure 3: Overview of the Intelligent Tunnel Ventilation system 42 . however. 300m. fans con- lowest point is 260m below the sea level and the total trol parameters and trend diagrams. A number of manu- climb from the lowest point to the Sveio portal is al radios were also provided. 2000 m. In order to reduce the toxic fumes.2km drive. The tunnel cross sec. ted to a slave computer 150-600m from the face and ty to achieve an improved work environment. high capacity blowing . ~ 35. The surements and events.2km long Sveio radio link boosted the transfer when the drive got long- drive of the 7. ocity at the tunnel face and at the portal. steep grade at low gear. The recording units for gas were electro-chemical sen- The fan control and reduced duct friction would reduce sors placed in a container equipped with radio connec- power costs.000 USD per trucks (up to 13 units) hauling the muck up the long year against the full potential of ~ 85. showed reasonable correlation to handheld sensors for CO.

P-E. but Blasting Conference.P UBLICATION NO . 1998: "Lærdal tunnel. New duct material with significantly reduced expansion Lima.Measurements inside the dump truck cabins showed References: concentrations below the norms.Mobile (hand-carried) gas sensors should be connec- . J.NO2 concentration was too high in the outer kilometre . Oslo (in Norwegian). Improvement is possible: . B.Dust from mechanical scaling and shotcreting was not . potential for reduced power costs.. Similar results as in Tunnelling Society. M. during loading and muck transport.. no detectable values were recorded. but not suitable for other trucks) may undermine the overall efforts and should works until 1 hour after muck transport is completed. Norwegian for dust. . . Oslo (in Norwegian).The documentation of the air quality with focus on measurements increases the consciousness about air quality and health. Aga.CO from the blasting fumes was evacuated fast. Norwegian Norway Tunnelling Society.2 Bragernes tunnel Nilsen. The development Course in Rock blasting – new methods and techniques. Storås. Directorate of Public Roads. F.CO concentration inside the loader’s cabin was too ferent locations in the tunnel. . Public high for a short while. Rock Measurements were also performed at face for NO. . considered .Generally good air quality. the full potential may be realised as the attitude towards more "conscious" control of the fans will increase. & Birkeland.. E. look beyond the initial high investment costs towards the long term benefits of better work environment and The results regarding the air quality throughout the tun. under high pressure was developed.CO concentration during scaling from the muck pile ted to the data base. I.The NO2 concentration increased over several hours Office for Owner’s Affairs. re and documentation of the work environment at dif- . Lima. the world’s longest In the Bragernes tunnel near Oslo. and need for maintenance.The use of diesel engines with particulate filters to be of tunnel drive due to the dumper trucks. CO and NO2 was installed. . Vestfold". . Oslo (in Norwegian). (2003): Personal communication. 43 .The control of fans with manual radios works well. 1999: The equipment for fan control was re-used in the "Bømlafjord tunnel – experience with intelligent ventil- Baneheia road tunnels in Kristiansand in southern ation". . Roads Administration. . Rock Blasting Conference.. Norwegian Tunnelling Society.the NO2 concentration was hardly measurable.More information is needed to encourage others to diluted sufficiently.The system functions robustly.CO from the blasting fumes high .The occasional use of "old machines" (loaders. J. 1996: "Use of slurry explosives in the Hanekleiv tunnel.A more extensive measurement scheme for duct pres- . & Rønn. Ø. a measuring station road tunnel". providing a more complete pictu- was too high. the Bømlafjord tunnel were observed: . J. dump . high. 3.Uncomfortable draft was experienced due to the high sure will provide a better monitoring of duct condition volumes of air. of a new jointing system for the ducts was postponed for Storefjell (in Norwegian). nel indicated: .It is possible to reduce the electric power consumption.. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y The results regarding air quality at the face showed that: 4 CONCLUDING REMARKS . further development by Protan AS after the project.. Løvås. 3. be abandoned. 2001): . 2001: " ITV – Intelligent Tunnel Ventilation".3 Main conclusions The tests in 2 tunnels confirmed (Lima. The fan was kept running at full speed most if the time hence the power saving potential was not realised.The CO concentration from the blasting fumes was Øvstedal.. Elvøy. Rock Blasting Conference.

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remote controlled from the cabin. and consists of a charging manipulator. Bever Control AS. front of the drill jumbo during drilling will be elimina- ted during drilling in accordance with the new regulati- The charging system is mounted on a separate boom on ons. as well as a system for transporting the primer. The main target of the project is to automate the char- ving work safety. The handling of system which is now installed on one of the drilling explosives also represents a risk. Norway in May 2001. The system and SINTEF Elektronikk og Kybernetikk (electronics was tested and presented in a demonstration at the tun. Mesta as Jan Elvøy. as well as has since May 1997 developed an automatic charging adaptation to new regulations that prohibits simultaneous system for emulsion explosives suitable for tunnelling. nel project Baneheia in Kristiansand. falls and slabbing rock on face represent a risk of inju- Mesta AS has purchased the first complete charging ries and damage during charging. Block summer of 2003 and tested during the fall of 2003. and Dyno Nobel AS version to the use of emulsion explosives. Administration).2000) The prototype was completed 2003. human activity in gram (1998. Mesta as Summary 1 BACKGROUND A joint venture (JV) of Mesta AS (formerly the The purpose of the project was to investigate the possi- Production Division in The Norwegian Public Roads bilities for automatic charging of blast holes in tunnels. face 45 . The drill jumbos of this generation are equipped with computer programs in which the drill plan is preprogrammed. The JV completed of the detonators by approximately 20 %. A Industri (mechanical industry). Andersen Mek. manual charging and drilling on one of the tunnel face. The main targets was to reduce the time consumption for drilling and charging by approx. and the JV concluded that a DURING CHARGING commercial system is feasible. The manipulator could operate the system over the complete face. Verksted vision system is used for the recognition of drilled holes (tunnelling machinery and equipment manufacturer). Skanska Norge (previously Selmer The background for this was. charging is done manually on face after drilling construction of the system took place and was finished is completed in line with the new regulations. The charging system eliminates ging in tunnelling in order to reduce the time consump- human activity in front of the drill jumbo during dril. Through an a feasibility study (1997) followed by a research pro.8. Rock drilling during tunnelling is to a large extent an automated process in Norway. the drill jumbo. a con- Skanska AS). The 2 INCREASED SAFETY ON FACE results were promising. tion for drilling and charging including the connection ling. among other things. AUTOMATIC CHARGING OF EMULSION EXPLOSIVES TO INCREASE SAFETY. a charging tube for inserting the primer and charging Subcontractors for the project were Bamble Mekaniske hose. automation of the charging process. 20 % while impro. PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY Randi Hermann. Later engineering and Today. adhering to the new regulations. As an advance- Figure 1 Automatic explosive charging system mounted on a Figure 2 Manual charging on fully computerised AMV drill jumbo. jumbos owned by the company. and fine positioning of the charging tube. and cybernetics).

This appears for the data processing in order to recognise and measure posi- driller on the screen as colour coding and symbols. This implies a In addition to increased safety by eliminating personnel clear benefit in terms of safety. Controlled charging of the hole using the proper explosives The team agreed that the feasibility study (1997 – 1998) would focus on item 1. Prototype. 2 m).N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . The prototype was tested in an AMV workshop in January 2001 against a simulated face.2 Results – developing equipment for prototype shows a picture of drill holes on face. ting in urban areas. Three main technical tasks were defined (1997): matically (according to a pre-programmed charging 1. The feasibility study concluded that further development could be based on the methods tried out in the feasibility study. charging tube. Automation of the charging process will eliminate per. charging manipulator. Such pared to today’s charging process. The top left 3. Below on the right. the status for the insertion of the char. hose feeder. Figure 3. An operating panel with joy sticks allows for hose into the hole in a controlled manner overriding during automatic mode. i. For the operator on 3 FEASIBILITY STUDY AND RESEARCH face. The charging may be managed manually or auto. The charging tube is oriented in the pro- Loaded holes are marked with a red symbol. The feasibility study was continued in a research pro- gramme from 1998-2000. possible with the help of sensors in the boom’s links and On the top right.1 Technical tasks times. a geometry model of the boom. on face. This may be used for vibration control during blas- time within existing laws and regulations. the tip of the charging tube is 46 . There. and ancillary control system. Designing a new primer makes it possible to pull it out again if problems arise during charging. This jumbo. Figure 3 Display from operator’s screen. se tions for drill holes on face. primer is going to be fit especially to the system. 13 ment of the automated drilling. Inserting the correct detonator and primer into the drill hole 3. Shows loaded holes and position of charging hose. The prototype consisted of a camera. This consisted of cameras. The system gives products are not available on the current market. the driller will have access to information concerning the charging at all 3. per direction based on data from the drilling log. supported by NFR (The Research Council of Norway). the display will appear as shown in Figure 3 (still PROGRAM undergoing development). A prototype system was built. and The social consequences and costs connected to such may allow for a safer charging of problem holes. and computer hardware to provide a technical solution for the purpose of demonstration. reducing the risk of accidents considerably. 2000. based on the drilling log. A yellow symbol indicates drilled holes. work can be strongly reduced. thus. Through the positioning ging hose can be seen.e. a need arose to make a new type of primer. The more accurate information of amounts of explosives per technology enables drilling and charging at the same hole. A charging log is produced based on the charging. the blast hole. the system also has a number of other advanta- ges in relation to security and quality. This is loaded holes are marked with smaller.e. 2. whe- reas a green symbol indicates all holes that have been The charging boom is operated automatically close to drilled and lie far enough away to be loaded (i. green symbols. Recognising a drilled hole and guiding the charging sequence). computer technology is The charging log provides a quality improvement com- used to develop an automated charging process. while non. A measuring system has in terms of distance from the drill and loaded hole are been developed based on the use of a video camera and taken care of in the control system. Requirements for safety distance in the new regulation a wooden wall with drill holes. The design of a prototype was completed at the end of selected data from the charging are shown. In connection with the construction of this feeding appa- sonnel from staying between face and the rock drill ratus. illumination.

