You are on page 1of 95

Japanes. Monograph No. 157 (Includes Nos.

IS7 t 158,159)

Co y

--·r·-;]
_.. __

1959

I

HOMELAND AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS REOORD

!

: r
!

I"

PREPARED BY HEADQUARTERS, USAF FE AND EIGH TH U.S. ARMY (REAR) DISTRIBUTED BY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

PREFACE

P.EVlSED EDlTIClf
Japanese Monograph, No. 157, "Homeland Air Defense Oper­ in 1952, as a series

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, Institution tor War Records Investi­ 12 October 1945, subjec t : gation, steps were 101 tiated to exp loi t milltaryhistorical . records and ot1'icial reports ot: the Japanese War Ministryand Upon dissolution ot the War l.f1n1atry Japanese General Staft. and t he Japanese General Start, and the transter ot their tor­ mer functions to the De mobillzation Bureau, research �d com­ pilation continued and developed into a series ot historical monographs. The pauci"ty ot original o rders, plans and \Ul.it journal., which are nonnally essential in the preparations ot this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field ol.)erations or bombing raids rendered the task of cocpilation m st d.1fficultj p:lrticularly distressing has been the complete J.o.ck of official strength reports, nonnal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the i:nnortD.nt orders, pla ns and esti­ rnates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the Originals, they are believed to be generally a c cura te and reliable.

ations Record" was originally prepared, ot three sepa rate studi es :

No. 157, "Homeland Air Defense Operations Record, Kanto Sector."

No. 158, "Homeland Air Detense Operat1ons 1fecord. Central Sector." no. 159, "Homela.nd Air Detense Operat1ona Record, Western Sector." The originnl editions, which were developed frolll fragmental")' records and recollections, failed to present the various Sector operations in proper relationship to ench other. This lack of cohesion made i1; virtually impossible to gain an un­ derstandine of the ov.er-all air defense operations in Japan. During the six. years that elapsed between the publicntion of the Original cd.! tions and this revised edition; a trel:lelldoua 8J:1ount of additionnl infomntion became available, ll'.a.kinC i't pos�ible to rectify ��y errore of omission and comm1s3ion in �p and othe r illustrative material has also the original. been expanded and improved. PR.sic data contained in this monograph vas compiled by the following former ofr1cere of the Japanese Army Air FOrce: Col. Klyoshi Kanzak1

o

Under the supervision ot the �mobillzation Bureau, the basic material contained in the monograph w.s compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within maJor units during the period of oper­ Translation v.lS effected through the fac ili ties ot a tions. Allied Translator and Interpreter Se rvice, G2, General Head­ quarters, Fo.r EJ.st Comma.nd.

�gl1sh by the Japanese Hesearch Division, Mill taryII1stol")' Section, General Headquartercs, far East Commaml Qlld is based on the translation or the

Thio Japanese Operational Monograph

\/a�

rewritten in

- Operations Off1ccr, 11th Air Division
-

MaJ.

lI1 ro shi Toga

Japanese origino.l. FAi torinl cor­ rections were limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.

Start 01"f1cer, 10th Air Division
Sta.tt Officer,

MaJ. Munefus a Hamrulo

-

121.h Air Division
- Start Officer, 12th Air Divis10n
-

Maj. SeiJi Yo..nnmoto 9 June 1952
Capt. lIasakicbi Tako.da

Stnt'f Officer,
11th Air Division

111

v

2

The ed1 tor wishes to take this opportunity to express his thanks for the splendid cooperation and valuable assistance . rendered the Foreign Histories Division by Mr. Susumu Nish1ure. and his statt ot the War Histori es ROO!I1, Key Personnel School, Japan Self' Defense Force.

TABLE OF CONTEm'S

Chapter 1 AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAIf

Title

Revriting or the revised edition was accomplished by the Foreign Histories D1vi�ion, otrice of thP Assistant Chief ot starr G3, Headquarters, United States Army Japan . Research and compilation o.f data for the revioed cd1 tioD was pertol'llled by fonner LCDR Ryosuke Nomura, now a Mil1 tary Opero.tional �t with the Foreign Histories D1 vision.
30 December 1958

Basic Concept ot Japan's Air DefenBe Army Minister ToJo's Comments . Homeland Defense Orsanizatlon Air Defense Organizatlon Strengthening of Air Defense. Co.nmand Progrom - 1944 Type of Planes Special Methods to Combat B-29' s

1 2 3

·

. . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

.

6 8
9

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

11
13

Reinforcements tor Air Divislons . Speclal Attack Ubits
Ta-Ian Bomblng

·

.

.

13
14

·

.

.

. . . .

16
17 17 19 19

Service Unit Operations Airfield Battalions

. . . . . . .
· .

.

Special Intelligenc e Squadrons Navigational Aid Units Air Rald Waming Lookout Posts Radar Stat10ns Picket Boats Early Wandng Net
• • •

·

.

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
· .

20 20
-

. .
. .

. . .

. . . . . . .

22
24 24

. . . .

.

. .

vi

v11

Chapter

1

AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAN Pilot Training

(Coot'd)
• .


.

Chapter 2
.

AIR DEFmSE OF TllE KAN1'O sa=TOll

Title

(Cont'd)
.

.

.

.

.

26

Service

Uhits

.
.
. . . .

47 47 47
48
· .

High Altitude Training

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

26
27

Airfield

Battalions

.

.

.

.

NIght

Combat

and

Bad Weather Training
• • • • •

Special Intelligence Navigational Aid Air

Squadrons

.

.

.

Ta-Dan Bombing Training
Final Defense

28
28 28

Units.

·

.

Preparations
6th Air Army

·

.

.

.

Raid Warning

System

.

.

.

49 49 57 59

F01"lllation or the Hedesignation of Army Commands Command

·

.

.

.

Lookout Posts
Radar Installations

..

.

.

Districts
• • • • • •

and
• • · . · .

251

Reorganizations - 1945 and Reassignments
Srl'OR
• • • • •

·

.

31
. .

Picket Boats Antiaircraft Defense of Airfields I-lD.jor
• · .

Transfers

·

.

31

60
61 63
65

2

AIR DEFnlSE OF' THE KANl'O

·

.

33 33 34 3S

Command

Changes

.

.

.

.

Organization

of

Defensive Air units Division
• . . .

Tactics to Counter the The Alert SysteQ Improvement in

B-29 Bomber
• •

·

.

.

.

·

.

Fonnation

of the lOth Air

.

.

.

.

·

.

Transfers and Special

Reassignments
. . .

Attack

Techniques
• •

67
6ij 71 72
· .

Attack units

.

.

.

.

.

.

39 39
lie

First Carrier Plane Attack Plans to

Activation of the 6th Air �
Air

·

.

.
·

Combat

Future Attacks

.

Training Program .
High A1titude Bad Weather
Night

.

.

.

. .
.

Night Bombing Attacks Transfer of the 6th Polley

.

.

.

Training .
. .

. . .
.

.

.

.

Air Array 1945
• • • •

75

.

Training

.

.
. . .

Changes

- March

7S

Combat Training

. .
.

Fonnation or the Air Ceneral Art:!y The Ketsu-Go

78 80
· .

.

.

Ta-Dan

Bombing Training

.

Operation

.

.

.

Reinforcement by Trainin.g tb1ts
SUIIlI!I8.l",Y of Traini"ft�·

The
• • • •

Air

General AnDy Takes

Ccmaand

81

Operations
1x

r
Cho.pter 2
AIR

DEF�SE OF THE KANl'O SIOCTOR (Cont'd)
End 01' the War
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Chapter
3
AIR

Title DEFENSE OF THE
CENl'RAL

S!L'TOH (Cont'd)
• • • • ·

3

AIR

DEFEr-'SE

Study 01' 13-29 Ha1c1s

.
.

·

.

ll3
. .

OF THE CENl'RAL 5lCl'OR

B-29 Target SelectiOQ
• •

. .

.

Organization ot Defensive F'onnation 01' the

Air Unito

.

.

11 3 113 ll4 ll5 ll6 ll8 ll9
J20 121

11th Air Division
.

B-29 Flight Fonnations and. Approach Routes

·

.

. .

Forma tion or t.he 23d Air Brigade
Transfers and Reas Ri gnments Formation ot the Operations
• • •

.

.
.

Plotting ot

B-29 Courses
• •

·

.

.

.

.

Operations Ago.1nst B-29' s
Changes in

·

.

·

.

.

.

.
.

6th Air Army
• • • • • • •

.

. .

B-29 Tactics

·

.

. .
• · . .

Di re ction
11th

·

.

.

Carrier-Based Plane Atto.cks

.
.

Location of

Air
• • •

Division
• • • • • · . • •

Headquartera

88

Preparations for Future Attacks
Changes in Zones 01'

·

.

.

.

Air Training Program

.

. .

.

.

·

.

.

Responsibility
• • • • • •

·

.

.

.

.

Emergency Reinforcements

Air General Arrrry
• • • • • • •

. .

Servi ce Uni ts

Air Defense Operations Mly and June 1945 • • • Final Air

.

.

.
.

.

.

.

123
.

Airfield Conditions

Defense lofeasures

.

.

. .

.

.

124

Specinl Intelligence SquadroDa

AIR DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN �

Air-Ground Air

Radio Communi ca.ti ons

Organization

of the 19th

Air

Brigade

129

Raid Warning

System
• • •

Evaluation 01' Pe rsonnel Operational Plannin g Coopera tio n
Alert
• • • •

and Equipment
• • • . .

130 131
132

Lookout Posts

.

.

Radar Installations
Search Missiona

with
. .

Antiaircraft Un1ts
. . .

.
.

.

System

. .

.

.

.

.

.

1 33

Alert System
Tice

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. . . .
• • • •

Differential Study

109

x

xi

.',

Chapter

4


AIR

Chapter
(COot' d)
• •
. . .

DEFEllSE

OF THE WESTERN S!L"TOR
• • • • • •

4
. .
.


AIR DEF.EliSB OF THE WWl'ERN S!X:TOR

(Cant' d)
.

Air add Waming Net
Radar

13�

Raids trom J.arianas Bases

• •

.

.

.

.

Instal.l.ationa
• • •

·

.

134

1.S1 151 151

Organj,zationoJ. Changes

·

.

.

Lookout Posts

. .
• • · • . • •

136
llt2

Improvements in Operational Facil1ties

Intelligence tram Ul1ts in China TraiDing Program
• • • • • • • • • • •

l36 143

Bunso Channel Def'ense

.

.

.

.

.

.
.

l58

Military District Reorganization

·

.

.

.

Night Operations Training Navigation Aid Tn.1n1ng Mo.intenance ot Morale
• • •

.

Change

in Open.tioaal PollC7

.

.
·

.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

·

.

.

144 144 144 145 146

Logistic Support of' Suicide units Chs.llge in Eoemy Tactic•

. .

• •

• • • •

. .
.

First Paid by China-Based U. S . Planes

Comand Changes Air Detense Situation june and July 194 5
Land-Based
.

.

1� 162 164

16J.

160

160

15 9

Intelligence Reports The Attack
• • • • •

• • •

• •

• • • •

• •

• •

.

.

.

.

.
·

.
.

. .

.

.
.

Assessment of Results
Detects in Detense

. . .

.

.

·

.

.

. .

147

Fighter Attacks

.

·

.

.

Rei�orcement of the

19th

148 150

Release ot the 6th Air A.rtlt.7 by the Combined Fleet • •
F1nal tnys of the War
• • • • • •

• •

• •

.

.

.

Air Brigade
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

149 152

165

164

Revision ot Operatione.l. Plan
Second Raid by China-Based

U.S. Pl.aDes

Organization ot the 12th Air Divisio n New Detense Measures
• • • • •

153 155
156

SUIIIII8. ry ot Attacks trail China Bases

r
,
LIST OF "IAl'�, CllAllT3, FIGUHl!:S AND TABLES

Chart No.

Title Organization c.nd Chain ot CO'IIIIIWld the Defense of the lloweland •

1.
Title 2.
• • •

tor
· .

. . . .
• •

5
10
76

1.

Military

Di st ricts of Japan,

1937-1945

Organhation of the Air Defense ot Japu.n Air Combat Plan Organization Chart, Alert Instructions 18th Air Br igade, May

2.

3. 23 4.

MaJor �dar Ins lalla tio ns in Eastern,

Centro 1 und Westem DIstricts, March 1945

1942
. .

84
. . . .

Mill tary Districts and Area Army COlMIIlds, ll April 1945 • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Airfields in Kanto Sec tor Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters, :EAstern Army Command • • • • • • • •

30
36 51 58 93 91 1.21 135 131 151 161

. . . .
· .

110
11.2

6.

Time Differential Study

.

.

Figure
1-

No.

Title Ta-t'an Bombing Technique Typical Airfield Layout
· · . .

Page 18
.

Fadar and Comsnunication Netvork in Kanto Area.
Central Distri ct Airfields
• • • • • • • •

2.

·

.

. .

.

62

Padar Net'WOrk Under Central Army Com:uand,

l'.arch 1945

Table No.

Title

Page
. .

Disposition Plan of Central Sector Air Units, Aucust

1945

1.
2. 3.
4.

Ydlltary and Civllia.n Lookout Posta Under Eastern Army Command
Organization and DisposItion ot Air Division, 6 February 1945

·

·

.

. .

52

Padar and COCll!lunicatiOIl Net'WOrk Under Western Army Command, March

1945

10th
• • · .

. .

Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters, Western Army Command • • • • • Western District Airfields Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters, Central Army C��d
• • • • • • • • •

Mill tary

. . .

64 98
1 38

and Civillan Lookout Posts Under Central Army Cou�d

·

·

.

.

.

. .

Milltary and CIvillan Lookout Posts Under Western Army Command

·

.

.

.

.

.

.

xl.,

ClIAl"n!R 1

Am DE."'ENSE OF JAPAlf

Basic Concep t of Japan's Air Defense �le U.S.S.R., long recognized securi ty of Japan,
W� as

the primary threat to the

known to have the potential of launching

air

raids against Japan proper from the Mari t1r.!e Provinces Siberia.

ot

ea.stem

�e

Japanese military planners, hovever, adhered to a po­

sitive policy of defense which contemplated the immediate destruct­ ion or capture of enemy air bases at the outset of any hostilities that miGht develop.

As a result of this fUndamental concept that a strong offense
constituted the best defense, little effort was devoted to building
a tactical air force to defend the prinCipal islands of Japan.

The

planners

of the Greater East Asia War saw no reason to change this

defense concept and, after

the

outbreak of the Pacific War , the in­

itial successes of Japanese arms only strengthened them in their belief that the defense of the Homeland could best be accomplished in China, Manchuria and the South Pacific. It wns recognized,

of

course, that the enemy might be capable of laWlching some

air raids

with carrier-based planes, but it was thought that these would be minor in nature, conducted primarily for purposes

of diversion or
Bri tain .

tor

their &tfect

on

morale in the United States and Great

1

In add! ti on to the 1'1nnly iulplanted conviction that the torce
of Japanese anns

would

keep th e enemy at a distance that would pre­

'be intrequent and would 'be carried out by car­ rier-based planes. It i t should become po88l­ ble for the eneulY to raid Japan tl'OUl bases in the Soviet Union we mi�t face considerable
danger, the early stases ot the var. Approximately one month later,

clude air raids by land-based planes, an econo. a1 c conslderation die-

but I think that this is not l1lcely in

tated the degree ot air defense preparation.
Japan, with its limited resources,

It was impossible tor

to organize and equip large tield

Japan entered a state ot 'WI!t.r

torces simultaneously with the organiz1ng ot strong air and ground defenses tor the

with the United States, Great Britain o.nd the Netherlands

witb the

Homeland.

assurances ot her Army Minister �lat serious enemy air attacks would be only a remote possibil1ty. Homeland Defense Organization The General. Defense Command

Arroy

Minister Tojo's Comments At a meeting of mil1 tary councillors, held on 4 November 1941,

Army Mi n i ste r Tojo made the following reply to a question asked by
Admiral Hyakuta.k.e regarding air def'ense: In milking air defense preparations, the first consideration m ust be given to invasion especially their air forces.

(GDC)

vas acti vated on 12 Jul.;y

1941, with the mission of providing f'or the def'ense of' the Japanese
Homeland, which included Korea, Fonuosa and Karatuto as

vell

as the

operations to be launched by the Army and Navy, preparati�ns for Homeland air defense must not

Bonin, Ryukyu and Kurtl Islands.
Japan

l

The f'our

p rin cipal islands ot
were divided into tour

In other wordG,

( Hol-,ka1do,

Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu

)

Army and the other

The stre ngth currently available tor overseas. Homeland defense is composed approximately 300 aircraft, of ,..bleb some 100 beloJll; to the

interfere with the operations ot our armed forces

districts; Northern,

!astern, C entral and Western

01'

(t4ap

No. 1)" with-

in each of' vbi ch �s a tactical detense force organized as an army
cowmand. Commanders of' the di stri cts,

500 Army and 200 Navy, c cmmitted to the immediate defense of strategic points. Though small in nu.lIber, thes e aircraft and antlaircrai't "Capons bave been rec entl y rcadied tor action and tru.1nins in thei r u:;e is now being conducted.
mately
antiaircraft ,..eapons,

700

200 to the Navy, and approxI­

in addition to controll1ne

the admi ni strati v e functions of the di strict s, aloo cOl:l;."l8Dded the tactical a:nn1es.
For all ad n1nistrative attaira the district com..

manders were under the control of the War (An.ty) Ministry, whUe as a�1J c��ders they were re s ponsib le to the GDC tor all defense
preparat10ns and op erations

proper from the air irJIITledia tel y o.fter the out­ break of hostilit1es. Some tim� would elapse
before t he enemy could attempt such raids.

I do not think the enemy could mid Jap8.D

I

(Chart No. 1).

belie ve tha.t euemy air attacks against Japan proper in the early stages of the 'wlllr , would

1. See Japanese Monograph No. 17, Homeland Operations Record for detailed information on Japan's defense organization.

2

".
MAP NO.
I

CHART NO.1 MILITARY OF DI STRICTS JAPAN

1937 -1945
ORGANIZATI ON AND CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR THE DEFENSE OF T HE HOMELAND
..

\
SeA OF

r------------------------ -------- ----------

,

:
I

:I

IGHO
(ARMY SECTION) GENERAL STAFF WAR

:

I I �----------

:

I I ----------�

r-

-----

M I ISiiJf ---N

__

J

:

:
I I

NORTHERN ARMY COMMAND

NORTHERN DISTRICT

EASTERN ARMY COMMAND

EASTERN DISTRICT

CENTRAL ARMY COMMAND

CENTRAL DISTRICT

PACIFIC

OCeAN
WESTERN ARMY COMMAND WESTERN DISTRICT

4

(b 5 February

1943,

the northern
8.

Arnty

COIIIIIIlUld

vas renamed. the

AgreeDlente between the

Anny

and navy General Sta:rts provided. tor

c0-

Iforthern Anny and bect\IIIe the respons1bIl1 ty ot

I118.Jor operat,ional cOllllllaDd charged. With operat,ioDu in the Aleutians. St­

operation in the detenae ot the Homeland, and detending Japan' s sbores
'Wall

supporting

but the mell10n ot hol.41.Da

primarily the responslblll t7 ot
II.

the

multaneoualy, wit,h the chlUlged t'wlction ot the l'forthem Army, the

A:rmy.
the

The conduct of air detenae vas likewise air and antiaircraft torces.

responsibillty ot

ODe w.s relieved from respons1bllIty for the defense of Hokkaido,
JCa1'1lf'uto and the lCurll Islands.

In spite ot' the tact that army air \mits vere organized. into
tactical commands with specitic defenae missions assigned, first two years ot the Pacific War there vas torce. tor

In Mareb 1944, in order to etill further loealhe the detense
efforts ot the ODe and to enable It to concentrate ot Japan proper, ot Formosa lands.
OD

the

the detense

no

real air detense

It vas relieved ot responsibillty tor the detense

and

What actually existed. vas an air training establlabment

lCorea ae vell as the Ry\Ik;yu, Bonin and Volcano Is­

that vas organized into air regiments

and

squadrons wich could,
II.

This change narrowed the direct responsibility ot the ODe Shikoku and IC;yuIIhu. The Cine ot

theoretically , be pressed into service as the event ot an eDlergency.

defensive air torce in

to the main islands of Honsbu,

The planes with whicb the various air for the most part, sui table for air �

Detense still retained 11mi ted. control over the defense preparations ot the lCorea

Army

and the nevly

activated 32d

units were equipped. �re not, detense missions.

AJ'"Jly

in the Ry\Ik;yua,

L'1 addition, many

un! ts

lIhicb were carried On actuall7

tormed as a part ot the P'onnosa Army,

came under the Western A:rlAy

organizational cbarts as operational air defense \mits,

Coaunand tl"Olll May to July.
Air Detense Organization The responeibillty ot defending Japan against air attack vas divided. bet...een the defensive air torce and the antiaircraft units. Although organized as entirely separate commands, subordinate to the district army ccwnanda, the two detenelve torces vere normal.ly re­

consisted ot instructors who were s�ultaneously engaged in train­

ing

student pilots.

In general, the individual. &billties or the

instructor group as pilots and crew members, vas higher average field p�ot,

than

the

but the effectiveness of the emergency flight.

or squadrons vas not necessarily higher tban th.at of the averagot canbat squadron. structors to
wear

J'urthel"lllore, the couwand system, whicb forced two bats,

in­

terred to as the air defense establishment. separate air t'oree but,

Japan did not have a

resulted in reducing their efficiency

1nstead, bad. both anny and navy air units.

to a po1l1t considerably lOller than bad been anticipated wen the air defense establlsbll!.e nt was originated.

6

7

The cCllllll8Jld organization tor air defense vas extreme17 cClllpl1..
cated.

the 11th Air Brigade vas organized under the 1st Air Army and placed under
the

The 1st Air Am:h

unde r

vh1ch

the

various air units

'Were

operational c Ollld ot the Eastern A:rmy C ommand. lllSJl

In May,

orpn1sed, vas not a tactical c OIIId, but functioned rather as a IIWl replacement tra1n1ng command.
were
in

the 18th Air Brigade WIlS sil.o.1lArly established and placed under the central Army CocWlWld and in June, the newly tormed 19th Air Brigade
became a part of the tactical defense forces ot the Western A:rmy

70r tactical. purposes the air unit.
'Were,

under the operat1onal. control of the a:nny c omanda, vh1ch

tum, under the GDC tor all detense operat1ons.

In add1ticm,
zoe-

command.

As the detense planners continued to consider air a ttack s

since the primary w.ss1on ot the air units vas the tra1n1.J:l& ot placement personnel for the air units
in

against the Japanese mainland as a minor threat and believed that

the combat areas, the

In-

raids could only be conducted sporadically by carrier-based plAl'lea, the three air br igad e s constituted Japan's principal air defense unita unt11 the early part ot 1944. Co:nmand Progl'8.lB - 1944
Following the March reduction of the GDC's zone ot respona1bil­

spectorate General of A:rmy Aviation vas vitally concerned and exercised considerable Jurisdiction over the activities ot the 1st Air Army units. Production ot planes and maintenance ot supply depots

vas the responsibil1 ty ot the Army Aeronautical Department which, by controlling the distribution of planes and replacement parts, could also exercise great influence over the training activities and the readiness ot the air dcfense force. While the powers and influences of the several headquarters may have been neces�ry to the acc�nplishment ot the trn1n1ng mission and its correlation to
the combat

ity, on 5 May 1944, Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) directed the establlsh:nent ot a new command program that would further unity the detenses of Japan by broadening the c ommand powers of the GDC (Chart No. 2 ) .
2 The new defense concept recognized the possibility

of invasion attempts being made against Japan, but visualized any approaching invasion force being destroyed at sea by combined air and naval attacks long betore an actual landing could be eftected. However, as Japan's defenses in the Southwest Area and the Central Pacific had begun to crumble, it ws realized that the pages 18 - 21 and Appendix I, for mand powers of the GDC.
2.
U.S.

minion, the lack ot a unian

tied air command vas a serious handicap in the building ot ticient defensive air torce.
Strengthening of Air Defenses

ef-

Air

Following the Dool1ttle Raid on 18 April 194.2, some attempt
vas

l114d e to establish effective tactical air units

within

the frame-

See Japanese 1-t:>nogroph No. 11, Homeland Operations Record, deto.lls of new miSSions �d COll­

work ot the GOC and the 1st Air Army.
8

In the latter part of April,

9

b

CHART NO.2

r
Corps
DOW

constitutt.>d a S<.:rio us l4ena.ce to Japan proper.

Between

ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAN

MarCh and July of' 1944,

the 11th, 18th Wld 19th Air Brigades vere lith and 12th Air DiVisions,

a�en ted Wld reorganized as the 10th,
respec tiv ely

.

TraininS in air defense tactics was int e nsi fi ed and

GENERAL DEFENSE COMMAND

add! tiona! airfields were constructea.

Erforts vere aleo made to govern­

improve the antiaircrnrt de fen se s ot the industrial areas,

mental ce nter s and ai rfi elds .

3

By

July,

the GDC had. under its con­

trol approximately 150 planes and

600 antiaircraft gun.s, ass i gned

to the three army commands.

Types
12th AIR DIVISION ( I SO PLANES I

ot Planes

Because their missions were of a purely def'ensive nature, the
10tt! AIR DIVISION (400 PLANES)
I I ttl AIR DIVISION

planes of' the air divisions were all fighter types, with the excep-

(200

PLANES)

tion of' the Type-1OO, Headquarters Reconnaissance planes. The principal types ot planes available tor the air de tense ot Ja p an are

EASTE"!'!

(300

AAA GUNS)

GP

CENTRAL AAA GP
I

WESTERN

EASTERN

ARMY AIR UNIT

RAID WARNING

I I I I I I I I I I I

(ISO ,GUNS)

elSo GUNS )

AAA .P

deSCribed below:
Type-l Single-seat Fighter (Ki-43) Si ngl e , 14 cylinder, aj,r cool ed, Engine:

Ar.nament:
Speed:

CENTItAL ARMY AIR RAID WARNING UNIT

W ESTERN AR..., AIR RAID WARNING UNIT

Two 12.7-111111 l\lachJ.ne guns. Maximum, 515 kph. CruiSing, 40,5 kph.
Same as Type-l, with 1mproved horse­

radial.

Type-2 Single-seat Fighter (n-44)

Engine:

I

L------

-------l.--- ___,... _ _ ____J T I I I I I r----J..----, ,.. _ _ _ _ .1. ____ ,
IINSPECTORATE GENERAL I

power and highe r c e il1 na .

I I

I ARMY I I

OF ARMY

AVIATION

'- - - -- - -

(TRAINI N G )

I -__..a

I

AERONAUTICAL. DEPAftTMENT esup�,,)

I

... - - - ---- -�

I I

3. Antiaircraft defense ot airtields vas the responsibility of the i ndi vidue.J. airfield commander, and vas entirely separate fTO!4 the ope ration s of the antir:d.rcrarl; commands which defended cities and industrial a reas under the direct control ot Ule a� com.'l1ands. The defense or h!:l.rbors and naval in s talla tions vas, in general, the responsibil1 ty of the Navy

11

10

'fnle-2 Siug].e-aea.t Figh1.er (cont'cl)
A1'I\IBIIIE!nt.:
Speed:

Two 12.7-I11III
Maximum,

(S<lIHetiule& f'our l�. 7- 1lIl1I mach1ne guntl)

and

t.vo 7. 7-rntn dlRch1ne guns.

Special Methods to eanbat :8-29' s The first B-29 raid ws launched i"rom bases in Cb1na tI.nd struck
at the industr1o.1 cOInplex of' Kokwu-Yawata in northe rn

605 Iq.h.

',r,YFe-2 'l'vO-l'ellt Fighter (Ki-45) 'l'vo engiot?ti each 1lW\lE;: as Type - l Eugillo: AnliHouent. : 'l."A> 12.7-mr.t and one 7.1-mm machines guns. Ont? 37-1Ml carmoll. O1.c bOmb rac� under each v.Lng. Maximl.W, 547 kph. Cruising, 400 kph. Spct.-cl :
TJpe- 3 Single-seat

Cruising, 430 kph.

Kyuahu,

on

16

June 1944.

In November, after U.S. basCG had been e Gtabl1shed em

Tinian and &lipan, air raids on Japan were i nten sified. Reint'orcements tor Air Divi sions
In the !Astern and Central Districts, the air tra1n1ng schools

Dlgine:
Almament:

type. Two 2O-mm

Fighter (Ki-6l) Single, 12 cylinder, liquid cooled, "V"

Speed:

and two l2.1-uWl machine guns. <.ne 1J00ub roel. under eo.eh wing . t4aXiotll.lLlI, 600 kph. Cru1:::inl3, 420 kph.

and similar instal.l.atiolls had each been allotted a l1.Jn1ted num.ber at

fighter planes for use in training programs or test fl1Ghts. it was considered
necessary to ..Jake

Since

Type-4 Single-seat Fighter (Ki:84) &1e1ne: Single, 18 cylinder, air cooled, rodial. Armament: 'l'vo 2O-11un aIlli two 12.1-nk;! u.achine eU!lS. O1.c bomb l"aclt under euch v.Lng. Speed: Maximu:n, 624 kph. Cruising, 430 kph.

f'ull use of' every plane in the

event of' Class air attacks, it 'oIaS deter.n.ined to man the se tighter planes with instructorc and test pilots and orsanize them into provisional squadrons which would augment the stren� at the 10th and

Type-91

Engine : Al"ITIl:l.;llCnt: �p eed :

Slncle, 9 cylinoer, air cooled , radial. Two '{. 7-mm machine gun:::. Maxim�., 470 kph. c s ing, 315 k h. (Obsolete in ea.rly days of war out s till in u"e in 1944)

Single-seat Fighter (Ki-2'()

11th Air Divisions in emergency situations.

The reinf'orcins units

were called TO-Ni-Go

Butai,

Q.

tenu tbat may be tree1y translated as

SecOildary Provisional Unit. �

Type-lOO

'l.'vO-sea.t Headquarters ReconnuissWlce (Ki-116) &1g1ne: Two, 14 c ylin der , air cooled, radia.l. Annalllent: <Xle 7." -lJIn llIachine GUll ' Speed: Maximum, 635 kph. Cruising, 475 kph.
Throughout the war the various types of planes were iwproved in many winor respects. Figures given above indicate ar.n�nent &1d speed us fi­
nally developed.

Note:

The To-Ni-Go Un! ts shoulcl not be Confused vith the Special or suiCide units which were known 8S TO-Go Unit!>. The "To" of the To-Iii-Go Uni ts conveys the meaning of !Ast or Eastern, the units beinc; oriB1na.lly developed by the Eastem Arr.J.;y COOJIOIIld . The ll "To" of the To-Go Units is an abbreviation of Tokubetsu KOSek! Tai, which i s transluted as Special Attack U1it. The use or the ter.1 To":Ni-Go to dl!signo.te provisional units in other anny co.Jl2.lld s is attributed to the fact that units similar to those originated by the lOth Air Division and the Enstem Army CO!1i:lW1d were later estab­ lished wi thin the 11 til Air D1 vI cion and the originn1 term ·cto.1.ned.
Attack

4.

12

In spite ot the superior aIdll ot the inst.ructors and test pi­

vb1ch had ope ra ted effectIvely in the Philippines, it vas suggested
that a plane, even if piloted by an inexperienced pilot, could wreak

lots who manned the provisional \mits,

as

a result ot lack ot UD1t.

tra1n1ng and conf'licts ot duties, performance of' the T�-!fi-ao tb1t. tell tar below expec tations.

tremendous danllige if' it yere to crash-dive a B-29 or an enemy naval vessel. While such tactics would, of course, be extremel,. wasteful

In addition, air-ground communicatiOilI

did not function as smoothly as vith the re�rly orgwrl.zed squad_ rons ot the air dividons.
that t.he

of Japan's meager supply ot plancs and pilot personnel, it vas re­ cognized that one tighter plane and its pilot 'WOuld be a cheap price
to pay tor the e11m1nation ot a B-29 and its crew.

Results verc, in tact, so unsat1etactorr

're-I'l1-Go Un1 ts vere finally di:Jbanded on 15 April 1945.

