You are on page 1of 26

On Gödel’s modal interpretation of the

intuitionistic logic

Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science - CLE
Department of Philosophy - IFCH
State University of Campinas - UNICAMP
E-mail: itala@cle.unicamp.br

Hércules de Araújo Feitosa
Department of Mathematics - FC, Bauru
São Paulo State University - UNESP
E-mail: haf@fc.unesp.br

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse Gödel’s paper “Eine Interpre-
tation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls", presented in 1932 at
the Mathematical Colloquium in Vienna and published in 1933. This
paper presents an interpretation from the intuitionistic propositional
logic into a certain modal expansion G of the classical propositional
logic introduced by Gödel. We discuss Gödel’s results and several
known important extensions of his conjectures. We also analyse a
second paper presented at the Vienna Mathematical Colloquium in
1932 and published in 1933, in which Gödel introduces an interpreta-
tion from classical propositional logic into intuitionistic propositional
logic, that he extends to the corresponding arithmetics in order to
prove the relative consistency of one relative to the other. We empha-
size the originality and relevance of Gödel’s results and their mean-
ingful extensions, and analyse them under the scope of the study of
interrelations between logical systems through translations between
them.
Keywords: Gödel’s interpretations between logics; intuitionistic logic,
model logic, classical logic; relative consistency of arithmetic; ex-
tended results; translations between logics; conservative translations;
contextual translations.
MSC: 03A05, 03B22

1

2

1 Introduction
Among several papers published by Kurt Gödel in 1933, two are of special
interest for the study of interrelations between logical systems.
Gödel participated actively in the Mathematical Colloquium in Vienna
chaired by Karl Menger, his former teacher. In 1932, Gödel presented at the
Colloquium two relevant results, that would become important references
for several posterior studies and results in the logic literature.
At one session, Gödel described an interpretation of the intuitionistic
propositional logic IPC into a certain modal expansion G of the classical
propositional logic, showing that the notions and formulas of IPC could
be “translated" into G, such that if a formula ϕ is provable in IPC then
its “translation" ϕ0 is provable in G. Gödel also conjectured the converse,
that an intuitionistic formula ϕ should be provable in the intuitionistic
propositional calculus IPC if and only if its “translation" were provable
in the modal expanded classical calculus G. Gödel’s conjecture was later
proved to be true.
On June 28th , during another session of the Colloquium, Gödel showed
that if ϕ is a classicaly valid connective formula built with the connectives
¬ and ∧, then the direct “translation" (that is, ¬ by – and ∧ by ∆) of ϕ is an
intuitionistically valid formula; as the other classical connectives ∨, →, ↔
are definible from ¬ and ∧, it results that the set of all valid formulas of
the propositional classical logic according to such translation is a subset
of the set of the valid formulas of the propositional intuitionistic logic. In
addition, Gödel extended his translation from the Hebrand (1931) formal
classical arithmetic into the Heyting (1930a) formal intuitionistic arithmetic
and proved that the formal classical arithmetic can be included into the
intuitionistic arithmetic, presenting a proof of the relative consistency of the
classical arithmetic (and classical logic) relative to intuitionistic arithmetic.
Gödel’s talks were published in 1933 in Ergebnisse eines mathematischen
Kolloquiums, number 4 (1931-32), edited by K. Menger.
The first talk was published as a short note, under the title “Eine Inter-
pretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls (An interpretation of the
intuitionistic propositional calculus)", pages 39-40. The original text was
translated into English as ‘An interpretation of the intuitionistic sentencial
logic’ in The philosophy of mathematics, pages 128-129, edited by Hintikka
in 1969; and was reprinted in 1971, by Berka and Kreiser, in Logic-Texte.
Kommentierte Auswahl zur Geschichte der modern Logic, pages 187-188.
The second one was published in the same volume, under the title “Zur
intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie (On intuitionistic arith-

W. Spain. There is a translation into English by Martin Davis in Davis (1965. . Kleene. H ` α implies Ak . . number 48.. and in the third edition of 2006 the two papers appear on pages 136-137 and 126-135. with an “Introductory note" by A. The first edition in any language of Gödel’s complete works is the Span- ish translation. the same year Gödel’s results were published. listed as 1933f. Troelstra. Getzen also published a paper on the subject in 1933. Kurt Gödel: Obras Completas (Kurt Gödel: Complete Works). Glivenko (1929) and Lewis and Langford (1932). and defines inductively a function K that associates to every formula α of H a formula αk of B by adding a double negation in front of every subformula of α. S. van Heijenoort. Aside from preparing the edition. . . Dawson Jr. pages 300-303). Moore. Solovay and J. with an “Introductory note" by A. . In spite of the originality and relevance of Gödel’s results. and also a bilingual version of “Zur intuitionistis- chen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie". under the auspices of the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic. Kolmogorov’s aim “is to explain why" the illegitimate use of the princi- ple of excluded middle in the domain of transfinite arguments “has not yet led to contradictions". Troelstra. given a set of axioms A = {α1 . where Ak = {αk1 . pages 1199-1201. The second edition of the book was published in 1989. A review by Rolando Chuaqui of Kurt Gödel: Obras Completas was published in 1983 in The Journal of Symbolic Logic.S. pages 282-285. Mosterín wrote a special introductory note before each one of the papers and personally translated from Ger- man into Spanish the two papers mentioned above. Kolmogorov suggests that a similar result can be . . Feferman (Editor-in-chief). In 1986. Volume I: Publications 1929- 1936 was edited by S. The first known “translations" involving classical. intuitionistic and modal logic were presented by Kolmogorov (1925). αn }. . based on Hilbert (1923). It is then proven that. G. pages 34-38. modal logic and classical logic are not the first known results in the literature concerning the study of inter-relations between logical systems through the study of translations between them. listed as 1933e.S. R. pages 296-299. αkn }. pages 286-295. B ` αk . 3 metic and number theory)". edited by Jesús Mosterín in 1981 and published by Alianza Editorial. This volume brings together Gödel’s original texts and presents a bilingual version of “Eine Interpretation des intuitionis- tischen Aussagenkalküls" (the original German paper and a translation into English. the book Kurt Gödel: Collected Works. his interpreta- tions involving intuitionistic logic. J. 75-81). A. respectively. . He introduces the intuitionistic formal logic B and the classical propositional calculus H. p.