In principle.1 Project continuation In the middle of November 2000. the charging been decided that the detonator and primer must be gui- tube may be moved with sufficient accuracy to guide the ded into the system manually by an operator who must charging hose into the hole. Thus. The charging tube is moun- ted at the front of the manipulator’s boom in front of the charger. the cameras only measure angles between the charging tube and various holes on the side of the charging tube. on of the hose feeder will be integrated with a control system for the boom. thus. tive feedback from SND (The Norwegian Industrial and mination. This enables it to control and moni- the charging hose with detonator and primer into the tor correct insertion of the primer at the front of the drill hole. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y begins. vision system. This causes the primer to be pressed out of the charging hose.P UBLICATION NO . Regional Development Fund) with an offer of financial support for the project. part of the charging hose. built. The detonator number for the indivi- accurate to allow the charging hose to enter the blast dual drill hole cannot be planned in advance. built. Subsequently. It can be mounted on the manipulator’s boom This is mounted on one of the drilling booms used in the right behind the charging tube and the vision system. The feeding position is located at the boom 4. a range finder is mounted in the camera body. The hose feeder possesses actuating the manipulator. Later. A primer with the proper deto. In other 47 . This cont- inuously measures the distance from the cameras to the Figure 5: Manual charging station. see Figure 5. the charging hose is guided through the charging tube and into the 4. after which the hose is pulled backwards with a controlled speed until the emulsion string has reached its proper length. operati. prototype. When the hose has been guided to the bottom An important condition for automating charging at the of the hole. close to the drill jumbo. and tested. the JV received posi- Figure 4: Feeder system for charging hose and primer. 4. 4 INDUSTRIAL PROTOTYPE – COMPLETE CHARGING SYSTEM 4.2 Charging tube with vision system is positioned by the blast hole A charging tube with a vision system and other sensors has been designed and built. it has hole. A separate charging manipulator has been developed. The manipulator is moved close to the drill charging hose and that the hose is guided to the bottom hole that is to be loaded. The aim was to construct an industrial pro- totype. but not sufficiently studied and tested.3 Feeding of primer in an air hose and emulsion mount on the drill jumbo. through charging hose Alternative principles for guiding primer and detonator safely and reliably through a charging hose have been brought closer to the blast hole. and charging tube. face. A control system for the charger has been developed. illu. of the blast hole prior to dispatching of primer and deto- nator number is inserted into the hose feeder with a nator and pumping of emulsion explosive. Based on data from the vision system. and tested. the pumping of the emulsion explosive tunnel face is the use of only one explosive.4 Charging with emulsion explosives blast hole. pneumatic dispatch from an operator’s console at the back. In order to facilitate the search for holes and to be able to calculate distances to the face. This has a hose feeder for insertion of drives and sensors. A hose feeder for the charging hose has been constructed. experiment A charging tube is mounted at the front of See figures 4 and 5. This system enables automatic char- The detonator is automatically inserted into the front ging of the blast hole. the project continued in 2001 – 2003. be behind the boom mounts on the drill jumbo.

The In May 2001. drill hole. By • Positioning of charging tube for automatic and manual varying the degree of filling in the individual blast holes insertion of charging hose. 5 FULL-SCALE TESTING enlargement holes. A control system for the manipulator’s boom and the • that were placed behind an overhang – and were there- charger has been developed and built. Tested in plexiglass pipes • Dealing with clogged or partially clogged holes 48 . The test took place in a pilot tunnel on an extremely angled face. the emulsion explosive is • Feeding of charging hose with primer and detonator in pumped into the drill hole with a given capacity of e. Figure 6: String of explosive. the fill-up • Charging cycle was carried out with dummy primer level will vary accordingly. drill hole is achieved. a full-scale test was carried out for auto- first condition is that it must be water resistant. 7 CONCLUSION – FUTURE TASKS The project has given positive results. contour holes and ‘lifters’ alike. carried out. 13 words. process • on extremely angular planes. These demands Baneheia.in the opinion of the project group - the system has the potential to become a viable com- mercial charging system. Later the charging system was temporarily installed on a computerised drill jumbo operated by Mesta to gain further experience using the system in ordinary tunnelling. It has a 6 PROGRESS SCHEDULE screen that normally shows the drilling log to be used Mesta entered into an agreement with Bever Control and during charging.g. however.5 System for remote control of the entire charging • placed completely towards contour. See Figure 6 for string from and emulsion explosives in non-gassed and gassed experiment in the Baneheia tunnel in the spring of 2001. AMV as system suppliers. a controllable charge per metre of • Feeding of primer to charging tube. condition. see figure 3. Remaining unsolved items for full automation are: • Automated interconnection of the detonators. only the five links in the with conditions that can normally be anticipated. manipulator have automatic control for fine positioning according to data from the cameras. blast hole. The test comprised: can be met by using a pumpable emulsion explosive. however. • Charging of emulsion explosives with controlled with- a well-defined ‘string’ of explosive will remain in the drawal of feeding hose. matic charging of an AMV rig at the Norwegian Public Secondly. All 8 links in the fore concealed from direct view.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . The testing included charging of holes: 4. the explosive must cover the needs of cut holes. AMV designed and built the prototype that was com- pleted in the 2003. The system PC has programs for the superior control of the system. the first test of the prototype took place and the development project was completed. During operation so far. ting strength from 100% filling down to 0.35 kg/metre drill hole. By varying the pull-out speed. and with its JV-partners regarding the purchase of one complete charging unit. Kristiansand. it seems necessary to develop other elements of the charging process to be able to remove crew completely from the tunnel face. By pulling the hose out at a constant speed. it must be possible to vary the blasting Roads Administration’s tunnel production plant in strength in the various groups of holes. In this The experiments on the tunnel face gave experience part of the project. A complete test of the charging cycle was The present system makes it possible to vary the blas. the system . charging boom/manipulator are equipped with instru. • made accessible with the help of projecting plastic ments containing angle sensors or devices for measuring pipes (for lifters etc). length in the same way as on the drilling booms. In short. In the fall of 2003. Based on results so far. 40 kg/min. using ‘string charge’.

Electronic detonators will be advantage- ous... When the explosives industry some day can supply cordless electronic detonators. Oslo. J.( 2001): "Automation of charging of emulsion explo- sives in tunnelling". Rock blasting conference. H. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y The greatest challenge in achieving a complete automa- ted system is connected to the selection of the numbered detonators for the individual holes and the coupling of the detonators. Figure 7: Automatic charging.P UBLICATION NO . the Baneheia tunnel. The Norwegian Tunnelling Society. (In Norwegian).. 49 . all-automated charging at face may become a reality. Finden. B. Bjor. & Petterson. B. 2001. R. References Elvøy. Hermann.

environmental management and architecture.no www. Norway Tel: +47 67 12 80 00.no .sweco. More than 80 years experience within: • Energy • Environment and Water Resources • Industry/Structures • Transportation • Underground Works and Engineering Geology • Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering For Rock Engineering and Underground Planning please contact: SWECO Grøner P.O. E-mail: post@sweco. N-1327 Lysaker. Box 400. Fax: +47 67 12 58 40.SWECO Grøner – Combined skills in consulting engineering.

9 DIESEL UNDERGROUND. BACKGROUND Administration. The Owner's HSE-plan should contain a requirement for a maximum sulphur content of 50 PPM in diesel used underground (present requirement is max. This can be achieved through: In order to cover the broad subject area. Regulation No.1.and mining industry. 547) must include a requirement of a maximum sulphur content of 50 PPM Fig 1: The diesel exhaust may cause health hazards for diesel used below ground. www. STEERING COMMITTEE related consequences of the use of diesel for under. The object of the feasibi. Specific measures effort for improvement. Skanska Norge AS 1. define state-of-the-art. the steering committee suggests that the Rockwork Regulation (No. • The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority: Revised regulations from this authority have resulted in very strict requirements (found in the new attach- ment VIII. No. Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority. The project group had mem. prioritise areas for study. the ground construction work and to propose measures that steering committee concluded with some specific short- would reduce the hazards for the work environment. The Norwegian The Norwegian Tunnelling Society (NFF) Development Construction Industry Association (BNL). focusing on technical solutions and 2 RECOMMENDATION FROM THE recommendations. Additionally. The report "Exposure and obstructi. • The builders (owners): Through a revision of the The steering committee and working groups consisted Owner's Regulation (which outlines the Owner's over- of representatives from The Norwegian Public Roads all responsibility for HSE. the group cove.an epidemio. 534) that requires the use of low-sulphur diesel for all under- ground works.tunnel. According to the findings of the working groups. Machine Regulation. The report tunnels and mines. The background for this project was the attention given areas that need more long-term work in order to achieve to health damage caused by diesel waste gas (exhaust) in further improvements have been pointed out. from the feasibility study can be downloaded from ve pulmonary disease in tunnel workers . Diesel quality The best diesel quality currently available provides the The feasibility study was organised with one steering basis to obtain the best possible work environment. This triggered the 2. The aim was to clarify the health. The Committee in the year 2000.no (see references) logical study" (Ulvestad et al 2000) especially expressed the dangers of inhaling diesel exhaust. SINTEF. and The lity study (autumn 2000 – summer 2001) has been to Norwegian Petroleum Institute. It will not be possible for the industry to fulfil these requirements unless diesel containing a lower sulphur content is used. the contractors Selmer Skanska and The project "Diesel Underground" was initiated through Scandinavian Rock Group. PROJECT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Jarle Gausen. • The industry (contractors): By using low-sulphur die- red all related disciplinas. sel for all underground vehicles. and organise a main development project on the use of die- sel in underground. The committee and three working groups that reported to the diesel with the lowest sulphur content must be chosen! steering committee. bers from the Norwegian tunnel. 51 . term and long-term measures that will improve the wor- king environment when implemented. Thus. 522). 500 PPM).

