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TAMBARA 22 (2005): 1-40 The Making of Military Rebels: The Social and Cultural Influences in the Mutinies of the 1980s Gail Tan lla@gan “Civilian supremacy is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the People-and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.” Section 3 Art II Philippine Constitution ebellion is defined as “a concerted campaign of violent action used by organizations claiming to represent an ethnic or other roup to make claims against the State.”" The military rebellions that happened in the Philippines in the last nineteen years fall within this definition. They have all been waged ostensibly by a reform group within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) which undertook or threatened to undertake violent action to demand the resignation of key officials or the ouster of sitting presidents. On 27 July 2003, some 297 enlisted men and seventy junior officers who called themselves the Magdalo? seized the Oakwood Premier, a luxury apartment complex in Makati, to signal their rebellion. Their demands pertained to reforms in the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to include 1) the mandatory retirement of all officers with the rank of Brigadier General/Commodore/Chief Superintendent; 2) the institutionalization of meritocracy as the sole basis of selection for AFP/PNP leaders; 3) fixing the tenure for Major Service Commanders; 4) the creation of the Inspector General Service: 5) an inve «ory of the government arsenal; and 6) a sundry list of measures forenh racing troop 2 GAIL TAN ILAGAN morale (Mogato 2003). They also called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and AFP Intelligence Service (ISAFP) Chief BGen. Victor N. Corpus (Burgonio 2003), accusing both of complicity in the Mindanao bombings. The rebellion, dubbed by the press as the “Oakwood Mutiny,” was eventually put down within twenty hours without violence or loss of life. The Oakwood mutiny was only the last in the string of military rebellions’ in recent Philippine history. The first one was the failed coup attempt by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) on 22-25 February 1986. This event is best remembered as the People Power Revolution or EDSA I,‘ which ended the 21-year Marcos dictatorship. Since EDSA I, the Philippines has been rocked by sporadic saber rattling from some quarters in the military. The government of Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, who replaced Marcos, was plagued by eight coup attempts from 1987 to 1989, ironically by the RAM (Yabes 1991), the very same group that initiated the moves that unseated Marcos and brought her to power. The RAM, then renamed Rebolusyonaryo Alyansang Makabayan (Honasan 2000), was joined by the Young Officers Union (YOU) and the more amorphous Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP) on issues concerning AFP reform and alleged destabilization attempts. The Aquino presidency survived these threats and instituted sweeping reforms that ungagged the media, increased democratic space, and enshrined the ideals of human rights, social justice, and good governance in the 1987 Constitution. However, the uneasy rumblings in the ranks of the AFP suggested that her hold on power all throughout her term was at best tenuous. Every regime after Aquino’s was not spared from rumors of conspiracies to topple the government and replace it with juntas. At each instance, there was the speculation of military involvement among the forces out to grab power. The plot involved the clamor for reforms not only in the military, but in the political sphere as well. In January 2001, the military, represented by then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado, the AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes, and the different Service Commanders including PNP. Chief Gen. Panfilo Lacson, withdrew its support for the 13th President of the Republic, Joseph Ejercito Estrada. This event came to be known as EDSA ILS TAMBARA 22 3 In both EDSA Land IJ, the military played a crucial role in rendering the sitting president unable to rule the nation, thereby paving the way for a change in leadership. The military's action showed the soldiers’ disenchantment, which indicated that they went through a process of conscientization, politicization, and conversion to turn into rebels. To stop massive troop disenchantment, the government looked into the work conditions in the AFP, as well as the culture that prevails in it. The Davide Commission, a fact-finding body constituted to investigate the 1989 coup attempt, recommended specific issues for the government and the AFP to address. These included competitive pay, adequate housing, and restructuring of military logistics and procurement procedures that were identified to be sources of corruption (Villanueva 2003). But whatever had been done about these recommendations proved inadequate to prevent the Oakwood mutiny of July 2003. In the period immediately after the incident, some quarters called for the closure of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) as it was seen as the breeding ground of rebels (David 2003). Gen. Narciso Abaya, AFP Chief and former PMA commandant, observed that the institution “perpetuates the class system which develops a culture” (Newsbreak 18 August 2003, 23), and he was all for abolishing it. For her part, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) commissioned a restructuring of the PMA curriculum to prevent producing future officers with a “messianic complex” and the spirit of adventurism (Arroyo 2003). All these moves indicate a tacit acknowledgment that early socialization into military service factored into the making of a rebel. Objectives of the Study This study aimed to 1) describe the career profile of twelve selected rebel soldiers; 2) explain the socialization process of rebellion in the context of the sequential stages of conscientization, politicization, and conversion; and 3) examine the social and cultural influences in the socialization process of rebellion. Research Design and Methodology This study describes the making of the Filipino military rebel. It assumes that socialization to rebellion consists of the three sequential stages of conscientization, politicization, and conversion that soldiers 4 GAIL TAN ILAGAN go through, culminating in their participation in a mutinous exercise. The factors investigated by this study include the quality of interaction with peers and superiors, the soldier's perception of prevailing societal and organizational conditions, and the cultural factors of institutional norms, in-group norms, and in-group values. The problem required the use of a multiple-case study, primarily through in-depth interviews conducted between 11 December 2003 to 19 January 2004. Validation was done through key informants by personal interviews, phone, text messaging, and email. Pertinent journalistic reports and official documents were also utilized. Both the key informants and the secondary sources were assured of confidentiality as a precondition to their consent to be interviewed. In this paper, they have been assigned pseudonyms to protect their identities. Scope and Limitation ‘As there are only twelve respondents in this study, no generalization could be drawn on the profile of the Filipino military rebel. This exploratory study can only identify some common patterns of social and cultural influences in the creation of a military rebel on the assumption that the respondents share common or similar experiences with other rebels. The phenomenological report style requires that the researcher establish position as the interpreter of the respondent’s narrative accounts (Wilson 2002). It is possible that the researcher's interpretation and the respondent's intended meaning may diverge “Lhe information extracted from the interviews may have been limited by many constraints, among them the quality of rapport between the respondent and the researcher. Career Profile of Former Rebels The twelve respondents in this study were commissioned to active military service between 1978 and 1986. Nine of them graduated from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), two from military institutions in the United States, while one was a graduate of the Advanced Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC) from a Catholic university in the Visay Pseudonyms ate used in this report to refer to the respondents Bagyo enlisted in the Philippine Army-(PA) upon graduating from high school and served as a foot soldier in the frontlines. He later passed TAMBARA 22 5 the PMA entrance exam and left the battlefield for the academic halls. A veteran of Mindanao campaigns, he was instructing on Ground Warfare at the PMA at the time of the interview. Chef was among the military contingent that served in the security group of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in 1986. At the time of the interview, he was on house arrest for alleged involvement in the Oakwood mutiny. Heraldis a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and who served with the Scout Rangers. He resigned his commission a few years back to work in the business sector. While in service, he edited a military journal where serious critiques for AFP reforms were published. Kiko served in the MND. He had resigned his commission and, as of this writing, is a permanent resident of the US. He graduated from the PMA in the early 1980s. Marshall was taking the PA General Staff Course at the time of the interview. He is a graduate of a Catholic university in the Visayas. He is the only respondent who went through direct commission. He served both with the MND and the Scout Rangers. Pogi is a ranking PNP commander who graduated from the PMA in the early 1980s. He was originally commissioned to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Prof is considered by fellow Scout Rangers as a “military genius.” His PMA class adopted PGMA as an honorary “mistah’” He is an information management specialist who, while retaining his service rank, is currently detailed in a sensitive civil government post. Sigmund is a career intelligence officer who was assigned in Mindanao at the time of the interview. He had previously served with the Scout Rangers. Teddy is a native of the Mountain Province. He entered the PMA in the early 1980s and went on to serve with the Scout Rangers. At the time of the interview, he was on furlough from Iraq where he was part of the humanitarian contingent that was pulled out in exchange for the release of Angelo dela Cruz. Tiny is now a private security specialist. Scion to a prominent political family in the Visayas, he joined Bagyo as a plebe in the PMA, but opted to finish his studies ata military institution in the US. He was commissioned to the PA and served under Honasan. 