B.

Right to Accession:

1. Definition and Classification;

2. Immovable Property;

*Discreta (Arts. 440 – 441);

Natural (Arts. 442 – 444);

Industrial (Art. 442);

Civil (Art. 42);

*Continua (Art. 443);

Naturally Incorporated (Arts. 445 – 446);

Cases:
ZAPATA vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 5 SCRA 335;

CORTEZ vs. CA, 10 PHIL 567;

HILARIO vs. CITY OF MANILA, 19 SCRA 931;

Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a 49 hectares land in Barrio Guinayang, San
Mateo, Rizal.

Upon his death, it was inherited by his son, Hilario, Jr..

Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.

To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed
on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side.
For years, these safeguards served their purpose.

1937 - an extraordinary flood occurred in the entire place including the neighboring barrios
and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and
meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land.
The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the
old riverbed site and the newcourse."

1945 - U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas along the River. The
operations eventually extended northward into this strip of land.

A claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War Department by Luis Hidalgo, administrator
of Dr. Hilario’s estate. U.S. Army paid.

1947 - the plant was turned over to City of Manila, who took over its operations and continued
the extractions and excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near
the River.

Hilario filed a complaint for injunction and damages against City Engineer of Manila, District
Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Bosuego, the Engineer-in-charge of
the plant.

Hilario prayed that:

1. To stop the excavating, bulldozing and extracting gravel, sand and soil from his
property;

2. To solidarily pay to him P5,000.00 as damages.

Defendants' affirmed that the extractions were made from the riverbed.

Intervenors, Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang, were allowed to join the litigation.

Bureau of Mines complained that the disputed area was within the bed of the River so that
plaintiff should not only be enjoined from making extractions there from but should also be
ordered to pay the fees and penalties for the materials taken by him.

Atty. Calalang claimed that:

He was authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed area

March 14, 1954 - Defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor
Calalang alleging and prayed that:

1. the latter have fence off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between
the latter and the Director of Public Works where¬in the defendants were allowed to continue
their operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit.

2. To remove the fence and allow them to continue their operations.

A counter injunction was filed.

March 23, 1954 - Lower court issued an order

1. Maintaining the status quo;
2. Allowing them to continue their extractions from the disputed area provided a receipt in
plaintiff's favor be issued for all the materials taken.
May 13, 1954 - Plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional defendants were
the City of Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Sese, the new Engineer-in-
charge of the plant.

Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila
and the Direc¬tor of Public Works, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials
taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted there from until they stop their operations.

Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that the City Engineer acted merely as
a deputy of the Public Works Director.

The other defendants put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff and the
Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for damages against plaintiff.

The rest renewed the same defense: that the disputed area was part of the public domain,
since it was situated on the riverbanks.

November 3, 1954 - City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to delimit the area of excavation
and asked the lower court to authorize his men to extend their operations west of the
camachile tree in the disputed area. But, later DENIED

Lower Court’s Decision: (against defendants)

1. City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, to pay solidarily, P376,989.60, for the cost
of gravel and sand extracted from the land.
2. Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, to reimburse to intervenor Cala¬lang, P236.80 for gra¬vel
fees illegally collected.

2. They are perpetually enjoined from extracting any sand or gravel from plaintiff's property
which is two-fifths northern portion of the disputed area.

None of the parties seemed to be satisfied so they all sought a reconsideration of the same.

Lower Court’s Decision: (MR)

1. Denies the MR filed by plaintiff and intervenor Calalang;
2. Dismisses the com¬plaint with respect to City of Ma-nila;
3. The northern 2/5 por¬tion of the area belongs to the plaintiff with right to the immediate
pos¬session;
4. Enjoins the defen¬dants and intervenor Bureau of Mines to vacate the same and to stop
from extracting gravel thereon.
5. Dismisses the case against the Bureau of Pu¬blic Works and its agents and employees with
regard to the claim for money.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N when a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new
one through private property, would the new riverbanks be considered as public ownership?

HELD:
SC set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered another judgment to the
effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and his agent and employees,
are absolved of liability from extracting materials from subject property (of public domain);
Portion within the strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as
part of Hilario’s private property.
No Costs.