When the practical conditions con. ted. the contrac- for electric drive of several machines in the completion tors Mesta. Long-term measures and tasks . . ment! lytic) have been performed as part of the project. requirements concerning the use of The main development project "Diesel powered con- particulate filter should be introduced. A par. . If requirements rela. A part refund and equipment adapted to tunnel operation be further system has been introduced. . The suring technique is undergoing rapid development. behaviour and motivation: . Again. ques available According to the working group.Use the best available diesel motors 2. e. and motivation for all parties involved: The objectives through the working groups are: the contractors. but should be co-ordina. attitudes.g. it is important that electrical machines low sulphur diesel through tax refund.Cleaning techniques ed.Document the effects of the different cleaning techni- ques Measuring methods for gas. It is particularly important to be able to measure the requirements. will be an reduction of the exposure for underground construction important part of the main project. new measuring techniques must be developed.Propose improvements of regulations.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . workers to diesel exhaust. 13 • The public authorities: Stimulating increased use of To achieve this. 547). Equipment Particulate filters Thorough assessment of the choice of machines and A reduced content of sulphur opens possibilities for the equipment adapted to the specific project is crucial. dust. it is objective is to continue the work of the feasibility study.2. the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority. The conclusion of the work group is that a full. Since the mea. This will provide the opportunity Norwegian Public Roads Administration. It installing the permanent electric supply at an early stage has a wide participation with representatives from the during construction. the phase.Clarify the influence of the diesel quality and any addi- ties. the current measuring . difficult to specify the type of particulate filter. and the practical measurement techni- effect of measures when these are implemented.Diesel quality nected to the use of particulate filters have been clarifi. even 3 FURTHER WORK IN THE though there are not adequate measuring methods for COOPERATION PROJECT soot and particles. Further work with The purpose with the project is to contribute to the particulate filters.Influence decision takers. . struction underground" was started in June 2002. further work must . atti- tudes. .Create attitudes in the industry towards improvements ted to soot in the working atmosphere shall be introdu. This will be achieved by: . Norcem. standards and be undertaken with joint measuring techniques and tech. including full-scale testing. requirements niques of analysing diesel exhaust.Inform the industry about achieved results methods for diesel exhaust are not good enough. The work must be directed both towards the mana. including at the owners. 52 . nent electric supply is laid during the excavation phase. use of new cleaning technology. Veidekke and Skanska Norway. road tunnels) it may be possible to A steering committee is responsible for the progress. In addition to improving the methods for measuring gas The results of the project shall be: and dust in the working atmosphere. three work groups have been established: ticulate filter must be chosen according to the class of machinery and task. the owners and the supervisory authori. and soot . tives on the exhaust gement and the individual employee. Equipment must be optimised to suit the work environ- Testing of available cleaning equipment (including cata. and the Norwegian Petroleum Institute. . It is the opinion of the steering committee that. SINTEF. scale experiment should be carried out in which perma. behaviour. of the underground work environment ced. to work towards measures that will improve the work Permanent electric supply installed in the constructi. particulate filters.Use the best available diesel quality Information. the steering committee wishes to include require.Assess the suitability of the present regulations.Use the best available cleaning techniques for the In the effort to reduce exposure to diesel exhaust below exhaust ground emphasis should be placed on information. Norwegian Union of Construction Workers.g. . environment on phase In some tunnels (e.Relations to the authorities ments for particulate filters below ground in the Rockwork Regulation (No. developed.

2001.: 70 04 70 00 E-mail: E-post: post@orstagroup.no www. 3: Aug. www. Oslo (in Norwegian) Ulvestad.. NFF Newsletters: No. by M. Eduard W. No. J. 2003: (in Norwegian) The CT-Bolt TM The new generation of rock-bolts. No.4: Feb.com www. Skogstad A. Kruse K. 2000: "Exposure and obstructive pulmonary disease in tunnel workers . Sc. 2: Feb. 2001. plus from Altima. Gausen. Bakke B.P UBLICATION NO . www.1: Dec.no 53 . Report from a Technology.2000 (in Norwegian).com Ørsta Stål 6150 Ørsta Ørsta Tlf. Report from the feasibility study" NFF Technical Report 02 (in Norwegian). B. STAMI report 1. Thorud S.. Trondheim. "Diesel under ground. 2000: nisations.: Tlf. Woldbæk T.com firmapost@orstastaal.tunnel. 2000. 2000: work at the Norwegian University of Science and "Diesel oil in underground construction. Department of Construction Engineering.an epidemiological study". NFF. 2001: "The Diesel Underground project" The Norwegian Tunnelling Conference. Preliminary field studies have been performed for tes- ting of one type of particulate filters.. can be downloaded at: qualities are under preparation at SINTEF..orsta. thesis Norwegian Tunnelling Society.. technical study" Further testing including several filter types and diesel NFF Engineering Review 02. NFF. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y The working groups have members from the same orga...no The plan is to complete the project by end of 2004.ct-bolt. Norwegian Tunnelling Society.. The Norwegian References Tunnelling Society. No.orstastaal.

O. Box 505 Skøyen. www. giving it a wide range of expertise and resources.000 m of the 11.veidekke. The main span is 530 m long and the A-towers are 152 m high. China. building and managing projects in partnership with customers who inspire growth and development. Its business concept is to create value through designing. A shotcrete robot tional experience includes countries such as Iceland. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT & FINANCING Veidekke is one of Scandinavias leading construction and property development companies.5 billion and 7.Fax: + 47 21 05 50 01 Contact: Espen Moe E-mail address: espen.no CONTRACTING. Norway.moe@Veidekke. It is the largest in its field in Norway. railways and airports Lillehammer. the company’s interna.000 employees. ENGINEERING. The Skarnsundet Bridge is a 1. Thailand and Norwegian mountains. Extensive Expertise Excavation work Veidekke offers specialised know-how for in the Gjøvik Olympic Mountain the construction of Hall. This is • Harbours the world’s largest • Industrial and oil & gas facilities public mountain • Underground facilities hall. Veidekke was honoured by the National Association of Architects for this project.P. N-0214 Oslo. Veidekke has an annual turnover of approximately USD 1. Germany. which was ice-hockey arena • Residential and non-residential buildings during the 1994 • Roads and highways Olympic Winter • Conventional and subsea tunnels Games in • Bridges. Veidekke had the contract for 4. VEIDEKKE ASA . Veidekke’s vision is to build a better future for people in all aspects of life. working its way through the Greenland. Norway Tel: +47 21 05 50 00 .010 m long cable stayed bridge with 12 spans. Italy. International Experience Since 1982 more than 60 companies have merged into Veidekke. In addition to the other Scandinavian countries.no .000 m long road tunnel through Folgefonna in western Norway. Veidekke has participated in the develop- ment and construction of a large number of infrastruc- ture projects in Norway and abroad. East-Africa.

SRG Amund Bruland. excavation Norway is building 20 – 40 km each year of drill & blast and primary rock support). CO etc) and on time. The ways). SINTEF Civil and Environmental Engineering Nils M Beitnes. mostly single tube tunnels for roads or railways. (or may be): installation of drainage pipes and basins. water demands in this respect stem from the Owner (who shielding and frost insulation. which is most Due to the continued demand for reduction of total con. road substructure and roadway (or equivalent for rail- This is especially the case for longer tunnels. The levels of gas (NOx. sub-stations for power and control. Normally.1 Adverse working conditions due to dust and gases excessive ground water drainage due to insufficient pre. but also from the ducts. frequently used for contractual matters. Scandinavian Rock Group. work safety and work environment. concrete portals etc. The potential is particularly large during pha- "behind" the tunnel face. have been assessed to stem from too strong emphasis on rapid excavation and completion. the rear section. SRG 1 INTRODUCTION (such as probing. Performing completion works while still excavating may and could probably be improved to be more efficiently introduce difficult working conditions in the sections exploited. Typical works that are carried out in these sections are lation and completion works before excavation break. pre-excavation grouting. where work take place outside the area supplied with fresh air from the main ventilation duct. A look at the state-of-the-art of organisation of dust may easily exceed the "administrative norms". there is a strong incitement to start instal. these difficult conditions are typically lasting improvements are included. pre- grouting. The rest of the time of each work cycle (during probe drilling. tunnel for infrastructure. Norwegian University of Science and Technology Anders Beitnes.10 WORKING CONDITIONS BEHIND THE TUNNEL FACE – CHALLENGES CALLING FOR NEW SOLUTIONS Pål Egil Rønn. tunnelling works and suggestions for new approach to However. improved cash-flow etc). tunnel sections where such works take place are referred to as the "rear section" of the tunnel. then referring to which usually result in spare capacity for machines and work activities that are not taking place at the tunnel equipment. during loading and transporting of the tunnel muck by diesel powered rubber wheeled equipment it is almost This paper address the effects on work safety and work impossible to sustain acceptable working conditions in environment resulting from efforts to reduce constructi. supplementary (permanent) rock support. In the following the on of overhead costs. through and to finalise the tunnel as early as possible. lining (rarely). lighting. cable benefits from early start of operation). blast hole drilling. "Behind face" is an expression ses of extensive pre-grouting and heavy rock support. Examples include 2. Such tunnels will constitute a major In this paper we are concerned about the tunnel sections part of the tunnelling in many years to come. safe- Contractor (who may benefit from a connected reducti. face or affecting the critical path of tunnel face advance 55 . the ventilation forces fresh air via ducts to the excavation grouting and rock-fall incidents due to poor tunnel face. struction time. The challenges are in the following expressed as pro- Some unfortunate incidents in recent tunnelling projects blems that must be solved. charging) the 2 THE CHALLENGES working conditions in the rear section are less strained. rock support. Scandinavian Rock Group. This situation has created a dilemma with respect to quality of works. During ventilation of the blasting gases and adaptation of rock reinforcement. ty equipment. often limited to the 100m closest to the advancing face. only some 2 hours after each blasting round.

