You are on page 1of 10

Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online

Chapter Title Military Governance and Trends
Copyright Year 2018
Copyright Holder Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
Corresponding Author Family Name Giancotti
Particle
Given Name Fernando
Suffix
Organization/University Italian Air Force, Air Force
Headquarter
City Rome
Country Italy
Email fernando.giancotti@aeronautica.
difesa.it
Email giancottif@gmail.com
Author Family Name Renault
Particle
Given Name Anita
Suffix
Organization/University University of Rome Tor Vergata
City Rome
Country Italy
Organization/University Pictet Asset Management,
International Trade and Development
City Paris
Country France AU1

Email anita.renault@gmail.com
1
M

2 Military Governance and and institutions”, formal and/or informal, vertical 24

3 Trends and horizontal, meant also at resolving conflicts. 25

4 Fernando Giancotti1 and Anita Renault2,3
1
5 Italian Air Force, Air Force Headquarter, Introduction 26

6 Rome, Italy
2
7 University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy To define the fundamentals of military gover- 27
3
8 Pictet Asset Management, International Trade nance and its actual trends today, it is necessary 28

AU1 9 and Development, Paris, France to frame the military dimension of governance. 29

Frequent exertion of violence among humans, 30

documented in proximity of the Neolithic Era 31

10 Synonyms and thereafter, shows “organized lethal aggres- 32

sion” as a distinctive feature. The level of effec- 33

11 Collective action; Decision-making; Effective- tiveness, lethality, and organization of this 34

12 ness of military organizations; Leadership inter- violence has varied greatly through the millennia 35

13 action; Military governance; Social norm and and within different contexts and historical 36

14 institutions periods. The so-called traditional or prehistoric 37

warfare was largely at the band and tribal level, 38

with little hierarchical organization and coordi- 39

nated TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- 40
15 Definition
dures). With the rise of “chefferies,” starting 41

about 11,000 years ago, more complex and strat- 42 AU2
16 Military governance can be considered as the
ified social systems with specialization of func- 43
17 application to the military field of the broader
tions in the social body and division of labor, a 44
18 concept of governance, i.e., according to Hufty’s
proper warrior caste emerged and therefore a bet- 45
19 Governance Analytical Framework, a social phe-
ter organized and led combat force. But only states 46
20 nomenon, “namely the processes of interaction
have then produced proper armies, with a profes- 47
21 and decision-making among the actors involved
sional officer corps, more or less established 48
22 in a collective problem that lead to the creation,
TTPs, and a military bureaucracy to take care of 49
23 reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms
support functions, from about 5400 years ago. 50

Throughout this spectrum, military governance 51
Gen. Giancotti has worked mainly on the conceptual
framework, while Ms. Renault has focused on the had to bring to bear on its “collective problem,” 52

historical research. i.e., being able to effectively exert violence for 53

# Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018
A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3309-1
2 Military Governance and Trends

54 scopes involving very high stakes, both a aspects are “Decision-Making” and “Leadership 101

55 decision-making function and an effective inter- Interaction: Fear or/and Trust.” Of course, also 102

56 action among combatants, also through social quality and effectiveness of the “social norm and 103

57 norms and institutions. institutions” produced by the decision-making 104

58 Very specific of the military function is the process and the collective action are relevant, but 105

59 criticality of the mentioned stakes. In fact, the as a second order of these primary factors. It must 106

60 military is normally a last resort choice to promote be clear that the abovementioned oversimplified 107

61 or protect very critical interests, and once a con- classification is meant only to make a general 108

62 flict has started, the ultimate ones, like life or point about military governance, considering 109

63 death or great sufferance of the people and the some examples, and it is by no means scientifi- 110

