COMPARING STATE REPRESSION OF PRO-STATE VIGILANTES AND

ANTI-STATE INSURGENTS: NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972-75*

Robert W. White†

I compare the repression of "pro-state" paramilitary violence with the repression of anti-state
insurgent violence. The setting examined is Northern Ireland between August 1972 and
November 1975. During this time period, "pro-state" Protestant paramilitaries and "anti-state"
Irish Republican paramilitaries engaged in significant levels of violence. Among the state's
responses to this violence were the internment, without charge or trial, of suspected
paramilitaries, and the confiscation of illegally held weapons. How the state used these methods
of repression differently for Protestant paramilitaries vs. Republican insurgents is examined with
time-series regression methods, employing data collected at monthly intervals. In general, the
state was less repressive of Protestant paramilitaries, and state repression of Protestant
paramilitaries tended to reflect attempts by the state to find a political solution to the violence (by
both Protestant paramilitaries and Republican paramilitaries) in Northern Ireland, rather than
Protestant paramilitary violence per se. In contrast, the state’s repression of Republicans was
more forceful, and more directly linked to Republican violence.

July 1972 was an ugly month for Northern Ireland. The Irish Republican Army, fighting to
break the link between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom and create a united Ireland,
killed 51 people, many of them in horrific explosions. On Friday, July 21, the IRA set off
twenty-two bombs in Belfast. Nine people were blown to death—two British soldiers, five
Protestant civilians and two Catholic civilians. In response to actions like this, the
government was interning—arresting and holding without charge or trial—persons suspected
of Republican activity. That July, there were 346 Republican internees. Protestant para-
militaries, opposed to the IRA and trying to prevent any change in the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland, also killed people in July 1972. They had 23 victims, many of whom were
abducted and tortured prior to being put to death. On the night of July 21, Rose McCartney
and Paul O'Neill, both Catholic, ordered a taxi to Ardoyne, a Catholic area of Belfast.
Protestant paramilitaries, monitoring radio despatches in a stolen taxi, picked up the couple.
McCartney's and O'Neill's bodies were found the next morning, each shot a number of times.
It was not until February 1973, however, that suspected Protestant paramilitaries were
interned (see Sutton 1994; Bell 1993: 339-40; Dillon and Lehane 73:100-104; Wright 1981).
________________________________

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Second Conference on Protest Event Analysis,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), July 9-11, 1998. This research was supported by a grant from the Harry Frank
Guggenheim Foundation. I thank Terry F. White, Partha Deb, Ruud Koopmans, Dieter Rucht, Charles W. Feeney, and the
conference participants for their helpful comments.

† Robert W. White is Associate Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Liberal Arts,
Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis. Please direct all correspondence to: Robert White, Dean's Office,
School of Liberal Arts, IUPUI, 425 University Boulevard, Indianapolis, IN, 46202. E-mail: spike@iupui.edu.