his results had been superseded by Gödel’s and Gentzen’s results. which is also among the selected collection of papers of this book. . 4 extended to quantificational systems and. he does not mention Kolmogorov’s paper. 1977). By the time Kolmogorov’s paper finally became widely known. where the author proves that. edited by van Heijenoort in 1967 (corrected third printing. Our aim in this paper is to analyse and discuss Gödel’s “Eine Inter- pretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls". Feitosa and D’Ottaviano (2001) and Carnielli. in general. In “Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls". antecipating Gödel’s and Gentzen’s results on the relative consis- tency of classical arithmetic with respect to intuitionistic arithmetic (see Feitosa (1997). In “Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie". if α is a theorem of classical propositional logic CPL. Also related to intuitionism is Glivenko (1929). Gödel uses Glivenko’s (1929) results. apparently not aware of Kolmogorov (1925). appeared in From Frege to Gödel. from a universal logic approach. that is. “On the principle of excluded middle". to all known mathe- matics. aiming at analysing both of Gödel’s papers as forerunners of the study of interrelations between logical systems through translations between them. Coniglio and D’Ottaviano (2009)). until its English translation. We will analyse the “interpretation" presented by Gödel and will discuss some posterior results and extensions by several other authors concerning Gödel’s conjectures and results. Kolmogorov (1925) was published in Russian and his results were not published in any other languages. Gödel only mentions Kolmogorov’s paper in a footnote. However. and interprets it incor- rectly. then the double negation of α is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional logic IPL. We will also briefly present a general discussion of Gödel’s “Zur intu- itionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie".

“Bp" can be read as “p is provable". or into the corresponding epistemic logic. the notion “p is provable". Gödel’s result shows that there is an immersion of the intuition- istic propositional logic into the modal logic S4 . and if Bp is understood as “p is necessary" the expanded system results as the Lewis modal system S4 . Gödel introduces the system G by adding to the primitive notions ∼. denoted by Bp. S4 ` ϕ’. ∨ and •. ∨ and ∧. with B written for the necessity operator  (or N) (Lewis and Langford (1932)). “provable by any correct means". that may be interpreted either epistemically or as a modal operator. It thus can be expressed by: If IPC ` ϕ. →. and with three axioms and an inference rule for B. that is. then S4 ` ϕ’. 5 2 “Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagen- kalküls": Gödel’s “interpretation" from the intu- itionistic propositional calculus into the modal sys- tem G(S4 ) In this short paper of 1933. an intuitive interpretation. the operator B must not be interpreted as “provable in a given formal system". ⊃. 2. The classical propositional logic CPL is enriched with an additional unary operator B.1 The system G The primitive “notions" of the system IPC are ¬. and only if. Following Gödel’s conjecture in the paper. and to the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus. where ϕ’ is Gödel’s “translation" of ϕ. and the following three new axioms and a special inference rule: Axiom G1 : Bp → P Axiom G2 : Bp → B((p → q) → Bq) Axiom G3 : Bp → BBp . Gödel interprets the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC (as introduced by Heyting in 1930) into the modal system G. The letter B stands for “beweisbar". Hence. we can claim that IPC ` ϕ if.

6 Rule G : ϕ/Bϕ Gödel then defines his “translation" Gd1 from IPC into G: Gd1 : IPC → G1 (p)Gd1 =d f p (¬p)Gd1 =d f ∼ Bp (p ⊃ q)Gd1 =d f Bp → Bq (p ∨ q)Gd1 =d f Bp ∨ Bq (p ∧ q)Gd1 =d f p • q We can naturally obtain the following “translation" from the set of for- mulas of the language of IPC into the formulas of G: (p)Gd1 = p (¬ϕ)Gd1 =∼ B(ϕGd1 ) (ϕ ⊃ ψ)Gd1 = B(ϕGd1 ) → B(ψGd1 ) (ϕ ∨ ψ)Gd1 = B(ϕGd1 ) ∨ B(ψGd1 ) (ϕ ∧ ψ)Gd1 = ϕGd1 • ψGd1 Gödel observes. that is: 1 Gödel does not use any special denotation for his interpretation function. without proving. is not derivable in G and. for any formulas ϕ and ψ. in general. . that: (i) We could obtain another “translation" by defining (¬p)Gd =d f B(∼ B(p)) (p ∧ q)Gd =d f Bp ∧ Bq. Gödel then claims that if a formula is provable in the intuitionistic logic. if Bϕ and Bψ are not provable in G then Bϕ ∨ Bψ is not provable in G. (p ∨ ¬p)Gd1 . (ii) The “translation" of (p ∨ ¬p). then its “translation" is derivable in G.

