Enrique T. Garcia v. Commission on Elections and Sangguniang Bayan 3.

Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional,

of Morong, Bataan provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
GR No. 111230, Sept. 30, 1994
Ponente: Puno

FACTS:

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang

Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993
which includes the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227. Nonetheless, the municipality
did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission;
so, the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures
to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding
Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong wrote a letter dated June 11,
1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6,
1993, the COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative because its subject
is “merely a resolution and not an ordinance.” They contend that under the
Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of
initiative. They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. — Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

ISSUES:
1. WON the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper
subject of an initiative.
2. WON the decision of the COMELEC to deny the petition be set aside.

HELD:
YES. The petition is granted and the decision of the COMELEC on July
6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

RATIO:
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act
or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ."
An act includes a resolution. It is basic that a law should be construed in
harmony with and not in violation of the constitution.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative,

namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS:
 On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone.
RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive
uses.
 On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner
commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation
of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.
 On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein
its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.
 On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993.
 The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang
Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow
Morong to join provided conditions are met.
 The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA
7227.
 Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the
LGC of 1991.
 On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
 On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532
defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion
of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
 On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845
and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
 On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent
on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law.
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,
the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not
mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body
of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and
to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.
On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt
or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a
law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or
the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is
still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and
to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become
an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal
and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not
hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review
Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the
proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements
about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is
really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the
exercise of its review powers.
SJS VS DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
570 SCRA 410 – Political Law – Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
Representative process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R.
No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in
the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in
that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five
(5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member
of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring,
via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug
free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates
for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable
as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
 Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
Borja vs Comelec Case Digest freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
Three-Term Limit monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of
the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
Facts: serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term
in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No.
for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became 133495, September 3, 1998)
Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from
1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja,
Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on
the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another
term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run
for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by

operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election
because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the
full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of
the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the
event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his
service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term
limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to
prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance
the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical
background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION
OF ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300

Facts:

March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition

for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-
Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing
the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for
the position of the member of the House of Representatives for the First
District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the election.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.

Held:

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake

the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to
the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. An
individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile
of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctlyargued that Marcos lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that Marcos posses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Aquino vs. Comelec 1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous
with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Sept, 18, 1995 Mr. Nolledo:
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
Relevant Provisions: preceding the day of elections.
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution …
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party- Mr. Davide:
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the
immediately preceding the day of the election. interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
Facts: On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly …
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of Mr. De los Reyes
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and
district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months. not physical and actual residence.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to meaning of domicile.
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,”
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his law.
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence
May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
lack of constitutional qualification of residence. qualify.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 Which brings us to the second issue.
orders.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was
Issue: running in.
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that
“domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
electoral district. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Held: Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
Conception, Tarlac. II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in
lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati
is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due
to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant
case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another
forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to
promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement
of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable
laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of
enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in
newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year
at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s
district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781. October 6,
2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC Issue:
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000] Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for Held:
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
of Representatives come from the party-list representatives. bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
Issue: "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
solons be filled up completely and all the time? legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
Held: legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to Issue:
a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
FORMULA FOR private respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step
is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
representatives/.80 x .20 cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least
two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
“first” party.
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party
votes of party list system is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
votes of first party x additional seats for concerned party the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
BANAT VS COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department
– Party List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the
Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-
list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners
at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule,
same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the
formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11
of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-
list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If
it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances
when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue
of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-
list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for
party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) =
Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling –
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of
the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional
basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast
are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility
to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party
that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed
seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if
we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats.
In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast
(called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second
round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-
percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be
rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list
– but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections
(15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining
seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2.
BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS
additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got
20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional
seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed
to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the
party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
“party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate
in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate
in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department
– Party List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the
Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-
list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners
at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule,
same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the
formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11
of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-
list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If
it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances
when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue
of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-
list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for
party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) =
Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling –
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of
the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional
basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast
are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility
to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party
that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed
seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if
we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats.
In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast
(called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second
round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-
percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be
rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list
– but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections
(15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining
seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2.
BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS
additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got
20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional
seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed
to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the
party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
“party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate
in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate
in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system

PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department
– Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs
COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases
of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded
the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the
party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending
their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those
who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop
a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case,
Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent
of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts
but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running
for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others,
in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are
not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Aquino III V. Comelec
Apr. 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation
of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase
“or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or
only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement
for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.
Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008. (B) On the merits –
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: legislative district for such province.