pipe –works. this may include supplementary During excavation. new activities will start behind bly limited in extent because of the presence of high vol. water. exchange of sub-base material. who usually are Introduction of a conveyor belt used for muck transport bound by strict time limits for completion of the trans. as they to a large degree accidents. Instead. Tools may have to be powered de work by diesel engines and there may be a lack of electric This is primarily a problem during mucking out. fresh air to and drainage from the ding. road completion and the electrical tage cables. will have positive effect on the working environment in port for each blasting round. Besides. and cause unpleasant working conditions not conducive for 2. This practise may not be a the rear section. ce along the tunnel. while performing rock support in also for example short circuits (which may trigger the other end. This the respective parts of the contour.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . them.2 Hazards of mixing wheeled transport and roadsi. For example.3 Services infrastructure does limit full access for number of locations along the tunnel after break- installation works through. rock support. there is a need for uninterrupted sup. there is typically a strong demand for nume- rous activities to be performed at the same time and at a 2. At the same time. end up having almost finished the completion works in vices and resulting and hazard at the tunnel face. mounted. 13 2. installations and civil obstruct free passage for each other. Example of time schedule for completion works – Rv4 Gjelleråsen – Slattum 56 . the transport is most often performed by sub-contractors. Completion works in the rear section with rete works at the portals. the tunnel face works are poorly suited for supplying the Fig 1. driveable passage out of For reasons discussed above. however. works in the rear section. The potential con- works. which may hamper face advance are often to a large degree found impracti- the work in the rear section. water pipes and air ducts. but one end of the tunnel. and their sup. insufficient light. introduce even stronger restraints to completi- on. such as lining. may increase the risk of collisions and accidents. cal. In longer tunnels one may ports. road buil- ply of power. Connected risks are not only interruptions in ser. the services infrastructure for flicts may cause unwanted incidents. It may. overloaded vehicles etc.4 Strained logistic for completion works after performing high quality construction works. foundations of structures and conc- tunnel face. due to possibly high driving speed. As these work activities advan- today’s solutions will obviously be hampered and possi. According to Norwegian practise. either roof or sidewall good combination with roadside works in the rear secti. completion works during the tunnel for evacuation purposes. This makes it difficult to plan and execu- explosions or fires) and leakages which could cause te the various activities. on works in the rear section due to the reduced access to bumpy and wet roadway. damage equipment. light and suitable water taps. break-through there always has to be a free. and mechanical installations.

good light.9 Too much focus on advance rates follow-up at the site. These facilities own work all the time. But productivity is more than that. which lasts only ~ 2 hours of 2. . The main approach will be to include a larger good weather conditions crucial in order to maintain a portion of tunnel completion works within the workspa- draft trough the tunnel. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y 2. on works could be arranged within the fresh air zone halting works during roadway building. supply for tools. provided some minor adjustments utilising avai- Because of the limited working space.Excellent surveying and positioning (by twin laser) is sideration when planning the job.Competent and all time present engineering geological 2. utilising both the available conditions. adapting permanent rock support To put the observed problems in perspective.4 km single tube road tunnel at focus away from just advance rates during excavation. 3. all workers in a lable technology and resources are implemented: tunnel have to be extremely flexible and have a positive . king conditions rapidly turning so bad that work has to be stopped and resumed only when the tunnel is suffici. man. conc. look for alternative approaches to safe.P UBLICATION NO . However. we have recognised that it is time to cantly worsen the working environment in the tunnel. floor. improved mapping and documentation. ducts etc. as industrialised work procedures.6 Difficulties in distributing fresh air to multiple rity. More works could then be performed in this enced in working in tunnels area. and for road work and foundations.Mobile extensions for services infrastructure may sites). . ous consideration. dozers etc). and working conditions on different sites (not all tunnel .Automatic cleaning stations for vehicles are state of The installation crews are not dedicated to tunnel work the art requirement in certain environments and could only.7 Installation sub-contractors may be less experi. on workers . They are normally involved in a variety of tasks be introduced inside tunnels close to the face. or in periods with frost. whole. as well as for 2. we anticipate that quality of works and work areas after break. It is often necessa. Safe and healthy work conditions for the different crews should be a first prio- 2. SOLUTIONS ry to install gates to close the tunnel portal and thereby When taking the challenges discussed above up for seri- stopping the draft. Gjelleråsen near Oslo. and removal of the ice by machinery became necessary. ending up unrealisti. thus allowing an efficient decision process. one may signifi. the natural draft may fresh air and services infrastructure in this area as well be non-existent. allow unrestricted work along walls and provide power matic health monitoring programs specific for the tun. (some 100-150m from the tunnel face) except during blasting and mucking out. could be utilised for installation of pipes.Supplementary booster for locally extended ventilati- attitude to co-operation. Improving the health and safety of the work frost and wind environment for other work activities than just excavati- This is especially true during winter. In a typical road tunnel. we find it in close and efficient interaction with contractor’s fore- necessary to point out: Too often productivity is measu. each cycle. But by doing so. inexperienced sub-contractors do not take this into con. cost efficient tunnel construction. road building and so on. or for example asp. The reasons for this are often extensive A considerable and well-suited work zone for completi- engine loads (lorries. red in advance rates. During con. it is probably necessary to shift struction of the 3. when cold draft on will also improve productivity for the project as a through the tunnel can cause problems. To obtain this. Frost also made it difficult to perform shotcreting. of mud. excavation may represent less than 30% of the total 57 . both in the roof and in the cess.through utilisation of resources also will benefit to a large After break-through. a lack of forced ventilation makes extent. which may result in that they fall outside syste. But in unfavourable weather ce close to the tunnel face. There are numerous examples of wor.1 Improved work zone close to the tunnel face ently ventilated. This made it hazardous due to risk of falling ice. already used for programmed or semi-automatic dril- cally demanding "right of way" and priority for their ling and accurate contour profiling. build-up of ice was experienced and to take a more complete view on the tunnelling pro- in areas with water ingress. 3 POSSIBILITIES WITH TODAY'S rete works. even in fair rock conditions. Lack of experience may cause a on during mucking out may allow the front end of the lower dedication to cope with the special conditions and main ventilation duct to be retracted further away from potential conflicts of interest. healthy and still because the gates hamper the ventilation.8 Lack of health follow-up programs for installati. Problems may occur when the face.5 Conditions after break-through are subject to investment. water supply and removal nel conditions.

no pipes) have been found to work.Installation of cable trays and certain cables. due to improvements in can be accommodated. base or roadside structure Concrete segments or ’slabs’ may be designed for con- Probably. they can serve both the tunnelling service infrastructure and the 4. drainage inspection. For shorter tunnels.3 Dual function of cables This may give a time buffer in situations of favourable High voltage main supplies. Permanent drainage will maintain an unsaturated layers and drainage ducts. high voltage and communication cables.g. but not remo- traps for the often occurring surplus of fines throug. Thus only clean water enters the drainage sub-base and a cleaner environment during mucking out ditches in the rear section. lining base. made of remaining blast round debris. under favourable 58 . ved rock. A is solved by introducing cross-ditches with pipes and necessary part of this concept would be to introduce protection layers. no more than two rounds per 24 hours. In general. The sub-base. A net advance of 50 m/week including a med in one operation (or within closest 15 m to the high degree of completion close to the tunnel face face). 4 NEW PRINCIPLES AND SOLUTIONS? . ducts and lining could help. base material replacement and .a gap in the scheduled working hours for those not and water. There is also a potential for savings when the ted for the loads during excavation road base can be built from tunnel rock. wall lining segments.scheduled hours for specialist services (e. One purpose would be to . Other solutions could be considered.g. often becomes ving only the larger size fractions and use those for impermeable due to produced fines. and introducing a reinforced methods and solutions which are new to the tunnelling concrete roadway for construction phase loads. which by this approach the tunnel face. nient trench excavation. business and to discuss whether benefits could be achi- Improved roadway quality reduces wear of equipment eved that way. which should be balanced by more cables for permanent operation may. restricted to fairly strong rock types. frost insulation. multilayer concrete slabs containing permeable well. city and space. In other cases. Early mounting of such structures can also active during blasting and mucking.2 New solution for cast-in-place or pre-cast wall final installation works. In built-up areas. Solutions along where continuous. surveying/positioning and fresh/clean rock surface.ample and fixed cycle periods (except in situations serve as multifunctional structures including gutter. and allow for rapid and unobstructed installation of final . Lining foundations. A mobile ramp transversal drainage needs attention and most often this could be used to protect the front of the roadway. which may cause safety and health pro- having qualified installation specialists (electricians. such as exchange of weak rock debris. cable e. and the benefits thereof. By pipe laying.1 New drainage and roadway sub-base design sui- roads. possibly hout the construction period. There is a large potential for there may be a requirement to regulate the blasting time improved quality in rock support when performed at to ease the impact on the public. demanding extensive pre-grouting and rock support). ducts and safety installations. communication and control rock conditions. We would also like to introduce some thoughts about infill of graded sub-base. Use of graded material in the tunnelling. ons by engineering geologist) 4. inspecti.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . completion works.Road works. like foundations may be built into this concrete roadway as pre-cast. The quality of port water from: groundwater ingress directly to the the roadway will have to be assured by processing of invert or to other parts of the tunnel contour. This results in an inconvenient inter- collection of discharge water at the face even in uphill ruption of the tunnelling. some interesting possibilities may follow: struction/mounting close to the tunnel face and could . will provide excellent protection for these lines could contribute to the relief of the inconve- e. One idea is construction water. as well as the muck. this is also where we find the best qualified crew and the best machinery. would be: cal work activities may consume most of the spare capa- .g. The quality One challenge in tunnel construction is to obtain a requirement for the substructure can be optimised durable permanent drainage that will collect and trans- taking the actual rock type into account. and quality of the works. which may be arranged locally. blems. 13 The types of works that could be completed in this wor. and clean vehicles facilitate direct transport routes from the tunnel to the permanent dump site via public 4.work arranged in two shifts. plumbers) joining the main contractor’s team. extension road substructure and drainage basins will act as sand of the depth of the blasted zone (blasted. which normally is to extract sufficiently strong rock material by retrie.Primary and permanent rock support could be perfor. This will favour both safety for tunnel workers should be within reasonable reach. carry the construction services infrastructure like cables . Pipes. face advance of criti- king area. Especially the crushing and a new sieving process.