HELD:

1. Old Civil Code and Law of Waters of 1866 controlling law Since the change in the
course of the River took place in 1937, long before the present Civil Code took effect, the
question should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and
those of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866.

2. All riverbanks, as part of the riverbeds, are of public ownership Under the old Civil Law and
the Law of Waters, all riverbanks are of public ownership, including those formed when a river
leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Artcile 339 of the old Civil
Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it provides that “that devoted to public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character” are property of public ownership. Further,
the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Article 73 of the Law of Waters which provides that the
phrase “banks of a river” is understood those lateral strips of zones of its beds which are
washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The use of
the words “of its bed [de sus alveos] “ clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the
banks for all legal purposes, as part of the riverbed. Thus, the banks of the River are part of
its bed. Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, it follows that the banks,
which form part of them, are also of public ownership.

3. Natural bed or channel of a creek or river defined

The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the
highest [ordinary] floods (Article 70 of the Law of the Waters).

4. New bed, when river changes course, is of public ownership; Means to recover
Article 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that “whenever a navigable or floatable river
changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the
new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event
that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally
authorized for this purpose.” Banks are not mentioned in the provision, as the nature of banks
follows that of the bed and the running water of the river.

5. A river is a compound concept consisting of running waters, bed, and banks

A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements;
(1) the running waters,
(2) the bed and
(3) the banks.

All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord with this view, as that “‘
River’ consists of water, bed and banks”; and that “A ‘river’ consists of water, a bed and
banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it
cannot exist without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you
could sink the bed, instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks,
and you have, a boundless flood”

6. River is of public ownership, elements follow same nature of ownership; Law explicit
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should
either be totally public or completely private. Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit
that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. Still, the law expressly
makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Artciles 339 and
407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Articles 33,
par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

7. Natural is not synonymous to original or prior condition “Natural” is not made

synonymous to “original” or “prior condition”. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its
original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within
the scope of the definition provided by the Diccionario de La Real Academia Española. Hence,
the law must have used the word “natural” only because it is in keeping with the ordinary
nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.

Diccionario De La Real Academia Española: “NATURAL-perteneciente a la naturaleza o

conforme a la calidad o propriedad de las cosas; -nativa, origivario de un pueblo o imcio’n;
hecho con verdad, ni artificio, mezela ni compocision alguna, ingenuo y sin doblez en su modo
de proceder; di cese tambien de las cosas que imitar a, la naturaleza con propiedad; regular
y que comumnente sucede, y par eso, facilmente creible; que se produce por solas las fuerzas
de la naturaleza, canio contraVuesto a sobre natural y milagroso.”

8. Article 553 of the old Civil Code does not intend to authorize private acquisition of river
banks but recognizes vested rights of riparian owners; History of ownership of River Banks
Article 553 was never intended to authorize the private acquisition of river banks, as this
would conflict with clear legislative policy enunciated in Article 339 of the Code that all
riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested
rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were able to acquire ownership
over the banks.

This was possible under the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1834. Under Law 6, Title
28, Partida 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the Roman Law
rule. But subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of 3 August
1866, riverbanks became of public ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part
of the bed which was public, by statutory definition. This law, while expressly repealing all
prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then existing. Article 73 of the Law
of Waters of 1866 is the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks
and the policy of the law to devote all banks to public Use. The easement would preserve the
private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in
Article 73 only recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize
future private appropriation of riverbanks. Subsequently, the Law of Waters of 13 June 1879
reenacted Article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866 and affirmed the public ownership of rivers
and their beds and the treatment of the banks as part of the bed. But nowhere in the law was
there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of the banks. The public nature of
riverbanks are obtained only by implication until the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1899,
which was explicit in Article 339 that riverbanks were declared public property since they were
destined for public use. Since the first paragraph of Article 36 of the Law of Waters if 1879
was reenacted in Article 553 of the Code, this article must also be understood not as
authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as recognizing the vested titles of
riparian owners who already owned the banks.

