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WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER, as her


husband, Defendants-Appellees.

Gamboa & Gamboa, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

A. R. Narvasa for Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT; SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT;


EFFECT. — Where a non-resident alien had constituted his wife as his attorney-in-fact had authorized her to sue, and the
latter in fact had sued on his behalf, and as a result thereof a suit was brought against him and a service of summons
addressed to him on the latter case was served personally on his wife, his attorney-in-fact; the court had acquired
jurisdiction over his person, he having empowered her to sue, so that she was also in effect empowered to represent him in
suits filed against him.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and co-
defendant, Helen Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant, because he is
beyond the reach of the magistracy of the Philippine courts." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker — hereinafter referred to as Schenker — acting through his wife and
attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker — filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
a complaint — which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof — against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the
enforcement of Schenker’s allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and
the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase
thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had
caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to
said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the
only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred, discredit, disrepute
and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the
recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney’s fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs.
Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions." In due course, thereafter, the lower court rendered the
decision above referred to. A reconsideration thereof having been denied, Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Schenker. Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the
Philippines, although the summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the
Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary
appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer
having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff’s complaint, respectfully aver",
which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to
plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker
alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative defenses, one of which was lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense. Nevertheless, We hold that the
lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs.
Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative
capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she
was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a
consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction
over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefrom is, likewise,
untenable. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Pennoyer v. Neff
SCOTUS - 1878 (95 U.S. 714)

Facts:
 In 1866, Mitchell, attorney from OR, sued Neff, resident of CA, in OR state court to recover unpaid legal fees.
 Mitchell published notice of the commencement of the action in an OR newspaper, pursuant to state statute about
giving notice to out of state defendants. Neff was not personally served.
 When Neff failed to appear, Mitchell obtained a default judgment against him.
 Court attached a tract of land that Neff had purchased in OR. Land was sold to Pennoyer at auction and proceeds
awarded to Mitchell.
 Nine years later, Neff sued Pennoyer in OR federal court to recover the land.

Procedural History:
 Neff won in lower court (on basis of technical problems with 2 affidavits, not on jurisdictional issues)
 Neff won in SCOTUS

Issues:
 Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been personally served while within
the state and whose property within the state was not attached before the onset of litigation?

Holding/Rule:
 A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party…

a. Is personally served with process while within the state, or

b. Has property within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (as in quasi in rem
jurisdiction)

Reasoning:
 "Field theory" of state-court jurisdiction
o Every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory

o No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property outside its territory

 These principles follow because the states resemble independent nations


 Principles are rooted in the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. Courts have to give other judgments "full faith
and credit".
o "Full faith and credit" is not valid if the court did not have jurisdiction.

Dissent:
 None given.

Notes:
 Courts have to give other judgments "full faith and credit".
 SCOTUS doesn't say anything bad about the notice.
 State has power over people who are there and the land in its boundaries.
 The claim doesn't have to have anything to do with the property in the jurisdiction
 In personam - suit against a person
 In rem - suit against property
 Quasi in rem - suit against someone out of state through property in the state
 Oregon has a real interest in making its courts available to its citizens
 Since the adoption of DP, the validity of judgments like this may be directly questioned and their enforcement in the
state resisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of
parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
 Special appearance means you can enter a jurisdiction in order to dispute jurisdiction issues in a case.
 Theology of Pennoyer
o States have power over their people
o States have power over their property
o All assertions of jurisdictional power must be justified consistent with One and Two
o Problem - Underinclusive, need a way to protect citizens

 How to mitigate
 Create quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to permit assertion of claims against non-residents by
grabbing property
 Physical presence - if you can find them, grab them
 Consent can be either express and implied
 Status relationships like marriage

International Shoe Co. v. Washington


Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was an out of state company that employed salesmen within the state of
Washington. Washington sued Defendant to recover unpaid unemployment taxes and served Defendant in two
ways: (1) by mail and (2) by serving one of its salesmen within the state. Defendant appealed from a verdict for
Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant
must have such minimum contacts with the state so that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with an office in St.
Louis, Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided in Washington to sell their product in the
state of Washington. Defendant regularly shipped orders to the salesmen who accepted them, the
salesmen would display the products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were compensated
by commission for sale of the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the cost of renting
the places of business in Washington. Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make
contributions to an unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington
statute said that the commissioner could issue personal service if Defendant was found within the
state, or by mailing it to Defendant if Defendant was not in the state. The notice of assessment was
served upon Defendant’s salesperson and a copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant
appeared specially, moving to set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper
service. Defendant also argued that it did not “do business” in the state, that there was no agent upon
which service could be made, and that Defendant did not furnish employment within the meaning of
the statute. Defendant also argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and imposed a prohibitive burden of interstate commerce. The trial court found for
Washington and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow of
Defendant’s product into Washington was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Defendant
appealed.