works front) and a turntable for lorries. 5 CHALLENGES One obvious complication and challenge for the above discussed roadway approach is the unavoidable amount of sludge and wide-spread blast debris after each blas- ting round. this is a matter of marginal costs versus total efficiency. at least for the roof section. shotcreting and installation. effort. One should per- skills. however. be installed to serve also during the con. Recent studies have. A tunnel roadway dimensioned for carrying efficient mucking out lorries may appear like an over-investment compared to the dimensioning loads of public roads above ground. to the tunnel face. The most of completion at the tunnel face and integration with important condition is to allow for sufficient constructi- permanent foundations in a manner where the conveyer on time. skilled decisions on permanent rock support almost continuously.4 New types of machinery contractors. rock support. Other ideas Otherwise. the proposed approach calls for struction phase.P UBLICATION NO . As mentioned above. 4. rock bolting. It must be a contract requirement to schedule supports do not obstruct remaining completion works. It could be well be put on other work activities than just excavation and suited also for shorter drives of single tube road tunnels. If suitable rock material is available. This paper described several elements of a if combined with a new approach with a higher degree new approach conceived under this ambition. the result may be either an over-investment are to combine a mobile bridge (to span over the road or the need for supplementary shielding later. railway tunnel construction in Central red in order to substantially improve the working condi- Europe. the most widespread debris stems from blas- ting the early ignited sections of the blasting round (the "cut"). as the throw may be difficult to control under a variety of rock mass conditions. and carry out the works in a manner that does not impo- One additional advantage will be protection of road se risks of compromised safety and healthy work envi- works. ronment. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y conditions. One further practical challenge in this should have as a clear goal to accommodate safe and principle is that groundwater ingress does not show healthy working conditions and at the same time not immediately after blasting and may also change during restrict the full exploitation of experienced operators’ the weeks and months after excavation. or 4. as well as changes in This is a concept which appears to have an increasing attitude. Shielding or damping of this "gunshot" effect may be an option. Oslofjord strait crossing breakthrough with remains of freezing equipment The need for curing time of shotcrete and cast-in-place concrete before close by blasting has traditionally regar- ded as a potential restriction for performing high quali- ty permanent structures close to a tunnel face. Damage of structures installed too close to the face may also occur. The main advantage is to avoid the large tions in the rear section of tunnels. shown that young concrete has a remarkable tolerance to strong vibrations. However. More emphasis must amount of diesel power in tunnelling. are ready to acknowledge the value of this The above suggestions may call for new types of machi. Such development tent specialists. Probably. and it will depend on the availability of compe- nery to be developed and introduced. 59 . at least on a daily basis. One example is a separate drilling jumbo (or haps avoid installing the final water shielding shell close similarly based vehicle) equipped with tools for scaling. Not all clients. the extra costs may be small.5 Crusher and hopper station plus conveyer as 6 FINAL REMARK alternative to wheel transport Changes in contract conditions. organizing and techniques should be conside- popularity in e.g.

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i. the industry. If a user passes a monitoring sta. In most The work group then defined the following require- tunnels there is only one way out. lar. the Underground Work Regulations are satisfied people are in a tunnel or mine in case of emergency situ. Construction Sites' : The group established that none of the systems available §30: A system shall be established that provides a cont. group and SRG. 3 WORK GROUP FOR ASSESSING tory. In an emergency situation.e. i. This may be critical in ments: case of emergencies. tion without. Health and Working Environment on Franzefoss Bruk (an underground quarry operator). exiting including those travelling in cars or other wheel- bound machinery.the monitoring station shall read movements from per- sonnel walking or driving by up to 80 km/hour. of the tunnel without logging. Manual systems also do ween the site office and the monitored zone. and Safety. 61 . The work REGULATIONS group consisted of participants from the major contrac- The basis for the development of access monitoring in tors Skanska Norge (Selmer Skanska). in the market at that time satisfied the requirements of inuously updated list of which employees are under. magnetic boards or other ations. monitoring stations and admi. manual systems. The unit will automatically submit its reading to the administration software usually situated If it is accepted that some workers can move in and out in the manned operation office of the site management. for the administrator or other users of the system. Regulations are not satisfied. Road Authorities Summary 2 SIMPLE MANUAL SYSTEMS To fulfil regulations in terms of monitoring how many Today. the administrator can print or dis- play a detailed screen status report of the domain inven.11 ELECTRONIC ACCESS MONITORING – IMPROVING TUNNELLING AND MINING SAFETY Jan Lima. These may function well as long as the tem has been developed. nistration software. the tunnel system. the Underground Work It is also possible to establish voice communication bet. to monitor all personnel entering or ground.e. The result may be that the monitoring rou- Everyone with valid access to the tunnel is required to tines connected to movement of personnel will not be wear an electronic tag. Mesta as Svein Skeide. One example: by wheel-bound muck transport the truck drivers frequent- The monitoring station(s) placed at strategic points in ly forget to register for every truckload. the Norwegian Public Roads on and escape routes' of 'the Regulations concerning Administration’s construction division (now Mesta). not record any unauthorised entries. NCC. and their most probable location. the overview will easily suffer. The system consists of three number of personnel is limited and the routines are regu- main components: tags. When several contractors and suppliers are present. a red light will signal to the passing person A manual system requires strict discipline by the per- that access is denied (passing done without a valid tag). followed. how many people are present and in which ACCESS MONITORING zone. the AF- tunnels and underground openings is §30 'Fire protecti. . an electronic access monitoring and safety sys. The Development Committee of the Norwegian Tunnelling Society appointed in 1999 a work group with the mandate to assess the existing electronic monitoring 1 ESCAPE ROUTES – NORWEGIAN systems and potential alternative technology. by means of visitor protocols. partly with different work routines. This requirement has its background in the scarcity of escape routes in tunnels during construction. which is difficult to prevent in relation to an efficient operation which The administration software provides the user interface demands open tunnel portals. sonnel driving in and out of the tunnel.

beam pointing outwards and one inwards. pilot systems were installed: one in the Bragernes tunnel and one in the Boge tunnel (close to Bergen). such a system will in the tunnel and testing of the system in the two test provide a significant improved safety. plus tags for SYSTEM FOR TUNNELS AND MINES visitors. Skanska Norge and the makes it easier for rescue personnel and others to help Norwegian Tunnelling Society as contributors with any accident victims or trapped personnel. By placing tested in a pilot project in the Bragernes tunnel in monitoring (card reading) stations at the tunnel portal Drammen near by Oslo. the group embarked upon ‘tag’) which the workers and other personnel are wea- a co-operation with the suppliers Protan and Q-Free. Protan and the Norwegian Tunnelling an accident occurs.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . monitoring stations record the movement of the tags ed with Q-Free’s technology and adapt it to use in tun. The system consists of: 4 ACCESS MONITORING AND SAFETY .Administration computer with software. . Description of the system at 80 km/hour at optimal conditions. Q-Free performed the technical development and Protan acted as distributor of the developed pro- ducts. (Antall personer = number of personnel) 62 . from one zone to another. The pro. Access monitoring provides increased safety for the workers and visitors in the tunnel. one can at any time see how many are besides SND were the Public Roads Administration. the different zones can be printed immediately. ring. The co-operation partners struction office. The development and adaptation of the technology star. technical solutions large and complex underground sites. The project was concluded with a recommendation to proce. During the development project two . 13 . Q. 1 Access monitoring system based on personal ID-cards (tags). Fig. This Roads Administration. monitoring stati- ons and administrative PC at the site office.the reading capacity shall be 20 tags in a bus passing 4. The tag has its own battery and is activated by the Free’s technology for recording electronic cards was radio beam from the monitoring station. If Selmer. The electronic access monitoring and safety system is designed around an electronic card or chip (here called To satisfy these requirements. an overview over the personnel in Society. On a computer in the con- Development Fund (SND).Monitoring stations. In December 1999.2 Increased safety for the tunnel workers ject was completed in 2002. The recorded movements from the different monitoring stations are The pilot project lead to a public development project collected by radio communication (Ultra High part financed by the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Frequency: UHF) or by cable. Q-Free. Especially on respect to functional requirements. the tunnel is divided in zones. tunnels.Tags for all personnel working on the site. by the means of one radio nels and mines. the pilot and inside the tunnel. In case of accidents The project was managed by Q-Free with the Public an updated overview is immediately available. 4. present inside the tunnel and in which zone they are. ted the fall of 2000.1.

