QuickLink

Mobile Identity

Delft, 11-01-2005 Paul de Grijp - 1049003 Thieme Hennis - 1052381

Index
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 3 SERVICE CONCEPT .................................................................................................................................. 4 TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................................................... 7 ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................. 8 OPERATIONAL PROCESSES................................................................................................................... 9 FINANCIAL IMPACT............................................................................................................................... 12 FUTURE ...................................................................................................................................................... 13 LITERATURE ............................................................................................................................................ 14

1. Introduction
The awareness of possible terror attacks has grown the last few years, after the 9/11 attack in America. Security measures, implemented worldwide, must make sure that safety in important economic and social regions is ensured. Extra security measures are implemented at important places, such as political buildings, industry areas and airports. The security level on airports has always been a very important issue for managers. A very large amount of money is spent annually on safety measures, security systems and risk management. For example, on systems that (try to) prevent crisis situations or aim for the consequences of a crisis situation. An emergency plan is an example of the latter. Our product will focus on crisis prevention, in particular the prevention of terrorist attacks. It will provide the user with more information on the whereabouts of suspected terrorists and uses the GSM network. In order to explain the service as good as possible, we have aimed our design on the Netherlands, with the AIVD as the main actor and the airport of Schiphol as the location where it should be implemented. The design has network characteristics and will be more effective when used more broadly and by more airports and more intelligence agencies. An important flaw is that when the service becomes publicly known, the effectiveness will decrease. In the next chapter the service concept will be explained in full. In order to give an overview of the complexity of this system the technical and the organizational architecture will be dealt with in chapter 3 and 4 respectively, succeeded by the operational processes. Furthermore a realistic estimation of the financial impact and costs will be described in chapter 6. New features and future possibilities will be discussed in the final chapter.

2. Service concept
In this chapter the service is explained from the perception of the user. As mentioned earlier, the service regards a crisis prevention concept and regards airports as the working ground. Our service can help in tracking suspected terrorists on airports. To explain it we first use a storyline of the main user, the Dutch central intelligence agency, AIVD. In this storyline the service is implemented and used. “The AIVD maintains a database of persons, suspected of illegal activities. They also update the list in cooperation with Interpol and other intelligence agencies worldwide. This database consists of all kinds of information, including contacts, telephone numbers and addresses. For the most important persons and their relations, such as dangerous terrorists or other criminals, a special record is kept in this database. This record consists of a mobile telephone number, if available, and an International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI). Every mobile phone has a unique IMEI number, at the moment merely used in anti-theft programs. These communication ID’s can also be stored, if necessary, without names or other personal information. The AIVD is authorized to demand these IMEI-numbers from the Dutch mobile providers or gets them immediately from other intelligence agencies. In a fully implemented service, the database will be a European or maybe even worldwide database, with one central committee responsible for keeping it up-to-date. New information will be provided by the different intelligence agencies worldwide. So, there is a database with all kinds of records, among which are communication ID’s. On the other side an area, this area is Schiphol, is monitored the following way. Any time a mobile phone (so a person with mobile phone) enters this area, it registers at a Base Transceiver Station (BTS).1 It does this by transmitting its phone number and IMEI-number. For this area not only the creditworthiness check is done, but also the check whether these mobile ID’s somewhere exist in the database. If it does, a hit is projected on the computer screen of the security office of the AIVD on Schiphol. Immediately all other information is being transferred to the screen and a status position is being brought up. The suspect can be localized by his mobile phone. There is special software available to localize a mobile phone through triangulation. The accuracy of this system is about 50m.2” This storyline makes clear what goals the system has and how it works on a more global level. The technological details and other interesting aspects will be further examined in the following chapters. The technical overview on the next page makes clear on which aspects the service system should aim at. In short, the system has an input of a lot of identification numbers (GSM and IMEI numbers), which should be matched with numbers in a database. Subsequently these numbers should be disposed, when there is no match, or, when there is a match, the corresponding information be transferred to the responsible airport instance. On the next page there is a more elaborate system overview.

1 2

http://www.bryte.net/gsm/hoe.asp http://www.cursor-system.com/cps/offer_matrix3G.asp

2.1 System overview
In the system overview shown in figure 1 the process of determining a suspect can be found. Mobile users enter the (Schiphol) area. The IMEI number is picked up by a BTS and send to QuickLink. If this number corresponds to a number in the AIVD database, it will be sent through to CPS. Consequently CPS requests the time intervals corresponding to this IMEI number and calculates the position of the suspect. This happens constantly in order to be up-to-date regarding the position of the suspect.

Figure 1 – System overview3

2.2 Requirements
In order to specify a system several aspects have to be defined. These are the objectives of the system, the constraints and the performance indicators.

Objectives

The main goal of our service concept is to create a safer environment on certain public locations. In this context ‘safer’ regards the possible threat of terrorist attacks. The system can be specified in the following two objectives: To identify a mobile user and verify if this person is a suspect. To localize a mobile user, if identified as a suspect.

Constraints
3

Westerveldt R., (September 2004), Wireless principles

Some important constraints are inherent in this system. The person has to carry a phone and this phone has to be turned on. It is extremely difficult to maintain an up-to-date database, especially regarding the effect of switching mobile phones. The radius of triangulation is about 50 meters. This will be less in the future due to technical improvements. When the system becomes known within terrorist groups this will have great impact on the effectiveness of it. When many terrorists know that they will be monitored in the neighbourhood of an airport, they will certainly shut down their mobile device. This has the advantage that a terrorist will be limited to use the same mobile phone again. Still, as for accidents, a small mistake can have major effects. When a sought terrorist arrives at the airport with his mobile phone on, a whole network could be discovered. Besides, this idea has a lot of growing options. For instance, a BTS, combined with this system, can be placed at big public gatherings or even throughout urban areas. We assume that AIVD can get access to IMEI-numbers of suspects. In this report privacy matters are demarcated.

Performance indicators

The success of the system can be measured by the following performance indicators: The availability of IMEI-numbers for the database (# IMEI-numbers of terrorists / # known terrorists). The availability of the service (% of time). Time between moment of logging in by a mobile user to a BTS and locating the suspect (# seconds). Number of identified mobile users as a suspect (# persons per year).

3. Technical architecture
This chapter will elaborate on the technical aspects within our system design. The main technical characteristics are put forward to create more comprehensibility and a better overview of the issues that could play a part. Underneath you will find an overview of the technical system, split up in two essential parts.

QuickLink

This is software that can receive IMEI-numbers. An IMEI-number is a 15-digit number (composed of four parts) that uniquely identifies an individual wireless phone or communicator. The IMEI-number is automatically transmitted by the phone when the network asks for it. When a mobile user logs in to a Base Transceiver Station (BTS), QuickLink can check if an IMEI-number belongs to a known suspect of AIVD. All the suspects are in a database. The database can only be updated by authorized personnel. Furthermore the software is based on Web Services to ensure connectivity between the different kinds of systems.

Cambridge Positioning System (CPS)

When a mobile user is identified as a suspect the AIVD wants to localize this person. This can be done through triangulation. The CPS software can localize a mobile phone based on the Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD). It does this by measuring the time at which signals from the BTS arrive at geographically dispersed wireless handsets. The position of the handset is determined by comparing the time differences between the two sets of timing measurements. An algorithm calculates the position.4

4

http://www.infosyncworld.com/news/n/3356.html

4. Organizational architecture
The actors that are most important will be discussed in this short chapter. The most important actor is the AIVD. The other actors are shown in table 1, which provides an overview of these other important actors and their role within the system. AIVD and other actors The AIVD will be the user and the buyer of the service. The organization is the most important national intelligence agency and plays a very important role in preventing terrorist attacks. They do this by monitoring suspected terrorists and give precise warnings in time, so that these attacks can be prevented. They try to collect information on suspected persons and improve security measures.5 QuickLink in combination with positioning software as CPS or GPS can be helpful for AIVD as an extra security measure. The other actors are described in the table below. An important role will be laid aside for the security of Schiphol. They have to cooperate closely with the AIVD, when a suspect has entered the area. Furthermore a possibly much more intense collaboration will take place between the mobile operators and the AIVD regarding the collection of IMEI-numbers. In a more distant future the different national intelligence agencies will have to work together in order to create a global database to monitor movements of terrorists worldwide. Actors AIVD Mobile user Security of Schiphol Mobile Operator Intelligence Agencies System Integrator Table 1 – Overview of actors Role Operates the service Uses the mobile network Assist the AIVD Provide IMEI and mobile numbers Provide IMEI and mobile numbers Makes the service operational

The creation of the system is subdivided in several parts, which can be organized separately. In the figure below a possibility on this is shown. This is only a reflection on the technological system, not on the possible difficulties that exist around it (see Constraints, chapter 2.2).

Figure 2 - Value chain

5

http://www.minbzk.nl/wwwaivdnl/aandachtsgebieden/terrorisme

5. Operational processes
What are the activities that take place when the service is up and running? You might use modelling techniques to visualize the operational processes. SADT In a SADT-diagram a process is divided in sub processes. It can be very useful in determining the system requirements and providing a structured overview of the different activities. The diagram consists of different building blocks with arrows from all sides. Left and right respectively represent input and output variables. Arrows from above mean control variables and from below are mechanisms that are needed for the process. The diagram below basically describes the process of QuickLink. It starts with a person, carrying a telephone or mobile device, entering the Schiphol region. It then transmits its IMEI signal, which is picked up at the Base Transceiver Station (BTS). This SADT-diagram shows the process of identifying and locating a suspect, because nothing will happen whenever the IMEI-number does not appear in the database. The whole process after identification and locating the suspect will serve as material for further analysis and other services.
geographical boundaries information availability in database network/ system information completeness, suspect's presence

mobile user

Login to BST
IMEI

Lookup IMEI
IMEI

information of suspect

Request time intervals

time intervals

Locate suspect

reaction time location of suspect

Base Transceiver Station (BTS), GSM

QuickLink, database

Cambridge Positioning System (CPS), BTS

CPS, computers, cameras, security, handhelds

Figure 3 - SADT As can be seen in the diagram, QuickLink regards the process of revealing suspects in a certain area. The process of locating this suspect, by using the technology CPS in combination with cameras, security, and customs is one that is extra to the service. This technology, as explained before, can be normally purchased and is applicable on any mobile device. For the moment and the near future it can be more helpful than technologies using GPS and Geographical Information Systems (GIS), which depend on the availability of GPS technology in a phone. In the future this will probably be a standard in newer generations of mobile devices.6 This diagram does not, of course, represent everything we need to know for our design. For example, the future dilemma of a decentralized versus a centralized system is not brought forward in it. There are still
6

http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/media/features/researchandinnovation.html

some things to be learned from it by going through the different processes. Questions that can be asked and several indications when analyzing the process are classified below. These and other questions contain essential aspects of the system to be build. That is why they should be answered accurately.

Processes

As we look at the four processes that are described, we can determine a few factors that are worth mentioning. • Number of logins per minute, this is the same amount of IMEI-numbers that are to be checked in the database. • The average time needed to check the IMEI number. • The average time needed to get the time intervals. • The frequency of getting time interval data of the suspect in order to have an accurate determination.

Input/Output
• • • •

The The The The

format in which the signal is received. correct information of the suspect that has to be passed through. accuracy of the position of the suspect. time between logging in and moment of locating the suspect.

Controls
• • • • •

Range of BTS. The size of the area to cover. The geographical locations of the BTS’s. The format of the database and the contents. Ways to secure the network and the system from intruders and technical problems. Need of extra software in BTS. Technical specifications of QuickLink, like the capacity of the server. Security of database. Quality of the database, maintenance issues. Pro’s and cons of CPS. Alternatives to CPS.

Mechanisms
• • • • • •

These issues, mentioned above, are to be dealt with in the system design and during the exploitation of the service. Two very important aspects of the service and its design are the way in which it is secured from intrusion and the quality of the database. To have the second aspect correctly will take a lot of work and difficulties. In order to realize a detailed specification of the service, a more extensive analysis of these aspects has to take place. On the next page another way of looking at the technical process is worked out.

Sequence diagram Another way of giving an overview of the way the service works is by making a sequence diagram. In this diagram not only the actions are described, but also the interactions between the different actors and authorities. In figure 4 the actions and interactions of the service are shown. It makes clear which actions are undertaken when and by whom, and how the roles are divided. The figure for example shows that QuickLink and CPS are two different services and only have one link or interaction.

Figure 4 - Sequence diagram7

7

Quatrani T., UML Evangelist (2001), Introduction to the Unified Modeling Language

6. Financial impact
An important aspect of the system is the financial impact. This can be divided in two. First of all the investment costs and second the operational costs.

Investment

The main investment costs are the software and the system integration. Some components can be bought at third parties, such as Cambridge Positioning System. Other parts have to be custom made. There are no standard components for QuickLink, so this part has to be programmed by a software company. The software has to be able to connect to the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) of a mobile provider and the database of the AIVD. For the system to work, all the components have to be integrated and tested. Often testing is very expensive cost. Hardware QuickLink (dedicated server) Hardware Database (dedicated server) Software QuickLink Software Database (SQL 2000) Software license CPS System integration Total costs Table 2 – Investments € 3.500 € 3.500 € 15.000 € 6.000 € 10.000 € 20.000 € 58.000

The operational costs are relative low for this service. The main cost is the person who operates the service. The support is delivered by the manufacturers of the different components. Another cost is to update the database, especially if you want to have international content. Because this cost is very difficult to quantify it is not in the table below. 1/2 FTE for controlling the system Support hardware QuickLink Support hardware Database Support software QuickLink Support software CPS Total costs Table 3 - Operational costs € 15.000 € 1.500 € 1.500 € 4.000 € 4.000 € 26.000

Operational costs

If in the future new connections will be made with new technology (e.g. GPS), the software part has to be updated. This brings along extra development costs.

In the future there will be a lot of developments and new possibilities for QuickLink. Therefore it is plausible that the service will change. Three different areas can be pointed out.

7. Future
Database

Not only terrorists, but you can also use such a system for kidnapped people and criminals. This will be one of the most difficult things to design, especially with the cooperation problems of different intelligence agencies. Global coverage is the maximum achievable. From the beginning the service can be extended and even a mobile service belongs to the possibilities. A mobile service can be used during public gatherings.

Coverage

Technology

There are constant technical innovations. Therefore in the near future it is possible to extend this service and making new connections. CPS can be traded for GPS, which is more accurate. Another possibility is to stay dependent on CPS, but that the technology is improved.

8. Literature
1. Quatrani T., UML Evangelist (2001), Introduction to the Unified Modeling Language 2. Westerveldt R., (September 2004), Wireless principles http://blackboard.tudelft.nl/courses/1/spm9612/content/_272091_1/Wireless_Principles_2004.pdf 3. http://www.bryte.net/gsm/hoe.asp 4. http://www.cursor-system.com/cps/offer_matrix3G.asp 5. http://www.infosyncworld.com/news/n/3356.html 6. http://www.minbzk.nl/wwwaivdnl/aandachtsgebieden/terrorisme 7. http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/media/features/researchandinnovation.htm