C. published in 1925. Gödel mentions Kolmogorov’s paper in a footnote: “Kolmogorov (1932) has given a some what different interpretation of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. that his system G is equivalent to Lewis’s system of strict implication if Bp is “translated" by “necessary p" (N(p) or. presents for the first time in the literature an axiomatization of Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic. McKinsey and A. and thus we should have: IPC ` ϕ if. Hence. without. In fact. equivalently. It is verified that the closure algebra is an adequate (sound and complete) model for S4 . Gödel observes.2 On the converse of Gödel’s result Gödel’s conjecture concerning the converse of his result was proved by J. mentioning Parry (1933). p. in a rigorous and elucidative text- These authors present a strict implication propositional calculus and prove its equivalence to Lewis’s system S4 (with the modal operators  and ^). 497): Becker Axiom: Nϕ → NNϕ. G ` ϕGd1 . the Heyting propositional calculus IPC is studied. antecipating Heyting’s axiomatization published in 1930.C. specifying a precise formalism". 7 If IPC ` ϕ. Tarski in 1948. by interpreting B as the modal operator  (for necessity). and known as Johanson’s minimal logic. is that this would collapse with the second incompleteness theorem if ϕ is the sentence that formalizes the consistency of first-order arithmetics. and only if. then G ` ϕGd1 . Gödel’s justification for why the operator B can not be interpreted as “is provable in a formal system". . Kolmogorov’s paper. In addition. Kolmogorov’s system B is the same system posteriorly introduced in 1936 by Johanson. He conjectures that the converse also holds. As noted above. and the authors prove that the Heyting algebra (called Brouwer algebra in the paper) is an adequate semantics for the system IPC. to be sure. 2. p) and we add to the Lewis axioms the additional axiom of Becker (1930. Gödel’s system G results in the Lewis modal system S4 (see Lewis and Langford (1932)).

this property of S4 im- plies the disjunction property of IPC.2: If S4 ` ϕ ∨ ψ. with special attention to the system S5 . classified as a normal extension of S4 . McKinsey and Tarski define three functions from IPC into S4 . S4 ` ϕTM . In the same paper.1: IPC ` ϕ if.3: If IPC ` ϕ ∨ ψ. namely to S3 . Hacking’s proof is based on cut- elimination. and only if. 8 Finally. proved by Gentzen (1935) using cut- elimination.2. Theorem 2. one can also weaken S4 .2.2. based on a certain duality between the closure algebras and the Heyting algebras. Observe that there is a relationship between the interpretations Gd1 and TM: S4 ` ϕTM ↔ ϕGd1 . . Several further results are proved in McKinsey and Tarski (1948). By means of the proved Gödel’s conjecture. Theorem 2. the first one being: TM : IPC → S4 (pi )TM =d f pi (ϕ ∨ ψ)TM =d f ϕTM ∨ ψTM (ϕ ∧ ψ)TM =d f ϕTM • ψTM (ϕ ⊃ ψ)TM =d f (ϕTM → ψTM ) (¬ϕ)TM =d f ∼ ^ϕTM ( ∼ ϕTM ) Gödel’s conjecture is then proved. then S4 ` ϕ or S4 ` ψ. in particular the remarkable following theorem. then IPC ` ϕ or IPC ` ψ. According to Hacking (1963). McKinsey and Tarski analyse some extensions of Lewis’s system. in order to prove Gödel’s conjecture. Theorem 2.

. or into the intuitionistic system. . . . by using algebraic semantics. a question that naturally appears is whether there is an interpretation from S4 into any other modal system. xik ))RS =d f (Fkm (xi1 . xik )) (ϕ ∨ ψ)RS =d f ϕRS ∨ ψRS (ϕ ∧ ψ)RS =d f ϕRS • ψRS (ϕ ⊃ ψ)RS =d f (∼ ϕRS ∨ ψRS ) (¬ϕ)RS =d f (∼ ϕRS ) (∃xϕ)RS =d f ∃xϕRS (∀xϕ)RS =d f ∀xϕRS The same result can be obtained by extending Gödel’s function Gd1 : (∃xϕ)RS =d f ∃xϕRS (∀xϕ)RS =d f ∀xϕRS The result proved by Rasiowa and Sikorski was independently obtained by Maehara (1954). using cut-elimination. . . . . extended Tarski and McKinsey’s result to the first-order predicate calculus. for there are known functions from a modal system into classical arithmetic and into intuitionistic arithmetic. At present the answer to such a question is still only a partial one. in the Lindenbaum style. . Prawitz and Malmnäs (1968) proved the same result using normaliza- tion for adequate natural deduction systems for IQC and QS4 . After presenting algebraic semantics. and not only into the underlying logics. 9 Rasiowa and Sikorski (1953). the authors obtain the extended result by using the following function from Heyting predicate calculus IQC into Lewis predicate calculus QS4 : RS : IQC → QS4 (Fkm (xi1 . for various logical systems. Due to the above mentioned symmetry between the closure algebras and the Heyting (Brouwer) algebras.

extending Rasiowa and Sikorki’s result. but by the incompleteness of PA it is known that there are true sentences of arithmetic that are not theorems). Goldblatt (1978) indicates a problem in Solovay’s result. for pi a proposition letter of the language of S4 . where pϕq denotes the numeral of the Gödel number of ϕ. but defining (pi )S =d f ∅i . Goldblatt suggests a slight modification in Solovay’s interpretation. with ∅i a sentence of PA. The following theorem in then proved. Theorem 2. ∨. Bew is the canonically defined predicate expressing arithmetized provability (Prov) in PA and pkq is the Gödel number of the sentence ϕS . 10 2. is given by Solovay (1976).3. with the meaning “ϕ is true and provable in PA". using proof-theoretical methods. Solovay defines the following function from S4 into Peano classical arithmetic PA: S : S4 → PA (pi )S =d f pi (⊥)S =d f ⊥ S commutes with ∼. it is not the case that every translation (ϕ → ϕ)S of the formula (ϕ → ϕ) of S4 is a theorem of PA. Hence the scheme ϕ → ϕ would not be valid in S4 . According to Solovay’s interpretation.1: S4 ` ϕ if. and only if. • and → (ϕ)S =d f Bew(pϕS q). for it is not the case that PA ` Bew(pϕ)S q → ϕS (this occurs only when PA ` ϕS . . Let us consider Solovay’s original interpretations.3 Other extensions of Gödel’s result The first result in the latter sense. PA ` ϕS . in order to maintain valid the above scheme by defining (ϕ)GS =d f ϕ • Bew(pϕq). so Bew(pkq) is the formula expressing that k is the Gödel number of a theorem of PA.