Issue. Is service of process upon Defendant’s agent sufficient notice when the corporation’s activities
result in a large volume of interstate business so that the corporation receives the protection of the
laws of the state and the suit is related to the activities which make the corporation present?

Held. Yes. Affirmed. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with someone outside the
state, the person must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. For a corporation, the
“minimum contacts” required are not just continuous and systematic activities but also those that give
rise to the liabilities sued on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It was afforded the
protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be subject to suit.

Dissent. The state’s power to tax should not be qualified by an ambiguous statement regarding fair
play and substantial justice.

Discussion. This decision articulates the rule for determining whether a state has personal jurisdiction over an
absent defendant via the “minimum contacts” test. In general, International Shoe demonstrates that contacts
with a state should be evaluated in terms of how “fair” it would be to exercise jurisdiction over an absent
defendant.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co
Brief Fact Summary. Appellee, a bank located in New York, set up a trust covering 113 participants and sent
notice by publication to all known and unknown beneficiaries regarding Appellee’s application for judicial
settlement of the trust, as required under a New York statute. Upon first distribution of the trust, Appellee would
mail notice to known beneficiaries that could benefit from the interest or principal. Appellant, guardian of the
beneficiaries, appealed, arguing that notice by publication alone violated the beneficiaries’ due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Notice must be “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the action and give them an opportunity to object.
Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a New York statute allowing
the creation of common funds for distribution of judicial settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts.
Appellee petitioned for settlement of its first account as common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were not
residents of New York. “Notice” was by publication for four weeks in a local newspaper. Appellee had notified
those people by mail that were of full age and sound mind who would be entitled to share in the principal if the
interest they held became distributable. Appellant was appointed as special guardian and attorney for all
persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the
income of the common trust fund. Appellee was appointed to represent those interested in the principal.
Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the applicable statute was
inadequate to afford t
he beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking.

Issue. Is notice by publication of a judicial settlement to unknown beneficiaries of a common trust reasonable
notice under the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Is notice by publication to all of the beneficiaries of a common trust whose residences are known reasonable
notice under the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. First issue: Yyes. Second issue: Nno.


Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the interests of all
claimants as long as there is a procedure allowing for notice and an opportunity to be heard.

There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. The
claimants at issue could potentially be deprived of property here, as the proposed disposition cuts off
their rights to sue for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests. In addition, the court’s decision
appoints someone who, without their knowledge, could use the trust to obtain the fees and expenses
necessary for a sham proceeding.

There need not be personal service because the state has an interest in settling trusts. “Notice has to
be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pending
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” You do not have to notify all the
beneficiaries when the trust concerns many small interests. Sending notice to most of them will
protect their interests sufficiently.

The New York Banking Law, however, that does not require notice to all persons whose whereabouts
are known, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because contacting
beneficiaries by mail at their last known address is not particularly burdensome.

Dissent. Justice Burton: Omitted from casebook.

Discussion. The majority’s opinion illustrates that notice by publication will not suffice only because it
would be burdensome for the plaintiff to notify all parties involved. If the plaintiff knows of a way to
contact the parties, then the plaintiff must bear that expense. Mailing notice to an address, if known,
will suffice. Notice by publication will suffice only if there is no practical way of knowing the identity or
location of the party.
Shaffer v. Heitner
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff stockholder brought a shareholder’s derivative action in Delaware state court
against Defendants, corporations incorporated in Delaware with their principal place of business in Arizona,
and corporate officers of the corporations (Defendants). Plaintiff moved to sequester Defendants’ property,
which was stock in the company, located in Delaware as defined by the Delaware statute. Defendants moved
to quash the summons and to vacate the sequestration order, arguing that both exercising personal jurisdiction
and seizing Defendants’ property violated due process.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. When the only contact the defendant has with the forum state is the location of
property as defined by statute in the forum state, the forum lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant
unless the minimum contacts test of International Shoe is satisfied.

Facts. Plaintiff, a stockholder for Greyhound Corp., a company incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Arizona, sued Greyhound Corp., Greyhound Lines, Inc., (a subsidiary of
Greyhound Corp.) and present and former officers of the two companies for violating duties to
Greyhound Corp. by causing it to be liable for damages in an antitrust suit and a fine in a criminal
contempt action in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a motion for sequestration of the officers’ stock. Under a
Delaware statute, Delaware is the situs of all stock in Delaware corporations. The stock was seized.
Defendants were notified by certified mail of the sequestration and notice was published in a
Delaware newspaper. Defendants entered a special appearance so they could move to quash service
of process and vacate the sequestration order. Defendant argued that the order violated due process
and therefore the property could not be attached in Delaware. In addition, Defendants argued that
they did not have the minimum contacts with Delaware required to establish jurisdiction under
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In addition,
Defendants argued that the sequestration procedures were inconsistent with the Sniadach cases (see
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969)). The Court of
Chancery found for Plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery. The
Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that the Sniadach cases involved default judgments and not
compelling a party to appear. This court furthered reasoned that sequestration procedures help to
adjudicate claims of mismanagement against Delaware companies, and do not cause permanent
deprivation of property to their shareholders. Defendants appealed.

Issue. In order for the forum state to exercise in rem jurisdiction on a nonresident, must the
nonresident have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of that state’s laws? If so, must the cause of action be sufficiently related
to the contacts the nonresident has with the forum state?

Held. Yes to both. Judgment reversed. In rem is not a proceeding against the property, it is a proceeding
against a person’s interest in the property. You need to give an owner of property reasonable and appropriate
notice of an in rem proceeding so that he or she recognizes that such a proceeding directly affects his or her
interests. Having property in a state does not give the state jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to the
property unless the person also passes the minimum contacts test articulated in the International Shoe
decision. If it is unconstitutional to exercise jurisdiction over the person directly then it should be
unconstitutional to assert jurisdiction indirectly. Plaintiff’s argument that Delaware has an interest in asserting
jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries is not established by Delaware law. Delaware law determines that it has
jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants’ property is in Delaware; and not due to their status as
corporate fiduciaries. First, the statute authorizing jurisdiction does not specifically apply to stockholder
derivative actions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s inability to secure jurisdiction over seven of the defendants because
they didn’t have property in Delaware shows that there is no necessary relationship between corporate
fiduciaries and stockholders. In addition, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Delaware is a fair forum. Plaintiff
must demonstrate more than the applicability of Delaware’s laws to the controversy to establish a basis for
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have received benefits from Delaware laws only demonstrates
that it would be appropriate for Delaware law to govern obligations between Defendant and stockholders. This
argument does not require that Delaware be permitted to exercise jurisdiction, especially considering its lack of
a long-arm statute. Concurrence. Justice Stevens: The majority should not broadly eliminate in rem jurisdiction
by stating that there is no personal jurisdiction if the only contact the defendant has with the forum state is
property located in the state. There are other means of acquiring jurisdiction over local actions that may be
unintentionally limited by this broad language. Justice Brennan (concurring in part and dissenting in part): The
Delaware sequestration statute embodies quasi in rem jurisdiction that is no longer valid. The parties did not
make the minimum contacts test an issue so the court should not have decided this issue. There is no proper
factual record for determining the level of contacts in this case. This is also a constitutional question, and this
decision will reach to all the state statutes that permit quasi in rem action through sequestration of property.
The general rule is that the forum state has jurisdiction over the directors and officers of a corporation
chartered by the state in a shareholder derivative action. A state’s valid substantive interests are considerations
in assessing the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. Delaware has interests in preventing local
corporations from being victims of foreign stockholders and in regulating its own corporations. In addition,
jurisdiction can be based on out-of-state activities that have foreseeable effects in the forum state. Delaware’s
failure to express an interest in corporate fiduciaries does not pertain to the minimum contacts analysis. In
addition, there was purposeful availment of the forum’s laws because the corporate officers entered business
relationships with Greyhound’s stockholders pursuant to the laws of Delaware.
Discussion. As the concurring opinions illustrate, it is highly unlikely a court has personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant that is absent from the forum state when the only contact is property owned by the
defendant located within the forum state. Even if the property is connected to the suit, minimum contacts must
still be established in compliance with the International Shoe test.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, Petitioner, v. MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL., Respondents.

Alva J. Hill for Petitioner.

DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for respondent Judge and respondent Perkins.

Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso, Jr., for respondent Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; MEANING OF JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER; ADJUDICATION OF TITLE TO CERTAIN SHARES OF
STOCK. — By jurisdiction over the the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and
this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in the general nature of its
power, or in authority specially conferred. The respondent’s action calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock
of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. (Vide sec. 146, et seq., Adm. Code, as amended by Comm. Act No. 145; sec 56, Act
No. 136, as amended by Act No. 400.)