It waG also ob­

Special Attack Units
Slliplilents of oil fl'Ol4 the southern area decreased rapidly throughout 1944 and ceased altoge ther in early 1945.

vioua that several planes and pilots Inight prot1 tab1y be expended on the destructIon of
B

capital ship.

As i t become
a

obvlous tha.t Japan's fuel uupply could not be r eple nished, the air

To accomplish the destruction ot the enemy by suicide tactIca, nunber of units were fonned from the lOth and 12th Air Divisions.

de fe n s e planners ....ere faced with the

problem of providine sufficient

The name applied to these units ycre "Tokubetsu !Cogek1 Ta1", Yhich

ruel for traininc without handicapping the air defense miasion. 5
Japan's air de fens e forces ....ere faced by a dilemma; It vas clear

may be freely transla.ted as "Special Attack Units."
ing planes later becanle known as �kaze" planes.

The crash-div-

6

that although only adequate training would fit pilots to successtu!.

In conducting their raIds, the B-29's came over Japan at nltitudes of' approximately 10,000 meters, a height which Japanese f'18bt­ er planes had difficulty attainiIlG. By using tighter planes Yhich

ly combat B-29's and other

U.S. planes,

if' large quantities of' ruel

Yere expended in training there would not be sufficient tuel to u:se
in interception I1l1ssions and in a.ttacks on carrier task torces. Neanwile, losses of combat pilots continued to mount and the quality ot replacementa continued to deteriorate due to lack of' tra1n1n8. In late 1944, rccal1ing the example of a n1Dber of' suicide unit.

had been stripped of all armor and weapons, except a nose bomb, the special attack planes could achieve
o.n

altitude above the ene:!lY

5. See page 46, Japanese Mono graph !fo. 23, Air Defense of the aviation ruel H041eland, for description of efforts cade to develop substitutes.

"Kamikaze", 1itera.lJ.y translated as "God Wind" vas tirst which drove ott and destroyed a l-Pnsol tleet which soU8ht to invade Japan in 1281. In pozt World War II yetlTS, the tenn has been used as a derogatory description ot Tokyo's taxi drivers wo crash-dive their vehicles in and out of' Tokyo's traffic Jams.
used in connection with a typhoon

6.

15

b

I

'bombers and crash-dive them.

thf ortunate ly, the crasb -diving method

great hopes were plnned on the emplo)'ll1ent of the nev bombing tech­ nique, the method. proved ineftective because of the inability ot
the bomb carrying plWles tu

did not prove o.l.together oa:t1sfactory as the plane bad difficulty 1D.

o.pproac:b1ng the beavily o.nned

the B-29 made 1t ncceaso.ry to attack at a steep angle and the mo.x1m\llll

U.S.

bombers.

Tbe rear

&nII8IIl

ent at

reach

W1

aJ:tItude a.bove the B-29 tor­

mat.1ona (ngure fto.

1).
Service Unit eperationa

cenings 01' the ,Tapaneatl planes wtde It extremely difficult to
from the

gain a pooltl00 sufficiently above the bombers to attack
required angle.

Al.thougb there were oorce slight d.11'1'erencelJ in the operat1ng procedures and Illethods 01' IService units within the various aIr d1TIsions, in general, their organi�ation and operating methods Yere

Shallov angled frontal. a.ttacks appeared to offer

the best cbance of success although this Illaneuver could onl1 be aecompl1shed by an experienced pilot. This drawback tended to negate

lSimilar.
Airfield Battal10ne

the value of the special attack tactics because experienced pilots were in short supply and one of the principal arguments advanced in favor 01' the plan had been that the suicIde a.tto.ck3 could be accOlllplished by inexperienced pilots. In sIlite of the fact that saaething less than complete success crowned the efforts 01' the To-Go Units, the suicide method of attacking heavy bcmbers and naval vessels 'WaS continued throughout the
Ta-J)m :BombID§
war.

Airfield battalions were 01' two t)'Ile5:

A and B.

Each

'Va"

can-

posed 01' a headquarters, a maintenance and a guArd c oaxp any.

In the

Type A batto.l.10ns the iIIlUntenance cocpany bad tvo sectlOOIS, one 01' Which specialized in maintenance and minor repairs on tiGhters and
the other pertonned similar duties in connection vi th all other

types ot planes.

In the Type B battalions,

the IlIAintenance company

provided mainten3llce and minor repair service tor all types at planes. M41ntenance companies yere also responsible tor tuel1�
'!'he guard

Another method that 'Was oric1na1ly thoUGht to ofter some chance of succesd'ul.l.y cOlllbatting enemy raiding planes, was the "ra-Dan BaIb­ ing Technique." J'lying above an enemy bOlnber fo:rmat1on, a light bomber or fighter equipped vith banb racks would release a large n\llllber of small conto.ct-�ed bombs in the path ot the 1"ormation. 7 Although
I

loading or amh1un1tlon and tlight control operations.

cO;lIpanies were responsible for protectinS airfield installations and equip!lIent, including the manning 01' antiaircraft weapons in­ stalled at the airtieldo.

7. See page 39, Japanese Monograpb lfo. 17, Hom eland Opel'S.t10ns Record, for nescrlption 01' the San-Go bomblng procedure, a similar tactic.
16 17

FIGU R E

1

�ecial
TA - DAN TECHN IQUE BOMBING

Intelligence

Squadrons

Organized in ate 1944, one Special Intelligence located in each air division headquarters.

Squadron "..
to

Personnel. assigned

the squadrons were capable ot pertorming cr)'Ptanalysis and vere fic ient in !llgl1 sh.

pro­

Tbe units obtained �orme.tion on enemy oper-

ations by intercepting and deCiphering radio communications ot eD-

erny torces, especially those on Tinian and Saipan. � � �

In most cases,

advance notice ot large-scale air raids �s determined at the time

'N'''Y .0 .. 1'" '0 " ..... TI ON

//',' 1111,
"

" 1 "

� �t, ",1 /-" V'\<::, I I I 'I I 1 \ \ " " '11'" , , , I, , ' , ' I I , , ; ' • • • • I I. • •• • ,. , " .. ' . ," , . ," , I
" , ' 1 , " , , ' ,

, z.

s:l

JI

I

I I I

I

I I

the B-2$l's took ott trolll their bases. the Saipan area ....as also intercepted, the enemy's probable course.

'!'he enell1Y weather report tor making it possible to e.timate

This intormation was also used in planThrough interception

ning Japanese air attacks on the U.S. bases.

ot cOll1lllunications bet....een the retUl'ning B-29' s and their basee, the
amount of damage sustained by the raiding planes could also be de­ tennined. Navigational Aid Units

In November 1944, personnel drawn from the air-ground radio
un1ts and the air signal regiments were tonned into navigational

aid unitsi one ot which 'Wtl.S established at each airtield.

1'he1r

�I

I I

II

" I I-

"

,

prlncipo.l duty was the operotion ot radio direction tinders to u.IOON

.. 'TI" THI 10.. 1 W... . "IL' ... . IO..... OUT eo TO 100 L.GHT 10 .. 1. WI"E "'UTO­ .. AT'C;... LLY "IL-'... . ED TO ,.0"" .. OI''''''''ON ZONE IN THI ....TH 0' THI
ENIMY ,.OltM ...T I ON

list interceptors in maintaining their alert position patterns. Aa

a

secondary duty, they cooperated in the bad weather and nisht In Jauuary 1945, these units were re-

fighting training program.

intorced and placed on an around-tile-clack watch on

two

12-hour

shifts.

19
18

2

Air Raid Waming

18ilure

to recognize enemy planes,

identitication ot trieDdl7

'l'hree diff'erent types ot inste.lle.tions vere used in the air raid varning net:
lookout posts, radar stations and picket boats.

planes as enea1,Y, errors in estimation of' altitude and duplication of' reports were 8lIIong the many flaws in the operation.

In

Jul;y

Units ot all three types were organi sed vithin ee.ch ot the m1l1 Uu7 dintricts and vere unde r the direction of' the three anllY cOlllllllUlda. lDokout Posts ed by the Army: the m.t11n Two types of' lookout posts wre operat posts Which
vere

1945, special training vas g1 vea

to

army lookout personnel and the

nUll1ber, st rength and equipmeDt of' the anDY posts was increased. The posts vere also assigned the additional duties of' vatching tor ene­ my naval craft and confi mi ng the

res ults

of the air battles.

Im­

nco's or I�ed by 1 otficer or senior �CO and 18

portant lookout posts vere equipped with poveri'ul binoculars and T'JPe-95 telephoto cameras. A

lookout posts which were 1IIOJl­ other enlisted men; and the ordinary ned by

1 rIco

and

12

enlisted men.

Honn.ally telephone communieation

t rainiDg

program tor civi11 an lookout personnel vas also un­

with the centrnl intelligence vns used to connect the lookout posts not available, radio co�u­ headquarters, but where telephones vere nication vas provided. 'or this purpose,
W':l.D

dertaken in order to increase their proficiency. As a result ot the training and increased experience, their reports became more accu­ rate. Lookout posts �ere orig1nally located and installed by the ar­ my co��ds and were later taken over by the area armies. At the

a radio squsd con sisting

of' 1 lfCO and 6 enlisted hlen the lookout post.

added to the normal. complement of

posts, civilians operated In addition to the Army lookout large number ot such installations.

a

time of the formation of the Air General Army, in April 1945, it was desired to have th e lookout posts come under the direct control ot that organization. Since, hovever,

Such posts were manned by volFor

unteers and the nallber at each location varied considerably. each 8 or

all communications systems and

10

civilian posts there was generally a central headquar­

manni ng personnel vere controlled by the area arc1es, it vas recog­ nized that a changeover vouJ.d require core time than vas available.

ters which vas connected by telephone with the neare::;t al'T!lY or air unit headquarters. Although a tremendous number of lookout posts were establish-

In addition , the army would not l"el1quish control of the cCllllllunic:ations systems. L�fonaation developed by the lookout posts ¥.as,

ed throughout Japan, their operation vas not completely successful.

therefore, passed directly to the army and then transmitted to the

2l

M A P N O. 2
appropriate air units, causing considernbl.e delay and being general­ ly unsatisfactory to the Air General. An.ry and its component units . Radar Stations
T'olO types of radar syste.tns were utilized in establishing the

air rai d warn1ne net : the Type A, or f'lanld.ng type, lIhich scanned verticaJ.ly and employed radio waves transmitted benreen two points to detect planes by means of the Doppler Effect; and. Type B, or frontal screen type, which scann ed horizontally and could cove r a c:lJ 0 arc with
an

effective radius of' 200 to 250 kilometers . Approx­

i.-nate1y 59 of the frontal screen type and 40 of the fl.a.nkins type
radar stations vere in use by the end of' the war (Map No. 2 ) .

Although c on s tantly improved throughout the war, neither type
of radar was comp le te ly sati s fac tory . Planes approaching at ex-

trernely hig. or very low alt it'\1d.e s could not be dete�ted end it was lJ.
also di fficult to detect single plane s . Later, as the B-29' s began to be accompanied by fighter escorts, i t
't4\S

not 1>osoib1e to deter-

.dne by rndar whether

QJl

incOlldng f'onuation c onsi sted enUrely ot
z

bouIbers or wao being given fighter protection . Ruclar installo.tions o.lso failed to accurately dc te n ai ne enemy plnne altitudes - infor-

oc:::::::;'

(

1;lation wich was l-equired as a guide for the antia1rera1't un1to in
the establishment of range c on t rol s .
In many cases, the pe rsonnel

of' the radar stations performed doub le duty, actin! a.s visual lookout post observers a.s well.

22

23

Picket IIoats A\.Ig1Qenting the lookout poats along the c oast and, to
a.

located in the Ryukyu, Bonin W'ld Kurl.l Islands as well as on the certa1n
many smalle r inlands u.dJa.ccnt to Jupan . Un1 ts located in China. and

extent, the early warn1n8 net, were about 50 Navy picket boats 01' 100 to 300 tons . nlese were stationed about 1000 kilometers ott

Korea were helpful in detecting luids launched by U . S . planes based in China Wld some success tacks rrOlll that direction. Air raid. warnings i ssued by picket boats und the nearer isl.anda could have been valuable in alertinc the air defense units, but delays in the transmitting or warninc;s and in getting planes to their combat positions were rre�uently so great as to make the warnings valueles s . A typical example o f the time lag i n Getting defense
was

achieved in meeting and CO!:lbatt1ng at-

shore, along an ea.st-vest line through the Bonin Islands as vell as in the waters east of Japan. Originally their purpose
was

to detect

ene::.y surface c rai't but they were later u.ced to give wanl10gs 01' approaching aircraf't . ntei r usefulness
V3.S

sozcewhat impaired when

constant attacks by enemy naval ves sels made it necessary to withdraw the picket bo�ts much closcr to the shore .
Early Warning Net

planes into the air i s shown in connection with the radar unit 10cated on Hachijojima (i sland) , a.bout 300 kilometers south 01' Tokyo . Action Hostile aircraft detected 200 to 250 kilometers south of HachiJoJima Exi stence or hostile planes co�i:nued Air derense units aJ.erted Report reaches air division headquarters �d interceptors ordered to take ott
. --

nte location and geography of Japan made the establishment 01'

an early v arning net virtually impossible.

The great majority 01'

Japan ' a vi tal indu&trle.l and gove mrne ntal install.ations vere locat­
ed along the east coast and vere particularly vulnerable to attacks from the south and east. In addition, at its widest part Japan measure& only about 250 kilOlneters from the Sea or Japan to the Pacific, so that even lookout pOints and re.dar irlsta.llat ions located along the west coast were unable to pick up approaching planes in surficient time to penni t air defense planes to reach t. eir assigned a'l lert areas and al ti tudes berore the arrl val. of the :5-29' s over east coast target areas . Air raid warning units, both radar e q uipped and visual, were

Elapsed T1!:le

3 mins .

7

Idns.

Lead planes o f air regiments take ott
All planes

15 mns. 50 - 60 mine .

take alert sta.tions and gain required altitude ( 10, 000 Lleters )
Total

75 - 85

mi.r: .. .

24

1

25

A B-29 could cover the 500 to 550 ldlometers between its posi­

meters, experiments were conducted to determine the possib1l1ty ot extending the performance capabilities ot Japanese planes. Average climbing time to reach 10, 000 lIleters 'Was treD 50 to 60 m1.nutes tor a single plane and would be somewhat longer for un1 t tozmations to reach such height s . Descent required approximately 30 m1nutes, vh1eh

tion at time of detection

and

the Tokyo area in about 60 minutes.

Therefore, there 'WIlS no pOBcibl11ty of intercepting the incaa1ng bombers and even the pursuit of planes 'Which bLl.d o.lready accomplish_ ed their bombing mi ssions
was

often impossIble .

Pilot Tra1n1ng Training of pilots was General of part..nent .

J:1eant that only 30 minutes ot tlying t1:ne was possible tor the aver­ age plane.

Air

under

the control of the Inspectorate

In addition, it vas dete:nn1ned that at the 10, 000 meter

Training and the chief of the Army Aeronautical De­

level, it was extremely difficult to oaintain altItude and plane bal­ ance . Even a sUght bank resulted in a loss ot altitude that might tmder such conditions, only one

The air defense tro.inina program emphasized high alti­ Training in Ta-Dan tactics vas

tude, night and bad weather flying. o.lso included.

take 10 to 20 minutes to regain .

\olhen U . S . forces cnptured Saipan in July 1944, at­

pass at an enemy bomber would be possible . !fight Combat and Bad Weather Tra1n1ng
In training for night combat,

tempts were Ll8.de to intensify t raining but the effort was handicap­ ped by shortages of planes and fuel. Although it vas recognized

the prinCipal emphasis 'Was placed

that bases in Saipan and Tinian would enable the U.S. to launch raids against Japan with the newly developed B-29 bo�ber, the de­ fense requirements of the Philippines had first priority and train­ ing for the air defense ot Japan suttered.

on achIeving and maintaining a fl1ght patte:rn to cover established interception zones . Time was also spent in tra1n1ng pilots in methods ot attacking targets illuminated by searchlights . Tra.1n1ng in cethods of intercepting raiding planes in bad weath­ er or in overcast skies 'Was begun in md-Augu.st 1944. ing this type ot training was due to the necessIty ot
ground support units .
ed

High Altitude Training
High altitude, in the Japanese anny ai r torce, meant heights
up to 8, 000 meters and engines had been desIgned to operate at l. 'tlum efficIency at about 5, 000 meters .
max­

Delay in start­

first

torming

Navigation Aid Units, one ot which was assIgn­

When it vas tound, 10 Oc­

to each a1 rt1e�d, used radio direction finders to essist inter­

tober 1944,

that the B-29 ' s gas turbine engines and pressurized

ceptors in l!I&1nta1n1ns their alert patte:rns by establiShing the re­ latIve positions ot other Japanese planes . One ot the pr"-ncipa1

compa�Qents permitted operation at altitudes in excess ot 10, 000

results ot the operations of Navigation Aid Units was t'J reduce the

26

["
amount at training necessary tor
Ta-Dan
bad

weather tlying operatiODs.

The GDC, however, determined that the threetold msdon vas

too

Tra1n1ng in the tactic at counter-bombing B-29 tormations traa

Bombing Tra1n1ng

d1fflcult to accOiilplish and relieved the 6th Air A.rmy ot the mission ot conducting the current air detense at
Japan.

pod tions above the attacking pJ.anes vas carned. out t'1ghters
vitb

b,.

multi-seat

In early February, concluding that the attacks on the l.far1anas

special bomb carrying equipment.
used.

As

a part or tlie

bases could not be carried out

in

sufficient strength to be at

value,

training, live bombs were

Since the bombs were act1vated b:y

that operation, too, was discontinued. designated as a strategic reserve to
be

The 6th Air A:rIrJ.y vas then employed against enemy in­ c urrent air detense re­

contact fuzes, it vas necessary to conduct such training over the
ocean. Final M

vasion torces and it vas exempted trom Det'ense Preparations
vould.

all

sponsibilities. Redes1gnat1on of Districts and Anny Commands
On 6 February

1944 drew to a close, it became obvious that the U.S.
invasion

attempt an

o� Japan during the

following

:year and. derenBe to

1945, the three districts ot Japan

were

increased

preparations were intens1%'1ed. Foroation ot the 6th" Air Army
On 20

tive

and redeSignated as military districts . District,
which

The two new districts encompassed
all

were the northeastern Military Honshu north ot the

ot

to as the Air Instruction Army) was reorganized as the 6th Air ArtIly and
a

Decembe r 1944, the Air Training Arm7 (sometimes reterred

Kanto Plain area, and the East Coast M1lita.ry

District, lIhich vas established between the old Eastern and Central Districts and included a portion ot both. trict was extended to include
the western

number ot' Air Tra1ning Divisions were tormed under the Inspec­ The missions ot the newl,. tormed

The Central Hilitary Dis­ tip ot Honshu and the is­ Suultane­

torate General. ot Army Aviation.

Air Army were announced b,. IGHQ as : 1. To carry on the attacks on U�S. bases in the Marianas, presently beins undertaken b:y the Air Training Arm:y.
2.
To

land ot Shikoku, formerly parts ot the Western District.

oud,. with the redes1gnatlon and increase in the number of military districts, the amy commands within the districts
and

were

inactivated

conduct the air det'ense ot

Japan.

ti ve area annies were establ1shed (Map No. 3 ) . 8

3 . To plAn ano. ll\Bke preparations tor the t� defense ot Japan against invasion, in­ cluding the attacking of' invasion 'task torce. at sea.

8 . See pages 40 - 43, Japanese Monograph Ito . 11, Homeland Op­ erations Record. t:or more cOiilplete int'onnat10n on the mill tary dis­ tricts and area armie s .

M AP

NO. 3

MI L I TARY ARE A

DISTR ICTS AND COMMANDS
1945 AREAS
aoo , _

r
I

C�d Reorganizntion - 1945
On 8

ARMY
APRIL
100

April 1945, the Ketsu-Go Operation, outlining the t1nal,
w.s

0 -0
o

all-out defense of Japan

announced by IGllQ . 9 en the same date,

KETSU -GO

drastic command changes were also announced - all to be effective 15 April. The General Defense Command 'Was inactlvated and the

KIL.OWCT'C".

First and Second General Anll1e s as well as the Air General Army were established. The 1st Air A:rm.y 'Was relieved of responB1bll1t7
un-

for replac�nent traininS and reorganized as a tactlcal command der the newly fonned Air General Army.

The effects ot the changes In the nUlnber of milltary districts and the formatlon of the general armies on the three air div1sions
S EA OF JAPAN will

be discussed In subsequent chapters ot thls study.

Transfers and Reassignments
On 2 GA

!-18.y, the 6th Air Anny 'Was augtllented by the addition of

some 100 planes trom To-Go Un!ts as well as a number of f'lghter and heavy bomber regiments . Following the aU8mentatlon the Army was

placed under the operational control of the Combined Fleet for uti11zatlon In the Okinawa battle . At the concluslon of that engage­ ment, the 6th Air A.rmy 'Was returned to the control of the Air Genera! Army and the operatlonal boundaries of the 1st and 6th Air Armea were changed to conform with those of' the First and Second
9. See page 62, Ibld. and po.ee 73, Japanese Hono�raph No. 23, Air Def'ense of' the Homerand for details of the Ketsu-Go Operatlon.

PA C I F I C

OCEAN

30
�,

General Armies, respectively.

OIl 1

July the air divisions vare re­

CHAPTER 2

moved t'rom the operational control ot the First and Second General

AIR DEFENSE

OF THE KANTO :m::TOR

Aluies

and

placed directly WIder t.he lot. and 6th Air Andes with S1multaneoua17 Tbe Knoto Air Defense Sector encOIIlp assed the Kanto Pla1.n area, in which is located Tokyo and the great industrial centers ot' Yokohama and Kawasaki .
In addition to its indust.rial and governmental

over-all direct.ion vellted in the Air Genero.l Arrrty .
wi th

thi s eotnblisru4cnt ot the Air General Army as the tactical CQIl­
tor all defendve air power in Jo.po.n, the Sei-Go Operat.ion was This operation divided the defensive air torce into stat­

mand

activat.ed.

importance, the Kanto area i s also one ot the important. rice produc­ ing areas ot the CO\.Ultry. Occupying the southern port1on ot' the

ic and mobile air group s and established a pat.tern ot mutual support bet.ween areas .
10

Eastern DistriCt., the Kanto Air Defense Sector vas considered to be

the most vital ot all Jap3ll and its defense
ty.

had

the highest priori-

AlthoUGh all the rest of Japan miGht fall, the Japanese were

firmly determined to defend the Kanto area to the end. Organization of Defensive Air Unit.s Prior to April 191!2, the 244th Air Res1.:nent ot the 1st Air Axmy, UDder the operational control ot the Eastern Army COl:lZII8.Dd, vas charged vi th the air defense ot the Kanto Sector. To protect the

Imperial Palace, the Tokyo-Yokohama. area, Tachikaw. and other vital pOints, the 244th Air Regiment was to intercept and dest.roy enemy planes over the ocean before they could penetrate the strategic eas on the mainland.
ar-

To accomplisb this mission, the Regiment vas

equipped vith 50 Type-97, single- seat, tighter planes.

10. See page Go Operat.1on.

68, � t'or

As a result of the Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942, 'When the
a

canplete explanat.ion ot' the Sei­

air defense un1ts failed to prevent the enemy trom bombing the st.rateg1.c Kanto area, it was detcr.n1ned to strengthen the det'ensive air
))

)2

strength ot the Sector.

To this end, the 17th Air Brigade vas tom­

lOth Air Division 1st Ai r Regill1ent
18th Air Regiment Type-l Fighters Type-3 Fighters Typc-2# Sins!eseat Fighters Type-:2, Twos eat Fighters Type-2# Singleseat Ficbtera Type-3 Fighters Type-l00 Recon Planes
Matsudo

ed on 30 April# with the following canponenta and equipment :
17th Air Brigade 244th Air Regiment Type-3 Fighters Type-97 Fighter.

Chotu Nar1...aasu Toltorozawa Kasbiwa Cbotu
Cbotu

47th Air Regiment 53d Air Regiment 70th Air Regiment 244th Air Regiment 17th Independent Air Squadron

5th Air Regilllent

Type-l Fighters Type 97 Fighters
-

4th Independent Air Squadron
Headquarters Recon­ naissance Squadron

Type-2 Single-seat Fighter.

Type-l00 Reconnaissance Planes

Like the 244th Air Regiment, the 17th Air Brigade \/as organic to the 1st Air Anuy but 'Was under the operational control ot the

Transfers and Reassigomenta

Eastern Army Command.
Fomation of the 10th Air Division

In July# in order to cOlQbat
Manchuria,

B-29 attacks on the

Anshan area ot

the 70th Air ReGiment was moved fX'OCl Ka shi wa to lI .ancburia B-29 ' s had also intensified

In early 1944# wi th the u . S . achiev1.ng major successes

in the

were it ca.:lle W1der the Kwuntung AImy.

Soutp Pacific# the strength ening of the air deten se s ot Japan aga1D

their atta ck s OIl Kyushu and at the end of August, the 1st Air Regi­ went \/as di spatched to Gann osu Airfield to operate under the 12th Ai r Division 1n defense of the Western Di strict .

appeared necessary.

en 10 March 1944# the 17th Air Brigade \/as aug-

mented e.nd reorganized as the lOth Air D1 vis i on, under the te:Dporar,y cOl1llll8lld ot I�J . Gen . Shoichi Sato.
Two months later# as a result ot

To replace the 1st

Air Regiment, the 53d was transferred to l-!atsudo tran Tokorozawa. The newly orca.n1zed 23d Air Regiment (Type-l Fighters ) was subse­ quently added to the 10th Air Division e.nd based at !1uba Airfield

the new cOlnmand p rogra.u# the Division \/as reonoved tran the organ1zational chart of the 1st Air Army and placed directly under th e co:n.. -,and of the C in C of the GOC# with operational control continuing to be vested in the Eastern AxuIy Com:nand.

(P ap No . 4) .

By October 1944, the

composition of the lOth Air Division ap­

By 1 July 1941., the 10th Air Division had attained a strength ot six air re giments and one independent air squadron located at the airfields indicated:

peared to be fairly well stabilized with a strength of appro�tely

35

MAP

NO. 4 200 plane s , about halt" ot vhicb were c a.pable ot night flying.
prox1lllate strength and qua.llty ot 10th Air Division
uni

Ap_

ts

va.s as folloW8 :

18th Air Regiment ( 30 Type-3 Fighte rs )

Newly organized. sUuldard

Combat ability belov required

2 3<1 Air Regiment

( 12

Typ e -l Fi ght e rs )

Newly organi zed.

Barely

operational
Best in Division . skilled pilots

47th Air Reg1J11cnt

( 40 Type-2 Fi ghte rs )

Many

Single- seat

53d Air Regircent ( 25 Typc-2 Two-seat
Fighters

)

Nevly organi zed. Combat abili ty belov required

standard.
Adequat e . Second to 47th in quality Aver dge ability

244th Air RegL �ent

( 40 Type-3 Fighters )

17th Independent Ai r Squadron ( 50 Typ e -100 Hq RecoD Plane s plus a fev fighters)
Note :

About one-hlllf ot the Type-1OO planes of the
lIth Independent Air Squadron

conduc ting Ta-Dan Bombing .

ve re

capable of

Sp o radi c raids by B-29 ' s on the Kanto Sector began in November 1944,

and, althoug.. large - scale raids appeared 1lnm1nent they had not � In spite of the threat of intensified enemy air ac-

yet developed. tivity,

the lOth Air Division underwent seve ral changes in organ i -

zation and sufi'ered from unit and individuel personnel levies.

On 6 November, thc strength of the Divi sion vas reduced by Ule

AIRFIELDS IN KANTO SECTOR

te:lporary transfer of the 18th Air Regiment to the Philipp ines, from

36

1

37

which area it did not return until 21 Jo.nual")' 19lt 5 .

In an eftort to

r I

the majority ot its planes , the rema1.neder ot the force vas ordered
to rejoin the Reg1.tnent.

restore the strengtil of the lOth, the 70th Air Regiment was ordered
back to Japo.n from Manchuria on 6 November 19� 4 .

Th e newly assigned

§?ecinl Attack Ubits

regiment vas not, however, cOUlbat ready and some t1Jne was needed tor lII.Q.intenance units to bring the planes up to reQ.uired otandardB . On 15 November, the 28th Air Regilllcnt vas transferred

During the battles in the PhilippineS in October 1944, the sui­
cide tactic s of Special Attack l.b1ts produced a deep impression on both Japan and its enemi e s . I n November, a Special Attack Ubit,

into the

lOth Ai r Divi sion fl"Oln the 2d Air Anay in J.lD.nchuria and the fi ghter ::oections of the 17th Independcnt Ai r Squadron were incorporated into the Ree;1ment.
On 13,

organized by the 10th Air Division and sent to the Philippines to operate from Clark Field, was particularly successful. As a conse-

1

quence, in reviewing the failures of the air defenses in the first large-scale bow.bing raids on the Kanto Sector, the lOth Air D1vision c orumander determined that suicide tactics offered a means successfully operate against 13-29 ' s .

18 and 22 of December, the Central Di strict was subjectThi s shift in target areas apparently

ed to large- scale air raids .

to

indicating a telTlporary respite tor the Ko.nto Sector, the 244th Air Regiment was sent to H&lmmatsu Airfield to assist in the defense ot the Central District.
On 1 December 1944, the Hioki Squadron or the 23d Air Regiment

All air regjJ:1ents, vi th the

exception of the 18th Air Reg1alent and the 17th Independent Air Squadron, were ordered to organize Special Attack Units co:nposed ot three or four plane s . These units, generalJ.y knO'WIl as

To-Go Units,

was dispatched to Iwo Jima to provide fighter escort tor convoys . By 26 December all planes ot the Squadron had been damaged and the surviving pilots were returned to Japan aboard a Navy plane . On 17 January 1945, an addi tiona! 12 planes from the 23d Air Regiment were �ent to Iva J1ma on the same mi ssion, but by 8 February, having lost tva sec­ 1 . The 17th Independent Ai r Squadron vas divided into because : Fi ghter and Reconna issance . The Fighter Section, tions planes, of the superio r high altitude per1'o nnance of its Type-1OO the Ta-lhn 13ombine; Techvas a::osigned interception lni ssions using niQ.ue .

were also designated as Shinten (Heaven Shaking) Obits. Activation of the 6th Air Army On 26 December 1944, the Air Training � the 6th Air A:rmy and assigned
'WaS

reorganized as

to the GOC .

The

C in C of Detenae to be employed

established the 6th Ai r Array as a strategic reserve

against enemy invasion attempts and exempted it fl'Olll all c urrent. air defense responsibilit ie s . The 10th Ai r Division, although

made

organiC to the newly established Ai r Art!lj', remained under the con­ trol of the Eastezn Army Command for air defense operat1.:ms.

)8

Air

Training

Program was \Ulder the cOIltl'Ol.

In the Kanto Sector, the

and direction of the Inspectorate General at Amy Aviation and the Chief of the Anrty Aeronautical Department. At M1to, the Hitachi Air specialized in the

training progl"Wll

a lOth Air D1vioion pilot W8 11, 000 meters o.nd. thi s had been ac­

complished by one of' the best pilots in the Division.

With aU

units bnv1ng pilots ot varying degrees of' qualification, it � JIIllll1 f' estly impossible tor an air l'Cgilnent to achieve the 10, 000 �eter level as a unit. Besides weaknesses in pilot qual1t'1catioo,

Un! t which was a pert of the Akeno Air School,

training of pilots for fighters .

The let Advanced Training lh1t at

a number ot maintenance problems developed and frequent trouble.