6 GAIL TAN ILAGAN Top Gun went to PMA because it was a family tradition. He put in the required service years with the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and is now engaged in transport services based in Mindanao. Van was consistently in the Commandant’s List during his years at the PMA. He was commissioned to the PC and was sent to Fort Benning, GA, USA to train with the Green Berets. He passed the courses with distinction and was even offered the opportunity to instruct there. He turned it down to come home and continue service in the AFP. The respondents were in junior to middle-level ranks in the military hierarchy (2"4 lieutenant to major) at the time of their participation in a rebellion. Those in the Army and Constabulary were in positions where they had direct contact with troop soldiers, if not in command over them. ‘ Ten of the respondents participated in the 1989 bloody taking of the Makati financial district. Six were involved in the 1986 EDSA uprising, while at least eight participated in the siege of Malacaiang in 1987. Seven respondents were affiliated with the RAM at one time or another, though none claimed that RAM membership was formalized. Two figured prominently with the YOU, while three claimed no membership in any reform organization. Military Preservice Training Preservice training for officers consists of a 4-year combined academic and tactical education at the PMA, at the end of which they get a bachelor’s degree in Military Science and a commission into active service. A nonmilitary-school graduate who has completed the ROTC and has been granted a reservist rank may also opt for direct commission to active duty. In this case, the ROTC serves as preservice training. Preservice training is geared towards making the recruit cognizant of his role as soldier. The role is embodied in the Code of Conduct of the Filipino Soldier,’ a short pledge that is memorized by heart by every soldier. The Code states thus: Tam a Filipino soldier. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Iam a Filipino soldier. I will fight all forces that would destroy the freedom of the Filipino people. I am a Filipino soldier. I will obey the law, legal orders and decrees of my lawful superiors at all times. TAMBARA 22 7 I am a Filipino soldier. I will fight and die in the true Filipino tradition of valor, honor, duty and loyalty. To all these I pledge my life, my treasure and my sacred honor. The pledge repeatedly hammers into the soldier his identity as a Filipino soldier. His first duty is to defend and protect the social compact embodied in the Philippine Constitution and ensure that the rules fora just, peaceful, and functional society are preserved. The preservice training makes the soldiers recognize that theirs is a specialized function that sets them apart from the other government employees. Herald sums up the concept of being a soldier as “the only profession in the world that requires one to be sworn to die in defense of country and people.” The difference that sets the military apart from other government employees is interpreted by some as a “better, superior way.” Indeed, military training is rigorous and anybody who comes through it earns the right to take pride in his or her ability to survive it. In military terms, this is referred to as “morale” and is deemed desirable. The heavy responsibility laid on and accepted by the soldier and the morale that is necessary to maintain an efficient troop give the soldier a sense of confidence — even arrogance — in the belief of his or her competence. ‘The Limitations of the Preservice Training Top Gun, a PMA alumnus, defends his alma mater on the point of meeting preservice objectives. The PMA as an institution, he says, does not rebel. It follows the chain of command which is designed to instill discipline. He, however, clarifies that “circumstances can collude when the soldier obeys a direct order believing in all honesty that it is constitutional or it is in the service of the people.” Another PMA graduate who is a senior ranking military officer comments that perhaps the preservice training may fail in its ability to shape the character of the future officer, as the Academy may not do enough to root out character faults that had been shaped prior to the officer’s entry to the PMA. These faults may lie dormant during his Academy years, and may resurface in active duty once the officer is free of the round-the-clock surveillance on his conduct that the PMA provides. Inits attempt to clearly define the narrow boundaries of the role of the soldier, the Code of Conduct ironically provides many areas of ambiguity. 8 GAIL TAN ILAGAN For instance, the static nature of the Constitution that is implied in the first admonition has been demonstrated to be false, as the Constitution could be changed by popular will ot through amendment. Be that as it may, the constitutionality of the act is oftentimes the first thing that the soldier needs to resolve when deciding in ambiguous situations. While “all forces that would destroy the freedom of the Filipino people” may have been intended to mean the lawless elements, the definition would also apply to legitimate political authority that abrogates human rights. Similarly, the term “lawful superiors” implies the recognition of the authority that invests the superior with position. This would also be subject to ambiguity in interpretation, as in the case of contested election results or anomalous political appointments. Herein lie the fault lines that could cause cognitive dissonance when stacked against the glating contradictions the newly commissioned soldier experiences in actual service. Cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual simultaneously holds two contradictory cognitions or beliefs, such as when actual experiences do not live up to one’s expectations. It can also happen when the individual behaves ot is constrained to behave in a manner contradictory to his beliefs. Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable state which the individual is moved to reduce through 1) the addition ofa new cognition, 2) change to a behavior more in line with one’s beliefs, or 3) seeking information that would support one’s belief (Festinger 1957). ‘Actual military service exposes the young officers to violations of preservice expectations, thereby increasing the chances for cognitive dissonance. Herald, one of the respondents who did not graduate from the PMA, says that the institution breeds soldiers who would rebel because its “graduates are imbued with a sense of idealism that questions the lack of it outside the walls of the Academy, especially in the AFP. Government as well is not the kind of government that is worth dying for.” ‘The soldier’s lack of exposure to social realities prior to, and even during, his actual service was one of the prevalent answers for motivation to rebellion that was established in the email survey of thirty-two former rebels that was conducted to enhance and validate the findings in this paper. Indeed, many enter the PMA at seventeen and stay cloistered within its environs for four years preceding active duty (McCoy 1999). And even among integrees, the modal age at entry into the service is quite young, as the age limitis twenty-seven: ‘This does not TAMBARA 22 9 give the young soldier much exposure to see how civilian bureaucracies and organizations conduct their affairs or how the different sectors of the bigger Filipino society really work. Moreover, the preservice training does not focus on an in- depth analysis of Philippine society. Bagyo, member of the corps of instructors at the PMA at the time of the interview, commented that those who come from other univers! ies may actually have had more academic background on Philippine history and society, as these subjects were not - and still are not- given much focus in the Academy. Thus, the junior soldiers’ understanding of social realities 1s at best theoretical or stereotypical, albeit supplemented by readings and by discussion groups. Asan example, in Arguillas’s (2003) analysis of how the Mindanao wars have contributed to the making of a rebel, it was cited that the soldiers in Mindanao have a limited understanding of the history of conflict in these islands, as well as the tribal lines that divide its Muslim populace.* The soldiers’ limited exposure nevertheless provides them with expectations about future field experiences. Because the exposure is limited, the soldiers are unable to factor in some unanticipated elements to actual service experience, such that some of their subsequent experiences would not make sense. This is how cognitive dissonance sets in. ‘The Factors in Socialization to Rebellion Social and cultural influences are often intertwined. This poses the difficulty of isolating the exclusive influence of one from that of the other (Wilson). For the initial stage of conscientization and the final Atage of conversion, the active interpretation of experience and the process of deciding to take the final step are assumed to be immensely pertonal, thus the social influences are not differentiated from the cultural ones in the analysis of data. In the crucial stage of politicization where the processing of personal frustrations and alternatives occurs in a social setting, the researcher attempted to isolate some ascendant social influences. ‘The Factors in Conscientization In this paper, conscientization is defined as “the beginning of the awareness to discontent over one’s life experiences in military service.” Tt is the realization that some things are not right (Freire 1970). This 10 GAIL TAN ILAGAN was influenced by the soldier’s observations of 1) improper conduct of superiors; 2) the abrogation of the military values of meritocracy, professionalism, and competence; 3) contradictory elements in their combat experiences; and 4) interactions with civilian elements where the soldier comes away with the realization that the AFP is failing at its job. For eleven out of the twelve respondents, the realization of contradictory elements between their expectations from preservice training and the actual realities on the ground began to manifest early in their careers, Consistent with Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, the perception of contradictory elements is an aversive state. Following is a discussion of how cognitive dissonance sets in from the individual experiences of the respondents. For Van, it had to do with his perception of impropriety in the conduct of his fellow officers, especially those who came from the PMA. He witnessed early on that arbitrary standards were applied in the awards for excellence in service. He says: ‘The Fourthclass System’ is supposed to reshape future officers to adhere to the same standard of service. In our time, the plebe stayed within the system for ten months. It is intended to effect a change of attitude after one has lived through four years of the Honor System,” the Upperclass System"... But you see that after some get out of the “Academy, they revert to old values. They don’t recognize the standards of propriety anymore. Those who have confined themselves to the standards of the service may not be seflected in the honor roster of the military. The Valor (Medal) awardees may not necessarily be... Observations on the incompetence and improper conduct of other officers generate negative emotions. It is a natural reaction for the soldier who tries to do things properly to compare his conduct against the excesses he sees. Prof has this to say: [There is] incompetence in personnel selection. The people occupying certain positions do not deserve these positions. Why put in command someone who has had no combat duty? The ones who get to be commanders come from Comptroller or Finance and haven't had combat experience. Imagine what kind of decisions he would make. They don’t eam the respect of the men because there are no secrets in the military. Look at Angie Reyes’ Ranger pads. He is not a Ranger. Or the automatic issuance of medals for the siege of (Camp) Abubakr.” Do you know how they conducted that siege? ‘They bomb it now and see in the morning if they hit anything, ‘TAMBARA 22 11 Now, conversion of funds is a necessary evil because that is how the AFP budget is configured. You need legislation in order to correct that. But as it is, how would a foot soldier feel coming to Headquarters and seeing the snazzy cars of the officers? Then you hear about these people spending as much as PhP35,000 one-time nightclubbing with GROs.