Goldblatt (1978) presents other interesting translations. Solovay’s result (see Troelstra (1986)) can be stated as G ` ϕ if. modus ponens. with K4 W extended from CPC by the following axioms and rule: (RN)(ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) (K)ϕ → ϕ (W)(ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ (Löb’s Axiom) Necessitation Rule: ϕ/ϕ The system S4 Grz is obtained. 11 Write ∗ ϕ if we have PA ` (ϕ)S for all possible interpretations S. The first one involves the modal systems K4 W and S4 Grz. •. from S4 . and only if. by adding the following axiom due to Grzegorczyk (1967) (Grz)((ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ) → ϕ The function Gl1 is defined by: Gl1 : S4 Grz → K4 W (pi )Gl1 =de f pi Gl1 commutes with ∼. Let G be the modal system containing all classical tautologies. the schema (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) and the following Löb’s Axiom: (ϕ → ψ) → ϕ. ∨. → (ϕ)Gl1 =de f ϕ • ϕGl1 . ∗ ϕ. the necessitation rule (from ϕ infer ϕ).

for every formula ϕ in a modal language.3. SG : K4 W → PA (pi )SG =d f pi SG commutes with ∼.4: K4 W ` ϕ if.3: K4 W ` ϕ if. •. 12 The following result is proved. and only if. From another interpretation function. Theorem 2. and only if. he defines the following function Gl2 from IPC into PA: Gl2 : IPC → PA Gl2 (ϕ) =d f SG ◦ Gl1 ◦ TM(ϕ) TM Gl1 SG IPC −−→ S4 Grz −−→ K4 W −−→ PA | {z } Gl2 The following result is then proved. Theorem 2.6: IPC ` ϕ if. Theorem 2. we have the following theorem. The following theorem is proved. The same result is also proved relative to Solovay’s interpretation. Theorem 2. K4 W ` ϕGl1 . and only if. PA ` ϕS . PA ` (ϕGl1 )SG . Finally. . and only if PA ` ϕSG .3. PA ` ϕGl2 . → (ϕ)SG =d f ϕ ∧ Bew(pϕSG q). Hence.2: S4 Grz ` ϕ if.3.3.3. and only if. Goldblatt observes that the interpretation TM of McKinsey and Tarski can be extended to S4 Grz and. Theorem 2. ∨.5: S4 Grz ` ϕ if. by the composition of the interpreta- tions.

we have the following result. Goodman (1984) presents a new extension of the results involving in- tuitionistic and modal systems. (iii) G ` ϕB . •. The following interpretation is defined thus: Gm : HA → EA (ϕ)Gm =d f ϕ. EA is to be understood as a conservative extension of HA. According to Boolos (1979a. and the Heyting arithmetic HA. Theorem 2.7: The following assertions are equivalent: (i) S4 Grz ` ϕ.3.8: IPC ` ϕ if. Chapter 13). S4 Grz ` ϕG1 . 1979b) presents a synthesis of the results by Solovay and Goldblatt. (iv) Every Goldblatt translation of ϕ is a theorem of PA. Theorem 2. (ii) ϕ is valid in every weak finite partial order. and only if. ∨.3. if ϕ is atomic Gm commutes with ¬ and ∧ (ϕ ∨ ψ)Gm =d f (ϕ)GM ∨ ϕGm . 13 Boolos (1979a. The function B from S4 Grz into Gödel’s G is defined as follows: B : S4 Grz → G (pi )B =d f pi (⊥)B =d f ⊥ B commutes with ∼. → (ϕ)B =d f (ϕB • ϕB ). He considers a first-order arithmetic based on S4 and named epistemic arithmetic (EA).

Gödel introduces the following “translation" from CPC into IPC: Gd2 : CPC → CPI (p)Gd2 =d f p (¬ϕ)Gd2 =d f −ϕGd2 (ϕ ∧ ψ)Gd2 =d f ϕGd2 ∆ψGd2 (ϕ ∨ ψ)Gd2 =d f −(−ϕGd2 ∆ − ψGd2 ) (ϕ → ψ)Gd2 =d f −(ϕGd2 ∆ − ψGd2 ). of the converse of the previous result. we have that if HA ` ϕ. 3 “Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheo- rie": Gödel’s intuitionistic interpretation of the clas- sical propositional calculus and classical arithmetic In this also very well known paper Gödel defines a translation from the classical propositional calculus CPC into the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC.3. Glivenko (1929) had proved the following results. Theorem 2. The main results of Goodman’s paper is the proof.9: HA ` ϕ if. then – – ϕ is a theorem of IPC.1: If ϕ is a theorem of CPC. As the other classical connectives (∨. 14 (ϕ ⊃ ψ)Gm =d f (ϕGM → ψGm ) (∀xϕ)Gm =d f ∀xϕGm (∃xϕ)Gm =d f ∃xϕGm As EA is an extension of HA. – and ∆ being the corresponding intuitionistic ones. via cut-elimination. ↔) are definible from the ¬ and ∧. Theorem 3. and only if EA ` ϕGm . then EA ` ϕGm . →. He considers the negation ¬ and the conjunction ∧ as the classical primitive connectives. . Gödel distinguishes the classical and intuitionistic connective symbols. which is extended to a translation between classical and intu- itionistic arithmetic.