Se.gam1 provided advanced tra1n1ng for non-comm1 s sioned officer t'1ght­ er and light bomber pilots. Other air

vere experienced with oxygen regulators. The best perf'ol'lnance in reaching high altitudes ws achieved by the Type-1OO Headquarters Reconnaissance planes, tollowed by tJle Type-3 Fighters, the Type-2 Single-seat Fighters, the Type-l Fighters and the Type-2 Two-seat Fighters in that order. It was concluded, 1'rom the difficultie s exper1enced. in tn.1n­ ing, that it would be virtually impos sible to intercept a t'lJ.ght of B-29' s with the present equipt!lent and levels of pilot qualifi­ cation. The accuracy of this conclusion was demonstrated during

Sector were the Army Air Academy at Shubuda1 and the Army Air Schools at Utsunomi ya and KUIIItlgaya. The training progrwn of the lOth Air D1 vision was hampered by shortages of planes and fuel. Repeated requests for more plane.

training

schools in the !Canto

and fuel were not honored due to the priori ties established for the cce:1ng Philippines cwnpaign. After the fall of Sa1pan, in July 1944,

the Division was convi.nced that the Japanese mainla.rld would be the next lnajor target of U . S . bombers and insisted on supply priorities. This insistence resulted in a portion of the planes and ruel which had been earmarked for the Philippines being given to the Division.

the several B-29 reconnaissance flights �ch vere flown over the Kanto Sector between 1 and 23 November 1944.
en each occasion,

the 10th Air Division attempted to intercept the ene:ny in strength but the combination o� speed and altitude or �e B-29 ' 8 prevented the interceptors 1'rom even approaching the enemy ba:.bers . was the time lag between the sighting and Added

High

Altitude

Trainiag

In experiments to develop methods of successt'ully combattiDg the B-29' s which were known to fly at altitudes at 10,000 meters or more, the lOth Air Division discovered that only Class A pilots were able to clill1b to that level. The highest altitude eYer reached by

to the d11'r1culties caused by the super1or1ty 01' the B-29 Bociber identification of en.ecy

planes and the taking 01." positions by the derendins fighter units.

40

Nonus.l.ly, tram the time a bomber vas first sighted and reported 1'\ required onJ..y 60 minutes to reach its obJective, lIb1l.e the elapsed t.ime between the 1n1 ti&1 report by the radar installation or look­
out post and the reaching ot the required 10, 000 meter level by

Ni ght Co;nbat Training

During Decembe r 1944 and January 1945, there vas an increase in the trequency ot night raids by 81118.l.l groups ot enemy bombers, indi­ cating a possib1li ty that large -scale raids might be 1mm1nent.

the

Act­

inte rcep tor un1 ts vas approximate ly 70 to 80 minutes.
Bad Weathe r orra1.n1ng
Flying in bad weathe r or heavi:Q' overcast sky conditions pr0Ye4

ing on this assunption, the lOth Air Division emphasized night train­ ing and took steps to reorganize tor more etticient night �ght1ng
operation a . On 19 January 1945, the 53d Air Regiment vas designated as a pe:nuancnt night tighter unit . The advanc ed nicht training tor

to be a problem. which the lOth Ai r Divi sion had. not cOIIlplete:Q' solve4
by the end ot the war.

The navigation aid units which were establi sh.

the Regiment was m03t intensive and so strict the.t, atter a tew !:lonths, morale deteriorated within the organiza.tion. In addition, a number

ed in August 1944 were not comp le te ly effective in assisting 1n oper­ ational. tlying and in most cases served only to aid planes, which had lost their bearings in bad weather or at night, to return to their

01' ne rvoua breo.kdo\/Ils we re suffered by the p1lots .

An

investi gati on

indicated that this reaction had come as a result of keeping the men

base s .

Their assi stance in aiding combat op e rati ons never achieved OIl

training all night, every night, and having them attempt to get their
re s t during the day. Rooms occupied by the trainees were ke p t dark

any real success.

30 Novembe r

1944, when B-29' s made the first

night raid on Tokyo and started tires

in the Kanda distriCt., the at­
The

and the men were required the day.

to wenr dark glasses when going out during

tack was not only carried out at night but also in bad. weather.

Because or the deleterious affect of the intensive training

lOth Ai.r Divi sion cOlJlmt!.Dde r and his atai'f' became greatly conc e rned

and duty, the 53d Ai r Regiment

was

relieved or its mi s sion ot e xclu­

because the Divi sion vas unable to take any defensive action due to
the �_ouble handi cap of bad. we athe r and darkness. While the 10th Ai.r

sive night opel�tioDS on 20 May 1945 . Ta-Dan Bornbing T rai ni ng

Division, unable to operate under the adverse conditions, stood belp­ lessly by, the enemy clearly demonstrated its superior equipment,
tra1n1ng and coordination.

The 10th Air Divioion had been highly confident that the Ta-Dan
Bombing Technique would prove to be a highly efficacious way ot disruptin� enemy bomber formations and infl1ctins heavy losses. With

this end in View, the Divi sion conducted intensive train1ng in the
specialized b��bing technique, using the fighter section

of the l1th

42

43

Independent Air Squadron with its Type-1OO Reconnai ssance planes as the principal Ta-Dan th1t.
this tactic However,

Light BoiIlber Training School at Hokod.a;
ing Ul1 t at

the

1st Advanced Air Train­ Station at Fussa.
en

the first attempts to employ

So.gami

and the Army Air Testing

proved unsucce sstul becQ.uoe ot the 1nabil1t7 ot the

1 November 1944, however, when the Kanto Sector vas subjected to
its first B-29 raid, the To Units p roved ineffectual. and, etforts ve re made to improve their ope rating e:rficiency, no .narked 1;lIprovement in pe rl'o :n:l8Jlce and the ass1stance de red in subsequent attacks was negligible .

banbera . plane s to gain suft'ic1 ent altitude to get above the enemy
Th e maneuver, p roving ineffective, time preT10us to the otficial Re1nforce:nent by Training

although
there vas

was dropped by th e Division SQlle

disbanding at the Ta-Dan Units.

they ren­
the tre­

th1ts
vaG

In addit1on,

Furt.her interl'ering vi th training

the establ1l1htnent ot an

mendously increased responsibilities and heavier work load laid

on

emergency reinforcing program which placed instructors and test pilots ot testinS agenc i e s .

a beavy burden on the

the inst ructor group re sulted in a. deCl�ase in the effect1vene s s of the training mi ssion.

the

various air training schools and

A series of units called

�-Iii-Go

Butai, or Sec­

In early December 1944, addi tiona! strength vas added to the
lOth Ai r Division when the 22d Air Ree:iu .ent. the located at Sagam1,

ondary provi sional Units,

using the fighter plane s assiGJled to

the

and

schools a..od Ll81lIled by instructors and test pilots, vere activated on 10 !l y a

16th Ai r Bri gade (51st and 52d Air Regiments ) , stationed at
ve re delliGll ated a s

1944.

Tbe

To

Units cQll1e under the coc;nand of the lOth Air

Shimodate.

To Units .

Although the addition at

Divi sion only during air alerts a..od were used s1 ve strength of the Division. bout cies .

to

ausment the defen­

these regiments appeared to add considerably to the strength of

the

The newly 1'or:ned un1 ts

provided a­

Division, they actually were of little assi stance as they were all involved in a general reorganization and had few serviceable planes . Ai r-ground co:nmunication with these added un1ts, as vell a s wi th the original To Units, did not operate with the e fficiency that it did with the organic units ot' the Il1vision. Since

90

e.dd1 tional planes which the lOth could call on in emergen­

To

Units were as signed a.reas in the defensive alert pattern

and it vas expected that the a.dd1 tional strength co:nbined

with the

high que.ll ty of the veteran pilots would result in greatly increas­ ins the effectivene s s at the

all efforts to improve

10th Air Div1siou.

control and perfol' ..lance appeared \JlUI.VIlillnG, the To Un1 ts were cal­

The princ ipal installations from which the vere : the Advanced Fighter

TO Un!ts

vere dxavn

led on less and less and the

To-Ni-Go BUtai concept of �ergency 1945 .

Training School at Hitach!; the Mvanced

reint'oTCl!lJlent VQ.S offic1ally discarded on 15 April

45

L

ma sumry ot Training

Operations

vi th planes that 'Were unable to illatch the enemy bombers I

speed and

aa to In January 1945, combat. operations were so eont.1nuoua

altitude was

demonstrated in

the first large-scale B-29 raid on 24

mission s. In l virtualy preclude the carrying out. or pilOt. training
addi tion,

Novembe r 1944.

It was then reaJ.ized that the only hope tor sUlCcess­

shor1;.a.Ges ot ruel

made

it. ill-advised to expend large

t:ulJ.y c(X.Ubatting the B-29 was to develop f'1e;hter planes capable at operating at high altitude s . This problem va s the Llll.J or di tficulty

quanti ties for t.ro1n1 ng.

The only way in which pilot. t.ra1D1ng

ng unit.s in combat. could be accomplished was by includ1nc t.raini patrols . trail a Re:;Jults ot thi s system 'Were tar t'rom satistactory

encountered in th e air def'ense of' the Homeland and persisted until
the end at the war.

co.rry out the ordor ot combat standpoint, o.lthouCh it did serve to

Service UnIts
Service units assigned to the lOth Air Division consisted of'

on : the COllunandina General ot the lOth Air D1visi

to conduct train.

iog through the use of fuel reserved for air COll1bat operations . The almost continuous B-29 raids caused great emphasis to be placed on training for attu.cks on bombers.
As a consequence, in

airfield battali on s , zpecial i ntelli genc e

zquadroos, navigation aid

un i t s , ai r si6l1ul uni ts and a i r- cround couuunicutions � "lits.

Ai rfield Battalions

February 1945, when enemy t&slt torces began launching f'iGhter raids, the lOth Air Division pilots f'ound theluselves inadequately trained tor action against this type at' aircraft. Problems encountered by the lOth Air Division included inabll· i ty to conduct hie;h 0.1ti tude training because of' physical l1m1 ta­ tions of plo.nes,

Ai rfield battalions of

the 10th Air Di vi s i on perf'o:ced mainte.
as

n:l.tlc e duties and were o re;ll.1l i z ed

de sc ri bed in Chap te r

1. IDeations

of uni ts at the tiroe of the organiza tion of the 10th Ai r D1 vision were a s follows :

too

f'ew planes tor training purposes, critical

shortages of' av1�tion ruel and lack ot technical skill on the part of navigation aid units . The training program was consistently be·

3d Ai rfield Battalion 6th Ai rfield Battalion 7�1 Ai rfie ld Battalion 43d Ai rfield Battali on 244th Ai rfi eld :&I.t.tulion 65th Ai rfi eld Company 71st Ai rfield Company 72d Ai rfi eld Company
Stlecia1 Intelligence Squadrons

• • • • • •

Chot'u Matsudo

• • • • •

• • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • •

Nari.masu Chofu 'l'okoroz.awa Oshima ( i sland ) �i18hima ( i sland )

Ke.shiwa

hind in counterinG the technical p rogress of' the enemy in developiog new types of aircraft and equipment. The rutili ty of' conducting an intensified training program

On 12 November tile 10t.h Air Divi s i on Special Intelligenc e Squad­ ron

vas formed and located in Division headquarters . PersonLel levies

46

47

were n;ade

on

suOordJ.na.te eleillents ot the DivisiOD in order to obtain
The

Ai r Raid Warning

System

bleD capable of c l")'iltaDalysis o.nd who were proficient in D:lgll sh .

Organized under the Eastern Anly Conmand, were three �terent types of air raid warning un1 ts : pi cket boats . LoOkout Posts Both military and civilian lookout posts were iI\Il1.!l.tained throUBh­ out the Kanto Sector. The o.my posts were organized under the 32d
Air

duty ot the UA1t was to obtain inrormation on ene- operations by v J:\Ooitor1.n3 and deciphering radio comm unications, particularly those err.anatinc f'ro.. Tinian ond Sa1pan . 'l 30ce excellent resu1ts were
0.-

lookout posts, radar sta.tions and

chieved by the Special. Int.c111(;ence Squadron, pl"1ncipa.lly in pre­ dictinG large- scale a.ir raids . It was found that such raids were
a

generally preceded by the b roadcasting of

continuous signal ap-

Air Raid Warnin.::; Unit ot the lOth

Division \/bich also exercised

parently used as a GUide in establishing the patt.ern ot the tllgbt tOl'lll&tion . Navieation Aid thits Experience in combatt.ing air raids in Kyushu had indi cated the necessit.y for organizinB navigation aid units to aid interceptor plnne s in :nainta1oing their alert patterns.
On 11 November 1944,

so:ae control over the civilian posts. Civilian lookout post.s were manne d by volunteers who varied widely in ability. Civilian urea headquarters were established at

key points and all lookout posts were connected to the headquarters by telephone. The area headquarters, actinc as central clearing

stations, were in direct telephone c�nun1cation with the nearest appropriate air base or ar.ny hea.dquarters. Initially, the operation of lookout posts was far tro� satis­ factory as personnel, both military and Civilian, lacked experience and training in techniques of observation and identification ot planes . To re:ledy thi s detect, training progre.:uB were established

one each of such units was a.ssigned to each airfield in the lOth Air Division ' s zonc of' responsibility. Necessary personnel were

drawn f'rom the air-eround radio un1 t of eo.ch airfield and trom the

13th Air SignaJ. Regiment o.t Chofu.

In addition to a.::;sisting in the

maint.eno.nce o r the a.l.ert pattern during air raid alerts, the nav1Gation a.id wU. ts
vere

o.ssigned the secondary duty of cooperatinS
In Jo.nuar)'

to train observers in plane identification and altitude estimation.

end assi sting in ba.d weo.ther and night flying training.

By the end of 1944, as

e.

resu1t of training and experience, reports

1945, in order to increase efficiency and eliminate any possibility of' a tue laC, the un1 ts were aueuented and establi shed on tully me.nne d 24-hour watches.

were generally �ucb more reliable and accurate. Begin.!ling 7 June 1945, the 10th Air Division issued a series of

L

I

I

49

MAP NO. !5

orders and directives
organization of

desl6Ded

to further
post.s.

improve the

operation

and

the army 1ookout.

St.rength of post.a vas set and 18 enl.1at.ed
were
1IIaD-

at.

one off1cer or senior non-commi ssioned offlcer

men for ned

the

l.e.rger lnstul.l..nt.iona,

by one non

equip!lleIlt, cameras,

such as more

_

while the smaller post.a and 12
enl.i st.ed men.

'JL..
• U • • •

c�nm1s s ioned officer powerful the lIlore

Improved

binoculars and

Type-95 t.elephot.o

was issued to

important. posts.

COlIDunicat.ion bewere

tween posts and headquarters vas no:nnall.y by telephone, but.
vire com.:nunico.tion was not m1ssioned officer the lookout. post. posts,

possible, a men

radio squad of one was adde d to the for the

noD-CCllll
.

and

six enl.isted

st.rength lookout.

of

�f'.--..r-... . �.
•T
ICASAKI

:

( �
J' \

OTAWAItA

.

T O ••

:.:.�

••• , ••

MAEBASHI

.�

SA,.O

.

.KUWAOAYA

To auglnent personnel required
on Ground unit s . In


CH'CH'8U

KUK

� \
'

f'"

"...,-/'-

(

r

· SHIIIOQATE

S A I T A M A

levies were IlUlde
improving

addition

to increasing

. KA...OOE

·

'

I . A It A • I

strength and

training,

all po st s

vere to be placed
Posts vere

under.

ground and observation tovers vere to be strongly fortified to enable t.hem to bombard:nent . The
duties of

built.

to be

\�'2:: '�:- ' .-=�..
.�.J "�' 'ATSUG '

vi thsto.nd int.ense air or naval

the

coastal.

1ookout. post. s
vessels,

vere

al.so in-

creased to include the ob servation of of veathe r data,

enemy

the recording

and

t.he reporting of re sults of

attacks by special

j

• A N A G

at.tack unit s

_

since

the l.e.tter, afte r
to

accanpli shinc suicide mia-

IC ATlUUlt A •

sions, could not return
�cat.ions of ed in

make

thcir

ova reports . shovn
CI VI LIAN LOOKOUT POST ARE A H E ADQ UARTER S E A STE RN ARMY COM MAND
o 10 20 30 40 $0

both military and

civilian lookout. post.a are liat.-

Table

No.

1.

�ation of civilian area headquarters are

on Map No. 5 .

ICIl.OMETEItS

51

Table No. 1
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LOCKOUl P08.rS UNDER F..ASTERN ARMY COMwm

Table No. 1 (Cont.' d)
GUMMA PREFFL"l't.l'It
C1 villan Posts Area Sq. - Maebash1 As\D& Ise salti K11")'U

CHIBA PREFB:'l'URB C1villan Post.. Area Sq. - Chibe.
Anegasak1 FUnabe.sh1 Malcubarl
Owada So.tom1 Sh1sa1

Area Bq. - 'l'akuak1
Mamba M:1.now

Area Sq. - Choshi
.A8ah1 FuDak1
lCyoko

Area JIq. -

Kodama

Gonda

lCat.wura As� ChjMch1

'l'ateba1a1lh1

Murota

Sh1ranwa.

Area Sq.

Sb1to Ush1h1sa
Yawata

Akimoto

- Kiaarazu

CbOJa Ich1nclm17& KBae1U&
(klt..u OnJuk\l

Ozawa Sa1moku

Sh1.mon1ta

Ueno Milltary
oso An1 Mka
7Om1oka Fuj10ka !BARAGI PRE�
Clvi 11 an Posts Posts

Kwueyama
Kana.;yua

0tak1

Area Sq. - Mo.tsudo

Kururi

Nakaga.....
Sanuk1 Sek1toyo

Ab1ko Kazaha:ya Ich1k&wa Urayasu

Area Hq. - 8akuzoa AJ1kl Kioro.hi
Narlta

Ota

SeJta:i. Matsuida

ltIkU(lO Yo.ch1ll\ata Yatom1

Area Sq. - Saw.ra

lino Kozak1 Ku.r1moto

Area Bq. - Tate)'BmA Alllatsu
Chikura

Area. Hq. - '1'op.De
Futekava. Baruto BallunUlll&

Area Hq. - Kashima
Su1Ia Tsuswli

Area Hq. - M1to lwa.se Kam1nakazU1I8. f.Be\/8.tarl Og:lw. Tematsukurl Area Hq. - Shimodate »taw. Ishise
Sakal

lwama

Area Bq. - Chta
Da.1go Nakaaato

Funakata

Nakaw. N::unek.ava Qnigava Tako

Kamoga:wn Katsuyama
NUltary Posts·

Begur!

Katat;u1 Mobara
0am1

Area Hq. - 'l'akahag1.
Hanakawa Hatsuzak1 H1raltata

lI J.nalld hara

Sh1rato

Qn1:ya Osato Suga:ya Yamagata Area Sq. - Tsuch1ura Akioka
Mi ts uka1do

Isohara Kurosaki 'l'akaoka

lloda

Chosh1

Ichinom1ya
cnjuku

Toyosato
l-tinam1han.

Obara Taito Am:ltsu

Toyooka

I10ka

Kyako

ToyoUr&

Yoka1chiba Cldt.u
»n1 SUk1

Tsukuba Yuki
mil tag Post.s

Mori:ya Yatabe

Tateya.llla

Basunuma

Sh1rahama Sh1rato

Susald Bonno

Shlrakata

Al.tho UGh both milltary nnd c1villan lookout posts are :rrequentl1 shown in the same tovn or city, they vere separate po sts , otten

Wakamatsu

Bakata KaniJima

AlIa

DUgo

111 ra1 so

O)'a

ltako

Fukashlba Kaah1ma Suva Isohama

some distance apart.

52

53

Table No. 1 (Cont ' d) Millta2 posta Katakura Maewa:t&ri

Table No. 1 (Cont' d) C1 villan Posta

Koga
Sh1moyukl Arakawaokl Kihara Toride

Makabe

Nagaoka

Hitachi

ShimOtauma KuJ1

Area Hq. - Kumagaya
BonJo

Fujlsawa

I&b1oka
Shibazald

Ryugasaki Ushiku

Konosu Takekawa Yoril

Kavanata K1 taltawara

Area Hq. - Urawa Hatoba,a Kosh1ga,a
owada Tokorozawa Yo shikawa Mill ta2 Poats

KANAGAWA PREFrruRB
Civilian posta ChIch1bu Ki shi Qn1shl

Area Bq.

- Atsugi

Area

Hq. - Odawara
Koz u
Hatano �\a.nazuru 1/ .1ho Motohakone Ninomiya

Area Hq. - Yokohama
Chigasald FuJ1sawa FutatsUlll&Ch1 KamBkura Kavaseld Kava..

Ogawa
Kurlhasbi

Sakato
Kon08u Ivatsuld

Aone Iehara Nakano Sh1.mom1zo Yose

Qn1ya

�eo
Uruva SHIZUOKA PREFD:'l'URE

Oyama

Area Hq. - Yokosuka Nage.1

Sengokubara Yemaki ta

I,agano
Nagatauda Sh1mokaw.1 TakeshIta

CIvillan Posta Area Hq. - FuJ1m1)'8. Inogasbira
Shinosald.

Yoshill8.ra

}'!111ta� Poats
Hiratsuka Fuji sawa Nagal
}.b.oazuru Bayama Tsurue;1zakl SAITAMA P� CIvilIan Poata

N1no:IIi)'8.
M1sak1

Mill ta� Posta Kof'll Otsuld TOCHIGI PREFECTURE Ci villan Posta Area Hq. - Otawara Funyu Area Hq. - Utsunomi)'8. ABbio

U1t1J1ma

Area Hq. - ChIeh1bu
ABh1ge.kubo

Area Hq. - Kavagoe
Hara1ch1ba Matauyama

Area Bq. - Kuki

Kunibe.mi Ogano
Otaki Urayama

Irumagawa

Ogot

Boki.ne

SUgito

lono Mataugo

Ogose
Tsukikawa Yatsuo

Shiobara Takaba)'8.sbi Yalta

Awano Bato FujIwara
Ishibashi Kanuma Karaa�

Kugeta Malta

YUIDOto

Oyamada

Nikko

Ki tsuregava

UJ11e

Ubaga1

54

Table Ho. 1

(Coot' d.)

Radar Installatlons At the start ot World War II, the only radar in use in the
Kanto Sector was the Type-A, a vertical scanne r which ut1l1zed. the

TClCYO-TO

ctvUian Posts
Aretl. Hq.

- Hach1oJ1 Aome Asakava Higashiakiru Hinobara Itsultaido Kaucbi lo' chida A M1takesan Murayema Onkata Yamada

Aretl. Hq. - Oc:bsnomi&u
Altabe.ne

Doppler Effect to identity objects.

This radar vas manufactured. in

Cbotu Denenchotu Faogava Fucbu KaJaata Keto 11 zonokuch1 .1 Nerima Og1kubo Setagaya S' ninagava Tachikava
Tanash1

3, 10, 100 and lIQO vat.t. units which wre strateg1call.y located with­
in the zone of the �stern Army Comma.n� to to:nl1 an air raid wanUns

net..

The Type-A radar speedily beca. e obsolete because it could. 'll

only detect objects 'which passed directly through its fixed be8l!l, which could riot be established beyond t.he coastline . After the first air raid on Tokyo, in April 1942, Type-A radar stations were supplecented by Type-B installations
an
.

The Type-B vas

improved type of scanne r which covered a

ot 125 to 150 r'l1le s .

Type-B radar unite developed b y the Tam& Army

ryJ0

sector with a radius

Technical Research Station were clas sitied as "Tachi " ( ground) or
"Taki" (air) and were developed in severol models :
20

Tach! 6, 7, 18,

and 35, as wll as Tak1 1, 13 and 15 .

Taehl 6, 7 and 18 were

mob1le units. Map No. 6.

Locations ot Type-A radar installatlons are shown on

Operational ability in the use ot Typ e B radar improved rapid­
-

ly with experience and, by late November 1944, it vas possible to identity B-29' s and predict altitude and speed.
Cc

24 Januar,y 1945,

additiona1 Type-B radar vas installed at Matsudo Airfield to a.ss1at

the 53d Air Regiment in nlGht interceptlon missions .

Matsuzak! and

MAP

NO.

6
Kotu also re c e i ved

the same

e�uipment but it did not p e rfo rman c e .

function �rree-

tively in improving night in te rcep t i on

13 raddr � c anne rs ( a Pl�totJ?e of � c �i �
• VTSUNOUIYA . .. A E BASHI

35 ) were

installe d

at

each

ai rf'i<.:ld ..:.nd otiler

:; tr t.e ci c .J.

locations c.mi, by
wa;;

cOlU

bi n1ng the ground

.ni sl!::mncr wi t.h tile Ta.ki 15 radar, a tecl"> qu<!

<le velop e:d to

plot

the

course of enemy bombers :Jot nic;t.t without the us e of

seurchl1shts .

Other heiGht

finde r

se ts , usilli;

a

68

to

80 megacycle band, were 10-

stalled ;.:.t Shimoda and Matsuzaki to be us e d in coordinution With
ground radar in plotting courses .
OTSUtO •

Th e Tama. AImy Te cwli cal

Research Station had de ve lop e d special us in g

- --

tec�i<l.ue3 for t. 'le in'te rct.:ptioLl of enemy p lan e s by

Type-I!

ra-

dar and a p rovi sio:'la1 rac!.a.r guide: unit ra1t cf 1945 .
On 16 July,

W d,l>

established in

the tirl:lt

the p rovi sional Guide un i t

was formally the cO::1l!l8Jld

integrated as the 1st Radar Guide Unit and placed under
of the

10th Air Divi s ion .

The Ail'

Anni e s were, however, /lore con-

c e rned wit h

�le p re�c.� tions for t�e final defense of the

Homeland had lit-

a�nst the anticipated invasion and the radar guide uni t s tle opportuni ty to en,3t!.ge in actual
KO Z U S H ''' A

operations. the middle

There were no deve10p:::e nts in radar op e rations frexn of July to the end Picket Boats
To au.y.ent the looitout posts a series

of the

war.

RADAR AND COMMUNICATION NETWORK IN KANTO AREA

of picket boats patrolled

_;: - - "'1 - -...

RAOAR TYPE

A

T

RADAR TYPE • RADIO STATION LINE
I

TELEPHONE
ao 40 eo

o

59

58

radioa, but t ot Japan . These vessels had the sea east. and southeas 600 m1lea ott Orlg1.nall)" operating about vere not rada r-equippe d. w to posi­ ses, they were later withdra shore, due to exc essive los 4, in an et­ mainland. <n 21 Novembe r 194 tions Itluch closer to the the Ea.stem at the early warning net, tort to increase the radius Lookout Un1t. '1'vO to torm the 1st SUrl'ace ArrAY eo.nmand was dire cte d rox1mately 200 equipped and stationed app vessels vere to be radar

bombers vas very close to the

mwdmum

range at the 15-mm Weapons

and

that only the l2O-mm guns vere ettective .
en 1

March 1945, when Lt. Gen. Kanetoshi Kondo assumed caD.llllUld
in­

at the 10th Air Division, his operating plan called tor maj or creases in the number of o.ntiail"<:raf't guns stationed .at the Although a numbe r ot
2O-IWl\

u rbase • •

and 4o-!lI/1l aircraft machine guns vere e­

quipped with special mounts tor use in defense of airfields, because ot the 11m! tations of the ItlOunts they vere useful onl)" in specific locations and vere used principall)" in connection with dumMY' plane. used as decoys to lead enemy planes into the line or fire or the converted guns (Figure No . 2) .
In spite ot General Kondo ' s good intentions, there vas little

t ot Japan . m1lea ott the east coas

sent out. Arter t vas radar equipped and eventually one picket boa r to et­ t1l&e 1 t rstu:nled 10 orde tion only a abo rt

Supply difficultie a

aro.. but

remaining in pod

\lll.a aubseQ,uentl)' equipment. '!'he veuel tect repairs on its radar efit reaulte4 l-Brch 1945 and little ben sunk during an o.1r raid in

trom its ope ration. ields Antiaircraft Defense at Airf Eastem � under the command ot the An Air Defense Bri gade, g1.na1 equip­ of the air defenses . 0rl d 'oIaS inc luded as a part Cornoan 1942, its fire­ rcraft BUDs but in April ment vas 150 15-mm antiai er at l2O-1IIIIl gun s. plying units vi th a numb powe r vaS increased by sup ­ 24 November 1944, a� large-scale B.2 9 raid on Afte r the fir st ense Brigade o efrected and the Air Det tation or personnel was als Following the first iaircraft Group . vas reorganized as e.n Ant iaircraft Group 24 November 1944, the Ant large- scale B-29 raid on at the enemy man Comd that the altitude orted to the EAstern Anny rep

increase in the nUl!lber of weapons onade available to the antiaircraft wits and the only augmentation ws by means ot conversion ot weapons which provided only sllghtly IllO re firepower tor the airtield battal10ns. Major Command Changes
On

6 Februar)" 1945, the number ot milltary districts in Japan

(with the exce;t>tion of Hokkaido ) , ws increased from three to five b)" the add! tion ot the East Coast and llortheastern )f111 tary Districts. This chanGe had 11tUe aftect upon the operations or the lOth Air Division as it continued to have pr1mo.r)" responsibillty tor th e air detense of the Kanto Sector, whicb now coincided almost exact!)" with the Eastern
11,,1 11 tar)"

District.

60

FI G U R E

2

T Y P I C A L A I R FI E L D L AY O U T
"RoeAet.E F t. I O H T "ATH 0' ATTAC K I N G ENEM Y !'LANES AUTOMATIC W!A�S AND OIR!CTION OF FIRE

>-f .... �

>-f ....

The 6th Ai r Anny remained under the control of the General De-41.---

��:cLIW'T

tense Command, but 1 s sued a new order ot battle on II February, vith the ors=izat10n of the lOth Air Divis10n being show as in Table No. 2. Tact1c s to Counter the B-29 Bomber Folloving the 1ncendiary raid on Tokyo on 30 November, t'urther raids, both night and daytime, were experienced and in the inter-

1----

CONCeALIO TA)" ST"�

vals between raids, reconnai ssance flichts by single B-29' 8 increased in frequency.
On each occasion, the Division attempted to

intercept the enemy but by maintaining very high altitudes the BI---- TAII • •TIt.�

29' s easily eluded the Divi sion ' s fighters .

The attempted inter-

ceptions only resulted in l.'asted fuel, additional maintenance 'WON and exhaustion of pilot and ground c rew personuel. The Commanding General of' the lOth Air Division recognized that a great many problems faced the Division and that a number ot
' J! ROU N O .... l � G
',"E ., ,, ', E L D

them were not capable of solution.

The already overstrained indus-

trial resources of the nation had been badly hit by enemy bombings and there vas no possibility ot producing the quantity ot high altitude interceptors needed for detense against B-29 attacks . General

Kondo vas displeased by the tact that the latest models ot the Type-

1 Fighter (�el nIl had been denied his Division but were being
_ GONCI "LEO 100-_

supplied to the Special Attack Units .

A1J an altemative, it

was

TAll.

ST"'�

decided to employ Type-lOO Headquarters Reconnaissance planes, Y.b1ch

62

Table No. 2

had good high-altitude pertomance capab1l1t1es.

Since the a.rmament

th Air D1vision Orgnni zation end Di sposition of lO 6 Febru&l7 1945
lOth Air Divi sion Headquarte rs
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

ot the Type-1OO ws onl)" one 7. 7-1!D mch1ne gun, they 'WOuld be eon-

verted by installing a 2O-mm carmon. 'rOlQO
Kaah1Imba

Authorities were urged to push the production ot the SIlWN1 .1et
tighter" which 'Was still in the experimental stage . Jet fighter would have a very fast

18th Air Reg1cent ( Fighters ) ; 23d Air Regiment (Fignters ) ) 28th Ai r Re giment (Hq Recon Plane. 47th Air Regiment (Fighters ) 53d Air Re gUnent (Figh ters ) 70th Air Re giment ( Fi ghte rs) ) 244th Ai r Re �ent ( Fighters ) uadron (Hq Re con Planes 17th Independent Mr Sq 46th Air Secto r COL�d 164th Ai rfi eld Dattal10n
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Although this

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

'rogaDe Nar1maa",

rate of c.liL'lb (estimated 10,000

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .

lotLtsu@

Kaahi­

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Chotu Chotu Sh1sOd&te
KanalrA nIbe.ra

meters in four minutes ) , its combat fl1ght t1.r.1e would be only six minutes . Again, however, the p roduc ti on capab1l1ties o f Japanese

Airfield Enttalion Airf ield Battalion Ai rfie ld Battali on --' ield Bat�ion 3d Airf 6th Ai rfield Batt�on � 7� Airfield Bat tali on

l65th 1 66th 169th l70th 175 th

'

industry was indequate to the task.
During the period from 1 Ja.. 'lwry to 14 February 1945, frequent
raids, both night and daytLne, were launched again st Japan by small.

