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United Cadiz Sugar Farmers Association Multi-Purpose Cooperative v.

Commissioner

Facts: BIR Regional Director Galanto required UCSFA-MPC to pay in advance the VAT before
her office could issue the Authorization Allowing Release of Refined Sugar (AARRS) from the
sugar refinery/mill. This was the first instance that the Cooperative was required to do so. This
prompted the cooperative to confirm with the BIR whether it is exempt from the payment of VAT
pursuant to Section 109(1) of the NIRC.

The BIR responded favorably to UCSFA-MPC's query

As a result, Regional Director Galanto no longer required the advance payment of VAT from
UCSFA-MPC and began issuing AARRS in its favor, thereby allowing the cooperative to
withdraw its refined sugar from the refinery. But the administrative legal opinion notwithstanding,
Regional Director Galanto, again demanded the payment of advance VAT from UCSFA-MPC.
Unable to withdraw its refined sugar from the refinery/mill for its operations, UCSFA-MPC was
forced to pay advance VAT under protest.

UCSFA-MPC filed an administrative claim for refund with the BIR, asserting that it had been
granted tax exemption. It likewise filed a judicial claim for refund before the CTA division five
days later. Both ruled in favor of UCSFA-MPC.

CIR then contended that the judicial claim was not timely filed, thus, it did not take jurisdiction
over the matter.

Issue: Whether the claimant complied with Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC which states
that: within two years from the date of payment of tax, the claimant must first file an administrative
claim with the CIR before filing its judicial claim with the courts of law.

Ruling: Yes. UCSFA-MPC s claim for refund - grounded as it is on payments of advance VAT
alleged to have been illegally and erroneously collected from November 15, 2007 to February 13,
2009 - is governed by Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC. These provisions are clear: within
two years from the date of payment of tax, the claimant must first file an administrative claim with
the CIR before filing its judicial claim with the courts of law. Both claims must be filed within a
two-year reglementary period. Timeliness of the filing of the claim is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The court cannot take cognizance of a judicial claim for refund filed either prematurely or out of
time.

In the present case, the court a quo found that while the judicial claim was filed merely five days
after filing the administrative claim, both claims were filed within the two-year reglementary
period. Thus, the CTA correctly exercised jurisdiction over the judicial claim filed by UCSFA-
MPC

Begosa v. Philippine Veterans Administration


Facts: Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed he was
entitled under the veterans’ bill of rights. He filed his claim for disability pension but was
erroneously disapproved due to his dishonorable discharge from the army.
The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim, entitling him with a pension of
P30 a month, to take effect on october 5 of that year. Believing that his pension should have taken
effect back in 1955 when his claim was disapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension as
a permanently incapacitated person, which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362 was
amended by RA no. 1920 on june 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against PVA in the CFI. CFI ruled
in favor plaintiff. Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies
before resorting to court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the
Government which cannot be entertained by this court for lack of jurisdiction because the
Government has not given its consent.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case

Ruling: No. Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in
the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being
liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately be invoked.
However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted=
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statue appropriating public funds
for the benefit of plaintiff. Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the
lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants
being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not
come into play.

Balmaceda v. Corominas and Co.

Facts: In 1959, September 10, Republic Act No. 1410 was passed "to prohibit the so-called 'no
dollar' imports except under conditions."

The then Secretary of Commerce and Industry, Pedro C. Hernaez promulgated the Consolidated
Rules and Regulations implementing Republic Act No. 1410

Respondent-appellee Corominas & Company, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines engaged, along with other purposes, in the export and import
business. On January 29, 1959, it was issued by the then Secretary of Commerce and Industry,
Pedro C. Hernaez, Barter Permit, permitting it to export to Japan, The permit for importation was
encumbered by the limitation set forth in Section 5, para. B(1) of the Consolidated Rules and
Regulations, more relevantly, "that in no case shall non-essentials be more than 10% of the total
imports."

Corominas submitted to the Producers Incentives Board the firm offers sent by the Japanese
buyer's agent at Hongkong, Kim Guan Lee Hong, specifying the description, quantity, unit price
and total value in dollars of the commodities.
In response, the Products Incentive Board, either thru Mr. Mario P. Marcos, a member of the
Board, or Mr. Mariano G. Pineda, Acting Undersecretary of Commerce and Industry,
wrote Corominas in eleven differently dated letters uniformly stating:

This confirmation is an authority for you to import the abovementioned items from
your supplier but for the account of the buyer ...

Subsequently, Mr. Ernesto Y. Golez, Coordinator of the Producers Incentives Board,


wrote Corominas that the "NEC items you desire to import have already exceeded
the 10% allocated you under the Consolidated Rules and Regulation of the defunt No-Dollar
Import Office."

This led Corominas to institute a "Complaint with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI
of Manila against Secretary Manuel Lim to obtain the issuance of the corresponding release
certificates of its imported goods.

It was the Appellate Court's affirmance of this lower court's ruling on appeal that prompted
petitioner-appellant, BALMACEDA, in his capacity as Secretary of Commerce & Industry and
Chairman, Producers Incentive Board, to come to the SC and stresses en masse that the Appellate
Court erred in ordering it to issue release certificates in favor of respondent-appellee for its
imported goods.

Issue: Whether the reply-letters written by the Producers Incentives Board to respondent-
appellee are licenses or authorities to import such goods notwithstanding it already exceeded
the 10% allocated under the Consolidated Rules and Regulation of the defunt No-Dollar Import
Office.

Ruling: No. The reply-letters written by the Producers Incentives Board to respondent-
appellee are not licenses or authorities, but mere confirmations of the commodity classification
and price quotations of the firm offers submitted by respondent-appellee.

Assuming gratuitously that the Producers Incentives Board erred in applying and enforcing the
law involved and the implementing Rules and Regulations in issuing the letters, the same however
do not block the subsequent correct application thereof and that the Government is never estopped
by mistake or error on the part of its agents. The defense of estoppel cannot be successfully
asserted against the Government in the exercise of governmental powers and functions even by an
affirmative undertaking on the part of its officer or agent to whom no administrative authority has
been delegated, to waive or surrender a public right.

CIR v. Pineda

FACTS: Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the eldest
of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a lawyer. Estate proceedings were had in the CFI of Manila wherein
the surviving widow was appointed administratrix. The estate was divided among and awarded to
the heirs and
After the estate proceedings were closed, the BIR investigated the income tax liability of the estate
for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and it found that the corresponding income tax returns
were not filed.

Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the same. Subsequently, he appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or portion
pertaining to him as one of the heirs."

The Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment
corresponding to his share.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to the SC and has proposed to hold Manuel
B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate
instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate.

Manuel B. Pineda opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid
income tax due the estate only up to the extent of and in proportion to any share he received.

Issue: Can the Government require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed?

Ruling: YES. As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for the tax up to the
amount of the property in his possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on the
P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes
for which said estate is liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax Code.

By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession,
i.e., the P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of P760.28. After such payment,
Pineda will have a right of contribution from his coheirs, to achieve an adjustment of the proper
share of each heir in the distributable estate.

Wonder Mechanical Engineering Corp. v. CTA

Facts: Wonder Corp. was engaged in the business of manufacturing auto spare parts, lamp shades,
rice threshers and other articles. It was also engaged in the business of electroplating and repair of
machines. However, it did not pay sales tax on the sale of articles and the percentage tax on its
electroplating and repair business.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused the investigation of Wonder Corp. for the purpose of
ascertaining its tax liability. Revenue Examiner Pedro Cabigao reported that Corp. manufactured
and sold other articles subject to 7% sales tax but not covered by the Corp’s tax exemption
privilege. The Corp. was assessed with a deficiency percentage tax of P25, 080. and a 25%
surcharge.

Respondent also suggested the payment of the amount of P3,300.00 as penalties in extrajudicial
settlement of petitioner's violations of Sections 182, 183, 185, 186 and 191 of the Tax Code and
of the Bookkeeping Regulations

However, Wonder Corp. contends that it was a given a Certificate of Tax Exemption with respect
to the manufacture of machines for making cigarette paper, pails, lead washer, nails…, thus, not
liable to pay such deficiencies.

Issue: May the Commissioner legally enforce the collection of compromise penalty?

Rulling: No. The compromise penalty suggested by respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue, it
does not appear that petitioner accepted the imposition of the compromise amounts. Hence We
find no compelling reasons to alter the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals that:

With respect to the compromise penalty in the total amount of P5,020.00 suggested
by respondent to be paid by petitioner, it is now a well settled doctrine that
compromise penalty cannot be imposed or collected without the agreement or
conformity of the tax payer.

Gotamco & Sons vs. Commissioner

This is a CTA case and I cannot find it 

Ruling from Mamalateo:

Parties who are not included in an assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
cannot be made respondents in an appeal from a particular assessment, and no judgement can be
rendered against such parties because any such judgment would be an encroachment on the
prerogative of the Commissioner to make na assessment and would further violate the rule on due
process and the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moreover, under Sec. 7 of RA 1125, only
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Commissioner of Customs may be sued before the
CTA in appropriate cases.

People v. Mallari

-Crim Case

-Cited on footnotes of Mamalateo


People v. Paz Abad Santos

Facts: Based on the allegations in the Information, accused Paz S. Abad Santos is charged herein
for Violation of Section 49(b), now Sec. 106(A), Sec. 57(B), Sec. 175, and Sec. 24(B)(2) of the
(NIRC) of 1997, allegedly due to her failure to pay tax liabilities as deficiency income tax, VAT,
EWT, DST,

Notably, these tax liabilities are corporate tax liabilities of Vicente Singson- Encarnacion
Corporation, but it is misleadingly stated therein that "the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and refused to fail tax liabilities" without stating that
these are corporate tax liabilities.

The said accused is beingcharged " in her capacity as Treasurer of Vicente Singson-Encarnacion
Corporation", the supposed corporate taxpayer in the instant case.

A careful consideration of the supporting documents attached to the records of this case do not
substantiate or prove that accused Paz S. Abad Santos is indeed the Treasurer and/or responsible
officer of Vicente Singson-Encarnacion Corporation.

The name of accused Paz S. Abad Santos was only mentioned in the "Final Notice Before Filing
Criminal Complaint"

Issue: Whether the accused may be held liable absent the legal basis to charge the accused for
nonpayment of corporate tax laibilities

Ruling: No. The Court finds difficulty in making a judicious determination of the existence of
probable cause to hold accused liable for the commission of the offense charged herein.
Consequently, the Court is left with no recourse but to di smiss the instant criminal case pursuant
to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

CIR v Tokyo Shipping Co. LTD.

Facts: Tokyo Shipping filed a claim for refund from the BIR for erroneous prepayment of income
and common carrier’s taxes amounting to P107,142.75 since no receipt was realized from its
charter agreement. BIR failed to act promptly on the claim and thus it was elevated to the Court of
Tax Appeals which decided in favor of the refund. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether Tokyo Shipping is entitled to a refund or tax credit for the prepayment of taxes

ruling:Yes. The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore, it
should be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must
be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the “hen that lays the golden
egg”. Fair deal is expected by taxpayers from the BIR and the duty demands that BIR should refund
without unreasonable delay the erroneous collection.