© Mobilization: An International Journal, 1999, 4(2): 189-202

189
190 Mobilization

Why will a state actively repress some groups engaging in illegal violence, but not
others? This question frames the analyses below. State repression is typically defined as the use
or threat of coercion by a government against opponents or potential opponents to weaken their
resistance to authority (Stohl and Lopez 1984; see also Tilly 1978: 100). Most research focuses
on the repression of those opposed to the state and its policies. State repression has been
included as a variable in cross-national examinations of protest by dis-sidents (e.g., Gupta,
Singh, and Sprague 1993) and in examinations of the repression of dissidents in specific
countries, including South Africa (Olivier 1989), Palestine (e.g., Khawaja 1993, 1994; Francisco
1995), Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (Francisco 1995), and West
Germany (Opp and Roehl 1990). However, many states, like Northern Ireland, suffer not only
from anti-state violence, but also from pro-state vigilante activity.1
I examine the repression of pro-state vigilantes and anti-state insurgents with a case
study of state activity in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland was created in 1920, a by-product of
a guerrilla war waged by the Irish Republican Army (who sought to create an Irish Republic)
and a counterinsurgency campaign waged by the British government and its agents (who wanted
Ireland, and later, just its Northeast corner, to remain a part of the United Kingdom). From the
foundation of the state conflict has been open or ready to emerge. Irish Nationalists, in the
minority, seek re-unification with the Irish Republic to the South. Unionists, mostly in the
majority Protestant community, support continuing the union of Northern Ireland with Great
Britain. The British government traditionally supports the Unionists (e.g., Farrell 1980).
In the mid-1960s, a peaceful civil rights movement sought equal rights for Northern
Ireland's minority Catholic community who had suffered systematic discrimination since the
foundation of the state (Farrell 1980). Civil rights protests were met with resistance from both
the local police force, the Royal Ulster constabulary (RUC), and counterdemonstrators from the
Protestant community who feared that Catholic gains would come at their expense. When
communal violence became extreme in August 1969, the British government sent in troops to
restore order (see Bell 1993). A violent conflict developed in which the primary actors are: the
state's security forces, Irish Republican paramilitaries, and Protestant paramilitaries. Since 1969,
over 3,600 people have been killed in this violence.
My objective is to gain an understanding of why states are more inclined to repress
some groups than they are others. This understanding has important methodological
implications. If the dynamics of state repression differ depending upon who it is that is being
repressed, i.e., pro-state vigilantes vs. anti-state insurgents, then general measures of repression
and a failure to disaggregate the victims of repression may miss important differences in the
causes and consequences of state repression. The hypotheses developed below are drawn from
general research on state repression. Previous research has shown state repression to be
influenced by the presence of internal groups and organizations that may threaten state power,
and by the health of the state's economy. Previous research has also shown that states are more
inclined to repress left-wing dissidents than they are right-wing dissidents (e. g. , Tilly, Tilly and
Tilly 1975).

1
Steve Bruce refers to Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland as “pro-state” terrorists. Pro-state groups
like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) are not part of the state military forces and
they carry out illegal violence in order to protect the state (see Bruce 1992a; 1992b). In Bruce’s words, “Let us assume
that a ‘state’ is relatively stable; there is a government, a security system, a justice system, and so on. Some people are
willing to use illegal violence to destroy or radically change the state. Others are willing to do likewise to protect the state
from its enemies. These are anti-state and ‘pro-state terror groups’” (Bruce 1992a: 71). Although Drake (1996) argues that
it would be more appropriate to describe such pro-state groups as “conservative terrorists,” I employ Bruce’s terminology
in this paper (see also Bruce 1993, and Cusack and Taylor 1993).
Comparing State Repression 191

My own research on the conflict in Northern Ireland also informs the hypotheses.
This article is part of a long-term project in which I have examined the causes and
consequences of small-group political violence in Ireland (e.g., White 1993a). In the course
of this research I have visited the “violent field” regularly and have interviewed individuals
who experienced the events described below. The British Government has searched for a
resolution to the conflict. In undertaking this search, it has used repression. The use of
repression has also influenced the other opportunities available to the state. Repression is at
the same time an aspect of and an influence on the political opportunity structure of both the
state and other political actors, as described below.

TIME FRAME

I focus on state repression in Northern Ireland between August 1972 and November 1975, an
important period in the history of Northern Ireland. In June and July 1972, the IRA entered
into their first bi-lateral truce with the British government since the 1920s. When this truce
broke down in July, it ushered in a new era in the conflict. On July 31, 1972, the British army
undertook "Operation Motorman," eliminating "no-go" areas in which the IRA organized
itself. This marked a new approach in which the British sought to decrease paramilitary
violence through better security operations (see Bell 1993; Flacks and Elliott 1994: 256). In
this they were successful.The year 1972 was the most violent of the conflict, in which 467
people died in political violence. From 1973 through 1975, the number of persons killed in
political violence was 250, 216, and 247, respectively (see Flacks and Elliott 1994: 467).
The end-date reflects two key events in 1975. In September 1975 a second bi-lateral
truce between the IRA and the British came to an end. November 1975 saw the end of
internment in Northern Ireland. These events mark a change in British policy. In late 1975
and early 1976 the British policies of criminalization and Ulsterization were put into effect.
Criminalization, which denied the political nature of paramilitary offenses in Northern
Ireland, set in motion events that led to the hunger-strikes by Republican prisoners in 1980
and 1981 (Bell 1993). Also in 1976, the policy of Ulsterization began to be implemented.
This involved the gradual replacement of the British army as the front-line state security force
with the locally recruited Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defence Regiment (see
Bell 1979). August 1972 and November 1975 are historically valid start and end-points (see
also Isaac and Griffin 1989; Griffin and Isaac 1992).
Several important political events occurred during the August 1972-November 1975
time period. For the first time since the 1920s, Protestant paramilitaries were interned (see
Cusack and McDonald 1997: 124; Bruce 1992). In the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s,
internment was used against Republicans. Internment was re-introduced in Northern Ireland
in August 1971. Under internment, persons suspected of paramilitary offenses are arrested by
the state, but they are not charged with a crime. They are held in custody without a release
date. Initially, only members or supporters of the Northern Irish Catholic community were
interned. The internment of Republicans reached it highest level in March 1972, when 913
persons suspected of Republican activity were held without charge. In February 1973, the
state began interning suspected Protestant paramilitaries. The highest number of Protestant
internees in any given month was in May 1974, when there were 70 Protestant internees. In
that month there were 577 Republican internees (see Wright 1981). Suspected Protestant
paramilitaries were not interned after February 1975. Suspected Republicans were not
interned after November 1975 (see Flacks and Elliott 1994).
During this time period the British government undertook a number of political
maneuvers designed (1) to replace the Stormont Government of Northern Ireland, terminated
192 Mobilization

in March 1972, with a cross-community power-sharing assembly and (2) to bring about a
reduction in IRA violence. In 1973 Stormont was replaced with an Assembly, elected by
proportional representation and designed to give the Catholic minority increased participation
in government (see Flacks and Elliott 1994). An election was held in late June 1973, and
those elected to the new Assembly took their seats on July 31, 1973. In January 1974, a
power sharing Executive was formed. The Executive, led by Brian Faulkner of the Ulster
Unionist Party, was supported by a majority of those in the Assembly. Hard-line Protestants,
who objected to the Assembly, violently opposed the Executive, power sharing, and an all-
island Council of Ireland that was to be associated with the Executive. This opposition
ultimately took the form of the Ulster Workers Strike, in May 1974. The strike brought
Northern Ireland to a standstill. It also led to the resignation from the Executive of many
Unionists, effectively ending the Executive and the Assembly.
The other key political event during this time period was a bi-lateral truce negotiated
between the IRA and the British army. This truce developed out of meetings between leading
Republicans and several prominent Protestant churchmen, in December 1974. The IRA
undertook a Christmas cease-fire which was extended into January, and then terminated.
After negotiations between the British and the Republicans, a bi-lateral truce was entered
into, beginning February 1975. This truce held until September, 1975 (see Bell 1993).

DATA, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODS

Dependent Variables.Four measures of state repression are examined: the monthly

number of suspected Protestant paramilitaries and suspected Irish Republicans interned and
the monthly number of weapons seized from the Protestant and Catholic communities by the
security forces. By employing two dependent variables, I allow for the possibility that each
form of state repression is unique. The more the findings across forms of state repression are
similar, the more likely the results reflect a general process of state repression.
The number of suspected Protestant paramilitary and Irish Republican internees, per
month, is taken from Wright (1981: 320). The value for this variable for Protestant
paramilitaries for the months between August 1972 and January 1973 is a zero. This reflects
the fact that the state, if it had so desired, could have interned suspected Protestant
paramilitaries but chose not to. As part of the state's response to violence in Northern Ireland,
the security forces began organized searches for illegally held weapons. The monthly number
of "Protestant" and "Republican" weapons seized in these searches by the security forces is
also taken from Wright (1981: 319).
The data on weapons recovered by the security forces were supplied to Wright
(1983: 328) in a letter from The (British) Army Information Services, Lisburn, Northern
Ireland. The data on internment were supplied to Wright (1983: 328) in a letter from The
Northern Ireland Office, London. Although the possibility exists that these figures have been
manipulated for state purposes, this is unlikely. The conflict in Northern Ireland is perhaps
the most studied of the many small-group conflicts in the world today. This is in part caused
by the high quality of data available, and by its location in a well-publicized, English-
speaking state (e.g., Whyte 1990; Bell 1993). The nature of British parliamentary democracy
contributes to the public availability of reliable and valid data. Opposition political parties,
including those not associated with political violence, have the right to seek official data on
state activities. The press, both in Ireland and Britain, reports on state activities. Media
reports may be contrasted with official state figures (see for example accounts on internment
in Deutsch and Magowan 1973, 1974, 1975).
Independent Variables.There are four general independent variables: economic
conditions, the ability or capacity of the state to engage in repression, the level of paramilitary
Comparing State Repression 193

violence, and political events.

Economic Conditions. Economic conditions are measured by the monthly percentage
rate unemployed in Northern Ireland, as presented in Employment Gazette (Great Britain
Employment Department 1972-75). I expect high levels of unemployment to be associated
with high levels of state repression. Previous research on state repression in Northern Ireland
shows unemployment to be related to repression (White and White 1995; Henderson 1991).
Resources for Repression: The Size of the Security Forces. States engage in
repression in a context; some states are more able to engage in repression than others, and
over time the capacity of a state to engage in repression may increase and decrease. Having
the ability or resources to engage in repression, however, does not guarantee that a given state
will do so. Based on the findings of Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975), it is expected that the greater
the ability of a state to engage in repression, the more likely that state will repress anti-state
insurgents, relative to the repression of pro-state vigilantes.
The capacity of the state to engage in repression is indexed with a count, by month,
of the number of security forces in Northern Ireland. The size of the security forces is
estimated by combining the monthly totals for the following: the British Army; the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (Full-time, Full-time Reservists, and Part-time Reservists); the B
Specials (until May 1970); and the Ulster Defence Regiment (after March 1970; Part-time
and Full-time). Monthly figures are available only for the British Army (Barzilay 1981: 236-
39). Year-end levels for the other forces are taken from Agenda (Irish Information
Partnership 1987, Table B9: 316). Monthly figures for these state agents are estimated by
taking the year-end levels and apportioning change over a 12 month period.
Paramilitary violence: Pro-state vigilantism vs. anti-state insurgency.In general, one
expects a state to repress those who engage in unsanctioned violence within its geographic
territory. Previous research shows that, for various periods of time in Northern Ireland, state
repression leads to increased levels of anti-state Republican violence (White 1989; 1993b),
and that anti-state Republican violence leads to increased levels of state repression (White
and White 1995). The relationship between repression and pro-state violence, however, is
unclear. Table 1 presents a cross-tabulation of the victims of pro- and anti-state violence in
Northern Ireland, from August 1972 through November 1975. In this time period Protestant
paramilitaries killed 346 people (8.65 per month) while Republican paramilitaries killed 411
people (10. 2 per month). The two groups differ most in who it was that they were killing.
Most of the victims of pro-state Protestant paramilitaries were Catholic civilians, people like
Rose McCartney and Patrick O'Neill. Two hundred and forty-four of their 346 (70%) victims
were Catholic civilians. This was part of a concerted campaign on the part of Protestant
paramilitaries to make the Catholic community in Northern Ireland pay for the IRA's
campaign. By producing fear in the Catholic community, Protestant paramilitaries hoped that
Catholics would then put pressure on the IRA to stop their violence (see Bruce 1992; Bell
1979; 1993). In contrast, anti-state Republicans primarily killed members of the security
forces, especially the British army. Two-hundred and eleven of the Republicans' 411 (51%)
victims were members of the security forces. If the 48 Republicans listed as being killed by
Republicans (most of whom were killed in premature explosions) are excluded from the
count, then the IRA's focus on the security forces is more evident (211/363 = 58%). The IRA
was killing members of the security forces in their attempt to make Northern Ireland
ungovernable and to increase the possibility that the British government would withdraw
from Northern Ireland.
These differences in targeting are important. In this particular time period (August
1972–November 1975) the state's response to anti-state Republican activity is likely to be
repression. In contrast, the state may not respond to Protestant violence with repression, be-
cause the state and its agents are not the targets of Protestant violence. This is consistent with
194 Mobilization

Gurr (1986) and Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975; see also Duff and McCamant 1976: 80-86), as
noted above.It is also possible, given that the nature of their violence is different, that the
dynamics of repression of pro-state Protestant paramilitaries will differ from the dynamics of
repression of anti-state Irish Republicans.
Pro-state vigilantism and anti-state insurgency are indexed by the number of persons
killed each month by Protestant paramilitaries and by Irish Republican paramilitaries,
respectively. These figures are taken from Agenda (Irish Information Partnership 1987;
1990). The Agenda database includes an attempt to list every political fatality in the Northern
Ireland conflict since July 1969. Included in the data are the status of the victim (civilian,
British soldier, etc. ), the cause of the fatality (explosion, etc. ), and the agency responsible
for the fatality (the British army, the [Provisional] IRA, the Ulster Volunteer Force, etc. ). I
focus on deaths caused by pro-state and anti-state agents (e.g., the IRA and the UVF), rather
than other forms of disruption (e.g., riots or peaceful protests). Deaths by insurgents and
counter-insurgents are high-profile events that are likely to be reliably recorded. Only 17 of
757 deaths between August 1972 and November 1975 were “Not Classified” (see table 1; see
also White 1993b). Also, deadly events more clearly reflect the ideology of those perpetrating
them. When the IRA kills a British soldier, there is little doubt that this is anti-state activity.
When a Protestant paramilitary kills a Catholic, there is little doubt that this is vigilante
Comparing State Repression 195

activity. With other forms of protest the perpetrators, and their focus or ideology, are less
clear. Republican and Protestant paramilitaries may or may not participate in or direct a riot,
for example.
The Agenda data only include deaths from violence in Northern Ireland. However,
the IRA and Protestant paramilitaries have killed a large number of people outside of this
location. To control for these deaths, an additional variable is included in the analyses, as
described below. 2
Political Variables: The Assembly and Executive, the Ulster Workers' Strike, the
1975 IRA/British Army truce, and Violence in England. A series of binary variables are
included in the equations in order to estimate the effects that the Assembly, the Executive, the
Ulster Workers' Strike, the 1975 IRA/British Army truce, and IRA violence in England, had
on the level of state repression.
For the Assembly/Executive variable, the months of August 1973 through May 1974
are coded with a 1; all other months receive a 0. This covers the life of the Assembly and the
Executive, as described above. For the Ulster Workers' Strike, the month of May 1974 is
coded with a 1; all other months receive a 0. Because these two events are associated with
large scale Protestant paramilitary violence, they should be associated with increased levels of
state repression.
In late 1974, the Irish Republican Army entered into a series of negotiations that
concluded with a bi-lateral truce with the British army (Bell 1979; 1993). The IRA's
Christmas truce began in December 1974 and held into January. After a short breakdown and
further negotiations, the bi-lateral truce went into effect in February 1975. It held until
September 1975. For the Truce variable, the months of December 1974 through September
1975 are coded with a 1; all other months receive a 0. I anticipate that during the truce there
was less repression of Republicans. One reason Republicans entered the truce was the
expectation that Republican internees would be released (Bell 1993). The relationship of this
variable to Protestant paramilitary violence is more complex. In negotiating the truces, the
British government implicitly recognized the legitimacy of the IRA (Gamson 1990: 28-37).
Further, Protestant paramilitaries were faced with the possibility that the truce marked the
beginning of a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Protestant paramilitaries responded
to these threats by increasing their violence (Bruce 1992: 62-64; Dillon and Lehane 1973: 75-
90; White 1993b). I expect that during the truce the level of repression of Protestant
paramilitaries increased.
The final binary variable indexes persons killed by the IRA in violent events that
occurred outside of Northern Ireland. Over the time period examined there were three key
violent events in England that are relevant. These were the bombing of a coach carrying
British soldiers in February 1974 (killing eight soldiers and one woman and her two
children), the Guildford pub bombings in October 1974 (killing 5 people) and the
Birmingham pub bombings in November 1974 (killing 19 people). These three months were
coded with a “1", and all other months received a “0". I chose a binary variable for this, rather
than adding these deaths to the Northern Ireland total, under the assumption that violence in

2
I also considered the possibility that some of the deaths from political violence were the result of internecine
fighting, rather than insurgent or vigilante activity. The equations presented below were also examined after deaths of this
kind were excluded from the measures. This exclusion had no significance on the findings. As part of this subset of
analyses, only persons killed in internecine fighting among Republican paramilitaries and among Protestant paramilitaries
were excluded. I did not exclude deaths from accidental bombings, shootings, etc., or the deaths of informers. These
deaths were included because (1) the killing of people accidentally in the course of attacking the state or attacking the
state’s opponents are indicators of anti-state and vigilante activity, and (2) the killing of informers is, in effect, the killing
of agents of the state or enemies of pro-state activists. Victims of internecine fighting were identified in Sutton (1994),
who provides a brief description of the circumstances surrounding each death. A comparison of the general Sutton (1994)
and Agenda data may be found in White (1997).
196 Mobilization

England is qualitatively different from violence in Ireland. This is supported by statements by

the IRA, in which they claim that the British state is more likely to respond to violence “at
home”, and from previous research findings (e.g., White and White 1995). 3
Lagged Variables. All independent variables are lagged one month. This eliminates
possible simultaneity bias between independent variables and dependent variables measured
contemporaneously. The dependent variables measure state repression as a function of
conditions or events in a previous month. To control for the initial level of the dependent
variable and for unspecified influences, the lagged dependent variable is included in the
equations. With these terms in the level equations the dependent variables become the
monthly change in state repression rather than the level of repression itself. These lagged
dependent variables also index the possibility that repression will fall into a pattern whereby
having engaged in repression in one month state agents will be inclined to engage in
repression again, i.e., that repression will become routinized or institutionalized (see Gurr
1986: 55; Lopez 1984: 62). Including the lagged dependent variables in the equations is also
a method of compensating for trends in the dependent variables (Hall, Johnston, and Lilien
1990: 6-5). 4

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the different variables. As shown, the
British state in Northern Ireland was more likely to repress anti-state Republicans than it was
pro-state Protestant paramilitaries. This is especially so with respect to the use of internment.
Between August 1972 and November 1975, on a monthly average, there were 421
Republican internees but only 22 Protestant paramilitary internees. With respect to the seizure
of weapons, on a monthly basis the state seized 58 Republican weapons compared to 50
Protestant paramilitary weapons.
It is not surprising to find that the state in Northern Ireland was more likely to
repress Republicans than it was Protestant paramilitaries. This is consistent with other
researchers who find that states are less likely to repress pro-state vigilantes. More interesting
are the multivariate relationships, because they offer a sense of how the repression of pro-
state vigilantes differs from the repression of anti-state insurgents.
Columns 1 through 4 in table 3 present the results of regressing the measures of state
repression on the independent variables.5 The results show that in this province of one

3
A similar variable indexing deaths by Protestant paramilitaries outside of Northern Ireland was not possible.
The key event of this kind occurred on May 17, 1974, when no-warning bombs killed 27 people in Dublin and Monaghan
(5 more died later). Unfortunately, a binary variable was constructed for this month to index the Ulster Workers’ Strike. It
is my belief that because this violence was in another state, i.e., the Irish Republic, then the variable measuring events for
this month (May 1974) indexes the British response to the Ulster Workers’ Strike, rather than the British response to the
Dublin/Monaghan bombings. A more in-depth analysis, including examination of memoirs of political leaders and
interviews with political leaders of the time, may show that this variable reflects a mix of the bombings and the Ulster
Workers’ Strike.
4
The one-month lag is taken under the assumption that it will take the state this long to respond to an event,
e.g., the Ulster Workers’ Strike. In fact, this may be too long but unfortunately the data do not provide lesser periods
(several days or one week) for lagging. As an alternative, the equations were also examined cross-sectionally without the
lagged dependent variables and without other independent variables lagged one month. The results are different but still
support the argument that state repression of pro-state vigilantes is different from state repression of anti-state insurgents
(results are available from the author). Because the lagged variables index an important issue— the institutionalization of
repression—and because the state responds to pro- and anti-state violence—i.e., there is time ordering—the lagged results
are more appropriate than the non-lagged results, and are presented in table 3.
5
The start date for the equations is September 1972. With a one-month lag, data from August 1972 are
included in the equations.
Comparing State Repression 197

Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in the Analyses: Northern
Ireland, August 1972-November 1975
Standard
Variables Mean Deviation

