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LVI.

RULE 58—PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:

1. Paras vs. Judge Roura, Atty. Pulgar, and Diosdado Carreon, deputy sheriff. [A.C. No. 3180. June 29, 1988.]

Facts: This is an administrative case against the respondent Judge Roura who rendered a decision against the driver
of the Philippine Rabbit Bus who was guilty of the crime of damage to property with multiple serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. The Decision became final and executory and a Writ of Execution was issued against
Oscar G. Tiglao.

However, the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, which resulted to the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of
Execution against Philippine Rabbit, the employer of Tiglao. Respondent Sheriff Carreon levied upon an Isuzu bus of
Philippine Rabbit, with body No. 239. Respondent Sheriff Carreon issued a Notice of Sale of Philippine Rabbit Bus No.
239 and scheduled the public auction sale.

The Philippine Rabbit filed a petition for certiorari, impleading the herein respondents and prayed for Preliminary
Injunction, which was granted by the CA on March 3 1987, enjoining the enforcement of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

After 20-days effectivity of the Injunction, the sheriff proceeds with the sale of the said bus, acting upon the request
of del Rosario who was entitled to the proceeds of the sale.

Issue: Whether or not, the respondents are administratively liable for implementing the sale despite the injunction
issued on March 3, 1987.

Ruling:

No, the respondents are not liable. the Temporary Restraining Order of 3 March 1987 of the Court of Appeals had
already lapsed when Deputy Sheriff Carreon implemented anew on 14 April 1987 the Subsidiary Writ of Execution
and Atty. Pulgar's act of requesting in writing the Deputy Sheriff to proceed with the Notice of Sale upon expiration of
the twenty-day period, was strictly in accordance with law.

"Section 8. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. — No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified complaint that a great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty-days from date of its issuance. Within said twenty-day period, the court must
cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated."

Further, it was held that the expiration of 20-day period of the Temporary Restraining Order, applies to all Injunction
issued by the inferior courts, including those issued by the Court of Appeals.

LX. RULE 62 - INTERPLEADER:

2. Ocampo vs. Tirona, 455 SCRA 62, G.R. No. 147812 April 6, 2005

Facts: Ocampo bought a parcel of land from Rosauro Breton. Ocampo then possessed and administer the subject land
although the TCT is not yet in his name. Ocampo notified Tirona, who was a lessee occupying a portion of the subject
land, about the sale. Tirona religiously paid her rents to Ocampo. However, when the subject premises were declared
under area for priority development, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal and refused to pay her rent until the NHA
processed her papers. Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. In her Answer, Tirona‘s asserted that Dona
Yaneza was the owner of the land and not Ocampo. She likewise reiterated that she has the right of first refusal over
the land as it was included in the area of priority development under PD 1517. The MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo.

In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory and disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the subject land.
When Alipio Breton died, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject land.
Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes. Tirona also stated that Rosauro could not
transfer ownership to the subject land to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in
favor of Maria Lourdes. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.

The CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action; hence, it dismissed
the case.

Issues:

1. Has Ocampo the right to eject Tirona from the subject land?
2. Is the issue of ownership essential in a suit to eject a person illegally occupying a land?
3. Is the CA correct in holding that unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the partition proceedings?
4. What should have been filed by Tirona when she does not know the person to whom to pay the rentals due?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer
cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer
case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s
continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually
refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

2. No. The issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration
of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the
action. The affected party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this
is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of ownership is to be settled in the
proper court and in a proper action.

3. No. Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error for the appellate court to include the issue of
ownership. Had the appellate court limited its ruling to the elements to be proved in a case of unlawful detainer,
Ocampo need not even prove his ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer had
to wait for the results of the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case. The issue
of ownership opens a virtual Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.

4. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder,
Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader
is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession,
or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate
among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the
former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

LXV. RULE 67 — EXPROPRIATION:


3. City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, Inc. GR. No. L-2929 28 February 1950.

Facts:
RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from Reconstruction Finance
Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their territorial jurisdiction and reselling
them at cost to residents. The court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not expropriate
and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land situated in Legarda St. Manila.

Issue: WON the necessity for condemnation is shown to justify the expropriation.

Ruling: No. The SC is inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands
for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this power
to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited. The National
Government may not confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher
than its source.

To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must
exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.

Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. does not mean an
absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with
the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefits.

The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being
undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the money with a
view to disposing of the property later for a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school
and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are plenty
elsewhere.

The defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had the plans for construction ready
and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities.

IX. RULE 71- CONTEMPT


4. Rodriguez vs. Blancaflor, 645 SCRA 286, G.R. No. 190171 March 14, 2011

Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People
of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was
implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to
Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez),
to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an
Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but
eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009,
Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge
Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an
order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his
possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan,
among others.

On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s
continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.

After the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October
13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice
of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due
process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s
disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner
of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and contempt
proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.

Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and contempt proceedings
against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary.

In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded
as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect
contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be
satisfied.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written
charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge
filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009
Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali,
on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he
came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.

In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts
constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why
they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend
themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the
suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process.

Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes
that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct
in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's
oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing
grounds.

RULE 35-SUMMARY JUDGMENT:


5. YKR Corp. v. Philippine Agri-Business Center Corp., G.R. No. 191838, 20 October 2014.

Facts: Petitioners YKR Corporation and then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs responded to the Request for Admissions
by making no categorical admission or denial of the matters set forth in the Request for Admissions allegedly because
all the records of YKR Corporation have been taken by the PCGG when they were sequestered.
Court held that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR Corporation
and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.

Issue: Whether or not summary judgment is proper.

RULING: No.

This answer is a permissible way of making a specific denial under the Rules. In ruling on the issue of whether a
genuine issue of fact exists, there was no mention of any circumstance or situation upon which the court a quo derived
its conclusion that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR
Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs. We cannot thus properly ascertain whether the facts which the
latter could not make any truthful admission or denial are so plainly and necessarily within their knowledge.

Considering that petitioners YKR Corporation and the remaining six out of the ten Yulo heirs were deprived of their
day in court, the court a quo should have made its ruling as to the non-existence of genuine issues of fact by clearly
stating its basis both in fact and in law and not on purely conjectural determinations, i.e., that “the matters requested
for admission ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seven out of the ten Yulo
Heirs” and that “they ought to have made allegations of any knowledge or information as to the nature of such right
or interest, or at the very least denied PABC’s ownership or right to possession over the subject properties.” To be
sure, YKR Corporation and the then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs tendered an answer which is a permissible form
of making a specific denial under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules. The court a quo itself stated in the assailed June 30,
2009 Resolution that “this form of response to a Request for Admissions is allowed by the Rules.” Even respondent
PABC – the party that moved for summary judgment and which has the burden to prove that there are no genuine
issues of fact in the case at bar – did not submit any supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions to prove that the
matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seven
out of the ten Yulo Heirs.”

XX. RULE 14 — SUMMONS, SECTIONS 1 TO 14:


6. A.M. NO. 11-3-6-SC, NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGN JURIDICAL ENTITIES. (AMENDING
SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT).

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL
ENTITY Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. —When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with
law for that purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:

a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;

b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and
by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or

d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct."

This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in anewspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.