® And there you are who can hardly put your children to school and you're rotting away in the jungles. Another source of cognitive dissonance stems from junior officers being sometimes subject to the unprofessional demands of their superiors. Bagyo says: To be a soldier meant that there is a job you commit yourself to do and you do it. You earn self-respect when you know you are doing your job. The rules are clear, you know what to do and what not to do so don’t allow yourself to be a doormat. A soldier should do what he was trained for. A soldier should not be made to drive their officers’ children to school, or carry their briefcase, or bring water to their house. That is not his job. The soldier feels discontent and confusion because of the lack of acknowledgment of his professional merit. Promotions are not so much an issue, according to four respondents, because soldiers understand that the control lies outside of the AFP organization. This is dependent on the budget allocated by the government, and does not actually reflect a denial of merit at soldiering. For three respondents, the lack of acknowledgment of merit stemmed from being denied assignments and opportunities for further training which were decided by the military hierarchy. There are soldiers who are never included in specialized trainings, not because they lack ability or professional recommendation, but because they lack political backers in the appointing committees. There are also qualified soldiers who are not given assignments where they could use their expertise. Van, who gained honors in the various specialization courses that he was sent to abroad, felt his sense of entitlement violated by this. Early in my experience, | was not assigned to posts that I was trained for. I felt singled out for distrust and suspicion because of “politics” and intrigues. Despite my training, I was not given assignments that would tap my skills and where I can be most effective. War experience proved to be a rich breeding ground for cognitive dissonance. Five respondents discussed how disillusionment and confusion developed. 2 GAIL TAN ILAGAN “Teddy said he was frustrated by the derisive heckling he got from non-combat soldiers. A veteran of twenty-five encounters in his first four years of service, he looked upon his survival as a measure of his worth as a soldier, only to have it diminished by those who had less exposure. ‘We almost died fighting rebels to secure the sovereignty of the nation, only to have the people on easy assignments at the Center taunt us: “Why are you trying to get killed?” They called us crazy. “Teddy was frustrated that his fellow officers failed to appreciate how seriously he took his oath. He did not find the appropriate recognition either in his home community. Instead of honor and accolade for his combat exploits, he remembered that his elders counseled against it and downplayed his heroism in words that conveyed their negative sentiments for the military institution to which he belonged. He also complained that those he respected did not make him feel proud to wear his uniform. In his PMA days, the uniform was treated with much care, with the cadet spending many hours polishing buttons and making precise regulation creases. Violation of regulation posture while in uniform earns demerits. Allthese shaped in the soldier the belief that the uniform is a symbol of his honorable service. Teddy experienced cognitive dissonance when those whose opinion he respected would not allow him to take pride in being a good soldier: My elders said to me: “Our countrymen will not mourn your death in battle. They'll spit on your grave. They will not salute you because the military is corrupt.” ‘According to Prof, his early experience of unsettling confusion started in the field when he saw combat and he came to realize that fellow Filipinos were on the other side. Tf we were fighting the Japanese, it would have been alright. But asa lieutenant in Jolo, I saw death all around and it made me ask why: Especially since these are our people. ‘As a soldier, Prof had to fight the “forces that threaten the freedom of the Filipino people,” only to ironically find that “the enemy” is a Filipino that he had pledged to fight for and liberate. ‘Teddy, for his part, questioned why Filipinos turned against the government to become insurgents. Some of these were people he knew from his tribal community in the North. The dissonance lies in knowing that these ate his people who have now become “the enemy.” He narrates: TAMBARA 22 13 ‘Those we killed in battle turned out to be victims of abuse by local politicians. Or they turned rebel because of government neglect The government failed them. Teddy hewed to the conventional notion that political positions should be for service to the people. Yet he was confronted with the reality that local politicians committed abuses against those they serve. His narration above shows that he resolved the dissonant state by adding.a new cognition: the government failed these people. There was increased psychological static from his realization of his personal obligation since he was part of the government and that he had taken a personal oath to protect the people from all enemies that threatened their freedom. In the case of Sigmund, he saw the experience of fighting as the cause of the higher incidence of psychological stress among soldiers, indicating that things are not right. Marshall was more troubled by the deplorable life conditions he saw in the war-torn communities. Bagyo, on the other hand, analyzed the nature of the psychological stress from the factor of civilian casualties in battle. He admitted making the conscious effort to deny the impulse to empathy and emotional static in combat situations as these might affect his decisions under fire. A military dictum stresses that combat missions should be accomplished with minimum casualty However, the violence of war makes it also more realistic to assume the possibility of casualties among troops and among civilians during skirmishes. The expectation of casualties is intended to psychologically prepare the soldier, but this preparation may not be enough to help him deal with the reality of civilians caught in the crossfire (Grossman and Christensen 2004). While they may have made the necessary psychological preparation, the soldier’s emotions are nevertheless affected when confronted by casualties. It becomes especially stressful because they have to suppress their emotions. Says Bagyo: “That’s what people outside dor't see. Of course, you also feel pity but you should not show signs of weakness because your objective is to accomplish the mission by optimizing resources so that there will be no casualty. Battle is about survival. There is always the possibility of casualties. We will help in any way we can without sacrificing the objective of the mission. Thus, the reality of civilian or troop casualty in battle brought with it contendingimperatives on what to do: 1) achieve the mission, or2) assuage suffering, Rare is the opportunity to be able to do both. While a soldier 14 GAIL TAN ILAGAN is trained to prioritize the accomplishment of the first, he nonetheless is likely to feel guilty for neglecting the second. Combat casualties and collateral damage" make the soldier question his competence. For the young officer, what really served as an eye opener was the failure of civilian government to deliver services to the people. He realized that for some communities, the soldiers are their sole contact with the government. This realization became more intensely personal when he undertook tasks that were basically outside the mandate of soldiery to make up for the failure of the executive sector. ‘According to Berger (1979), conscientization consists of the awakening of 2 critical consciousness. Also, Brinton (1938) warned of government inefficiency as a structural precondition to rebellion, and five respondents referred to this very real aspect in their experience as frontline troops. They were left with little choice but to enter into the political and social concerns of the neglected people in their areas of operations. Prof explains: Soldiers are sent to pacify the area so that basic services can be delivered by the assigned (executive) agencies. But what happens is that the soldiers get to be the ones to deliver these services — clinics, roads, sanitation — these are the kinds of work that the soldier is additionally burdened to do. And being the only representative of government, the people come to rely on them for help in communal vccisions, which is actually a political role already. The soldiers are the only ones standing between the residents and the insurgents waiting in the wings. When the soldiers leave, those people will again be at the mercy of the insurgents Marshall adds that people in the hinterlands see the soldier as a political authority as he is the only government representative that people see. They refer to him their problems, even in their social affairs. Oftentimes, the soldier is the only representative that the people see, thus, according to Bagyo, the soldiers build latrines, undertake literacy programs, and do health clinics even if it is not their job. But because the government fails to do this, the soldier has to do it. ‘The soldier is forced to take on a political role, although he knows that such is not his mandate. Heider (1958) suggests that disagreements are perceived as unpleasant, and this moves the individual to change his mind. To achieve the more desirable state of cognitive balance, the soldier convinces himself that the task extensions are needed in the service of the people. TAMBARA 22 15 There is cognitive dissonance in that, while the military crganization is well trained and equipped to rout the insurgent forces, it is obviously unable to do so. The insurgents are still out there and, therefore, wart still needs to be fought. The discomfort from this logical incongruence had led the soldier to look for another explanation on why the military is unable to neutralize the insurgents. They find it in the analysis of systemic problems in society that are beyond the power and decision of the military to change. Balance is reached by the rationalization that the soldier can only do his job if these systemic problems are first solved. In 1989, the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), to which some of the respondents were then assigned, undertook active political education patterned after National Democratic (ND) methods. “Subversive documents” seized by the military ironically influenced the content of this political education agenda (Yabes). This validates Schutz’ notion that individuals pick up on the elements of their experience and use them for the immediate purpose (Wilson). These subversive materials armed the Rangers with the theoretical lens to analyze social realities. One is likely to see what is emphasized and pointed out to him (Schutz 1962). This is why classrooms work in educating the students, after all. Prof, who was the initiator of the political education of the FSRR, talks about how this was undertaken. We had “political officers” who formed the “political cadres” in the Regiment. Any soldier who was assigned there got educated on reading the social realities of that time. We discussed it. The soldiers got to see that there was ins ficiency on the part of the civil government to deal with insurgency. And this was not due to lack of resources or training, but because of corruption. Sigmund, who was detailed at the FSRR at this time, remembers how he responded to this concerted education campaign: That was an ongoing thing with the SR then. | did not sit in any of these political education lectures, but these were going on. Lots of ND documents littered the camp. But I also read a lot about Philippine society and revolution. We have no arguments with the ND analysis of society. They are fighting for the right thing. Their cause is valid. We also agree that some changes are required. It is their means that we find questionable. On hindsight, Pogi turns cynical about this concerted recruitment campaign to incite rebellion masquerading as an unnecessary political education that the junior officers were subjected to. Pogi scys: 16 GAIL TAN ILAGAN ‘The path leading to our participation was because of a series of brainstorming, brainwashing, and persuasion by upperclassmen since 1985. These discussions started way back in 1985 and 1986. I was in the field. I saw, felt, and experienced these gripes. There was no need for a bug (PM Aer) to raise these issues to me. Being “brainwashed to rebel” indicates that Pogi did not consider his action something that he willed. Without individual will, the ethics of the behaviors that proceed would be laid at the feet of the superiors who did the “brainwashing, brainstorming, and persuasion.” In Pogi’s case, accepting the prescription of the upperclassmen was also aided by the fact that he was able to validate the premises firsthand. Thus, the prescription was perceived to be logical. Milgcam (1974) explains that when one believes that he is merely following orders of legitimate authority, he divorces himself from the moral judgment on his subsequent actions. This perceived lack of will to one’s participation was also echoed by six other respondents, although not in the same cynical vein as Pogi’s comment. They viewed their participation as a given due to events and circumstances conspiring to lead them down an inevitable path. In the elite FSRR, Teddy had the reputation to be among the best. One of Prof’s political cadres, Teddy, found a lot of dissonant psychological static in his adjustment to active service. These dissonances found resolution in a new cognition he adopted and which he tried to sell to the troops through political education. Because it made sense to him in the light of his experiences, he genuinely believed in the solution he reached. His conviction was shored up by the constant repetition required in handling political education sessions to soldiers who seldom questioned his words. He remembers that he was so committed to an armed demonstration as a necessary means to shake ip the upper echelons of power. Explains Teddy: I was frustrated with how the government was handling the insurgency problem. There was the failure of national leadership. I believed the government needed to be attacked so it will work for once for the people’s interests. But you know that the Filipino easily forgets. After EDSA, there was unbridled democratic space. Nothing was getting done because the contending (political) parties would stand in the way of the agenda of the other party, never mind if that project would have been good for the people. I realized that maybe something needed to happen to shake up the political elite, TAMBARA 22 17 Over at the MND camp, soldiers seeking to resolve the dissonant cognitions became subject to a similar form of indoctrination. Active discussion led to the individual members’ adoption of the collective consensus of how to view the situation. On their motivation for participation in the 1986 coup attempt, Kiko and ‘Tiny's answers indicated this adoption of collective consensus that involved redefining, the soldier’s role. Says Kiko: ‘After Benigno Aquino was assassinated in 1983, we realized that the Marcos regime was out of control. We were not just “fence sitters.” We wanted total reform in the government and AFP. This was one main reason the RAM was organized, It was no longer “I,” but “we.” Tiny expresses the same collective view about the situation: Many remember EDSA I as “people power,” “it's a miracle” kind of thing. But it was actually us who started it all. The COMELEC walkout? Linda Kapunan" headed that walkout. Can't people see? We maneuvered that walkout. ‘The efforts of the politicians and the leadership of the AFP and MND to carve up the military into cliques highlight one of the structural predispositions that made conscientization prior to the EDSA Revolt possible. Incurring an wfang na loob or debt of gratitude (Panopio, et al 1994), the soldiers developedintense loyalty to their military superiors and politicians who provided them with plum positions and opportunities. ‘They were torn between the conflict of interests of military service and service to their patrons. For the soldiers to allow this to happen was tantamount to allowing the AFP to be attacked from within. The perception of the impending division of the ranks moved the soldiers to call for unity among their ranks and to demand reforms in the AFP. According to Brinton, revolutions are born of optimistic philosophy, and this is manifest in the soldier’s realization that the AFP had the chance to redeem itself. Revolutions are initiated not by the masses but by sectors of society that have the resources but are embittered and critical of a socially privileged elite. In this case, the would-be rebels saw that they had at their disposal military resources that could be employed to grab power. This consideration was alluded to by Prof in his remark that the FSRR used its own unit resources to take Makatiin 1989. They did not require the logistical support of politicians - a feat that, he says, the other participating units could not claim. 18 GAIL TAN ILAGAN The conscientization stage brought the soldiers to the realization that some aspects of his in-service experience were not as they were led to expect from preservice training. The dawning of this insight was aided by interaction with military associates, residents in war- torn communities, the people at the receiving end of their guns, and ~ in Teddy’s case — respected community elders. Political events and perception of the conduct of national leadership and local executives also played a part in bringing home the realization of the discrepancy between the ideal and the real. ‘The Factors in Politicization Politicization refers toa subsequent level in conscientization whereby the individual moves to resolve the feeling of discontent and con fusion through involving others in the analysis of causes, consequences, and alternatives to the issue at hand. This section examines the factors that influenced how the soldiers processed cognitive dissonance. The Social Factors The respondents acknowledge that they were moved to participate because of the expectations of their comrades in the core group and other people they worked with in organizing, This was particularly true for the repeated participants. As Heider contends, people do not like disagreements. They would rather be part of the consensus. Sigmund explains: I was surrounded by people who were there for the ‘86, ‘87, so. .. In fact, I was part of ‘87 also. But for 1989, they did not ask me to join because they respected the sensitivity of my position. I was the one who volunteered... I went up to Abe (Purugganan)" and said, “Sir, I am volunteering. Here I am.” So I was there in Makati. Pogi, on the other hand, mentions his commanding officer and a senior officer among those who figured in his decision to rebel in 1989. These two were among those who expected him to participate. Constant contact with them was provided by two-way VHF/UHF radios and nightly “squad meetings.” I was involved in EDSA 1 and the 1987 coup. The plotters were all over us before the 1989 exercise erupted. They never asked me to join. They expected me to join. Tiny qualifies the nature of his recruitment as mainly an extension of his assigned duties and responsibilities: TAMBARA 22 19 The military is just like how it is outside. People are segregated according to the following: there are the intelligentsia, there are those who are not, and there are those who prefer to do what they’re told to do. Ir just works that way. There are those who make decisions, and there are those who are tasked to execute these decisions. So it just depends on where you are in the pecking order. ‘Van provides a clearer picture into the dynamics of the unity of command in an elite military unit: The special units conduct more cohesive training and operations. ‘They are commander-dependent. Once respectis earned —and respect is earned, not due to position — men don’t question the commander’s decision. When there’s a mission, he asks for volunteers. But it is the commander’s decision, and a good soldier knows how to follow orders. It is the military culture for soldiers to put their trust in the commander, but that is only when the commander has earned the respect of his men. Van’s statement highlights the qualities of leadership that elicit the kind of trust needed to follow directions without question. It affirms Milgram’s (1974) theory about the effect of orders from a credible authority on the subordinate’s obedience and suspension of ethical judgment over individual actions. The Leadership Factor ‘There is a rigid system of hierarchy in the military, and leadership plays a pivotal influence on the behavior of the subordinates. The socioemotional atmosphere provided by the leader enhances cohesion and individual effectiveness in any team undertaking (Ortigas 1991). A good leader knows this. Writing an email at leisure, Kiko sent in a long accolade for Gringo Honasan, his superior at the MND in 1986. Much of his fecollection focuses on the nurturing side of his previous superior. Beyond appreciating those qualities that impact on the performance of professional duties, Kiko felt comfortable to assess his former boss on purely personal grounds and to look up to him as a role model. The line that divided the professional and the personal interactions were blurred in their shared history. Kiko was impressed with Honasan’s habit of breaking social divides. For Kiko, Honasan put less stress on the power he was rightfully entitled to, as evidenced in the anecdotes about serving his men before he even thought of eating and in laboring alongside the troops despite the fact that he could have taken a break. 20 GAIL TAN ILAGAN Most of Van’s military career had also been largely under Honasan’s command. Like Kiko, his esteem was based on the professional conduct and the personal aspects of his boss. Van appreciated their similar interests and predispositions, but qualified that he would draw the line over ethical considerations. His definition of a leader: He should be a good manager who knows how to optimize the human resources at his disposal, who can elicit/tap the expertise of his men, regardless of differences in political beliefs. T've been lucky because I chose a commander I can respect and who respects me back by giving me assignments that challenge me and are appropriate to my expertise. One thing I admire about him (Honasan) is his continuous quest for knowledge. He's always reading book. If he’s got some time, you'll find him with a book. | admire that: He does not stop learning He has this thirst for learning, When asked if he would still make the same decision as he did in 1989, Van replied in the affirmative, but qualified that if he found Honasan “in a position where I perceive him to depart from the standard of propriety, I will move against him.” Interestingly, some were not [oo keen on Honasan. When asked if he thought Honasan was a good soldier, Marshall replied, “ No.” He conceded, though, that Gringo was very charismatic. “Give him twenty minutes with a devout Muslim and he’ll have him thumping his chest and quoting the Bible,” Marshall adds. Bagyo also did not think Gringo was a good soldier, but thathe was good at another thing: “deceiving the unsuspecting,” Fourteen years after participating in the 1989 coup attempt, Marshall says he would do itagain if he were to serve under the same commanding officer. He says soldiers never really question their commander's decision, but that they would be willing to follow and even lay down their lives if they come to trust their superior. Marshall explains: You can see that he has concern for his troops. He really cares about them. He loves his men. He does not steal what's theirs. Prof was one of the prominent unit commanders in the 1989 coup. He demonstrated the ability to inspire his men to follow him to rebellion. He thinks a good commander is one who shows respect and commitment to his men. In particular, he stresses the importance of keeping sacrosanct the romantic and domestic arrangements of the people below. Prof explains: TAMBARA 22 Respect is earned by showing your men you love them. You are concerned about them. You should also show firmness in decision and all out support. And above all, you should not take away those they love. There are soldiers who will hold their commanders at gunpoint for taking away their wives. You should never take away their loved ones. Many soldiers don’t trust their commanders because the latter don’t show that they are committed. Bagyo’s concept of an inspiring leader is one who radiates ofessionalism in service, goal-orientation, and good interpersonal skills, that order. Based on these qualities, he considers Abe Purugganan a ‘od commander because he revolutionized counterinsurgency operations and it’s so effective. He is a good leader. A thinker, a doer. [He] produces results, too. And he relates well with the men. In general, soldiers hold on to legendary myths that tell about the markable qualities of those who came before. The telling and retelling rve to convey a model worthy of emulation to the next generations of ven at arms, thus perpetuating a defined ideal of leadership within the iilitary culture. Prof provides an example of a legendary myth that has arvived the changing of the guards: (The greatest Filipino soldier) is what one could call a soldier's soldier. He did not command from the luxury of safety. He slept among the troops and at the frontline. And he knew how to deal with soldiers. For example, Canieso” gave a soldier who accidentally fired during the patrol a bolo for the next patrol. He was not officious, but he knew how to discipline his men. You can bet the guy with the bolo learned to be careful, otherwise he would spend the whole time in enemy territory armed with only a bolo. In summary, the qualities of a leader who can inspire his men to rebellion include competence, respect, charisma, rapport, sensitivity, judicious use of power, and the ability to elicit the personal admiration and high regard of the men under him. The Cultural Factors In seeking further information and, hopefully, a resolution, the soldier goes to those he believes will understand and will be able to help. He brings these issues to the formal and informal discussion groups which ate a normal feature of the respondents’ military experience. Junior officers also air their concerns to their commanders. Bagyo tells of how he deals with the gripes of those under him: 22 GAIL TAN ILAGAN “Three of the (Oakwood) mutineers were under my command in Jolo. They used to come to my quarters and gripe, but I already saw that they were being used so I tried to discourage them. But then, I got transferred. The commander who replaced me humored them, so they thought he’d go along. But when they brought their commander for “high level” talks, he would not commit. They were embarrassed. ‘The disgruntled troops became easy targets for recruitment because in their search for resolutions, they were willing, perhaps unconsciously, to be deceived by those who offered a solution. Heider (1958) contends that overt disagreements over common issues are generally avoided. To avoid further confusion, people seldom dwell on the troublesome elements to their behaviors. Sigmund shares this insight into the process: Iwas with RAM, but not exactly formally. There is no application form or things like that. I sat at their discussion groups. In fact; | was part of the group that handled recruitment for the Air Force and Navy in 1987. That was when I realized that we were lying for recruitment. We lied so they would join up. We were told that 100% were joining. So why did we need to recruit, huh? I think I lied to comfort myself. | allowed myself to be deceived. But, of course, it’s hard to own up to having been deceived. So one can lie and say it’s for the country. That sounds better. But of course, the truth is that we were willing to fool ourselves. Atthe elite FSRR, where six of the respondents were assigned in 1989, the political education lectures drew on soldier’s individual experiences to bolster the validity of the social analysis. It also played on the Ranger’s elitist and messianic sentiments, a form of class consciousness that grew out of high morale in the unit that allowed them to see themselves as a breed apart, as evident in Sigmund’s clarification: There's the messianic feeling that the others were not doing anything soit's up to us. Since we “saw” the horrors, we were moved to do something about our country. The SR also has an elitist attitude. To our minds, we were the best, so we kind of insisted - demanded- that the same level of discipline should be the standard met by the other units and yes, even by the civilian government, though, of course, you can't impose that on them. ‘Another feature that played a crucial role in politicization is the soldier’s perception of belongingness and identification with his unit. For some, the esprit de corps provided a strong motivation to participate in unit activities. For others, harmonious everyday interaction in the unit CAMBARA 22 23 ‘ostered an emotional climate that deepened beyond esprit de corps, 1s evidenced by the kinship the soldiers felt for each other and the personal ties that were established. This suggests the lack of acrimonious disagreements in their relationship, a May-in-Camelot setting ideal for bonding the individual to the emerging in-group. Kiko reminisces of his days with the MND: We were closely knit like brothers. Being assigned with them was one of my colorful military moments. We were almost like family My wife - my girlfriend then - was close to theit wives. We were really happy then. Chef was also with the MND in the mid-1980s. At the time he was interviewed, he was under house arrest for being implicated in the Oakwood mutiny. He was evasive, and talked in metaphors about his involvement with the RAM, referring to the pie as the tactical design for the coup plot and the baker as the tacticians. Says Chef: The pie has got to be a good one. That’s the difference between the pie you buy just about anywhere and one baked at the Hotel Intercon. I tell you, the pie is all about the baker. Chef's reply suggests that planning fora coup (the pie) is 2 specialized skill. Prospective rebels evaluate the skill of the tactician (the baker) when they decide to participate. Unit involvement was a crucial factor to the rebel’s willingness to commit, While Chef acknowledged being part of the coups in the ‘80s, he denied being a participant to the Oakwood mutiny, an adventure that was headlined by a junior officer from the Philippine Navy, the smallest branch of service. Unlike the Army and Marines, the Navy people are not purposively exposed to combat operations, their contribution being yenerally on the matter of providing tactical support and delivery of logistics. Oakwood was the least likely location to hold hostage the powers that be. Thus, hours after it was mounted, most who had an understanding of military tactics were aware that it was a matter of time before the mutincers would negotiate to be allowed to get out alive. Chefs derision for the unidentified Oakwood tactician/s stems from his comparison with their MND experience at planning this kind of escapades. [t is ironic for him that he was implicated in the Oakwood mutiny. Chef remarks: (The pie baked) in 2003? That was not a pie. What were they doing out of the kitchen? You bake but you don't fire up the oven? You don't mount a coup without firing a shot 24 GAIL TAN ILAGAN In-group pressures were strengthened by the limited exposure the soldiers had with contending support settings outside of the military. Aided by the relatiye isolation of field assignments, the soldiers discussed the issues of their discontent and confusion only among themselves (Balana 2003). The respondents were unanimous in their allegation that they never disclosed their work issues to nonmilitary elements, not even to their families. Thus the issues stayed insulated within and bouncing around among the troops, with the soldiers actually preventing the dilution of their analysis or processing towards a resolution. The discussions among the troops had a way of affirming a shared reality that, in turn, further bonded those who participated in it to the bigger military institution. Nine respondents discussed with the researcher the crucial factor of the dynamics of discussion groups to their politicization. Discussion groups widen the prospective rebel’s perspective of the problem. However, discussion groups also have a way of raising other points of convergence on issues that extend well beyond the immediate concerns of the rebel. In the course of exchanging views, other members also share their experiences of violated expectations, frustrations, and confusion. The soldier realizes that others in the organization also harbor discontent, and that his experience of injustice is not an isolated case. Paradoxically, while entry into the discussion group was sought by the soldier in order to relieve confusion, this had the effect of producing mote dissonance. Prof provides: The discussions stayed