64 most gruesome destruction of infrastructure and cally based. 111

65 wealth. Furthermore, the military people, formal
66 and informal, usually the main actors of any vio-
67 lent conflict, accept “by contract” the risk of los-
A Few Hints on Decision-Making and 112 AU3
68 ing their lives and of being exposed to the utmost
Leadership Interaction Throughout 113
69 sufferance.
History 114
70 Thus, the prize put on an effective military
71 governance is extremely high or at least is very
Assyro-Babylonian Empire 115
72 likely to become so in case of actual conflict.
73 Consequently, the need to establish mechanisms
Decision-Making 116
74 such to promote good decision-making and coop-
Recent archival papers have showed that Assyrian 117
75 eration among people rather than defection in
kings were often helped by military and other 118
76 front of the highest danger is crucial. The
kinds of elites. Though in a vertical relation, 119
77 decision-making question is related to the skill
these circles have supported the kings in the pro- 120
78 and knowledge of the military leaders and to the
cess of establishment and operations of the Assyr- 121
79 general leadership dilemma of how much a leader
ian empire. The kings appointed governors and 122
80 should allow and listen to the contribution of
officials on which they could blindly rely on. Even 123
81 collaborators. The cooperation issue instead can
though the relationship between them and the 124
82 be considered a special case of the general conun-
kings stayed always very formal and never over- 125
83 drum of leadership and the effectiveness of the
passed the bureaucratic level, officials could 126
84 collective action, i.e., how to promote cohesion
approach the kings without bodyguards, which 127
85 and convergence on a collective interest (the mil-
was a concrete sign of trust. 128
86 itary objective) rather than defection toward indi-
87 vidual ones, like, e.g., survival of individuals
88 fleeing the fight. Both questions show through Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust 129

89 history a range of solutions that go from a Many archives have showed that the kings led 130

90 combination of the most autocratic and vertical their armies in war. Both Sargon II and Tiglath- 131

91 decision-making with regular exertion of violence pileser III are remembered today as having been 132

92 to maintain discipline and a compliance based on very active and close to their men during war 133

93 fear to very contributive decision-making and a campaigns. It is even believed that the King 134

94 cohesion based on strong consensus. Just to give a Sargon III has lost his life while fighting alongside 135

95 very general idea of how these issues have been his army. Kings were thus very respected by the 136

96 dealt with through time, it can be helpful to give a armed forces which showed clear willingness to 137

97 cursory look at some hints thereof taken from dedicate their energy and life in serving them. 138

98 military history, to enable focusing on nowadays Nonetheless, according to the culture of the 139

99 trends, evolving to face the continuously emerg- times, punishments were harsh and fear was also 140

100 ing new challenges. The two key highlighted a relevant factor in maintaining discipline. 141
Military Governance and Trends 3

142 Ancient China hierarchy and expected to take key decisions in 185

143 The Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu, concert with trusted generals of noble rank. 186

144 in his famous masterpiece “The Art of War,”
145 accounts both for decision-making and leadership Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust 187

146 on troops. The centrality of the phalanx in Greek battles 188

reinforced this idea of mutual support and cohe- 189

147 Decision-Making sion while requiring trust in a leader who could 190

148 Military leaders make decisions which regularly rarely be present in the main battle line. This 191

149 involve high risks and uncertainty, balancing patriotic and cohesive core is celebrated by the 192

150 wisdom and strategic planning to de-risk a battle. willingness of Leonidas’ men to stand with him at 193

151 Reference to officers does not highlight collabo- Thermopylae. For Sparta as much as Athens, this 194

152 rative decision-making. was to a degree the result of the soldiers being 195

representatives and members of the state (through 196

position and degree of personal property). Though 197
153 Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust by Alexander’s time this concept had lost much of 198
154 Generating a personal relation with his com- its relevance, the achievements of Greece in the 199
155 manders and troops and showing benevolence Persian wars became an ideal of comradeship and 200
156 and love for them is a tenet of Sun Tzu leadership. collective action that subsequent Greek armies 201
157 The effective leader should encourage his troops were supposed to emulate. The wider bonds of 202
158 and always remind them for whom they are fight- morale and collective effort were thus key ele- 203
159 ing for: the people. According to Sun Tzu, the ments of Greek military culture. 204
160 valor of the leader should always be reminded to
161 inspire the army and boost the spirits. The Chinese Roman Army 205
162 general’s opinion is that if the leader succeeds in
163 treating his people with justice and sending strong Decision-Making 206
164 signs of confidence, the army will answer by Command of the Republican legions was 207
165 demonstrating willingness to serve him and the assigned to consuls, drawn largely from the top 208
166 country. In Sun Tzu’s words, when a general treats of society, reflecting the political landscape. The 209
167 his army as sons, men will follow him “into the army was supposedly loyal to the Republic, an 210
168 deepest valley.” Notwithstanding that, also in idea reinforced by the property-owning, largely 211
169 China at the time, punishments were harsh and unpaid position of most soldiers. Command was 212
170 fear was also a relevant factor in maintaining issued and enacted through a formal hierarchy of 213
171 discipline. staff officers and formation commanders (tribunes 214