. Thus. for the natural numbers. xk ) is equivalent to x1 . in the sense that it preserves theoremhood. x2 . . built on the first-order classical predicate logic. . Based on this result. . . Gödel extends the function Gd2 . . . and only if. observing that such a result obtained for the connective calculus could not be extended to number theory. Gd2 : HA → H’ (xi )Gd2 =d f x0i ( fi )Gd2 =d f fi (functional symbols) (=)Gd2 =d f = (identity symbol of H’) (0)Gd2 =d f 1 (+1)Gd2 =d f S (successor) (∀xϕ)Gd2 =d f ∀x0 ϕGd2 . . with some additional conditions in order to make it the formal system HA. The interpretation of these new variables of H’ is given by: a formula of type ∀xϕ(x0 ) is equivalent to a formula ∀x(x ∈ N →H0 ϕ(x)) 0 0 and. . . then Gd2 (ϕ) is a theorem of IPC. then the corresponding formula (Gd2 (ϕ)) in IPC is a theorem of IPC. . – ϕ is a theorem of IPC. every formula that contains new variables is equivalent to a usual formula. Gödel assumes the Heyting (Heyting (1930a)) system and in- 0 0 troduces new variables x1 . . if in ϕ(x1 . Theorem 3. Gödel takes the semi-formal Herbrand arithmetic system (Herbrand (1931)). . .3: If ϕ is a theorem of CPC. . 15 Corollary 3. . .4: If ϕ is a theorem of CPC. xk ). . . Gödel explicitly mentions Glivenko’s Corollary. . xk occur free then ϕ(x1 .2: A formula ¬ϕ is a theorem of CPC if. Gödel shows that the function Gd2 is a “translation". As the corresponding intuitionistic arithmetic. Next. . . xk ) the variables x1 . . Aiming at extending these results to the classical arithmetic. Theorem 3. xk ∈ N →H0 ϕ(x1 . He uses it in the following version. built only with the connectives ¬ and ∧. introducing the system H’.

as a consequence. we have that H’ ` − − ϕGd2 →H0 ϕGd2 Lemma 3. differently of Gödel’s.6: If ϕGd2 and ψGd2 are H’-numerical formulas. then H’ ` (ϕGd2 →H0 ψGd2 ) ↔H0 −(ϕGd2 ∆ − ψGd2 ). then we can be sure that the classical arithmetic is also consistent.5: For every H’-numerical formula ϕGd2 . and thus acceptable from the intuitionistic point of view. In March 1933. The aim of Gentzen (1933) (see Gentzen (1936) and (1969)) is to show that “the applications of the law of double negation in proofs of classical arithmetic can in many instances be eliminated". Let us finally emphasize. in the sense given to this word by Herbrand (1930a and 1930b). He explicitly states that Theorem 3. It must be observed that Gentzen’s proof. is constructive. that Gödel was apparently not aware of Kolmogorov’s paper of 1925 and does not mention it in his paper. 16 The following results are then proved. but of notions introduced by impredicative definitions". then its translation ϕGd2 is deductible in H’. a proof of the consistency of classical elementary arithmetic with respect to intuitionistic arithmetic is obtained. If the classi- cal theories were contradictory.7: If the formula ϕ is deductible in the Herbrand extended system HA. then the intuitionistic ones would also be contradictory. It is interesting to observe that in Gödel’s text the expressions “ϕ is valid". Theorem 3. Ge(ϕ) is derivable in the classical predicate calculus. if we are sure that the intuitionistic arithmetic is consistent. . Hence. and only if. however. He introduces a “transformation" Ge from the language of CPL into IPC and proves that ϕ is derivable in the intuitionistic predicate calculus if. But Gödel explicitly calls our attention that its proof is not “finitary". “ϕ is deductible" and “ϕ is a theorem" are used indistinctly. Lemma 3. not of the principle of the excluded middle.7 gives a proof of the relative consistency of classical logic and arithmetic relative to the respective intuitionistic theories. these restrictions. with a simpler translation from CPC into IPC. following Hilbert. as mentioned in the Introduction. Gödel comments on his results: “Intuitionism appears to introduce gen- uine restrictions only for analysis and set theory. Gentzen published a rigorous and complete paper. are due to the rejection.

with the same sets of variables. and only if. . Kolmogorov (1925). . for every formula ϕ of S1 . such that t(µi (α1 . . Moreover. S1 ∪ Γ ` α if. (ii) For each connective µi in S1 of arity k there is a formula ϕi in S2 in the variables p1 . . such that. . for each variable p. . modal and clas- sical logic. logics are defined as algebras with consequence operators: a logic is a pair (A. . αk )) = ϕi (t(α1 ). Prawitz and Malmn̈as (1968) survey these historical papers and intro- duce the first general definition for the concept of translation between logic systems. for every set Γ ∪ {α} of formulas in S1 . . Coniglio and D’Ottaviano (2009)). For Wójcicki. t(p) = ϕ(p). for every α1 . and only if. Gödel (1933a. C) such that A is a formal language and C is a Tarskian con- sequence operator in the free algebra of formulas of A. t(αk )). . S2 ` t(α). Given two propo- sitional languages S1 and S2 . . several distinct terms having been used by them such as interpretation and transformation. 1933b) and Gentzen (1933) are not interested in the meaning of the concept of trans- lation between logics. S1 ` α if. S2 ∪ t(Γ) ` t(α). where t(Γ) = {t(β) : β ∈ Γ}. Wójcicki (1988) and Epstein (1990) can be considered as the first works envisioning a general systematic study on translations between logics. a mapping t from S1 into S2 is a translation if. . The system S1 is then said to be interpretable in S2 by t. Since their papers were writ- ten. . For these two authors. 17 4 Final Remarks: Gödel’s interpretations from the point of view of translations between logics In spite of dealing with interrelations among intuitionistic. D’Ottaviano and Feitosa (2007) and Carnielli. interpretations between logics have been used for different purposes (see Feitosa and D’Ottaviano (2001). . . pk . αk in S1 . a translation from a logic system S1 into a logic system S2 is a function t that maps the set of formulas of S1 into the set of formulas of S2 . . and only if: (i) There is a formula ϕ(p0 ) in S2 in one variable p0 such that. S1 is said to be interpretable in S2 by t with respect to derivability if. Glivenko (1929). . .