Airfield Dattal10n Airfield Datta1ion

llitta

Nitta
Nitta Tatebayaah1
Kash1Imba

ShimodAte
Matsudo Narimasu

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

group s of B-29' s and there were also four larGe da.ylisht raids on
the Kanto Sector.

It beca:::e apparent that the enemy' s raiding poten­
,

43d Ai rfield Battal10n 116th Ai rfi eld Battal10n

140th Airfield Battali on l4ls t Airfield Battali on l76th Ai rfield Battalion 2 44th Ai rfie ld nattalion 65th Ai rfield Battalion 72d Airf ield Battalion Navigation Aid
Unit

Tokorozaw. Yachimata Togane
*

tial ws increasing and that SO::lC !!'leans must be found to effective-

l;y counter the B-29' s .
The Alert System
During

71st Airfield Battalion

Chof'U Chof'U Oshima N1ij illla
Tokyo TokYO

1944, a systeo of air alerts

had

been deve loped :

under

1st Air-Ground Radio Unit

Alert-B, fuel and ammun1 tion ..as loaded end p1lots stood by in the
night \18.1 ting l"OOIn; upon announc emen t of Alert-A, pilots stood by

( subordinate unit s s tationed throUGhout the Kanto area) TokYO Unit lOth Air Di vi s i on Traininc Tokyo li genc e Unit Ai r Inte l Tokyo � 13th A1 - Si gnal Unit te units stationed ( subordina throughout the Knnto area)
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

their planes, which were in night read.1ness. Even in the absence ot specific orders fro:n the 10th Air nl.vi-

�t 1st Searchli& Re �aent

( Subordino.te units stat one throUGhout the Knnto area)
Uni t

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

i

· · ·

d

sion, air \.Ul1ts were to enter Alert-B status autanatical.l;y upon re­
ceiving an alert warning froc. the zastern A:r::I:! Corumand.
Alert-A

TokYO

*

Jlovn on 6 Februa ry. Exact location unY red to Shikoku. transfer

subsequently
65

voul.d be as s u:ued 'When o.n actual air raid

'Warning

vas reeeived .

With

the

announc e:.lent

of Ale rt

- " -A <U.J,. T- -Ni -Go 0

The 53<1 Ai r Re giment , which had been aSSigned exclusively to ni ght operation s, :na1ntuined a separate alert. Betveen 1900 aDd
Be-

Unit planes would revert to

the co..uand of the 10th Air Division.

0500 hours, one- fOurth of the plan es were in Alert-A status .

In connection 'With the alert llystCJ4, a series ot al.ert stations
'Were developed.
Areas wId altitudes 'We re aSlligped

to each unit

in

tveen 0100 and 0500 hour s, one squwl patrolled at 5, 000 me te rs above Toqo.

such a way as to ed.

fonn

3.

po.ttcrn o.bove the turget area

to be protect-

In spite of the fact that the alert putterns and system were
well pl.u1.!1e d ,
-

In additi on to eliminating c ontu Sion, it vas expe cted that the new eJ.ert system would serv e to combine c ombat ope rat ion s and trainiog

,..

c e rt � ; . l 8.!�ount of confusion i nva riably r �. r To re l i eve

to

effe ct economie s in fuel

consumpt ion.

resulted

wen

Unfortlmately, the re­

units were alerted. oy havins to i s sue

the

sults of

w:loiQli ty and confusion caused

the nev aler t plan were ineffective from a combat stand-

ord�rs
W:l.S

point and caus ed exce s sive fatigue acco�plish the training misc ion.

amon�

e ac h t�ne a so rt i e vas necessary, effective 1

a change

the pilots .

It did,

hovever,

in the alert systeill

::w.de,

January 1945 .

A recapituand it

lation o f the times of enCJJY air raius indi c at e d a patt ern

On 9 Ja. "luary, o rde r s 'Were illsued to abandon the constant alert
air patrols 'Was to be !II&1 n­ tain ed ooly wen intelli Genc e infonuation or estimates indicated that an ene. ":lY raid was probable . e:ny and g1ve the
flovo, ai r- ground

patrol syste. . ":1

In its place

, vas deter-lined tllat the periods in which raids were mos t likely to occur could be Genern ly -1

El

system

of

p redi cted.

�ith this guide,

a schedule tor

a constant ai r p�trol Yas c s tub!ished with one air regL �ent desig­

In an atte. 'l!pt to deceive the en­

ir.1pression

nated as

an

e..le rt reGiment at eJ.1 time s . 1900 and

that regular patrols Vere still being
to op e rat e during the fo nne r pa_

Bet....een
pattern above

0100

radio continued
too,

hours,

one f1i eh t maintained Bet....een llOO and

an alert
hours,

trol hours .

Thi s,

Toleyo

at 5 , 000 r.leters .

1400

p roved ineff'ecti ve and vas shortly dropped.

tvo fllt:hts we re o.bove Tokyo at maximum altitude .

Du.r1og these

Improve�ent in Attack Techn ique s The incr ease d f re quenc y

hour s all other ple.nes of the eJ.ert regiill ent maintained Alert-A sta­ tus and dunn e the remo.in1ng hour s of their shift, Alert-B vas main-

raids during January

of'

the ene.ony ' s large - sc ale bomb ing

and February resulted in giving pilots of the

ta1ned.

lOth Air D.1 vision much experi ence and they bee8l e ll fective in combat opera tion s . The tact i c s

1Ilc reas 1.ngly ef­
Spec ial Attack

of the

Uni ts ....ere succ es sful In infllc ting severe loss es on the enemy

and

66

1

67

torced the B-29' s to continue to maintain

high

aJ.ti tude s with conae·

The

53d Air Reg1ment, still held exclusively tor night fighting,
un! to vi th pilots ot Class B, or

or­

quent loss of bombing accuracy.

In sp1te ot tho. successes or the

dered all advanced air training

suicide units, rn£\... "ly commanders were violently opposed to the use or

below, to Nitta Airfield to take shelter.

Clas s A pilots were al­

such tactics because many of the best trained p110ts were being lost.

erted at their hOllle base at Matsuda .
lbe

Improvelllent

in the operation and reporting ot radar in stalJ.&­

attack began almost immediately atter the varning was re­

tions vas al:;o noted, part1c ula rly the Type-B uni ts . coordination vith the Central

In additlon,

ceived and consisted ot seven wves of navy tighters and llght bcub­ ers, vith the last attack beinG carried out between 1415 and 151io
hours . The attackers c oncentrated on anay and navy air1'ields aJ.ong � �e coast and inflicted conside rable damage on the air1'ields, east of Tokyo, at Yokoshiba, Katori and Konoike . c:n e
wve

Army CO!lIlI81lc, and

the 11th Air Divi­

sion 'Was improved a. "ld report:l from radar stations in Shionomisaki and Baldri, in the

Central

Di strict, were relayed to the lOth Air

Division vithin five minutes. Fi rst Carrie r Plane Attack J On 16 Februa :r

attacked an

airc raft manufacturinG plant at Obta, about 50 J;ule s north ot the first laree - scale ene:ny air raid to 10th Air Division losses, on the ground, 'Were two plane s .

Tokyo .

19l,5,

�t. th e lOth Air Divislon be launched fro::1 task force carrie rs caU&
cOlnplete1:r by s urf/ ri s e .

De fensive action va s , in eeneral, ineffective d ue to the tact � �t the D1 vision had been concentr ating on train1ns for combat a­ sains t bombers and pilots were uninstructed in methods ot combat­ tiDG fighters . The lOth Air DiVision ' s lo sses in the air were severe
p lane s shot down greatly reduced canbat

A civili an lookout post at Shlraham&, OD

the

Boso Peninz tU.o. about

160

kila;:.e ters south ot Tokyo,

reported &

""Ii ..h'o.'8.- at 0100 hours . tliGht of sl1lD.ll enemy ai rc ratt flying nor'"
Since the B-29 '
6

s, had oeen ca.unc; in at ext rewe ly high altitude

and the total of 37
cy.

etf1cien.

the

.g tratir radar ins�al lation s h�d been concen

on detectlon and

Identif1 ca.tion and !l.Sscs s.. 'lcnt of ene.. lY �osses 'WaS di fti c ult as

and bad tailed to pick identi ficati on of hieh-altitude ton.Jationll up th e s e

rep ort s trom lookout posts made it clear that personnel had contused

gle . seat fighten into Th e D1 Yi5ion irrunedie.tely ordere d e.ll sin
were di spe rsed aJ.ons action and all rlanc s held on the ground

10v-fly1ne

planes .

f'riend1.y and enemy tighter plane s .

the

Since a follow- up ra i d vas antiC ipated o n th e next day, th e 6th

Air Army Llade plans to attack the vessels of' the ene;ny task torce

tuel and ammunition re· taxi strip s bord� rin� th� airfields vith

and ordered the 47th and 244tb Air Regiments under its direct co:nmand

JIlOved.

68

69

! ---"'-

i

to act as bomber escorts in the proposed ac tion

.

The loss of tva

Division fought vith greatly l-educed strencth, it lo st an addi t1OD&l
l�

air regiments c rippled the already weakcned lOth Air Divi sion and when fighte r wave s appeared the following day, little efteet1Ye action coul.d be Wkeu. StonilY yeather and snoy during the at'ter­

planes.
Two days later the Division ' s inability to effectively combat

a large- scale B-29 raid choved hoy badly i t had been

handicapped b7 found in the

noon ot the second attack caused both s ide s to break ott action at

its losces ot veteran pilot o .

an early hour.

Som e consolation

va ll

The banbers to be used in the attack on the task

fact tha t a fev pilots vi tIl only 200 hOur5 of flying time had per­ f"ormed yell in the Type-2 single-seat fighter. 2 This plane had Just

force vere not readied in time, the attack was c ance lled and the enemy task force retiree. southward under cover of the atom. Among th� staff officers of the lOth Air Div1sion there was a difference of opinion regarding the reasons i'or the attacks o t the

recently been adopted as a standIlrd combat plane and it lieved that only
an

bad been
hours vas

'be-

expert pilot vi th

over 1, 000 fl�g

16th and 17th .

capable of hancilinG it in combat. Plans to Combat Future Attacks Anticipating that the enemy task force, Yhich had struck on the

So:lle thouG'lt that it indicated that defensive et­

forts u8�inst the n-29 ' s, although inadequatc, had been sufficiently

effective to re�uire the enemy to take concerted action to destroy
airfields in Japan .

16th and 17th, woul.d return af te r refueling and resupply, the 41th

others held that the att.o.cks indicated a turn­

and 244th Air Reg1Jr.ents

·

...e re

aGe-in placed under the 6th Ai r Army to

ins p o ::.nt. and the licginnlng of more intensive cne:uy a.1r operations
again �t the Home �ld. It was, of course, later deter.ained that

both

prepare for action as bomber e scorts for a possible attack on the task forc e .
T ile tvo regiments being exempted f rom air defense oper­

:;chools of thouc;. t. were wron£; and that the mids vere directly con­ '1
nected
... th i.

ations req,uired a cOCl;;lete reorc;a.. "lizs.tion of the lOth Ai r Division ' . defense system.
Wi thin the next fev da;,'s, a naval pi cket boat sighted an �

the lil. d1ng operations which took place two '1

days later

at I'"o Jima .

:1egarcile ss of the reason!: for the mid, one thing vas obvious if such raid�
...ere

task force vhich included carriers .

At the same tL:1e, 1nf'onaatiOl1

to continue, the strencth ot the lOth Air Divi­

don vO\1.1d soon be decimated. of

In spite of the fact that the period
shorter than on the 16th and that

combat.

on the 17th

\18.5

much

the

2 . A nur.:ber of men had been mobili zed fro.n civilian colleges and, because t. eir educational s tandard s vere higher than the aver­ � age inductee, 'Were g1 ven an abbreviated. traininc course .

70

71

developed by the Special Intelligence Squadron indicated that B-29' .
based in the Marianas were

About 2400 hours on 9 ltirch, a small number of unidentified

p reparing tor a tull- acale attack.
a an4 carrier-

In-

aircra:t't were spotted south of Katsuura, on the Boso Peninsula a­
bout 80 kilometers southeast of Tokyo .

dicationa were that a s iDiultwle oWi attack by B-29' based planes was possible any time a!'ter dawn

Sinc e

this w:l.S the nonnal.

on 25 FebnllU"Y.

time for ene:ny night reconnaissance, u.nd uince no other pl.anes

were

The defense plan established by the lOth AJ.r Division included the ordering o f all
ruary.

reported, the Gubsequent c.PIJearance of B-29' s, flying at low level,
\laS not taken seriously.

W11 t s to

Alert-A, effective 0530 hours, 25

reb­

However, it vas almost immediately an­

The 11th Ind�pendent Air Squadron, as well as the 28th

and

nOW1ced that bOlilbers were dropping incendiaries in the Tsukish1.ma area of eastern Tokyo Wld that other enel:lY bomber for.na.tions were rapidly approachinG. This raid came as a surprise because again the radar

53d AJ.r Rec1r.lents, were ordered to I:lOVe to Nitta AJ.rl'1eld p razaptly after dawn on the 25th and prepllre to intercept B-29' Ro.ids by bombers and fiGhters lllIlteriallzed

s.

as expected, but

installa­ ab­

there was no coord1n!l.ted raid of fiGhters and �be rs on a single
taraet or area.

tions had f"ailed to pick up the enemy f"or..la tions due to their sorption with the detection of" hiGh-altitude plane s .

The bombers attacked Tokyo vbile the tighter. conand the Izu IslandG . Bad weather
pre-

Once aware at

centrated on HIlch1J o Jima

the f"act that a hea� attack was in progress, all radar stationa 1 concentrated on tracing the path of the attack. T ne enemy

vented effective defense e fforts although the enemy bomberl, tly1Ds
above the wea� �er, were able to

bombers

inflict cons1derable damage. plans for an attack
on

had approached Tokyo di rectly at altitudes of 2, 000 and 3, 000 meters

The 6th Air Army continued to p re s s

the

und dropped large numbers of small incendiary bombs vhich turned large portion of the city into a se a

a

carrier task force, but the bad we ather also interfered operation and the atto.clt \r u.s cancelled. Ni ght Bombing Attacks The first indication that large- scale ni ght expected was at the tine of a major B-29 raid on
March .

with that

of flame .

The 10th AJ.r Divi sion ordered all avd.ilable night interceptors Co.bout 90 planes ) into the ai r. Searchlight units and antiaircraft The tires

attack s might be the morning
ot

batteries also went into concerted action .

of Tokyo lit to attack the

4

u� the sky and the D1 vision ' s interceptors were able B-29 ' s from beneath even without the aid of the however, dense clouds of" GIJoke arose fI'O:Ll the

Intelligence reports indicated that enemy

formations bad

searchlights . Soan.

rendezvoused over Saipan during t. '1e previous night and it

was be-

city, obscuring the

lieved tho.t this was a trial for-nation for I!l8.SS night raids in the near future.

enemy planes and making it almost impossibl.e to attack them.

72

73

The toll of enemy bombers, announced as 15, was the heaviest since interception tactics had been started. The lOth Air D1vision

Transfer o f the 6th Air Anny � 19 March 1945, orders were issued placing the 6th Air

A:riay

sustained almost no losses in air COQbat although several planes failed to locate their airfields and were lost in attempted forced landings . The reason for such success was attributed to the low Although enemy losses

under the cOI11r.lB.Ild of the Cexub i ned Fleet for the defense of the Ryu­ kyu Islands and its base of operations wns moved to Kyushu. The

30th Fighter Group was organized to take over the duties of the 6th
Air Anny in defending the Kanto Sector acainst invasion. The 1'o=tion of the 30th Fighter Croup was unde rtaken as a part of

level at which the bombing was perfomed.

were severe, the raid reduced the eastern half of Tokyo to a barren expanse of smoking ruins . There was a large loss of life, thousanda

a

new Ai r

Combat

Plan which contemplated the

Special Attack

were made homeles s and property losses were tremendous
any other,

-

more than

Units sho�dering the main responsibility for attacking any eneny
task forces that might st rike at the Kanto Sector. p endent Ai r Squadron, U!'llts
....ere

this raid weakened the resolve of the people to continue It was evident that the repetition of such raids would

The 17th Inde­

the

war.

the 1�7th and

244th Air

Ai r R�c;1luents and other Division to the 30th Fight­

rapidly reduce all. of Tok;ro to ashes and that the center of mill tary and govern:nental affairs would be co:npletely paral�ed. The administration and do:nni tory buildings of the lOth D1vision
were completely destroyed but the operations room was spared and

re a s si gne d from the 10th

er Croup (Chart No. 3 ) . Policy Change s

- March 1945

During March there ve re several chance s in the operating pollc,. for the ai r defen se of Japan.

there was no interruption of tactical command.
To reinforce the air defenses of Tokyo, IGR" ordered ten planes

!I j . Gen. Kihachiro Yoshida was re­ .s.

lieved as cO::L'ilo.nd1nS general of the 10th Ai r D1vision and tran8�er­
reel to the

from the 4th Air Regiment of the 12th Ai r D1vision and ten planes from the 5th Air Regiment of the llth Air D1vision transferred to the lOth Air Division on 16 March. The planes of the 4th Air Be­
h'CXIl

13th Air DiviSion, in China .

Hi s chief of Stat'�, Col.

Shui chi Okamoto , ..'as reas dgned to the 55th Ai r D1visioll, and Lt . Cen. l�anetosh1 Kondo
\laS

in Korea,

d e signated

as

commandi ng Bene re.l. of air staff officer

gi.-nent were stationed at Imba Airfield and those

the 5th Air

t!1e lOth A i r D1 v l s io� a s ve1l as b e i n g for the Eastern Army COt"lITland .
chi e f of staff for th e

appoint ed

Regiment at Chof'u, where both were ordered to prepare for night in­ terception mi ssions . No large-scale night raids occurred in the

Lt . Col. Hiroshi Sasao \laS appointed

Dlvi oion.

Tokyo area during the next week and the 20 planes were released to

their parent

un.1ta

on 25 March.

74

15

Chart No . 3
General. Kondo was f'ully cOgnizant of' the graY! ty

.--

� rJ, g

o � �

s::

o 'd

II

ot

the detense

situation and knew that plane and personnel replacements vou1d

be­

� =;!

r--

...

< ,....-


'"

.s § u

=;!
\0

:5

, � ... a :5 i§
� 'd

:l 1I 3 I-- .r;: G.t 1D �

� e 15 � s::
... 1II 1D

S '!i '"

��

s::

� -g

..

cane

progres sively llore d1:ff'icult.

Desiring to ma.inta.1n the strength

ot the lOth Air Divi sion f'or employment in the tiDal deci sive battle tor Japan, be outlined hi s plans for future operations : Abandon over-emphasis on training tor CCIII.­ bat against bombers and stress combat against fighter planes . bis belief' that :fighters trained to combat oth­

0

� .8 :5 =1
... ;:: I:::

... :: � " ll ::l H f! ", ,, :.. ?S

( This

rule came as a re sult ot

� g

� (5

...

:: -g

" C " 0

• II c

'---

6

Pb '"

U t- Po M " �

" " ... ti d c:; '"

� o c U 0

"

��

J.!

II ...

i

.....

..... >

5

.

er tighters 'Would bave no trouble in engaging boobers if the occasion arose.

..

)

g

Avoid a deci sive battle with enemy tight­ ers until the :fighter vs . fighter training is completed. Concentrate on protecting aircratt on the groWld. Inc rease the capabilities and nUl:lbers of antiaircraft gun s . M!.ke use ot de­ coy planes to lure enemy aircratt into posi­ tions 'Where they can be destroyed by ground fi re . Ignore enemy reconnaissance planes, but make concentrated attacKs on enemy fonllation. composed mainly of bombers perf'orming large­ scale bombing mi s sions . ( Thi s rule put

...

U

... <

'"

� e�

r-.--

;:l N � .... ....

...

0

§' e
'"

... III II " f � �. <':I
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l3'

r--

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.,..(

d!


U

r-i

:a
'""

"

a

.,..(

'-

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.r: ...

" ...

2 -ti � ::s .s GI t-'-t 0 ; :5 to "£! :f ;:l '"
":1 ::1 '" 0 :':

...

o

0\ � :5 � ,.... ...::t r0::> d M C\J

!i �

.. ..

g

'----

���
� ��
Il.t

:5 � � � '" ... =;! � "
,,

.. ..

.:t

::s .0

(i5

,..

r�
��

III u � OM

-

r.

an end

.-1 -

� ..... *

..,

to the fome r policy of' constant interception and protection of strategic points in favor ot engaging only tarGets of opportunity.

)

�§

Improve supply and maintenance ot plane. and equipment. ThroUBh close coo'peration vi tb the

Tama

t--

A:r:my Technical Research Station, put nev radar into operation end strive for the modernizing of' air defenses • ACCOrdingly, orders 'Were i ssued to change operational p�_

�� .::
" ;:::

... e

"

1: ,

o �

0 ... .. u < ... ... CI

'---

::;! � e

"' ...

t- I) .:t a:;

ti �
.

... ... U U

f & � tIl

CD 'd :9

tiona to intenSify training for combatting fighter

aircra:tt .

At

77

76

night, only two to rour planes or the 53d Air Regiment would be la\Ulched against SIIIB.ll numbers or enemy raiders - the balance ot the Regiment would contillue trailling.

an operational. canmand and the lOth Air Division \/8.8 placed.

in Ita

order of' batUe

with

the rollowing organizatIon :

In the daytime, two flights

lOth Air D1 vision Headquarters 18th 23d 28th 5 3d 70th Air Air Air Air Air 46th Air 3d Regiment ( Fighters ) Regiment (Fighters ) Regiment ( Fighters) Regilaent ( Fighters) Regiment ( Fighters ) Sector Coumand Airfield Battalion 6th Ai rfield Batte.lion 7th Airfield Battalion 43d Ai rfield Batte.lion 116th Airfield Battalion 140th Airfield Battalion 141st Airfield Battalion 232d Ai rfield Batte.lion 233d Airfield Battalicm 234th Airfield Battalion 244th Airfield Battalion 65th Ai rfield COllipany 25th Independent Maintenance UDit 26th Independent Maintenance UDlt

of the al.ert air regiment were assigned illterception duties when SIUall groups or B-29 ' s attacked while the rest continued tra1.rUng. Thereafter, the 10th Air Divi sion headquarters merely passed on to the apPI'opriate subordinate units the reports received from t... �e air raid var:ni.ng system. Independent decisions on assu:aptic:m

of alert status \rere left to the cOllunanding ofticer of each regi!:lent. Orders were given to concentrate on the shooting down ot en-

eJll)' planes wherever they might be found without any consideratic:m

beillg given to the guardins or strategic points.

The old al.ert

flying pattern was abolished in favor of issuing separate orders on the occasion of each raid. Tnese changes reduced wasted effort

le . and cade the command ot the Divisi on more flexib For.nation of the Air General

The 47th and 24.4th Air Regiments and the 17th Independent Air Squadron had been pe nnan ently transferred to the 30th Fighter Group, vhile the 40th Air Sector Co:mne.nd, together with the 164th, l65 th, l66th, l69th, 170th, 175th and 176th Airfield Battalions as weU as the 71st and 72d Airfield Companies were attached directly- to the 1st Air Anr.y.
All signal. and air-gro\Uld radio units, althousb con­

Amy

In early 1945, as u . s . air :mids increased ill intensity and the threat of an invasion of the Homeland became greater, it vas deter.:lined to unity all air derense rorces under a single c ommand. Accordingly, the orge.nization of the Air General Army, \Ulder the
.AZU Kawbe, vas announced as being etfecc Otllllle.Od of General Ma sai"

tinuing to operate with the DiviSion, were removed 1'ran its order ot battl.e and aSSiGned to the 1st Air A:rmy. Simultaneously with the establi shment ot the Air General A:rrq, the Fi rst and Second Gene ral Armies were organized to take over the

tive 15 April 1945 .

The 1st Air Army, which had been responsible

for train!.ng and replAcement of air pe rsonnel, vas reorganized as

78

79

ground defense and the anlY c OallIlds lUl

we re rcdes1gDAted as

area ar­

p reparation s for the future and fl'Oll1 the TveU'th Area Army regarding defense againot current air att.o.cks.
l �e Ai r General An:ty Take s COCll!l8ld
CD 9 July

mies . The 10th Ai r Di vi sion, "oIiU.ch bad been under the :Eastern Arusy C<XlIlI8Jld for operational control, now came under the Tvel.1'th Area

Army.
The Ketsu-Go Operation

1945, all air units on the Japanese mainland

came

un-

der the direct com..1Il.lld of the Air General Army, and the long awaited plan ot a unified air defense was put into operation with the 1=plementation of the Sei-Go Operation. 4

The fonnation of three new general armies coincided with the announcement ot a new plan for the final all-out defense ot Japan. This plan, known as the Ketsu-Go Operation, was an areal detense concept which sought to weld air and ground forces into a stronger defensive force by establishing de1'inite defenBive zones and provid­

lbe reorgo.n1zation to ac.hieve a unified cO!llld and a coord!ll8.D nated defense had, however, come too late . Neither the CO!llbat
si tuati on

strength of the air divisions nor the general
an effe ct ive air defense .

pe rmitted

ing Qutual support between

the several area armies and air armies. '

The lOth Air Di vision lISS no longer able

Because suic ide tactics we re to b e employed against invasion

to concern itsel.f with interception of raiding plc.Ules, but had to preserve what lISS left of its fighting strength for the t1nal. defense of Japan under the �etsu-To-Go pJ.an.

convoys, the air portion of' the Ketsu-Go Operation was
Ketsu-To-Go Operation.
ta.ck vas concerned there

knO'WD as the

However, as far as defense against air at­

At the end ot July,

the

vas little chc.Ulge in the operations ot

the

10th Air Division had been drastically reduced in strength
le ss than 100 plane s capable ot operating :

and bad

lOth Ai r Division. General Kondo ' s outline continued to be the guide and the Di vi sion made every efi'ort to conserve its strength tor the

18th Air Regiment :
23d

Type-3 Fighters Type- I, z.k>del III Fighters Type - l Fighters

15

final defense effort.

Although there we re no major

changes in the

Air Regiment :

immediate duties of the 10th Air Division, the
the reorganization

chanGes incident to

• • • • • • • • • • • •

7
13

caused

some

contusion since trequently conflict­
re ga rding Ke t su-To-Go

• • • • • •

ing orders were recd ved from the 1st Air Army
3.

53d Air Regiment :
70th Air Regiment :

Type-2 Two-seat,

Fighters

• • • • • • • • • • • •

30

See Jo.p�nese 1·1onograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Hooeland", page 73, for additional information on the Ketsu-Go Ope ration
• .

Type-4 Fighters . . . . 15
. .

Type-2 Fighters

15
-

Total Serviceable Plane s 00
4. � page 68.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

95

End of the War

CHAPl'ER 3

Plans to conserve strength by attacking only large bomber tor_
mations were entirely upset. vith the dropping of the atanic banb on Hiroshima. on 6 August. Since this feat had been accanpl1shed b:y
a

AIR DEFENSE OF THE CENTRAL SE(. 'TOH

Tile are a designated by � �e ai r defense force s as the Central
Air Defense Sector, gene rally coincided \lith th e boundaries or the

single plA. "le, thc lOth Air Division realized that defense aca1nst that powerful weapon 'WOuld require abandoning the concept. ot attack­ ing only large bomber formations . Hereafter every single plane

Central Di s trict, 'Which extended from the Izu Peninsula. 'We:.t to

include all but the 'Western tip of Honshu and the southern half of
Shikoku . It � �s believed, hO\o1cver, that the ai r derense effort

'Would have to be at.tacked and, vith only 95 serviceable pla.nes re­
maining,

this 'W8.S impOs sible .

'JOule. be confined principally to the defense of the Osaka-Kobe­
Nagoya region 'Whe re important o.rd.na.n ce and aircraft w.a.nuf'actur1ng

On 9 August the chief of start of the Air General Army tel.e­
phoned the chief of statf of the lOth Air D1vision to notify him ot the second atomic strike and hinted of the possible te�tion of the w.r. He urged that the stronge st efforts be made to continue

pl3'1ts 'Were locate d .
..re re

When the boundaries o f th e Central Di strict

changed,

the air defense force continued to consider the gen­

eral area of the old Cen t ral Di strict a s �le Central Ai r Defense
Sector. Organ1zo.tion of Defensive Air Units

the fight and emphasized that cepted. ()l 13 August,

all enemy attackers should be inter­

the Tokyo area was again at.tacked b:y carrier­

based plane s, and although the Divi sion intercepted the planes, the
commander failed

Prior to April 1942, the air def'enze of t. e Central Sector had 'l
be en entrusted to the 2 46th Air Regiment . Raid of 18 Ap ril, Follo\l1ng the D::Iol1ttle

to urge hi :. r:lcn to press the a.ttack to the utmost.

It seemed absurd to incur additional losses vith the 'W8.r obviously lost and its termination due in a matter of days.

it w.s determined to strengthen the air de�enses
The 246th Air Reg:1Jnents 'Was augnented and

of

all districts .

reor­

ganized in May 1942, a s the 18th Air Brigade
Brigade
'oIB.S

( Chart

rio .

4) .

'l'be

o rganic to the 1st Air Arr:J;f, but 'WUs under the opera­

tional control of the Cent ral Ar.ay Command for nir defense activi­ ties .

On

CHART NO. 4
The air defenses of the central Sector underwent few changes

O RGAN I ZAT I O N CHART 1 8TH A I R BRI GADE
MAY 1 942

during the next two years c.nd the principal. mission of the 18th Air Brigade was the tra10ing or replacement personnel tor the field CCIID­
bat units.

In J\ule 1944, howeve r, the U . S . began raiding northern
The 246th

KyuShu :from ba se s in China.

Air Regiment vas thereupon

transferred to Ozuki Airfield in the Western District Where it came under the cOlllld of t. lWl �e 19th Ai r Brigade o.nd a.ssiGted in the defense of northern Kyushu.
1ST AI R ARMY

The regiment reverted to the 18th Air

Brigade 10 early July.
Formation of the lith Air

(fOR TRAINING) I I I I
I

Dirl slon

The increased enemy air activity of June 1944 again IDILde it neceszary to strengthen the a.ir defences of Japan II.Dd, 10 July, the 18th Ai r Brigade wall stronGly reinforced and reorganized as the lith

AIR BRIG

Air Divisio�,
HQ

��th

units located as shown below :
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Hq. lith Air Divi sion

Taisho

BRIG RECON Pl..A NE UNIT
2 4 6 TH

16th L "ldependent Air Squadron 246th Air RebL �ent 2 46th Ai�rield Battalion 56th Air RebL �ent 143d Ai rfield �ttalion 55th Air ReGiment 42d Airfield Battali on

• • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AIR REGT

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

, )

) ) )

Ta1sho
ltam! omaki K

A I R BRIG HQ I NTEl..L UNIT

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

) )

163d Airfield Battalion Fonnation of the 23d Air Brigade

Kiyosu

The Osaka and Nagoya areas had gene rally been considered a8

one

de fen se area and the 18th Air Brigade and later the lith Air Division

85

84

continued

to

consider the area as a single defensive entity.

This

1, 000 sorties being flovn. invasion or signaled the

Believing that this presaged a possible of air attacks against assist in

vas a convenient arrangement admlnistratively but the Suzuka MoUD­ tain Range, \/bich runs between Nagoya and Osaka, constituted a nat­
ural

intensification

I8.ll Fonno S8, on 22 October, the General Defense CO!lIIId directed the

obstacle to efficient air operations .

In add! t1on,

beeause
a1r

11th Air
the

Division to dispatch

the 246th Air Regiment

to

ot

the larse number ot vital targets in both areas, the one

di­

defense of thi s strategiC area. The strength of the 11th Air
Division

vision could not provide adequate protection to both Osaka. the 23<1 tield.
Air

Nagoya an4 September,

was still :rurther re­

The situation required a nev air \m1t and, on 6
Ai r

duced ....hen,

on

11 Nove:llber, the 55th Air Regiment vas ordered to

Brlg3de was organized

vi th

headquarters at

!C0!!l8lt1 Air­ llth

the Philippines.