2. ID.; ID.; CROSS-COMPLAINT. — I. S. P. in her cross-complaint brought suit against E. A. P. and the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below to
render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by
section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; — Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the
New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy
and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of
jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, no whether its conclusion in the course of it is
right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question,
which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by the court — and the rightful exercise — of its
jurisdiction.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

On July 5, 1938, the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum of P71,379.90, consisting of dividends which have been
declared and made payable on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the
company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. To the
complaint, the company filed its answer, alleging, by way of defense, that the withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal
and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner herein, Idonah
Slade Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard. The answer prays that the adverse claimants be made parties to the action
and served with notice thereof by publication, and that thereafter all such parties be required to interplead and settle the
rights among themselves.

On September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, to include in his complaint as parties
defendants petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in
addition to the relief prayed for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and
George H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert
thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and
George H. Engelhard, pursuant to the order of the trial court. On December 9, 1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the
amended complaint, and on January 8, 1940, petitioner’s objection to the court’s jurisdiction over her person having been
overruled by the trial court and by this court in G. R. No. 46831, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which
she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the Supreme Court of the
State of the New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the
shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, and prays for various affirmative reliefs against the Respondent. To the answer and cross-complaint thus filed, the
respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a reply and an answer in which he sets up several defenses to the enforcement in
this jurisdiction of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York above alluded to. Instead of demurring to
the reply on either of the two grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Petitioner, Idonah Slade
Perkins, on June 5, 1940, filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the
action," because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is res judicata.

Petitioner’s demurrer having been overruled, she now filed in this court a petition entitled" Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus," alleging that "the respondent judge is about to and will render judgment in the above-mentioned case
disregarding the constitutional rights of this petitioner; contrary to and annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment
rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, . . . which decision is res judicata on
all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317, of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and which
New York judgment the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction of annul, amend, reverse, or modify in any
respect whatsoever" ; and praying that the order of the respondent judge overruling the demurrer be annulled, and that he
and his successors be permanently prohibited from taking any action on the case, except to dismiss the same.

The only question here to be determined, therefore, is whether or not, in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of
the petitioner by the Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by
the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, in civil case No. 53317 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the local court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in the said case. By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature
of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court,
and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, in the court below alleged the ownership in himself of the shares
of stock involved in this action as manager of the conjugal partnership between him and his wife, Idonah Slade Perkins; that
the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins; that such claims are invalid, unfounded, and made only for the purpose of vexing,
hindering and delaying Eugene Arthur Perkins in the exercise of the lawful control over and use of said amended complaint
prays, inter alia, "that defendant Benguet Consolidated Mining Company be required and ordered to recognize the right of
the plaintiff to the control and disposal of said shares so standing in his name to the exclusion of all others; that the
additional defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, be each held to have no interest or claim in the
subject matter of the controversy between plaintiff and defendant Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, or in or under the
judgment to be rendered herein and that by the said judgment they, and each of them be excluded therefrom; and that the
plaintiff be awarded the costs of this suit and general relief." The respondent’s action, therefore, calls for the adjudication of
title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall
within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. (Vide: sec. 146, et seq., Adm. Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 145; sec. 56, Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 400.)

Similarly, the Court of First Instance of Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s
cross- complaint. The cross-complaint sets up a judgment allegedly recovered by Idonah Slade Perkins against Eugene
Arthur Perkins in the Supreme Court of New York and by way of relief prays: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Judgment against the plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins in the sum of one hundred eighty-five thousand and four hundred
dollars ($185,400), representing cash dividend of March 30, 1937.

"(2) That plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins be required to deliver to this defendant the certificates representing the 48,000
shares of capital stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. issued as a stock dividend on the 24,000 shares owned by this
defendant as described in the judgment Exhibit 1-A.

"(3) That this defendant recover under that judgment Exhibit 1-A interest upon the amount of each cash dividend referred to
in that judgment received by plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins from February, 1930, to and including the dividend of March 30,
1937, from the date of payment of each of such dividends at the rate of 7 per cent per annum until paid.

"(4) That this defendant recover of plaintiff her costs and disbursements in that New York action amounting to the sum of
one thousand five hundred eighty-four and 20/000 dollars ($1,584.00), and the further sum of two thousand dollars
($2,000) granted her in that judgment Exhibit 1-A as an extra allowance, together with interest.

"(5) For an order directing an execution to be issued in favor of this defendant and against the plaintiff for amounts sufficient
to satisfy the New York judgment Exhibit 1-A in its entirety, and against the plaintiff and the defendant Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. for such other amounts prayed for herein as this court may find to be due and payable by each of them; and
ordering them to comply with all other orders which this court may issue in favor of the defendant in this case.