Finally. for any X ⊆ A.2: A translation from a logic A into a logic B is a mapping t : A → B such that. and a Tarskian consequence operator. Definition 4. C1 > is said to be translatable into C2 =< S2 . 18 A propositional calculus is defined as a pair C =< S. . where C is a consequence operator over the language S. and only if. D’Ottaviano and Sette (1999). in order “to single out what seems to be in fact the essential feature of a logical translation": logics are characterized as pairs constituted by an arbitrary set (without the usual requirement of dealing with formulas of a formal language). where the set A is the domain of A and C is a Tarskian consequence operator in A4 . t(CA (X)) ⊆ CB (t(X)). t(Γ)  t(α). propose a general definition for the concept of translation between logics. motivated by D’Ottaviano (1973)2 and Hoppmann (1973)3 and explicitly interested in the study of inter- relations between logic systems in general. in semantical terms.1: A logic A is a pair < A. a logic is basically a pair formed by a set of entities called formulas and a consequence relation. C2 > if there is a mapping t from S1 into S2 . Da Silva. Γ  α if. The usual concepts and known results on closure spaces are here as- sumed. C >. Epstein (1990) defines a translation of a propositional logic L into a propositional logic M. that is. as a map t from the language of L into the language of M such that L. and only if M. C1 =< S1 . C >. The general definition of translation between logics is then pro- posed. α ∈ C1 (X) if. for every set Γ ∪ {α} of formulas. t(α) ∈ C2 (t(X)). Definition 4. 4 It is not hard to see that a logic could be defined along the lines of universal logic. translations between logics are then defined as maps preserving consequence relations. as for instance in Béziau (1994). such that for all X ⊆ S1 and all α ∈ S1 . without assuming any properties. 2 In this paper variants of Tarskian closure operators characterized by interpretations are studied. 3 This is apparently the first paper in the literature where the term “translation between general logic systems" is used to mean a function preserving derivability.

1999b. C >. 2000.3: A logical system or deductive system defined over L is a pair L =< L. Coniglio (2007) proposes a different approach to translations by means of meta-translations. A conservative translation from A into B is a function t : A → B such that.2. it is possible to consider logics defined over formal languages. and only if. D’Ottaviano and Sette (1999). in terms of consequence relations. An initial treatment of a theory of translations between logics is pre- sented in da Silva. 2007) and Feitosa and D’Ottaviano (2001). t(x) ∈ CB (t(X)). Definition 4. Coniglio and D’Ottaviano present a simplified version of the definitions given in Coniglio (2007). and only if. Naturally. and that . and Feitosa (1997). Contextual translations are mappings between lan- guages preserving certain meta-properties of the source logics. 19 Of course. 2006. Carnielli. D’Ottaviano and Feitosa (1999a.4: Let A and B be logics. for every Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ Form(L1 ): Γ `C1 α if. Definition 4. Definition 4. for every set X ∪ {x} ⊆ A. An important subclass of translations. is investi- gated by Feitosa (1997). called contextual translations by Carnielli. respectively. If A and B are logics with associated consequence relations `CA and `CB . The authors present examples showing that contextual translations and conservative translations are essentially independent concepts. the conservative translations. t(Γ) `C2 t(α).3 can be presented in terms of consequence rela- tions. t : Form(L1 ) → Form(L2 ) is a conservative translation when. x ∈ CA (X) if. where L is a formal language and C is a structural consequence operator in the free algebra Form(L) of the formulas of L. A contextual translation is a translation in the sense of Definition 4. acting as a kind of sequent calculus whose rules govern the consequence relation of the logic. that are defined in a formal first-order meta-language. Coniglio and D’Ottaviano (2009). and only if. Note that. obtain some related results and analyse several examples. then a function t : A → B is a translation if. for every Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ Form(A): Γ `CA α implies t(Γ) `CB t(α).

They do not preserve derivability. even on the propo- sitional level. the identity function i : IPL → CPL. such as the identity map from intuitionistic into classical logic and the forgetful map from modal logic into classical logic: such cases would be ruled out if the stricter notion of conservative translation (or the general notions of Wójcicki and Epstein) or of contextual translation were imposed. . ∧. Epstein’s translations (Epstein (1990)) are instances of conser- vative translations. is a translation. even at the propo- sitional level. If Gd2 were a translation. are also introduced and dis- cussed. Gödel’s interpretations Gd1 : IPL → S4 and Gd2 : CPL → IPL are translations only in Prawitz’s sense. discussed earlier in this paper. nor with translations in the sense of Definition 4. for they preserve only theoremhood. Such translations are also examples of contextual translations. is a contextual translation. while i(p ∨ ¬p) = (p ∨ ¬p) ∈ CCPL (φ). and not derivability. →. In can be seen that the interpretations of Kolmogorov (1925). but is not a conservative translation: it suffices to observe that p ∨ ¬p < CIPC (φ). Translations in the sense of Prawitz and Malmnäs (1968) do not coin- cide with conservative translations. accommodates certain maps that seem to be intuitive examples of translations. conservative and contextual. it is not a translation. In the case of the Gödel function Gd2 : CPC → IPC. The general notion of translation (Definition 4. as ¬¬p `CPC p. Glivenko (1929) and Gentzen (1933) are translations in the sense of Prawitz and Malm- mäs. Athough Gödel’s papers of 1933 and their meaningful extensions by others. then − − p `IPC p. Translations in Wójcicki’s (1988) sense are particular cases of conservative translations.4 (see Feitosa and D’Ottaviano (2001)). are important and relevant. Wójcicki and Epstein. both logics considered in the connectives ¬. But paradigmatic examples of both kinds of translations. In particular. and are conservative translations according to Definition 4. and hence are not translations in the sense of our Definition 4. that encompasses the notions of conservative translation and contextual translation.2.2. ∨. D’Ottaviano and Sette (1999).2) introduced by da Silva. 20 neither of them entails the other.