among other soldiers. There was this sense of systemic injustice that touched us all - not only those who serve in the military, but also the civilians denied good governance Herald says that nothing has changed in the issues that were the bases of the soldiers’ discontent back in the 1980s: We discussed gripes all the time. Nothing has really been done to check unprofessionalism and corruption in the Armed Forces and in government. There are still unmerited promotions and favoritism in the AFP. In 1989, I thought it would be a way to change towards a better government and country. ‘Teddy confessed that he naively simplified the problem in military terms. He blamed the national leadership for the ills of society because he likened political leadership with military hierarchy. As the unit commander is responsible for the foul-ups committed by his TAMBARA 22 25 subordinates, so also should the President be held accountable for the shabby performance of the executive government. Sigmund also believed that those in other units — and even in the civilian government — should meet the same standards of service adhered to by the Scout Rangers. While the discussions started as a way to process individual gripes, talk soon turned to generalized features in the experience of soldiers ‘This served to shape the recognition of a shared reality that divided them as insiders from outsiders and defined the conflict of interest between the two. While the soldier recognized the supremacy of civilian authority, there was the perception that government made ill-advised decisions that acted against the interest of the military organization and the Filipino people. In particular, the reconciliation agenda pursued by the Aquino Administration was a galling prospect for the military then. Not only was there a perception of the erosion of tactical gains in the battle against the enemies of the state, but that the “other side” was actually gaining ground through entry in government posts (Yabes). The soldiers confronted the prospect of having to take orders from the “enemy.” This did not sit well with the troops. Says Prof: In 1989, what we saw were the tactical gains of the military sacrificed for political reasons. There was a failure of government to address the insurgency problem, which is the main concern of the military. The policy of reconciliation resulted in the release of many leftists who had murdered many soldiers. The country spent a lot for their capture, only to release them later. You turn around and there they are sitting in government making those decisions that further exacerbated the insurgency problem. The Left was taking over the government Prolonged and intense exposure to a one-sided argument is likely to have a polarizing effect on the individual's attitude and perception. Like a crude brainwashing tech nique, one-sided arguments win sympathy and identification for the group to which one is exposed, while demonizing the out-groups. When this happens, there is a shift in the individual's fubjective judgment, evident in his adoption of stronger, emotionally- laden words to describe his experience. For example, Prof’s answer above shows a shift in perspective of how troop casualty in combat with the insurgents was viewed. By calling troop casualty “murder,” 26 GAIL TAN ILAGAN he redefined his cognition of the nature of the interaction between the soldiers and the insurgents. ‘Tiny expresses the same sense of betrayal, decrying the disregard of military efforts in nation building: After 1986, we went back to the barracks. We did our jobs, and it was now up to the civilian government to build up on the gains. But Cory’s government started making mistakes early on. She was not even able to exact justice for the death of her husband. In fact, she was not able to exact justice from the Marcoses. Look at them now- they’te still there. I know these people- I've known them since I was young, I talk to the Lopas, the Romualdezes, etc., and I can see that nothing has changed for them even with the change in government. The military gave Cory the chance to do something, What did she do? She threw it all away. The 1989 exercise was to correct what was started in 1986. Pogi justified the 1989 coup to neutralize the antagonistic threat of a third party that was supplanting the AFP’s power to in fluence government policies. He saw this emerging political force to be sympathetic to the communists who have long been seen by the military as the enemy of the democratic ideal that they were pledged to defend. Says Pogi: The country was in chaos during the Aquino Administration. All government systems were failing, The biggest threat to democracy was the emergence of a new group that was so powerful in government. ‘They detested the AFP and were more inclined to side with the engmy of the soldiers, the communists. This new cognition was juxtaposed against another emerging dissonant and alarming observation: that the government was allowing the enemy’s strength to grow by disregarding the opinion of the military in the matter and by appointing demagogues to policy-making posts. The disenchantment with civilian authority was intensely emotional for the soldier, more so because the soldier lacked the control toinfluence their decisions. As evident in the Code of Conduct, they were trained to live by the dictum of the supremacy of civilian authority. In return, the military expects civilian authority to trust it to do its job of securing the interest of the nation. But the peace and reconciliation agenda pursued by the Cory administration with the Left gave the military the perception of betrayal and neglect. The sense of powerlessness and betrayal was exacerbated TAMBARA 22 27 by the lack of choice but to respect those decisions that affected the military establishment. These conditions pushed for renewed atternpts at integration and cohesion in the face of the perceived threat to the military organization. There was the escalation of negative emotions that was relieved by condemning the conditions of the status quo. Says Bagyo: ‘There was unprofessionalism and bata-bata system. But the more emotional issue was what Cory sought to do with the local Communist movement. The soldiers saw that the politicians were throwing away tactical gains. Many soldiers sacrificed their lives, but this was all for naught as our government released the enemies. Take the case of Kumander Parago."* He killed many soldiers. He was caught, but released only to go back and kill more soldiers. But politicians, like Loren Legarda, have no idea that they are just being used by Joma.” She even negotiated for the release of Obillo and Montealto.” That only served to legitimize the Left. Many soldiers died in the Abubakr offensive, but now the politicians say that the camp has to be given back to the MILF. Nobody takes up what the military has started. Abubakr was built up because the government failed to give it attention. They ignore how much it costs the military to take Abubakr. You see, the politicians are more powerful. The AFP budget needs legislation. The same is true for promotions. GSC does not stand for General Staff Course, but for Governor-Senator-Congressman to back your appointment. That’s why politicians have their way. In answer to the same question, Pogi talked about the growing disenchantment with the way the Aquino Administration spurned the military. The most galling aspect of it was the perception that the government was favoring the enemy. The discriminatory attitude and the ceasefire agreements éntered into by the government coalesced the griping military elements to mount the post-EDSA I coup attempts. Polarization can be observed in the way the recruits to rebellion came to view the traditional enemy. In sum, the thinking was that the AFP was weakening because the Left was gaining ground and usurping the AFP’s ascendancy in the citcles of power. The threat they presented to the military establishment was mignified and generalized to be a threat to the nation. It rallied the soldiers, trained and equipped to al and the threat of the Left in particular, to a call to battle borne of messianic and elitist sentiments. defend the nation against any threat in - 28 GAIL TAN ILAGAN ‘The ironic lesson learned was that the arena of battle had shifted and it was now necessary to shake up the government to tear it away from the guilefully seductive spell of “the enemy.” It was a lesson that found convergence in ‘Teddy's belief that the political elite needed 2 rude awakening, The Aquino Administration needed to be educated about the detrimental effects of its policies. At the very least, it deserved a wake up call. The military began to believe it was the only institution that had the moral obligation and capability to make it happen. As Prof says: “It (the military) is the only institution that holds the country together. Without it, the country will implode.” In the military culture, the idea of mutiny is not taboo. However, it is considered to be an extreme measure to be taken only when all else fail, In the thick of the politicization stage, the ambivalence that soldiers felt about mutinies suggests that ethical consideration for the act have moved beyond the immutable absolutes of military dictums to the realm of subjective justification. Prof provides this insight: You see, the military cannot be isolated from the bigger society. It is a microcosm of the bigger society. It reflects the conditions that could be found out there. In that sense, mutiny is aot an unnatural phenomenon because in everyday affairs, a mutiny of some sort happens in almost every sphere of social life. It could be about children rebelling against parents or secretary denying her boss crucial information. In the military, you also see soldiers holding their commanding officers at gunpoint. So it’s not an unnatural event. Ifthe idea of mutiny is not taboo, sois the idea of soldiers using arms and violence in pursuit of a better, safer nation. Ex-Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, for example, has often defended the all-out war policy in Mindanao because “it is necessary to wage war in order to have peace” (Ilagan 2003). Soldiers are taught to use arms and to fight to the death in order to do their specialized function of defending national sovereignty. Teddy explains his view: You see, faced with the task at hand, itis logical that one should use his skills and resources. In a strike, my peasant relatives would use their farm implements to block roads and their produce to throw at those at the other side of the barricade. The journalist would use his pen. The teacher would use his classroom. Because we soldiers were given guns, we would use those guns to secure the objective. In summary, the cultural conditions in the military establishment fostered the formation of an in-group that featured one-sided arguments, TAMBARA 22 29 lack of dissent, and mutual affirmation. Continued interaction and the perception of being under attack by a comtnon enemy enhanced the cohesion of the in-group. The in-group members perceived the need for something to be done to secure the collective, as well as the national, interest. In the search for alternatives, the rebels covered the range available to them, including the use of justifiable violence. In the politicization stage, the in-group assumed a dominant