"(6) For the costs of this action, and

"(7) For such other relief as may be appropriate and proper in the premises." cralaw virtua1aw library

In other words, Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against Eugene Arthur perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court
below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action
recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the
general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid
judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, . . . which decision is res
judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317," and argues on the assumption that the
respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course
of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is
a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not
to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the
inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be
reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the
exercise by that court — and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction.

The petition is, therefore, hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company


Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were
corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to
agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a
local agency to whom summons may be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US
and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in
German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff


As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance
companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them
to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to bring documentary evidence
all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that
jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which
arose from another jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster


Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in
Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the
India passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the
Indian government filed a complaint before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The district court granted the motion on three
conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of
Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due
process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian
government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India. The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant


While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than
that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who have revoked their representation by
an American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already
consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is
problematic as it gives the impression that foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement
of the Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by
a foreign court may be enforced in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is
untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a
case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action
for enforcement later on. Denial of due process may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian
judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be given equal access to
evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

[G.R. No. 32636. March 17, 1930.]

In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A. W. FLUEMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANNIE
COUSINS HIX, Oppositor-Appellee.

C. A. Sobral, for Appellant.

Harvey & O’Brien and Gibbs & McDonough, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 781, AS AMENDED, APPLIED; RIGHT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL FROM DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL. — The special administrator of an estate is a
"person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," within the meaning of section 781,
as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and so may be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance
of a will.

2. ID.; ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 300 AND 301, APPLIED. — The laws of a foreign
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The requirements of
sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 633, APPLIED. — The due execution of a will alleged to have been
executed in another jurisdiction must be established. Where the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it
is the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE. — Where it is desired to establish the execution of a will in another jurisdiction, it is necessary to
prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the Philippine Islands.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 637, 638, AND 639, APPLIED. — Where it is desired to prove the
probate of a will in another jurisdiction and the appointment in that jurisdiction of an administrator for the estate of the
deceased, the moving party must comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
requesting a hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in another jurisdiction.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason
denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee contends that the
appellant as a mere special administrator is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant,
who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance
of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of
the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva v. De Leon [1925], 47 Phil., 780).

It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who
had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of
section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and
as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an
extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.

In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony
of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 633).

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine
Islands. The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of
the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own
theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.

While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking
the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a
paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on
June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana
Wamsley and Joseph L. Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by
another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed Claude
W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it
is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an
intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this
may be, no attempt has been made to comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia
has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands
and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.

Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie
Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West Virginia. The present proceedings do not call for any specific
pronouncements on the validity or invalidity of this alleged divorce.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.
[G.R. No. L-12105. January 30, 1960.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor and appellee, v. MAGDALENA
C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors and appellants.

Jose D. Cortes for Appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla & Balonkita for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS, WHAT LAW GOVERNS; APPROVAL OF PROJECT OF PARTITION. — Article 10 of
the old Civil Code (Article 16, new Civil Code) provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question. In case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of
Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary
dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be
respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved.

2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW IF INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE. — The pertinent law of the state of the
testator may be taken judicial notice of without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition where it appears that said law was admitted by the court as exhibit during the probate of the will; that the same
was introduced as evidence of a motion of one of the appellants for withdrawal of a certain sum of money; and that the other
appellants do not dispute the said law.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections
filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and
approving the said project.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and
testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state, or at
least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention is untenable. Notwithstanding the long
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a
citizen of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his will. He had planned to
spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his
personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of
that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of
the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is
hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued
and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust." (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.)

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questioned on appeal. The executor filed a project of partition
dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the
residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit
of testator’s grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of P90,819.67 in cash and one-half in shares of stock of
several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister,
Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consists in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator’s grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohanan, and his
daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash,
the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother
and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the
estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum
concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The
will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have
recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the cases of Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup,
12) 315, Cousins Hiz v. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb v. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The
court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and
personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s debts." cralaw virtua1aw library

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator’s estate had already
been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 18, 1955, (pp. 155- 159, Vol. II Records, Court of First
Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its
validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the
estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and
the court in its said error found that there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the
time the decree of divorce was issued. As already adverted to, the decision of the court had become final and Magdalena C.
Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their coverture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and
that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and
this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by
the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator’s children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the
amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the
laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure of the testator to give his children
two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional
rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the
law on this point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found." (par. 2, Art. 10,
old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State
of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950,
supra). So the question at issue is whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of
the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a
testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at
the time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor’s duty to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.."
. . (Rule 123)

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on
October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially
Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants’ (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-
79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the
executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael
Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State
of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of
the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in
the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary
provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.