the interest of his result in “Eine Interpretation des intuition- istischen Aussagenkalküls" is that it gave for the intuitionistic propositional calculus an interpretation that is also meaningful from a non-intuitionistic point of view. Although being not a translation. by the Deduction Theorem of IPC. Gd1 : IPL → S4 . pages 6-7). D’Ottaviano and Sette (1999): it suffices to consider that p. Gödel’s axiomatization of S4 was new and led to a much simpler axiomatization of systems of modal logics (see Lemmon 1977. in the sense of da Silva. Gödel’s inter- pretation was not apparently expectable from Brouwer’s conceptions and from Heyting’s interpretation of intuitionistic logic. . once the semantics for QS4 had been formulated. Since S4 is a system based on classical logic. p → q 0G/S4 q. D’Ottaviano and Sette. in the sense of Wojcicki (1988). Aside from this. the discussion of Gödel’s system G is also “really a topic in the history of Gödel’s second incomplete- ness theorem". Gödel’s interpretation showed how to obtain a semantics for IQC. we should have `IPC ¬¬p → p. 297). da Silva. what is very well known not to be a theorem of IPC5 . following Kolmogorov (1925) and Glivenko (1929). Gödel’s papers of 1933. Gödel’s interpretation of “Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aus- sagenkalküls". Gödel’s result was “instrumental" in the development of Kripke’s semantis for intuitionistic logic. p ⊃ q `IPC q and p. Furthermore. p. play a very important role in the study of inter-relation between logical systems through the analysis of interpretations (translations) between them. The two papers here discussed may be considered among the Gödel’s many relevant contributions to the history of logic in the 20th Century. According to Troelstra (Gödel (1986). and hence in the comparative strength and extensibility of a logic with respect to another. For Gödel. also is not a translation. According to the Introduction to Kripke (1965). 5 We could present another simple proof using the algebraic structures associated to the corresponding logics. Epstein (1995). 21 Hence.

pp.. State University of Campinas. J. KREISER.A. 1199-1201.. I. 497-548. I. (1979a) Solovay’s completeness theorems. Manuscrito . Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. In: Caicedo.L. pp. G. D’OTTAVIANO. CARNIELLI.E.. 3. D’OTTAVIANO. vol. J. CHUAQUI. W. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.M. (1994) Recherches sur la logique universelle (Excessivité. D’OTTAVIANO. Hewlett. (1930) Zur Logik der Modelitäten. in Portuguese.Revista Internacional de Filosofia. (1983) Review of Kurt Gödel: Obras completas. C. BOOLOS. DAVIS. . H. vol. Basic papers on undecidable propo- sitions. A. In: The unprovability of consistency: an essay in modal logic. 48. Montenegro. (2007) Recovering a logic from its fragments by meta- fibring. Master Dissertation.H. da SILVA. 203. In: The unprov- ability of consistency: an essay in modal logic. Ph. XXII(2). Paris 7. (1973) Fechos caracterizados por interpretações (Closures characterized by interpretations). Logica Universalis. 117-132. 159-167.M. vol.D Thesis. 151-158. Logica Universalis. New York: Marcel Dekker. 1(2). K. (1979b) An S4 -preserving proof-theoretical treatment of modal- ity.J. M. BÉZIAU.E. (1971) Logik-Texte. BERKA. 11. D’OTTAVIANO. pp.L. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. CONIGLIO. pp.L. X.A...L. M. G. 22 References BECKER.M. 377-416.. New York: Raven Press.M. SETTE. (1999) Translations between logics. Lectures Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics. vol.-Y. unsolvable problems and computable functions. IMECC. I.) Models. FEITOSA. (eds. O. pp. R. Algebras and Proofs. BOOLOS. (2009) New dimensions on translations between logics. Négation. 435-448. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. 1-18. I. Kommentierte Auswahl zur Geschichte der modernen Logik. pp. (1965) The Undecidable. pp. CONIGLIO. Séquents).. M.M. L. pp. (1999a) Conservative translations and model-theoretic translations.

FEITOSA. GENTZEN.. (1969) On the relation between intuitionist and classical arithmetic (1933). FEITOSA. (1999b) Many-valued logics and translations. pp. IFCH. 125.L. D’OTTAVIANO.. Translation into English in Gentzen (1969. 121-140. In: Szabo.). II. 15.L. Volume 1: Propositional logics. pp. 91. in Portuguese. Szabo.03. (eds. (2001) Conservative translations. H. Matematische Zeitschrifft 39(3). G.L. FEITOSA.L.A.A. Bulletin de la Classe de Sciences. but not published (eigegangen am 15. D’OTTAVIANO. (1990) The semantic foundations of logic. M.D. 77-95. 9(1). Monza: Polimetrica Interna- tional Scientific Publisher. J.M. pp.A.M. (eds.E. M. 108(1-3). GENTZEN. (1933) Über das Verhältnis zwischen intuitionistischen und klassischen Arithmetik. Pietrusczak. (ed. I. Brouwer. H. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics. 493-565.M. I. I. (1936) Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinem Zahlentheorie. (2000) Paraconsistent logics and translations. (1935) Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen. 405-431. (ed. 112. EPSTEIN. I. A. Synthèse. pp. Thesis.). (1997) Traduções conservativas (Conservative transla- tions).E.1933). V. pp. Ph. Académie Royale de Belgique.M. D’OTTAVIANO. 205-227. pp. State University of Camp- inas... GENTZEN. 23 D’OTTAVIANO. Mathematische Annalen. vol. R.A.A.L. G. H.L. Amsterdam: North-Holland..M. J.. A. D’OTTAVIANO. pp. H. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic. vol. pp. In: Béziau. Manuscript set in type by Mathematische An- nalen. (2006) Translations from Luka- siewicz logics into classical logic: is it possible? In: Malinowski. FEITOSA. (2007) Deductive systems and translations. pp. 53-67. 125-157.)). . (1929) Sur quelques points de la logique de M.) Essays in logic and ontology.) The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen. Dordrecht. vol. G.-Y. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Costa-Leite (Org. G.. 157-168. H. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. vol. FEITOSA. Perspec- tives on universal logic. GENTZEN. H. I. 183-188. GLIVENKO. FEITOSA.A.

Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums. K.W. HACKING.. Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums. vol. pp. 51-71. vol. (1978) Arithmetical necessity. 282-285. et. vol. G. 223-231. vol. 4. Volume I: Publications 1929-1936 (Ed. vol. van Heijenoort). (1931) Sur la non-contradiction de l’arithmétique. HERBRAND. vol.. pp.) Collected Works. pp. provability and intuition- istic logic. 243-255. Moore. (1986) On intuitionistic arithmetic and number theory (1933e). 49. A. In: Feferman. A. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Solovay y J. Dawson. (1984) Epistemic arithmetic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic arithmetic. GOLDBLATT. 44. 28. R. Journal für die Reine und Angewandte Mathematik. v. 39-40. Oxford: Oxford University Press. K. Theoria. (1930a) Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik. Feferman. GÖDEL. GRZEGORCZYK. pp. Kleene. 36-38. (1933b) Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagen- kalküls. pp. HERBRAND. 34-38. (eds. R. S. 166. (Partial translation into English in van Heijenoort (1967. pp. (1986) An interpretation of the intuitionistic propositional cal- culus (1933f). . 1-8. 525-581)). Fundamenta Mathematicae. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Physika- lisch-Mathematische Klasse II. et. GÖDEL. PhD Thesis. J. al. 42-56.) Collected Works. vol. pp. presented to the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Paris. S. pp. K. pp. N. K. J. In: Feferman. HEYTING. (1967) Some relational systems and the associated topological spaces.D. pp. HERBRAND. 1. K. vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. al. (1963) What is strict implication? The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 192-203. J. (1933a) Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und Zahlentheorie. pp. (1930b) Les bases de la logique hilbertienne. pp. J. 1. 24 GÖDEL. vol. S. S. (eds. Jr. (1930a) Recherches sur la théorie de la démonstration. 300-303. GÖDEL. Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. I. 37.. GOODMAN. 4. (1986) Collected Works. GÖDEL. 60.

3.G.) (1969) The philosophy of mathematics.) From Frege to Gödel: a source book in Math- ematical Logic 1879-1931. Mam. Nagoya Mathematical Journal. J. Compositio Mathematicae. A.N. and Dummett.N. C. J. J. McKINSEY.H. (1932) Symbolic Logic. 4. 4. SCOTT. E. 88.A. pp. pp. 105-110.J.). 92-1130. pp. In: Heijenoort. In: Cross- ley. A. Massachussets: Harvard University Press. I. (Ed. Mathema- tische Annalen. cb.C. LANGFORD. 1-15. pp. KOLMOGOROV.A. A. (1923) Die logischen Grundlagen der Mathematik. vol.N. C.. (1930b) Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Math- ematik. Rio Claro. S. vol. pp. n. New York (Reprinted in 1959). A. 13. 151-165. 1. In Russian (Translation into English in van Heijennort (1967. pp. (1973) Fecho e imersão (Closure and embedding). SP. in (1989)) . (1965) Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic. (1948) Some theorems about the sentential calculi of Lewis and Heyting. pp. ein reduzierter intuitionistischer Formalismus. A. in Portuguese. D. MOSTERÍN. MAEHARA. (ed. LEMMON. pp. J..) Kurt Gödel: Obras Completas.. HILBERT. LEWIS. KOLMOGOROV. D. (2006) (ed. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Madrid: Alianza Editorial (1st Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Ed. in (1981). HOPPMANN. Cambridge. Thesis. S. HINTIKKA. (1977) An introduction to modal logic. JOHANSSON (1936) Der Minimalkalkül. São Paulo State University. vol. J. pp. Ph.D. 414-437. 646-667.. vol. 2d Ed. (1925) O printsipe tertium non datur. Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.E. (1954) Eine Darstellung der intuitionistischen Logik in der klassischen. vol. Physikalisch-Mathematische Klasse II. 57-71. (1977) On the principle of excluded middle (1925). TARSKI. KRIPKE. 32. 119-136. n. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.I. M.C. 416-437)). FFCL. Formal systems and recursive functions. 25 HEYTING.

P. PRAWITZ. WÓJCICKI. pp.T. 1879-1931. (1976) Provability interpretations of modal logic. MALMNÄS. (1953) Algebraic treatment of the notion of satisfiability. Massachussetts: Har- vard University Press (corrected 3d edition in 1977). et. K. H. 215-229. 15-16. Cambridge. vol. R. SIKORSKI.. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.). Amsterdam: North-Holland. SCHÜTTE. (1968) A survey of some connections between classical.M. (1933) Zum Lewisschen Aussagenkalkül. W. In: Schmidt. pp. pp. 40. al. . Israel Journal of Mathematics. SOLOVAY. 62-95. 4. (eds. VAN HEIJENOORT.. A source book in Mathematical Logic. (1968) Vollständige Systeme modeler und intuitionisticher Logik.E. v. 25. 287-304. R. Dordrecht: Kluwer (Synthese Library. J. D.) Contributions to Mathematical Logic. 199). Fundamenta Mathematicae. intuitionistic and minimal logic. vol. 26 PARRY. (1988) Theory of logical calculi: basic theory of conse- quence operations. Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums. vol. pp.. (1967) (ed. RASIOWA. From Frege to Gödel. H. R.