and legates). Depending upon the commander in 215

172 Ancient Greece question, this could be a relatively open and hor- 216

izontal process or highly authoritarian. Caesar’s 217

173 Decision-Making accounts in “De bello gallico” highlight an open 218

174 As with many ancient societies, the early ancient discussion among the commander-in-chief and 219

175 Greek military structure was very similar to that of the subordinate commanders to enhance 220

176 the society and wider political power. Significant decision-making. One of the key roles that was 221

177 to this respect is the election of (aristocratic) devolved to staffs was a complex and efficient 222

178 Athenian generals by the soldiers at Marathon; logistical systems that enabled Roman com- 223

179 in this ancient epoch, the core of the army was manders to campaign longer and more effectively 224

180 composed of middle-class, property-owning than their opponents. This effective management 225

181 hoplites that reflected this less autocratic arrange- of supply and reinforcement required effective 226

182 ment through their selection of commanders in use of subordinates with independent authority. 227

183 whom they placed most trust. Later also, aristo- Despite claims by Caesar and accounts of 228

184 crats were assigned to highest rank of the military the young Pompey, commanders were rarely 229
4 Military Governance and Trends

230 expected to take directly part in battles but rather and effective bond between soldiers, their imme- 277

231 to command their subordinates and the timing of diate officers, and their general, but as it grew 278

232 reinforcement. At the lower level, the centurions stronger, it was to cause continued damage 279

233 were supposed to take the commander’s orders through ongoing civil wars and ultimately played 280

234 and adapt them where necessary and within limits, a strong part in the disintegration of the Republic 281

235 to address the difficulties of command and control and subsequently the empire. Military governance 282

236 in battles of 50,000 troops on each side. However, had then direct impact on major geopolitical 283

237 it is generally believed to have been a looser form turnovers. 284

238 of command and control than that of the Greek
239 armies and therefore more effective under many Medieval Chivalry 285

240 circumstances.
241 Under the empire, command at an opera- Decision-Making 286

242 tional level remained roughly the same, but army Authority to command was founded on the idea of 287

243 commanders surrendered strategic freedom to the the king as the rightful ruler of society: in this 288

244 ruling princeps to whom they and their men swore sense it was extremely hierarchical but, in reality, 289

245 direct loyalty. This semi-medieval arrangement may have been more flexible as capable lower- 290

246 became stronger in the later empire, with the ranking commanders exercised authority under 291

247 emperor himself often taking the field in order to actual battlefield conditions. However, as feudally 292

248 ensure loyalty of the army and its generals. raised armies often had greater loyalty to an 293

immediate lord or commander rather than the 294

249 Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust senior noble or king, the debate and planning 295

250 The Roman army was famous for its strict process had to offer a degree of inclusivity to 296

251 discipline, but that was accepted by the soldiers powerful nobles in order to retain their loyalty, 297

252 as necessary to a degree. It is an early and both at an operational and tactical level. By con- 298

253 well-documented case of widespread small unit trast the lower-ranking lords, their professional 299

254 motivation, with squads (contubernio) bunking knights, and cavalry/archer and their levies had 300

255 and fighting together and the 80-man century little input but were expected simply to fight as 301

256 organized under their own standards. Personal they were told. 302

257 bravery and aggressiveness, formally and publicly
258 rewarded by army commanders with medals and Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust 303

259 promotions, were a key driving force behind its Medieval command was based strongly on 304

260 success, along with continuous training. The high the personal charisma and strength of the com- 305

261 casualty rates of centurions – who lead from the mander, either king or nobleman, as well as his 306

262 front – speak to this emphasis on bravery and ability to generate military power, very much 307

263 leadership. A key element of this, whoever – and together with his ability to pay and support his 308

264 to some degree reflective of the Athenian soldiers. Command traditionally rested on the 309

265 phalanx – was the concept of state citizenship; personal authority and seniority – essentially his 310

266 the soldiers were active members of the state, reputation – as well as strength of the forces that 311

267 and though their democratic ideal declined, they he brought to the table. 312

268 thought of themselves as representative of the Most medieval campaigns were relatively lim- 313

269 Roman state at war, their future tied to its success ited in scope (the Crusades being a notable excep- 314

270 and failure. This was though balanced by personal tion in strategic movement, if not in the style of 315

271 loyalty to legion and army commanders who – command). Armies fought in general under their 316

272 through the spoils of their campaigns and their local commanders, though the further up the 317

273 ability to guarantee generous retirement packages social scale, the more professional the combatant 318

274 for their soldiers – melded their forces into what and hence likely greater willingness to serve. Pay 319

275 became effectively personal war-bands. This pri- through spoils of war was an important motivating 320

276 macy of loyalty to the commander proved a strong factor, but loyalty to a lord or house, defense of 321
Military Governance and Trends 5

322 one’s land, and some belief in the righteousness of strategy and operations together with responsibil- 367

323 a cause were all contributory factors. Even though ity of junior commanders to develop or exceed 368

324 it is not easy to determine to which extent the orders (the modern example of mission-oriented 369

325 soldiers felt themselves part of their kingdom, it command) was both a key component of effective 370

326 is reasonable a degree of identification, even if not leadership. Establishment of a staff, a war acad- 371

327 quite the same as Republican or city-state soldier emy, manuals for officer, and consideration of 372

328 in the previous millennium. technical improvements (weapons, transport) 373

329 As with the Roman legions, although lacking were part of a wider open-minded appreciation 374

330 their sophistication, leadership and bravery were of how to maximize Prussian military advantages. 375

331 key and nobles were expected to fight in the front Producing and sharing knowledge through a staff 376

332 lines. Furthermore, the strength of loyalty – both for the sake of better decision-making was even- 377

333 for mercenary and political reasons – should not tually a Prussian invention. 378

334 be underestimated: medieval battles often lasted
335 the best part of a day and saw very heavy casual-
Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust 379
336 ties before one side retreated, sometimes retaining
The increasingly patriotic and nationalistic under- 380
337 good order and discipline.
pinnings of the Prussian nation and army, together 381

with concern over disadvantageous strategic situ- 382
338 The Prussian “Revolution in Military Affairs” ation, drove the formation of professional, offen- 383

sive doctrine promised on flexibility and 384
339 Decision-Making concentration of force against single enemies in 385
340 The Prussian Army’s influence in European mili- succession. Within the army, the message of the 386
341 tary affairs has varied between that of a leading nation in arms – as was the case in France – 387
342 power in the eighteenth century and to humiliating delivered both an expectation of performance 388
343 defeat against Napoleon and subsequent forma- and the opportunity for advancement. 389
344 tion of a new empire from the defeat of his great The focus on junior leader responsibility, com- 390
345 nephew in 1870. The strong investment in the bined with effective generation of the army as a 391
346 buildup of a truly professional military under national concept, forged close relationships 392
347 Frederick Wilhelm the First, the soldier-king, among lower levels of the army. Emphasis on 393
348 sets the stage for a true military power of the collaboration across ranks and units together 394
349 eighteenth century. A strong identification of the with the military self-identification as the van- 395
350 military with the kingdom (“an army with a coun- guard of the nation created a strong concept of 396
351 try”) reinforced this practice, though governance both citizen and professional soldiers. Emphasis 397
352 remained largely traditional and based on the on esprit de corps and aggressive action had gen- 398
353 person of the king. The aristocracy, largely erated a positive feedback loop from successes in 399
354 outpowered due to the absolutistic monarchy, the second half of the nineteenth century, com- 400
355 was channeled and given high status in the mili- bined with extremely effective governance and 401
356 tarized state system. Senior officers remained of supply of units on campaign. Indeed, these were 402
357 traditional backgrounds and were too be obeyed many of the strengths that had allowed Napoleon 403
358 based on the faith that the kings showed by their victory in 1806. Exceeding Bonaparte’s armies, 404
359 appointment. Famous is the picture “War council the Prussian force of late nineteenth century had 405
360 of Friedrich the Great,” the mythic general, states- professional command, logistics, signals, and 406
361 man, and king, depicting him listening to his weapons together with a strong sense of vertical 407
362 general proposing a battle plan. The defeat by and horizontal relationships among units and 408
363 larger and faster moving Napoleon armies drove arms. This combination of the moral with the 409 AU4
364 thinking about combined arms efforts and profes- physical and the technical factors was to prove 410
365 sional instruction for a broadened conscript army an extremely strong entity. 411
366 and wider officer corps. Emphasis on flexibility of
6 Military Governance and Trends