In the present case, since the new banks were formed when the river changed its course in
1937, the banks cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas, to claim private
ownership of the banks, as such was already superceded by then.

9. Legal definition applies with the legal order, distinction due to physical order cannot prevail
The conclusion made by the lower court that only the northern 2/5 of the disputed area
remained as plaintiff’s private property is predicated from the findings that the portion where
rice and corn were found in the ocular inspection of 15 June 1951, was on the northern 2/5
of the disputed area; that this cannot be a part of the bed because of the existence of
vegetation which could not have grown underwater, and that this portion is manmade. This
is bereft of evidence, as the unexcavated portion of the land is the southwestern ¼. Further,
American cases cannot be applied as these do not involve a similar statutory provision, unlike
in the Law of Waters, which defined “beds” and “banks” and considered the latter as part of
the former. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not have grown
on the bed which is constantly subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction
between “beds” and “banks” in the physical order. However, in dealing with the legal order,
legal definitions prevail.

10. Limits of banks of rivers

Article 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers “By the phrase
‘banks of a river’ is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by
the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The farthest extremity
of the bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or strip which is reached by
the waters during those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other words, the extent
reached by the waters when the River is at high tide.

11. Banks of river different in topography

There is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining the
River. The line indicated as “primary bank,” which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and
has a steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level.
The opposite side, on the other hand, has no such steep acclivity. The bank near the water
edge, is about 30 to 50 cms. high only, and gradually slopes up to a height of about 2 to 2-
1/2 meters along the line indicated as “secondary bank”, which is quite far from the waterline.
Considering the peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the river, the rise in the
waterlevel would not have the same effect on the two sides. Thus, on the east, the water
would rise vertically, until the top of the “primary bank” is reached, but on the west, there
would be a low angled inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the “secondary
bank” line is reached. In other words, while the water expansion on the east is vertical, that
on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.

12. Ordinary and extraordinary flood

There are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. One is the so-called
“ordinary” flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines of
the “primary” and “secondary” banks. This occurs annually, about three to four times during
the period. Then there is the “extraordinary” flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said
banks, and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen
regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods.

13. Movement of the river, west bank, from 1945-1955

From 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River extended westward up to the “secondary
bank” line; from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east, its lateral
borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and from 1953 to
1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the camachile tree,
until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.

14. Floodings not accidental as they are annual; Government v. Colegio de San Jose does not
apply
Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season. These
floods can hardly be called “accidental”. The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point.
What was mainly considered there was Article 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds
and pools. In the present case, none of these is involved.

15. Movement of the river not due to excavation and extraction of materials
The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been
made only on the strip of land west of the River. Under the “following-the nature-of-things”
argument advanced by plaintiff, the River should have moved westward, where the level of
the ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead.
Therefore, it cannot be attributed to defendants’ operations. Moreover, Hilario’s own evidence
indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. The movement eastward
of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which
caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which
increased its level from as much as .93 to 2 meters.

16. River of different width; claim of unnatural widening unfounded

Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the river was only 60 meters
wide, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide. Such area sampled shows only the
width of the River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate
how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north.

17. Extraction confined on the banks of the river and not beyond limits of the west bank to
invade his private estate; Hilario cannot recover damages from defendants
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in the
New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This
zone, City Engineer Manila, is about 1 km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35.
However, no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the
“temporary bank” line. This line is located east of the “secondary bank” line, the lateral
extremity of the west bank then. In the latter part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants
from extracting along the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This
forced the defendants to go southeast of the “Excavated Area”. From 1954 to 1955,
defendants’ area of operation was still farther east of the New Accretion Area. They were.
working within a confined area along the west waterline, the northern and western boundaries
of which were 20 meters away east from the camachile tree. It appears sufficiently
established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond the receding western
extremities of the west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only
from which the banks of the River, which constitute part of the public domain wherein they
had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that defendants have
gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have invaded his
private estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from them.

18. Plaintiff not denied of property without just compensation The Court does not declare
that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the “secondary bank” line and the “primary
bank” line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What is held is that at the time the
defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks
then. All that space to the west of said receding line” would still be part of plaintiff’s property
and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by the non-
inundating ordinary floods. Further, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of
his property without any compensation at all. Under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the
abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the
other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost.
19. Defendants did not unjustly profit at plaintiff’s expense as they are not responsible for
the shifting of the river Defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff’s
expense. They were not responsible for the shifting of the river. It was due to natural causes
for which no one can be blamed. Furher, defendants were extracting from public property
then, under proper authorization. The government, through the defendants, may have been
enriched by chance, but not unjustly.

GRANDE vs. CA, 5 SCRA 524;

FACTS: The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their
deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early
1930’s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land
was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.

By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an
alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed
an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and
continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the
Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated that they
were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for
damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners?

HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land.
However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial
deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the
Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible
witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only
entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by
the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when
the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in
1950.

IGNACIO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 727 SCRA 13;

REPUBLIC vs CA, 132 SCRA 514;

FACTS: The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan,
bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration
of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the
Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the
petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone
witness (their overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the respondents simply
transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if
there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human
intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place

HELD:
No, Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to
said property was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The
lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been
caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in
1939, but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property
conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire
Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling
the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to
protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in question
were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public
property.

Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even
dry land. The entire area was under one to two meters of water.

LUNOD vs. MENESES, 11 PHIL 128;

FACTS:
 Nicolas Lunod, et al, residents Bulacan, Bulacan, filed a written complaint against
Higino Meneses
o they each owned and possessed farm lands situated May Tunas and Balot,
near a small lake named Calalaran
 defendant: owner of a fish-pond
and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the Calalaran lake on one side,
and
the River Taliptip on the other
 (from time immemorial, i.e., for more than twenty years before 1901), there was a
statutory easement in favor of rice fields of petitioners, permitting the flow of water
over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the
year 1901
o the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake could flow
through Paraanan into the Taliptip River
 defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fish
pond; dam and a bamboo net, prevented the' free passage of the water through said
place into the Taliptip River
 lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters, (land in
Paraanan was only outlet)  plantations destroyed
 plaintiff’s lands and Calalaran lake are located in places relatively higher than sitio
Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated
  during rainy season, only outlet of rain water from land of plaintiffs  Calalaran lake
 Taliptio river is through the low land of Paraanan
 on borderline between Calalaran and Paraanan  dam, constructed by the
community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters
from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran (this dam
was opened when there was heavy rainfall)
 defendant’s dam (now the 2nd dam) along the boundary of his fish pond in Paraanan,
thereby impeding the outlet
 Plaintiffs asked that defendant be ordered to remove and destroy obstructions to free
passafe of waters
 Defendant: no statutory easement existed; owned area and boundaries

HELD
 owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such an
easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the
benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners; neither
can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement
o A 530. easement is a charge imposed upon
one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner,
and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate
 Lands of Paraanan are lower – subject to easement of receiving and giving passage
to waters from higher lands, and Calalran lake
 Easement not constituted by agreement –STATUTORY NATURE, imposed for cthe
common public utility
o A 552. Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without
the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they cairy with them.
"Neither may the owner of the lower estate construct works preventing
this easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the
burden.
o A563. he establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of
waters to which this section refers shall be governed by the special law
relating thereto in everything not provided for in this code
o Special Law: Law of Waters of August 3,1866, article 111. Lands situated
at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that
flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands
together with the stone or earth which they carry with them."
o A530, 552, 563, and Law of Waters of August 3,1866, article 111
 Meneses, had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the
passage,
through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood
the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the
easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law
 While A338 authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of walls, ditches,
fences or any other device, this right is limited by
the easement imposed upon his estate.
 His right to construct necessary works for fishpond subject to obligation to respect
statuory easement of waters upon his property, i.e., to give passage to and allow the
flow of the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of the
plaintiffs through
his lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River
  Conclusion:
 Respondent ordered to emove any obstacle that may obstruct the free passage of
the waters
 abstain from impeding, in any manner, the flow of the waters coming from the
higher lands

BINALAY vs. MENESES, 195 SCRA 347;

BAES vs. CA, 224 SCRA 562;

VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. CA, 257 SCRA 589;

FACTS:
Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled property situated beside an accretion area
along the banks of Cagayan River. Jose Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of land from
Nazareno. When Salsalan & Rabaya stopped paying rentals, Nazareno filed an ejectment suit.
The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of Nazareno; the RTC affirmed the decision. Thus,
Nazareno filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to perfect his title over the accretion
area being claimed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is a public land?