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original
nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total
number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao
were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.
Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first
legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato

City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act
District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201. No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
February 2007, provides in pertinent parts: Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units –
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, creation must not conflict with any provision of the
subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan affected.
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City).” There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
Issue: The petitions raise the following issues: However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
I. In G.R. No. 177597: to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
(A) Preliminarily – subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
Resolution No. 7902; and create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597. Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x
x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

However, the creation of provinces and cities is another
matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot
also be created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to
create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or
in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact
such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus
will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s
proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City”
mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity
of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of
MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether
the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
“Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in
the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is
no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues
raised here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the
recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in
Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.”
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic
Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the
apportionment provided in the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695
because (1) it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through
a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the
creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in
Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by
Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a
regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by
Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to
create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that “each province shall have at least one representative”
in the House of Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a
legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will
leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative
district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it
had a population of only 163,849.
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and
independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual
income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following
scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional
assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the
Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution
which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas,
was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners”
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to
meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers
of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect
a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s
statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from
suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the
said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication
endowed to members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed
by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such
at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in
session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing
the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
 foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in Congressional sessions and
meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with all
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also
vs.
would be a making of the purpose of the correction system.
Romeo G. Jalosjos, accused-appellant
GR Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Facts:

Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined

at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos,
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties of a
Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-
bailable offense.

Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he

was re-elected as Congressman of Firs District of Zamboanga del Norte by
his constituents in order that their voices will be heard and since the accused-
appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives,
the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to

discharge his mandate as member of the House of Representatives.

Held/Ruling:

No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the

House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution and
shows that this privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, the rights and privileges from being elected as public official may
be restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the
duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the requirement of
obedience rather that exemption.

The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Section 11 Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable imprisonment by
more than six (6) months is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH
148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the
Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal
justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for
a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement
in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered
by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail
and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application
for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said
that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow
him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no
"prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held
that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election,
or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations
on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty
conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The
apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the
mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate
and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free
a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed

to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That
this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the
trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May
14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June
29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court
lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks
on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.
DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON, GR No. 175352, 2009-07- PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
15 Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

Facts:

Issues:

whether the respondent holds the chairmanship of PNRC in an ex officio

capacity.

may hold any other office or employment in the Government

Ruling:

the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

Principles:

a position held in an ex officio capacity does not violate the constitutional

proscription on the holding of multiple offices.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed
as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein
without additional compensation... in an ex officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an...
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.

The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already... paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.

The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an

"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex
officio likewise... denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority other
than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and... without further
warrant or appointment.

the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a

government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition
in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it... creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the
Adana vs Pacana in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
135 SCRA 431 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of Office/Position the Local Government Code.
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental
in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando
Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same
elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on
March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy
for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas
Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions
of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties
of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the
governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years,
that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on
March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local
elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as
a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor
who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such
can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa]
shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister
or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot
invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza
further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against
BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14,
1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing
a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from
office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN

113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in

Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by
Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly
counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s
group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman,
Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other,
Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat
objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to
appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the
SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as
counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of
IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez
leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear
and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision
that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise
that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and
that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from
appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated
that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after
the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What
could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
Avelino vs Cuenco
83 Phil. 17 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election of
Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on
the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose
Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the
next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for
about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco,
Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session.
He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics
to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised
by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s
camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad
however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in
voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he
was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood
up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members
of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions
of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech.
Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected
as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took
his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance
of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of
the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the
resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators
(Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al)
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while
Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the
morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one
day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by
the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to
be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When
the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a
quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of
all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a
majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of
one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there
would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance
of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the
SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24
senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other
abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change
the majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half
of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was
elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over
the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The
Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the
quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,
the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism,
it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would
result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such
formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the
Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial
justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has
been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of
all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business” and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution
of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge
their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the
jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance
of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process
which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere
oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original
Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article
VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in
the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual
members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-
three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
 from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.

356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019 Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known
that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office
by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding
under which he stands accused.
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the suspended?
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in
by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or
of the Senate without violating the Constitution. (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
sixty days.”
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides: warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under procedure.
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct

CHAVEZ VS COMELEC
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements
with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these
agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the
products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which
contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name
of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing
the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or
television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing
rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station
shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said
provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the
COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed
provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be
exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that
the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of
the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the
SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision
unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature
of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid
due to overbreadth.
Issue:
Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?
Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image,
do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support
for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product
endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their
exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the
validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the
interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing
field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular
or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on
the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely
product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan
political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes
directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to
endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the
right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates
for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial
products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the
same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse
popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual
intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay
private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of
familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the
campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule
against premature campaigning.
Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to
enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this
Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Ex post facto law
Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally
liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at
the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.
Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such
advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes
a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively,
except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however,
that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on
walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person,
and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image
or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or
consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials
by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One
definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private
parties to use his name and image to endorse certainproducts prior to his
becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed
in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda
materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
Fair Elections Act
Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful
election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively
prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through
the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument
is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed
provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only
regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as
much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and
rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of
such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty
under the law.
Overbreadth
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved
by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope.
It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the
start of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also
show his name and image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only
to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose
of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of
opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid
on the ground of overbreadth. Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, Aug
31, 2004
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia
and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he
returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration
as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the
Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually
granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed
by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed
to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel
said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year
residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement
of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be
taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City
to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his
old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of
choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim
that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in
Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters
is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same
village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local
and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to
breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
 to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
ABBAS VS SET Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Electoral refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
Tribunals – Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on
elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six
senatorial election contest.
(6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator
members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of
them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of
public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require
the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed
disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules
(Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and
may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously
tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain
terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,
creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of
the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those
“judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not

Case Digest: Layug v. COMELEC, Velarde & BUHAY
G.R. NO. 192984 : February 28, 2012
ROLANDO D. LAYUG, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MARIANO VELARDE (alias BROTHER MIKE) and BUHAY PARTY-LIST,
Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as
a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify Buhay
Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike
from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension
of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect and as such, it is disqualified from
being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution,as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother
Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual
leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as required of party-list nominees under Section 6
(7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the Rules on Disqualification Cases
Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that
Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented elderly group. They likewise argued that nominees from a
political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Record shows that Layug received a copy of the aforesaid Answer only at the
hearing conducted on April 20, 2010 after his lawyer, Atty. Rustico B. Gagate,
manifested that his client has not received the same. Counsel for private
respondents explained that their liaison officer found Layug's given address
to be inexistent.
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying
the petition for lack of substantial evidence. A copy thereof was sent to Layug
via registered mail at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City.
However, the mail was returned unserved. Subsequently, the COMELEC
Second Division found Layug to be a phantom petitioner by seeing to it that
pleadings, orders and judicial notices addressed to him are not received by
him because the address he gave and maintains is fictitious. Accordingly,
Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the
Resolution dated June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for
reconsideration filed within the reglementary period, said Resolution was
declared final and executory. Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc
proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House
of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not
proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List. Layug moved for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC
En Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve
him, his representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged
that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in the newspapers,
that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. His
motion for reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second
Division, for being filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not Layug was not afforded due process of law.
HELD: COMELEC's decision is sustained.
POLITICAL LAW: procedural due process
Layug was not denied due process. A judicious perusal of the records shows
that Layug filed pro se both the Petition to Disqualify and his Position Paper
before the COMELEC Second Division. In the Petition to Disqualify, he stated
his address as #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. While
Atty. Rustico B. Gagate appeared as counsel for Layug during the hearing
conducted on April 20, 2010, he nonetheless failed to provide either his or
his client's complete and correct address despite the manifestation that
counsel for private respondents could not personally serve the Answer on
Layug due to the inexistence of the given address. Neither did the Position
Paper that was subsequently filed pro se on April 23, 2010 indicate any
forwarding address.
It should be stressed that a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was
mailed to Layug at his stated address at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San
Miguel, Pasig City, which however was returned to sender (COMELEC) after
three attempts due to insufficiency of said address, as evidenced by certified
true copies of the registry return receipt, as well as the envelope containing
the Resolution. Consequently, the COMELEC deemed Layug to have received
a copy of the Resolution on June 23, 2010, the date the postmaster made his
first attempt to serve it. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
COMELEC issued an Order declaring the Resolution final and executory, which
thereafter became the basis for the issuance of the assailed COMELEC En
Bancs NBC Resolution No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010.
From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC
was incorrect, his pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being in violation of
his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to rectify
the error despite knowledge thereof leads to the conclusion that he
deliberately stated an inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the
proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process. As the COMELEC aptly
pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of election laws and parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
procedure by appearing before the Commission by himself or by different constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
does not receive mails addressed to him.He cannot thus be allowed to profit especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
from his own wrongdoing. To rule otherwise, considering the circumstances
in the instant case, would place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments
and processes within Layug's power to determine at his pleasure.

DISMISSED.