influence in the individual soldier’s search for alternatives. Groupthink. Syndrome and Risky Shift Effect The task of decision-making for an insulated group is a potential venue for Janis’ (1972) Groupthink Syndrome to come into play. The Groupthink Syndrome 1s characterized by the static of heightened emotional contagion and the felt need to preserve cohesion in the face of a collective threat. These have the effect of putting pressure on individual members to encourage and affirm each other in the hope to relieve tension (Baron and Byrne 1999). Disagreements are avoided. ‘Thus, while creative solutions are brought out, the negative aspects of danger and questionable morality are usually downplayed or ignored (Janis). This attempt to preserve group coherence leads toa deterioration of reality testing, mental efficiency, and moral judgment. Kogan and Wallach (1967) describe the phenomenon of the Risky Shift Effect that, like the Groupthink Syndrome, was evident in the politicization of potential rebel soldiers. First, the individual acknowledged a personal stake in the resolution of the dilemma. He then became motivated to contribute to the alternatives and encouraged others to share theirs. The atmosphere of affirmation facilitated the soldier's willingness to participate: toward collective solutions. In exploring the alternatives, the soldiers found it natural to delve into and exploit their own training and expertise in a climate that approximated war room dynamics. Drawing on resources that went beyond the personal reach of the individual members, the final output was likely to be more creative. ‘This was recognized as a team effort that the individual member took pride in. As Prof relates: We gravitated into informal discussion groups. These were mainly people with similar concerns, similax reading of the situation, and similar interest in tactical planning and operations. We talked about how best to accomplish the mission. We shared expertise 30 GAIL TAN ILAGAN and information. No dissent - this was a community of people who respected each other's ability. In these discussions, observations were affirmed, frustration was acknowledged. Soldiers felt that the group supported their concerns, and they were encouraged to speak out. It was very cordial and initially harmless, but it turned serious when we saw it could be done. There was a sharing of solution. We treated it as an intellectual problem for collective effort to solve. In the discussions, we improved on the alternatives presented Chef offers a comparison of the intellectual exercise that was required in plotting a coup. This time, instead of baking pies, he talks about working out the physics in sighting targets with a Howitzer cannon. Well, it’s like a physics problem. You see, I am an artilleryman. There's your target — you work out the angle and distance. You also factor in wind velocity, wind direction, atmospheric temperature... If you have taken those into consideration, you should hit the target In Chef’s narration, the moral dimension was ignored, and the actual magnitude and scope of the issue were trivialized by the incongruous and inappropriate analogy. Reality testing broke down as unlikely consequences were pushed out of consideration. It won't be surprising, if this thinking lent to the rebel an idea of the in-group’s invincibility that would ultimately lead them to adopt a risky alternative: If one can’t miss with a cannon, one can’t miss with a coup attempt. The Risky Shift Effect on the Unpoliticized Rebel ‘The Risky Shift Effect could also occur in the decision-making of an unpoliticized group so long as the cohesion is sufficiently binding on the individual members for it to constitute a push for group coherence. This was evident in the experience of Top Gun who participated in the 1986 EDSA Revolt because of personal pressures to conformity and reluctance to physically part with his buddies. Recalls Top Gun: It’s funny. We were in the barracks that first day and monitoring on television what was going on in EDSA. That was how we identified the players. Everytime we saw a face on TV, someone would recognize it. Of course we talked about it, we were glued to the events on TV. I can’t remember who started the talk about how this was going to affect all of us. “What are we doing? How can we help?” For that matter, “Which side are we on?” Our base commander was not taking sides. He only directed that we secure the base. So those who had training got assigaments to fly recon(naissance missions), but only as base security. His attitude then ‘was to wait and sce. ‘TAMBARA 22 31 ‘The next day we got word that the PC were organizing, volunteers in‘ Batangas City. They liberated the armory there. They said that anybody who wanted to go to EDSA to help could come over to the PC detachment, and they would issue arms. There was supposed to be buses to take the volunteers to Manila. ‘There were around twenty of us. Some wanted to volunteer, their minds were made up already. So they said: “Hey, let’s go.” Me, I kept asking: “Is this tight? Is this constitutional? Hey, we are supposed to defend the Constitution.” But I tagged along, still asking all the way. I think two or three among us chose to remain in the barracks. So there I was with a gun in the bus going to Manila, and still I was arguing with the guys. But they were adamant. I kept asking about what's the proper way to defend the Constitution and was it right for us to turn rebels? After a while, I was beginning to think that if they won't be dissuaded, I'll go along. When we hit South Superhighway, there were government tanks there so we took the backroads. We sat on our guns just in case we got stopped. We finally got to EDSA and when I saw the swelling crowd there, I stopped asking questions. I thought, “Hey, this is not an isolated case. There’s more to this than I originally thought.” ‘The people were cheering us. That convinced me Had the base commander taken sides and communicated the same to the men under him, perhaps Top Gun wouldn’t have gone to EDSA. But the commander was obviously ambivalent, and the fact that the group was not prevented from leaving the base only highlighted the lack of direction from above. On the bus, nobody took up Top Gun’s questions against the collective action. For lack of supporting argument, he was not able to elevate these questions to the level of a more forceful categorical dissent. Because he couldn’t convince them, Top Gun sought the balance in the contradicting, elements of the experience by changing his mind instead, as his own exposure increased his involvement in the group exercise. When he saw the people cheering their arrival at EDSA, he interpreted this as an affirmation or vindication of their act. ‘Yop Gun’s experience emphasizes the Risky Shift Effect. On his ‘own, he wouldn't have done as he did, but he went along with what the others were doing even though he wasn’t convinced of its advisability. ‘Yop Gun’s arguments weakened as the bus rolled farther away from | the airbase and as he continued to conform to the demonstrated group ~ norm of undertaking increasingly risky moves. His participation to avoid 32 GAIL TAN ILAGAN the government barricades was already a tacit, albeit tentative, vote for participation to rebellion. Had the EDSA reception been different, his arrival there would have meant another round of soul-searching. After convincing himself that their action was justified, Top Gun was now ready to commit to more dangerous tasks and to subvert his will to the will of the collective. The abdication of personal will to individual action manifested symptoms of mental inefficiency. He stopped asking questions, although some part of him was looking at his actions with incredulity, dissociation, and a sense of unreality. Ultimately, he found humor in what did not make logical sense to his action. Top Gun explains: When we got there (at EDSA), our bus got assigned at Lasalle, Greenhills. We were to be the first line of defense. Our CO was a PC captain. I don’t remember the name anymore, but I do remember he was from Batangas. A few hours after we got there, there was word that the government was going to send in their troops. And I was there on the frontline, only twenty-two, had yet to make children... I could die out there. Anyway, ourCO gave usa pep talk. He ended itby saying, “Whatever happens tonight, let’s prove that Batangueiio blood runs thick!” I could have died out there to prove that about Batanguefo blood even though Tam not a Batanguefio. Ah, to die for the wrong reason... The foregoing sections illustrate the strength and nature of group influence on individual behavior. However, the two examples also show that the optimism and relief brought by the creativity of novel solutions could overshadow the cautionary considerations of what could verily go. wrong in the plan. Through the problem-solving dynamics of the smaller groups of tacticians, the atmosphere of respect allowed creative solutions to come out and be further improvised. The ego-involvement of each soldier in the search for alternatives has the effect of making him’ feel proprictorial about the collective consensus and solidified his | commitment (Lewin 1952). . In the second illustration, we see that individual conformity to” collective action is a potent force that brings the individual to behave in ways that, on his own, he would not consider. Reminiscing about EDSA| seventeen years later, Top Gun says: i ‘As an individual, I’m not likely to be adventurous. And I find the very idea of me influencing others to rebel particularly ludicrous. ‘TAMBARA 22 33 The Factors to Conversion Conversion defines the point of no return. This section examines the factors that influenced the soldier’s conscious decision to participate ina rebellious act when the opportunity presented itself. Top Gun, the unpoliticized rebel, observes that “rebellion happens to the individual soldier.” In his case, he crossed the line when he saw the people at EDSA. Until then, he was still trying to resolve the dilemma to his participation. It was still only on an intellectual level and he was still “tguing with himself. But the cheering people crystallized for him his deals as a soldier who should be defending the nation. When all is said nd done, the people are the nation. The overwhelming crowd at EDSA nd the noise they made convinced Top Gun that these indeed were the seople he should be fighting for. Because he needed to minimize the stress from holding contradictory ethical judgments on his conduct, he filtered out from consideration that there must be Filipinos who were not at EDSA and that their desires should have also factored into his decision. But when one gets applauded, one can’t help but want to please the audience some more, and never mind those who are not there to see. Out of sight, out of mind. Surreal as this tale of conversion sounds, it eerily echoes much of the elements that became part and parcel in the considerations of Defense Secretary Mercado and Chief of Staff Reyes when they joined the EDSA II crowd and effected Estrada’s fall from power in January 2001. In their separate speeches on that occasion, Mercado and Reyes alluded to realizing an identification with “the people,” the reworking ff the criteria they latched on to adopt what constituted “the will of the people,” as well as the period of self-argument over how to interpret the idea of “defense of the Gonstitution.” Ambiguity becomes subject {© personal interpretation as emerging correlates of the experience are fearcanged into a coherent, balanced, and consonant whole. In summary, for nine of the respondents, crossing the line was # @rndual, conscious process reached after being convinced of the Vegitimacy of the collective grievances in the military. They had actively Patticipated in the search for solution and this had made them more ed to identify with the collective verdict on the action to take. it involvement in educating, recruiting, and organizing the troops their own participation in its culmination a foregone conclusion. were converts long before the coup attempt was mounted. 