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CASE NO.

1 41 SCRA 702

TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


(GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under
and by virtue of resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act
6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of
article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the voting age to 18. Said
resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers
only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect
as laws in so far as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution.
Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to
be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
ISSUE:
Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional?
CASE NO. 2 63 PHIL 249 (1936)
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MANUEL V. MORAN
63 Phil 249 (1936)
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:

Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger was a duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at


Manila, Philippine Islands and was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected, citing that both
under the US and Philippine Constitution the CFI of Manila has no Jurisdiction to try him
being a consul. His objection was overruled, hence, he filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger is right on saying that the CFI has no
jurisdiction to try him, being an honorary consul.

CASE NO. 3 570 SCRA 410 (2008)


SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (2008)

MUTUC VS COMELEC (1970)

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, PETITIONER, VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND


THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

FACTS:

Several bills were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT.
These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended
for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197. On February 7, 1994, the Senate
Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630. It was stated that
the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into
consideration P. S. Res. No. 734 and H. B. No. 11197. "

The Conference Committee bill was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate. It became Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law.

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, Congress violated
the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of
Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the
Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the
President signed into law. Another contention of the petitioners is that S. No. 1630 did not
pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act 7716 violates Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution?
CASE NO. 5?????. RED FLAG DILI KO SURE SA IYANG PHIL NO.

Angara vs Electoral Commission


G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of
the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3,
1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a ͞Motion of Protest͟ against
the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by
the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC
cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.


2. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.

CASE NO. 6 117 SCRA 668 (1989)

G. R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND
R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and
Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President
of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power
have not been unchallenged. The armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist
insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of
Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own
on the areas they effectively control. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to
wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also through the use of
propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country. Now, Mr.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. This case
is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who
within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself. This petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents
to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The petitioners contend that the
President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and
his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed. On the other hand, the respondents'
principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-
justiciable. Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over
individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit: Section 4. The
prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service. Section 5. The
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy. Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international
precedents.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
CASE NO. 7 65 PHIL 56 (1937)

PEOPLE VS. VERA


GR. No. L45685, November 16, 1937
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 4221 is a valid delegation of legislative Power.
FACTS:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted for a criminal case.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgement of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng
to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to eight years
of prision mayor, to pay costs and with resevervation of Civil action to the offended party (HSBC).
Upon appeal, the court changed the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of 5yrs and 6mos of prision
correccional to 7 years, 6 months, and 27 days of prision mayor.
Cu Unjieng sought to have the case elevated on certiorari but this petition was denied
The Court denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for the
execution of the judgment
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature.
Cu Unjieng stated in his petition that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he
has no crimininal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
The Court of First Instance of Manila Judge Pedro Tuason set the petition for hearing.
HSBC assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 on the ground that it gives undue delegation of
legislative ower to the provincial boards of several provinces.

CASE NO. 8 225 SCRA 511 (1993)

TEODORO B. PANGILINAN vs. GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS G.R. Nos. 104216 August 20, 1993

FACTS: The petitioner complains that he has been removed from office without due process and just cause
in disregard of his constitutional security of tenure. Worse, his removal was made in bad faith,
immediately after his expose of certain anomalies in which superiors were involved. Teodoro B. Pangilinan
joined the government service on July 18, 1966, when he was appointed agent in the National Bureau of
Investigation, a position for which he had the appropriate civil service eligibility. He had risen to
Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept appointment as Executive Director of the Land
Transportation Office on July 8, 1987. He assumed office on July 16, 1987. The petitioner says that from
February 19, 1988 to November 30, 1988, he was detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority,
where he served as Assistant General Manager in charge of finance and administration and also of security
and general services. Upon his return to the LTO, he was designated as Resident Ombudsman in addition
to his regular duties. As such, he discovered, among other anomalies, irregularities in the purchase of
motor vehicle license plates. The license plates ordered were not reflective as required by P.D. 98 and B.P.
43. He says he brought this matter to the attention of Asst. Secretary Manuel Sabalza of the Department
of Transportation and Communications and later of Secretary Pete Prado. Neither of them took any
action. On September 27, 1991, the petitioner called a press conference expose what the media later
described as "the license plate mess." He also announced his intention to file graft charges with the
Ombudsman against Prado, Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecañas, also of the DOTC. The following
day, Secretary Prado relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director of the LTO and replaced him with Guillermo
Maglaya as officer-in-charge. However, the petitioner continued receiving his salary (although his
allowances were withheld) until December 31, 1991. When he asked why his pay had been discontinued,
he was informed by Asst. Secretary Juan V. Borra, Jr. that Maglaya had already been designated as Acting
Executive Director of the LTO. In this petition, Pangilinan prays for reinstatement on the ground that no
charge has been filed or proved against him to justify his removal. Required to comment, the Solicitor
General argues that Pangilinan was validly separated because he was appointed to the disputed position
in an acting capacity only. He does not possess the qualifications prescribed for the office of Executive
Director of the LTO, which is a career executive service position for which only a career executive service
official is eligible. The petitioner is not a career executive service official. Hence, he could not be, and was
not extended a permanent appointment. The public respondents cite Sec. 5(1) of P.D. 807 which provides
that membership in the career executive service requires: (i) that the official must be included in the
register of career executive eligibles; and (ii) that the official must have been appointed to an appropriate
class in the Career Executive Service. Respondent Augusto B. Araneta, who was later designated to replace
Maglaya, submitted the certification from the Executive Director of the Career Executive Service Board
certifying that the position of Executive Director in the Land Transportation Office, Department of
Transportation and Communications is classified as a position belonging to the Career Executive Service
(CES); and certifying further that per records of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB), MR. TEODORO
B. PANGILINAN, former Executive Director of said office is not a CES eligible, and was not appointed to a
rank in the CES. The petition is DISMISSED. ISSUE: Whether or not Teodoro Pangilinan’s removal from
office is valid and constitutional.