GUINGONA VS GONZALES

HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-
PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant
to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,
two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s
representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled
to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding
one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section
18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership
in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2
duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Nachura, J.)
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the
establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before
the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country
cannot be denied.
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the
concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C.
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president,
the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner
submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot
create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the
absence of an act of legislature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is
Constitutional.
HELD:
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
"dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable"
is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but
it remained absolute.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced
assumption that the text of the provision itself was the only basis for this
Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality.
The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the
discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted
the present Constitution.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to
constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the
absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is,
cannot contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to
accept the constitutionality of the PET.
“The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan
trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as
congressional and senatorial - exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in
the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral
Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC,
the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still
subject to judicial review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party
- if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed
out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And
yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the
present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to
the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts
of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution
draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court,
sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the
constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the
petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The
Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three
Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals,
respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the
prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution
itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to
which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power
without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this
power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power
to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should
not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”
Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission to the present case is an unmitigated quantum
leap.
The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)
“finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.” A plain
reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and
Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two
are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and
the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis
for the constitution of the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of
the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the
present Constitution.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO

353 SCRA 452 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – De Jure vs De Facto

President – Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s
term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the
Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the
Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s
legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It
was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on
the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXEC SEC of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
– Singularity of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union
(CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
(i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks
to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should
be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7
BITONIO VS COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received
by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
FACTS: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director
IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and RULING: YES. The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is
Employment. He was designated by Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Department of Labor and Employment to be the DOLE representative to the Since the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
designation, he receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner
On July 31, 1998, COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment due to the who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better
principle established in Civil Liberties case stating that Cabinet members, right than his principal. The contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no
their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary merit since such law was amended by RA 8748 where provisions in conflict
office and to receive compensation therefore is unconstitutional. with the law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.
On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to
the COA on the following grounds:
1. The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for
clarification1 filed by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling
in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet
Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their assistants. Officials given the
rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary
and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary
are not covered by the prohibition;

2. Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to
receive per diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years after the
Civil Liberties Union case became final. In expressly authorizing per
diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been
aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as
interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

The motion was denied by COA, hence this petition.

1
The clarification was the Court’s action on the motion for clarification filed in
Civil Liberties Union v.The Executive Secretary, and revises the main opinion
promulgated on February 22, 1991 (194 SCRA 317) totally invalidating
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 25, 1987 (whose questioned Section 1
states: “Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.”). The clarifying
dictum now considered Executive Order No. 284 partly valid to the extent that
it included in its coverage “other appointive officials” aside from the members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, with the
dispositive part of the clarificatory resolution of August1, 1991 stating:
“WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void insofar
as it allows a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary to
hold other positions in the government and government-owned and controlled
corporations.”
FUNA vs Ermita
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R.
Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport
of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23,
2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA
Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed
by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was
appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
Held:
Ratio:
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just
a “designation,” and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really
“appointed” as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v.
Garrucho, Jr., we distinguished between the terms appointment and
designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he
is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation,
on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the
Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is
said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because
it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.
Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced
considering that the above-cited case addressed the issue of whether
petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed position and so had the
right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the
designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words
“hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both
appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs
the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting
dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding
of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy”
the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing
less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma.
Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator,
Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
 Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the
Funa vs Agra
“hold-over principle”
No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex
Facts:
officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen
consequence of holding the other.
Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot
was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera
liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec
when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate
7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of
Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice
versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” To claim the
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming
exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter
that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an
prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent
Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never
designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is
in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other
Issue 1: W/N Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
by the primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice
his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition
versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter,
under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
for appointment, rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as
Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
those of Presiding Judges of the Court of Appeals. #
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because
the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,
or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that
had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be
it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section
4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
Binamira v. Garrucho
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have
been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the
duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors
and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including
the Office of the President.
He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation
was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
Binamira’s demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a
complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights.
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism
Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve
for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That
upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor
shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because
it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only
an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure
on the person named.
Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation
of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed.
The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves
the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment
(or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial
act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as
in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Issue:

whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the

Philippine Tourism Authority or merely designated

Held:

Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines

but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction
between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to
consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a
temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed
Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo
in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
"transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec
from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07,
s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain
in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of
the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on
the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to
a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of
Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed
by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36,
this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC
requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the
rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision
of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
 the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
170338 December 23, 2008 Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedurecould be arrested and
Facts: detained by the Senate.

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results
of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of
both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document
as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in

Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process
requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in

pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that

SENATE VS ERMITA
495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch –
Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail
Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters
that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a
similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for
they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such
other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO
464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions
in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which
is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question
Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance
of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation
and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in
the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections
21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond
the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is
valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information
is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.