34 GAIL TAN [LAGAN Two went with the flow by not rejecting the alternative presented earlier and by putting themselves in a position where the core organizers came to expect their participation. Conformity was judged the lesser evil to breaking the unity of command. When asked if he will do it again, Bagyo replies: No. Whatever the soldier does, he could not rewrite laws or change political leadership. That is not what the soldier is for. When you are a 1Lt, sometimes you can't see that your direct superiors may be used by politicians for their owa ends. You don’t question, you just follow. But now, if you ask me about 1989, I would not do it again because the soldiers were merely used by the politicians. Conclusions Socialization to rebellion is a developmental process that begins with the soldier’s realization that his actual experiences are far removed from what he was led to expect from preservice training. For some soldiers, adjustment merely requires a reorientation of mind set to make it more congruent with existing realities, but others strongly adhere to the ideals imbibed (Rogers 1980). The latter would be more likely to feel disenchantment, disgust, and confusion when exposed to social realities that contradict his expectations. The social factors that set off the conscientization of the rebel included fellow soldiers and superiors, enemy forces and civilian casualties, as well as the residents of underserved communities. His observation of the conduct of other officers was a major factor in his realization that things were not as they should be. The cultural factors include the theoretical framework provided by self-fashioned political officers in various units. This made the soldiers see the contradictions in their individual and collective realities and influenced them to be critically conscious of the meanings of their experiences. The inadequacy of grievance mechanisms in the service is a very real condition in the military bureaucracy, and in the larger context of Philippine society there is inertia in the response of the executive sector to formulate policies and deliver services to address social injustice and inequality. Both conditions constrain the soldiers to act in ways that depart from his preservice expectations, thereby causing cognitive dissonance. TAMBARA 22 35 When the soldier cannot resolve the inconsistency on his own, he further delves into the mechanisms and standard operating procedures provided during preservice training. He brings his concerns to his superiors or to discussion groups within the AFP organization. This is the stage of politicization which exposes the soldier to various social and cultural influences as he analyzes dissonant experiences, attributes causes, and decides on actions that would correct the incongruence. The foremost social factor in politicization would be the discussion groups. The opinions and attitudes of fellow soldiers and direct superiors exert a strong influence on the alternatives considered by the potential rebel, more surely because the soldier did not entertain a perspective other than that coming from fellow military comrades. Thus, while the soldier seeks help to clear up his confusion, the discussions had the effect of intensifying it. In-group dynamics heighten emotionality and screen out dissent. The discussions introduced high, risk prescriptions and emphasized the sense of injustice that pushed the soldier to commit to and identify with the collective solution. What is remarkable at present is that various units in the military organization maintain several discussion e-groups (Ilagan 2005). These ate in addition to the combined communication capacity of the military organization and the personal resources of the individual soldiers. It would be interesting to study the role of technology in the politicization of the soldiers. The social factor of leadership was also demonstrated to have persuasive influence on the rebels. There are two sets of cultural factors that prove to be influential at this stage. One is the culture that prevails in the military organization and the other is the culture that prevails in the bigger society, to include the workings of the government and the predominant social conditions. Cultural factors provided by the military organization include the demand for troop cohesion and the mechanism of discussion groups for dealing with organizational concerns. The perceived marginalization of the AFP ignited a stronger adherence to the value of esprit de corps. The discussion groups, meanwhile, elicited the soldier’s commitment to collective action. Observations about prevailing conditions of incompetence, unprofessionalism, and corruption in the military highlight the AFP’s 36 GAIL TAN ILAGAN departure from preservice expectations. The soldiers realize that despite their best efforts, the job is far from over. It has become increasingly hard to do because of lack of cooperation from the other sectors in the government. The external realities helped push the soldier toward rebellion. Tiny sums it up: If you have to study the modern mutinies in the Philippines, don’t focus on the military. Study our political system instead. The conditions that occur in the military are caused by what is happening in the political spectrum. The failure of governance, a feature of revolutions mentioned by Brinton as well as by Seabury and Codevilla (1989), was a conclusion arrived at by frontline troops in contact with the residents of remote boondocks. The pacifist culture of the Aquino government lent a perception of the diminution of honor in military service. The political decisions, like the release of political prisoners and their rise in government posts, were seen as a betrayal of the AFP. The elevation in prestige of the enemy could have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. Socialization to rebellion culminates in the soldier’s participation in a coup attempt. The decisive cultural factors in conversion are the military dictums on how soldiers are supposed to deal with threats to the AFP. Perceptions that the military is threatened with division in the ranks or is marginalized moved the individual soldier to rebel to correct the situation. For those involved in organizing for reform of the military institution, participation in a coup was a foregone conclusion. It was only a question of when. The dictum of unity of command became crucial in their conversion when the time came to take a personal stand. The foremost social factor to conversion is the Filipino people. The people’s conditions proved to be the determining factor in the soldier’s decision to rebel. The soldier thought that the people approved of what he was doing; he also perceived that his action would secure the people’s freedom and rights. The roots of rebellion, therefore, lie deep in the socialization of the individual to become a soldier. His preservice training imbues him with ideals that are proven to be contradictory to the real conditions in service. This sets off the initial discontent and confusion. Preservice training also provides him with the standards of conduct, and it is these very same standards and procedures that he goes back to in his quest for solutions. TAMBARA 22 37 The rebel seeks to actively interpret his world of experience and decide upon actions that are intended to realize the preservice ideals of being a soldier serving the military institution and the Philippine society. Creative ideas and the will to action move the individual soldier just as much and as surely as they move the next person. Notes "In http://payson.tulane.edu/conflict/glossary/de_final.htm 2 Magdalo was the name of the Katipunan faction led by Emilio Aguinaldo. + In January 2004, five masked junior officers and a renegade lawyer read a public statement on national television denouncing government policies and calling for AFP reforms. See Iagan 2004. “Prior to January 2001, this event was also called People Power Revolution or EDSA Revolution. EDSA is an acronym for Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, site of the historic convergence in 22-25 February 1986 of church and civil society groups who responded to the call of Jaime Cardinal Sin for citizens to support the rebel soldiers holed up in Camps Aguinaldo and Crame. In January 2003, the site was revisited by the sustained protest action that culminated in the ouster of Pres. Estrada. This later event became known as EDSA IT. * A spontaneous anti-Estrada rally was set off by mass disenchantment and disgust over the Senate vote not to admit as evidence bank records of the disputed Jose Velarde accounts presented by the prosecution in the impeachment trial against Estrada. The next three days would witness the cooperation among middle and left-leaning forces, church groups, business groups, and civil organizations to sustain the call for Estrada’s resignation ° Corruption of “mister.” It is a term used by cadets to refer to a classmate. A “mistah” evokes feclings of intease of group belongingness and identification. See McCoy 1999. ’ From Army Management Information Center. * see http://www.mindanews.com/2003/08/02nws-military.html. ° Prescribed code of conduct for plebes or freshmen at the PMA ' Internal procedures in the PMA designed to make the plebe adhere to the Honor Code that says “A cadet does not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do.” "' Prescribed code of conduct for PMA upperclassmen. " & major MILF camp in Maguindanao, site of February 2000 offensives in the all-out war declared by the Estrada government. 38 GAIL TAN ILAGAN 1 Guest Relations Officer. A euphemism for hospitality women and sex workers. 4 Tacidental loss of civilian life in the course of legitimate combat operations. ‘S Linda Kapunan headed the walkout of the COMELEC tabulators in the February 1986 Snap Presidential Elections, ostensibly in disgust over the rigged computers. She is the wife of Col. Eduardo “Red” Kapunan who was one of the prime movers of the RAM. \6Jq 1989, Purugganan was Commanding Officer of the Scout Ranger Combat Tactical Group. " Major Gen Rodolfo A. Canieso (Ret), PA Commanding General from 28 Feb to 01 July 1986. 1 Leonardo Pitao of the NPA Pulang Bagani Command operating in the Southern Mindanao Region.” ¥ Jose Ma. Sison heads the National Democratic Front from his exile in The Hague. 2 BGen Victor Obillo, commanding officer of the 55'* Engineering Brigade of the Philippine Army, and his aide Capt. Eduardo Montealto were held prisoners by the New People’s Atmy between 17 February to 16 April 1999. 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