CASE NO. 9 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

JUAN ANTONIO OPOSA, ET. AL. VS. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., (in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ET. AL. G. R.
No. 101083 July 30, 1993

FACTS: The Petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
They are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use, and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests.
Co-petitioner Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) is a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. Petitioners filed a complaint before RTC
Br. 66, National Capital Judicial Region as Civil Case No. 90- 77. The Petitioners asserted that
the defendant of the Civil Case (Respondent Factoran) and other persons acting in his behalf to
do the following: Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the country; Cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLA. Respondent
Factora, Jr filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds: The plaintiffs of
the Civil Case (Petitioners) have no cause of action against him The issue raised by the plaintiffs
is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government. Respondent Judge granted the Motion to Dismiss sustaining the claim of
Respondent Factora that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question. The respondent Judge added that there would be impairment of contracts
which is unconstitutional. Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of the Court. Petitioners contend that the complaint has legal basis
in violation of their rights as based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of PD No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also
emphasized on the respondent’s obligation as stated in Section 4 of EO NO. 192. Respondents
state that the Petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Case No. 90-777 raises a political issue
CASE NO. 10 6 SCRA (1962)

G. R. No. L-19748
PAULINO J. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and JUAN SALCEDO, JR., in
his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board, respondents.

FACTS: Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, was appointed by the President of the Philippines, which
appointment was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as the first Chairman of
the National Science Development Board for a fixed term of six years, pursuant to Section 6 of
the Science Act. Accepting such appointment, petitioner duly qualified, assumed the
performance of the functions of the office on July 15, 1958, and organized and since then built
up the Board into a real effective instrument for scientific advancement that it is today. As a
result of the last national elections held in November, 1961, a change of administration took
place. Shortly thereafter, or on February 9, 1962, after petitioner declined to heed what
respondents admit as the new Assistant Executive Secretary Rodrigo Perez's "friendly gesture of
advising petitioner to resign from his position in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences of
having to face an administrative action for violation of the Revised Administrative Code on the
basis of evidence then on hand", respondent Executive Secretary required petitioner in writing
to explain charges for alleged electioneering based on the affidavits of four individuals. On
February 15, petitioner submitted his written explanation denying under oath the said charges
claiming them to be false, malicious and unsubstantial. On the following day, February 16,
respondent Executive Secretary advised petitioner, by authority of the President, that his
explanation was found unsatisfactory, and immediately ordered his preventive suspension from
office effective upon receipt of the communication. Thus, the preventive suspension took effect
on Monday, February 18, 1962. On the day previous, or on Sunday, February 17, 1962, the
respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Chairman of the National
Science Development Board. In view of his indefinite suspension, petitioner, on May 5, 1962,
filed the present petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service
Law for preventive suspension having already expired on April 19, 1962, he be reinstated in the
service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act.
H.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of the Civil Service Act (Lifting of Preventive Suspension
Pending Administrative Investigation) applies to officers appointed by the President answering
administrative charges against them.

CASE NO. 11 204 SCRA 516


ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL

G.R. NO. 100883, December 2, 1991

Cruz, J.:

Facts:

Republic Act (RA) No. 7042, also known as “Foreign Investment Act of 1991” is enacted on June
13, 1991, as an act to promote foreign investments, prescribe the procedures for registering enterprises
doing business in the Philippines, and for other purposes.
In this case, Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, petitioner, challenges the constitutionality of RA 7042
in developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. He further claims
that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair
advantages over local investments.