be placed to inform and remind visitors about the The system does not log the movements of the individu- access monitoring system. other registers must be reported only. supervises.Use and how to wear the tag. The communication between the monitoring stations and the administrative computer at the site office may be wireless or by cable or as a combination. (The colour code ting. these should be utilised. compa- tunnel construction division tested it in the Boge tunnel. Registers easily understandable overview of the system and the required by the Work Environment Act which do not monitored zones shall be displayed at the entrances and contain sensitive information are exempt from repor- also be available on the computers . tronic cards (chips) within pre-defined control zones. Negative Positive .4 Overview of the site zones dent administrative body. . The Public Roads Administration a tag that is recorded in the protocol with name. it may be developed and adapted for: 5. As the system basically identifies the presence of elec- ments must be cleaned weekly.The tags were correctly tion as expected during the recorded by passing of the 5. .5 Visitors’ protocol Selmer Skanska tested the system in the Bragernes tun. so . monitoring stations.general access monitoring for other types of construc- It is easy to learn how to use the administrative software. The tag . change and hand out tags.P UBLICATION NO .managing quantities of deposited material be placed in the site office where people are present. shall be available for visitors and as reserve. A visitor will get nel the summer 2001. Tunnelling machinery and other equipment must not be placed so that it may block the signal between the tags and the 6 OTHER APPLICATIONS monitoring stations.Visitors’ protocol.Overview of the site zones. industrial. not previous or future locations. by an installation monitoring more than 5. the site must adhere to routines for checking and maintenance.2 Checking and maintenance of the components the system functions well. For the system to function reliably. Signs must about the tag.Use and administration of the software. The tag shall be worn by all personnel at the site.7 Observations from the tests in the Bragernes tun- . The Data Inspectorate. or office workplaces. in a special pocket on users reduced gradually problems. a sufficient number of tags system during the initial bility problems. The system has also been used on the Södra Länken pro- ject in Sweden. It is important that several can operate the program. In addition to the tags due to the instability of the solved the solved the insta- for the regular personnel. A visitors’ protocol must still be kept. The sensors that record the move. for the zone division must coincide with the colour code on the PC display).Later tests have dem- onstrated that the new software is stable and that 5. Only error messages are logged.Checking and maintenance of the components. an indepen- 5. Concession is The tunnel system to be monitored will be divided in required for registers that contains sensitive informati- security zones using colour codes. These are summarised in the table below: . the name and company of the tag wearer. tion. . . In order for the access monitoring system to function properly. The administrative PC must .After several months of shall be placed in a breast pocket. it can only show where the personnel (tags) are at any time. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y 4.6 Communication 30 zones. The use of Monitoring access systems are regulated by act and regulations.3 Practical trials 5.1 Use and how to wear the card test period. routines have to be established for: 5. als.The system did not func. A board should also be displayed in The administrative computer will contain information the office together with the emergency plan. nel . 5 USE OF THE ACCESS MONITORING Provided data communications systems are available at SYSTEM the site. test period. Boards that present on.monitoring of transport and location of dangerous that at all time personnel are available at site who can goods.The enthusiasm of the . new software the arm or worn as a necklace.3 Use and administration of the software . It is not possible to record how 63 . so that unauthorised entries and malfunction messages are 7 PRIVACY PROTECTION IN NORWAY discovered and acted upon. ny and date.

There is no substitute for thoroughness You want your specialist adviser to be thorough. Rock Blasting Conference. Committee of the Norwegian Tunnelling Society". The market for access monitoring References in tunnelling and mining is limited and the general inte. any subcontractors. Requirements from large tun- ween the administrator of the system.com www. the electronic access Today other systems have become available.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . monitoring system is a useful tool to keep an overview sing similar technology. and which may be acceptable for the tunnelling and mining industry. 10 CONCLUSION 8 OTHER SYSTEMS Based on the experiences achieved. usually the main nel owners. 13 many times an employee has passed in or out. his staff and his advi. Hence information needed by The described development of electronic access monito- the system is not sensitive.. I. Storås. for improved tagging systems would accelerate users. 2000: "News from the Development rest from manufacturers is modest. the development. Oslo (in Norwegian).com Take contact and get advice you can rely on! 64 . and all the individual safety. results. of the personnel on tunnelling sites. with a view to their overall responsibility for contractor.blindheim. According to the regulations ring for tunnelling and mining has been promoted by regarding personal privacy. an agreement is signed bet. More information is needed as well as the further development of thorough Some manufacturers have made available technology and practical routines. or time for 9 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT arrival at the work place. contractors and suppliers. sers. partly utili. including the tunnel owner. An introduction into the respecti- that have been used in other industries with promising ve parties’ HSE manuals is necessary. Under ground you need solid and useful advice in all phases of the project: x Site investigation programs x Uncertainty assessments for planning x Predictions of tunnelling performance x Design review and technical audits OTB inspecting a TBM face in basalt x Risk allocation in contracts x Practical technical specifications x Construction problems and performance OTBlindheim assessments x Expert witness opinions Geological and rock engineering If you are looking for specialist advice for: for underground construction x Underground storage Independent consulting engineer with x Tunnel boring or drill & blast tunnelling 36 years of international and Norwegian x Subsea tunnelling experience in a variety of rock conditions x Probing and grouting x Rock support otblindheim@compuserve.

diesel engine exhaust In tunnel construction work the number of contractors (gases and particulate matter). quartz exceeded the Norwegian OEL’s of 10 mg/m3. 1998). radon and oil mist. To minimise the size of the tunnel crews the wor- disorders.9 mg/m3). University Hospital Northern Norway. tunnel boring machine crew. 1974-2003). OEL. They do occur as a result are periodically high compared to the Norwegian of years of exposure to these agents and the actual wor.12 RECENT STUDIES OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION WORK IN NORWAY. 5% of the respirable dust and 21% of the alpha- and tunnelling during the last 10-15 years is that work. Exposure levels nesses do not occur by chance. nitrous oxides. unit is increasing (Myran. mg/m3 and 0.1 mg/m3 respectively). king environment. Dynamica AS ABSTRACT 1 EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKING Apart from hard physical labour. the amount of air pollutants produced per time noise. These engaged in tunnelling for a period of more than 40 exposures may place them at an increased risk for lung years. Studies have shown changes in lung function kers do many different job tasks on the projects. Furuseth. Tom Myran. shaft drilling crew. tunnel construction ENVIRONMENT EXPOSURES AND workers are exposed to such agents as mineral dust with EXPOSURE LEVELS varying degrees of alpha-quartz. Occupational Exposure Limits. SINTEF Rock and Mineral Engineering Tor Viggo Hansen. Work related ill. chemical are relatively few.1 mg/m3 respectively.4-1. industries with similar exposures.0-1.8-6. job groups with highest geometric mean total dust exposure were shotcreting operators. In the above mentioned study. In this study a total of 15% of the total dust measure- The general tendency in Norwegian construction work ments. 5 places do not seem to be getting much healthier (Myran.2-6. Elkem Meraker. vibration and poor lighting etc. (Ulvestad et al. and an increased frequency of respiratory diseases among tunnel workers. Similar results are seen in different 2000). increased mechanisation and pro- Tunnel construction workers are further exposed to ductivity. Some of these have been continually products (synthetic resins). tunnel boring machine workers and shaft dri- vers (6. concrete wor- 65 . electricians and support workers (1. support workers. Because of the demand for reducing construction times for tunnel projects. The lowest expo- sed groups to total dust were outdoor concrete workers. Personal exposures to dust and gases were measured among 189 underground construction workers who were divided into seven occupational groups: drill and blast crew. Knut Furuseth. NTNU and SINTEF Georg Brustad. shotcreting operators.

along with other types of Several of these subgroups (grouting workers and shot- mining work. Diseases of the lungs and respiratory red agents have also been reported in other studies.9 ppm). lung function changes in tunnel construction workers. ring because of noise is the work related illness most Bakke et al. = 1. The study try. on of exposures. However. This showed that non-organic dust. noise. Reduced hearing accounted for 47% to 54% of the reported cases of work related illnesses in Respiratory effects of exposure to several of the measu- this time period. This includes a series of investigations FEV1 related to exposure and prevalence of chronic into dust containing quartz and other types of mineral obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). asbestosis and diesel exhaust and spraying of oil onto concrete forms other respiratory disorders caused by dust and gases.1 – 0. cause the observed effects. These investigations show that excesses of crete operators) had an increased risk of asthma. the che. a connection betwe- Some years ago an investigation was carried out en exposures and health effects. obstructive pulmonary disease. or indicate. These results are based on measurements at 16 different tunnel construction sites between 1996 and 1999. 1974-2003). Different studies show. vibrati. occupational asthma due to oil mists (study of machine shop workers).N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . i. High short related illness. noise term exposures (>10 ppm). are very similar in the construction and mining found to have a significantly higher exposure to total industries. often reported. occupational exposure limits. 1995) of the grouping of work related illnesses luded that it is not clear which exposures. oil mist. 16% and 18% of the reported pendent predictor for spirometric airflow limitation. whereas those using size-sensitised emul- 2 WORK RELATED ILLNESSES (WRI) sion (SSE) do not.e.4-0. were higher dust associated with mining. alpha-quartz. workers were passing through the cloud of blasting Repetitious monotonous and stressful work had brought fumes. exposure to oil mist from for 28%. slate and other stone industry. resulted in exposures of 0. struction operations can be rather more intense than for example in mining (Myran. open-pit mining. compared to outdoor construction workers and were ons etc. od 1989-1993. cases in the years 2000. Injuries or diseases of the respiratory system accounted tic drilling. occurred when and vibrations had caused most work illnesses. quarrying.5 mg/m3. tunnel The tunnel workers were further divided into groups. mineral among the tunnel workers than in the reference group.. In a study by Ulvestad et al. (2000) tunnel workers were mical/physical factors such as dust.4 mg/m3). nitrogen dio- xide and carbon monoxide. had substantial exposure to alpha-quartz. Tunnel workers using ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) as the explosive show a temporary reduction in lung function. primarily injuries to hearing. gravel. Exposure to dust in the tun- SINTEF has for nearly 30 years carried out testing and nels was periodically high compared to the Norwegian documentation of dust and other air pollutants associa. or combinati- reported to the DLI from the mining industry in the peri. gas. tract accounted for 13% to 19% of the reported cases of bronchi-alveolar inflammation because of short-term (1 work related illnesses in the same time period. For other groups.500 work related illnesses were reported yearly to The (Effects of blasting fumes on exposure and short-term Directorate of Labour Inspection (DLI). except for shaft drivers and tunnel boring which work environment factors had caused the work machine workers. This is especially linked to differences in the quartz concluded that exposure to dust and gases in under- content characteristic to the type of mining and related ground construction work enhances the risk for chronic dust. about 12% of illnesses. dust. With 3 EXPOSURE AND HEALTH EFFECTS reference to the working environment generally. hour) exposure to diesel exhaust. 13 kers and electricians. it is still conc- (Alteren. Such diseases included silicosis. Both yearly losses of ted with mining. that was generated mainly from pneuma. and power station work places. 2001). but also to the fact that the work intensity in con. who had lower exposures. as 34% of reported work related illnesses were injuries Shaft drivers had the highest exposure to oil mists (GM to the nervous system. Other OEL occur more frequently within the construction groups (shaft drivers and tunnel boring machine worker) industry and stone processing than in the mining indus. Exposure to nitrogen dioxide was similar across all groups (GM = The reported incidents were also classified according to 0. This investigation showed that as much 66 . however. The most likely explanation for the During the years 1997-2002 a number of approximately observed changes is peak exposures to nitrogen dioxide 3. Reduced hea. and Construction work and tunnelling are the trades that top alpha-quartz exposure has been shown to be an inde- these statistics with 15%. respirable dust. 2001 and 2002.

amongst such causes (Burge. dency in the spirometric results is found among workers exposed to inert dust and workers exposed to dust with The content of alpha-quartz in the presently active alpha quartz. Results from Medical supervision of the employees exposed to dust similar type of industry (mining and other industries varies considerably. in mineral quarrying Whether tunnel construction workers have an increased and in tunnelling.1982).P UBLICATION NO . must be interpreted with caution. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y 4 OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS DUE TO are uncertain. are seen among workers vidual factor. what is investigated and with increased reduction in lung function (FEV1). which causes the most injuries at work.1 Acrylamide Of these. The same tendenci- Within drilling and blasting. and dual workers. The obstructive ten- rent work areas. particularly to dusts. industry. 1994). The collective pic. reduced lung function. Work site alloca- 67 . This her exposure to mineral dust compared to healthy wor- applies both to tunnelling and to mining. Dust investigations carried out indicate that the danger of silicosis must still be regarded as real 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS in a number of mining situations.2 Noise tendency in the spirometric results. Tobacco smoking has been identified as an important SINTEF has for nearly 30 years carried out testing and risk factor in causing reduction in lung function documentation of dust and other air pollutants associa.000 workers (mineworkers. risk of work-related chronic obstructive pulmonary dis- ease is debated (Ulvestad et al. although in varying degrees. kers. nical examinations revealed a lot of miners with mode- trical fitters) have been investigated with reference to rate obstructive bronchitis. redu- how the investigation is carried out. both open pit and underground. are caused by exposures other than tobacco smoke. In in the different mineral quarries. es. 1991). 2000). which means that incidence numbers EXPOSURE IN TUNNEL CONSTRUC. Because of great variation in the follow-up of Studies on health effects from exposure of acrylamide these workers there are grounds for asserting that the and N-methylol-acrylamide have shown slight. In one of the mines a number of tests AND HEALTH EFFECTS were carried out for the evaluation of possible reversibi- During the time period from 1989 to 2003 more than lity of reduced lung function. about 40% come from the mining industry and During grouting operations workers may be exposed to about 8-10% from tunnelling and the construction acrylamide and N-methylol-acrylamide tunnel work. in the mines. 4. al. diovascular diseases.. varies between 0 % and 50 %. Among the workers examined we find an obstructive 4. from hardly anything to systematic with high exposures to mineral dust and gases. Numbers tasks that have a variety of exposures. 2002). It is parti- cularly difficult to recognise occupational lung diseases Exposure assessments are associated with a high degree (Wolkonsky. noise is probably the indi. along with deciding the background level that occupational exposures. but early stages of silicosis will be overlooked (Furuseth et mainly reversible effects on the peripheral nervous sys. among the mines hardly any 50 to 60-year old worker with a foundry workers and among the electrical fitters. 1973) and chronic airways disease. lung diseases and car.. but little reversibility judged exposure. mines. The Workers with reduced lung function seem to have a hig- large majority is more or less hearing-impaired. such as purposeful investigations. There is however ground to claim that among those 5 OTHER RESULTS WITH RELEVANCE investigated can be found a large number with reduced TO TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION WORK lung function. long working background within drilling and blasting and other underground work had normal hearing. by the spirometric results. The occurrence of lung disease and reduced lung function will depend on which criteria are adopted. ture for the industry is as a result very mixed. (Kibelstis. There is great variation in the foundry workers) show a high percentage of workers frequency of investigations. In all there are repor- TION WORK ted to the DLI about 4. foundry workers and elec. struction work incorporates many different types of lopment of silicosis in Norway are incomplete. The objectives here have been both a now growing evidence that airway obstruction (COPD) documentation of the exposure-level to dust for indivi. tem (Kjuus et al. The statistical exercises dealing with the deve.000 cases of silicosis in Norway. It is also ted with mining. Working in the construction industry per severe underreporting of pleural mesotheliomas in se is not a useful indicator of exposure because con- Norway. The test together with cli- 1. Mowe (1995) has documented a of uncertainty. are of dust in different work undertakings and within diffe. ced lung function and lung diseases.

Hansteen. Bakke B. 13 tion is also not useful because construction workers are "Occupation and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease typically employed at a large number of sites with diffe. 70:67. gases and particulate matter. Langeland... investigations show that excesses of OEL "Health and safety in the Norwegian mining industry. G. Kruse K.. Experience from the industry indicates that results of Myran.S. References Alteren. B. B. Stewart.O.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . (COPD)". Lund. Woldbæk T.T. SINTEF Rock and stone processing than in the mining industry. 1982: "The industrial physician and occupational lung disea- Fig. (miners. STAMI report 1. Occupational Hygiene. 1982.108. Tunnel construction workers as well as miners are liable to contract parts of the above mentioned exposures. vol. Results from similar industries Skaug.. 2001: "Effects of blasting fumes on exposure and short-term lung function changes in tunnel construction workers". and Kjuus. I. MB. T. follow up studies over many years. 4(3-6). Telnes. "Prevalence of Bronchitis and Airway Obstruction in versible..an epidemiological study". (in Norwegian).... D. S. 1991: However. Nor Laegeforen. SINTEF Rock and neither put together nor compared. American Review of Respiratory Disease... Furuseth. STF36 A92023. 1973. Immunol. Vol. M. also show that wor. Eduard W. Tidskr. S. Heier. K. G. Bakke B. pp 427-441. and Mineral Engineering. T. Delrapport 11. Øvrebø. J. Scand J Environ Health 2001. K. P.. J..S. B.. SINTEF Rock and Mineral Engineering.. Eur Respir J.) have been reported.. W. 27(4):250-257).A. see Figure 1. B.L.2002.. Ryberg. 1995: "Risk analyses and safety work in the Norwegian mining industry". L. M. both reversible and irre. & Andersen. Ulvestad.: "Challenges and progress in health and safety work in the mining industry and tunnel construction in Norway"... American Bituminous Coal Miners". H. A. STF36 A95062. Skogstad A. and Myran. Burge. 115:706-9. Kibelstis.. V. Mineral Engineering. P... 7:1032-1034. in varying degrees. H.. ring working conditions throughout their career. 1: Co-ordination of studies? se". Brudal.. Ulvestad. 2002: "Examination of nervous system kers with reduced lung function and lung diseases seem effects and other health effects in tunnel workers expo- to have a higher exposure to mineral dust compared to sed to acrylamide and N-methylolacrylamide in healthy workers. P. Allergy Clin. Paulsson. The documented high levels of the different exposures seem to be sufficient to cause the observed changes in Mowé. Sjöholm.2000. Romeriksporten.. 2000: "Exposure and obstructive pulmonary disease in tunnel workers .. electrical fitters and foundry workers) based on Törnquist. Goffeng.. A occur more frequently within the construction industry review". Trondheim. Norway" STAMI-report 5.. Wolkonsky.. Trondheim.T. Furuseth. 1994: 68 .1973: NO2 etc. Respiratory effects of exposure to several of the measu- red agents (mineral dust. Trondheim. Ø.. Eduard. Foss.. 1974-2003: health surveys and occupational examinations are often Research and contract reports. et al. Thorud S. B. T.. "Malign pleuralt mesoteliom i Norge 1960-92" struction workers and workers in similar trades.1995: lung function and lung diseases seen among tunnel con. Myran.

lopment of asthma. gram are not presented in this article. out by the occupational health service at Skanska Norge r’s cabin is that the operator’s chemical exposure is redu. The project aimed at surveying exposure of the sprayed rators are also exposed to diesel exhaust.2 The aim of the project to being exposed to concrete dust. Studies perfor. over a period of 8 years showed that these operators as a ced by way of reduced dust exposure. ted. Mesta as Ingvild Storås. Results from this supplementary pro- cate based accelerator (water-glass). on to the administrative norms.13 HEALTH ASPECTS OF SPRAYED CONCRETE Randi Hermann. there was a wish to The Norwegian Public Roads Administration initiated in examine whether the use of an alkali-free accelerator 1998 a research project highlighting health and safety reduces the dust load in air in comparison with a silica- during shotcreting. A follow-up dust is reduced by 44 %. the rete exposure levels are high. the operator’s exposure to respirable operations underground in terms of health. The results from the survey will be used in connection with the assessment of the operators’ exposure in relati- Based on these health screenings. Concrete spraying is an operation where large amounts of dust are developed. This is because the concrete is split up as it leaves the nozzle and is sprayed onto the 1 INTRODUCTION rock surface under high pressure. They may also form the re measurements carried out at the National Institute of basis of proposals for measures to improve the work Occupational Health (STAMI). One advantage with a closed operato. The use of an alkali-free accelerator may contribute ject was to assess the work environment and also to to increased safety for work at tunnel face. concrete operators with regard to aerosols and gases. protective device when working outside the cabin. poses. the operators are expo- ment programme for increased safety and improvements sed to oil mist when the rig is sprayed for cleaning pur- of the work environment in connection with tunnelling. Concrete spraying is one of the most hazardous work operations underground in terms of health.1 Health hazards in connection with sprayed conc- Compared to the Norwegian administrative norms. With use of a closed cabin on Concrete spraying is one of the most hazardous work the spraying rig. ted a large spread in the exposure levels for total and respirable dust for the same type of accelerators. Additionally. The effect of a closed is one of the most risky processes with respect to health operator’s cabin on the spraying rig was also investiga- in underground works. In addition 1. group has increased risk of developing asthma in com- parison to tunnel face workers. 1. sprayed concrete. group of operators has an increased risk of developing asthma in comparison with the tunnel face workers. Therefore. The annual drop in lung It is recommended that the operator uses a respiratory function (FEV1) was twice as high as expected. One of the main tasks of the pro. and previous exposu. Furthermore. med by the occupational health service at contractor and to compare alkali-free and silicate based accelera- Selmer Skanska (then Selmer ASA) showed that this tors.For total dust the exposure is study of 17 sprayed concrete operators that was carried reduced by 74 %. The results indica. the objective was to environment. investigate different actions for improvement. Several studies initiated by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration have indicated that diesel exhaust may lead to the deve- in 1998 as a part of a continuous research and develop. The application of sprayed concrete te based accelerator (water-glass). Mesta as Summary work environment. assess the effect of various measures to improve the 69 . the project also included a full-scale testing with regard to early strength development and durability of the The tests included both alkali-free accelerator and sili. In addition the opera- The health and safety project Sprayed Concrete was tors are often exposed to diesel exhaust. sprayed concrete ope.