412 Napoleon’s Revolution in Military Affairs unimportant, was not perceived as a barrier to 459

advancement while the opportunity to be recog- 460

413 Decision-Making nized in front of one comrades was a key element 461

414 The experience of the French and their opponents of the armies’ aggressive appetite and resilience. 462

415 from 1789 to 1815 represents an important mili- A well-established structure of command allowed 463

416 tary evolution on many levels. Command was flexible organization at lower levels as well as 464

417 essentially hierarchical, relying on competence depth of control should individuals be injured. 465

418 and charisma to motivate and guide forces but As with the Caesarian legions, discipline was 466

419 with a degree of debate and collective decision- also relatively fierce, providing the stick alongside 467

420 making. Though much was later made of the the carrot of rewards. 468

421 levée en masse and new commanders with revo- Over time and despite the nominal flexibility 469

422 lutionary zeal, the management of the early and opportunity offered, the Imperial Armies 470

423 French Revolutionary armies depended signifi- became increasingly hierarchical, though they 471

424 cantly on the existing infrastructure and training managed to retain their offensive spirit and confi- 472

425 of the royal army of Louis XVI. As the old com- dence owing to the personal loyalty shown by 473

426 manders and structures died through attrition, the middle- and lower-level commanders to their 474

427 Republican and Napoleonic armies became more corps or army chiefs and ultimately to Napoleon 475

428 meritocratic (often by necessity) as junior, capable himself. As long as the regime met with success, 476

429 commanders – including Bonaparte himself – this was sustainable, but as defeats mounted, the 477

430 imposed their more agile vision of military affairs. reliability of army commanders – his marshals – 478

431 Napoleon’s famous victories in his early and their subordinate armies began to decline. 479

432 years were a balance of his personal authority Nevertheless, the freedom of corps commanders 480

433 and capability combined with that of subordi- and the collective input under Napoleon’s unas- 481

434 nates. A degree of council on decisions and the sailable position continued to be the main feature 482

435 articulation of objectives combined with freedom of control, even if Ney and Grouchy’s actions at 483

436 to – and expectation of – exercise judgment at Waterloo showed the limits of allowing subordi- 484

437 lower levels to take advantage of developing sit- nates to operate with minimal oversight. 485

438 uations. This challenged the more prosaic com-
439 mand structure of his opponents, emphasizing and
440 rewarding personal leadership and results over Industrial Age Militaries: World Wars 486

441 adherence to established practices. and the Cold War 487

442 Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust Even a very simple scheme as ours would require 488

443 The French Republic was perhaps the first entity a large book by its own to map the last century of 489

444 since antiquity that managed to generate a com- military governance. We try to capture some gen- 490

445 mon principle of citizenship and shared responsi- eral ideas from the governance and leadership 491

446 bility. This tilted heavily the trust/fear relationship dynamics of the period, to confront with our pre- 492

447 toward the first term. Furthermore, Napoleon’s vious discussion. The Industrial Revolution pro- 493

448 policies offered prospects and promotion lacking duced armies by far larger than any other time, 494

449 in other armies to those prepared to take risks and through the related demographic explosion, and 495

450 forge relationships with their units, motivating equipped with the deadliest killing technology 496

451 their forces to succeed. The Legion of Honor ever seen on the planet. In the age of industrial 497

452 and rapid promotions exemplified the potential wars, the twentieth century, a Tayloristic approach 498

453 rewards of success, as did – initially at least – to the enormous production of violence and of its 499

454 the ostensible sharing of campaign hardships instruments aimed at enemy systems could maxi- 500

455 among officers and men. A focus on battlefield mize coercion of enemy’s will. A rather vertical 501

456 capability and the opportunity to be recognized decision-making for large masses of soldiers 502

457 and gain the rewards of service were key facets of together with production of huge amounts of 503

458 Napoleonic service. Social position, though not armaments to feed the fight have been decisive. 504
Military Governance and Trends 7

505 Centralized command and control, more or less combination thereof. These ranged from a very 551

506 open to contribution, could often leave men on the vertical, authoritarian stance, though coupled to 552

507 ground with no clue of the reason for their orders. strong charismatic leadership, deaf to contribu- 553

508 Discipline was harsh and court martial proceed- tions and conductive to disaster, like Hitler’s stra- 554

509 ings severe. Decision-making was supported by tegic conduct of World War II, to the Israel 555

510 varying degrees of commanders’ discussion in the Defense Force model of horizontal relations and 556

511 western democracies while being mainly vertical diffused leadership, formally loose but dense of 557

512 and authoritarian in Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s interactive exchanges within clear strategic direc- 558

513 Russia. The cohesion was tied to a nation-state tives. Identification with the institution (Rome, 559

514 ideal, until that survived the harshness of the the Republic of Venice, the country, etc.) or with 560

515 battlefield, and to peer-to-peer bond among sol- the leader has often been a pillar of motivation to 561

516 diers. War was generally seen through the lens of fight, as loyalty to one’s own fellow soldiers. Trust 562

517 the positivistic culture, as an organized, linear could be established between the leader and the 563

518 process where power factors were engineered to soldiers, within the units, and in both cases in the 564

519 coerce the enemy’s will. Actually, economic best circumstances. Fear of punishment has 565

520 power and industrial production were key in win- always been in varying degrees a contributor, 566

521 ning the war for the Allied Powers. But in sum, sometimes the main one, to collaboration versus 567

522 notwithstanding the enormous scale of the conflict defection. Social norms and institutions generally 568

523 and its incredible technological leaps, not much in followed the lines of the different governance 569

524 terms of decision-making process and leadership modes. Of course, we shall recall that their effec- 570

525 interaction had changed, at least for the main- tiveness depended largely on the context in which 571

526 stream war. They were linked to trust to identities they had to operate. 572

527 as the state, the nation, and some leaders, based on Nowadays, apart from the dormant nuclear 573

528 fear for harsh punishment in case of desertion, confrontation, conflicts seem to be much smaller 574

529 with a largerly vertical decision-making process. than the global deflagrations of last century but 575

530 Varying degrees of shared analysis at the top and much harder to understand and manage. The end 576

531 some tactical freedom from subordinate com- of the Cold War has opened a Pandora’s box of 577

532 manders were often allowed but also often not. tensions and conflicts, in which the industrial age 578

533 The MAD (mutual assured destruction) paradigm paradigms show very little effectiveness. What 579

534 of the Cold War added an absolute new and fright- has been called a VUCAR (volatile, uncertain, 580

535 ening paradigm change to confrontation, de facto complex, ambiguous, and rapidly changing) 581

536 quelling the potential for major conflicts. But even world has deeply changed the challenges that 582

537 there, no corresponding change arose in gover- militaries face and thus their governance needs. 583

538 nance concepts. Remarkable in a sense was the The new emerging trend for the nowadays effec- 584

539 extreme centralization and verticalization of the tive military governance is still inevitably based 585

540 Soviet military system, fully discovered after on satisfaction of the deep needs of humankind: 586

541 the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its operational social interaction, leadership, and values as 587

542 and tactical fragility is an icon of the inadequacy glue of the collective action. The appreciation of 588

543 of linear, disempowering governance systems those is today key for a mature adhesion to the 589

544 posed to confront the “fog and friction” of war. mission accomplishment. But also on an agile, 590

decentralized but strongly connected network of 591

people whose bond is trust, rather than fear. It is so 592

545 Drawing Conclusions: Trends in Military because of the key importance of the distributed 593

546 Governance Today ability to contribute with information and ideas to 594

the decision-making process and the capacity 595

547 Our very shallow look at some fundamental of individuals and teams to take the initiative 596

548 modes of military governance through history when their situation awareness so dictates or 597

549 has shown a wide variety of decision-making when centralized control fails. Those are trust- 598

550 and leadership interaction approaches and of based actions, apt to contribute enormously to 599
8 Military Governance and Trends

600 effectiveness in complex environments and resil- opportunities but also new challenges, since sys- 630

601 ience in any contested endeavor. The age-old tem thinking is still unusual among humans, 631

602 conundrum between trust and fear is thus defi- let alone among humans and machines. Opportu- 632

603 nitely gone to trust, just like the many different nity and challenge will be multiplied manyfolds in 633

604 combinations of authoritarian versus collabora- the next future, most likely well before we gener- 634

605 tive decision-making go definitely toward a coop- ally think, as artificial intelligence will explode as 635

606 erative mode. Collaborative doesn’t correspond to a diffused new tool, with mind-numbing implica- 636

607 the definition of democratic political process: mil- tions, among which its potential to utilize humans 637

608 itary officers are appointed and not elected and as tools for mission accomplishment. Thence will 638

609 bear personal responsibility for the decision taken military governance, as actually any governance 639

610 as a synthesis of the decision-making process. But at all, need to be thoroughly redefined once again. 640

AU5 611 the analithical phase thereof, collecting inputs
612 from rank-and-file, from operational actors of
613 any relevance, from collaborators and staffs,
Cross-References 641
614 must be highly cooperative and closely
615 networked. Nor does it mean that defection from
▶ Decision-Making 642
616 cooperation and values should stay unpunished.
▶ Group Interactions 643
617 Sanction stays as deterrence thereof and warrantor
▶ Influence 644
618 of fairness and justice in the system. But it is by no
▶ Leadership 645
619 means the main reference of the collective action.
▶ Military Governance 646
620 In this new world, leadership stays as the mainstay
621 of the operational effectiveness, but its focus
622 moves to trust and network. Leadership today
623 has also the great responsibility and the unusual References 647 AU6
624 task to bring together people and technology as
625 a system, since if we know that we will always Schadlow N (2017) War and the art of governance, con- 648
solidating combat success into political victory. 649
626 need the first, we cannot hope to do without the Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 650
627 second when networking and speed of informa- Vroom VH, Yetton PW (1973) Leadership and decision- 651
628 tion exchange are key to agile and effective making. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 652

629 answers in a VUCAR world. That implies great
Author Queries
Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance
Chapter No.: 3309-1

___________________________________________________________________
Query Refs. Details Required Author's response
AU1 Please be aware that your name and affiliation and if Add second organization for Fernando
applicable those of you co-author(s) will be published as Giancotti: University of Rome, Tor Vergata
presented in this proof. If you want to make any Remove Second organization « Pictet … »
for Anita Renault and correct with
changes, please correct the details now. Note that « OpenText Corporation, Enterprise
corrections after publication will no longer be possible. Information Management »
AU2 Occurrence of decimal dot has been changed to comma. I confirm: eleven thousand years (11,000)
Please check.
AU3 Please check if the section headings are assigned to Yes, they are
appropriate levels.
AU4 Please check if edit to sentence starting “This combina- Yes, it is okay
tion of. . .” is okay.
AU5 Please check if “analithical” should be changed to Yes, please do!
“analytical.”
AU6 Please cite all references in text. The papers on the « References » have been read for
more knowledge but no data has been taken from it

Note:
If you are using material from other works please make sure that you have obtained the necessary permission from
the copyright holders and that references to the original publications are included.