Although the nevly tormed Brigade was organic to the

Formation of the 6th Air
On 26 De c embe r 1944, 11th

Anny

Division, because ot inadequate communications tacilit1es, the

the 6th Air Army was establ1shed and the

commander ot the 2311 Air Brigade was given considerable autonomy in the conduct ot operat10ns in his
area.

Air Division

\ill S

rellloved f'rom the order of' battle of' the 1st
The Divi sion still

oUr Army and became organic to the 6th Air Army.

The 23d Air BriGS-de vas built around the 55th oUr Regiment ....hieb was already stationed at Komslti Airfield. Like the 11th
oUr Cen-

remained under the operational control of the Central Army COUICland a:ld since the 6t. Air AnDy was othervise engased, it exercised l} e.ctive command over the 11th Air Division.
no

Division, the Brigade vas under the operational control of the

tral Army Command.
Transters and Reassicnments
Ckl 21

Operations Direction
The
lith

Air Division operatioIls

room

was established

at

the

August

1944, 18

planes ot the 56th Ai r Regiment were dis­

Division headquarters at Taisho oUrf'1eld.
The commander of the 11th Air Division direct responsibility for
directinc
'WS

patched to

Tachia rai

Airfield, in north-central. Kyushu, to operate The zone of operations ot the 56th Airt1eld and Depot, near Nagasald..

charged v1th the
The

under the 12th Air Division. extended
CD
frorll

all defensive air combat.
during

Tachiarai to

Qnw-a

number of personnel vho assi sted him

operational periods

12 October, a day-long raid by carrier-based U.S. planes
vi th

varied accordine to the situation.
to c.e.n

Nonnally, personnel sufficient
up

was conducted against targets on Fannosa,

a total of' about

the operations
In

room

was set

to vork in three shirts of'
all

eight bours each.
S6

the event of' an attack,

personnel vent

em

a 24-hour duty status.

A large
aDd all

1nfonuatioll

board

showed the positions of enemy plane s
in

of having the headquarters o.f the Army hea.dquarters
\inS to in

A.tr

Division estaolished v1th the

a weather chart indicated fl.y1ng conditions and visibility parts of the country.
From

Osaka Castle .
the

Tbe purpose o.f the desired wove two
heatiquart.ers .

the operations

room

commWlication

improve liai son betwcen

In

addition,

vith

and direct subordinate units vas maintained by Lleans of radio enabled the op­ telephone lines, W:lile air-gruund radio- telephones erotio ns
room

since the entire intelligence netvork of the

Central

Anny Command

",-as concentrated ill the Osaka. Castle headquart.ers, it vas felt that the joint
headquarters

to keep ill tou<:h 'With plane s in the

air.

wuuld

improvc

the llth Ai r Division ' s intel­

Responsibility for radio commwli cutions between the headquar­ ters and subordinate units \/as assigned to the 18th Air Signal Unit, 'With the signal section leader of headquarters being in charge of
all

ligence system. The Division commande r pointed out that Taisho vas only 16 kil­ ometers from Osaka end that four telephone and two radio circuits constituted !ll1Ip le means of communication. The Divi sion cOlllJlde r l8.D

cOlllmunications facilities 'Within the operations

room .

Tbe reg­

ularly established telephone line s of the CommWlications Ministry were ordinarily useu for communication between the division headq,uarters and its subol'dinat.e Wlits . Offi cers
f rom

further stnted that the loss of direct supervision ot his unit ' s tl�ining
and

combat

operations

would inevitably result in a

108s

of

operating efficiency.

Actually, it vas the belie! of the Division
Ar .JlY

the Air Si gnal Units , the Air-G round Radio Unit

that air combat directions from the Centre! � �ecessary in most cases .

CO;:I.il8.lld vould be

all assigned dutie s alld the Meteo rological Cooperation Sectio n were ds of cOlllbat op­ in the operet.ions room. In addition, during perio Supply and Medical erati ons, liai son office rs from the Ordnan ce, prepared to take Departments were instl"Ucteli to stand by and be he s . prompt action in matters affecting thei r bl�c Loca.tion of 11th Air Divi sion
Headquarters

The controversy dragged on for SOI!le time until the C in C ot Defense finally directed that the move be made . The DiviSion, in

spite of difficulties encount.e:..ed in obtaining additional equipment, began the installation of an operations room in Osaka castle .
In

April 1945, just before the mOVe vas actually &lade, the newly es­ tnbl1shed Air General Anny cancelled it and the Divi sion headquar­ ters remained in Taisho until the end of the var.

Although the Taisho headquarters of the llth Air Division vas located very near Osaka, the Central
Army

c�and vas most desirous

8S

Ai r

T roining

Program

�ergency Reinforcements

personnel, l of lith Ai r Divi sion To improve the c Otllbat potentia a t roinins altitude niques .
prog ram
wn o

In the latter

part

of

1944, when the

lith Ai r

Division sutfer-

inst ituted

to increase p rofi ciency in high

ed a num.ber of losses by transt'er and reassignraent, an effort vas made

o control flyins, ai r-ground radi

and

Ta-Dan

bombing tech-

to bolster its streDo <rth throu@l the use ot provis1ona1 lm1ta
Butai ) . These unit s , gene rolly knovn

s for study. and di stributed to ai r unit the B-29 vaS gath ered h nical photographs vl1ic
vere

construction All. a.vailable data on the

and per!o:n.anee ot Tech­

(To-Ni-Go

as To

mu t s ,

were

t'ormed t'rom instructors from the nit s . A

Yura and Kakogava Ai r �in1ng U­

found in

a

B-29 which hn.d

been shot helpful

To Unit vas also f'omed
a.

from

Akeno

Flyine;

School

personnel

particularly hu on 20 Septembe r ....ere dovn in northe rn Kyus

but vas late r reorgan1:r.ed a s

pe nnanent

operationa1 lm1t. the lith
Ai r

in

thi s vo � .

to War game s vere conducted

p rovide p ra ctical experi­

The To

Units,

vhich cwue under the command of

Di-

. hing and attacking B-29 ' s ence in locatinG, app roac vas held combatting night attacks

Training 10
searchlight.

vision in the event of an air raid, were assic;ned positions 10 the alert defense pattern. Although

in conjunction

vi th

the provi:.10na1 tmits did not op­
aS Signed

units . All. ai r
three groups

erate as effi ciently as the

reGularly

organic

unit.s, the

c revmen and pilots

vere graded and

a ssi gned to one

of

Divi sion \/as requi red to

make

the fullest

use

of

them as its regu­
of

rative abilit.y. in acco rdan ce vith thei r compa

Group A

lar

strenet.h had. been so drastiCally reduced.

The use

instruc­
a

Group B capable of' night flyi ng, vas composed of pilo ts dayt ime operation s . vere proficient only in quired standard s . of the As the troining pro�ram they

those wo

tors as pilots in the provi sional units naturally re sulted in reduction of the ef't'iciency of strain on the instructor group. Service

Group C vere belov re­

the

schools

and imposed a severe

increased the abilities

pilots

and creVlllen,

er vere e.dw.nced into the next high

muta the llth
Ai r

group .
f 1945, wen �er the firs t part o Ju

With !:lany of the flying units of

Dlvision being

enemy air activity

ws

great.

deployed in other areas,

every effort \/as

made to strengthen the
1m-

l vi rtualy iJllpo ssible ly intensified, i t vas ing program. Instructors

to ma1nta.1n a real train­

service unl ts so that airfield and plane

maintenance might be

vere required and advanced student pilots

proved.

stream dv1ndled to the pi lot replacement to fly combat mi s sion s and
e.

mere

trickle. 91

M A P NO. 7
Airfield Conditions At the t1.cle of the organization ot the llth Air Division, Te.i­ sho and lte.mi Airfields were equipped tor day and night use and bad supporting antiaircl"aft artillery. Most of Karnaki Airfield 'WaS op-

erotional, eJ.though some portions were \Uldergoinc repair and the aiet1eld vas eJ.so being enlarged. tional and
no

Kiyosu Airfield vas not opel1l.It was, howver,

flying units were stationed there .

a I() a:: 0 I- 4n • f/) Q 0 ...J laJ o ...J � . a::: < a:: < 0 .... N Z � U •
z
-=>

i

.. .. :II •

• c III

protected by o.ntiaircroft artillery and vas \Uldersains extensive repo,irs to penni t it to GUpport a flyinc unit.
In the latter part of

1944,

attention was concentrated on the The enlarging ot
\13.5

enlarging ot airfields near strategic points.

Komaki Airfield vas neariIlb completion and vor' ", construction of
an

started on the The

operations

roow

for the 23d Air Brigade .

Kiyosu Airfield taxi area vas almost completed and construction ot strips and area installations vas p roceedin& satisfactorily.
M1k1,

Sano and "iura. Airfields were in process of beine; constructed by the Arrr.:y Aeronautical Department . Akeno, "iokaichi, Gifu, Kakogawa and

'" o

i :1 =� e <D "
e

Kitaise Airfields were already in use by To Units and co;a:nunications acd other facilities had been almost completed (Map No . 7) .

In February 1945, the

47th

Air Sector Co;;u!illld vas placed l

di-

rectly under tlle 11th Air Divisioll which orU<!l"ed it to Kamaki and directed it to

rush completion of Kiyosu Airfield.

The nirfield

battalions at Hwnamatsu, lll:l.goya and Ise were placed \lllder t. '1e 47th

92

93

Ai r

Sector Command.

At about this sllUle ti.r:1e, special attention \laS auxiliary defense installations, of reserve planes and the
command p o s ts.

the Osaka-Kobe area.

Reserve

radio equip;uent had also been pre-

di re c ted to the c on s t ruc ti on or

pared tor use when planes fro.u the Nagoya region were operating 10 t. �e Osaka-Kobe area . the
Central Ar .ny

such as revetlUents for the bombproofing of tion,

p rot e c ti on

'IVo ai r- g round radio

p lane s

vere assigned to

regimental Ilnd

battalion

In

add!-

COUli.1s.nd for use in the directing ot local cOI1lbat

refuellin.:;

methods

....ere improved anu the nu;nb e r ot refuelling

in Osaka

and Kobe .
vere

c a rs and pumps ....ere in c re a s e d at almost
w.s

all airfield s .

provision each field.

In April 1945, additional one-kilowatt air-ground radios
set up in the Divi sion I S ope:rs.tions relay urgent infor.uation
roe:n.

also rr.e.de fo r cons'.;; ru ction of
Intelligence

refuellinG ror S e:t JP

These were designed to by simultaneously broad-

Speci al

Squadrons

and ins t ruc tions

tion of the Central. An:;! rJari ly , by ti'le Int e ll i ge nc e Sec in!onnation emanated out posts .
p rincipally 1'l"O..!l

.a Infonr tion on t..:'1 e movement s

of

en emy p1.o.ne s

;ro.s gathe re d, priCoc:oand and look-

casting

to all plnnes in the ai r.

All e.lr-ground radios vere UDder

the control of the 13th Air-Ground Radio Unit, an element of which vas stationed \11 th each Air Regiment. Air Raid Warnin§ System
T ne

radar

in stallations and

ved throuch the Army �, To supplement the i nfo r.ua.ti on recei Squadron
w.s e stablished in

air raid varnins

s::rstem

for the Central District vas oper-

a Special Intelli genc e

the headquarters in monitoring

ated by the mil1tary

Central AnlY CQ:];llBJld and consi sted of both civ1Uan aDd

cf the llth Air Divi sion .

ne Squadron sp e c ia ll z ed T

lookout posts and radar installations .

g in radio trall sm issio ns ori gi natin
�ce v�

Saipan and Timan to obtain ad­ in that area. The Squadron also

Lookout Posts Beceuse of the position of the Central District 10 respect to the app roach
routes nOlT.lB.lly

�ti on on B-29 i nfor

activity

interc epted radio

cO::u;luniclltions

­ bet'Jeen enemy plAnes and was tre
raids .

utili zed by the U . S . planes, the looIt­

c tine nir quentl.y s uc c e ss ful in p redi
Ai r-Ground Radio Communications
Co;ru�un icati ons both \I1re · end redio

out posts of the District vere only of nominal value to the llth Air Division. The information Yhich the lookout posts genenLted

l ":I8.ld w.s maintained by be t'Je e n unit s of the cOl!l. telephone . To control planes i n the ai r, air-

and which the llth Ai r Division passed on to the !astern Army Cca­ mand and the 10th Ai r Division vas, hovever, o t great value to the \laming system of the Kanto Sector. Iccations of both military and

�d radio -telephon es grou.

units in had been installed for the use o t

94

95

MAP
civilian lookout posts are shown in ian

NO. 8

Table

No. 13

3.

Location of civil-

area

h eadqua rte r s are

shown on Map No . expected to

(page 167) .
predicting thei r pro-

Lookout posts vhich verc

be of great assistance in

determining
bable

the

course
found

of

ra

idi ng bombers u.nd
approach tacti c s

targets, it

that the

utilized by the BAt
first,

29' s

made

ve ry difficult

to

make accurate estiJ�tes .

the B-29 ' s

�ntalned

more or le ss

set routes � �d
hovever,

v

e re succesQtul-

:::l I tf) Z 0 I

ly

attacked

by interceptors .

Later,

they chanc;ed their

technique and began usine diversionary tactics vh1ch misled plot-

<� � �
at

.... --1.....
f
,

ters

and interceptors.
InstallatIons
A and B moor
u.nd
s tati

Radar

Both Type

ons

vere insta.1.led vlthin the had,

�i
r
lC


/

� \l

at



.. ,

i!

Central Di strict

althoush the Type B i ns tallati on ::
range

under

"II .... ....

-.P

ideal conditions, a maximum
paths utili zed by the B-29 ' s
e

of 300

ki lomete rs,

the

approach

generally precluded early
planes,

pick� . As

re :; ul t ,

the rildar detection of
post�,
�::

like the visual pick� or to the K� �to Sector than

the lookout
to

of er eat e r No .

value

the Central Sector (Map
Right up to the end

a) .
var, radar planes.
stations in

of

the

the Cent re.l

Di strict

failed to locat e

small

No information concerning Ivo

the enemy' s freQ.uent raids emanating from fro::! carrier
tllsk

Jima and Cklnava or
the

f'orces

vas ever IlVlli lable

to

11th

Air

Dirt-

sion prior to the time of the act� appearance of the planes the Central Sector.

over

96

97

Table No . 3

Table No.

3 (Cont ' d)

c rlILIfu AND AR. 'l! "1i LOOKOtfl' POSTS Ul;'"DER CENTRAL AIMY COMl·1ANI)
- Mats� Do1 GUDClJu

EHIME PREF&. "l'URB
Civ1lian Posts

Area Hq.
AlCHl pr ,sFS:£URE
Ci vtlian Posts Area

Hakata
Area Hq. Eb1

K\.IIIa M1.bama

Area Hq.

-

Hq.

- Nagoya

Handa. Ichinomiya

Fuld

Inuyama

I\lBkura Kan1 e Kornak1 Mi yosh1 MorouUd Na I'Ul!li Nawa Ono Seto So:f'ue Tokonarue U"t s �

Area Hq. - Otazaki Anjo Asuke Issh1kl Karlya Koromo Nishio O'r .nezaki

AkabaDe
Fukue

Toyobalth1

HoJo
Imabar1 KamiDada Kam1 sak ura.
Komatsu Ko zak i Kik uma

Ikazalt1

Mizuhama Nagazava OChiai

M1sh1llla

Akeb&ru Higash1 aotonouad. 1w.matau 1&\1111

UwaJ1ma

Futagava Garnagor1

SaiJo Shimizu '!'achibana Tanano
Uga'"

Kall8ltam1 Kawatahama
M1sh1ma. Nagaballa Nakastai Ozu Tomatsu
M1.kame

Goyu lrako
Shinsh1ro

Sakurai
Takaoka Yoshida

Tcltatoyo Togo
Toyotsu
Civi 11 an

Posts Area Hq.
-

Yabat.a Yatomi

Area Hq. - Fukui Ech1 z en Goka Kanazu Katsu,yama

Area

Hq. - Suruga Ka1z u Kato

'l'akef'u

Obams.

KwUJu1

Dwano

HakUS8.D H1gash1ura Hirom1

.! Mill tar Posts*
Asuk.e lrako

Okazaki-Baw ShimoyazIIB.
Tak e toyo

Tawal'&
Toyokawa
Ut sumi

Menaya Mikun1 Oda

Santo Shiotsu
Tabe Tate1chWsalt1

OJima

Okazaki

Sh1h1 Sh1.moarlama Sh1zu Uno

Toba
TS u'!'lekam1zo.k1 Urlyu

*

are frequent­ Al.tho� both military and civilian lookout posts arate posta 0ftly ShOVIl in the same tOVIl or cityI th ey we re sep en some distance apart.

9S

99

Tab�e no. 3 (Cont ' d) GIFU

Tab�e No. 3

( Cont ' d)

PREm::TURE

HYOGO PREFEX:'l'URE
CIv111an Posts

Civ1lian Posts Area Hq. - Gifu
Hachiman Ibuki J(ashIwbarn Kuse Kuwhara Ogaki Seki SekIga.hara Takata Takatomi
Area

Akechi

Hq. - Tajima

Iw.mUlU
Kamiaso

Area. Hq. - Taka)'SJIB Funa tsu

Area Hq. - HimeJI Aboshi
Ako HoJo Kekogawa Murots u Of'u Shikema Takasago

Furuke:wa
Qero

�yaroa

Bag1vara

Ka.wube Nagash1ma Nakatsu Tokl Tsukechi

Kucuno Qsa.ka . .ash ita SalWashimi

tIne
Yamazaki

Area Hq. - Kobe Akash1 Arima Kaihare. Mikage M1kI Nakamura Ni shinada Ni shlwld. 000 Sanda Sasuyawa

Area Bq. - Sumoto AIDa

Fukura

Iwya Kanya Sh:1.zuk1 Tosh1.ma Tsush1 Yura

Hili ta!Z Posts

Suma
Takatolll1
TaJima Area Hq . - Toyooka

H1romi

M1.j unama

Sek i Sekigahara Taka ta

Uozak1 Uozum1

H1daka

Area Hq. -

HIROSHIMA

PREFrl'URE

Kasu:n1
Kinosa.k1m1nato

wadayama BanaeI
Dtuno

CI vilian

Post.

K1!m1helJll\ Muraoka

NIsh1ta.n1 Seklnom1ya Yoke.

Area Hq.
Aka Fukuyama Itozo.ki Kabe Kure M1.bu

- H1rosh1.oa
Takehara
Taman Tomo Uch1noum1 Yano Ama Miki

:.I1li ta!1: Posts

M1tsu Miyosh1 Nigata Onom1chl Sa.1Jo Tadanoumi

Murotsu
NI sh1l18kl ISHIKAWA

Sumoto
Yura

PREFE:;TURE Posts
Area Bq. - KCllltsu la

CIv1lian Area Hq. - Nanao

Area Hq. - Kanazawa

Ane.m1zu
I1d& Takahama Togo

Hagu1

Kanaiwa

Mikawa Mitarashi Tsubata Tsurugi

Ataka De.1ahoJl

Uzetsu
wajima

Mibato Nash1date N1ahio OSug1da1 ShIoya Yamanaka

100

101

Tab1e No. 3 (Cont' d)

Tab1e NO. 3 (Cont' d)

KOCH!

pREFF,X;TURB

Millta!1: Posts
lJash1moto* Kem11ch1 Sb�
Sh1m1zu
SUk\lllO Tal.aoka Tano MIE PREFl!L"l'URB C1 villo.n Area

Clvillan Post.a

GoJo*

Area Hq. - Kochi Akaoka
Ak1

Sonobe

Mi sak1

l-fit.au
Mit.auk1 Murotoz.ak1 Miyanotani
Nakamura NUda

Amat.subO

Sh1mokavagu.chi Susak1

Posts
Area Hq.
-

Ashlzuriz,ak1

Chl ch1sat.O
Hiragawa
Hirata

Hq. - Kinomoto Adava Kamik1tayama Shimok1tayama
Arasaka lkura

Area Hq. - Tsu
Agele1 Aho
Awa Kameyama

Gokaaho Goza

Toba

Irino

Och1

KamihanyamA

Osugi

Tate1Bhi yot.su

Tom1�
Area

Kanoura Kure

Saga Shimada

Hq. - Cashi Akaba
Nagashima
Hikimota

Ku'WB.M. Kui !-1a.tsusaka
Tsuchiyama

Isobe Kagam1ura
Kak1no

Hamash1ma Icbino se

KYaro PREFwruRE

Shiroko Toyotsu Ueno

Ci vi 11 an

Posts Area Hq. - Sh1molch1
GoJo

Kuk1

Kat.suragi

lyarna Area Hq . - Fukuch Ayabe Monobe Mutobe
Sh iinOyakuno
Area

Area Hq. - Kj'oto
!)al go

Hiraoka Hirara Hosono
Iozumi

IIanZODO

Area Hq. - Uj1yamada Fut.am1
Oyodo

Ywnochi Yokkalchi

Mataya
Nagaoka Na.k1r1
Cka

Koga

Kama

Ka:aata

Minue:yama

Hash1llloto
Kavalte.m1

0sug1dan1

Hq. - Miyano Amino As eku
Hongo

Kuchild

lwakura

Kudoyama Ko;ya

Mitaue
Uda -

Hioki

Kurama Kuze Muko
Saga Shuzan

Oyoclo Takam1
Yoshino

Agek1
Kanbe

Mlllta;:z Posts Komono Kuwana Ms.t suzaka Suzuka
NARA PREFrl'URE

Ugata lkura Yo shi zu

Kameyama

Tau

Ueno
Yokka1 ch1

Honjo Kurita

Kyugasak1 Maizuru Maru sez eld

Takashima
Uj1

Area Hq. - Sonobe Qokaao
GomagO
Ck1e

Ta1za

Takal'J,eJ!la

Ya8i Yat.suse Yodo
Yue;e

�ch1

Civilian Posts
Area Hq.
-

Tsurugaoka Yag1

Nara Takada Tah.a.remoto

Gose
Baibara
lkomn

Nabarl
Sakurai SanboDmat.su

Tanabaich1

102

103

Tuble No.

3 (Coot ' d)

Table No . 3

(Cant.' d)

}.fllItag Poats

OSAKA PREFE:TURB CIvilian Posta

Haibara CKAYAMA. PREFEL"l'URB
Civilian Posts
.Amam1 Fujl1dera Hira.oka Hirakat.a Ibarald Imazu

Area IIq.

- Osaka
11IJoyama Selta1 Sanoch1ha.7& Suit.a Ta¥ .at.suk1

It.am1
Kaizuka Katsurag! Misbima ¥ .1ya.rua. Nagano SHIGA PtOO'a "l'URE

Area Hq .

- CkOoyama Asllimori Chlyaye.chi

Area Bq.

-

Kokubu

KannonJ1

Takamatau

Fuklya Fuse Hibi Hikino

Kotohira

Ih:l.l"a KnnagaW8. Kasaoka K onosh lma

Ma.rugame l-ture Saka1de Sanbonmatau Shido
ToyohallB

lao

Cl vi 11 an Post.s Area Hq. - Otsu
Hachiman Hayami Hayano Hi re. Dcatachi IcbIbe Kataga Kldo Kusat.su Kumoi Minaguchi Nakaau Qn1zo

Tak\1118.
Tsuda

Tadot.su

Area Hq. - Hikone

Kotoura KUl'ashlkl Kuro:z.e.. lti
Mlzuta

Awami

Chikubu

Nariha
Nim1

Ochiai SaidalJI

Area Hq. - Tsu;yam& Dn1 Higasa Hinase Hlre.fuku Inbe Kamo Kat sumat.a OsakI Sayo Susai Takakura

Sakamoto
Seta lasu

Sendo S. '1imotsui Shimokura

Samegai Yokalch1

Echigava laono Nagahama Nanao 0ta.k1

TakahashI Takaya TaJna.sh1Jna Told'ola Ud..J lkan Uno Ush l.mado

Milltag Poata
Hikone

Minaguch1

Yasu

Wake
luge

Yakahe Yorish1ma

104

lOS

Table No.

3 (Coot. ' d)

Table No. 3 (Cont ' d)
TOYo'\MA PREFPI:TURE

6ll IZUacA PIWlL'TORB Civ1l.1an POSt.1S

C1viUan Posts

Kakegava Area Hq. Ikesh1nden Kana),. K&.w.aald K1 tamata
-

Area Hq. - Bamamatau Are.1

Kokezuka
Ma1salt&

Area Hq. - Takaoka Fukuno
Fush1k1

Area Hq. - Toyaua Goh)'8kkolcu Name r1kawa Uozu t.Jn8.zuld Yatsuo
� WAKAY�IA PREl< C1vilian Posts
TaDar1

Fum1

Higash1wase

Sb1ruulca

JobaDa

Hi tsuke Morl Qnae ;.:.aki

Misakubo

Area Hq. - Shbuoka
Ash1na FuJ1eda �abe Sh1m1zu Yabu Yui

"Url. 16hu...

Sagara Tahara YBlIl8.gI1 Yokosuka

T(.1(USHIMA PREFE::'l'URB

Area IIq. - Kush1moto Arlta

C1 rtl1an Post.s Are� Hq. - Tokush1m&
Aide Anabuk1 Aratano
Fukllhama H1I.;asa. IkedA Iwkuro. KandA

Hashikuro

KavashimD. Komo.tsush1ma Miyaha,ma Mugi Muya Sad.am1tsu Sakan1shi

Taeh1bUna.
Tanoura Tomooku Tsubak1 Urano6ho

Seto Sh1shiku:1

Hik1 Hongu I rokawa Katsuura
.avazoe Y

Esllllli

Area lIq. - Tanabe Aikava Chikano Funatsuk1 Gobe Iehonose
Iwkura Kaminoj o Kavakami Kirlsugawa Minabe Ryu&in Samukawa Totsugava Yavata
I.nami

Wakayama Area Hq. Higata Iwabe
-

TOITORI PREFH:TURE
Ci rtl1an Posts Area Hq. - Tottorl

Koza Iw.za.!d. Nach1 Shi.mosato Shingu Susamu Tanami Ukui Wabuka

K.o.da Kokava Minosh1lua Miyo
Tannova

Ivaa

Shirosak1

ToyaJo Waksnoura

Mili ta.ry Posts Kokava Wakanoura

Area Hq. - Yonago
Hinanisak1 Hoshoj1 Ijirl Iya Goka Ki suk1 Kurosaka Mihonosek.1 Mizo8UChi NoIla!d
Se.da

Aj l ro Aoya.

Kamo Shikano
Tomarl Wakasa

Chizu Hamasaka Iva1

StlimohoJo Shina! ShinJ1 Yabase Yas� Yura Yurayoshi

Sakai

Sa1SO

107

106

Since the approach routes and the d.1versionaI7 tactics ot the ene,"'QY
bO' .nbers

were anno\Ulced.

Four types of alerts vere listed :

A, B, C and D.

mnde it extreraely dit'f'icult to follow the course ot

Starting with Al.ert D, men and machines were pl.aced in graduated states of readiness \Ulti1 reaching Al.ert A, which calle d for pi10ts
to be in their planes with the cngines twning over

an attack or to predict the intended target by means ot radar or lookout lJosts, the lith Air Division foWld it Iilore advantageous to re1y
on

(Chart No. 5 ) .

patrol planes for spottina and tracing raiding planes.

Al.so inc1uded in the alert plan were movements o f' various u­ nits, both prearranged and er:tergenc y. In general, these movement s

Search Mi ssions The Type-100 Headquarters Reconnai ssance p1anes ot the 16th
and 82d Independent Ai r

Sq\l.!ldrons beca.use of their superior speed

sent Wlits into an alert flying pattern or assi@led air regiments
and to teruporo.ry bases were they would be in more strategi c positiona.

highe r altitude capabill tie s, ....ere nonnal.ly used in search m.1 ealona.
Such �i3sions ....ere conducted 1n accordance with the general estimate

Time Differential Study In the development of the alert system. and the making ot pre­ parations for defense against B-29' s, a study vas made of the char­ acteri stics and capabilities of the American heavy bombers and an appraisal was made of Japanese air defense strengths and weaknesses. One of the prinCipal weaknesses was the time involved in relaying air raid warnings . Thi s weakness received l:luch serious consider­

ot the s ituation or 1n ref'erence to inf'onnatlon developed br the Special Intell1gence Squadrons . Reconns.i ssa.nce Dd aeions we re sen­ It enemy plane s were spot­

era1ly rlown by Croups of' three pla.ne s . ted, they
.... ould

be approached from the rear, thoir movements observed
or the three reconnaissance

and reports relayed to headquarters.

planes, one would nonr.a.l.ly be assigned to folio" the raiding planes and the o ther :. would be assigned ney mi ssions . Alert System As B-29 l�ids we re intensified in e a rly 1945, the alert system, which h'ld pre'liously been established on a fairly simp1e patteI'D, was re-ex.e.nd.ned and a core efficient system ot graduated al.erts adopted. The lith Air Division prepared a series ot directives
••

ation since it vas obvious t. �at in order to successfully meet and attack the enemy bombers, the Air Division had to be given e.mp1e warning of their approach. The maxilUum range of the Type-B Radar

vas about 300 kl10tneters and, because of the size and shape ot Japan, radar stations in the Central Di strict could seldom be lo­ cated more than 150 kilometers fl"OCl a vi tal target area.

This

meant that it was of'ten possible for a B-29 to approach wi th1D 450 kl1o:neters of its tarGet before being detected.
With the speed of'

wich described the action to be taken by each unit as the al.erts

108

109

Chart

No.


the :8-29 being in excess of
I ... �e

'8 ...

.... ...

a .

.... . ... ...
I

... ....
... �

500

ltilaneters per hour,

the bomber could

...

��

£ 8

" II III

� a � o� a� g s M
" ...
��

§

fl e 8 .... .... .., ...

... ....

� J! 't oO

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'e f
t,;) al

u .... as ... ... � 0

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... a

§

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0 »

as '"' .... 0

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... ...

� t!

�!
....

��

.

l ! t" � .
• •
...

a�

... §. ;§! � t: g e� ... �e

.

be over its target 50 to

55

minutes

after tirst being detected. Ever'7

effort vas made to speed up the process ot relaying mes sage s from the radar installations through Division headquarters ment s .

to the air regi­

In spite o f the fact that th e time lost in getting the order

to the f'i{;hter units "Was cut to approxtrnately 20 minutes, it stUl required an addi tioD8.l. 50 minute s or more for an entire regiment ot Type-2 and Type-3 Fighters to reach an altitude ot ( Chart No. 6 ) .

.... u as II

10, 000 meters

...

�a
III

...

.... u

... <

a�
e
"


"

as

"

III

8-

�!
co

B I)

� •.

� e

.,

;

8

III

.

a �

.

Thi s time lag :aeant that whole i'omations of :8-29 1 •

a-

� a a- �

'e .
co I ",

�!

�!

0

"

� I)

,
lii

would often be met by the one or two !1ghters which wre the tirst

...

III

to get off the ground.

The entire ret;1l!lent 'Would have difficulty in



'"'
III

8-

" i
'"'

becoming ai rborne in su1'1'icient time to attack the enemy banber tormations even on their retUl'U
run.

� a

:9 � ... e

il s'
to. P..

�f
II

t!

f ,S u
. :.

III

. .go e f§
$ 13 e
m oO � P..

]ji
...

8

O ... � " .... � �
CI

"' � III ... .... .,

I) � � t) � ...
e) '" as

t!

III 1 r:: .... 0

1D ....


;:

J i 8 � ] '2 , '2 l g !� �$ ! 3 �$ 1 ��� ! �i �i
III III �

• • III ...

S�
I

�i

I) S

.

8.

In
get,

some cases,

depending on the route of approach and. the tar-

a little more time

vas

available, but the time differential be-

tween the first reports of enemy planes and the time required mount an effec tive defense remained c ritical.

to

Decisions on the dis-

.

pod tion of forces bad to be made very quickly in order not

to lose

the opportunity for interception, but in1tial information vas of'teD misleading and too meager to permit the making of decisions . in turn, caused still greater delay as infonnation trom. the

� t!

I:lit •

onus, radar

III

co

... ...

III

insta.llat ions w.s carefully studied prior to commi tting the units •

i

� 13t

t)


;:

Po g:;

sq


;:

<


1:
*

lll.