003-0.04 mg/m3. total dust: 10 mg/m3 STAMI has been in charge of carrying out the work Bothersome dust. • Plan of action and time schedule ordered. the 1/3 of the administrative norm. The conc. See Figure 3. 1: Controlling the • Critical problems. Sika Norway Compared to the administrative norm. The norm for nitrogen dioxide is a maximum con- The spraying was carried out by contractor PEAB using centration which must not be exceeded. respirable dust: 5 mg/m3 environment measurements. 3 RESULTS OF WORK ENVIRONMENT nel in Hordaland county. tested. a Meyco spraying rig. • Regular control measurements are ordered. Rescon AS. nel floor • Control measurements required after measures have been implemented. This means that the norm may be exce- eded for short periods of time if the concentration for 1. the norms indi- The concrete spraying has been carried out by subcon. A er (with the exception of Scancem). have carried sampling equipment. they are acceptable. as well as the Norwegian Oil mist: 1 mg/m3 Public Roads Administration. 13 Administrative Norms for Pollution in the Working Atmosphere from the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority is used. thus. All analyses were carried out by STAMI.4 Implementation the rest of the shift is kept so low that the average con- The first phase of the project was carried out in centration for the entire 8-hour period is below the Elskauåsen tunnel on the Oslofjord Connection Project. the results indicate a large spread in the rete mix had alkali-free accelerators. was used. the Norwegian Public Roads Administration). Measuring result > administrative norm: Fig. 25 ppm Veidekke and Selmer Skanska. Measuring result > 1/4 of the norm. respirable dust: 0.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . The same applies to respirable dust. The survey included 10 measuring days for each suppli- The spraying contractor was Entreprenørservise AS. The results are high compared to the norm of 5 mg/m3. A total of 5 people spraying rig with a closed cabin from AMV was used. The study of the effect of a closed cabin on the spraying rig was carried out in Fossna tun. Personal sampling equipment with the air intake close to the breathing zone Both spraying rigs were made available for the test pro. which is 10 and Master Builders Technology respectively were mg/m3 for total dust. • Acceptable. but not above the norm: • Discernible problems. 70 .3 Organisation Administrative norms in Norway: The work was coordinated by the Norwegian Public Nitrogen dioxide (NO2): 3. The results are lower than to one’s health exist in connection with exposure. norm. spraying rig from the tun. the contractors Carbon monoxide (CO): 29 mg/m3. The joint venture has consisted 2 ppm (max. as well as the analyses of α-quartz. Figure 2 shows how the sampling equipment gram by Mesta (previously the construction division of was carried. samples. Except in the case of nitrogen dioxide.6 mg/m3. measures are being assessed. Veidekke ASA has been in charge of measure- ments in connection with early strength and durability. 1. See Figure 4. The tunnel was excavated by MEASUREMENTS the Public Roads Administration's construction division. For total dust.1 mg/m3. These criteria are as follows: Measuring result < 1/4 of the norm: • No requirement for measurements be followed up. value) of representatives from STAMI. the results are high. Oil vapour: 50 mg/m3 Bothersome dust. suppliers Scancem Chemicals. immediate measures required. Roads Administration. cate the highest acceptable average concentration during tractors. 2 CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT REGARDING EXPOSURE An analysis of the quartz content shows concentrations In order to assess whether conditions that are hazardous in the area 0. an 8-hour shift. Additives from the exposure levels for the same type of accelerators.

cabin’s air intake were tested. When the formwork oil is sprayed on. and 8 measurements using a silicate based concentration of NO2 may exceed the administrative accelerator.9 6. and there Out of a total of 16 measurements. However. The tests indicate concentrations of oil vapour in equipment on operator the range of 1.00 Avarage = 21. dust the exposure is reduced by 74 %.00 SD =1.9 SD = 5.80-10. the operator’s tions on the spraying rig cabin: exposure to respirable dust is reduced by 44 %. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y The tests for oil mist and oil vapour indicate concentra- tions of oil mist in the area 0. Three tests were carried out for different filter combina. static filter + coarse filter • coarse filter + bag filter EU7 5 RECOMMENDATIONS • coarse filter + electrostatic filter + coarse filter. Fig. there was a wish to also look at the effect of sampling time was too short.1 SD = 6. This is a result of different work 4 WORK ENVIRONMENT IN CONNEC.0 Avarage = 3.03-0.6 20 SD = 1. The results show that the operators may be sig- nificantly exposed to oil mist when the rig is sprayed with formwork oil.0 SD = 4.00 0 0.1 15 5.87 mg/m3.0 mg/m3. because the spraying rig was run by electricity.1 25 Avarage = 11. nitrogen dioxide (NO2) were also taken.P UBLICATION NO . various combinations of filters on the difference between the various filter combinations.00 1.10 mg/m3. The results indicate very low concentrations of both gases. discernible pro- blems. 4: Results respirable dust 71 .00 SIKA RESCON MBT SCANCEM VANN. were carried out using an alkali-free accelerator rements have shown that if the rig is run by diesel.00 10 3. The tests were carried out 150 to 315m from norm. The administrative norm for oil mist is 1.89 30 Avarage = 16.7 7.5 Avarage = 4. The results show that with a closed cabin.00 SD = 13. The te spraying. the tunnel portal. the avera- ge concentration being 0.00 SD =1. how often he enters and leaves the cabin TION WITH CONCRETE SPRAYING – throughout the spraying period. the cabin.8 Avarage = 5. 2: Placement of sampling device.3 SD = 2. This is acceptable in comparison to the administrative norm for oil vapour of Measurements have been undertaken inside and outside 50 mg/m3.g. 3: Results total dust.4 Avarage = 11. no conclusions can be made with Based on results of exposure in connection with concre.28 mg/m3. the number of mea- the use of a closed operator’s cabin in the experiment. regard to what are the best filter combinations. as well as on the operator. e.00 4. One great advantage with a closed operator’s cabin is that the operator’s chemical exposure is reduced by way of reduced dust exposure. surements carried out was not sufficient to establish any Additionally. the (Rescon).7 9. For total • coarse filter + bag filter EU7 + coarse filter + electro. Also. it will be necessary to use a respiratory protective Fig. The results show that the operator’s exposure varies with each spraying round. Based on the measure- CLOSED OPERATOR’S CABIN ments carried out.8 10. Conclusion: Respiratory protective device is required.53 ± 0.00 5 2.5 8. physical exposure 55.00 Avarage = 5. i. This is more than 1/3 of the administrative norm. Previous measu. 8 measurements was good ventilation to the work face.e. patterns. Each series of tests consisted of measurements of both respirable dust Some random samples of carbon monoxide (CO) and ("fine" dust) and total dust ("coarse" dust). This is The same operator was used for the entire experiment. MBT SCANCEM VANN- SIKA RESCON GLASS GLASS Fig.

5: Entreprenørservice’s spraying rig.N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y P UBLICATION NO . one needs to con- sider the fact that during spraying. «Bjørnen». i. will also stay in the work zone throughout the entire This showed an improvement of the work environment. 13 in the form of noise and draught will also be reduced 6 FURTHER WORK – CONTRIBUTING considerably. 9 in this publication). Since the described project concluded in 1999. Special thought is here given to the intake into the operator’s cabin concrete supplier. In most cases. with a closed cabin. the ters for particles/soot introduction of equipment which protects the spraying • Cleaning of the tunnel air. In this connection. the operator. In the subsequent "Diesel Underground" considerably when the operator’s cabin is closed. Fig. the person who is clo. shift. It is recommended that the operator uses a respiratory protective device when working outside the cabin. gated. a test has sest to the source. project (see paper no. will experience the been performed about the use of an electric driven conc- highest degree of exposure. and this will increase the well-being in the TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE work situation. The concentration of oil mist with diesel-powered trans- mixer was significantly higher instead of electric driven The results show that the operator’s exposure is reduced transmixer. the effect of sitting inside the • Reduction of diesel exhaust. which the concrete supplier will not. 72 .e. despi. cleaning of te the fact that there may be a great deal of movement diesel exhaust by particle filtration was further investi- out of and into the cabin. investigate different fil- cabin will be reduced considerably. Furthermore. since the operator often has to leave the cabin while required in the following areas: spraying is taking place. WORK ENVIRONMENT FOR SPRAYING OPERATORS Arguments against the use of this equipment have been The joint venture concluded that further work is that. electrostatic filters operator does not reduce the exposure for others staying • Assessment of the effect of various filters on the air in the work zone. the operator rete transmixer instead of the normal diesel powered.

(green is outside cabin. Gol. blue is inside) References Norwegian Public Roads Administration. Hauck. Fig. 1994: HSE Sprayed Concrete.P UBLICATION NO . 6: Concentration of respirable dust on operator inside Fig. Storås. I. B. I.. C. (Green is outside cabin. Publication no. Bakke.. 13 N ORWEGIAN T UNNELLING S OCIET Y 4 Operatør resp 14 Operatør tot Inne resp 12 Inne tot 3 Ute resp 10 Ute tot 2 8 6 1 4 0 2 0 516 518 520 522 524 526 528 530 ID NO.: 1999: "Full Scale Testing of Alkali–free Accelerators". 73 . 94 (in Norwegian). Modern Use of Wet Mix Sprayed Concrete for Underground Rock Support. & Davik.. blue is inside) outside the cabin. 7: Concentration of total dust on operator inside and and outside the cabin. K.. Third International Symposium on Sprayed Concrete. ID NO.

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