Number of Suspected Protestant Paramilitaries Interned per Month 22.35 21.50

Number of Suspected Republican Paramilitaries Interned per 421.25 146.75

Month

Number of Protestant Weapons Seized per Month 50.07 40.93

Number of Republican Weapons Seized per Month 58.12 33.34

Monthly Unemployment 7.00 1.43

Size of the Security Forces per Month 31,845 704.77

Persons Killed by Protestant Paramilitaries per Month 8.65 4.97

Persons Killed by Republican Paramilitaries per Month 10.27 6.55

Western state the dynamics of state repression are different for pro-state vigilantes than they
are for anti-state insurgents. This is demonstrated with a number of variables. Consider the
variable that indexes the capacity of the state to engage in repression.With respect to both
internment and weapons seized, the higher the number of security forces in Northern Ireland,
the more likely these forces were used against Republicans. In contrast, there is no
relationship between the level of pro-state violence and the size of the security forces.
However, neither kind of repression is influenced by the number of people killed by
either Protestant or Republican paramilitaries. This is surprising, and, for Republicans, differs
from findings for this variable from an earlier time period. In that earlier time period, August
1969 to June 1972, the number of persons killed by Republicans was significantly related to
the number of Republicans interned in Northern Ireland (White and White 1995). Finding this
difference confirms the importance of historically relevant start and end-dates to analyses like
these. By August 1972, there was large scale violence in Northern Ireland. The conditions
that led to this violence, and the state's response to those conditions and the violence, led to a
new situation in Northern Ireland. The killing of people, by both Protestant and Republican
paramilitaries, was no longer exceptional. Given that the lagged dependent variables for both
Protestant paramilitaries interned and Republicans interned are significant, it appears that the
state's response to the general situation, regardless of fluctuations in the relatively high levels
of violence, became routinized or institutionalized. Trends in the numbers interned, possibly a
reflection of government policy, were more important in determining internment levels than
were Protestant and Republican paramilitary activity.
The findings with respect to the political variables are most interesting. Differences
in the dynamics of repression of pro- vs.anti-state paramilitaries are especially evident. With
respect to both Protestants interned and Protestant weapons seized, state repression increased
during the time period of the Assembly and the Ulster Executive (between August 1973 and
May 1974). This variable did not influence the number of Republicans interned or the number
of Republican weapons seized.
198 Mobilization

Based on a reading of the literature associated with this time period, the results reflect
attempts by the British to involve moderate nationalists in the political structures in Northern
Ireland. In July 1971, in response to state violence, the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP), the moderate, Catholic/Nationalist party in Northern Ireland, withdrew in protest
from the Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont Castle (in Belfast; see Bell 1979; 1993).
When internment of only Irish Nationalists (Catholics) was introduced in August 1971, the
SDLP leadership pledged that they would not re-enter Stormont until internment was ended.
Stormont was prorogued in March 1972 and replaced with direct rule from Westminster.
Comparing State Repression 199

Although internment was not ended, the SDLP participated in the Assembly and the
Executive. Increases in the number of Protestants interned and the number of Protestant
weapons seized during the Assembly/Executive period suggest that this was an attempt by the
British to demonstrate that they were responding to the Northern Irish conflict in a fair way.
Instead of ending internment, the British did the next best thing for the SDLP—they interned
suspected Protestant paramilitaries and they searched for weapons in Protestant
neighborhoods (see Devlin 1993, and the references to internment; see also Devlin 1975: 87-
88).
The findings for the Ulster Workers' Strike variable are also interesting. Beginning
on May 15, 1974, Loyalist/Protestant workers began to cut the power supply in Northern
Ireland. As the strike spread the power cuts forced the closure of factories. There was
widespread intimidation by the strike's supporters (see Bruce 1992; Cusack and McDonald
1997). On May 25, 1974, Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister at Westminster, referred
to those supporting the strike as "thugs and bullies" (Flacks and Elliott 1989: 10). The strike
was successful and the Executive collapsed on May 28. On May 29 the strike was called off.
One would expect that Protestant paramilitaries, who actively supported the strike, were
subjected to internment. Instead, in June 1974, the authorities in Northern Ireland released a
significant number of Protestant paramilitary internees. Further, in June 1974, the security
forces relaxed their searches for Protestant weapons. In spite of Harold Wilson's sentiments,
for Protestant paramilitaries, disruption was not only effective, but rewarded. It is worth
noting that for Republicans the Ulster Workers' Strike did not significantly affect the number
of internees or the number of weapons seized.
Contrast the findings for the Ulster Workers' Strike variable with the findings for the
Truce variable. Consistent with expectations (e.g., Bell 1979), the truce is associated with a
significant decrease in Republican internees. It is also associated with a significant decrease
in the number of Republican weapons seized. In contrast to Protestant paramilitaries,
Republicans were rewarded not for disruption, but for ceasing (or limiting) their disruption.
The IRA/British truce also led to a significant decrease in the number of Protestants interned.
This is surprising. It would appear that not only were the authorities rewarding the IRA for
ceasing their disruption, but they were also working to limit negative responses to the truce
from Protestant paramilitaries. Unlike the Ulster Workers' Strike, which only affected the
level of repression of Protestant paramilitaries, the IRA/British truce benefitted both
Republicans and Protestant paramilitaries.
Finally, the findings with respect to violence in England are puzzling. As with the
lagged dependent variables for internment, this variable, with respect to weapons searches, is
significant across anti-state and pro-state violence. In response to deaths in England caused
by the IRA, there was a decrease in the number of weapons seized from both Republican and
Protestant paramilitaries. This is surprising, since it would be expected that violence in
England by Irish Republicans would generate increased state repression, of Irish Republicans.
However, finding a negative effect of this variable may still indicate increased state
repression. One possible explanation for less repression in Northern Ireland following IRA
bombs in England in February, October, and November of 1974 is that the authorities shifted
their focus (to a degree, and perhaps only momentarily) from Northern Ireland and increased
their level of repression in England. There is evidence to support this argument. Because they
are a standing army, the British government may shift troops from one location to another
fairly quickly. British army troop strengths in Northern Ireland increased slightly from
February to March, 1974 (16,282 vs. 16,418 troops), but they decreased significantly from
October to November and November to December, 1974 (16,199 troops in October, 15,228
troops in November, and 14,550 troops in December; see Barzilay 1981: 237). Also, forty-
eight hours after the Birmingham bombs in November of 1974 the British parliament passed
200 Mobilization

the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974). The primary focus of the Act was to increase the
ability of the state to monitor terrorist suspects in England (see Bell 1993).
There is also the possibility that February, October, and November 1974 are
important for reasons other than IRA bombs in England.For example, there were general
elections in February and October of 1974 (see Bell 1993). The findings with respect to the
violence in England variable may be subject to alternative explanations. Employing a binary
variable to index one event in a particular month has its limitations. This is further support for
the view that the analysis of event data should be placed in an historical context.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings are based on one Western setting in a relatively limited time frame, August 1972
to November 1975. However, there are several important findings to report. Not only are
states less inclined to repress pro-state vigilantes, but the dynamics of state repression are
different for pro-state vigilantes than they are for anti-state insurgents—at least in Northern
Ireland. Controlling for other variables, the capacity of the state to engage in repression
influences the repression of anti-state insurgents. In contrast, the capacity of the state to
engage in repression does not influence the repression of pro-state vigilantes. Pro-state
vigilantes are repressed when it is politically necessary. In response to widespread disruption,
pro-state vigilantes are rewarded with less repression. Anti-state insurgents are rewarded for
less disruption.
These findings have important implications. Methodologically, having historically
relevant start and end dates for the analyses is justified. In an earlier time frame, the level of
repression against Republicans in Northern Ireland was influenced by the number of persons
killed by Republicans (see White and White 1995). This was not the case here. The dynamics
of state repression are subject to change over time. This may not be surprising, but it is
important and should be taken into consideration when researchers model state repression.
In addition, in many examinations of the causes and consequences of political
violence authors include general measures of state repression in their equations, e.g., a
measure of "regime repressiveness" (see Muller 1985). The results suggest that state
repression takes different forms depending upon whom is being repressed. General measures
of repression may not capture the nuances of state repression. Since many states suffer the
violence of anti-state insurgents and pro-state vigilantes, variables indexing state repression
need to account for its complexity.
Finally, over the years many people have argued that the security forces in Northern
Ireland are biased against Republicans (e.g., Rolston 1991). Republicans have also argued
this point. Between August 1972 and November 1975, the British state was more likely to
repress Republicans than it was Protestant paramilitaries. This supports the Republican
perception. It also offers some insight on why it has been difficult for the recent peace
process to unfold in Northern Ireland. As difficult as the process itself may be, the mistrust
generated by differences in the dynamics of repression in Northern Ireland is surely a
contributor.
Comparing State Repression 201

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