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Presentism some issues brought by growing blockism

The theory that holds the A-series called presentism and the combination between A-series
and B-series of time called growing blockism are the theories that take into account primary
intuitions about time. But growing blockism holds an extra intuition that presentism does not,
the existence of past (P) although they both share the dynamical thesis that present (N)
changes. An exploration of the statements are given by two papers The status of the past by
H.D Oakeley and The puzzle of change by Hinchliff.

Presentists state that they share the common belief of experiencing now and for so they
confined consciousness to the present but If N is the only time that exists. What is to be done
with the sense of passage and our memories? can our experience be a good start for the
metaphysics of past? Oakeley offers a critical view for this metaphysics and starts with a
distinction of both present and past as each one has a theoretical and practical part.

The overall aim that present is the only existing time is due to the specious present but for
making an action is necessary to think an absolute moment that will be the limit and is called
past, for this reason present does not seem to be enough to explain the process or the content
of a human experience. This view seems to confine P primarily to the theoretical as well for
the incapacity to act in the past.

In search for an answer is important to have always in mind the memory, trough this one we
evidence existence of P. Memory reveals an intimacy that makes possible the concept
passage, thus in memory past is also practical but in a different way than the present. In order
to know about past, it is necessary to start from passage an “memory [as] a mental necessity
that is an a priori required for history”.

The important part is to know whether P is the epistemological object as well as the
ontological. For Oakeley given the importance of past for self-consciousness and self-
certainty “the passage of consciousness involves the reality of the past qua necessary for the
self” (p.244) the objects of memory as are fixed required to be given a certain kind of being,
but because is impossible to know all the personal memories to make a science like history
one will have to operate like past as a regulative idea, but then is it really proving that past is
existent or only saying that is necessary for thought? .If past is real how to differentiate
between past and present?
Some presentism views hold P and F are important for thinking but not real, being aware of
the fact that people project themselves to F and remembers P. As Hinchliff suggest some
presentists hold a view called eratz times that are “an abstract representation of time but a
genuine time”(….) but is like being afraid of a jump to stating the existence of the other
objects that make statements about time true like past, they have also stated that P and F are
operators like negation but also possibility in modality, but is the indexical N necessary and P
and F accessory? Or as Oakeley holds N needs of P in order to be present?

There is also a consequence for presentism of not holding past it expresses a change on
objects but not on events so is stricitily attached to physics but simultaneity that is a premise
for presentism cannot be held by a theory like STR. Hence change cannoy be simultaneous
with because light spreads in a relative way. So change it is or not merely of time and not
special?

Reading the two papers help to understand the issues that may come from a view like
presentism but also the benefits that will bring a theory like growing blockism although, the
problem with the F account can be more explore on Oakeley’s critical view as it may result
on eternalism.