With Garcia’s high civic spirit and zeal in the protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign
competition, he studied and analyzed the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 and comprehended on the
following:

a) That Section 5 makes certain that there has been no limitations on the extent of foreign ownership
as they do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital
without need of prior approval.
b) That the provision for a Foreign Investment Negative List in Section 8 does not satisfy the
constitutional mandate for the government to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments.
c) That Section 9 may bring burden to justify whether the criteria was met if the Philippine national
believes that an area of investment should be included in list C, in which "existing enterprises
already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further
foreign investments."

Finally, the petitioner claims that the transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited
entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment
Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at
a fatal disadvantage in their own country.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 7042 is unconstitutional.

Held:

No, the Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned.
The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests
over the national economy. The court also observed that the petition is only a debate on the wisdom of
the efficacy of the Act, in which it does not sit to resolve the issue but for the legislature to decide. Hence
the petition is dismissed.
Case no. 12 187 SCRA 377
Coseteng vs Mitra
G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts:

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of
the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP),
NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and
some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the
banner of KAIBA.

On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong.
Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, 11 out of twelve 12 congressmen to represent
the House in the Commission on Appointments.

On September 16, 1988, LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House
of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.

On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as
representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House
Electoral Tribunal. Her request was endorsed by nine congressmen.

On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the
objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep.
Luis C. Singson, LDP

On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court
declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the
theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the
New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their
parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the
Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced
Majority.

Issue: Whether or not the members of the House in the CoA were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, (which
it does not), but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership. This
granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest
parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA
were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership
and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Moreover, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the CA should have
been nominated and elected by their respective political parties, as they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House.

They were elected by the House (not by their party) in accordance with the Constitution. The validity of
their election to the Commission on Appointments — 11 from the Coalesced Majority and one from the
minority — is unassailable.

Furthermore, the endorsements of the 9 congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members
of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman
Verano-Yap.

CASE NO. 13 179 SCRA 828 (1989)


LA UNION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (LUELCO) VS. BRAULIO D. YARANON

G.R. No. 87001 ; DECEMBER 04, 1989

FACTS:

Far Eastern Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), La Union Branch filed a petition against the La Union
Electric Cooperative (LUELCO) and the National Electrification Administration (NEA) to determine the
proper signatories to checks relating to withdrawals and disbursements of LUELCO deposits with the said
bank. Based on the LUELCO Board Resolution No. 33-02-88 dated February 20, 1988 it allowed the General
Manager to sign checks and disbursement to a maximum of P5,000. The said resolution was amended by
the LUELCO Board under Board Resolution No. 53-03-88 dated March 20, 1988 stated that all checks and
disbursements made in any amount shall bear both the signatures of the Acting General Manager and the
President of the Board of Directors of LUELCO. However, NEA amended the Resolution No. 33-02-88
authorizing the General Manager to sign checks of withdrawals or disbursement to a maximum of P5,000.

LUELCO insist that the bank should follow Resolution No. 53-03-88, NEA through its project
supervisor and acting general manager in the LUELCO alleges that Resolution No. 33-02-88 as amended
by the NEA should be observed as the NEA has taken over LUELCO and the Resolution No. 53-03-88 was
disapproved by general manager pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 269 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1645 empowering NEA to exercise control and supervision over electric cooperatives and
borrowers.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 269 as amended which empowers the National
Electrification Administration to exercise control and supervision over electric cooperative and borrowers
is unconstitutional?

RULING:

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. It is well-settled that the party raising a constitutional
question must be able to show direct injury to or invasion of his constitutional rights arising from the
operation or enforcement of the questioned act (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56).

As long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other
available grounds.

Moreover, the reason courts will as much as possible avoid the decision of a constitutional
question can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a
proper respect for the acts of the other departments. In line with this policy, courts indulge the
presumption of constitutionality and go by the maxim that “ to doubt is to sustain”. The theory is that as
the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied
and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted.

CASE O. 14 190 SCRA 130 (1990)

G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990


INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner
vs
HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE
UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
G.R. No. 89331 September 28, 1990
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI-ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES
AND AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INC., respondents.

Facts: ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in
international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic
and Social Council and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of International
Committee for Migration and the International Committee of the Red Cross

IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock
organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting “basic research on the rice plant,
on all phases of rice production, management, distribution and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive
and economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through
improvement in quality and quantity of rice.”

The labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed a petition for certification election,
which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.

Issue: Are the claims of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of Philippine labor laws
valid?

Ruling: ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights,
which are guaranteed by our Constitution.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations
provides that “each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is
a party.” Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the
Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there
had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation
of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein “both management and employees
were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between
IRRI and its employees.”
CASE NO. 15 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

REP. RAUL A. DAZA

V.S

REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

G.R No. 86344; December 21, 1989


Facts of the case:

 In May 1987 proceeding the Congressional Elections, the chamber of the House of Representatives
equally distributed its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political
parties in the house, this is relative to Article 6, Section 18 of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was one of the chosen representatives of the Liberal Party.

 On September 16, 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized which resulted the
political realignment of the House of Representatives. 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and
transferred to LDP. Thus, LDP rose to 159 members and the LP was left with 17.

 The realignment caused the chamber of Representatives to revise its representation in the
Commission of Appointments. Petitioner was removed from his seat and was replaced by respondent
Singon.

 On January 13, 1989, Petitioner challenged the House of Representatives and filed for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court on the grounds of his removal from the Commission on
Appointment and the assumption of respondent. In view of the compliant, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order to t both petitioner and respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointment.

 Petitioner contend that he cannot be removed because his appointment is permanent, invoking the
ruling in Cunanan v. Tan. He argued that the reorganization of LDP is not based on permanent political
realignment since LDP is not a duly registered political party.

 Respondent argued that question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court and that the Constitution does not provide to require a political party be
registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:

Whether or not the question raised by Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

Ruling:

The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question. The Court can take cognizance
on the matter at bar. Accordingly, the court held that the issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court because it is political in nature.
In this case it is the legality of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments that is in question.

As explained by Justice Concepcion in Tanada v. Cuenco, the term political question refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.”
Under Article VII, Section 1, cases with political in nature would still not be precluded from resolving
it under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

CASE NO. 16 297 SCRA 754(1998)


Echegaray vs The Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 754(1998)
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative
power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an
unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director. In his motion
to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 8177 is constitutional?

CASE NO. 17 179 SCRA 828 (1989) -

LA UNION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC (LUELCO) VS. YARANON

GR No. 87001, December 4, 1989

179 SCRA 828 (1989)

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 4182 is an action for interpleader filed by the Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), La
Union branch, against the La Union Electric Cooperative Inc. (LUELCO) and the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) to determine the proper signatories to checks relating to withdrawals and
disbursements of LUELCO deposits with the said bank. It appears that in LUELCO Board Resolution No. 33-
02-88 dated February 20, 1988, the authorized signatories are the General Manager, the President and
the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board; they are to sign checks and/or disbursements to a maximum of P5,
000.

The said Resolution was amended by the LUELCO Board under Board Resolution No. 53-03-88 dated
March 20, 1988, which states that all checks and disbursements made in any amount shall bear both the
signatures of the Acting General Manager and the President of the Board of Directors of LUELCO.

However, the NEA in its letter of April 8, 1988 to the LUELCO Board of Directors amended Board Resolution
No. 33-02-88 instead of P5,000, authorization is approved for the amount of P3,000 only for single
disbursement or withdrawal and that any amount beyond this shall be counter-signed by either the Coop
President or Treasurer.

It is alleged that the Board Resolution No. 33-02-88 as amended by the NEA should be observed as the
NEA has taken over LUELCO and that Board Resolution No. 53-03-88 was disapproved by said general
manager pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1645, which
empowers the NEA to exercise control and supervision over electric cooperatives and borrowers. The
bank through the interpleader thus sought the resolution of these conflicting claims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD No. 269, as amended, which empowers the National Electrification Administration to
exercise control and supervision over electric cooperatives and borrowers is unconstitutional.

CASE NO. 18 103 PHIL 1051 (1957)

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et al vs MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, et al


G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party,
whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was
one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November,
1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido,
Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections
of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner
Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa
and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now
pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, a Nacionalista Party member. The two
seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with Nacionalista Party members to meet the Constitutional
mandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman
of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that
the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC,
since 3 seats on the Electoral Tribunal are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party
representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar
is a violation not only of Tañada's right as Citizen Party member of Electoral Tribunal, but respondent Macapagal's
right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents, to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the
Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of Electoral Tribunal members, since it is a constitutional right
granted to Senate.

Issue:

Whether or not Constitutional right of Citizen Party can be exercised by Nacionalista Party, or the Committee on
Rules for the Senate.

CASE NO. 19

CUNANAN v. TAN

G.R. NO. L-19721, May 10, 1962

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

On June 6 or 8, 1961, the petitioner Carlos Cunanan, was appointed by the President of the
Philippines as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On November 6, 1961, the President extended to him an ad interim
appointment allowing him to continue performing his duties and functions as Deputy Administrator. Six
Senators and seven members of the House of Representatives purporting to act as the Commission on
Appointments rejected the said ad interim appointment. Soon thereafter, the petitioner commenced the
present quo warranto against the respondent Jorge Tan Jr., contending that the latter’s designation is
invalid since the position is not vacant when he was designated thereto, because the aforesaid rejection
of petitioner’s ad interim appointment is invalid for several reasons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr. is valid.

CASE NO. 20 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

RED FLAG: WALANG TITLE NG CASE AT GR. NO. - JAPS

73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Amendment to the Constitution

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas”
clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution