International Phenomenological Society

On Johnstone's `Phenomenology of Death' and `Philosophy of Sleep'

Author(s): Joseph W. Galloway
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Sep., 1977), pp. 107-113
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106518
Accessed: 27-09-2015 11:04 UTC

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 DISCUSSION

ON JOHNSTONE'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEATH' AND

'PHILOSOPHY OF SLEEP'

In a recentissue of thisjournal' HenryJohnstoneargues thata

"philosophy of sleep"is essentialforany theoryof consciousnessand
especiallya phenomenology of consciousness.In connectionwiththis
claim he has also suggested,in anotherarticlein this journal2,that
an understanding of thephenomenonof sleep would providea foun-
dation fromwhich one could extrapolateto a phenomenology of
death.
In thisreplyI will arguethatJohnstone is wrongon bothissues.
I will showthat1) Johnstone radicallymisconceivestheveryidea of
a phenomenology of deathand 2) thathis philosophyof sleep is in-
coherentand thusfailsto illuminatethisphenomenonin any impor-
tantway. First,let us look at the problemof the phenomenology of
death.Johnstone states,"If we have no experienceof our own death,
it mightseemthatthephrase'thephenomenology of death'is a tour
de force.This is surelythe case if phenomenology is restrictedto
whatwe can experience."'In otherwords,ifphenomenology is funda-
mentallya description of experiencefromthestandpointoftranscen-
dentalreflection, then,since we mustconceiveof death as the total
disappearanceof conscious experience,it would follow that there
could be no "experienceof death" on whichto reflect.Thereforeit
would seem to followthata phenomenology of death would be im-
possible.
However,Johnstone thinksthathe has founda way to getaround
this paradox and thus to reinstatethe possibilityof a phenomeno-
logicalaccountof death.This he thinksis possible by extrapolating
fromthephenomenology of sleep to thephenomenology of death.To
indicatehow thisextrapolationis possible,the followingillustration
is offered:

1 Henry W. Johnstone,Jr., "Toward a Phenomenologyof Death," Philosophy and

PhenomenologicalResearch, XXXV, No. 3 (1975), pp. 396-7.
2 Henry W. Johnstone,Jr., "Toward a Philosophyof Sleep," Philosophy and Pheno-
menologicalResearch XXXIV, No. 1 (1973), pp. 73-81.
3 "Toward a Phenomenologyof Death," p. 396.

107

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108 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

One phenomenologicalattributeof sleep which is useful to consider is its gate-

lessness. One does not cross over into sleep; one is instead just suddenlythere
. . . There are no gates throughwhich to entersleep. And their absence is part
of our experienceof sleep.4
From this observationabout sleep,Johnstone then extrapolates
to a similarconclusionabout death.He continuesas follows:
Extrapolationfrom this phenomenologicalobservation concerningsleep to one
concerningdeath is justifiedby the fact that structurallythe beginningof death
is exactlylike the beginningof sleep . . . If loss of consciousness is gateless in
sleep, it must also be in death. The decedent experiencesno transitionto death;
he is suddenlythere . . . But while we can later verifythe gatelessness of sleep,
we cannot later verifythe gatelessness of death.5
Myfirstobjectionis a minorone,namelythatit reallymakesno
sense to say of a decedentthat "he is suddenlythere."If death is
reallythe extinctionof consciousness,then it is necessarily,at the
same time,theextinction of any and every'there.'Death is not some
place; it is ratherthe total loss of place. The decedentis not here
or there;he is simplynowhere.
However,mymainobjectionreallyconcernsthebasic conception
of the natureand aims of a phenomenology of death.At bottom,it
seemsto methattheunderlying idea of thisphenomenological project
is painfullyliteral-minded. To put it quite plainly,it seems thatfor
Johnstone a phenomenology of deathwould,in some sense or other,
tell us what it is like to be dead. For it is onlyin termsof such an
underlying conceptionthatone can make sense of the-followingre-
mark:
In fact with a single exceptionall inquiries that I know of which have used this
phrase as a title have failed to live up to the title. They have actually been
phenomenologiesof dyingor of the death of the other.6
However,if we look at some examplesof genuinephenomeno-
logical accounts of death, then it will be obvious that Johnstone's
basic idea of sucha projectis seriouslymisguidedand thattheabove
remarkis simplyill-informed. The examplesI have in mindinclude
one thatis well known-Heidegger'saccountof death in Being and
Time-and anotherthatshouldbe well known-WilliamEarle's bril-
liantphenomenology ofdeathin The Autobiographical Consciousness.
Despite the significantdifferences betweenthe accountsof Hei-
deggerand Earle, neitherof theirdescriptionshas anythingto do
withtryingto imaginewhat it is like to be dead. Earle settlesthat
issue quite decisivelyin thefollowingremark:
4 Ibid., p. 396.
5 Ibid., pp. 396.7.
6 Ibid., p. 396.

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 ON JOHNSTONE'S
'PHENOMENOLOGY
OFDEATH' 109
AND'PHILOSOPHY
OFSLEEP'
The phenomenologyof death is not a simple description of it, which would
hardly be worth the trouble, since the description is completed in a word:
nothing. It is instead an exploration of what death means to life, from the
point of view of the living.7
This involveswhat Husserlwould call a reductionto meaningor
significance. The questionsbecomewhatis themeaningofdeathand
how am I consciousof death. Now clearly,to be conscious of my
death is simplyto recognizethat my life has a terminalpoint.The
phenomenology of deathis nothingbut the clarificationof the sense
whichthis termination has for me as one who is not yet dead but
alive.Andof coursethe significance of my death,forme, cannotbe
overestimated:it is of ultimatesignificance.And this pointis ab-
solutelyessential.As both Earle and Heideggerpoint out, nobody
else's deathhas thesame significance forme thatmyown deathhas.
For Heideggerit is onlythrougha reflection on my own death that
authenticexistencebecomespossibleforme; and,forEarle,it is our
owncertainty ofourindividualmortality thatconferson our livesthe
sense and meaning,howevervariable,thattheyhave foreach of us.
Now, in contrastto what is assertedabove neitherof thesepheno-
menologists is concernedwiththemeaningof thedeathof the other.
Both insistemphaticallythat the death whichcarries this ultimate
significance forme is myowndeathand notthedeathof anyoneelse.
Furthermore, neitherof thesephenomenologies of deathhas anything
essentialto do withthe"experienceof dying."Theyare not"deathbed
phenomenologies." Ratherbothare fullyentrenched in theexperience
of livingand the phenomenonof death as it appears fromthisper-
spective.Andthis,I think,is theonlylegitimatesense in whichthere
can be a "phenomenology of death."Unfortunately, this conception
seems to have eludedJohnstone completely.
Let us now turnto thereflections on thephenomenon of sleep.In
the article,"TowardsA Philosophyof Sleep," it is argued 1) that a
personwho had neverbeen asleep (or "experienced" unconsciousness
of some sortsuch as thatwhichresultsfromanaesthesiaor a blow
to thehead,etc.) could notpossiblybe aware thathe is consciousor
be self-conscious; 2) thatnot onlyis sleep a necessaryconditionof
thisconsciousnessof consciousnessor self-consciousness, but further
thatsleep is a necessaryconditionof simplybeingconsciousat all;
3) thatany philosophy, and especiallyphenomenology, whichclaims
7 William Earle, The AutobiographicalConsciousness. Chicago:
Quadrangle Books,
1972.P. 215.

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110 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

to characterizeor describe"consciousness"and "self-consciousness"

must commititselfto a "philosophyof sleep," in the sense that it
must presuppose"sleep" as a necessaryconditionof its own possi-
bility.
In whatfollowsI will arguethatJohnstone is wrongon all three
of thesepoints,and thatin truththeveryoppositeofwhatJohnstone
concludesis reallythe case. Therefore,I will show that the pheno-
menon of sleep and relatedinterruptions of consciousnessare in-
telligible,if and onlyif,one is aware of his own consciousnessprior
to such an interruption, and furtherthatone can onlygive a cogent
accountof thesephenomenain termsof certainnotionswhichare
centralto mostphenomenological accountsof consciousnesssuch as
the "prereflective awarenessof self"and the "transcendental ego."
But first,I would like to examinebrieflythe argumentswhich
are offeredin supportof theseextraordinary conclusions.The argu-
mentbeginswiththeassumptionthatwe could conceiveof a person
who,whilenormalin all otheraspects,had neveronce in his lifebeen
asleep. It is assertedthatif such a persondid exist,thenit wouldbe
absolutelyimpossiblefor that personto achieve self-consciousness.
He statesthefollowing:
. . . it is easy to conceive of a fullyrational person who, although conscious,
not only has no idea of the meaning of 'consciousness', but cannot be taught
this meaning; and who, therefore,cannot be said to know that he is conscious.8
Andlaterhe adds thefollowing:
I assume that anyone who knew the meaning of one of these terms (conscious-
ness/unconsciousness) could easily frame the idea of the other. It is only be-
cause a person does not know what it would mean to be unconscious that he
does not know what it would mean to be conscious and vice versa.9
The conclusion,then,is thata personwho has neverbeen asleep
could not knowwhat unconsciousnesswas like and thus could not
knowanythingabout consciousnesseither.He states explicitlythat,
"My argumentis thatno one can be aware of his own experience,a
ofitspossibility
fortiori, untilhe has acknowledgeda gap in it."10The
generalepistemologicalgroundsforthis argumentappear to be the
following:
This position is a kind of empiricism; it is a denial that an individual can
framecertainideas at all until he has received the requisite "impressions." The
ideas in question are those of consciousness and unconsciousness.The "impres-

8 "Towards a Philosophyof Sleep," p. 74.

9 Ibid., p. 74.
10 Ibid., p. 75.

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 'PHENOMENOLOGY
ON JOHNSTONE'S OF DEATH' 111
AND'PHILOSOPHYOF SLEEP'
sions" are non-Humean; they arise from the mental activity of interpreting
gaps.11
Now since the "requisiteimpressions"for formingthe ideas of
"consciousness"and "unconsciousness"arise only on the occasion
ofa gap in theformer,it allegedlyfollowsthatone could notcomeby
suchnotions,or evenhave anyawarenessof thephenomenato which
theyrefer,in theabsenceof such a gap. Thus,accordingto thisargu-
ment,I cannotbe aware of my consciousnessunless I have been
asleep,drugged,or clubbed6verthehead.
Now thisargument, WhichI assume is taken to be sufficientto
establishthe priorityof sleep, is howeverbased on the assumption
thata personwhohad neversleptcouldnevertheless be conscious.At
the endof thisarticle,however,Johnstone goes on to show thatthis
assumptionis untenable.He challengeshis own assumptionby ap-
peal, curiouslyenough,to one of the centralslogansof phenomenol-
ogy.He affirmsas a prioritrueof consciousness,not onlythat "all
consciousnessis consciousnessof something"but in additionthat
"all consciousness is somebody's consciousness."12 But to recognize
any act of consciousnessas "mine"I must,by necessity,be aware
thatI am consciousin thefirstplace. But if this"principleof owner-
ship" is an essentialfeatureof consciousness,then it followsthat
self-consciousnessis equally essential.However,if to be conscious
impliesthatone is also self-conscious, and if self-consciousness
re-
quires"sleep"as a necessarycondition,thenone mustconcludethat
sleepis a necessaryconditionof consciousnessas well.Indeed thisis
theconclusionthatis drawn:
Hence the initial assumption is false; no one who has never slept can possibly
be conscious. Sleep, therefore,is a necessary condition for consciousness as
well as self-consciousness.13
Now,to be sure,this is an extraordinary conclusion.It is, how-
ever,completely withoutfoundation. I will show1) thattheconsider-
ationstakenas evidencein his firstargumentactuallysupporta con-
clusionwhichis the exact oppositeof the one at which Johnstone
arrives,and 2) thatthesecondargumentis so utterlyincoherent that
it defeatsitself,as well as the firstargument.
Let mebeginwiththesecondargument. Accordingto Johnstone's
ownusage,sleep is to be understoodas a gap or interruption in con-
11Ibid., p. 75.
12Ibid., p. 79.
13Ibid., p. 79.

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112 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH

sciousness.But therecan be a gap in consciousnessonlyif thegap is

bothprecededby and followedby thesame consciousness.Therecan
be no gap in consciousnessunless thereis some consciousnessto
beginwith.This followssimplyfromthemeaningof the word"gap."
Since thisis thecase, thenin orderto sleep I mustfirstbe conscious
in orderto "lose consciousness."But thenwhat possible sense can
one make of theexplicitclaims that,"sleep,therefore, is a necessary
conditionfor consciousness,"or "no one who has never slept can
possiblybe conscious"?These statementsare totallyincoherent. The
"condition" and "theconditioned"are simplyreversed.How can sleep
be a "necessarycondition"for consciousnessif sleep is impossible
exceptforone who is alreadyconscious?Obviouslyone cannotex-
perience an interruption in consciousnessunless one is conscious
priorto such an interruption. If sleep were reallya necessarycon-
ditionforconsciousness, thentheonlylegitimateconclusionwouldbe
thatnobodyis, or evercould be, conscious.But I, forone,knowwith
certainty thatI am conscious.Therefore, the secondargumentproves
nothing.
Now let us look at the firstargument.Here the contentionis
thatit is onlythroughan interruption in consciousnessthat one be-
comes aware of being conscious.But is it not reallythe otherway
around? How could I possiblyexperienceany interruption in con-
sciousnessas "an interruption" unless I were aware of my own con-
sciousnessbothbeforeand afterthisgap? How could I remembermy
acts of consciousnessafteran interruption in consciousnessif I were
notconsciousof themas myown priorto theinterruption? It would
not only be impossiblefor me to "interpret" a gap, but impossible
forme to knowthattherehad evenbeen a gap if I werenot already
in some way self-conscious. Thus,self-consciousness itselfis a mini-
mumrequirement of beingable to conceiveof and understandthese
gaps in consciousness.In fact,if we were not alreadyaware of our
own consciousness,theneveryperiod of sleep would resultin total
amnesia. I would argue furtherthat the possibilityof maintaining
thecontinuity ofour experience, in spiteofinterruptions, is grounded
in a transcendental selfor ego which,because it is genuinelytrans-
cendentalwith respect to everymode, moment,or interruption of
consciousness,is therefore"in a position"to maintainthe unityof
experience.But to argue this fullywould carryme well beyondthe
scopeand purposeoftheseremarks.
In conclusion,I would simplyadd that thereis one point on

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 ON JOHNSTONE'S
'PHENOMENOLOGYOF DEATH' 113
AND'PHILOSOPHYOF SLEEP'
which I can agree with Johnstone,namely the "ownership principle."
As Sartre argues, every act of consciousness is also a consciousness
of consciousness. But it is preciselythis self-consciousnessthat makes
sleep an intelligiblephenomenon,and not the other way around. Thus
the phenomenon of sleep should strengthenone's commitmentto a
philosophy,indeed a phenomenology,of consciousness, not because it
is a "philosophyof sleep," but rather because it is a philosophy which
can make some sense of sleep. And this is somethingwhich Mr. John-
stone has completelyfailed to do.
JOSEPH W. GALLOWAY.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

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