NERI VS SENATE
549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various
resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs
and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated
that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent
a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri
is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be
answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s
decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several
petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to
others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
"even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional”, citing in support the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the
other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of
contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that
legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to
cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to
infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the
law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege
anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by
granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely
subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have
long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the
law does not discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory
taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The
Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax,
which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the
press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of
its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax
on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed
on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes.
To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right
any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that
even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase
the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose
additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still
the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said
that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense.
It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and
medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real
property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum,
medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services
was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before
the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A.
No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of
petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No.
7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of
taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of
taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the
Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which,
like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has
been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred
[and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The mandate
to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.
As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts
to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are
exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no
constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment
– Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation.
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate
the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments
by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by
the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without
legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source
for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is
a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of
an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can
no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority
of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as
the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to
which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of
the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of
the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto.
Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance
of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in
the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and
the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within
its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC
dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling
in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction
scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken
cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising
the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly
veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the
president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would
in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-
rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President
vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The
reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in
the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to
the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach
of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment
of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in
question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto.
It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which
they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The
veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original
intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision
blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits
should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the
purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover,
he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment
of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be
subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.
6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said
existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional
injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which
states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by
law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The
SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President.
The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the
second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements
of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in their
constituents areas than the national government or the president for that
matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position
to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387.
December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare
as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election
Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed
rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006,
on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other.
Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding
in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only
of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against
appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs
for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still
considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety
as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section
14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited
the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect
upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court
laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006
are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form
of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed.
The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society
and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as
it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of
the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by
the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has
a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election
of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective.
However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v.
Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada,
Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen
days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles
in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor
delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of
the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case. confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in
472 SCRA 587 – Political Law – Commission on Appointment – Ad Interim the government service or any other competent person to perform the
Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even
appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
Law on Public Officers – Modes and Kinds of Appointment long as the President deems that person competent.
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as
secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting
capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed
a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA
cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective
departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interimappointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself
provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the
provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this
case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and
when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments
– this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the
president. The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally
appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose
the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose
on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is
in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to
team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three
deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a
final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon
Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to
respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued
declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private
respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as
National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results
of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National
Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of
discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was
disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at
that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second
shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when
they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and
the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that
would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures,
and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to
equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing
in this case.
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential
Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out
Power
Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists
to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led
to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred
that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of
natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of
PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling
out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still
affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in
part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing
PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed
for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated
cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading
of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended
for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that
‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The
SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’
the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power
is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided
in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws
but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress.
On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is
not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC
made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president
by the president.
right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to
do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens’
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to
Facts:
be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before
the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation
A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of
Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide
taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they
the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money,
Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed
and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined
EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other
reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an
activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of

Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”
agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a
entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the
legislator’s suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or
Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its
any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senate’s constitutional function
position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former
senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements
of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing
the case
as citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters
personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here,
of transcendental importance which justify setting aside the rule on
aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a
procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very
public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for
the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public
a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or
facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not
that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases,
discretion on the part of the Executive Department. troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence
to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty. Read more
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the
requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public right has been
violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion.
The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the
Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of thetranscendental importance of the issue, but
because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the court’s
expanded jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for
concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because
it is in the form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves

“adjustments in detail” in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These
are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already
been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the
status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the
Senate.

De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA
and the MDT. Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty

In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive

Agreements are defined as international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature.

Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval
of two-thirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage.

The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 –

already allowed the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content,
purpose, and framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The
practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law
or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces is
not at all unusual in this jurisdiction.

In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the same
time against the destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends.
Who they are, and what form the friendships will take, are for the President
to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution itself expressly
prohibits. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.