110

Chart No. 6
Time Di fferential Study Study ot

B-29

Raids

The 11th Air Division al.so made a caref'ul study o� the hea"7

Speed

Time Requ:1red to Climb to llt.1tude
ot

B-29 l1!.ids which began in November

1944,

and sUlll!:la rized re sults �or

Type

10,000

JIl

the benefit of operational planning.

�-29
Single

Target Selection The B-29 ' s,

operating from Saipan bases, had concentl1!.ted their

�um

Cruis1ng

Plane

Section

Flight

f'1rst attacks on the Nakaj ima Aircraft Factory,

in

the Tokyo area.

nen the destruction of that plant had been �
days of steady bombioGs of Tokyo and Type-2

e

cc ocrplish ed during ten
the enemy sv1tched

vi C ini ty,

Fighter

634 km

40 IlIin

50 min

50 min

its attack to the Nagoya area for several days .

Follo'J1ng these

attacks, the enemy began bombing th e Kawasaki Ai rcraft Factory at Akashi, near Kobe . It was clear that the prlmary target of the eneJllY 1oI8.S the airc raft industry, with the total destruction of Japan ' s aircl1!.fi manu-

Type-3 Fighte r

5� km

400 km

40 min

50 min

1 hr

facturing potential as the ultilllate aim. selected as a target, the

Ctlee a fa.c tory had

been

D-29' s wuld

bomb it until canplete de-

st ructi on 1oI8.S achieved.

Then, a new ta rget wuld be selected anQ. In view of thi s definitely e stabl1shed

accorded the SBJlIe treat:nent . T)'pe-2 tv1n-seat 5 45 k:n

llQ zn1n

50 miD

l hr

pattern of ene::ty target selection, the study 1ndicated that. it would
be pos sible to anticipate future targets v1th a reasonable degree o�

Fighter

acc urac y

.

B-29 Flight FOrmations and Approach Routes
ne Division ' s study took note of the fact that the standard T

Headquarters
Reconoaiasauce

630 km

450 kill

40 min

113

B-29 fo rma tion consi sted
tern.
mond .

ot a unit. ot tour planes in a diamond pat­
0.

In an effort to obta.1n 1nfonoat10n well in advanc e of raids,
the Division maintained cl.ose liai son vith the :Eastern Army Camnend

Four such Wl1 ts usuo.lly be ing grouped to fona
The tour &roUPs,

larger dia.

nying at intervalE;

of five

to ten ldlometera, otb.

to secure !nfonnation emanating froL1 the Bonin Islands, Iwo J1ma
end the Izu IslAnds . l The Division also reinforced the Special In­

consti tuteu one echel.on lIh1ch vas tre<!,ucntl.y folleved by s everal e r similarly tomed. echelons. �le bomber formations tended or soutllvest and,

telligence Squadron in an effort to imp rove the operatina efficlenc1

to app roach Japan tram the south

of that Wl1t.

To aid radar installations in effec ting speedie r Iden­

after arriving ove r the mainlAnd, turn to the eaat.

t.i fi cation of enemy planes and detennining their direction ot ap­ proach, plotting device3 vere set up vi thin the radar installations

The study of the tactic s led

to the assu.-.xption that this maneUYer

the !H'evailing v.l.nter viDda . vas used 1n order to take advantage of Plotting ot

at Quaezaki, Shirahama, Yavatahnllla and Osalta.

B-29 Courses

gpe rations

Against B- 29 ' s

As they gained experience, the efficiency or the radar units shoved marked improvement. Hovever, unless the intial radar report
'1018.11

At. first , as the B-29 ' s maintained their successive echelon fOrr.lat1ons, with each echelon closely folloving the route

ot the

vas s upported by intellleence received f1"O' other sources, It � se ldom sufficiently complete to indicate the attack .

fi r st , they vere successfully attacke d.

'

This type of tOIWlt1on

di rec tion ot

the e�

served to overcome a di sadvantage vhich plagued

interceptors tl.y1ng

oCca.siono.1ly it vas possible to make a rough approximatioD

at hi gh altitude s :

Any me..nueve r a tt. empte d at an altitude of 10, 000

of' the ene.:!y ' s approach path by colla ting information received the radar stations at O:naezald,

traa

meters invariably resulted in a great loes of altitude and by t.ime altitude had been regained,

the

Nakir1,

Shio no M1saki and Ash1zuri

the opportunity tor attack would

M1 saki , but due to the loca ti on II and dista. "lces between the lltattona,
simultaneous identifIcation wos seldom eftected.
AlthoUGh it ba4

bave been lost.

Hovever, vith e chelon s flying in regular progres­

Sion, recovery of alt! tude could be achieved in sufficient time to
penni t an attack to be mnde on follOwing echelons.

been expected that the informatIon developed by the Spec1al Intel­ ligence Squadron lIOuld be of material assistance to the plottera 1ft the operatIons rooril, �levant Into:ma.tlon
the
wall

not otten obtained 01

Squadron.

1 . Direct contact vith radar installations in the Bonin Is­ lands and lwo Jima vas maintained by GDC a genc ie s in Tokyo and transmitted to the :EAstern Ar "lY Comnand. Radar in stallations on the Izu Islands vere directly under the :Eastern Army Ccx. '1Ira8Jld .

114

I I ds

llS

The fighter un1t.s 01' the llth Air OJ.vision also achieved good result.. aa long
as

approach, dispatch 01' the :t1rst \mit would be ordered. units then took off tiOll
required

Fighter

the B-29' s cont.1nued their habit 01' approac:h1.D«

in

s

uc cessive waves and if subsequent intorma-

central. Japan over the K1i Pen1naulA o.nd then turning east. to at.tack Na.go� or '.rcJlQO.

changes, the orders could be revised as the sit.uation

demanded.

Tlli s method of dispatching interceptors and effecting

Changea

in

B-22 Tact.ic s

di sposition a.chieved unexpectedly effective results as long as the ene..':lY continued its syste:n of attacking with successive echelons alone the same approach route .
W' Llen fo:nn.a tions were changed and.

Apparent.ly becom1.ng ....re that rigid adherence to the -­ types ot fomations o.nd the S8Jlle approach paths waa reault1n& in losse., the enemy beean adopting deceptive and diversiOD&r.J tac ­ tic s . Tne

echelons followed varied paths, the 11th Air Division' s tactics lost their effectiveness. Another innovation successfully practiced by the enemy ,.s the latmchinc of scale attack.
a

B-29 echelons chose different routes and otten separat.­
In addition, they made change. in

ed to attack several. targets .

their approach routes and often caused interceptor plaDe. to tly into the wind . This was a definite disadvante.ce to the amaller

nu:nber ot s:r.all raids sllllultaneo\Wly with a tull.­ Tne s:nall tllGhts of planes frequently were uncietectstations and

and lighter fighter a.1rcratt. '!'be change from \Wing successive echelons ot bOClbera to at.tack a single target also had the affect ot

ed by the radar

first in1'ormation " '8.S genere.l.ly 1'8With such a short warning, the plAnes

cei ved froon the lookout posts .

making the task 01' the

ot the Air Divi sion ....ere unable to even atte:apt to take on and reach t. e �
requi red 10, 000

operations room much 1Il0re difficult.

It had been recognized that

meter altitude .

the information available 1mII1ediat.ely after the first identifica­ tion 01' enemy plaDes was too meager to J\Wtify the di spatch 01' the
entire

So successtul were the enemy' s diversionary tactic a, that they

otten were able to penetrnte into key target areas and begin bomb1ng betore the plotters and interceptors were able to detenn1ne the pro­ bable target. As a matter of fact, the Division' s di sposition ot

Division.

� the other hand, the alerting ot the Division

could not be delayed unt.U collation and caref'ul st.\lI3,y 01' all in­ tell1gence could be accomplished. The Division hed compran1sed 'b7

forces seldom coincided with the true battle situation and vben it did, it was generally due entirely to chance or coincidence. Tbe

having all tighter \mit.s assume Alert C

- ready tor action -

as

soon as radar stations contacted the tirst enemy plAne .

\ihen sut­

inabill ty ot the air defense units to even attempt to cope vith the nev

ticient 1nfol'\Jl&tion was developed to estimate the direction 01'

B-29 tactics

had a demoralizing affect OD the entire Division.

1l.6

1l.7

Carrier-Baaed Plane Starting

Attacks

to avoid falling into a trap .

With radar seld0i4 able

to detect

about the middle of February 1945, in the III1dst ot
a.

tighter planes, particularly when acting as escorts to bombers,
there vas er

very intense :8-29 nUds, task. torces.

number of attacks vere laWlched by enemy

danger in mounting a defense wen it vas not clear wheth­

The Kanto Sec tor had already been subjected to such

or not the attackins i'onnations vere accaupanied by fighters.
very carefully

attacks and, t.sking advantage of the experiences of the lOth Air Di­ vision, the 11th set up plans for dealing \11th the carrier-based at-

It vas necessary to study the Situation
believed

when it 1I&S

that »-29' s might be accompanied by righters .
Preparations for Future

tacks.
be attacked and that no It. vas decided that only bomber s vould

Attacks

To the problems created by intensified

:8-29

raids and

carrier­

action should be taken age.ins t fiGhter plane s .

To avoid possible

based fighter and light bomber attacks vas added another serioua
threat .

e rsed and hid its damage to planes on the �roWld, the Division disp
plane s . Dnphas is

Toward the end of February 1945, Ivo Jima fell to the U.S.

\/Us placed on the use of antia.1rcratt artillery There vere several reasons tor '1'be bal­

forces, giving them an air base only 1, 250 kilome te rs tram Japan.
A drive against Ckinaw. vas clearly indicated and it the American.
should be successful in

1IY fighter plane s . to canbat. the ene.

threat : adopting passive defense measure s against the nev

taking that island they vould have another The c onstruction ot

favor ot the enelll1' ance of fighter strength vas heavily t1pped in
and an

air 'base only 1, 000 kilometers trom Japan . 'bases on these

in losses eneagement in a test of strength could only result

two islands would inevitably result in an even great­
Worse,

of the Division bad heavi er thnn the Division could atford; pilots received

er intensification of the B-29 raids .

the big bombers vould

cOlllbat, bav1ns allIlost no training in fiGhter vs. fighter

undoubtedly be accompanied by large numbers of fighters, aea1nst
which Air

c oncent.rated on tully

success­ attacking bombers and, sinc e the problem ot

the air defenses of Japan were all but helpless.

The 11th

solved, it ap­ copinG \11th the »-29 menace bad not yet. been to the nev to be virtually i:npos sible to find a solution

Division speeded p reparations to meet this nev threat.
During the attacks by carri er-ba sed planes, which were conduct­

peared

. p roblem of combat.ting fiGhters sinlult.aneoualy

ed at l4uch lowe r levels than the bomber attacks, it bad been tound that antiaircra1't veapons were relatively ineffective belov 3, 000
mete rs .

considered to be a Since efforts against enemy tighters vere
caution had to be exercised' vaste ot plane s and pe rsonnel, extreme

To correct this shortcoming, six automatic cannon UD1ta

1l.9

-

rrom the Central. Army Caamand were attached

to

the Air

Division and

part of

the old Central Di strict and the southwe stern portion or

the

distributed to

air1'iel.d.s .

In addition, rocket-type grenade la\mch-

Eastern District.

In

general, the line of demarcation between the

era were i s sued to Taisho

Airfield.

2

E;tst Coast mlltary Di strict and the Central the Suzuka M01.Ultain Range which midwa.y between Nagoya
ran

M1.litary

District was

Measures were also taken

to install searchlights and other 10-

approximately north and south

c:ator aids in order to orient pilots during night

flights.

and

Osaka.

The t'tlO

mill tary

districts were

guides bad beccme a neces sity because of the enemy' s incend1&r7

still conside red as one administrative district by the 11th Air vi sion and continued to be r .DO'WIl as the Central Sector.

Di-

raids

against by the

most of the large citie s. buge :fire s,

Due

to

beat

and

smoke sen-

enlted

it was orten difficult for flyers

to ori­

With

the fonnation ot the nev area a:nni e s,

the 11th Air

Dirt-

ent the:nselve s and it 'Wa S particularly difficult tor

them to laDd. bombs

sion came under the operational control of the Fifteenth Area A.:rrlf1, while the Thirteenth Area Army exercised control over the 23d Air Brigade . The Bri{;ade, which 'WaS a�nted by the addition ot the remained under the adz:l1ni strative

Also as a result of the enemy ' s wide spread use of incendiary

and shells,

further emphaSis 'WaS placed on concealing and

dispera1n&

combustible materials as vell as plane s . Changes in Zones o t ReSpon sibility

5th Air Reg:l.r.lent, the 11th

J uri sdiction or

Air

D:l.vision. The Air General

en 6 Feb ruary 1945, when the three districts of Japan were
divided into five military districts, the l3:reo.test chanGes were

sub­

en
was

Amy
the Air
General

9 April 1945,

the order of battle for

Artq

vi thin the Central District.

The nev area assigned

to the Central

announced by

IGHQ, vith an

activation date or 15 April .

Coin­

lo!1l1 tary Di strict wa.s extended to enccmpass al.l of
or Honshu and the entire i sland of Shikoku.

the western end Division' s

Cident vi th the e st3.bli sh:llent of the Air General

Army,

the

Firat Op_

The 11th Air

and Second General Armies were also organized and the .Ketsu-Go enltion, the plan tor the final detense 01' Japan,

subordinate unit,
new East Coast

the 23d Air Brigade, 'W8.S made responsible ror the

was published.

Mill tary Di strict lIhich 'WIlS formed from the eastern

It

vas intended that the Air General Army should telte over re-

2.

Research fails to reveal �ctl.y what type of weapon

meant by " rocket-type grer .a.de la1.Ulchers . " that the weapon refe rred

to 'WaS

the Japanese

It is

1.

sponsibility tor all air ope rations as well as preparations tor the derense 01' Japan against the expected invasion. mand charlees were so complicated that However, the
COIIl-

probable, bowever, Mortar

70-mm Barnlge

firing a shell that, a1'te r reaching a predetermined altitude, expel­ led several parachute-supported time-fuzed high explosive charges.

it

was determined

to bring

121.

l the various air un!ts under the nev air ca:m:ll8.ld gradual.J.)' in order not to disrupt current detense operations. lbder the nev command system, the Eleventh, Twel.tth and Thir­ teenth Area Anrdes came under the First General A:rmy, vh1ch meant that the 23<1 Air Brisade, vh1le still orc;an1c to the 11th Ail" Divi­ sion was under the operational. control of the First General Antr:I. The Fit'teenth and Sixteenth Area Ar .des vere included in the order of battle of the Second General Army under wich the 11th Air DiYi­ don nov found itself. This rather complicated comma.nd system made

Steps were immedia.tely taken to plan supply requirements, ea­ tablish cClllll1'UIlications and train for air and ground activiti.s called for by the Ketsu-Go Operation. The Air Gene ral J.:rmy named

July as the deadline for the cOlllpletion of all preparations. '!be Air Ge neral Army took command ot the 1st Air Aroy, relieved it ot its training and replacement mission and e stabllshed it as an operatiOnal. comman d. Air Br1gade
wera

The 11th Air Division, together with the 234

then transferred trom the order ot battle ot the Actoo.lly, this change vas onl.7

6th Air Army to the 1st Air Army.

"I1inistrative task of the 11th Air Division extre:nely difficult the ad. and to this already complicated arrangement vas added another diffi­ culty. The 11th Air Division was expected to conduct air detens.

a paper transaction and made little, if any, difference in the op­ erations of the Division. Since the 6th Air A:rmy had been engaged

in other fields, it had never exercised any coo::and over the 11th Air Divi sion and, with operational control of the air detense. ot the Central and East Coast Mill tary Districts beinB vested in the respective area andes, it 'Was not anticipated that the Division becocUng organic to the 1st Air Amy would e.tfect its operations . Air Defense
In

operations asainst the intensified B-29 and carrier-plane raids and at the same time stockpile all the necessary materiel that \/Ould be necessary for the implementation of the Ketsu-Go Operation.

Sine.

it was not possible to peri'onll both tasks, and since the air detens. ot the area bad not been particularly eftective, it was dete:na1Ded

to curtail detense operatIons and concentrate on preparations tor
the Ketsu-Go Opero.tion. Ito attacks \/Ould be made against s1ngl.e en­

early May, the Air Gene ral Army reassigned the 16th Inde­
To

Operations

- May and June 1945

pendent Air Squadron from Tai sho Airfield to the Tokyo area.

emy planes and sorties would only be tlCNn against tIghter fomation.

accomplish the search ud ssions \lh.i.ch had previOUSly 'been fiovn b7 the 16thl the 14 planes of the 82d Independent Air Squadron were assigned additional reconnaissance missions.

wen the Division could operate with nW1erical superior1ty or other definite advantage . There \/Ould not, of course, be any curta1lment

ot attacks on large :8-29 formations vh1ch were unescorted by fighters.

122

During �y and JWle, incendiary at-tacite on the Central Sector
were particuJ.ar1.7 strong and

the 1s

t

Air Army vas re sponsible coincided with t.bat

ot

the First Coast

although interceptor planes toUD4 the ·

General Army, taking in the Northeastern, J.H.lltary Dist.rict.s.

!hstern and

!hst

beat

and smoke ·of the fire s made night t1y1ng cxtrelllely bazUdoua,

The 6th Air Army' s zone coincided with that

pil ts learned to use the light ot the tires to attack

o

E-29' .

frail

of the Second General Army and covered the Central end Western Mil.­ itary Districts. The llth Ai r Division w.s given tour air regiments elements ot vhich bad been located at

belovo

Fighters,

�clud1ng

Type-1OO Headquarters Reconnaissance

planes equipped with 2O-1IIIIl addit

cannon,

1on,

had some degree ot BUCce .. .

In
at­

end the 302d Navy Air Group,

the To Units launched the stron�st possible sui c About

ide

1tam1 under the Division, "Was transferred to the newly established Navy Air Comuand at Yamato Airfield, near

tacks in an ettort to curb the enemy.

the middle ot JUDe,

Hara. 3

wi th most ot the c1 ties in the Central Sector badly damaged, the
cedj,\I11 size ci t1es became targets tor massive bo:nbing raids .
By the end of June the battle tor Ckinava had been los the ener� vas in a posi tiOD to turther increase i t8 air

The Air General Army, in an e ffort to provide the cax1mum tense aga1nst bomb1ng raids vith the minic J.:l number of planes, .. l\

de­ de­

operationa.
or
on 1'010 J1ma

t

and

veloped the Sei-Go Operation. This nev concept of air detense

cen­

tered around a static air defense torce vithin each air detenae sector. J:1i ssion A mobile group vas also assigne!l to each sector with the

the first part or July it vas est1. �ted. that. the enemy bad,

'WOuld shortly bave , at least and 1, 000 in the ll.arianas .

&Jo

planes on Ckinava,

300

ot

rende rinc primary support to its home sector and second­

At th1s time,

the llth Air D1v1a1oa

ary support to adJacent sectors.

It.

bad barely 200 servicee.ble planes and the Air General muster about

A.'rmy could

In

the developi!1ent of the Sei-Go Operation the llth Air 55th, 56th and

Divi­

800

combat- ready tighter and bo:nber p lane s and lICIIle

sion, vith the 5th,

246th

Air Regiments, vas desig­ The

2, 000 suicide planes.
Final Air Detense Measures en 10 July t. e Air General Army asslr.1ed. 'l

nated as the stat1c torce for the Central Air Defense Sector. 20th Fighter Group, organized on

22

July, vi th the l.llth and l.l2th

al.l air pover and. developed zones of responsib111ty tor the l.at aDd
6th Air Ar.:l1es, the latter having been released. by the CanbiDed Fleet at the conclusion ot the Ckinaw, CaI:lpaign. The area tor

operat10nal.

con rol ot

t

3. See Japanese !·�nograph No. 23, Ai r Defense ot the HOIIIe ­ land, pages 28 - 31 and pace 91, for further details ot the Japa­ nese Navy ' s contribution to the air defense of Japan . 4.

which

eration.

Ibid, page s

68

-

12,

tor a deSCription of the Sei-Go

Op­

125

1

MAP

NO. 9

Air Regiments vas assigned as

&

part ot the mobUe torce. i'he bal.-

anee ot the mobile force consisted at the lOOth Air Brigade" CQIIlposed of the 101st and 1030. Air Regiments. Sei-Go Ope ration, the 5th Air Regiment
For the purposes

of the

�vUned wder the 234 Air

... .. ... ..
II:

.. •

:! o
... ..

Ie D ... ... c

Brigade vhich, in twn, wos te;nporarily attached to the 20th Fighter Group �or operational control . While both the 5th Air Reg1ment,

U
... C ..

c :2 C :2

at K1yosu, and the 23d Air Brigade, at Komaki, recained organic to the 11th Air Divi sion, because of c()l!lJl1UIl1 cations difticul.ties, it
was thought

expedient to have operational control vested in the
z

20th Fighter Group which had also established headquarters at Xo!lIB.ki Airlield. Despite the Sei-Go Operation plan for the efficient use ot air de�ense strength the enemy continued to hurl greater and greater nUI:lber of aircraft into raids on the Japanese mainland and the

<OJ

.. .. OIl

o ...

s'trenc;'tl'l

of the air defense units continued to decline .

By 1 Au-

gust, sorties againot raiding ene!l1y planes had been virtually dis­ continued as the Air General Army sought to conserve its strength for the Ketsu-To-Go Operations .

In p reparation for the t1n&l all-

out defense of the Homeland, nev di spo s iti ons or air units vera planned to /P. ve the Centr&l Se cto r invasion operations
e.

better defense against enerq

( Map

No.

9) .5

5 . �\e.p No . 9 vi11 be fowd to have mino r variances trom un1t listings in Appendices III and IV at Japanese MOnograph Ro. 23. Subject lists shov actual lmi t locations, vhile I-!ap No . 9 shows the plann e d disposition �or the implelllentation at the Xetau-To-Go Operations .

126

1

111 1
1 27

'When the loIIl r ended, on 15

August 1945, the lith Air Diviaion 182 plane s , at lIhich 52 were unAIR DEFENSE

CHAPl'ER

4

b8.d been reduced to a strength at dergoing repairs .

OF THE WESTERN SH:TOR

The shu,

Western Air Defense Sector of' Japan included all at Kyu­
southwe stern Shikoku and other Origjoall.,.

the western part of Honshu,

principal

island groups adjacent to the I:'ain i slands .

cOinciding vith the area of the Western Di strict, when the

mil.1'ta.r)­

districts of' Japan were changed in 1945, the air de fens e torce
still retained its original sector and was not l.1m1 ted duced zone of' the Western !<1ilitary Di strict. The

to the re­

reason f'or the nature of' air

retention of the sector concept w.s due parUy to the

defense - it being im.possible to restrict planes in the air to the precise boundaries which coni'ine the operetions of ground

units -

and partly to the f'act that northe rn Kyushu, western Honshu and southwe stern Shikoku were interdependent e.!ld considered tuting one air defense zone .

as consti­

The importance attached to the Bungo

Channel by the Navy also strone;ly affected the e stabllshoent of' def'ense zone. Organizetion of the

the

19th Ai r Brigade 1944 and was organic

The 19th Air Brigade was organi zed in June to the

1st Air Ar::J.y although it 'Was under the Western A.r::Jy COIIII:IIUld.
Th e p ri.. ry mis sion o f' th e newly tolU­ "'lB.

tor air defense operetion s .

ed Brigade was the defen se of the stretegic industrial areas at

1

northern Kyushu.

To accomplish

this mission the 19th Air Brigade below:
• • • • • • • • • •

dives .

Fev o f

the 59th ReGilnent '

s

pilots and only tour

01' the
o f'

was organized and located as shown 19th Air B ri gade Headquarters

plane s we re ca.pab1e of night combat operation s .

:Because

engine

( Cl:ldr :

Maj . Cen.

Fur\Jya)

Ozuld Airfield
Ozuk1 Airfield

trouble eiGht

and other maintenance difricultiefl,

only

about seven or

Heac.quarters Re connai ssance Unit
4th 4th

of' the Regiment ' s

planes vere operational. Planning defense 01'

• • •

Air Regiment ) Ai rfield rattalion) Air
Airfield

Ope rational

. . . . . . . . . • •

Oz\lki Airfield
Ashiya Airfield

The prima.:ry the industrial the hiehlY

mi s sion of the 19th Air Brigade , the

59th

248th

Re giment

Battalion

»

• • . • . • • • •

in s talla ti on:: in north ern

KJ'U:.hu and particular�

Evaluation of Personnel The 19th Air

and »\uipme!!t
Un1t lIaS e­

impo rtan t Ya'Wtl.tc

I ron

Work s ,

called for the dep10�nt
Fro!n

Drieade Headquarters Reconnaissance

o£ all air strength over the strat egic area . interceptor planes wotJ.d move Ol' .J.y lim! ted

thi s position,
to

quipped vith II) . Six
of

te:l

Type-lOO Headquarters Recon:a.Ussance plaDes (Model
and

distances target

attack enThe condevelop-

emy

plan e s

before they couJ.d

the ten plAnes vere operationc.l

two vere equipped

ente r the to

vi tal
a

area . wns

cept of dep10yinc air stren gth

cover

for night operations . The
4th

limit ed

area

Air RegiJaent posses:led the best trained pilots and e sp ri t
de corp s . Comprising

bad

ed because of t... 'le l1n>ited numbe r of plane s

avai1e.ble and because operations .
'!'bere

the highest
Brigade ,

the

main strength at tbe � were

searcbll g. 'lt coordination wo.s neces sa.ry for night

vere not

the

Reg1::lent

bad about 35 Type-2 Two-seat Fighters,

suft1c1e�t sea.rchliGhts availa ble for

use outSide the stra-

wich 25

tecic area.. The assi � �ent of this restricted of'
great conc ern to the Brigade as defen se area

vere op e rat i onal .

E1.ght 01' the 4th Regiment' a planes

imp roved model night fighte rs .

Most ot the planes were equipped machine guns .
Tva 01'

was a matter

vith

2O -lllIIl cannon and 12 . 7-rom
cannon .

the planes bad

it

was

felt that it lim1ted o!)area s .

portuniti es to
ANY Command

i nte rc ept the enemy in

other

31-mm automatic

The Westem air defense unit.

was

The 5 9th Ai r Ret;1ment

wa s equipped vi th 2 5 Type-3 Fighters, time and the pilots
lIere

que rie d. regartnE; the ac tio ti n s of'

in the event

enemy

raids The

but had. been usinc them tor only a short

on nearby ta rge ts

offered opportun1ties
but

tor interception. appeared

AnrJ.y

not c omp e t.e ly fami liar ....-1 th them . trou'ole had. been

Conside rable unexplained engine
toke-otf' vapor to stall

COIld took no definite position lIIlD.n
however,

to :favor defenrling only
IAter orders

eX"' erienced : ,t>

Just after

locks

tre-

the strategic industrial area 01'
that the ArrIr¥

northern Kyushu.

quently developed and

,...f enu·nes vere inclined

e.tter steep

revealed,

130

Coomand 1ncluded Nagasak1 as a strategic area and, when enemy a't­
tacks actual.l.y started, the Brigade w.s frequentl7 called on to de fend other c 1ties and airf1elda 10 the Westem District. Af't.er a s s es sme nt aDd cons1deration or 1ts mi ssions aDd strength,

a certain number of hits on friendl.y plAnes vouJ.d be a nomaJ. ope%'­ atiODA1 risk and that the fire power ot the ant1aircrai"t unite should not be curtalled.

In spite ot this recommendation, the an­

t1aircraf't groups decided that 10 a..ll cases where triendly planes llI1gbt be exposed to Sro\md tire, all firing 'WOuld be hal.ted 10 ac­ cordance 'With the judgment ot local antia1rcraf't unit cnmma.nde rs . Agreements on coordinated jo1ot combat aDd tra.1n1ng operations "be­ tveen searchl1ght wits and air reg1lllents vere also developed. Alert System Four types ot operat10nal alerts vere established by the 19tb
Ai r Brigade :

the 19th Air Brigade detenuined that to be prepared for 1mmed1ate ope rations , e.1l. 1ts air s trength 'Would bAve to be assigned to the
des1gnated s tra te gi c area. given code nar.le s :

Tllree operations vere established &Del

Ope rat10n ICarasu, ca.ll1ng for one ai r reg1.ment

to cove r the entire areaj Operation Megane, 'Wlllch d1vided the stra­ tegic area 1oto t'Wo zones, 'With the 4th Air Regiment providing CClll­ bat patrols in the eastern half aDd the 59th Air Reg1:nent covering the vestern halfj and Operation Nika1, cal..l1ng for the 4th Air Re­
giJ:lent to patrol at about 4, 000 meters vh1le the

1) Yo1oe, during 'Wh1ch training would continue
\ill S

while

nonnal combat readines s fuel aDd
8.IIlIuni Il

ma1ota1oed;

2) Asaok1, during

W1ch

59th patrolled at

tion 'Were to be loaded on planes while the pilot.

so;nevhe.t belo'W that altitude .

In all operat10ns, the defense ot

me.de ready 10 the wa1tlog room;

3 ) Yofukashi, during which pUote

alt1tudes beloY 1, 000 mete rs was left to the aDtia1rcratt units, aided by the barrage balloons moored around Kuklooumi Bay, Just north of yawata.
Cooperat1on

stood by their planes aDd preparations vere !!lade tor 1Jnmed1ate starting ot engines and 4) Tetsuya, during vh1ch the pilots vould

be 10 their planes and the engines of one-third ot the aircraft

'With Ant1aircratt Unit.

would be started.
to

Announcement ot the alerts \I'Ould be telephoned

In jo1nt pl.a.nn1ns vith the ant1a1rcratt units, the 19th A1r

each regimental headquarters trom the operations room or Brigade

Brigade agreed to report the nu:nber, altitudes and take-ott time. or 1ts plane s . The Brigade also recOlllended that ant1a1rcraft, lll

headquarters. The Brigade commander and a..ll headquarters personnel, except
medical and supply sect10ns, vere required to live at the headquar­

'Weapon s continue to fire at enemy planes during COlllbat operatioaa .

This suggestion was l:l3.de as a re sult of the Brigade ' s reel.1ng that

ters.

Uoder the Asaold. Alert all statf otficers and one-b&lt ot

132

133

1

MAP NO. 10
the ()pel'Btiona perso nnel were to be Under

present

in the operations roaa.

the

TetsU)'a Alert,

the

cOIIm8l1der and all operations personnel

were ordered to the operations room .

In order to speed transmission of air raid 1ntormation gathered.

by

the Western

� COGllJl6Od. and. to serve

u liaison tor

the

Br1p4e,

seve ral staff'

officers from operations and an element

of' the Br1e1I4e COIIII!I8l1d .

SiGMl Section were attached to the Air ieJ.d

headquarter.s of the Arrrs::!

War¢nS Net
Western
A:rr::ry COII\IlIBJld emanat.ed

Info:nna.tion a va i lable to the

from

radar installations, regular m1lits.r,y and Civilian lookout posta and
a n\%llOer

of special lookout posts wich were c omb ination radar ate-

tions and visual observation posta . Radar In stallation.
Radar instaJ.l&t1ons 1"urn1 shing 1nto:nna.t1on to the Weatem ArtIq

COl!t!8.lld
trlct.

we re

not confined

to the physic:s.l

l1m1 ta of the Westem

01.-

'i'ype-:a scanner radar installations were

located. at MosuJ,po

( Boshippo) on the i s land of CheJu-Do Tsush1ma Island. There were, in

and

at

Tsuzu and H14akatsu 00

addition, a number of' 1nstal.laUona

in Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and nearby ielArld.s, including TamanQ\1rl.
in the Gate Islands . Type-A vertical bea.. radar was installe4 -u

at

the spec ial lOokout posts Yi thin the Western Di s tric t adjacent is lands and in Korea.

aa well as on

(Map No. 10)

-()--_ TY

-==a -_ _ � ..
_ _

135

M A P NO. 1 1 Lookout posts
Wi tW.n

l.ookout posts manned 1»7 the Weste m Distric't were 50
eare st anQ in direct cownunication with the n
ot

H O N S H U

milltary

personnel

headquarte rs .

A total.

out POI't. approximatel.y l50 civ1l.ian l.ook

10headquarters, one ot which _I were organ ized under seven area No. II and Tabl.e no . 4) . cated in each prefecture (Map
J mil1 tar lookout

or the 50

manned by signal. post s, ten were special. posts
tion with combined the dutie s ot radar detec litary, Some 30 ot the posts , primarily mi

corp s

pe rsonnel WO

visual obse rvation .

vere

ds Illld island i located on the many small slan

groups s urrounding

Kyushu.
Inte lligence

from Units in China
l8 April l.942, llttle the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo on

FollovinS information

activity insofar as 1t had been obtained on ene�y air
ID early bomb-

on the Japanese Homel.and. might perta in to furthe r raids
�ti on vas received that many 1944 , hoveve r, in fo r
ers, inc luding

10ng-ranse

being nown into China the newly developed B-29 , were
. ..

from Indi a. .

It

..

d be as, therefore, expected that i t woul.

on.J.y a

aird be launching a'ttackl frca short time be fo re the enCUIY woul
!1e1d s in China .
Units

were alert.­ of' the China Expeditionary Army

r tl1;bta ing lnf'onnation on en� boII1be ed to the importance of pass
man to the 'o1e st.em Army Comd .
The

15th Army and the 5th Air ArIq

t be the parts of China wic!l migh incre ased their radar cove:roge of

CIVILIAN LOOKOUT POST AREA HEADQUARTERS WESTERN ARMY COMMAND

1 37

Table Do. ..
ARMY AND CIVILIAN LOClCOO'.r PamJ UNDER WES'l'ERN ARMY COKWiD

Table No. 4 (Cont 'd)
li'taro(»\A

PRErn:.'TU.RE

C1vil1an Posts
Area Hq.

NAGASAKI PREFi1:TtJRE C1vi11an Poata
Area.

-

Fukuoka ZendoJ i

Hq. - Nagasak1 Naga!
Onura

Mogi
Kasuaa Ohama Kechi

Sb1lllabara Chij1_

(TSU8b1ma)

Seto Sak1to Sonogi
Ha1ld

Onuta Yanagava Fuku.sh1.ma Akizuld. Yamae Fukuyosb1 Ma.ebaru KOf'uJ l

Kuroki Sh1rosh1ma. Kurume ImaJuku Kash1 1 Sh1l.lQ.

Halt1

Sasagur1

Shiga-shima ArTIlY Post.s

Sone Kanda Yukuhash!

Higo;yama Genkai-sh1ma Fukuma

Saee'bo Poata

Annl
Unzen

Ckinoshima Muts ure shima

Oshima

Ke.m1m1nat.o Akama Iizuka

Soeda

Saigaw Haeh1ya

NO!IIo

Sakiyama (Ooto Islanda )

Ik1tsuki Ioj1Jna.
Izuhara. Mie

OITA PREF� (Tsush1ma)
Area Hq. - Oi ta

CI vi 11an Posts Poat. Ridak.atsu (Tsush1ma) Tsusu (Tsush1ma) Sotaro
Shimonituzu Taketa Mie Saek1 Tsukum1 Tsurusa.k1

Special Army Tamanoura. ( Ooto Islands ) M1 1 ra.ku ( Ooto Islands )

Tate1ch1
Kak1saka

Yuf'u1n
Beppu

SAGA PREFmrURE
CIvilian Posta

Morl Hide.

Usa Nakatsu ZenkoJ1
Taketazu Kunisak1

Usuki

111.11
Kitsuk1 Amy

Area Hq.
Tara Arlta
Imarl

- Sa.ga
Kashima Kanazak1

Posts Saganoselt1 H1meJima

UreshiDo
Ki)'8llla Ogawash1ma Army Posts

Mbukue

Hibur1ebillla

Nagasald

Uch1J 1ma

..a.baru Nar

Karatsu

SpecIal Army Posts Tsuruud saki

Usbizu

Taku

Yobuko

Ouch!

Table No. 4

(Cont' d)

Table

No . 4 (Cont 'd)

Kl.MAMOl'O PREFn:TURK

KAOOSHIMA. P� Civilian Posts Area Hq. Ueld CleJa& Uto

C1vi11an Posta Area Hq. - K\lIllBJIlOto Yeda.ke H1toyoshi Tarald Yunomae Gokasho Mil'8.j1 0gun1 Wa1tu otsu Yanaga Arao Takase Amy
yama p

Kagosh.1.ma
Takarabe
Sue;yoshi Iw.gaw M!t.ts� Mob1k1 Sh1bush1 KanOl'8.

Yataush11"O

M1� H1nasu
Sasb1k1

Nap:tam1se.kl Anho Nishinoomote
E1 Ibuauld.

Sembi Akune

Noda Hagash1ma.

Tomochi
Mi1'une Takamerl

Nagasu

MiDamata .Arano

K11re Chlran

Makurazald.

Ckuchl

Post. TakAs.

IJu:1 n Kush1kino

Ta.niyam

Miyanojo Kurtno Mak1zono Kaj1k1 Shigetol!l1 Kokubu Ar.JJY Posts

Kushira
IzUlll1 SakuraJ1ma

Nagasu

ct vi11an Post..

Kuchinoerabush1ma IchinOGl1nato Na.katanega

Anno Hetsuka Uchinoura Spec1al Amy Posts

Ka1monodake Nomam1sak1 Sato

Area Hq. - M1�zald Fukushima Aburatsu MiY8konojo Shiw.chi Aoidake
Udo

Kirlsh1ma Kobo.�shi

Aye.

'l'sUDO JoUJa1tau
Kitakata
SOUba Takach1ho

Teuchl

Kandnaka
Bono-misakl

Sa t&-miaa.k1

Nobeoka

I1no Bonjo
Sadow.ra

Takaharu

Takanabe Amy

Posts

To1m1sakl Spec tal Army Posta Hososhial. Aoshima

141

utilized as approach routes and nlso established a nWlber 01' l.ookout posts. Because of this excellent cooperation the Western A:raJy
China.

ga1n1ng of' designated altitudes.

In trial.s conducted from the Te­

tauya AJ.ert condition, the time required for the tirst tighter to take ott nonnal.l.:y ranged tI'ODl t'olO to 1'1ve minutes and to reach an altitude of' 1, 000 meters required 30 to 40 udnutes. Tra.in1n8 w.s also extended to incl.ude the maintenance un1ta of the airfiel.d battalions, with emphasis being l.aid on speeding
up fueling and servicing of pl.anes forced to land during combat

CoIllrnand �s seldom surprised by nUda 1'rom U.S. bases in

Al.though the intelllgencc orig1nal.ly received was not compl.ete as
to types 01' planes and altitudes, it eventuall.:y improved and de­

tailed inf'or.nation 'Wll.S received.

l.

Training Program Special attention was given to conduct1nc a training that 'oIOuld be pre.cticnl and realistic .
pro�
eom­

operations .

It '\i8.S recognized that 'oIOrtdng under simulated combat

Flexibility in making

conditions 'oIOuld assist maintenance crews to achieve greater etticiency in read:yins planes to return to interception duties without delay. Night Operations Tra1n.ing Train1ng in night combat particularl.y stressed cooperation 01' pilots and searchlight units, although trequent test 1'li�ta were also cade to train pilots in l.ocating strateE;ic areas under conditions of' complete blackout. As
a

bat preparations was stressed by switching frequently from one t)'Pe 01' alert
to

another in practice drills .

Systematic take-ott trainThe

ing was er.1phasized throughout the entire training program.

attention of pilots was constantl.y directed to the importance ot fl:y1ng tactics and accuracy in firing. It was recognized that the

enemy planes had a speed advantage and this affected the tactical. principles to be used - attacks 'oIOuld have to be made 1'rom in t'roDt of' the ene:ny, preferably f'rom a higher altitude . Because ot their

guide for night pil.ots, red and
SUllllDit

green lights were installed on the Yawata.

of lott. SarakUl'8, south ot

superior speed and maneuverability, Type-l.OO Headquarters Reconnais· sance planes 'Were senere.l.l.y used as targets in pursuit train1ng. Time trials 'Were held in
an

Because of the proximity of Ashiya. Airtield to the strategiC defense area, night take-ofts and landinGs were conducted with a
:n1Jl1mum

effort to reduce the time bet\leeD
plAnes and

the issuing of' orders and the actual. take-orr of

the

number ot beacons and warning lights in order not to turM:dntenance units 'Were also train-

l.. See Japanese lI .onogra.ph No. 16, Air Operations in the Cb1na A.. -ea, pages l.80 182, for the 5th Air Ann:y' s part in rel.a:y1ng in­ f'oraation •.
-

nish a guide to enC1llY aircraft. ed to 'oIOrK with mini!num l.1ght1ne.

Navigation Aid Tra.1ning
In the basic

wuld

be over the tarGet between 2300

and

2330 hours .

Later a re­

t raining given pilot.s, special emphas1e .s placed The t.re.1.n1ng o� pilots tor the T)'pe-1OO Bead­ tliO-seat fi8htera stressed 1nBtruc_
T)'pe-l

vised est1l:late predicted the attack would be at 21too hours.
Intelligence Reports

on in st rument fiying.

quarters

RecoDllB.i s sanc e plAnes and

Reports from the radar
vided a steady flow of

tion and practice in

radJ.o

na

vil)ll.tion with the Chi

stations

Ilnd 8pecl.aJ. lo okout posta pro­
At

dJ.rection

ini'onn.o.tion .

2238 hours

0.

radar

installa-

riDden.
Maintenance of Morale The

tion in Korea reported interference but did not make positive Iden­ ti fication - due, pilots unde rgoing pl�bably, to the fact that th e

first fo rmations 2331

physical well-being or crucial L �portance .
"

t.raining was krlown provided and a
'WaS

had entered a!1d

the

radar !leld at extremely low alti tude s . Be twe en six reports were filed Special lookout by the

to be 01'
liberal for

Special rations

were

0021

hours,

radar ins tal.l.ation at

time orr" polley ws establlshed.

Provision

also made

Mosulpo on Cheju- Do . heading east between

posts also reported plAnes

the entertnlnment and rel.e.xation ot pilots during tra1.n1n& peri. combat operatIons.

0015 and 0030 .

ods and tollowinc

An inte rp retation of intelli �ence received indJ.c�ted that the

First

Raid by China-Based U . S . Planes

Intelligence gathered by the China layed

Expeditionary Army and re­

enemy force had rendezvoused

be tveen the islands of Tsushica and
moon

Cheju-Do.

Although

an

almost full

(23 . 9 days) was scheduled

to the Western An.lY Co:.rmand indJ.cated that the enemy would the Japanese liJainl.and.
At

to rise at 0125,

the weather was hazy and infor'I3.tlon on the alt1�
AlthoU{;h the

soon start the e:{pected air attacks on

tude of the enemy planes vas lacking. expected at app roximately

attack was now

1530 hours on 15 June 1944, an alert wrnin8 'oI3.S i s s ue d tor the
Westenl District. Durine

0100 hours, in order to be prepared tor
not have been detected by radar instal­

the afternoon and e vening, aevent.l
received froa the China

re­

� �y enemJ plnnes
lations, hours,

uhi

ch midlt

ports or enemy movements,
my and the 5th

Expeditionary Az­

an

air raid warning was i ssued

at 0024 hours .

At 0027

Air Army, we re transmitted to the 19th Air Brigade.
course or the enemy

one sqUll.dron of the 4th Air

Re�llent w.s ordered to take oU

JudginG from the

plAne s i t was estimated that

and p�trol area.

at

an

a.lti tude or 2 , 000 I:Ieters over the strategic de!enae

they vould attack the strategic industrial area or northern Kyushu.
From their average speed i t w s est1ma.ted that the first

Since the altitude of the ene;:IY planes had not yet been deto patrol between 2, 000 and

echel.oo

te nniRed, another squadron was dJ.rected

145

4, 000 meters . at 0100

Deplo),!lIent of the entire 4th

Regilllent vas cOII1ple ted

The es tiuluted alti tude ot 2, 000 t.o 4, 00:0 me te rs had proved to
be correct and the planes ot the 4th Regime nt had been in a

hours .

tavor-

The Attack The first. enemy plane to cOille over the strategic area conducted a pre-attack reconno.issance at the reconnaissance period,
o.n

able position for the !:1ttack .

Tile effectivene s s ot the

Brigade ' s
in

training progl"Wll was demon s t rated by

the

calm and o rderly canne r

alti tude of 2, 000 meters.

Dur1na

which the ope ration \l3.S conduc ted .
the pilots greater confidence .

The se factors combined to

g1.ve

the enelllY tonnatioo8 circled

over Cbeju-

Do

as well as the i slands of Tsush1ma and

Dci .

The actual attack

The 59th Ai r Regiment vas not used in th i s first engagehlent because its ba.se at Ashiya \las directly on the course ot

began at

0112 hours when several plane8 appeared over Yavata trom
Approximately 30 enemy planes

the west and northweat .

participated

•• in the attack, with all fonnations followinG a.lmost identical. course

After attacking,

the enemy withdrew tow.rd

CbeJu-Do ..mere

tomattona

I
!

the enelilY

'les and directly in front of t. 'le stretegic defense area. pla. the e ngine s of the planes been started. in the blackout, the

airfield

would have been an easily ident i fied

target .

Although theoretical-

were re sume d and the planes tlew westvarcl. Losse s ,

1y, it vould have been possible to trans fer at least a part ot the

3uppOSedly confirmed,

indicated that one B-24

and three

59th to Ozu.1d
a

Ai rfi eld,

prior to the attack,

it ...·as feared that

such

o the r unidentified plane s had been shot down and one B-11 and three 3-24' s had been damaged .
Unconfinned losses were claimed as one

maneuve r Ill bht ",ell confuse operations - t!le 59th neve r having

B-

;;orked vi th 4th Ai r Re gimen t in night tn!.ining.

In ad.d.1tion, the

11, one B-24 and one unidentified plane also shot down .

The wreck­

59th Air Regiment st111 lacked confidence in i ts Type-3 Fighters. Assessment ot Results
In thi s first o.ction, it appeared tha.t the 19th Air Brigade

age of two enemy aircraft ws :found ( one west ot WakalDatsu and the
other rive kilo.leters north of Orio ) the othe r two sh ot dO\l!l over the ocea.n.

were reported planes
ot

The only dD.::lllge suffered by

had achieved an out standing success, having ,possibly dowed seven
planes and dwr .a.ged four, without suffering any los se8 .
This

the 4th Air Re{;iLlent ;re.s dam.a.ge to the left engine ot one t.wo-seat. ti ghter ..mich was hit by enemy shells . The ac t i on lasted 2 hours and 39 minutes o.nd at 0500 hours the

tavor-

able outcome also served to raise corale vithin th e Brigade and
convinced the military autho rit i es that the planning and prepara-

ai r raid alann vas lifted, at 0535 all planes of
gade were ordered to land.

the 19th Air

Bri-

tion tor air det'ense ilad been correctly handled.

Mature

considerthe ac-

at10n and

a mo re aearch1ng reviev, hovever, revealed that

lA?

1
I

1:.100 bed. not. been quite as successtul. as it. bad. �irst. appeared.

In

power of the Type-2 Fighter was also too weak .

Lack of radar-equip­

the final. analysis •. only two of the losses were poa1tively

confirmed

ped fighters meant that enemy planes had to be v1suaJ..l,y detected and those which did not
C(MC

and reports 1'rotII. the China Expeditionar,y Army bore out the fact. that. claimed losses were too high. With approximately 30 enemy planes

wi thin rallge of the searchl..1 ghts were able I t wa s also concluded tha t the
had limited activities and bad. re­

to evade interceptors with eas e .

involved in the attack. definitely establisbed losses of only two planes constituted a loss ratio of less than ten per cent.

insufficient number of

ai rfi elds

It was

stricted the numbe r of intercepting plane s thc.t c ould be used.
Certain othe r defects. ni zant, of which the command had long been cog­ during this

agreed that to take a real toll of enemy strength and materially lower bi s morale. more than half of the attackers would shot dow .

have to be

�erc also c learly

apparent

first air action.

Actually. all that had been accomplished had been to The enelllY had

Radar waruing de vi ces had been unable to deter.nne the altitudes or

somewhat hamper the enemy' s air activities .

succeed­ bad

app roachins p lane s .

In addition. althoUGh the air raid

wrn.1ns net

ed in performing a bombing mission and the 19th Air Brigade

c.a.d worked satisfacto rily in this instance, it was apparent that a
more c cmplete network would have to be developed to furnish infor­

fai led to protect
Defects in Defense

the ta re;et or inflict cripplinc losses .

mation on attAcks ....hich might be launched from southern
..

bases . PlAne.

Chief among the les sons taught by this first air battle

s

'.'ith better altitude pcrforn�nce characte ristic s were also essential. to the air defense operations .

that the nu::lb er of planes capable of n1�t action was ent.irely

in­

adequate .

The ene!ay bad used about three times a s Ll&llY plane. a. There were. in addition. a number

Reinforcement of the 19th Air Brigade T!:le !::a·uility of t. e 19th Air Bri gade to mount sufficient num­ 'l

t.. 'le Brigade was able to mount. of other weaknesses brought out.

The ene!lty planes could achieve

bers of inte rc eptors "Was noted by the GDC which assigned the 16th

speeds of about 510 kiloUleters per hour as compared with a speed ot 541 kilO!!Ieters for the Type-2 Two-seat Fighters of the 4th Air Re­ gin:ent . This difference in capabilities made it difficult for pi­

Air Bri gade and the 246th Air Reg1laent to the Western District aa
re inforcements . The 16th Air BriB&del composed or the 51st and 52d Air Reg1ments , established hea.dquarte rs at Asllya. Airfield.

lots to make conte.ct with the ene.:ty planes and shortened or entire­ ly eliI:d.nated the possible firing time ,.hen contact was wade . ..

The 51st Air

Fire

Re,;1ment, eC!.u1pped with Type- 4 Fighters. was aSSigned to the

baae at

149

MAP
Ashiya . The 52d Air RcgLaent.,

N O. 1 2

also equipped with Type-4 �'1gbtera,
The mission given to the newly as-

ws as signed to Dafu Airfiel.d. signed Brleade was

to int.ercept enemy plane s a.Plll"OO.ching the stra-

tegic area fro.a the ".rest. The 246th Air Regilllent, equipped with T:fpe-2 Sinele- seat.

F1ght-

ers, was assigned t.o Ozuki Ai rfield and charged with the direct defense of

the

strategic area in cooperot1 on with the 4th and

59th

Air RegimenttJ .

Subsequently, an element of the 246th was ordered

to Cmura Airfield to aid in the defense of the Nagasaki area ( Map
No. 12 ) . Revi sion of Operational

Plan
Brigade,
planes

Wi th the 3.1J8Illenta tion of the strength of the 19th Air 1 ts mi s sion 'o/8.S broadened to include interception of at short distances outside of the strategic area.

enemy

A

request was

s ubmitted to the Western Arm:! COIllId for an inc rease in the number Ilall of searchlights in the area west of the cnga Rive r as far as Ts1.l)'&zaki . The request being Granted, and the installations accompllsh-

ed, plans were 1lIlInediately pushed .for Joint. training wi th t�e nevly e stabllshed searchliGht units to i!. prove night perfo:nnance '1 pilots operating in that. area. Previous plannin g had called .for the 5th Air }Jury,

ot

in

China,

to attack the enemy fonaations en route to Japan as vell as those
ret.urn1.ng after having made at.tacks .

To assist

in thi s phase,

an

W E STERN DISTRICT AIRFI ELDS
o 110

..

150

KIL.o:::t;r;R.

151

agreement was concluded concerning the exchange ot more precise in­ tormation between the air :force s in Japan and those in Ch1Da.
The

area wh1l.e one eneJay element headed northeast and struck at indus­ trial targets in northern Kyushu. other enemy planes were reported

5th Air Arm::! was to warn the 19th Air Brigade 01' approaching enemy planes and the latter was to fwnish info rmati on to the 5th Air Ar­
my on routes, t1mes, types and nunbers
ma tions .

as flying d1 rectly from the d1 rection of Tsush1ma, with the apparent intention of hitting northern Kyushu. Inasmuch as the planes d1d

01' planes in returning tor­

not enter the area, it vas not knO\lIl if this maneuver was a ruse or whether they were d1 verted. oe air raid warnIng was llfted at T
.

Inf'on:IB.tion 'WO.s to be as complete as possible and Head­

quarters Re connai ssance planes 01' the Brigade were to pursue vith­

O�l and the alert at 0430 hours

dxawing enemy aircraft in order to
courses and altitudes.

Although the 19th Air Brigade had

:furni sh :f'ull.e st In!'onnation on

deployed approximately twice the strengtb used on the 16 June, it d1d not Succeed in engaging the enem:y. Or.;;anization of the 12th Air Divisi on The build up in strength of the 19th Air Brigade required an
':1ents and in order to provide an organiza­ increase in COfolr.".and ele

2

Second Raid by Ch1na-lla.sed U . S . Planes Twenty-two days after the attack of 16 June, U . S . planes ap1D attacked the Western Di strict. fI'Oll1 ba ses in China. en thi s occasion, the 19th Air Brigade gathered advance in1'o rmation on the attacken in a similAr
mann

tion adequate to the task, the Brigade vas inactivated and the 12th Air Division fonued. Orgm1zation was coapleted on 11 July 1944,

e r as on t.he first occasion .

AIl alert

warning vaa

i ssued by the Western Army Courna.nd at 0011 hours on 8 July and an air raid warning at 0019. Planes 01' the 4th and 246th Air Regi­
....

wi th the D1 viSion aSSigned to the GOC but remaining under the West.­

ern Ar::.ty COr.l..-:l&Ild for operational control.

The order ot bat.tle tor

ments , with the exception 01' the unit at Qnura Ai rfield, ed in a double layer over the strategic area.

ere deplo;r­

the 12th Ai r Di vi si on showed the rolloving un! ts : Hq. 12th Air Division: ( Cmdr : MaJ . Gen. F\J.nJya)
4th Air RegL.tent - Type-2, Two-seat Fighters

West or the a re a, in

the d1rection of the enemy ' s approach, the 16th Air Brigade and the 5 9th Air Regiment 'Were similarly deployed.

With a cloud density or

10 and a ceiling of 400 meters in the neighborhood 01' Nagasek1 and Sasebo, the enel!ly launched a radar guided bocbing attack on that

41th Air Re(!i:'1ent - Type-4 Fighters "i..I 59th Air Ret, .ent - Type-3 Fighters 7J.st Ai r ReGi.aent - Type-4 Fighters

2.

rug., pages 182-4 tor 5th Air Arm::! operations.

152

153

83d Indepe ndent - Type-1OO Headquarters

Air Squadron

ReconnaiSSWlce Pl.e.nes

return the

26th

Air Bril3l:l.dc and the 246th Air Rebiment

to thelr

re-

51st Ai r Sector COIIlId IIBD 4th

spectl ve co,1\UUlds .

Airfield

Battallon

On 25

Se.l,'tember

1944,

Mlj . Gen.

Furu,ya

was named

ccxn:nanda.nt o t

64th Ai rfield Battalion 65th Airfield Battalio. �

tee Hi tachl Army Air Sc hoo l and C.Ola:IJW'lU o f the Divi sion was assumed
by Maj .

Gen. M1yoshi .

193d Ai rfield rattalion 194th Airfield Battali on 235th Airfield Battalion 236th Ai rfield Battalion 248th Airfield Batt:l.l.1on The 12th Air Division retained the Ozuki Ai rfield
and the 16th

New De fense Measures Tl:e 12th Air :)ivi sion repe:l.ted.ly reque sted additional

niGht­ the meas­

.3J'1 ufa.cturing potential ot fi(jlters but the re duced :lirc raft !:'

nation p reve nt e d
\L. , '"e

ful.f12l:"cnt of the request .

As a sUbstitute

a

special tro.ininc proGram vo.s de velop e d to train and prepare Pilots assicned

headqua.rten

pilots for night flyL-lg i n the regular righters .

Air Brigade

and the 2 46th Air Reg1;nent

remained attach­ at Ozuki

to ni c;.. '1t fly:ins ni s s ions enti rely reversed t. eir day and niGht 1-J.
sleepinG in 6rkened roo.�.s durinG the clay and wearing dark
O�

llte,

ed to the Division.

The 47t. Air ReciIl!ent \:as stationed '1 Alt. ou.Yl both reg1lllents '1

gls.sses

and the 71st at Bofu Ai rfield. fonned and \mderstreDGth,
pe rsonnel and equip:uent.

'Were newly
'both

tee :ev oc c a si on s they �ere re�uired to venture out into day,.., ,,, Tile "Mi" d • ...",
,� _ _ W� "

they we re oein� built up rapidly in The 51st Air Sector command wa s

li. :;.. '1t.

also use d t

0

silaI'l)en vi sual acuity and

transter­

pilot reaction. 3
Thc increa5ed intensity of ene:ny air attacks revealed

red fro.ll Ozuki to the lta.zuke Airfield c.t Fukuoka

in order to exer-

a criti­

c l s� closer supervision over the airrield battalions on Raids fI'Olol U . S . bo.ses in China. continued, general. pattern of

KYush�
the same

...a ce-l shor :e of pe rzonnel and equipment vhich the D1 vi s ion sout;ht

following

to re.;edy by reC].ue stin;:; teo;.p orary t:ransfer of reinforcing
Since this va s not possible,

units. Bead­

the first raids with l.arge-scale attacks begiD­

about tvo-thlrds of the Type-lOO

ning

on

20 August. On a few occasions, dayt1.ll1e :nUds

were tollowd
intensi­ to

quar vers Reconnai ss:l.. '1ce plane s of the 83d Independent Ai r

Squadron

by night attacks .

Althouc;h enemy ro.ids were increasing in

ty, 1mlned1ately a1'ter

the action of 20

Aue;ust,

lt was necessary

d " . ... .. u... ..1 ""1..lC s " 1uulated the centIUl nervous system and . � It vas si. l3.r to the cOLllIle rcial st1Iilulant mar­ "Ji keted in post- ....-:lr Japan 1.!.. '1der the t:rs.de � lIe or "Phillpon. "

3•

J.L,e ......

decreased ra ti.:;uc .

154

155

were diverted trom reconnaissance mi ssions to interceptor missiona,

Raids :rroo. Marianas Bases Sa1pan tell in July 1944, and tour months later, on 24 Novem­
be r, U . S . planes launched the1r first reid on Japan t'l'Oll1 Marianas base s .

us1ng the Ta-Dan Bombing Technique.
To increase the speed and climbing abil1ty ot available planes,
pn1nt and all equip:nent, except armament and radio, vas removed . This stripping technique increased the average speed ot planes by 15 to 20 kilometers per hour.
Summa ry of Attacks fl"Or.l China Baae .

Th e first raid was directed at Tokyo but i t 1oI8.S obvious tb&t

Kyushu would also be a tuture target.

Organizational Changes
To
m

eet �e new threat, a nUllber of organizational changes took

Raids by U . S . plane s based in China, which began on 16 JUDe 1944, continued until 6 January 1945 , when the enemy completed IIIOY­ ing its base of opcrn.t1ons to the Marianas. Attacks during the seven­ month period were not as frequent as had been expected, bein8 apaeed at interval.s ot one week to one month . The principal. targets ot the

place in the over-all air defense torces as well a s in the 12th Air

Division.

On 26 Dece:!l.ber 1944, ,the order of battle ot the 6th Air

Army was announced and the 12th Air Division vas transt'erred tro. the basic orQUlizatio:l of the GOC c.nd placed unde r the ne.... Air Army. Operational control of the Division still re:Jained with the Western
Anny Cor.':'1and.
The 12th

ene. 1IY bombers vere the Yawata Iron Wo rk s, in northern Kyushu, and the Nagasaki dockyards .

Air Division aucmented it s starf' t.o provide

impro",ed l ia i s on ...1. til other headquarters and to 1uprove CO!l1lll8.nd aunew

Mter the auo�entation ot the 19th Air Brigade and with the

pervision. Improvements in Q�erational Faci11ties DurinG ea rly 1945, t.he over-o.ll preparatory efforts ot the 12th Air Division ....ere devo�ed to il�lproving its operational f'acil1ties ao
as to make it independent of' the Army Comme.nd and other outside agen­

units assigned at the time of the tonnation ot the 12th Air Diviaion,
the strength ot the enemy
1018.6

not overwhelmincJ.y superior.

Arter 20

August 1944, dayt1::.e ra.1ds were nonnal1y conducted with about 100
planes, while approx� �te1y 20 planes were generally employed in the night ra.1da .

During the period trom 16 June 1944 to 6 January 19 45,

cie s in the accompli shment of its defen se mi ssion.

Steps were taken

there were tour occasions on which the detending torc .. shot dawn or damaged as many ns 20 of the raiders . Such 10llsell were not, hO\leTer, considered to be sutt'1ciently destructive to materially attect the enemy ' s operation Dince the average per raid 10s8 infl1cted vas les.
than ten per cent.

to improve the intellieence cOl;;:&lunications network, including the installation of broedcast1:lS equ1p�ent to supple. �nt the vulnerable wire telephone servicel operated by
the Co=uni cati ons

Ministry.

156

157

SpecIal ult.ra-high f'requency radio telephones were installed tor use bet.ween Di vi sion

the Bungo Chann el, vh1ch ceparates

Kyushu from Shikoku.

The per_ southee.atern

and AJ."fJJY COIJIIJlaDd

headquarte rs .

A Speeial Intell1-

to�ce of the radar instal.l.at1on at Ash1zurizak1,

in

gence Squadron ws orGUlized to intercept. enemy radio ccx:un.unicationa.

Shikoku, was outstanding and enemy pos! tions vithin Its re.nge could be accurately detennined . Since the enemy frequent.ly Circled

In spIte of the fact. t.bat it.

\laS

a dupl1ca t.Ion of' the ettorta

and

of other si�l unit.s, the Air Division Sic;nal Unit assI(;Oed a radio c�lmunications sect.ion to each airfield to operat.e cocmun1cationa exclusively for the Division. To expedite tactical canrnand, the 01-

rendezvoused over the southern part of the Bungo Channel,

there ....

an excellent. chance of detecting the attackers, particularly a1nee
flyUlg weather in that area was generally tavorable . The plan ca.lled for the deployment of interceptors along the entire lenGth of t. �e enemy' s Bunge Channe l approach course a cauntlet which the a.pproaching bomber fonnat1ons
run.

vision Headquarte rs Sienal Unit acted as a clearing station in collectin£; inforlllO.tion fro::l radio intelligence detaclu:lent.s ot both the Air Divi sion and the Western Anro,y Con::nnd . The infor .JS.t1on gathered

to t01'\il

\/Ould. haft to

by the Si gna l Unit 'Was :nore spec ific than had hereto!'ore been available and included types of attacking aircraft, size of formations

On 14 May 1945, the 56th Air Regiment, a component ot the llth
w.s orde red to the Saeki Naval Ai rfield i n nortbe&s't­ thfortunately,

Ai r Divi sion,

and altitude s .
Yonago Airfield, Kaiundai Ai rfield,

ern Kyushu, to carry out the plann ed interceptions .

in the northern part of western Honshu, &Del

enemy pressure on the Central Sector increased at that time and the 5 6th

in southern Korea, were prepared for use !l.S re-

wes

required to return to its parent orb&l1zation after about The 12th .Hr

serve airfields by sto ckpiling fuel and � �un1tion and assigning signal teWll to each.

a

one week of operations in the Bunge Chann e l area .

;)ivision le.ckcd th.c strenGth to send a replacel!lent unit and the op­ eration vas d1�continued.

Orde rs were i s sued to each reGiment to r-ove its operations , roaa

unde rground and to widely di sperse all fuel, a.::r:l\!ll i tion end aircratt
at each airfield. Bungo Channel Defense Plans were c!B.de to establish an advance base in order to

Mill tar Di strict Reorg:ut1zEltlon .! On 6 February 1945,
the three mil1 tary districts ot Japan were

increased to 1'ive and vo.rious changes of boundaries were eftected.

interover

In adc.;ttion, the ar..1Y cOfC.!ll!I.D ds were redesignated as area armies and
the 12th Ai r Division came under the operational control te enth Area Army.

cept approaching Marianaz-based B-29 ' s along their no� route

ot the Six­

Although the new alic;nment of military di stricts

158

159

the Westero Military Distric t removed the vestern tip of Honshu i':rClIil Di strict, the air defense or and placed. it in the Centra l Millta ry Shikoku remained vith1n '1e vcstero point of Honshu and southvc stenl t..

Change

in Enemy Tactics

In Mlrch 1945, the enCl.1,Y changed i ts tactics and instead at re­
stricting itselt to bacbins industrial areas, began lov-level incen­

ued to be the re::l'0n:libillthe ��estern Air Defenc e Sector and contin
ty of the J.2th Air D1 visio n.

diary attacks on the larsest cities.

Selecti.ng areas \/here Japanese

air def'enses vere .-eak, and choosing times wen interception vas dit'­ ficult, the ene' 1Y attacked boldly, maltinG many daylif3ht raids troaa �

Chang� in Operational Pollcy
' c defense area had Although the boundaries of tile 12th D1 vision not changed, there
,no 0.

above the clouds or durinS inclement veather.

In the lAtter part ot'

significant chnnge in operational polley .

March, wile continuing strikes a(.'a.inst the urban areas, the eneIQ' initiated concentrated attncks on airfields throUGhout the Japanese
mainland and partic ularly

Gic industrial area at E.!pMs is w.s shifted :<I"OIJ defend1n� the strate possible enerJY planes northero Kyushu to the shooting down of all
be attacked. whenever and vherev er they miGht logically

in Kyushu.
areas \/ere no longer the sole targets

Whatever
I f a pi­

Although the industrial

be w:: ed. 1ethod that vould bring dovn enemy planes vould L

they were not cow.pletely neglected and, as air raids increased in f'requency and intensity, targets of' all types \/ere heavily bc::IClbed.
It ..as clear that the U . S . intended not only to destroy the Japa­ nese air facilities and industrial potential but also to break the spirit ot the people . Attacks on airfields had the affect of cbecking the 6th

e the enemy in aerial combat lot poss e sse d ::u.Ci'1cient skill to engag
not a.s to continue such tacti cs; if' be could and shoot h1::1 dovn, he ....

he vas e�::pccted to carry out succeed in outfi ghtin g his ndversaries
diving suicide tacti cs to dovn th e ene:lY by crash
me

thods

.

The key
, ft

to pilot s ' instructions and orders VolS,

"

De stro y enemy pla.nes .

Air

Logistic Suppo rt of Suicide U11 ts "lticipation of the forthcoming As preparations proGre ssed in a. ion w.s given <kina..a operati ons, the J.2th Air Divis
sibility :
an

Army' s mission of cooperating 1i1 th the navy in the defense ot au ­
caw.

This phase of' enemy operations also added to the already

added respon­ The burden

beavy task ot the l.2tb Air Division as it be cao.e necessary s1:nul.­ taneously

Units . The billetins end supplying of TO-Go

to defend the stratecic areas and pro�ct airfields in
To provide closer liais on vith the 6th

dinG tile preparation and cain­ of providing logis tiC support, inclu ion ' s operations and tenance of airf'ields co=lplicated the Divis
rdened staN' . plAc ed a heavy d.xain on 1 ts already overbu

Kyusbu and vestern Honshu.

Ai r Arr:ry, the Dividon IIIOved its headquarters frcw Ozuk1 Airfield

to Itazuke Airfield, near Fukuoka .

160

161.

Commnd n
In

Changes
Althousb

April 1945, the GOC was replAced by the Firat and Sec<:m4

General Am1es and the Air General Arrq was established.

the 12th Ai r Division wa s slated to come under the eOIIIIIIIUld ot the
newly

fomed Air Army, it ws decided to GlBke the necesBa17 cOlllm8oZl4 gradually, the
and the

c he.DGes

Division remained under the operational.

to the increased t'requency of e ngagement s with the enemy and the tremendous loss es of skilled pilo ts, it b E!C8lJle necessary to use pllots who were bare...., trained and ' COll1pletaly inexperi enced. The T0Go tklits were strengthened thro ugh additional. recrui ting programs but even the hero ic effor ts of these S uic Ide un1 ts were not enoueb to tum the tide of battle .

Due

control o�

Sixteenth

Area. Anny which, in tum, was now under the

Second General Artrty.
On 18 May, tlaj . Gen. Mi yo shi was

reassigned as commande r ot tbe

20th Fighter Group

IUld

Maj . Gen . H1deji Habu replAced him as coavnend-

er o� the 12th Ai r Division.
Air Defense Situation - June and July 1945
To counteract the

the extreme pres sure of cons tant and intense air raida the intelligence system, which had been shoWing mark ed improvement, becaoe confused and frequently faIl ed to rnak e . accura te prediction. o! probable enei:lY targets, partIcuJ.a. r' " 'When ...., speed 'Was imperative. The 12th Air Divi sion deterrn1ned to exerc i se s t roD ger control over all air act ivi ty. Prior to thi s time, D:bri s ion bas as sembled, a­
nalyzed and diSS eminated all

Under

overwhel.ming strength lIhich the enenl1' bad

intelligence 1n:t'o rmation to Its sub. it
bad directe d preparations

manifested in
Navy ' s 5 th

�rch

and Ap ril , a plan for Joint action with the was
developed. would Unde r

ordinate units .

In addi t ion,

for and

Air

Fleet

the planned Joint respoo­

assu:nption o� the alert status
signments .

end has

sibility, the Ai r Fleet defense of
Sasebo end naval

take the re spon sibi lity tor the air
and dockyards,

The reGLaents vere permi tted

subsequently made target as-

to

�,' ft re � ....... te

instal.l.a.tions

particularly �ose 1a

of!s

their own take-

and

assi ;;n defense flight patte rns .
headqua rters

Under

Nagasak i .

Army and Navy leade rs met at Ozuki Airt1e14

centralized control, Divis ion pertorm all. of
Its

the new method or

on 27

not only continued to the
di rec tIon

M9.y,

to conduct war gtlJIles to perfe ct the details ot the Jo1nt Proving feasible, the plan was adopted and placed

previous functions but assi co:nent of flight

added

ot

ope re t1ons plan .

in ope rati�n after 5 June 1945.
Fro.n

this time until the
Di vision and

end

ot the \oI8.r, the difticulties ot

the 12th Air

its personnel became increasInsl7 severe.

In orde r to speed the launching of tighter units, the DiVi Sion 'WOuld O rde r the takeott's ot the reg1.l:lents on the basi s of 1n1 t1ft ' repo � rts. As additional. iDtormatlon became ava.1J.a. ble the operatlons room 'WOuld then direct the tighters to prec Ise defen se areas with de f1n1te attack

take -ort times and

patte rns.

163

instructions.
Land-llnsed Fighter

F1ns.l. Days ot the War
Attacks in June 1945 , land-based fighters from
'!be atocn1c banb -"..as dropped on H1ro sh1ma on 6 August

1945, b7

Hith the full of adnaw.

a single pl.ane, and

it was Lruaediately

the be.se s newly e stablished by the

enemy 'be� escorting the a1otack­
This gree.Uy increased en�

defense poll cy could no long er continue .

rea.l1zed that the passive air
Regardless ot the ult1ma. te

in!; B-29' s and other lighter bombers .

ai r power a.nd their 1'1Ghter planes outmIL'l'bere<i those of the 12th Air
Divi sion. It became impo ssible

to

even make

an effort to interc ept The p rlocipe.l of poa1-

and check the ever-increo.sing botnbing raids .

tive action was cho.nced to a poli c y of st rength conservation in pre-

consequen ces , it was c lear tbat not even a sinele B-29 coul d be ig­ nored. Picked airc raft were there af'te r a ss i cned patro l miss iona over the old stra tegi c area of northe:nl Ky\u;hu when ever there vas a report ot an approaching enemy bombe r. This w.s the situation wen the w.r ended on 15 August 1945 .

paration for the final de fe ns e of the Homeland against amphibioua
invasion attempts .

Interception fli£;hts wuld be made otlly when the

odds ....ere clearly in favor of the defenders and the 12th Air Divi­
sion conduc te d interce�tions only against lerBe- seale bomber tions ers .

torma­

",.-hich verc not accompanied by a large nu;;ibe r ot escort fightEvery effort
\la S

made

to safe(, rd planes and supplie s Oft the 'Ua

&round by use o f camou!'lage and. di spersion.
�e COI'!lbined Fleet Releas e of the 6th Air Anny by t..

In July, the

6th Air

A:rr:iy vas releaaed troc. attachment to tM

COIIIbined Fleet and C3me under the direct cClC:ll&Zld ot the Air GeDenJ.
Army .

The 12th Air Division was relee.sed fl'Olll the ope�t1OEal COIl......

1orol of the Sixteenth Area Ar&7 and

brought. under the o�c Frca this t1.IIe ,.tU

&Ad operatioM1. control of the 6th Air A:raJ:;f.

the end of' the war, the Ai r General. Army controlled all &1r detm.. actIvity.

164

165

Aeronautical. Department,

Air Academy, Arr:J:t : Air Army
1st :

2, 8 , 10 , 26, lIO

Army :

65 -7, 72, 108-10, 116, 133- 4, 1434, 152

Aircraf't, Japanese (Cont'd) Industr,y: 8, 65, 83 Losses :

155

69,

2d:

8, 9, 31, 33-4, 78-80, 83-4, 123-5, 129 136, 142m, 144, 150, 152 28-9, 31, 39, 63, 69, 71-2, 75-6, 81, 123-5, 151, 161, 164

lota1ntenance : 17, 63, 91 Night Fl ghters : 43, Numbers : 2, 11, 37, 81,

69, 74

69

5th : 6th :

38

Perfonoance :

Air Bases

Japanese :

See Ai rfields, Japanese 13� 142, 144, U . s ., in China : on Iw Jima : in Ml.rianas :

Airc raft, u . s .

11-2, U, 63, 65Lll 130, 1!f6 Supply : 8, 77, 123, 161. Types : 11-2, 33-5, 37, ' 65, 81, 112, 130, 1 49-50, 153 146 146 B-29' s : 13-7, 19, 22, 21 35, 31, 39-41, l 60, 63, 65, 68-! 3, 18, 90, 94, � 108-9, lll, 113111-9, 122, 124j 158, 164-5 Carrier-based : 1, 3, 9, 82, 119, Formations : 113-7 Land-based : 2, 164 Losses : 69, 74, 146-8, J 50, 69-70, 72, 82

131

B-11' s : B-24' s :

154, 156 119, 124 28, 124, 156-8 119, 124, on Ckinawa : 164 on Sa1pan : 13, 19, 26,
on T1nian :

Air Br1gade
16th : 17th : 18th : 19th :

94, 113 13, 26, 48, 94

lIO, 48, 72,

Aircraft, Japanese
Fighters :

45, 149, 152, 154 -5 9, 11, 34 9, 11, 83-5 9, 11, 85, 129-33, 144, 146-50, 152-3, 156 23<1 : 85-6, 92, 120-3, 126 lOOtb : 126 Aircraft Identification : 21, 42, 49, 69, 115

Air Counterattacks, Japanese Air De:t'ense Concept : 1, 9 Hissions : 7, 14 Orsanizat1on : 6-8 Pollcy : 1, 2, 75 Air Defense Sectors Central : 83, 85,

Kanto :

11-3, 15-6, 33, 38, Air D1vision 46, 63, 11, 81, 116, lOth : 10, 11, 13, 15, 31, 118, 124 31- 49, 59, 61, 63-

Western :

33, 36, 38-lIO, 45 61, 65, 75, 95-6,
129,

96,

12l

160

68-10, 72-82, 95,

'\

Air Division (Coot ' d) 11th : 10, 11, 13, 68, 74, 85-92, 94-6, lOS, 117,

Airf'1eld Conditions : 92 Airfield Construction : 11, Airfields, Japanese Akeno : 92-3, 127

119-20, 122-6, 128, 159 12th : 10, 11, 15, 3�t 74, 86, 153, 155-04 13th : 75 55th : 75 Airfield ]3e.tta.l1ons Gene ral : 17, 47, 61, 64, 79, 110, 143 47, 64, 79 3d : 4th : 130, 154 6th : 47, 64, 79 64, 79 7th : 42d: 85 43d : 64, 79 64th : 154 65th : 154 70th : 47 1lst : 64 64 12d : 116th : 64, 79 143d: 85 163d : . 85 164th : 64, 79 165th : 64, 79 166th : 64, 79 169th : 64, 79 l7Oth : 64, 79 175tb : 64, 79 176tb : 64, 79 193d : 154 232d : 79 233d : 79 234th : 79 235th : 154 236tb : 15 4 246th : 85 248th : 130, 154 Airfield Co:upaD1es 65th : 47, 79
71st : l1!oth : 64, 79 141st : 64, 79

92

62,

Ash1ya. : 143, 147, 149-50 Botu: 150-1, 154 Chotu : 35-6, 47-8, 64, 74 Ganno su: 35, 151 G1f'u : 92 -3, 127 Hamamateu : 38, 92- 3, 121 Hokoda : 45 !mba : 35-6, 64, 74 ltami : 92-3, 125, 127 ltazulte : 151, 15 4, 161. Kaiunda (Korea) : l58 Kakocawa : 92-3 KanaL1arubara : 64 Kashiwa : 35-6, 47, 64 Katori : 69 Kita1se : 92-3, 127 Kiyosu: 92-3, 126-7 Kotu: 57 Komaki : 86, 92-3, 126-7 Konoike : 69 Kumagaya : 36 Matsudo : 35-6, 47, 5 7, 64, 69 Me.tsuyam& : 127
Matsuzak1 : 57, 59 Milti : 92-3, 127

Airfields, Japaneee (Coot ' d) Tateba,aeh1 : 36, 64 Togane : 36, 64 TokOl'OZA\I8. : 35-6, 47, 74 Utsunaniya : 36 Yacll1mata : 36, 64 93, 125 Yamato : 92-3, 127 Yokaich1 : Yokoshiba : 69 Yonaso : 4, 158 Yura : 92-3, 127 Air Fighter Groupe 20th : 125-6 30th : 75-6, 79 Air Fleets : See Navy, Japanese Air General A:my: 21-2, 31-2, 78-9, 81-2, 89, 121, 123-6, 162, 164 Ai r-Ground Padio Un1 ts : 19, 64, 67, 79, 84, 88, 94- 5 Air Patrols : 66-7, 108, 123, 132
Airplanes : See Airc� Air Raid Warning System : 20, 24,

Air Regiments (Cont ' d) 59th : 130-2, 147, 152-3

Nar1masu: 35, 47, 64 Nara : 93 93 Naruo : N1tta : 64, 69, 72 Qnura : 86, 150-1 Oshima : 36 85, 147, 151, lS 4, Ozuki : 161-2 Sagam1 : 36, 40, 45 Sano : 92-3, 127 SI:Wuoda : 59 36, 45, 64 Shimadate : Tachiari : 86, 151 Ta1sho : 87-9, 92-3, 120, Takamatsu:

72d :

47, 79

123, 127

47, 79

Tama :

36

127

48-9, 78, 95 , 97, 134, 1 49, 153 Air Raid Warning Un1 ts : 10, 49 Air Raids, by U.S. : 1, 2, 6, 8, 15, 19, 33, 37-9, 43, 46, 60, 63, 65-6, 69-70, 72-4, 78, 83, 87-8, 94, 109-11, 113, 117, 124, 126, 132, 136, 1 45-8, 152, 151�, 156, 161 Air Reg:fJ:1ents 130, 146-7, 153 4th : 125-6 5th : 18th : 35, 37, 39, 64, 79, 81 224 : 45 35, 37, 64, 79, 81 234: 28th : 38, 64, 12, 79 47th : 35, 37, 64, 69, 7J., 75-6, 79, 153-4 51at : 45, 149 52d : 45, 149-50 53d: 35, 37, 43, 57, 64, 67, 69, 72, 78-9, 81 55th : 85-7, 125 5 6th : 85-6, 125, 159

Air-to-Air Bombing : See Ta-!an Bomb1ng TechD1.que Air Training Amy: See Tra1n1ng Arat:;t, Air Air Training Divisions : See Training Divisions, Air Akeno Ai rfield : 92-3, 127 Akeno Air School : See Tre.1n1ng Schools Antiaircraf't : · 2, 6, 7, 10, ll,

126 126 llltb : 125 112th : 125 21i-4th : 33-5, 37-8, 64, 69, 71, 75-6, 79 246th : 83-5, 87, 125, 149-50, 152, 154-5 Air Squadrons, Independent 16th : 85, 108, 123 17th : 35, 37-9, 43, 64, 72, 75, 79 82d : 108, 123 83d : 154-5 Air Test1ng Stations Fussa : 36, 45 Tru:n : 57, 59, 77

70th : 7lst : 101st : 103d :

153-4

35, 38, 64, 79, 81

Area Armies : See Amy, Area Army AeronautIcal Department : See Aeronautical Department, Army Army, Ai r : See Air Arrlr:! Army, Air General: See Air General Arm7

22, 60-1, 77, 92, 110, 119, 132-3 Number ot Weapons : 2, 11

Axmy, Area 11th : 30, 122 12th : 30, 80-1, 122 13th : 30, 121-2 15th : 30, 121-2 16th : 30, 122, 159, 162, 164

170

1'11

144, Central Mil1ta17 nLstrict:
Formosa : 6 Korea : 6

Centre.! District :

See Diatrict

Northe rn : 15th : 136 32d : 6 J.rmy COIIII!ISlld central : 5, 6, 81 10, 83-4, 86-9, 94-5, 91, 120 !):!.stern : 5, 9, 10, 13, 33-4, 39, 57, 60, 65, 15, 80, 95, li5 Northe rn: 6 Western : 5, 6, 9, 10, 129, 134-1, 142, 144, 150, 152-3, 158, 167 A.rmy General First : 30-2, 19, 121-2, l.25, 162 Second: 30-2, 19, 121-2, 162 143, 141, 149Ash1ya Airtield :
Atonic :Bomb :

Kwantung :

35 6

Sector CheJu-Do : 134, 14S-6 China, infon::.at1on !rail Wl1t. in : 1, 25, 15, 8S, 136, 142, 152 China. Expeditionary A:raq: Cbof'u Airfield :
Sc e Army

Centml. Se<ltor:

See Milltal7 District See Air Detenae

C1vil1an Lookout Posta : See Lookout Posts, C1Y1..l1aD Combined P'l.eet : See BaY7, Japenese C in C ot Defense : See Defense Comr.:and, General Ccmpanies : See Airfield Camp8D1ea Call1nl.m.1cat1ona, interception ot : 19, 4.3, 94, 158 ( See al.ao
Special Intell1Bence Uc1ts ) Communica tiona, systeI:us : 20-1, 49, 58, 60, 88, 126, lS 1

3S-6, 47-8, 64, 74

FiGhter Groups : See Air Fighter Groups 3, 6, 86-7 Fonnosa : FOn:lOS8 Anrr;r : See krmy, FoI'Ulosa Fuel : See Aviation ;ruel 4, 30, 137, 151, 154, Fukuoka : 161 Furuya, MaJ . Gen. : 155 Fussa. Air Testing Station : 36, 45 Ganno su Airfield : 35, 151 General Defense Cowrnnnd : See Defense CO;lII!ID.Ild, General Glf'u Air1'1eld : 92-3, 127 Goto Ialands : 134 Ro.bu, Hideji Maj . Gen . : 162 H1l.chijoj1ma. : 25, 12 68 Ha.klri I6dar Station : EamnJaatsu Airfield : 38, 92-3, 121 HiGh altitude flying : 15, 26, 401, 63, 63, Training �or : 46 Hi roshima : 4, 30, 82, 9 7, 165 Hitachi Advanced Ftr. Tog. School : See Training Schools 'l1 Hi tach! Air tl t : 40, 44 Hokkaido : 3, 6, 61 Hokoda Adv. Lt . Boluber ToG. School : See Tmining Schools Hokoda Airfield : 45 Honshu: 3, 29, 83, 120, 129, . l3 h- 5 , 137, 158, 160 - 1 Identification, of aircra1't : See Aircra1't Identification Imba Airtleld : 35-6, 64, 74 Imperial General lIeadquarters ( IGHQ) : 5, 9, 28, 31, 74, 121 Impe rial Pahce : 33 Independent Air Squadrons : See Air Squadrons, Independent Inspectorate General o� Arm:y Aviatlon : 8, 10, 26, 28, 40 Instructors, p11ot : 1, 13-4, 45 , 91
13

Intelligence :

20, 89, U�S, 152 ( See also Special Intell1gence

Aviation Fuel :

_ Tmining tor : 42, 4lj l3attallons : See Airfield Battallons 150-1, lS4 Bof'u Airtield: Bonin Islands : 3" 24-S, liS Bo80 Peninsula : 68 73 Brigades : See Air Brigade s Bungo Channel : 129, 158-9 carrier-Based Planes :
See Aircrat't, U . S . Centre.! Air Defense Sector : See Air Defense Sector Centre.! Army Caumand : IIIBll See Arm:.! CQIIId

U. S . Bad-weather tlying : 19 , 26-8, 72

82, 165 14, 26, 40, 46, 61, 158 B-17, n-24, B-29 : See A1rcratt

50

Cmsh-dive Tactics : lS-6 Defense C<xJ;-.-.and, Genere.!: 3, 5, 6, 8-ll, 29, 31, 34, 39, 63, 76, 89, 153, lS1, 162 Di strict Centre.! : 3-5, 13, 23, 29, 38, 63, 83, 93, 95-6, 109, 120-1 Easte rn : 3-5, 13, 23, 29, 33, Northern : 3, 4 Western : 3-S, 29, 85, 1291 . 132, 134, 136, 144, 14S;-Sl Divisions : See Air Divisions Doolittle Raid : 8, 33, 83 f 136 Early "-laming l!etvork : 24, 60 East Coast !.t111 ta17 District: Sce Arr:r:I � Eastern �tl.l1tIl.ry District-: See m.lltary District

Kaiunda Airfield: 158 Kakoeawa Airfield : 92-3 Kakoec.wa Tmining thit : See Tmining Uc1t. .a Karo1Jr ze : 15
Ka.na.:uarubara Airfield :
Kanda

Japanese Je t Fic;htcrs, Shusui : 6S

14, 33 41, 57, 59, 63, 72, 74, 71, ' 82, 131, 156-7, 160, 163- 4 Interception Tactics : 27-8, 13 InvaSion, plans to canbat : 9, 28, 39, 5 9, 80, 121, 126 Itallll. Airfield : 92-3, 125, 127 Itazuke Airfield : 151, 154, 161 Iw J1ma. : 38, 69, 96, li5, 119 124 (See also Air Bases, U.S. ) Izu IslAnds : 12, 115 Izu Peninsula : 83 Japan Sea : 4, 24, 30 Japanese Ai rcmft : See Aircrat't,
Interception Z<U.ssions :

Squadrons)

121

District (Tokyo) : 42 !{anto Air Defense Sector: See Air De 1'ense Sector Xanto Plain Area : 29, 33, 58, 76 Karaf'uto : 3, 6 KIlshiwa Airfield : 35-6, 41, 64 Katori Ai rfield : 69 Ka tsuura : 13
Kaw.be, Hasukaze General. :

64

Ketsu-Go Opemtion :

30-1, eo,

78

Ketsu-To-Go OpemtiOl1 : IC1 Type Planes :

121-3

80-1, l.26

Gee :·tLll tary District Eastern Army Cc'v'vneDli :

IC1i Peninsula : ll6 IC1 talse Airfield : 92-3, 127 IC1yosu Airtield: 92-3, 126-7 Kobe : 82, 95, 127

See Aircraft, Japanese

172

173

JCotu Airfield:

Kokura :

Komald Airfield :

66, 92-3, 1267 Kondo, Kanetosh1 Lt. Gen. : 61, 63, 15, TI, 80
158

13

57

Miyoshl, Maj . Gen. : 155, 162 Nagasak1 : 86, 1)2, 137, 150-2, Na.eoya :

Pilot tra1n1ng : Pilots Inexperienced :

Konoike Airfield: 69 Korea : 3, 6, 25, 75, 134-5, 145,

42, 46-8, 64 Korea A:nny : See Anrry, Korea Navy, Japanese : 2, 6, 7, 9, 2�, Ktmagaya Airfield: 36 38, 69, 71, l25, KurU Islands : 3, 6, 25 12Si, 161-2, 164 Kwnt\mg A:rrny. : See ArrAy, Kwntung Combined Fleet : 3J., 15, 12�, JCyushu : 3, 13, 35, 48, 15, 8? t
land-Based Planes :

Narimaau Airfield : 35, �7, 64 Si3 Hara Airfield : Si3 Haruo Ai rf'leld : Navigat10nal Aid Ul:l1ts : 19, 27,

156, 162 30, 83, 85-6, 93, 97, 116, 121, 127

See Training, Pilots

Plane s : See Aircraft Provisional Uni 108, Secondary :
Radar :

15-6, 71, 130, 163 Losses : 14, 71 163 Replacement : 14, 90, 163

Sh1modate Airfield: 36, �5, 6J. Sh.1ona:dsald Radar statioa: See �r Stations S1beria : 1 South Pacific : I, 34 Spec1al. Attack Un1ts : 14-6, 31, Special Intelligence Squadrons : 1St, 41-8, 72, 94, loa, 114-5,
See Air Squadrons See Spee 1Al

39, 63, 61, 15-6, 80, 124, 160

90, 129-- 31, 134-7, 144, 153-4, 157-8, 160-1, 164
See Aircraft,
u.s.

Look out Posts Civilla.n : 20-1, 49, 51-6,

98-107, 136-41 167 Equipment : 20-1, 50 mll tary: 20-1, 49-56, 95-6, 98-107, 134, 136, 135-42, 145 Training of perso!Ulel : 21, 49 Rl.nchuria : 1, 35, 38 Maria.nas : 28-9, 72, 124, 156-8 ( See also Air Bases, U . S . ) Maritime province s : 1 Matsuda Airfield : 35-6, 47, 57,

96,

162 5th Air Fleet : Na.vy, U . S . , Task Forces : 14, 28, �, 46, 68-T 118 Night !lying : 19, 26-7, 37, 5 7, SO, 13J., 143, 155,
Tra1n1ng tor : 4�t 1t8, 90 Niish1ma : 47, 58, b4 Nitta Ai rfield : 64, 69, 72 Northeastern Military District : See mlitary District, Northeastern Northern Army : See ArrAy, Horthem IaD Northern Arrn:y COIIIiId : See Aruly COIII, Northem III8Jld Northern Di strict : See Dist.rict, Northem

164

22-4, 49, 51, 60, 68, 73, TI, 94-7, 109, ll4, 1346, 145, 152 Radar Guide Uni105 : 59
�dar Stat10ns Ashizuri !·tl.saki : ll4, 159 Bonin Islands : ll5 Hak1ri : 68, ll4 Iwo Jirna : 115 Izu I slands : 115 ODaezak1 : 114
Sh.1onom1sak1 :

13-4, 44- 5, 61, 91-2

Attack th1t.8 Suz uka !-lolmtain Range : 86, 121 Tachi-type Padar: 57, 5 9 Tachiari Airfield : 86, 151 Tachikava : 33, 36 Ta- tan Bombing Technique : 16, 18, 26, 28, 38m, 43-4, 90, Taisho Airfield :

Suicide tactics :

158 Squadronn :

159

156

Matsuyama Airfield : 127 .atauzaki Airfield : 57, 59 l/ Milti Airfield : 92-3, 127 Milltary District CentraJ. : 29 , 30, 120-1, 123,

64, 69

Ckinava. :

(See also Air Ba ses, U.S.) 86, lSO-l c:muro Airfield : Osaka : 30, 83, 85-6, 88-9, 93,

3J., 96, 161

Regiments : See Air F.eg1J:aents Reinforcement : See Provisional Units, Secondary Replacement tra1n1ng : See Tra1ning, Pilots Ryukyu Islands : 3, 25, 15 Sagami 1st Adv Air 'l'ng Ul:l1t : See TraininG tbltE< Sagami Airfield : 36, 110, 45 See A1r Bases, U.S. Sa1pan : Sano Airfield : 92-3, 127 A Sato, Shoich1 lw' j . Gen. : 34 Schools : See Training Schools Sea. ot Japan : 4, 24, 30 Secondary Provision/l.l Un1ts : See Provisional Un1ts , Second.&r7 Sel-Go Operation : 81, 125-6 Bendai : 4, 30 Serviee Ulits, General : 17, 41, Shikoku :

68, Si7, 114

Sasebo :

151-2, 162

Mill tary Lookout Posta :

125, 160 last Coast : 29, 30, 61, 1201, 123, 125 Eastern : 30, 61, 125 Northeastern : 29, 30, 61, 125 Weste rn : 30, 125, l29, 160
See Lookout Posts, !-t111tary

36 0sh1ma Ai rfield: 47, 58, Oshima Island:
Ozuki Airfield :

95, 97, 115, 121, 127

Philippines Transfers to : 26, 37, 87 Suicide tact1cs in : lS, 39 Supplies tor : 110 Picket Boats : 24-5, 49, 59, 60,

85t 147, lS1, 154, 161-2

64

71

91, 110, 158 3, 6, 29, 83, 120, l29, 134-5, 159-60 Sb1!!VV}a Airfield : 59

TD.kauatsu Airfield : 127 Tal�i-type Radar : 57, 59 Tam. Airfield : 36 Ta.:::a Amy Technical Research Station : 5 1, 59, TI Task ::'orcc:s : See Navy, U.S. Tatebayashi Ai rfield : 36, � Testing Stations Fussa ArrAy Ai r : 36, 45 Tama. A:r::J.y Air: 57, 59, n See Air Base s, U.s. Timan : Tosane Airfield : 36, 64 To-Go Ul:l1 ts : Sec Spec 1al Attack Units Tojo, Hidek1 : 2 Tokorozaw. Airfield : 35-6, 47, 74 Tokubetsu Koge1t! Ta1 : See Special Attack Unit.8 Tokyo : 4, 25-6, 30, 33, 36, lt2,

81-9, 92-3, 120, 123, 127

To-N1-Go Units : See Provisional UD1ts, Second­ ary

; 6-8, 63-4, 66-7, 72-4, 02, 116, 123, 157

174

175

Txa1n1ng Divisions :

'l'ra1n1ng Arm:y, Air:

28-9 91 Training, Pilots : 7, 8, 13-4, _19, 26-8, ljQ, 42-3, 46, 67, 7lf'n, 71-8, llO, 1424, 141, 155
Defense tactics : II 'l'ra1n1ng ProGram : �, 9O Training Schools Hi tach1 Adv Ftr : 44, 155 Hokoda Adv Lt Bomber :

Air School. : See T2'a1n1ng Schools Volcano Islands : 6
UtsWlan1�

Western Air Detense Sector: See Air Defense Sector, Weatam

War 1.u.n1stry:

3, 5

Western District :

Japan ... Mono9fOph No. 1 19

SEP 111959 f'."f1f.jv 1958

See Diatrict, Westem We s tern Milltary District: See

Milltary

District,

Westem

K\.II:!ag!l.ya Ai r : ljQ UtsWlomiya : II() '!'raining Ul1ts : ljQ, 44-5, 64, 91 Tsushir..a : 134, 145-6, 152 Types of planes :
See Ai rc raft, Japanese
u . s . Air Bases :

45

See Air Defense Sector, Vestem Ya.ch1.mata Airt'ie1d : See Airfielda YWlI£I.to Ai rfield : See Airt1eld.a Western Sector:
Yawata :

See Air Bases, U.S . U . S . Planes : See Aircraft, U . S . U . S . S .R . : 1, 2 UtsunOI:liya Airt'1e1d : 36

Yoshida, Kehach1ro MaJ . Gen. : Yunl. Airfield : See Airf1elda Yunl. Air Training Ul1t : See Tra1.n1.ng Ul1 ts

13, 131-2, 143, 146, 151, 156 Yokaichi Airt'1e1d : See Airfi�ld8 Yokohama : 33, 36, 58 Yokoshiba Airfield : See Airf'1elda YOIUl(?;O Airfield : See Airf'1e1ds
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P R I O R TO T E RM I N AT I ON O F WA R A CT I V I T I E S CON N E CT E D W I TH THE C E S S AT I ON OF HOST I L I T I E S AND

O UT L I N E OF OP E R AT I ONS

PREPARED BY MILITARY HISTORY SECTION HEADQUARTER� ARMY FORCES FAR EAST DISTRIBUTED BY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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