ARGUMENTS:

VDA. DE NAZARENO SALASALAN AND RABAYA

 The subject land is a private land  They contend the public character of
being an accretion to Antonio the subject land.
Nazareno’s titled property.  Mere application of the
 Art. 457 of the Civil Code which Miscellaneous Sales Patent by
provides that “To the owners of Nazareno is an admission that the
lands adjoining the banks of rivers land being applied is a public land.
belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters”.
 The accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or current of the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the subject land is part of the public domain since the accretion was
man-made or artificial. Under Article 457 of the Civil Code:

“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

But the Court provides the following requisites of accretion (Rules of Alluvion):
 1. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

2. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and

3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or sea
coast).

In Republic v. CA, “the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current
of the river is indispensable”. In Hilario v. City of Manila, “the word “current” indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide”.
Here, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.

ARTIFICIALLY INCORPORATED (Arts. 451 – 456);

EQUITORIAL vs. MAYFAIR, 370 SCRA 56;

FACTS: Petitioner Carmelo and Bauermann Inc. leased its parcel of land with 2-storey building
to respondent Mayfair Theater Inc.
They entered a contract which provides that if the LESSOR should desire to sell the leased
premises, the LESSEE shall be given 30-days exclusive option to purchase the same.

Carmelo informed Mayfair that it will sell the property to Equatorial. Mayfair made known its
interest to buy the property but only to the extent of the leased premises.
Notwithstanding Mayfair’s intention, Carmelo sold the property to Equatorial.

ISSUE: W/N the sale of the property to Equatorial is valid?

HELD:
The sale of the property should be rescinded because Mayfair has the right of first refusal.
Both Equatorial and Carmelo are in bad faith because they knew of the stipulation in the
contract regarding the right of first refusal.

The stipulation is a not an option contract but a right of first refusal and as such the
requirement of a separate consideration for the option, has no applicability in the instant case.
The consideration is built in the reciprocal obligation of the parties.

In reciprocal contract, the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of
the other. (Promise to lease in return of the right to first refusal)

With regard to the impossibility of performance, only Carmelo can be blamed for not including
the entire property in the right of first refusal. Court held that Mayfair may not have the option
to buy the property. Not only the leased area but the entire property.

LIWANAG vs. YU-SONGUIAN, 5 SCRA 147;

FACTS: Yu-Chiocco leased a land on Calle Lemery, Tondo in 1901. The property, however,
was later claimed by Leoncia Liuanag, on behalf of the estate of Yu-Chingco, who had died in
China on Oct. 30 1901. Yu-Chiocco himself died in August 1902.

The lower court found that Yu-Chiocco contributed the labor, while the materials used
belonged to the estate of Yu-Chingco, and ruled that the estate of Yu-Chingco owned half of
the buildings.
The Supreme Court overturned the ruling, saying that even if the materials belonged to Yu-
Chingco, “it does not follow, as a conclusion of law, that the owner of the material thereby
became the owner of any part of the buildings.”
Instead, Liuanag should be paid for the materials that were used to construct the building.

It cited Art. 360 of the Civil Code, which says that a landowner who builds on his land using
the materials of another is obliged to pay for the value of the material. Saying that the
provision would also apply to a leasehold in real estate, the Court said Liuanag has a claim
for the value of the materials that were used in the construction of the building.

JUDGMENT: Ruling REVERSED. Case remanded to lower court with directions to enter
judgment in favor of defendant, without prejudice to present claim against the person or
estate bound to pay it.

JM TUASON vs. VDA. DE LUMANLAN, 23 SCRA 231;