Petition is DISMISSED.
Saguisag vs. Ochoa
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions before the Court question the
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the Philippines and US. Petitioners alleged that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that EDCA
violated multiple constitutional provisions. While, Respondents argued that
petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of
their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and
judicial precedents.
HISTORICAL FACTS OF EDCA ( YOU MAY DISREGARD THIS)
1. The defeat of the Spanish fleet at the hands of the US naval forces at the
Battle of Manila on May 1, 1898, cleared the day for the US occupation in
Manila and the transfer of the Phil. To US from Spain.
2. Philippine independence was declared on June 12 , 1898;
3. Treaty of Paris was signed by US and Spain on Dec. 10, 1898, whereby
Spain ceding several islands to US;
4. In 1901, President Roosvelt issued an executive order establishing the
Subic Bay Naval Reservation;
5. In 1902, Roosvelt signed another EO establishing Fort Stotsenburg which
was later occupied by Clark Airbase.
6. The was ensued between Phil. And US. The military victory enabled the US
to establish control over the Phil. Politically and economically. Successive
military governors exercising military, executive and civilian functions were
appointed;
7. On March 14, 1947, Agreement between US and phil concerning military
bases was signed. ( president Roxas and US)
8. MBA gave the US the control of at least 16 bases including Clark and Subic
base as well as the access to use of Philippine facilities such as Mactan Island
Army and Florida Blanca in Pampanga
9. RP-US Military Assistance Agreement was signed provided for the creation
of JUSMAG ( Joint US Advisory Group and permanent stationing of USmilitary
forces in Manila;
10. Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in Washington. MDT lasted for 25
years. Over the years, US military bases in the country served as launching
sites for US involvement in various wars such as Vietnam war.
11. In 1987 the Phil constitution was ratified , which explicitly prohibits
foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the country beyond the year
1991, except under a treaty concurred by Senate. Therafter, Phil. Senate
voted not to renew the MDT.
12. However, on May 27, 1999, the Phil Senate ratified the RP-US Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA).
13. Petitioner Bayan challenged the Constitutionality of VFA but the
agreement was upheld as valid.
14. In 2002 , Balikatan was launched to send US troops to Mindanao to assist
Phil forces in the war on terror against Abu Sayaff.
15. On Sep. 23, 2009, in the light of the Subic rape case and after hearings
regarding VFA , Senate paased a resolution calling on the Executive to
renegotiate the VFA and if the US refused, issue a notice of termination of
the agreement
16. In 2012, Pres. Obama announced its strategic pivot towards Asia as laid
down in Sustaining US global leadership, priorities for 21 st century defense
seeking to deploy 60% of its warship to Asia. Thereafter, dialogues were
made in Washington . The dialogue ended with the Phil. Delegation clearly
upon the instruction of Pres. Aquino, agreeing to adopt a policy of increased
of rotational presence of US troops , increased military exercises and more
frequent port calls by the US ships.
17. In 2013 , US-Phil began negotiations for the Framework Agreement for
increased rotational presence and enhanced defense cooperation which
sought to give US military access to the Phil facilities. The framework was in
the form of EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT NOT NEEDING THE SENATE’S
CONCURRENCE. The negotiators the changed the name of the framework
agreement to EDCA ( enhanced defense cooperation Agreement)
18 April 28, 2014 DFA Sec. Gazmin and US Ambassador to Ph. Philip Goldberg
signed the EDCA.
19. It was only on April 29, 2014 , the text of EDCA was made publicy
available via government websites.
20. Finding EDCA grossly one-sided and greatly disadvantageous to the
Philippines , petitioners, then, filed petitions before the SC questioning the
constitutionality and or legality of EDCA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. A. Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement
on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities? (YES)
B. Is EDCA a treaty or an international agreement that requires Senate
concurrence? (No)
HELD:
1. A. YES.The President may enter into an executive agreement pertaining to
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. The role of the President as
the executor of the law includes the duty to defend the State, for which
purpose he may use that power in the conduct of foreign relations. SC has
interpreted the faithful execution clause as an obligation imposed on the
President, and not a separate grant of power.
The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument
that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.
The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of a
executive agreement or a treaty. No court can tell the President
to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty
to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls
squarely within Article VIII, Section 25. Executive agreements may
cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves
detail adjustments.
The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters,
limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty that the
former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the
international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied
in the law or treaty.
The executive agreement must be consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the
form of an executive agreement, respondents carry the burden
of proving that it is a mere implementation of existing laws and
treaties concurred in by the Senate. EDCA must thus be carefully
dissected to ascertain if it remains within the legal parameters
of a valid executive agreement. EDCA is consistent with the content,
purpose, and framework of the MDT and the VFA
The starting point of our analysis is the rule that "an executive
agreement xx x may not be used to amend a treaty. Both the history
and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support
the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat
itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
Hence, even if EDCA was borne of military necessity, it cannot
be said to have strayed from the intent of the VFA since EDCA's
combat-related components are allowed under the treaty.
Another difference is that EDCA supposedly introduces a new
concept not contemplated in the VFA or the MDT: Agreed
Locations, Contractors, Pre- positioning, and Operational Control.
As previously mentioned, these points shall be addressed fully
and individually in the latter analysis of EDCA's provisions.
However, it must already be clarified that the terms and details
used by an implementing agreement need not be found in the
mother treaty. They must be source from the authority derived
from the treaty, but are not necessarily expressed word-for-word
in the mother treaty.
B. Meanwhile, the power of the President to enter into binding
executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already
well-established in this jurisdiction. Although the provision of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes by cast the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.
The effect of this statement is surprisingly profound, for, if taken
literally, the phrase "shall not be allowed in the Philippines" plainly
refers to the entry of bases, troops, or facilities in the country.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the
initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only
to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
The VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines.
This Court stated in Lim v. Executive Secretary: Thus, EDCA can be in
the form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves
"adjustments in detail" in the implementation of the MDT and
the VFA. It points out that there are existing treaties between the
Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the
Constitution under Section 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, respondent emphasizes that EDCA need not be transmitted to
the Senate.
Therefore, the President may generally enter into executive agreements
subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate.
The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive
power and is intimately related to the other executive functions. These
functions include the faithful execution of the law in autonomous
regions; the right to prosecute crimes; the implementation of
transportation projects; the duty to ensure compliance with
treaties, executive agreements and executive orders; the authority
to deport undesirable aliens; the conferment of national awards under
the President's jurisdiction; and the overall administration and control of the
executive department. These obligations are as broad as they sound,
for a President cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable
of securing the rule of law.
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded. As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted
scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on
the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature;or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent
power.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express
or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and
effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for
the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution
and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere
in the performance of these rules.
In sum, executive agreements cannot create new international
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied
in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior
to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the
Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are
solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation
through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same
level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law
or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.
Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject To
the supremacy of the Constitution.
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given
carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief
Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context
and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by
existing domestic and international laws. There are constitutional
provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in
concluding international agreements, such as those that involve
the following:

1. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within

Philippine territory
2. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, which must
be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
3. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant
to a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of Congress.
The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines,
of foreign loans that must be previously concurred in by the
Monetary Board.
ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004. eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from
implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to
7/8/2010 this project.

0 Comments
Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable
haste, without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial,
technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer
Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably
authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the of elections:
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim 1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in
Mindanao (ARMM). the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a the mandatory eligibility requirements
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct 3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC
biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the
Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission. 4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the
bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the
Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for automated election system IHaECA
the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the 5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding
release of an additional P500 million. despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the
Department of Science and Technology
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for 6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of
Eligibility and to Bid". the bidding for the automated counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the
Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote discretion:
a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a
of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the bidder
manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural technical tests
requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST
they sought a re-bidding. after the award, and their effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional; Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner
Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional; and by what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or
Whether the petitioner has standing; and readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter
Whether the petition is premature. given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3)
NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase types of software, which are intended for use in the following:
II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void 1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific 2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
 3. Election Day Use." governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when
to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money
operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to
nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of
that would be used on election day. an invalid or unconstitutional law."

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software In view of prematurity
that was the subject of the Contract was still to be created and could The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29,
conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written
in final form? protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter
was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information
In view of awarding of contract Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient
for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55
Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications of RA 9184.
and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second
envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles "(1) when there is a violation of due process,
of incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
documentary evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its or excess of jurisdiction,
technical and production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to concerned,
establish the bidder's financial capacity. (5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan latter,
executed among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for unreasonable,
determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
government's interest. remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
In view of standing intervention."
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers,
registered voters and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central
to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest."
Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract
to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of
the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the
expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the
democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award
of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in
gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws
Echegaray vs Sec. of Justice (1999) right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle
of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of

petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect
of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for
the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the
TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights
can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably
an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power
of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any timeamend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is
like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers
of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the
Meralco vs. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
Fast facts
The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC,
pet), requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to
fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation to be
paid to the MEC by such transportation companies.
Act NO. 1446, Section 11
Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to act on the petition.
Issue
Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board
of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to
act in that capacity.
Held & Ratio
Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of
a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the
petition of the MEC.
The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through the regular court
system (Trial Courts – Court of Appeals – SC). They will be reviewed by the
lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The SC cannot
sit as members of the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their
jurisdiction to decided on cases on purely contractual situations.
 Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides:
“Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any
other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to
the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for
said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final.”
 Said Act provides that for every franchise granted,
terms as to the usage and compensation to be paid to
the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the
Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority
vote is required and this is final
 Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court
requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of
arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALC
 Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the
Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which disclaimed any interest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit
as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is
asked of them in this case
HELD: No
 The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in
our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
 The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions
 The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law
(sec. 26).
 When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
 A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term,
and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
  The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot 1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction 2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the
government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or 3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty.
 section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government constitutionally established,
and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal
protection clause
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into
a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should
have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining
in all violations of said law violates:
VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branchesof our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on
the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power,
to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules
on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. –
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
Our institutional independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law
in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as
invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless
it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule
violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in
all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is
that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouragedbecause the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and
finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and
the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights
are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based
on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up
to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a
bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former
plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence
on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness
of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea
is improper and irregular.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees
to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act
as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a
representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence
of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives
of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of
providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is
an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress
to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As
such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned
from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the
phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room
for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records
of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of
the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This
disposition is immediately executory.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be

admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme
Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held
that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered
as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two
houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution,
the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives
in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector
and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal
voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more
than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote
each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be

composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress
with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional
mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made
to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition

of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest
of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.
Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Facts:
Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the
application or recommendations for the position left by the Associate
Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the
list of candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from
some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called “unanimity rule” against
him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the shortlist when
s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the
JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an
applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza
was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC
during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory
power and direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice
and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC
hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process
for nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and
disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute
a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right
to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested deferment of the
JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the
shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of the “unanimity rule”..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO
to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that
the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him,
despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in
JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
mean that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the due process
clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard
and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an
applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is
not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its
adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise
of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the
objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body
from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought
before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its
assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the
side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because
the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position
of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from
the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of
due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the
“unanimity rule” as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its
selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the
palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that
Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to
a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to
observe the minimum requirements of due process. ##
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before
the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in
the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and
did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of
the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and
administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public

concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the

dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before

any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of

publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be

published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina,
Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA
10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for
violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2)
prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-
mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information
Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National
Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the
petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of
expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of
communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against
double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure;
o • Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles
the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing
penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against
Double Jeopardy;
o • Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI
and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time collection
of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a
judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as
well as the right to the privacy of communications;
o • Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the
Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to
any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates
the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority,
infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates
the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due
process and freedom of expression; and
o • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation
to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6
months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6
years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of
expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under
Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can
trigger an order directed at service providers to block access
to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a
conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to
freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the
press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which
allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access,
work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and
that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power
under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant
to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o • imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based
libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions
penalized separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the
imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period.
Such changes will result in a chilling effect upon the freedom
of speech;
o • with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente
Sotto III’s earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers
and internet users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism
of online materials for use in his speech against the
Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of criminal
prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people
such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online,
thus creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of
expression;
o • gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and
block access to content whether authored by private citizens
or the organized press sans any hearing of any kind but
merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular
Internet article constitutes online libel;
o • respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will
fare under strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o • Persons who commit crimes using information and
communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of
being imprisoned more than double the imprisonment laid
down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the
Cybercrime Act;
 o • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of a license from the National Telecommunications
the Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the Communication;
RPC and special laws which raises the possibility that an 4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably
accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violating the IP Code.
violation of the Constitution; o • The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the
o • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes Court in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No.
“by, through or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal 166715) to determine the validity of delegation of legislative
protection clause power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy standard test
and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure: 1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy
o • No compelling state interest that justifies real time does it lay down the legislative policy with respect to
collection of data; the authority vested on the Philippine the blocking of content. No limits upon the takedown
National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation to power of the respondent DOJ Secretary;
collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard 2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the
except “due cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and
determine for itself; becoming the supreme authority in the Philippine
o • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Internet landscape.
Human Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the
Court of Appeals before surveillance operations are PRAYER:
conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed
without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6,
o • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the
7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
incursion into the right to privacy;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7,
o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can
12 and 19 of RA 10175;
lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections
o • No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited
4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
incursion into the privacy of citizens
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section
19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue
Delegation of Legislative Authority
o • The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the
restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a
mere prima facie finding without any need for a judicial
determination is in clear violation of petitioners’
Constitutionally protected right to due process;
o • The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ
Secretary will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all
cybercrime-related complaints;
o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are
cybercrimes under Section 6, it • follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights
owners may be acted upon the Respondent DOJ
Secretary to block access to websites and content
upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on
retail to Philippine citizens may be blocked for
violating the Retail Trade Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be
blocked from offering voice services without securing
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST 1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is
REV. BISHOPVICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
vs. administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015 neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

PONENTE: Leonen HELD:

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FIRST ISSUE: No.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a checkmark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for
the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the officialactions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.
 In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of
their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success
or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.  Bill of rights

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by  Check
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.  Contribution

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective  Post free classified ads
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the  Messages
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates 2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses 3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion

into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. 1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
vs. administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015 neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

PONENTE: Leonen HELD:

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FIRST ISSUE: No.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon
by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.
 In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of
their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success
or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes. 1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by 3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective

confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates

where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion

into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when: