Pierre Goldschmidt is a Dirty Liar
The Illegal Referral of Iran to the UN Security Council and the Propaganda Surrounding Iran‘s Nuclear Power Program
Table of Contents
Introduction 1) The Illegal Referral to the Security Council
A) Article XII.C
i) INFCIRC/66 vs. INFCIRC/153 ii) Non-compliance in INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 iii) In the Context…
5 7 7 8 10 14 15 16 16 17 17 25 25 27 31
B) Article III.B.4
i) Diversion ii) The History of Article III.B.4 1) Non-NPT States With Nukes 2) North Korea 3) Summary
2) They Could Have Done it Legally if They Wanted To! 3) Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right
A) A Better Example
i) Articles 18 and 19 ii) The DPRK
31 34 42 43 45 48 48 50 56 73 76 80 82 82 86
4) Goldschmidt Is Not Just a Liar; He is a Bad Liar 5) Who is Responsible for the Illegal Referral? 6) Undisputed? 7) Diversion
A) It‘s All Out of Context! B) If You Change the Definition of Diversion, Then They are Guilty! (Reason one)
i) The Grand Bargain ii) Iran‘s Enrichment Experiments
C) Exempt (Reason two) D) They Moved a Cylinder!! (Reason three) E) Summary
8) The Additional Protocol 9) Dirty, Dirty Liar 10) If Iran Has Not Violated The NPT, Then Let‘s Make a New Treaty! 11) The Laptop of Death
A) EU3/Iran Deal B) Usrael‘s Response to the EU3/Iran Deal C) Powell and the Design of a Missile Re-Entry Vehicle
i) The Response to Powell‘s Story
87 89 90 92 95 98
ii) Powell‘s Defense
101 105 108 112 118 120 128 131 135 139 147 148 151 153 156 157 159 161 166 166 167 167 168
D) RV Design Morphs into Nuclear Warhead E) The ―Black Box‖ of Death
i) David Albright ii) Heinonen
F) Return to the Laptop of Death G) Iran‘s missile test H) Instrument Section Stays with the RV I) The New, ―Triconic‖ RV
i) The ―Triconic‖ RV is Bigger; Room Needed for Nukes ii) Back to the Shape Issue iii) Sometimes, Smaller is Better iv) Stupid Media
J) Who Stole the Laptop of Death? K) High Explosive Testing L) The Run-Up to the Security Council Referral
i) The Paris Agreement
ii) The IAEA ―Update Brief‖ and the ―Green Salt‖ Project
a) The Documents 1) Usrael‘s version 2) Iran‘s Story 3) Usrael‘s ―Proof‖ 4) Forgery #1
5) Forgery #2 6) Summary
169 173 175 179 184 187 190 193 193 194 194 197 199 203 206 214 218 219 225 228 233 237 242
M) The Super-Duper Secret Annex N) English vs. Farsi O) A Stolen Laptop?? P) Don‘t Show the Documents, and they can‘t prove their fake! Q) The Work Plan R) Summary
12) Dual Use Materials 13) Lavizan
A) Russian Nukes B) More MEK Propaganda C) Disappearing Buildings
i) Whole Body Counters
D) Back to the Disappearing Buildings
i) The IAEA Goes to Lavizan ii) Propaganda for the IAEA Meeting iii) Iran Removed the Radiation by Truck! a) Environmental Testing b) Tree Removal
E) They Moved Lavizan! F) Summary of the Lavizan Issue if You Are an Imbecile G) Summary of the Lavizan Issue if You Are Not an Imbecile
A) Ledeen and the Wall Street Journal
i) Shirzad Said What? ii) Silencing Shirzad iii) The Source of the Wall Street Journal Article
243 243 245 246 252 252 253 257
B) McInerney and the Washington Times C) The BoG Meeting D) The IAEA Goes to Parchin
Appendix A: (IAEA Breaches Safeguards Agreement with DPRK) Appendix B: (Screenshot of Albright letter to the New York Times) Appendix C: (E-Mail Correspondence Between Albright and the New York Times) Appendix D‖ (Iran Daily Newspaper About Trees in Lavizan)
The amount of lies, distortions, and propaganda that surrounds the issue of Iran‘s nuclear power program is astonishing. The purpose of these lies is to start a war with Iran, based on the notion that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In order to
get a war started in today‘s ―civilized‖ society, certain steps need to be taken. These steps are necessary to show the world that the benevolent West is giving the evil country every opportunity to act in a ―civilized‖ manner (i.e., in accordance with the wishes of the West), and it is only after the repeated refusal of the evil country to act properly that the West resorts, against its true nature, to bombing the country to hell. Two critical steps in this march to war are the referral of the evil country to the UN Security Council, and the subsequent sanctions against that country (which in itself are an act of war). The referral of Iran to the Security Council in February of 2006, however, was illegal, and is the subject that started me writing this paper. As I began my research on this question, I came across a paper written by Pierre Goldschmidt, who was head of the Safeguards Department of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) from 1999 until 2005. His paper is an outline of a presentation that he gave to the International School of Nuclear Law at the University of Montpellier in France, which was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 7 Sept 2007. The paper can be found here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_montpellier07.pdf In Section 3.A of Goldschmidt‘s paper, he asks the rhetorical question: ―Was reporting Iran to the UNSC illegal?‖ He then goes on to explain why he views the act as legal. Considering who wrote the paper and where it was both presented and published (all would be considered by most as ―respectable,‖ if not ―authoritative‖), I decided that this would be an appropriate source on which to write a rebuttal. Once I had addressed this section of the paper, I continued addressing the rest of Goldschmidt‘s paper line-by-line. This turned out to be a large undertaking, partly because Goldschmidt‘s paper is so packed with lies that it takes a lot of time to unravel it all. Because of this, I have not come close to finishing my critique of Goldschmidt‘s paper. As of this writing, I have addressed about 1/3 of it, and I will get to the rest when I have time.
There is a reason that I called Goldschmidt a ―dirty liar‖ in the title of my paper. Goldschmidt, as I said, was the head of the Safeguards Department at the IAEA. Goldschmidt knows and understands everything that I will bring up in this paper. He is not making any mistakes when he writes what he does; he is deliberately lying and distorting every issue in order to facilitate the bombing of another country which will result in the deaths of thousands (at a minimum). In the paper, Goldschmidt‘s quotes are in red for easy identification.
1) The Illegal Referral to the Security Council
Goldschmidt gives two reasons that ―the decision of the Board [to report Iran to the Security Council] is in accordance to the IAEA Statute.‖ (bold in original)
A) Article XII.C
Goldschmidt‘s first reason is:
―Iran was clearly in non-compliance through failure, over many years, to declare all nuclear material and activities that should have been subject to safeguards, in circumstances where a military purpose was plausible. This constituted non-compliance in terms of Article XII.C of the Statute.‖
What Goldschmidt says in the second sentence restates what is said in the IAEA Board of Governors (from here on: BoG) Resolution of Sept. 24, 2005, where the Board ―finds that Iran‘s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency‘s Statute.‖ 1
Paragraph 1 of GOV/2005/77: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf
Both the Goldschmidt statement and the finding made by the Board with respect to Iran, however, are wrong. To understand this, it is necessary to know the basics about safeguards agreements.
i) INFCIRC/66 vs. INFCIRC/153
There are two types of safeguards agreements. There are those that relate to and grew out of the IAEA Statute, which are INFCIRC/66 safeguards,2 and there are those that relate to the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which are the INFCIRC/153 safeguards.3 (For details of these two different types of safeguards, see note 7 and the references therein).
The first types of safeguards, INFCIRC/66 safeguards, are provided for in Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute. These safeguards are applied ―with respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards.‖4 Agency safeguards, then, relate only to established Agency projects, and they do not contain provisions for stopping nuclear proliferation if it is done without Agency assistance.5
The text of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 can be found here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml 3 Nearly all safeguards agreements under the NPT between individual nations and the IAEA follow INFCIRC/153. All references to safeguards will refer to this standard. See: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf See this link in relation to all quotes of NPTtype safeguards agreements. 4 See Article XII.A of the IAEA Statute: www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html See article XI for a description of what an “Agency Project” is. See this link in relation to all quotes of the IAEA Statute. 5 “The IAEA Statute does not contain provisions to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons if those weapons are being built without Agency assistance.” Susan Carmody, “Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 229, 1994. Also see Documents on Disarmament, Volume 1, 1945-1959, pages ix-x, as cited in above. Also, see the statement: “…indigeneously-developed [sic] nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international surveillance or control *under INFCIRC/66 safeguards+,” Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” presentation given
The second types of safeguards are NPT safeguards, or INFCIRC/153 safeguards, which are provided for in Article III of the NPT.6 These safeguards are fundamentally different than INFCIRC/66 safeguards,7 because they relate to ―all source or special
at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec 2007, page 34, available here: http://www.aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf 6 See this link for a copy of the NPT: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 7 For statements regarding this difference, see: “Since INFCIRC 66 safeguards are intended to verify obligations that particular facilities and material are not used for military purposes, not comprehensive nonproliferation obligations such as those in the NPT, its safeguards are focused on the particular facilities and material in question, rather than applying to all nuclear material in peaceful activities, as in the case of INFCIRC 153.” Matthew Bunn, “International Safeguards: Summarizing ‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Measures,” Lecture Notes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Open Course Ware (http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/web/home/home/index.htm). Article here: http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-812j-managing-nuclear-technology-spring-2004/lecturenotes/lec16notes.pdf Also, see: “The fundamental difference between the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 & INFCIRC/153 systems is that the INFCIRC/153 system, as provided for under Article III.1 of the NPT, requires the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction and control of NPT NNWS Parties. Thus, the INFCIRC/153 system is also known as a Full-Scope or Comprehensive Safeguards System and differs from the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards, where indigeneously-developed nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international are surveillance or control.” Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”: presentation given at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec. 2007, page 34, available here: http://www.aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf Also, see: “The first such agreement was concluded between the IAEA and Japan in 1959, but the agency did not adopt a comprehensive safeguards system until 1965. Now set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, this system of safeguards was to be applied, upon request, to individual nuclear activities within a state and to all activities receiving IAEA assistance. INFCIRC/66 safeguards apply to individual plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between states supplying nuclear fuel or technology and states importing it, and they are the basis for nearly all agreements between the IAEA and states that are not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, extended the scope of the IAEA’s safeguards activities. By joining the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states (e.g., all those except the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) commit themselves to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and to submit to IAEA safeguards. Instead of applying only to selected nuclear activities on request, however, safeguards under the NPT—known as full-scope safeguards—are required of non-nuclear-weapon states on all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or under their control. To accommodate this new mission, the IAEA developed INFCIRC/153, a more comprehensive model safeguards agreement encompassing every aspect of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle except the initial mining and milling of uranium ore.” US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency”, OTA-ISS-615, April 1995, page 27, available here: http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9530/953004.PDF
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities‖8 of a State. INFCIRC/153 safeguards cover all nuclear material within a country, even if it is not part of an Agency project. For this reason NPT safeguards are also known as ―full scope‖ safeguards. The 189 countries that are signatories of the NPT are subject to INFCIRC/153, or ―full scope‖ safeguards, and the 3 countries that are not signatories of the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan), are subject to INFCIRC/66 safeguards.
ii) Non-compliance in INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153
As stated above, INFCIRC/66 safeguards are provided for in Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute. Article XII.C.6 of the same Statute defines non-compliance as diverting nuclear material, violating health and safety regulations, or violating any other conditions, of a ―project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned.‖ Regarding diversion, inspectors are empowered ―to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose.‖ (emphasis added)
Basically, a State is not allowed to use the help that the IAEA is required to give them in order to further ―any military purpose.‖ If you do so, you are non-compliant.
INFCIRC/153 safeguards are provided for in Article III of the NPT. The triggering mechanism for non-compliance with NPT safeguards can be found in Article 19, which states that referral to the Security Council will occur if the BoG ―is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖ 9
NPT, Article III “The NPT Safeguards compliance assessment mechanism is comprised of two components. The triggering clause, contained in Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement, contains the criteria for findings of non-compliance. The
The IAEA found Iran non-compliant under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. The IAEA Statute, however, relates to INFCIRC/66 safeguards, which only relate to Agency projects. Iran, however, has not been accused of any violations in relation to any IAEA project, and any claims of Iranian non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute have absolutely no legal basis.10 In fact, only India, Israel, and Pakistan are currently operating under INFCIRC/66 safeguards under the IAEA Statute, and a finding of noncompliance under Article XII.C of the Statute would only be legal for these three states.11 For any States that are a party to the NPT, a finding of non-compliance can only legally be made under INFCIRC/153 safeguards.
Goldschmidt knows this, and ignores it. He is a liar.
reporting clause, contained in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, contains the procedures for handling cases of noncompliance and the authority for reporting cases to the U.N. Security Council. As the triggering mechanism, Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement grants the Agency authority to judge and enforce compliance with its provisions: ‘If the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the *IAEA+ Statute...’ Per its authority under the Safeguards Agreement, the Board may only report a state to the Security Council if it finds that, based on the report from the Director General, the Board cannot be assured that the state has not diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. These provisions make clear that the only relevant consideration behind a finding of non-compliance in the context of safeguards is the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Any other breach of the Safeguards Agreement can only amount to non-compliance as far as it affects the Board's ability to verify that there has been no diversion.” Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007 10 “The language of the Board's finding is not consistent with the relevant provision of the IAEA Statute. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution finds Iran's past breaches of its NPT Safeguards, as detailed in a two-year old Agency report, to ‘constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute.’ Noted above, a finding of non-compliance, as the term is used in Article XII.C, pertains to circumstances when nuclear material provided in an Agency project has been diverted for military purposes, health and safety violations, or any other condition of an Agency project proscribed by agreement. Although Iran has several ongoing projects of the IAEA, including assistance in preparations for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the IAEA has not accused Iran of diverting nuclear material from any project. Nor has Iran been accused of any safety and health violations or of any other infraction of any condition stipulated in any agreement pertaining to an IAEA project. Therefore, the finding of non-compliance made by the Board is vague and has no basis in the IAEA Statute.” Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007 11 “As of 31 December 2006, safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 were implemented at a number of facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan.” IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2006, http://iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2006.pdf
Goldschmidt‘s says that Iran‘s ―failure…to declare all nuclear material and activities that should have been subject to safeguards, in circumstances where a military purpose was plausible…constituted non-compliance.‖ Goldschmidt brings up the term ―military purpose‖ because this issue is the key phrase regarding non-compliance in the IAEA Statute. In Article XII.A.5, the Statute says that the IAEA is authorized to:
―establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.‖12 (emphasis added)
Goldschmidt claims that it is ―plausible‖ that Iran‘s safeguard violations related to a military purpose, and this is why Iran is non-compliant. Once again, Goldschmidt is quoting the wrong document. The quote above relates to IAEA projects. This fact is made even clearer in Article XI.F.4:
―Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement with the member or group of members submitting the project, which agreement shall…[include] undertakings by the member or group of members submitting the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in article XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement‖
The IAEA Statute relates to IAEA projects!!
Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute
What is relevant, then, is what constitutes non-compliance under INFCIRC/153 safeguards. What constitutes non-compliance under this relevant document is an inability to ―verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖ (Article 19) The reason the IAEA BoG did not find Iran non-complaint with respect to their INFCIRC/153 safeguards is that the IAEA was able to verify that Iran did not divert nuclear material, and they have made this finding repeatedly. 13 The BoG could not claim that Iran was non-compliant under the relevant document, so they made the finding illegally under an irrelevant document. The BOG knew that a finding of noncompliance under INFCIRC/153 safeguards would have been grossly illegal, so they instead found Iran non-compliant with Article XII.C of the Statute. Although this is still illegal, it is less obvious to those unfamiliar with safeguards. Goldschmidt quotes the following statement by Iran‘s Ambassador Soltanieh:
See paragraph 52 of GOV/2003/75: “to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf See paragraph 112 of GOV/2004/83: “All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.” http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea1104.pdf See paragraph 51 of GOV/2005/67: “As indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.” http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf See paragraph 18 of GOV/2007/22 : “the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran” http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf See paragraph 52 of GOV/2008/4: “The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.” http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf See paragraph 18 in GOV/2009/8: “The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-8.pdf See paragraph 19 in GOV/2009/35: “As has been reported in previous reports, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-35.pdf See paragraph 26 of GOV/2009/55: “The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf See paragraph 33 of GOV/2009/74: “The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf
―‟Iran has been referred to the UNSC in contravention with the provision of the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT‟ for the reason that „the inspectors have not reached or concluded any „non- compliance‟ but instead they have confirmed non-diversion of nuclear activities to prohibited purposes.‘‖14 (italics in original)
Goldschmidt says that Soltanieh‘s comment is ―demonstrably incorrect.‖ He is wrong. For the reasons I have just demonstrated, Soltanieh is 100% correct. It is Goldschmidt who is wrong. It is Goldschmidt who is a dirty liar.
The fact that the referral to the Security Council was illegal in undeniable, but the argument is not merely a legal one. The various arguments that have been put forward that claim Iran‘s nuclear program is intended for nuclear weapons are all based on lies, and these claims will be addressed throughout this paper. iii) In the Context…
It is clear that the IAEA BoG realizes that finding Iran non-compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute is illegal by looking carefully at the wording of their finding. If the finding was legal, the BoG would simply have found Iran ―non compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute.‖ Instead they stated that Iran‘s actions ―constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency‘s Statute.‖ (emphasis added) The BoG knows that Article XII.C does not apply to Iran, but they claim that looking at the Iran case ―in the context‖ of Article XII.C is valid. It is not valid; it is illegal. The US has a history of playing these types of word games with treaties. When a treaty does not say what the US wants it to say, they simply ―re-interpret‖ the treaty. This is illegal.15
Goldschmidt quotes from GOV/INF/2007/8: http://www.pmiran.at/sts2007/GOV%20INF%20Subsidiary%20arrangement.pdf 15 The most famous example of treaty re-interpretation by the US is Judge Abraham Sofaer’s reinterpretation of the ABM treaty during the Reagan administration. See: Emily K. Penney, “Is that Legal?: The United States’ Unilateral Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” Catholic University Law Review, 51 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1287, Summer 2002
B) Article III.B.4
The second reason Goldschmidt gives as to why ―the decision of the Board [to report Iran to the Security Council] is in accordance to the IAEA Statute‖ is the following:
―Further, the BoG was justified in notifying the Security Council under Article III.B.4 of the Statute, since questions had arisen that are within the competence of the Security Council, namely, the ‗absence of confidence that Iran‟s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes‘ and therefore a threat or potential threat to international peace and security.‖ (italics in original)
Here Goldschmidt refers to the BoG resolution of 24 Sept 2005, which says that ―the Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4.‖16
Here again we see that the IAEA does not believe its own finding that Iran was noncompliant under Article XII.C of the Statute. Article XII.C of the Statute first defines what non-compliance is, and immediately afterwards contains a clause calling for referral to the Security Council as a result of that non-compliance: ―the Board shall report the noncompliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.‖ Since the Board found Iran non-compliant under Article XII.C, why didn‘t they simply refer Iran to the Security Council using the referral notification from
See also: David A. Koplow. “Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties,” University of Pennsylavania Law Review, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1353, May 1989, See also: Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Commentary: Testing and Development of ‘Exotic’ Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper,” Harvard Law Review, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956, June 1986 16 See paragraph 3 of GOV/2005/77: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf For the Goldschmidt quote that starts with “absence of confidence…”, which is not sourced by Goldschmidt, see paragraph 2 of the same resolution
the same clause, as they did with North Korea? 17 If it was OK for North Korea, why not Iran? Why did the IAEA instead first find Iran noncompliant under Article XII.C of the Statute, but then decide to refer Iran to the Security Council using a never-before-used clause in Article III? The answer is that the IAEA knows that the finding of noncompliance under Article XII.C is illegal, and they did not want the referral to the Security Council to be equally illegal. Although they believe that Article III.B.4 is easier to defend as being legal, it is not, which is explained next.
i) Diversion What is termed the ―NPT Regime‖ consists of three parts: the NPT itself, the IAEA Statute, and the safeguards agreement. When looking at a specific Article in any one of the three parts, the correct legal interpretation must look at that Article in light of the entire NPT regime.
Any referral of a State to the Security Council (SC) according to the Statute must be made in light of the safeguards agreement and the NPT as well. Accordingly, any referral to the SC must be related to diversion, which is the ―exclusive purpose‖ of safeguards. This includes Article III.B.4. Iran has not diverted nuclear material, so a referral to the Security Council is illegal, even under Article III.B.4.
ii) The History of Article III.B.4
In addition, any justification for a referral using Article III.B.4 must be made in light of the history of the practice of the NPT regime. How this Article has been used, or not used,
“Decides to report, as provided for in Article XII.C. of the Statute, through the Director General, the DPRK’s noncompliance” GOV/2003/14: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iran%20GOV200314.pdf
in the past must be considered when attempting to interpret it.18 In fact, this article has never before been used to refer a nation to the Security Council, and this non-use turns out to be very significant.
1) Non-NPT States With Nukes
Pakistan, India, and Israel are all parties to the IAEA Statute, and are subject to Article III.B.4 as well (even though Iran is not). Pakistan and India are both declared nuclear weapon states, and have both conducted nuclear weapons tests. Israel is widely believed to be a nuclear weapons state as well. Three countries, then, have actually developed and manufactured nuclear weapons, and two have tested them as well, and none of these activities were found to be a ―threat to international peace and security‖ under Article III.B.4. The determination that Iran‘s nuclear power program, about which there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever of either diversion or nuclear weapons intent, is a ―threat to international peace and security,‖ while other countries that actually manufactured nuclear weapons and tested them is not, is completely ludicrous, and completely illegal as well.
2) North Korea Another example of the non-use of Article III.B.4 is in response to South Korea‘s clandestine nuclear program that was reported in 2004, which we will cover in depth here.
“Where dissection of the text alone fails to resolve…an interpretation question, authorities turn to inspection of a subservient hierarchy of other source materials. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties cites ‘context’ (other instruments executed at the same time as the treaty), ‘subsequent agreements’ (later documents in which the parties reveal their interpretation of the original accord), ‘subsequent practice’ (statements and behaviors manifested after the conclusion of the treaty), and ‘the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.’” David A. Koplow, “Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty?” Wisconsin Law Review, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 301, March, 1993/April, 1993
Although Iran was referred to the Security Council under Article III.B.4 for safeguards violations going back 18 years,19 (this statement is largely untrue, which will be discussed later), South Korea also committed safeguards violations for two decades, including the omission or falsification of reports and refusing access to buildings to inspectors,20 but no equivalent action was taken. When Iran violated its safeguards agreement, they were found non-compliant and referred to the Security Council where they received endless sanctions. Iran‘s violations are also likely to lead to a military attack on their nation. What was the IAEA‘s response to South Korea‘s violations? South Korea was ―chided‖ by the IAEA, and the issue was dropped completely only 2 months later.21 This is quite a different response, and it is illegal. When it was discovered that Iran separated 200 milligrams 22 of plutonium for use in research experiments, it was a major issue worldwide. There were breathless reports of how the tests indicated that Iran was developing nuclear weapons,23 and the issue was investigated by the IAEA intensively for 4 years before they finally determined that the
“We need to reconstruct the undeclared programme that has taken place for 18 years.” Press statement given by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, one month after Iran was referred to the Security Council, 6 March 2006. Copy here: http://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2006/transcr06032006.html 20 “For two decades, South Korea covered up a series of sensitive nuclear laboratory experiments by omitting reports, falsifying reports or closing buildings to international inspectors, according to a report by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency's headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke 21 “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea breathes sigh of relief over IAEA decision on nuclear tests,” 27 Nov. 2004, copy here: http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041127062418.4wammeol.html 22 “Total amount of plutonium separated in the research activities is estimated by the agency to be about 200 milligrams.” A.A. Soltanieh, “Iranian nuclear activities and interaction with the IAEA,” Atoms for Peace: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, copy can be found here: http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/revistas/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0606130141A.PDF Also, see: “The Agency has been following up with Iran information provided by Iran concerning experiments involving the separation of small (milligram) quantities of plutonium”: GOV/2006/27, paragraph 27: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf 23 “Iran has been caught secretly developing the technology to produce a nuclear bomb, The Independent can reveal. It has been forced to admit producing plutonium - the material associated with nuclear arms - after concealing its nuclear weapons programme from UN inspectors until last month, according to a confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency” The Independent, “Inspectors Catch Iran Developing Technology to Produce a Nuclear Bomb,” 12 Nov. 2003 by Leonard Doyle and Andrew Buncombe http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/inspectors-catch-iran-developing-technology-toproduce-a-nuclear-bomb-735452.html
issued had been resolved.24 However, when it was discovered that South Korea separated 700 milligrams of plutonium back in 1982,25 the reaction was quite different. In the South Korea case, the IAEA made a ―casual inquiry‖ about the issue to South Korea by fax, and did not start an official investigation until 5 years later.26 This investigation lasted 2 months, as stated above, and the issue was dropped. This unequal treatment is heightened by the fact that, unlike Iran, South Korea‘s plutonium experiments were conducted in IAEA safeguarded facilities, and therefore were actually covered by the IAEA Statute (unlike Iran).27 In addition, although there was never any evidence that Iran‘s experiments were related to nuclear weapons, there were reports that South Korea‘s experiments were run specifically to give the option for South Korea to make nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.28 The South Korean government claimed that it did not know about these experiments, which was highly implausible
“On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency’s findings, and thus this matter is resolved.” http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf 25 “According to the international media, the IAEA report says South Korean scientists produced a total of 0.7 grams of plutonium comprising 98 per cent of fissile PU-239 in its 1982 test.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring quoting Chungang Ilbo, “South Korea downplays UN nuclear report,” 13 Nov. 2004 26 “The first indication of a plutonium experiment came to light in 1998 after international inspectors detected traces of the substance at a government-run nuclear research center in Seoul, according to the South Korean science ministry. IAEA sources said the samples were inconclusive, and inspectors began additional testing in other areas of the country. The South Korean government said the IAEA made only a ‘casual inquiry’ by fax in 1998 and submitted an official request about the incident in 2003. During that work, the South Koreans allegedly dismantled a test site, moved equipment and failed to notify the IAEA about the experiments while they knew the agency was trying to determine whether such tests had been conducted, according to the diplomats. By 2003, inspectors had collected irrefutable evidence of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and they confronted the South Koreans with it last December.” Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of '82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 Sept 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9761-2004Sep9.html 27 “The inspectors also uncovered a plutonium separation experiment in 1982 that was carried out ‘in a safeguarded facility and was not declared to the agency.’” (inside quote from IAEA report) The International Herald Tribune, “Nuclear agency's headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004 by James Brooke 28 “A former senior U.S. official responsible for conducting U.S.-Asian nuclear diplomacy said in September that, when Korean scientists conducted reprocessing experiments in 1982, South Korea ‘wanted to be ready’ to separate plutonium to produce nuclear weapons should the country's leadership deem that necessary for national security reasons.” Nucleonics Week, “ROK military said to have begun nuclear weapons plan in 1980s,” 18 Nov. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
given the fact that they were conducted by government workers in a government facility.29 At the same time that South Korea was isolating plutonium, they also isolated 153 kilograms of uranium metal at three nuclear facilities that were kept secret from the IAEA.30 South Korea claimed that the metal was isolated to use in nuclear power related experiments, but the amount that was isolated made this explanation implausible.31 When this activity was discovered by the IAEA, South Korea claimed that most of the uranium metal was isolated from imported phosphate fertilizer, and also from an indigenous mine of uranium-rich coal. The easiest way to isolate uranium is from readily available yellowcake, and using such obscure sources raised questions as to why such secrecy was required.32 Also, the explanation as to the source of the uranium was not feasible,33 and the issue was still being questioned months after the IAEA had already decided not to refer South Korea to the Security Council by invoking Article III.B.4.
“A week after admitting that government scientists enriched tiny amounts of uranium four years ago, the South Korean government disclosed on Thursday that scientists in 1982 conducted an experiment in plutonium extraction at a state-run research facility.” International Herald Tribune, “Seoul Tells of 1982 Test to Extract Plutonium; Admission Follows Revelation of Uranium Experiments in 2000,” 10 Sept. 2004 by Andrew Salmon, copy here: http://agonist.org/node/5910/print 30 “IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Monday that South Korea produced 153 kilograms of uranium metal in 1982 at one of three nuclear facilities undeclared to the watchdog.” Xinhua, “IAEA to Send Second Inspection Team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-09/15/content_1986585.htm 31 “Likewise, said one former IAEA safeguards official, the conversion by the ROK of 150 kilograms of U metal outside of safeguards at Kaeri ‘raises major questions about why they did it,’ especially since the ROK carried out plutonium separation experiments at the same time. ‘If they had 150 kg it's a lot of uranium metal, you don't need anywhere near that much to do lab experiments,’ the former IAEA official said.” Nucleonics Week, “ROK Secretly Converted Uranium Used in U-235 Laser Separation,” 16 Sept. 2004 by Mark Hibbs 32 “The inspectors reported that they also uncovered a secret program in the early 1980s to produce natural uranium from imported phosphate fertilizer and from a South Korean mine of uranium-rich coal. The goal of this effort, reportedly, was to have available for secret experiments a uranium supply unlisted on the nation's internationally controlled inventory. ‘We knew the deposits existed, but did not know they were actually mining it, separating it and processing it into pure uranium,’ said Peter Hayes, director of Nautilus Institute, a California group working for nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula. Referring in a telephone interview to uranium ore, he added: ‘There is a lot of very cheap yellowcake on the market, so why would they be doing this? And why would they be trying to keep it relatively quiet?’” The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear Agency's Headaches Proliferate; Report Details South Korean Cover-Up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke. 33 “But 125 kilograms would have been insufficient to produce 150 kilograms of uranium metal. Moreover, the IAEA has found that samples of uranium said to be from the Goesan mine are depleted relative to the amount of uranium 235 expected in natural uranium--yet another anomaly for South Korea to explain. The depleted uranium
Conversely, when Iran isolated uranium metal to use in experiments, 34 the issue was used as absolute proof that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons. 35 John Bolton said in relation to Iran that ―the only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon." 36 But when South Korea isolated 153 kilograms of uranium, the issue was dropped. On top of isolating such a large amount of uranium, South Korea could not account for all of it, and claimed that 15 kilograms of the material had been ―lost.‖ 37 If it was discovered that Iran ―lost‖ 15 kilograms of uranium, they would have been bombed by USrael the next day. In addition, Iran has a legitimate reason for isolating uranium metal for use in enrichment experiments, because its Bushehr reactor will use enriched uranium as fuel. South Korea has no similar excuse, because its CANDU heavy water reactors use uranium dioxide as fuel, and not uranium metal.38 In addition to the plutonium and uranium metal isolation in the early 1980‘s and reports of their links to a possible nuclear weapons program, there were also reports of a South
could only have come from imported uranium from which the uranium 235 had been removed. Reconciling these disparities will be complicated further because two laboratories (and a third that produced depleted uranium) were dismantled in 1994.” Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2005) pp. 40-49 (vol. 61, no. 01), copy available here: http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-274.pdf 34 “358.7 kg UF4 (mainly imported) used to produce 126.4 kg uranium metal” GOV/2004/60, page 2 of Annex: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf 35 For example: “Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal (which bears little relationship to an energy program which is what the Iranian government asserts to be its only purpose)” Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, “Iran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards,” James Martine Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 18 June 2003: http://cns.miis.edu/stories/030618.htm 36 “’The only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon,’ *Bolton+ said. ‘Why is Iran experimenting with small quantities of uranium metal? Why are they reluctant to allow the IAEA to make copies of documents?’” Judy Aita, “Iran Should Be Sanctioned, U.S. Envoy Bolton Says,” America.gov, 31 Aug. 2006: http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/August/20060831175737jatia0.2994043.html 37 Cho Chung-won, director-general of the Science and Technology Ministry: "Some 15 kilograms of uranium metal were lost in the course of experiments.” Xinhua, “IAEA to send second inspection team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-09/15/content_1986585.htm 38 “It should be noted, however, that the fuel used in South Korean nuclear power stations is uranium oxide. There is no plausible peaceful use for uranium metal in South Korea.” The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), “Shame on S. Korea for Covert N-Program,” 15 Sept. 2004 See also this history of the CANDU reactor: Gord L Brooks, “A Short History of the CANDU Nuclear Power System,” Paper prepared for the Ontario Hydro Demand/Supply Plan Hearing, Jan. 1993 (Page 10: “By October, 1955, a further key technical decision had been taken. This involved the switch from uranium metal as the fuel material to uranium dioxide”): http://canteach.candu.org/library/19930101.pdf
Korean nuclear weapons program in the early 1990‘s.39 These reports were also ignored. The revelation that prompted the release of the above nuclear activities was the uranium enrichment experiments that were run by South Korea in 2002. When Iran enriched uranium to a level of 15%, this was taken by the Bush administration as clear evidence of a nuclear weapons program. 40 South Korea enriched Uranium to 77%,41 but this was not an issue, even though 77% is considered close to weapons grade. 42 South
“In September, Japanese media reacted to revelations of Korea's previously unreported nuclear activities by raising suspicions that the ROK had tried to make nuclear weapons since the 1980s. In Korea, however, the media did not investigate the issue, with the exception of the Chosun Ilbo newspaper's monthly edition, which in late September concluded that a nuclear weapons development program called ‘Project 88’ had gotten started during the early 1990s on orders from the ROK military… The Chosun Ilbo research which was not published in September suggested that former ROK president Kim Young-sam personally intervened around 1994 to prevent the Korean military from developing nuclear weapons. In at least one interview held with other reporters since then, Kim has corroborated that version of events, interviewers said…Last month, a lawmaker in the ROK National Assembly close to the defense establishment told Nucleonics Week that, beginning around 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretly began outlining contingency plans to develop nuclear weapons. This, the source said, was in response to moves in the U.S. Congress to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. The Nunn-Warner amendment to the 1989 defense appropriations bill mandated a withdraw of 7,000 U.S. troops from ROK territory; that was done in 1991. But two more withdrawals foreseen under Nunn-Warner were shelved, in response to White House concerns about North Korean nuclear behavior. The legislator said that when U.S. President George H.W. Bush assured the ROK military that troops would stay, the Joint Chiefs suspended further consideration of nuclear weapons development.” Nucleonics Week, “ROK Military Said to Have Begun Nuclear Weapons Plan in 1980s,” 40 “While the amount of uranium that South Korea has admitted to enriching was small, about two-tenths of a milligram, it was enriched to nearly 80 percent, a level so high that is useful only for making nuclear weapons, not electric power. When it was disclosed last year that Iran used a similar method to attempt to enrich uranium, a process called laser enrichment, the Bush administration said that effort was clear evidence that Tehran was seeking to build a nuclear weapon.” The International Herald Tribune quoting the New York Times, “Seoul Says Scientists Enriched Uranium; Government Tells of Rogue Program; a U.S. Policy Setback,” 3 Sept. 2004 by David Sanger 41 “In interviews late last week, diplomats with knowledge of both covert programs disclosed that South Korean scientists enriched uranium to levels four times higher than did their counterparts in Iran. Seoul conducted those experiments, in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, two years before Iran did and kept them secret for nearly two years after Iran's came to light, said the diplomats, who would discuss the investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency only on the condition of anonymity…Iran was far less successful than South Korea at laser enrichment, according to diplomats and IAEA reports. In 2002, Iranian scientists enriched uranium to about 15 percent while the South Koreans, working two years earlier, enriched uranium to 77 percent, well within the range necessary for a nuclear explosive.” The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14633-2004Sep11.html 42 “’Not only did they have an undeclared uranium-enrichment program, but they were actually making something close to bomb-grade, so you have to conclude someone wanted to develop a capability to make nuclear weapons,’ said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and head of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.” The Washington Post, “S. Korea Acknowledges Secret Nuclear Experiments; IAEA
Korea claimed these experiments were run without knowledge of the government, but as above, these experiments were run by government officials at government facilities. 43 The IAEA also negated this excuse, saying that the enrichment experiment was the culmination of at least 10 experiments by a team of 14 scientists over 8 years, and was authorized by the director of South Korea‘s atomic research institute. 44 These experiments were deliberately kept secret from the IAEA 45 by denying inspections on two separate occasions,46 and only letting the inspectors in over 2 years later,47 after the facility had been ―scrapped‖.48 When the inspectors were finally let in,
Announces Probe of Activities,” 3 Sept 2004 by Dafna Linzer and Joohee Cho: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56258-2004Sep2.html 43 “Seeking to explain the enrichment of uranium four years ago in his South Korean atomic research institute - an action that was covert until admitted last month to the International Atomic Energy Agency - the institute's director, Dr. Chang In Soon, cast all blame for the treaty-breaking experiment on ‘the crude curiosity of the research scientists.’ Dr. Chang's faulting of the scientists strains credulity because the researchers he sought to blame were government scientists working at a government institute.” The Boston Globe, “Korean Chain Reactions,” 8 Sept 2004 http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2004/09/08/korean_chain_reactions/ 44 “The agency's report described the test as the culmination of an eight-year sequence of ‘at least 10’ experiments by a 14-member team of scientists working with *director of South Korea’s atomic research institute+Chang's authorization.” The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear Agency's Headaches Proliferate; Report Details South Korean Cover-Up,” 25 Nov 2004, by James Brooke. 45 “Diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna said the agency had begun to suspect that South Korea was conducting nuclear experiments more than six years ago and said South Korean officials had worked hard to hide the experiments from inspectors. ‘They had a fairly elaborate plan involving denial and deception in order to evade detection by inspectors,’ said one diplomat who would discuss the agency's investigation only on condition of anonymity.” Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of '82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 September 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-194722.html 46 “On 10 December 2002 and again on 1 April 2003, the Agency requested permission from the ROK as a transparency measure to visit KAERI’s Laser Technology R&D Centre in Daejeon, in order to confirm the nature of activities undertaken at the Centre. Both requests were refused by the ROK. Following the entry into force of the ROK’s Additional Protocol, the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.” GOV/2004/84: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf 47 “’In 2001, the IAEA asked to conduct a regular inspection and was denied. That happened at least twice before the South Koreans, under some protest, allowed the inspectors in two years later,’ a diplomat said.” The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14633-2004Sep11.html 48 “We enriched 0.2 gram of uranium through a series of the experiments and then immediately scrapped the facility.” The Korea Herald, “Uranium test stemmed from curiosity,” 11 Sept. 2004, by Chang In-soon, president of
they were not allowed to take environmental samples. 49 In addition to scrapping the facility, documents relating to the laser research equipment that was used were also ―scrapped‖, along with documents relating to the lost uranium mentioned above.50 As already mentioned, the IAEA decided not to use Article III.B.4 to refer South Korea to the Security Council only two months after all these revelations occurred, even though their investigation was still ongoing. References to this investigation were removed prior to the release of the report,51 and the results of the investigation were never released. All of these revelations were revealed from September to November, 2004, and the IAEA BoG decided not to report South Korea to the Security Council on November 27. 52 Ten days before this decision was made, the Board was presumably making their decision about what to do about South Korea‘s clandestine nuclear weapons program. Actually, at that time the Board was concerned about uranium metal and laser enrichment experiments. These concerns, however, related to Iran, not South Korea. 53
the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in Daejeon, who approved the uranium enrichment experiments in 2000. 49 “…the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.” GOV/2004/84: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf 50 “’We understand the IAEA team does not care much about the scrapping of the documents on operation of the laser research equipment and lost metal uranium,’ an official said.” Yonhap News Agency, “UN Inspectors Leave South Korea After Nuclear Tests Probe,” 7 Nov. 2004 51 “An IAEA report to the Board of Governors this month on past undeclared activities in the Republic of Korea (ROK) did not include information from an ongoing inquiry by the Department of Safeguards into the reasons for the hidden work. Some IAEA officials suggested that an assessment was not called for, and would not be reported to the board in the future. The IAEA secretariat in early November deleted substantial language from an initial draft of the ROK report, according to sources. The expunged passages in part reflected an ongoing internal evaluation, being conducted in parallel with materials accounting verification, into the background and purpose of the hidden activities, they said.” Nucleonics Week, “IAEA Report on ROK Activities Didn't Include Assessment,” 2 Dec 2004 by Mark Hibbs 52 “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea Breathes Sigh of Relief Over IAEA Decision on Nuclear Tests,” 27 Nov. 2004, copy here: http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041127062418.4wammeol.html 53 “’There’s no reason why these guys should be playing around with uranium metal, and you don’t do laser enrichment to put electricity in a light bulb,’ said a Western diplomat on the IAEA Board of Governors.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Dissidents Claim Iran Obtained Weapon-Grade Uranium, Bomb Design From Khan,” 17 Nov 2004: http://nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/11/17/28119636-950b-4e67-9b4a-b2a2102183ec.html
Similar revelations regarding safeguards violations have occurred recently in as many as 15 countries, and none have resulted in a referral to the Security Council under Article III.B.4.54 This non-use of Article III.B.4 repeatedly over the course of decades sets a precedent as to its meaning and applicability. Goldschmidt‘s quote regarding Article III.B.4 is nonsense, and he knows it.
3) Summary Both of the reasons that Goldschmidt gives to show that ―the decision of the Board is in accordance to the IAEA Statute‖ are lies. The referral was illegal, and Goldschmidt knows it. He is a dirty liar.
2) They Could Have Done it Legally if They Wanted To!
―Given what the Agency has reported by now, as I will more fully develop later on (cf. point B. below), the BoG would also be justified in reporting Iran to the Security Council since, as provided under Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is ‗…not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded…‘‖ (italics in original)
“What Iran has yet to do is provide the IAEA sufficient information on the history of its centrifuge programme for it to satisfy itself that there are no ‘undeclared nuclear materials or activities.’ However, this alone can hardly constitute grounds for referring the country to the Security Council under Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute since the IAEA, in the past two years, has found discrepancies in the utilisation of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries. Among these are South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt. In 2002 and 2003, for example, South Korea refused to let the IAEA visit facilities connected to its laser enrichment programme. Subsequently, though Seoul confessed to having secretly enriched uranium to a 77 per cent concentration of U-235 — a grade sufficient for fissile material — neither the U.S. nor EU suggested referring the matter to the UNSC.” The Hindu, “Iran and the Invention of a Nuclear Crisis,” 21 Sept 2005, by Siddharth Varadarajan: http://hinduonnet.com/2005/09/21/stories/2005092105231000.htm
If the BOG would have been justified in reporting Iran to the Security Council under Article 19, THEN WHY DIDN’T THEY DO SO! As stated earlier, Article 19 of INFCIRC/153 is the only legal route available to refer Iran to the Security Council. If referring Iran to the Security Council using Article 19 was warranted, then the BOG would have taken this route. The Board did not take this route, because they knew that doing so would be grossly illegal. It would have been grossly illegal because Article 19 allows a country to be referred to the Security Council if the IAEA ―is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.‖ This is not the case with Iran, because the IAEA has verified that Iran has not diverted nuclear material OVER AND OVER AND OVER AGAIN. I covered this previously in a footnote, but let‘s put it in the paper this time. To repeat: Goldschmidt, using the language of Article 19, says that the IAEA is “not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.” (emphasis in original) Let‘s see what the IAEA says:
―To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.‖ GOV/2003/75 ―All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.‖ GOV/2004/83 ―As indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.‖ GOV/2005/67 ―…the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran‖ GOV/2007/22
―The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖ GOV/2008/4 ―The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖ GOV/2009/8 ―As has been reported in previous reports, the Agency continues to verify the nondiversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖ GOV/2009/35 ―The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖ GOV/2009/55 ―The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖ GOV/2009/7455 (emphasis added to all)
Let‘s highlight the opposing statements using ―MingLiu‖ font: Goldschmidt: The Agency is “not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.” IAEA: “The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.”
Do you understand why I call Goldschmidt a liar? Later, Goldschmidt claims that all the above statements made by the IAEA regarding non-diversion are false. We will address that when we get to it.
See footnote 13
3) Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right
Goldschmidt: ―The decision of the Board does not contradict IAEA practice. One should remember that in his February 2004 report to the BoG (GOV/2004/12) the Director General stated that Libya was ‗in breach of its obligation to comply with the provision of its Safeguards Agreement‘. Based on that report the Board adopted by consensus a resolution [GOV/2004/18] where it ‗finds, under Article XII.C. of the Statute, that the past failures to meet the requirements of the relevant Safeguards Agreement identified by the Director General constituted non-compliance…and requests the Director General to report the matter to the Security Council for information purposes only‟.‖ (emphasis in original) It is correct that Libya was also found to be non-compliant under Article XII.C, even though Libya, like Iran, had not been accused of a violation in relation to an IAEA project. In that sense the Board did ―not contradict IAEA practice‖ by illegally referring Iran to the Security Council, because they also illegally referred Libya to the Security Council as well. However, the act of doing something illegal more than once does not justify it, or legalize it. It was illegal when they did it to Libya, and it was illegal when they did it to Iran.
Beyond this simple fact, there are also many differences between the Iranian and Libyan cases, which Goldschmidt does not mention. For example, Libya supposedly 56
Contrary to the news reports at the time, Libya never said that it had a nuclear weapons program. They said that that they had programs that “can lead to the production of internationally banned weapons” (New York Times, “Libyan Call Against Arms,” Dec. 20, 2003 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/world/libyan-call-againstarms.html ) Libya said that their nuclear program could have led to nuclear weapons, but they never said that they had the intention of doing so. Any peaceful nuclear program can lead to nuclear weapons, but that requires a conscious decision to do so. The only issue mentioned by the IAEA that related to “nuclear weaponization issues” was that Libya was in possession of some documents relating to nuclear weapon design and fabrication. However, Libya
had an active program for ―developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,‖57 and Iran did not. Even so, Libya was reported to the Security Council ―for information purposes only,‖58 meaning that the Security Council was ―not urged to consider sanctions against the North African country.‖59 This is a key difference, and is not discussed by Goldschmidt, although this part of the Libya resolution and was included in his quote. Even though Libya‘s situation was much more serious than Iran‘s due to their ―admitted‖ nuclear weapons program, the IAEA ―[praised] Libya‖60 in their Resolution, while Iran was referred to the Security Council and received sanctions even though they had no nuclear weapons program. This is discriminatory action by the IAEA, which is illegal under international law and the IAEA Statute.61 Goldschmidt points out that the president of the Security Council welcomed Libya‘s decision ―to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.‖62 (italics in original) Iran, however, received sanctions from the Security Council even though no evidence has ever been found of any nuclear weapons program. Would Iran have avoided sanctions if they had a nuclear weapons program and terminated it (like Libya) rather than never having had one to begin with?
also said that it “did not take any steps to assess the credibility or explore the practical utility of the information available in the documents,” and added that they had “no national personnel competent to evaluate the data and would have asked the supplier for help in the event it had opted to take further steps to develop a nuclear weapon”. The IAEA said that “initial inspections of these locations did not identify specific facilities currently dedicated to nuclear weapon component manufacturing” (GOV/2004/12: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf ). A subsequent report reiterated that “to date, the Agency’s inspections have not led to the finding of specific facilities related to nuclear weapon component design, manufacturing or testing.” (GOV/2004/33: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf). There have been no reports on the issue since that time. It is logical to assume that if the IAEA had since found evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Libya, it would have been reported. A lack of any reporting on this issue suggests that Libya’s assertion that they did not have a nuclear weapons program were true. 57 Paragraph (a) of GOV/2004/18: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf 58 Paragraph 4 of GOV/2004/18: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf 59 Agence France Presse, “UN Nuclear Watchdog Praises Libya in Draft Text,” March 9, 2004 by Michael Adler. 60 ibid 61 See Article IV.C. 62 Goldschmidt gives no reference for this quote, but it is from Press Release SC/8069 of the Security Council’s 4949th meeting on April 22, 2004, available here: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8069.doc.htm
Goldschmidt then points out that ―Libya signed the Additional Protocol in March 2004 and ratified it in August 2006, in sharp contrast to the actions taken by Iran, since 2005, in the opposite direction.‖ Goldschmidt fails to detail what actions taken by Iran he thinks are in the ―opposite direction,‖ or why these actions were only taken ―since 2005.‖ Goldschmidt says that Libya signed the Additional Protocol, but Iran did so as well, on 18 Dec 2003.63 Iran, however, suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol on 28 Sept 2005.64 This is why Goldschmidt says that Iranian actions were in the opposite direction ―since 2005.‖ Goldschmidt, however, does not explain why Iran suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol. They did so because 4 days earlier the IAEA had passed their resolution (GOV/2005/17) finding Iran non-compliant. This finding by the IAEA was illegal, as explained above, and this illegal action by the IAEA prompted Iran to suspend the Additional Protocol. Iran‘s suspension of the Additional Protocol, however, was legal, because it had never been ratified. Iran‘s cooperation with the terms of the Additional Protocol was voluntary. Iran did not feel like continuing to take voluntary measures with regard to cooperation when they were illegally referred to the Security Council. This is understandable. Another difference between Iran and Libya is that Libya‘s referral to the Security Council was made by consensus,65 which, except for two previous cases in the history of the IAEA,66 is how all BOG resolutions are passed. This tradition of passing resolutions by
IAEA, “Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards,” 18 Dec 2003 http://iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html 64 IRNA, “Majlis Approves Motion of Single Urgency to Suspend Additional Protocol,” 28 Sept 2005, copy here: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050928-irna04.htm 65 “The resolution was adopted by consensus,” in AFP, “UN Nuclear Watchdog Cites Libya for Non-Compliance,” March 10, 2004 66 “But on this resolution there was a vote, a procedure that has only happened twice during the last two decades and is regarded to be a course of last resort,” Anna Langenbach, Lars Olberg, and Jean DuPreez, “The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga ,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Nov, 2005, copy here: http://nti.org/e_research/e3_69a.html
consensus is termed the ―Spirit of Vienna.‖67 The IAEA lost its‘ ―spirituality‖ when dealing with Iran, and both the non-compliance resolution (GOV/2005/77)68 and the resolution referring Iran to the Security Council (GOV/2006/14)69 were not passed by consensus.
A) A Better Example
Rather than comparing the Iran case with an equally illegal action, it would be more instructive to compare the Iran case to a situation where the IAEA acted according to the law when referring a country to the Security Council. Unfortunately, such an example does not exist. There is an example, however, that can still be instructive to compare to the Iranian situation, which is the example of North Korea in 1993. Even though the IAEA acted illegally in that case as well and breached their Safeguards agreement with the DPRK (see Appendix A for details of this point), the procedure used to refer the DPRK to the Security Council did follow the applicable laws, and comparing this to the Iranian case will illustrate the illegal actions the IAEA has taken against Iran. Before comparing the DPRK and Iran cases, it is important to understand the meaning of Articles 71-77, and Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement.
i) Articles 18 and 19
“it is important to note that while voting is allowed under the Board's rules of procedure, the ‘spirit of Vienna’ calls for decisions without a vote,” Jean du Preez and Melissa Kessler, “Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Aug. 26, 2005, copy here: http://cns.miis.edu/stories/050826.htm 68 “But on this resolution there was a vote, a procedure that has only happened twice during the last two decades and is regarded to be a course of last resort,” Anna Langenbach, Lars Olberg, and Jean DuPreez, “The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga ,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Nov, 2005, copy here: http://nti.org/e_research/e3_69a.html 69 See note 14 of the Greenpeace briefing, “An Overview of Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and Turkey,” Feb 2007, copy here: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/nuclear-facilities-iran-israel-turkey.pdf
When issues arise concerning violations of safeguards agreements by member states, the IAEA may take the following steps, which ultimately lead to the referral of the states to the Security Council:
The IAEA may call for a Special Inspection: There are three types of inspections available to the IAEA. The first are called ad hoc inspections, which relate to the period just after a Safeguards Agreement comes into force, the purpose of which is to verify the information contained in the initial report provided to the IAEA. These inspections are provided for in Article 71. The second types are called regular inspections, which are the routine inspections that are run in order to verify reports, status of nuclear materials, etc. These are provided for in Article 72. Article 76 states that for regular inspections, ―the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.‖ Subsidiary Arrangements are provided for in Paragraphs 39 and 40, and contain the details as to how the safeguards agreement will be applied in a particular country. These details include the monitoring of ―strategic points,‖ where inflows and outflows of nuclear material can be measured and verified by the IAEA. For a regular inspection, access outside of these ―strategic points‖ is not allowed. The third types of inspections are called special inspections, which may be used if ―information obtained from routine inspections is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities.‖ These are provided for in Article 73. The scope of special inspections is contained in Article 77. Article 77(a) says that the IAEA may ―make inspections in addition to the routine inspections provided for in Articles 78-82.‖ Articles 78-82 outline the ―frequency and intensity of routine inspections.‖ Although Article 77(a) says that the frequency of the regular inspections may increase in a special inspection, it says nothing about increasing the areas of access allowed in regular inspections. Article 77(b) does address issues relating to access, and says that the IAEA may ―obtain access…to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76.‖ In light of what was said about Article 76 above, this means access to information outside of the
―strategic points‖ agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. This additional access, however, must be ―in agreement with [the member state].‖ If the IAEA and the member state cannot agree to the details of this additional access, the issue will then be resolved ―in accordance with Articles 21 and 22,‖ which involves a discussion of the issue before the Board, or arbitration.
Step 2): The IAEA may decide that an issue is ―essential and urgent‖. Article 77, which discusses Special Inspections, introduces this next step available to the IAEA if Special Inspections do not resolve a problem. It says that if an action by the member state is considered to be ―essential and urgent,‖ then ―Article 18 shall apply.‖ Articles 18 and 19 fall under the heading ―Measures in Relation to Verification of nonDiversion.‖ These are the articles that relate to possible measures that the IAEA can take in relation to diversion issues. Article 18 says that if the Board ―decides that an action by [the member state] is essential and urgent to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons,‖ then the Board may call upon the member state to ―take the required action without delay.‖
Special Inspections involve minor issues that can possibly be resolved with additional inspections, but ―essential and urgent‖ issues relate to ―verification of non-diversion,‖ which is much more serious. The ―exclusive purpose‖ (Article 1) of safeguards is to verify that ―special fissionable material‖ is ―not diverted to nuclear weapons,‖ and if an issue relating to diversion is identified, it is ―essential and urgent‖ that it be resolved. If it is not, it will lead to the matter being referred to the Security Council via Article 19.
Article 19 states that if the IAEA ―is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,‖ then the board ―may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute.‖ The reports in Article XII of the Statute are made to ―all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.‖ The two articles need to be read together to be understood correctly, because ―paragraph 19 connects paragraph 18 to Article XII(C).‖ 70 If the ―essential and urgent‖ issues of Article 18 cannot be resolved, then the board will ―not be able to verify that there has been no diversion,‖ and, according to Article 19, they ―may then make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII.‖ It is through unresolved ―essential and urgent‖ issues that a member state gets referred to the Security Council. There are two possible ways that these ―essential and urgent‖ issues can remain unresolved. Either the IAEA investigates the ―essential and urgent‖ issues and does not come up with satisfactory results, or the particular nation does not allow the IAEA to investigate the issues to begin with.
ii) The DPRK
Now we can look at the DPRK issue. The Safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA went into force on April 10, 1992 and ad hoc inspections to confirm the initial report began in May of 1992.71 Beginning in July of 1992, ―inconsistencies began to emerge‖ between the information obtained from the IAEA inspections and the data supplied by the DPRK. (See Appendix A about these inconsistencies.) Over the next 7 months, the IAEA attempted to obtain additional information and access to two sites for further inspection. The DPRK did not cooperate with either request. Due to the fact that the IAEA was unable to address these inconsistencies, on Feb. 9, 1993, the IAEA took Step 1 above and requested a ―special inspection‖. Over the next two weeks no further progress was made and therefore the Board proceeded to Step 2
David Sloss, “It’s Not Broken, So Don’t Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Summer, 1995, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 71 A summary of events is included in INFCIRC/419: http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html
by passing a resolution72 deciding that it was ―essential and urgent‖ for the DPRK to provide additional information and to provide access to two additional sites. The resolution was passed on Feb. 25, 1993, and gave the DPRK an additional month to respond. Instead of responding positively, on March 12, the DPRK gave a 90 day notice that it was withdrawing from the NPT.73 On March 18, the IAEA adopted another resolution74 notifying the DPRK that the Safeguards agreement remained in force in spite of the DPRK notice of withdrawal. The next day the Director General informed the DPRK that unless they cooperated within the next two weeks, he would have ―no choice but to report non-compliance when the Board met again on 31 March.‖75 On March 31, the Director General reported to the BOG that:
―as of now, the DPRK continues to be in non-compliance with its general obligation to co-operate in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement provided for in Article 3 of that Agreement, More specifically, it continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77 and Article 71 of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403 (Articles 18, 73 and 77) and also to deny the access required for the purpose of ad hoc inspections (Article 71). As a result, the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.‖76
It was the Director General (DG) who determined non-compliance and reported the noncompliance to the Board (it is the Director General that normally reports non-compliance to the Board – but this was also not what happened with respect to Iran, which we will discuss below), and specific reasons were given for the non-compliance finding. The
GOV/2636: http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3 INFCIRC/419, Annex 7: http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex7 74 GOV/2639: http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex10 75 GOV/2643, March 30, 1993, Paragraph 11 76 GOV/2643, paragraph 12
non-compliance finding was reached because the DPRK was given one month to resolve the ―essential and urgent‖ issues, and those issues were not addressed by the DPRK. Therefore, after the one month deadline the DG found the DPRK non-compliant and, as a result, declared that the Agency was unable to verify that there was no diversion. Article 19 says that if the Board ―is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,‖ then they ―may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute,‖ and this is exactly what the Board did. The day after the Director General reported to the Board that the DPRK was noncompliant because he was ―unable to verify that there has been no diversion,‖ the Board passed a resolution77 finding that ―the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency‖ and also found that,
―pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖
As a result, they decided,
―as required by Article XII.C of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.‖
The resolution of the Board followed Article 19 to the letter. This is the way a nation should be referred to the Security Council.
Because the report was made to ―all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations,‖ the General Assembly was able to act on the report by issuing a resolution (which passed by a vote of 140-1, with North Korea as the only dissenting vote78) that ―urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.‖79
The path to a legal Security Council referral, as seen above with the DPRK, is as follows: Serious issues can arise that bring into doubt the question of non-diversion, the ―exclusive purpose‖ of safeguards. Because the issues relate to non-diversion, they are deemed ―essential and urgent,‖ and need to be resolved promptly. A deadline is given, and if the state does not resolve the issues within that time, then the Director General decides that the state is in non-compliance. The non-compliance finding is made because the ―essential and urgent‖ issues remain unresolved. Once the state is found non-complaint, the Board may decide that it is unable to verify non-diversion (which took one day in the case of the DPRK), and the state is then referred to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Let‘s compare this to what happened with Iran. On 6 June 2003 the Director General released a report stating the Iran ―failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement,‖80 and another DG report on 26 August 200381 provided an update on the original report. On 12 September 2003, the BOG passed a resolution82 based on these reports that decided it was ―essential and urgent in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material‖ that Iran takes certain actions by the end of October of that year. This is similar to the BOG resolution passed on 25 Feb. 1993 83 against the DPRK which decided that it was ―essential and urgent in order to resolve differences
The Washington Times, “N. Korean Retaliation Feared Over Sanctions,” November 2, 1993 by Michael Breen A/RES/48/14, November 1, 1993: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r014.htm 80 GOV/2003/40: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf 81 GOV/2003/63: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf 82 GOV/2003/69: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf 83 GOV/2636: http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3
and to ensure verification of compliance with [their safeguards agreement]‖ that the DPRK take certain actions within one month.
Up to this point the situation is very similar to that of the DPRK. In both cases issues arose that brought into doubt the question of non-diversion. (The issues brought up in the Iran case are without justification just as in the DPRK case, but we are concentrating on the procedures here and not the facts that they are based on). In both cases, these issues were declared by the Board to be ―essential and urgent‖ under Article 18, and in both cases a deadline was given for the issue to be resolved. The Board was slightly more lenient with Iran than with the DPRK, because they gave Iran 6 weeks to resolve the issues, and the DPRK was given only one month. How generous. A decision by the Board deciding, in accordance with Article 18, that certain actions are ―essential and urgent‖ is critical, because if these issues are not addressed satisfactorily, then the Board will likely find, in accordance with Article 19, that it ―is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.‖ The DPRK did not respond to their ―essential and urgent‖ issues, and as a result they were found to be non-compliant and referred to the Security Council in accordance with Article 19 just over one month later. So what happened in the case of Iran? Unlike the DPRK, the IAEA stated that in response to the ―essential and urgent‖ request:
―Iran [showed] active cooperation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran‘s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews.‖
The IAEA then stated that ―this [was] a welcome development.‖ 84 As a result of Iran‘s cooperation the IAEA was able to resolve the ―essential and urgent‖ issues. On 26
Paragraph 50 of GOV/2003/75:
November 2003 the IAEA reported that ―Iran has taken the specific actions deemed essential and urgent and requested of it in paragraph 4 of the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69)‖85 (emphasis added) The IAEA also stated that ―there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program.‖
Unlike the DPRK case, Iran cooperated fully with the request for information to the ―essential and urgent‖ issues, and those issues were resolved. Therefore, no referral to the Security Council was warranted at the time, and no referral was made. The only way a referral to the Security Council can be made legally is if a request for ―essential and urgent‖ information is ignored or if the issues cannot be resolved. Because the ―essential and urgent‖ issues were resolved in the Iran case, a referral to the Security Council cannot be legally made until more ―essential and urgent‖ issues arise. Only if Iran were not able to resolve any new ―essential and urgent‖ issues could a legal referral be made. After this incident in 2003, however, no other decision was ever made requiring Iran to provide ―essential and urgent‖ information, and therefore the referral to the Security Council that eventually did occur is illegal because it did not follow Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement, which is the only legal route for referral to the Security Council.86
http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf 85 GOV/2003/81: http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf 86 “Aghazadeh *Iran's vice president and president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran+ outlined that, in Iran's view, the Security Council can be brought to bear in a case of noncompliance ‘only if the IAEA has established its inability to verify that no diversion (of nuclear material) to military purposes has occurred,’ under Article 19 of Infcirc-153, the model protocol for Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. Some Vienna officials close to ElBaradei told Nucleonics Week they looked with favor at that interpretation. They pointed out that, in ElBaradei's opening statement to the governors on Sept. 19, he said that, as a report from the IAEA on Sept. 3 to the board ‘makes clear, Iran continues to fulfill its obligations under the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol by providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities, and other locations.’ These officials also said that statements by EU delegations during the board meeting, which attacked Iran for having threatened to terminate implementation of the Additional Protocol should the Iran nuclear dossier be sent to the Security Council, were ‘nothing less than hypocritical.’ For six years after the EU signed the protocol, and before ratification, EU states did not implement the protocol, they said. Japan, another supporter of the EU resolution on Sept. 24, took five years before it implemented the protocol after Japan had signed it, the officials said.” Nucleonics Week, “Iran faces decision whether to enrich U, escalating conflict,” September 29, 2005, by Mark Hibbs
When the BoG referred the DPRK to the Security Council, the resolution stated that they decided, ―as required by Article XII.C. of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded…‖. (GOV/2645) The referral was made legally through Article 19 because the DPRK did not respond to the ―essential and urgent‖ issues. When the BoG referred Iran to the Security Council, however, the resolution simply stated that they decided ―to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.‖ (GOV/2006/14) There was no mention of Article 19, which is the only legal route to Security Council referral, because Iran had taken care of all the ―essential and urgent‖ issues. There was also no mention of the ―Agency's inability to verify nondiversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,‖ because in the case of Iran there was no diversion.
Under what circumstances was Iran Found to be non-compliant and referred to the Security Council? The finding of non-compliance was made on 24 September 2005, when the Board found that ―Iran‘s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency‘s Statute.‖87 As shown above, this finding of non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C is illegal. It also differs greatly from the DPRK case, which followed the procedures in the safeguards agreement. In that case, the DG gave the DPRK one month to resolve the ―essential and urgent‖ issues, and because the issues were unresolved after this time period elapsed, the DG found the DPRK noncompliant just over one month later, on March 31, 1993. In the Iran case, they were given 90 days to resolve their ―essential and urgent‖ issues, and Iran resolved those issues. A noncompliance decision is made if the IAEA is
―not able to verify that there has been no diversion‖ because of unresolved ―essential and urgent‖ issues. When the time limit given to the DPRK to resolve their ―essential and urgent‖ issues had elapsed, the finding of non-compliance was made less than 1 week later. This decision must be made immediately because noncompliance indicates an inability to verify diversion, which is a very serious issue. In the case of Iran, however, the finding of non-compliance (GOV/2005/77) occurred nearly 2 years after the report that the finding was based on (GOV/2003/75), (and nearly 2 years after all ―essential and urgent‖ issues had been resolved anyway). The fact that the IAEA waited nearly 2 years to make a finding of non-compliance shows that the issue was not serious, was not in response to an ―essential and urgent‖ issue, was not related to diversion, and was illegal. In the case of the DPRK, the referral to the Security Council was made in the same resolution as the finding of noncompliance. This is understandable because a finding of noncompliance means that the BoG is ―not able to verify that there has been no diversion,‖ which is a critical issue that must be dealt with immediately. In Iran‘s case, the referral to the Security Council (GOV/2006/14) was made over 4 months after the finding of non-compliance.88 Once again, this shows that the finding was a political decision, and not a response to the events. There is also the issue of the referral itself. The Statute says that ―the Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.‖ (Article XII.C) In the case of the DPRK, the BoG did indeed decide ―to report the DPRK's non-compliance… to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.‖ (GOV/2645) In the case of Iran, however, the BOG decided to ―report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.‖ (GOV/2006/14) For Iran, the referral was made only to the Security Council, and not to the General Assembly as required by the Statute. The reason this illegal action was taken was understandable, since nobody wanted the General Assembly to be able to comment on all the illegal actions taken by
the IAEA and the BOG, so the BOG didn‘t give them the opportunity to do so, which is also illegal.
4) Goldschmidt Is Not Just a Liar; He is a Bad Liar
―Under the IAEA Statute inspectors are to report non-compliance to the Director General ‗who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors‘. But Article XII.C of the Statute does not require the Director General to explicitly use the words ‗noncompliance‘ in order to report non-compliance to the Board. Inspectors should report facts which they consider constitute non-compliance.‖ (italics in original)
This is insane. Regarding inspectors, he says that they should report ―facts which they consider constitute non-compliance.‖ Is Goldschmidt insinuating that inspectors should only report facts that relate to non-compliance, and since only facts relating to noncompliance are being reported, then there is no need to use the term ―non-compliance‖? It seems so. Does Mr. Goldschmidt believe that when a country is in compliance, then the inspectors don‘t report anything? In that situation they are mute, and have nothing to say? This is insane. In reality, inspectors make detailed reports of all their visits, and their findings may or may not relate to non-compliance. In fact, if they don‘t use the term ―non-compliance,‖ the reason just may be that their findings do not relate to noncompliance! Imagine! Regarding the Director General, Goldschmidt says that the Statute ―does not require the Director General to explicitly use the words ‗non-compliance‘ in order to report noncompliance to the Board.‖ This is technically true. But if the Director General felt that what he is reporting constitutes non-compliance, why wouldn‘t he say so? Is he afraid to use the term ―non-compliance‖? Did his father beat him with a ―non compliance‖ stick
when he was young? The Director General was not afraid to report the DPRK as being non-compliant in 1993. It that case, the Director General reported to the BoG that:
―as of now, the DPRK continues to be in non-compliance with its general obligation to co-operate in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement provided for in Article 3 of that Agreement, More specifically, it continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77 and Article 71 of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403 (Articles 18, 73 and 77) and also to deny the access required for the purpose of ad hoc inspections (Article 71). As a result, the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.‖ (GOV/2643) (emphasis added)
In that case, the Director General had no problem using the term ―non-compliance,‖ and he was very specific about why he used that word. But in the case of Iran, Goldschmidt wants us to believe that even though the Director General did not use the word ―noncompliant,‖ that is what he really meant, and he didn‘t really have to use that word. Jesus Christ.
5) Who is Responsible for the Illegal Referral?
―But in any case the Statute requires the BoG to reach its own conclusion since Article XII.C clearly states that ‗The Board shall call upon the … State … to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred‘‖ (emphasis in Goldschmidt paper)
Even though this sentence does not give any context, it is technically correct, and as close to the truth as we can get from Goldschmidt. I guess he should be congratulated.
But although it is up to the Board to determine non-compliance, in the past this has been determined by the DG, as I have shown above with respect to North Korea. This is just another example of how the rules have changed for Iran. The essential point is that the finding of non-compliance was illegal, as explained above. If the Director General had made the finding, then that action by the Director General would have been illegal. Instead, the BoG made the finding, so the BoG made an illegal decision. All Goldschmidt has done here is to clarify who is responsible for the illegal act. It is the BoG is responsible; at least those countries that voted ―yes‖ for the resolution. The countries that voted ―yes‖ for the resolution, and who are responsible for the illegal act, are:
Argentina Australia Belgium Canada France Ecuador Germany Ghana Hungary India Italy Japan Netherlands Peru Poland Portugal Singapore Slovakia South Korea
Sweden United Kingdom United States The countries who voted ―no,‖ or abstained, are not responsible for the illegal act. Those countries are:
Algeria Brazil China Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Russia South Africa Sri Lanka Tunisia Vietnam Venezuela Yemen
―In his report to the BoG of November 2003 (GOV/2003/75) the Director General stated that ‗In the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement‘. These breaches were deliberate and undisputedly constitute ‗non-compliance‘ with Iran‘s Safeguards Agreement.‖ (italics in original)
Breaching a safeguards agreement is a much different matter than being in noncompliance. You can violate your safeguards agreement in a number of ways, and many, many countries have done so. This, however, does
not constitute non-
compliance. Non-compliance relates to diversion. Iran has never been found guilty of diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons. This is not hard to understand.
Goldschmidt claims that the safeguards breaches committed by Iran constituted noncompliance, and that this fact is ―[undisputed].‖ We have already covered why the BoG finding of non-compliance was illegal, and the claim that the non-compliance finding is ―undisputed‖ is plainly false on a number of levels.
To begin with, if the safeguards breaches undisputedly constituted non-compliance, then the BoG resolution that found Iran non-compliant would have been passed by consensus, like nearly all BoG resolutions are (see discussion above about the ―Spirit of Vienna‖). The non-compliance resolution, however, was not passed by consensus. One country, Venezuela, voted against it, but this does not reflect the amount of dissent. There were 12 countries that abstained from the vote, and these countries were also against the resolution. When Venezuela voted no, it was described as a ―tactical mistake,‖ because it gave the appearance that they were the only country against the resolution, when all the countries that abstained were also against it. 89 Twenty two
“The only opponent of the resolution was Venezuela, a state that has been engaged in a war of words with the U.S., a key supporter of the Iran resolution. Venezuela's ‘no’ vote was a ‘tactical mistake,’ one Vienna official said, since its effect was to suggest that the 12 abstentions by other states ‘were true abstentions, and not votes against the resolution.’” Nucleonics Week, “Iran Faces Decision Whether to Enrich U, Escalating Conflict,” 29 Sept 2005 by Mark Hibbs Voted yes: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India , Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Voted no: Venezuela. Abstained: Algeria, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Yemen.
countries voted ―yes‖ for the resolution, but with 13 countries against it, it is obvious that it was not ―undisputed‖.
Although 13 countries opposed the resolution, that did not prevent the media from misrepresenting the vote:
―Even so, the American campaign helped produce a consensus among International Atomic Energy Agency board members, although a fragile one. On Sept. 24, the board passed the resolution against Iran by a vote of 22 to 1, with 12 countries abstaining, including China and Russia.‖90
First of all, even if you don‘t count the abstentions as being against the resolution, there is one clear ―No‖ vote. When there is one ―No‖ vote, then the vote did not ―produce a consensus.‖ Maybe the authors of this article do not know what the word ―consensus‖ means. And, as stated above, the vote was in reality 22 for the resolution, and 13 against. 22-13 is clearly not a ―consensus,‖ even for the New York Times.
The amount of countries protesting the illegality of the referral would have been much higher if the IAEA BOG would have referred the matter to the General Assembly as well as the Security Council, as required by the Statute (see above). Also, international lawyers such as Michael Spies91 have explained that the referral was illegal. Countless other commentators have also commented on the illegality of the referral. The legality of the referral was most certainly ―disputed.‖ Regarding Goldschmidt‘s claim that Iran‘s breaches of its Safeguards agreement constituted noncompliance, we will cover this issue further as the specifics arise.
The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran's Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks To Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” David E. Sanger, copy here: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E0DA133EF930A25752C1A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&page wanted=4 91 See Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007
A) It‘s All Out of Context!
―B. Has Iran diverted nuclear material? As indicated above, in his letter of 29 March 2007, Iran‘s Ambassador claims that IAEA‘s inspectors ‗have confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear activities to prohibited purposes‘. This is likely based on the Director General‘s report of November 2004 (GOV/2004/83) to the BoG, where it is stated that ‗all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities‘, a statement which, taken out of context, (Goldschmidt‘s note at this point says: ―The next sentence in the report states that ‗The Agency is, however, not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran‟) may have been the source of a lot of misunderstanding among Member States and therefore needs to be clarified.‖ (emphasis in original)
Remember earlier how I quoted report after report that said the following (or something similar)?:
―The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.‖
We have now come to the point where Goldschmidt is going to explain why the Agency was wrong each and every time that they verified non-diversion (at least 8 times). So how does Goldschmidt start this process? He says that the verification of non-diversion was not really a verification of non-diversion! Goldschmidt claims that the verification quote was taken out of context! That‘s the cause of the ―misunderstanding‖!
Let‘s look at the context of the quote made by Goldschmidt:
―All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency is, however, not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, after an Additional Protocol is in force, is normally a time consuming process. In view of the past undeclared nature of significant aspects of Iran‘s nuclear programme, and its past pattern of concealment, however, this conclusion can be expected to take longer than in normal circumstances. To expedite this process, Iran‘s active cooperation in the implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and full transparency, are indispensable. The assistance and cooperation of other States, as indicated above, is also essential to the resolution of the outstanding issues.‖ (GOV/2004/83)
At the point in Goldschmidt‘s paper where he says that the verification of non-diversion was ―taken out of context,‖ he provides a footnote which quotes the second sentence of the above paragraph, which says that the IAEA is ―not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.‖ This is what Goldschmidt is referring to as the ―context‖ of the verification of non-diversion. As the rest of the above paragraph explains (which Goldschmidt does not quote), the statement that the IAEA is ―not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran‖ simply means that Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol.
If a State has not ratified the Additional Protocol, that does not mean that State has diverted nuclear material! Goldschmidt is a complete imbecile. (This is not really true. Goldschmidt knows he is lying, but he also knows the sheeple are too stupid to know it.) Goldschmidt brings this issue up again later, and I will cover it in detail then. Goldschmidt says that taking this issue ―out of context‖ has caused ―a lot of misunderstanding among Member States.‖ Member states know what the terms of the NPT are, and they also know when people are flat out lying. Member States know that
diversion consists of the diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, and they know that diversion does not mean not ratifying the Additional Protocol. This paragraph by Goldschmidt is pure deception for consumption by imbeciles.
B) If You Change the Definition of Diversion, Then They are Guilty! (Reason one)
Goldschmidt gives three reasons that the IAEA was wrong to verify non-diversion. Here is the first:
―First of all one has to recall that, in 2004, some if not most of what was ‗declared nuclear material in Iran‘ had previously been ‗undeclared‘ until its existence was discovered by the Agency. ‗Diversion‘ includes failure to declare nuclear material. Failure to declare importation of nuclear material, denying the import when questioned by the Agency and use of the material in undeclared nuclear activities clearly constitute diversion of nuclear material.‖ (emphasis in original)
―Failure to declare nuclear material‖ does
NOT constitute diversion.
Goldschmidt knows this, and to claim otherwise makes him a dirty liar. What constitutes diversion is mentioned several times in the appropriate documents. The IAEA Statute, for example, says that safeguards ensure that the processing of nuclear materials…
―will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes.‖
Article III of the NPT defines the purpose of safeguards, which is to prevent the…
―diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖
The INFCIRC/153 safeguards statement says in paragraph 1 that safeguards have the…
―exclusive purpose of verifying that [nuclear material] is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖
Paragraph 2 says that safeguards have the…
―exclusive purpose of verifying that [nuclear material] is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖
Paragraph 7 says that safeguards shall be applied in order to ascertain that…
―there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‖ (first italics in original, second added)
Article 18 says that ―in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,‖ then the BOG can order the state to take action in response to ―essential and urgent‖ issues. Article 19 says that if the BOG ―finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,‖ then it can refer the State to the Security Council. Finally, Article 28 says that the ―objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown.‖ Do you recognize the similarity in these definitions? ―Diversion‖ involves the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES! 92 Guess what? When non-liars define diversion, they do so in following the appropriate document:
―According to the IAEA Statute, the four primary functions of the Agency are…to establish and administer safeguards to prevent diversion to military uses…‖93 ―President Eisenhower proposed establishing the IAEA, which would sponsor the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and apply safeguards to ensure no diversion of nuclear material to military purposes.‖94 ―Safeguards enable the IAEA to detect diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; the likelihood of timely detection thus deters diversion.‖95 ―Full scope safeguards, which have long been a foundation of American nonproliferation policy, are crucial to the success of the IAEA. Inspections are intended to discover any diversion of nuclear materials from civilian programs to weapons development.‖96 ―As consideration for abandoning their nuclear aspirations, the non-nuclear States gain access to peaceful nuclear technology, including special fissionable material, but only if the material is subject to safeguards. The purpose of those safeguards, which are implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is ‗verification of the fulfillment
The IAEA Statute uses the term “military purposes,” but when the NPT and safeguards agreements were written, the term was changed to “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. This change was made to allow NNWS to use nuclear material for things like nuclear submarines or armor-piercing projectiles. These things have “military purposes,” but only “nuclear explosive” are banned by the NPT. See discussion of this issue here: http://pnwcgs.pnl.gov/fois/doclib/RockwoodTranscript(153).pdf 93 Edwin J. Nazario, “The Potential Role of Arbitration in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime,” The American Review of International Arbitration, 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 139, 1999 94 David S. Jonas, “The New U.S. Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way Out of the Wilderness?” Florida Journal of International Law, 18 Fla. J. Int'l L. 597, August, 2006 95 Barry Kellman, “Bridling the International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry,” American University Law Review, 43 Am. U.L. Rev. 755, Spring, 1994 96 Frank B. Cross and Cyril V. Smith, “The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Nonpolicy,” Catholic University Law Review, 33 Cath. U.L. Rev. 633, Spring, 1984
of its obligations assumed under [the NPT] with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.‘‖ 97 ―The NPT's principal tool for detecting cheating by member states on their nonproliferation obligations is the safeguards agreement, which Article III requires each NNWS to conclude with the IAEA for the purpose of ‗verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.‘‖98 ―Safeguards enable the IAEA to detect diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities at each declared facility to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; the likelihood of timely detection thus deters diversion.‖99
The appropriate documents explain what diversion is, and when people who are not dirty liars define what diversion is, they use the appropriate documents to explain it. When Goldschmidt was with the IAEA, he was not allowed to be a dirty liar. When Goldschmidt was with the IAEA, he defined diversion as follows:
―The technical objectives of these verification activities are to detect, within specified time-frames, the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown; and to deter such diversion by the risk of early detection.‖100
It‘s funny, but when Goldschmidt was with the IAEA he failed to mention that ―‗diversion‖ includes failure to declare nuclear material. I wonder why. Actually, Goldschmidt was
Davis Brown, “Enforcing Arms Control Agreements by Military Force: Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 26 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 159, Winter, 2003 98 Orde F. Kittrie, “Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It,” Michigan Journal of International Law, 28 Mich. J. Int'l L. 337, Winter, 2007 99 David S. Gualtieri, Barry Kellman, Kenneth E. Apt, and Edward A. Tanzman, “Advancing the Law of Weapons Control – Comparative Approaches to Strengthen Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Michigan Journal of International Law, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1029, Summer, 1995 100 st Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into the 21 Century,” Supplement to the IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1991, available here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull414/41403450122su.pdf
the head of safeguards when the news came out that there was ―previously undeclared nuclear material.‖ Why didn‘t he say that this constituted diversion when he was the head of safeguards? Do you know why he didn‘t? Because he would have been fired for being an imbecile if he did. Now that Goldschmidt is not part of the IAEA, he is free to spout off whatever nonsense he wishes.
The claim that not declaring nuclear material constitutes diversion is laughable. When you look at the details of this story, it becomes even more ridiculous. The incident Goldschmidt is referring to here is the ―secret‖ importation of uranium from China in 1991, which was used in ―secret‖ tests:
―In 1991 a major nuclear deal was signed when a senior Chinese official visited Iran, touring around facilities near the ancient city of Esfahan, one of Iran‘s most historic sites situated south of Tehran. Secretly that year, China provided Iran with three cylinders, one large and two small, containing 1.8 tons of Uranium ore, a deal that Iran did not report to the IAEA. This allowed the Iranians to carry out experiments in the 1990s without the IAEA noticing any diversion of existing material that the agency had been monitoring.‖101 ―In June 2003, an IAEA report cited Iran for failing to report 1.8 tons of natural uranium it imported from China in 1991.‖102 ―Tehran secretly imported 1.8 tons of nuclear material from China in 1991 and processed some of it to manufacture uranium metal, which would be of no use in Iran's commercial program but would be integral to weapons production.‖103
Gordon Corera, “Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 62 102 http://www.nti.org/db/china/niranpos.htm 103 L.A. Times, “Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,” 4 Aug 2003 by Douglas Frantz, see: http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/04/world/fg-nuke4/2
―[Iran] secretly imported 1.8 tons of uranium in 1991, never reporting this as required by the treaty.‖104
And from David Albright (Albright‘s involvement in ranian propaganda will be covered later):
―Iran failed to report that it had imported natural uranium (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4, and 400 kg of UO2) from China in 1991 and its transfer for processing.‖105
The only problem with this story is that it is yet another lie:
―At the 1991 IAEA General Conference in late September, official concern was raised about three batches of imported U3O8 in Iran that allegedly had not been reported to the IAEA. Sources said the matter was clarified to the satisfaction of the U.S. government only when IAEA officials, whom Iran had informed about the U3O8 transactions, agreed to share the information and confirm the presence of the material in Iran.‖106 (emphasis added)
Iran told the IAEA about the uranium.
This material was used in bench-scale lab experiments during the 1990‘s. On its face, this is a safeguards violation, but the issue is more complex that what it appears to be. Let‘s look at the details.
First of all, the amount of material involved in these experiments was 0.13 effective kilograms.107 To put that amount in perspective, in order to build a crude nuclear
New York Times. “Iran and Nuclear Weapons,” 22 June 2003, see: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/22/opinion/22SUN1.html 105 Statement of David Albright, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, “Iran’s Political and Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options,” 17 May 2006 106 Nuclear Fuel, “Nuclear Commerce at Issue As Tehran Leans Westward,” 9 Dec 1991 by Mark Hibbs 107 See footnote 6 on page 7 of GOV/2003/40:
weapon, you would need at least 40 Kg of highly enriched uranium. 108 This is over 300 times the amount of material that Iran imported. The amount of material that Iran imported was insignificant. This amount of material is so insignificant that it would normally be exempt from safeguards anyway. (This is probably why when Iran told the IAEA about this material when they imported it, it did not end up under safeguards. See the next section on Exemptions from Safeguards). The more important issue regarding Iran‘s enrichment experiments that used this material has to do with the ―Grand Bargain‖ of the NPT, which needs to be explained first before bringing up the actual issue.
i) The Grand Bargain
If you were to ask 10,000 Americans what they know about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, about 9,600 would say ―huh‖? Around 399 would say that it is a treaty designed to stop countries that don‘t have nuclear weapons from getting them. Maybe 1 in 10,000 would know the correct answer; that it was an agreement between non-nuclear weapon states (from now on NNWS) and nuclear weapons states where in return for not pursuing nuclear weapons, the NNWS were guaranteed certain things in return. This agreement is termed the ―Grand Bargain‖ of the NPT.
Before the NPT treaty was drawn up, every country in the world had the legal right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Do you think that the NNWS gave up this legal right just to be nice? Countries know that not having nuclear weapons exposes themselves to attack by Usrael. Do you think the NNWS decided not to pursue nuclear weapons because they like getting bombed by Usrael? That‘s not why. Countries gave up the
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf The definition of “effective kilogram” can be found in paragraph 104 of INFCIRC/153. 108 “A crude nuclear weapon would use 40-50 kilograms (88-110 pounds) of HEU; a more sophisticated design would require 12 kilograms (26 pounds) of HEU or 4 kilograms (9 pounds) of plutonium.” http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_terrorism/technical_issues/nuclearterrorism-overview.html
right to manufacture nuclear weapons because they were supposed to get something in return.
First, NNWS wanted the Nuclear Weapons States to guarantee not to attack them with nuclear weapons, or to make any threat to do so. This led to the passage of Security Council Resolution 255, which states that:
―…aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a nonnuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter‖109
(If Usrael does use nukes against Iran, then Russia, China, the UK and France would be obliged to come to Iran‘s aid. Of course, that would only really happen if western countries actually followed treaties.) Second, the NNWS wanted the nuclear weapons states to disarm their nukes ―at an early date.‖ From Article VI of the NPT:
―Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.‖
Disarming their nukes was supposed to have been done ―with a sense of urgency‖:
―Non-nuclear-weapon States have long harboured feelings of insecurity in a world where nuclear weapons continue to be possessed by some Powers…In that context, they called first for disarmament, notably nuclear disarmament, to be pursued with a sense of
urgency and, as long as that had not been achieved, for international security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was a major issue in the negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty in the 1960s.‖110
It is obvious to any sentient person that the US has been in violation of Article VI for decades.111 It is the US that has violates the NPT, not Iran.
Third, the NNWS wanted the right to the full nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear power. This is reflected in article IV of the NPT:
―Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty‖
The final right that was given to the NNWS relates to the previous one. Not only did the NNWS want the right to the full nuclear fuel cycle, but the nuclear weapon states were obligated to assist the NNWS in this regard. This is also reflected in Article IV:
―All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.‖
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF. 1995/6, 15 March 1995: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/docs/2162.htm 111 I don’t feeling like proving this fact in this paper. If you would like to start reading about this, you can start with: David Koplow, “Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 301, 393 (1993)
The US, then, is obligated under the NPT to HELP Iran build nuclear power facilities.112
When the NPT was being discussed in the Senate during the negotiation period, this issue was brought up:
―Senator [John J.] Williams: One feature of this is that we will share knowledge of nuclear power for peaceful purposes with other nations without any regard to the cost of development, and so forth. Does that mean we are going to make it available in unlimited amounts, and if so, is Russia likewise sharing her knowledge on the same basis? Secretary [David D.] Rusk: The Soviet Union and we undertake the same obligation under this treaty on that particular point… Senator Williams: And this sharing of knowledge could be applicable equally to all signatories? Secretary Rusk: That is correct, sir, as the treaty puts it without discrimination.‖113
During the NPT negotiations, when the nuclear weapon sates were trying to convince the NNWS of how great the NPT was going to be for their countries, Arthur Goldberg (the UN Ambassador for the United States) made the following statement to the rest of the world at the UN General Assembly:
―On behalf of the United States and with the full authority of my Government, I pledge in this open forum and before this important committee of the Assembly unreservedly that, in keeping with the letter and spirit of this treaty provision, we will appropriately and equitably share our knowledge and experience, acquired at great cost,
“*The NPT+ imposes an obligation on all parties to contribute to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in non-nuclear-weapon states and with due consideration to the needs of the developing world.” Sepehr Shahshahani, “Politics Under the Cover of Law: Can International Law Help Solve the Iran Nuclear Crisis?” Boston University International Law Journal, 25 B.U. Int'l L.J. 369, Fall (2007) 113 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 10, 11, 12, and 17 (1968)
concerning all aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the parties to the treaty, particularly the non-nuclear parties. This is not only a promise; when this treaty takes effect it will become an obligation under a treaty which, when approved by our Congress and President, will be, under our Constitution, a part of the supreme law of the land.‖114
A month later, again speaking to the UN General Assembly, Goldberg gave more details on how generous the US was going to be to the NNWS after they signed the treaty:
―But I should like now to deal with one particular assertion, an important one, namely, that this prohibition would retard the scientific and technological development of the non-nuclear parties to the treaty. This is not the case. This treaty will in no way limit the freedom or capacity of its signatories to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy - apart from nuclear explosive devices, the technology of which is essentially indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. Indeed, the treaty binds those parties in a position to do so to co-operate with developing countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy; and it further obligates the nuclear Powers - and I wish to emphasize this once again - to make available to treaty signatories nuclear explosions for peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis and at a cost for the devices used which excludes any charge for research and development, which is the major charge for any nuclear Power that has experimented in this area. While this treaty was still in negotiation, the President of the United States, President Johnson, gave the following instructions to the United States negotiators, and I should like to share them with the members of this Committee:
I have instructed our negotiators to exercise the greatest care that the treaty not hinder the non-nuclear Powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits of scientific progress
“Statement by Ambassador *Arthur+ Goldberg to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 26, 1968” A/C.1/PV.1556, pp. 13-40, reprinted in Documents of Disarmament, 1968, p. 221, 228
and we will continue to act accordingly. Through IAEA, through EURATOM, and through the international channels, we have shared - and will continue to share - the knowledge we have gained about nuclear energy. There will be no barrier to effective co-operation among the signatory nations. (Documents of Disarmament, 1967, pp. 98-99)
The United States negotiators followed that directive faithfully. I emphasized in my last statement the importance which we attach to article IV in furthering international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. In pursuance of our obligation under this treaty, the United States will appropriately and equitably share its technological knowledge and experience, and particularly the non-nuclear parties, in the important areas of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research. On the contrary, this treaty opens the way for greater knowledge and greater opportunity for the non-nuclear Powers to share information and move forward in the field of knowledge related to nuclear development. Thus, under this treaty, the great, wide and varied field of research and development in nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses will not only remain open, but will be opened wider to all parties that wish to engage fully their talents and capabilities in this filed. I could not hope to set forth in this presentation all the facets of this modern science – that would take many volumes and would be beyond my capacity. As examples, however, and to remind us all of the depth and breadth of this science and technology, let me mention just a few of these areas of nuclear science. The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production is accessible now, and will become more accessible under the Treaty, to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also that advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder power reactors which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume. Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced filed of science, that of controlled thermonuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of
hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermonuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the treaty, but, on the contrary, will be accelerated by it. The same will be true of the development and use of research reactors for specialized application in science and engineering; the development, for example, of reactors for desalting sea water; and the very important uses of radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine and the physical sciences. This list could be elaborated at great length. The point is that there is no basis for any concern that this treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology. On the contrary, under the express provisions of the treaty they stand to gain greater assistance through an expanded exchange of information in these areas. In this context some further comments are in order on the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions. The specialized technology involved in the production of nuclear explosive devices is not such a crucial element in other aspects of nuclear science that its absence would retard progress in their peaceful application. In any case, the limited amount of ‗spin-off‘ for such peaceful application from the development of nuclear explosive devices has long since been made available by the United States to all countries that might wish to use it. It should also be realized that the treaty does not forbid anyone to engage in research and development in the conventional engineering for peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. It is only the production or acquisition of the explosive device itself that is precluded; and it is precluded for the reason I have stated, that the device is indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon. There exists hundreds of reports, available to all, for those who wish to begin now to study peaceful applications of nuclear explosions…‖115 (emphasis added)
I have never read such a heaping pile of BS in my entire life.
“Statement by Ambassador *Arthur+ Goldberg to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Security Assurances and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 15, 1968” A/C.1/PV.1568, pp. 15-35, reprinted in Documents of Disarmament, 1968, p. 336, 343. About the “peaceful applications of nuclear explosions,” see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull113/11303580312.pdf
Contrary to everything that the US and Goldberg promised, it has been US policy for the past 30 years to do everything in its power to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear technology. In 1983, 4 years after the Iranian revolution, Iran attempted to continue the nuclear power program that had been started by the Shah, and they invited the IAEA to help:
―Entec was founded by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974. Its work was halted by the 1979 Islamic revolution, but in 1981 the new government concluded that the country's nuclear development should continue. In 1983, the AEOI then invited the IAEA to survey Entec and another installation, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Herman Vera Ruiz, an IAEA official tasked by Deputy Director General Maurizio Zifferero to conduct a mission to Iran, visited Entec in October 1983.‖116
Initially, the IAEA planned to assist Iran, which is, after all, their purpose:
‗In November, [Ruiz] recommended to Zifferero and to Director General Hans Blix that the IAEA provide assistance to move Iran's nuclear research program forward. Zifferero, who had a few years before facilitated supply of a plutonium hot laboratory from Italian industry to Iraq, looked with favor on the proposal to aid Iran's nuclear research, former officials said…After the IAEA mission to Iran, the Vienna agency was ready to help Iran move that program along. The summary of the report states that ‗a timely cooperation of the IAEA (with Entec) is highly recommendable‘ to overcome ‗a lack of practical experience and perhaps... a lack of contact with other scientists in more advanced institutes.‘ Ruiz wrote that ‗Though the overall objectives of Entec are quite clear and comprehensive, the short and medium term goals are undergoing revision to adjust them to a more realistic approach following the (Iranian) government's instructions.‘…The memo included a list of proposed ‗expert services‘ which the IAEA would perform in eight fields relevant to work going on at all of Entec's departments. For fuel cycle programs, these were to be carried out in the French language, since most of Entec's relevant personnel were previously trained by French
Nuclear Fuel, “U.S. in 1983 Stopped IAEA From elping Iran Make UF6,” 4 Aug 2003 by Mark Hibbs
experts. The proposed items included assistance and training in UO2 pellet and fuel element production and quality control procedures, ‗advice on the chemical engineering and design aspects of a pilot plant for fuel conversion,‘ and ‗advice on flow-sheet diagrams for uranium purification and conversion.‘ Separately, after the IAEA mission, the agency proposed setting up 10 fellowships of between three and six months each, covering areas including chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade UO2.‖117
Wonderful! This was going just like Goldberg had promised in his address to the General Assembly during the NPT negotiations! Maybe the West can keep their promises! Not really. What was Usrael‘s response to the IAEA‘s offer to help Iran? Let‘s see:
―Four years after the Islamic revolution, and two years after Iran's new leaders dusted off the nuclear program of the deposed Reza Shah Pahlevi, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in reactivating a research program to learn how to process U3O8 into UO2 pellets and then set up a pilot plant to produce UF6, according to IAEA documents obtained by NuclearFuel. Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then ‗directly intervened‘ to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. „We stopped that in its tracks,‟ said a former U.S. official… While some of the proposals quickly found approval by the IAEA's technical cooperation department, the former U.S. official said that after the U.S. objected in Vienna, the IAEA dropped plans to help Iran on fuel production and uranium conversion.‖118 (emphasis added)
Iran attempted to work on their nuclear program in full cooperation with the IAEA. Usrael prevented that from happening. The phrase ―we stopped that in its tracks‖ can be translated as ―we violated article IV of the NPT.‖ For fun, let‘s put the promise and the reality side-by-side.
―On behalf of the United States and with the full authority of my Government, I pledge in this open forum and before this important committee of the Assembly unreservedly that, in keeping with the letter and spirit of this treaty provision, we will appropriately and equitably share our knowledge and experience, acquired at great cost, concerning all aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the parties to the treaty, particularly the non-nuclear parties. This is not only a promise; when this treaty takes effect it will become an obligation under a treaty which, when approved by our Congress and President, will be, under our Constitution, a part of the supreme law of the land.‖
“we stopped that in its tracks”
Bu remember, it is Iran that violated the NPT! Funny.
Although the IAEA initially offered to help Iran, that attitude changed around 1986 (likely a direct result of US pressure):
―‗[The IAEA decision to aid Iran‘s nuclear research] was a few years before the IAEA and Zifferero began to change their mind‘ about the potential for proliferation in the Middle East, one source said.‖119
―Changing your mind‖ about helping Iran is a violation of the NPT by the IAEA. Let‘s not blame the start of the NPT violations with respect to Iran on Reagan. The violations started even before the Islamic revolution:
―The former U.S. official said that Entec had been set up on the basis of a bilateral cooperation deal between Iran and France. As a part of that cooperation, he said, France had agreed to aid Iran in the fuel cycle including uranium enrichment. U.S. President Jimmy Carter then objected to plans by France to help Iran produce fissile material and, the official said, French assistance on enrichment was halted…‖120
Jimmy Carter was violating the NPT long before Reagan got the chance. In 1984, Jane‘s Defence Weekly put out a story claiming that they had evidence that Iran was working on a nuclear weapon and that it would be ready in 2 years (these baseless stories about Iran being on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon are not a recent phenomenon – they have been ongoing for the last 30 years):
―Relying on press reports in the Arabian Gulf that quoted unidentified West German intelligence sources, Jane's said that Iran is entering the final stages of producing a bomb, which will be ready within two years. As evidence, Jane's said about 40 experts from a West German company had been dispatched to complete one of two unfinished 1300-Mw reactors in the southern Iranian city of Bushehr. The Iranian report appeared in the April 28 edition of Jane's Defense Weekly, which is published
by an organization recognized as an authority on weapons systems around the world. The editors of the publication insisted they stood by the story.‖121
Nobody believed the story, not even Israel!:
―A report in Jane's Defense Weekly that Iran is building a nuclear bomb was termed false this week by government sources in the U.S. and West Germany. A source at the London Institute for Strategic Studies called the story ‗balderdash.‘ Israeli sources who keep close tabs on nuclear developments in the Middle East were also skeptical of the report. And Iran's deputy minister for foreign affairs said the Jane's story was ‗a fabrication.‘‖122
The Jane‘s report was false, and Usrael did not even believe it. But even though the US government said they have no evidence that Iran was working on a nuclear weapon, they still announced that they would not aid Iran‘s program, and would not allow others to do so either:
―The State Department added that it has ‗no evidence‘ that Iran has repudiated or violated its commitment to the NPT. The State Department added, however, that it is ‗opposed to nuclear cooperation with Iran at this time. Iran is located in a region of tension and is at war with Iraq. Previous actions of the government of Iran do not provide us with great assurance that it will always abide by its international commitments. Thus, the U.S. will not consent to the transfer of U.S.-origin nuclear equipment, material or technology to Iran either directly or through third countries, where such consent is legally required. In addition, we have asked other nuclear suppliers not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran, especially while the Iran-Iraq war continues.‘‖123
Violation of Article IV in an official US Statement. Not surprising.
Nucleonics Week, “Jane’s Report on Iranian Nuclear Bomb is Termed ‘Balderdash’,” 3 May 1984 by Michael Knapik 122 Ibid 123 Ibid
After Reagan, it was Bush‘s turn to violate the NPT in 1991 by ordering India not to sell Iran a research reactor:
―The U.S. government will ‗strongly urge‘ India to withdraw an offer to sell a research reactor to Iran, a western diplomatic official said November 19. Indian officials confirmed the offer this week, but gave no details about the reactor. According to western official sources, the reactor to be supplied by India would be heavy-water moderated, possibly heavy-water cooled, fueled by natural uranium, and rated at 10to 15-MW(thermal). The reactor might be based on the successful design of the 100MW Dhruva reactor which India built at Trombay in the mid-1980s. U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew is expected in New Delhi soon to discuss the matter. Sources in India said that, in response to U.S. pressure, India would likely slow the sales plan.‖124
Also in 1991, the US violated the NPT again by convincing Argentina not to sell Iran UO2 conversion technology:
―About six months ago, Argentina agreed to supply Iran both a fuel fabrication facility and a uranium dioxide conversion plant. According to western officials, essential equipment for both facilities had been packed and was awaiting shipment from Argentina when the U.S. and other governments convinced Buenos Aires that Iran had other than civilian-use intentions for the facilities. ‗It was a last-minute effort,‘ one official said. ‗But Argentina was satisfied that the evidence presented was conclusive and that the equipment should not be exported.‘ According to one source, the intervention of Argentine President Carlos Menem was required to stop the shipment. Blockage of that shipment, sources said, led to cancellations of negotiations between Iranian and Argentine industry on supply of a pilot heavy water production facility. Teheran is also said to have approached Argentine and European industry for supply of hot-cell equipment that could be used to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel,
Nucleonics Week, “U.S. to Ask New Delhi to Back Off on Research Reactor Offer to Iran,” 21 Nov 1991 by Mark Hibbs and Neel Patri
although a well-placed U.S. official said Iran has not received any equipment that could be used for reprocessing fuel from the Chinese research reactor.‖125
Bush I also pressured Germany not to help Iran build the reactor at Bushehr:
―A U.S. congressional staffer said Washington has pressured Germany not to license exports of reactor technology to Iran. ‗Bonn has been told that export of the equipment would be considered an unfriendly act,‘ this source said…Since the Iran-Iraq War ended in a ceasefire, the German Foreign Office has justified the refusal to license the exports by German statutes which restrict exports to regions of conflict. These statutes, however, are expressly valid for transfers of weapons and military goods -but not for civil reactor technology. Refusal to license exports ‗has put the Bonn government on thin legal ice‘ and may invite compensation claims from Iran, one member of the IAEA Board of Governors said. ‗We are surprised the Germans cannot get back into the project.‘ Nonetheless, Germany will not license transfer of the reactor components to Iran.‖126
Germany is definitely on ―thin legal ice,‖ and although the case is not yet settled, Iran has sued Germany for billions:
―an Iranian official today urged the government to speed up the procedure for claiming 18.3 billion deutsche marks (10.6 billion U.S. dollars) from Germany for damages incurred to a submarine contract and suspension of a nuclear power plant in southern port city of Bushehr‖127
It was then Clinton‘s turn to violate the NPT. He cleaned out an entire nation of their uranium to prevent Iran from buying any:
Nucleonics Week, “Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from Argentina, China,” 24 Sept 1992 by Mark Hibbs Nucleonics Week, “German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished,” 7 Feb 1991 by Mark Hibbs 127 Xinhua News Agency, “Iran Claims 10-billion-dollar Compensation from Germany,” 13 April 1997
―Iran had visited Kazakhstan in 1992-1993, shopping for low-enriched uranium to power a reactor (this prompted a multi-million dollar U.S. program to remove from Kazakhstan its entire stock of enriched uranium).‖128
Iran then asked China for help. China agreed in 1996 to build a UF 6 plant in Iran, and the deal was being coordinated with the IAEA:
―The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the IAEA Department of Safeguards it will build a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant with Chinese aid, and then operate the facility under IAEA safeguards sometime after 2000. Against U.S. wishes, China will go ahead with plans to sell the UF6 plant to Iran, diplomatic sources in China told NuclearFuel last week. Last month the IAEA Department of Safeguards held what sources called a ‗transparency visit‘ at the Nuclear Technology Center in Isfahan, which is the designated location for the UF6 facility. These sources described the trip, which included a lengthy discussion with the director of the Isfahan center about the future of the complex, as ‗successful‘…Officials at the IAEA said that the Department of Safeguards has been officially informed by Iran that China will export the conversion plant to Iran. The IAEA was told that the plant would be completed sometime after 2000. The IAEA ‗has a limited amount of basic information‘ about the planned project, one Vienna official said. At a later date, sources said, it has been agreed that China and Iran will transfer design information on the facility to the IAEA for safeguards purposes.‖129
When Clinton violated the NPT, he even put it into writing:
―Senior Clinton administration officials said that it wasn't until the day of the formal meeting between President Bill Clinton and China's President Jiang Zemin October 29 that the Chinese provided ‗authoritative, written communications‘ that they would not engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran… At the press briefing, the officials, who spoke on background, said that several days earlier, ‗a general understanding‘ was
Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 26 Nuclear Fuel, “Iran Told IAEA it Will Build UF6 Plant at Isfahan, 16 Dec 1996 by Mark Hibbs
reached with the Chinese, ‗but that had to be reviewed and discussed at senior levels. So it wasn't really resolved until the very eve of the summit.‘ In fact, the official said, ‗today was when the final exchange took place.‘ The written assurances are confidential, but they will be discussed ‗in detail‘ with members of Congress, the administration official said. ..Officials said that China and the U.S. specifically agreed that under the terms of China's pledge to the U.S. to cease new trade with Iran, China will not sell to Iran any fuel cycle equipment or reactors that, thus far, have also been discussed by the two countries, and in one case, resulted in a letter of intent to supply enrichment-related equipment. In particular, U.S. officials said, the two sides agreed that China would not sell Iran any power reactors -- regardless of a 1991 agreement in principle by China to do so. Under terms of a Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation deal made about six years ago, China had agreed to sell the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) two Qinshan-1-class, 300-MW PWRs and build them in Karun in western Iran (NF, 1 Oct. '92, 4). According to U.S. officials negotiating with the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) last year, Iran and China had disagreed on the site where the plants were to be built. Officials then said privately that, in talks with U.S. agencies toward restarting bilateral nuclear commerce, China in 1996 agreed to a de facto moratorium on the PWR transfer, explaining formally that China and Iran continued to disagree over the seismic safety of proposed sites in Iran. Thus far, no equipment for the PWR project has been delivered to Iran by China. U.S. officials said last week that the deal has been annulled under China's pledge to Washington to cease future nuclear trade with Iran. Likewise, China has categorically agreed not to supply a heavy water-moderated, low-enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled reactor to Iran, officials said. This closely-held project had been under discussion by Iran and China as early as 1990 but it raised concern after Western governments concluded soon after that Iran in parallel aimed to import fuel fabrication and heavy water production facilities from Argentina (Nucleonics Week, 24 Sept. '92, 2). The U.S. intervened to prevent the Argentine equipment from being shipped to Iran, and then engaged China in talks to defer the reactor sale…Finally, U.S. officials said, China has scuttled its previously agreed-upon project to build a uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion plant in Iran. This project was a key target of U.S. negotiations with China over Iran trade this year and last, since Washington had concluded the UF6 plant could have no other purpose than to serve an indigenous uranium enrichment program in Iran…Under the
Sino-U.S. agreement, one U.S. official involved said, ‗there will be no fuel cyclerelated goods or materials exported to Iran.‘‖130
Although China illegally pulled out of the deal, they did sell Iran the plans to build the plant, and Iran told the IAEA that they were going to build it. When it was built, it was declared to the IAEA:
―At that time , sources reported that regardless of the agreement by China not to build the UF6 plant at Entec, AEOI reiterated to the IAEA that Iran would go ahead with construction of the facility. Sources said last week that while the U.S. has remained satisfied that China has held to its agreement not to build the plant in Iran, China sold all the blueprints to AEOI needed for the facility, allowing Iran to set up the conversion plant on its own. The plant was built at Entec beginning in 1997, and in 2000, Iran declared it to the IAEA.‖131
Iran follows the NPT. The US continually violates it.
Of course, Bush II was not going to be the only one not to violate the NPT. He got into the act as well:
―President Bush proposed recently that the 40 states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, operational enrichment or reprocessing plants. By denying the further spread of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology, President Bush seeks to establish a quasi-nuclear monopoly of sorts…The proposal by President Bush to deny states equipment for their civilian nuclear programs if they do not ratify the Additional Protocol constitutes a brash reinterpretation of Articles III and IV of the NPT. Article III requires nonnuclear-weapon states to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA on all nuclear activities and materials. Article IV emphasizes
Nuclear Fuel, “China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran When Two Projects Completed,” 3 Nov 1997 by Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik 131 Nuclear Fuel, “U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6,” 4 Aug 2003 by Mark Hibbs
the inalienable right of all NPT parties to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Notably, paragraph 3 of Article III states that ‗the safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty.‘ According to the accepted interpretation, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement fulfills obligations under Article III. In other words, Bush's proposal directly infringes upon the accepted interpretation grand bargain of the NPT -- that non-nuclear-weapon states renounce nuclear weapons in exchange for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agree to IAEA safeguards on related technologies. In exchange for ratifying the Additional Protocol, President Bush offers what is already established as an inalienable right -access to materials and equipment for civilian nuclear programs.‖132
Nations are not very happy with Usrael violating the NPT:
―The Zanger Committee and the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) both drew up guidelines on the kind of sensitive materials that could be transferred across borders. Many nations, especially those with developing economies, viewed the work of the Zanger Committee and the NSG as violating not only the spirit, but also the letter of the NPT when it came to Article IV, and moreover that the work of these groups is discriminatory in nature and harm their respective economies.‖133
All this activity by the US directed at denying Iran nuclear technology is a violation of the NPT, and it has been going on for decades.
ii) Iran‘s Enrichment Experiments
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, “Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determining Which States Should Have Access to What Nuclear Technology,” 28 Fletcher F. World Aff. 157, Summer 2004 by Natasha Bajema and Mary Beth Nikitin 133 Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 41
As it turns out, the US violation of the NPT in this way is very relevant to the issue of Iran running lab-scale experiments using nuclear material obtained from China. According to international law, if one party to a treaty violates the treaty, then the party affected by the breach is allowed to suspend the affected part of the treaty. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is titled ―termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach,‖ and states:
―2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: ... (b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State; ... 3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: ... (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty‖134
As a result of the continual violation of the NPT by the US, Iran was unable to get the assistance to develop their nuclear program that was granted to them by the treaty. Because of this, Iran had the legal right to suspend that part of the treaty, and to pursue nuclear technology on their own. This right to redress wrongs, regardless of the terms of a treaty, is called ―countermeasures‖ in international law. If one party to a treaty violates the treaty, the affected party can ignore that part of the treaty. According to the International Law Commission:
―The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State…‖
The Commission goes on:
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, see page 20 here: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
―In certain circumstances, the commission by one State of an internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury…Judicial decisions, State practice and doctrine confirm the proposition that countermeasures meeting certain substantive and procedural conditions may be legitimate. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ clearly accepted that countermeasures might justify otherwise unlawful conduct ‗taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State and ... directed against that State.‘, provided certain conditions are met. Similar recognition of the legitimacy of measures of this kind in certain cases can be found in arbitral decisions, in particular the „Naulilaa‟, „Cysne‟, and Air Service Agreement awards.‖135
The Air Service Agreement case mentioned in the above quote involved the US. In relation to that case, the US said the following:
―International Law recognizes that a party to an agreement which is breached by the other party may reciprocally suspend proportional obligations in the agreement. Available countermeasures range from formal termination of an agreement in the event of material breach, to interim withdrawal of corresponding rights of the other party while other rights and obligations remain in effect. As the I.L.C. has stated, a violation of a treaty obligation as of any other obligation may give rise to the right in the other party to take non forcible reprisals, and these reprisals may properly relate to the defaulting party's right under the treaty.‖136
The US explicitly recognizes this right that Iran took advantage of.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 2001, Page 75 (Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10). That report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected.) http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 136 International Law Commission Yearbook of 1991, part one, Vol. 1 , p. 13, cited in Dr. Francisco Villagran Kramer, Retaliation and Reprisals for Human Rights Violations, see: http://www.cecal.net/folder.2006-0103.8360909861/folder.2006-01-06.4334916191/villagran-kramer-eccla.pdf
Goldschmidt says that some of their nuclear material was previously undeclared. Guess what? The 2003 the IAEA found that “there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.”137 If there is no diversion of unclear material to a nuclear weapons program, then there is no diversion. The IAEA investigated Iran‘s previous activities regarding nuclear material for the next two years, and found that they were not related to diversion, and from that point on would be followed up through routine protocols:
― the Agency was able by November 2004 to confirm certain aspects of Iran‘s declarations (related to conversion activities and laser enrichment), which, as indicated to the Board, would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards implementation under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.‖138
To summarize: 1) Failure to declare nuclear material does not constitute diversion. 2) Iran did declare the material to the IAEA. 3) The experiments run on the material were perfectly legal under the international law concept of ―countermeasures,‖ a concept the US has acknowledged as valid. 4) Goldschmidt is a dirty liar.
Here is Goldschmidt‘s second reason that the verification of non-diversion was incorrect:
―Secondly, Iran has ‗carried out UF4 conversion experiments … using depleted uranium which had been imported in 1977 and exempted from safeguards upon receipt, and which Iran had declared in 1998 (when the material was de-exempted) as having been
See paragraph 52 of GOV/2003/75 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf
lost during processing‘ (GOV/2004/83-§14). This is a clear case of diversion of declared nuclear material.‖ (emphasis in original)
First of all, the experiments run by Iran were perfectly legal under the international law concept of ―countermeasures.‖ (see previous section) Even so, let‘s look at this issue further.
The part of the above quote that Goldschmidt left out by inserting an ellipsis was this:
―…on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry Laboratories of TNRC…‖
The UF4 conversion experiments that Goldschmidt brings up were carried out between 1989 and 1993.139 As quoted by Goldschmidt, the depleted uranium used for these experiments was exempted from safeguards in 1977, and was not declared by Iran until 1998 (which was when the material was de-exempted). The experiments were carried out before the material was declared in 1998. How can doing experiments on undeclared nuclear material be a ―clear case of diversion of declared nuclear material‖?
What does it mean when the IAEA says that Iran used depleted uranium that had been ―exempted from safeguards‖? What is an exemption?
Exemptions from safeguards are provided for in paragraphs 36 and 37 of INFCIRC/153. Paragraph 37 states that nuclear material ―shall be exempted from safeguards at the request of the State,‖ as long as the amount of material being exempted is less than a certain amount, which varies depending on the material. The appropriate amount for depleted uranium, the material in question here, is 20 tons. The reason that exemptions
“Lab-scale experiments using UO2, reported in 1998 as a loss, were used between 1989 and 1993 to produce UF4 at TNRC.” GOV/2003/75, Table 1 in page 2 of Annex 1, http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
exist is because it is not feasible for the IAEA to track every spec of fissionable material on the entire planet. Therefore, states are allowed to exempt ―minor quantities‖140 of fissionable material from safeguards. But what is a ―minor quantity‖ of fissionable material? The answer stems from paragraph 28 of INFCIRC/153:
―The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.‖ (emphasis added)
For safeguards purposes the IAEA defines a "significant quantity" of nuclear material as:
"The approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded."141
A ―significant quantity‖ is the minimum you would need to feasibly make a nuclear weapon. If the amount concerned is far less than what would be needed to make a bomb, then the IAEA may exempt the material from safeguards is asked for by the state. A ―minor quantity‖ of depleted uranium, which is therefore eligible for safeguards exemption, is anything less than the ―significant quantity,‖ which is 20 tons.142
The IAEA explains how safeguards agreements “provide for certain exemptions from safeguards (both of a general nature and as specifically related to reactors — in each case because of the minor quantities of materials involved)…” (emphasis added) http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull072/07203400311.pdf 141 IAEA, “Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s,” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3810.html 142 Exemption limits (see Table on page 7 here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull072/07203400311.pdf), are defined directly from
Iran used a ―minor quantity‖ of depleted uranium on a laboratory scale for enrichment experiments. So freakin‘ what. This is not even an illegal act. To illustrate this, let‘s look at a paper written by Goldschmidt in 2008.143 This paper talks about steps that could be taken to make Safeguards even stricter than the current Additional Protocol is. Included is a ―Model Temporary Complementary Protocol‖ (which he calls the ―TCP‖) which contains an example of what Goldschmidt‘s dream treaty might look like. (I wish Goldschmidt luck in getting all the countries in the world to sign his ridiculous treaty). Anyway, the paper says this:
―In its Note 45 of August 2006, the Secretariat indicates that there have been circumstances in which ―States have used exempted nuclear material to develop processes for use in undeclared nuclear activities (many in undeclared facilities), including uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, plutonium separation and fuel fabrication‖. Following the Secretariat‘s Recommendation 2, Article 2.a.(vii).(c) of the TCP requires exempted nuclear material to be de-exempted if the State processes the material for nuclear activities and requires the Agency to be informed accordingly.‖144
Goldschmidt‘s new rules say that if a state processes exempted material for nuclear activities, then the IAEA should be informed of it. This is what Goldschmidt would like to see in his dream world. As it stands now, states are not required to inform the IAEA what it does with exempted material. The following article describes the current situation as a ―loophole‖:
―Paragraphs 14 and 37 of the IAEA's guidelines for safeguarding agreements allow for exemptions from safeguards at the discretionary request of a state. Paragraph 37
paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153. The values for what a “significant quantity” of nuclear material is defined somewhat differently, but is based on a similar principle. (See Table II on page 19 for what a “significant quantity” is: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_scr.pdf ) For depleted uranium, the values for both the “exemption limit” and for “significant quantity” are 20 tons. 143 Pierre Goldschmidt, “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Goldschmidt_Dealing_Preventively_7-12-08.pdf 144 Ibid
imposes certain quantitative limitations on exempted nuclear materials and parties to the Additional Protocol must declare the amounts, locations, and uses of such materials. By allowing a state to temporarily exempt certain materials from safeguarding and acknowledging that these materials could be diverted for ‗nonproscribed‘ military purposes, the IAEA has effectively provided every state with a loophole that could be used to legitimize activities that may in fact be directed towards weapons proliferation.‖145
First of all, a ―loophole‖ that allows a state to experiment with minute amounts of material is not a concern. Experimenting with tiny amounts of material is not a proliferation concern, which is why exemptions exist. The quote above says that parties to the AP must declare amounts and uses of exempted materials. That means states that are not a party to the AP do not. Iran is not a party to the AP. Iran did nothing illegal with their exempted material.
D) They Moved a Cylinder!! (Reason three)
Here is Goldschmidt‘s third reason that the verification of non-diversion was incorrect:
―Third, in his report of August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) the Director General stated that ‗in April 2006, the movement of a 48X UF6 cylinder [capable of containing up to 9.5 tonnes of UF6] by the operator [of the UCF conversion plant] into and out of one of the withdrawal stations without prior notification to the Agency resulted in a loss of continuity of knowledge of nuclear material in the process‘. Considering the inevitable uncertainty on the result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) that took place thereafter at the UCF, the Agency cannot exclude the possibility that some nuclear material (say 200 to 400 kg UF6, i.e. more than enough to test an undeclared centrifuge enrichment cascade) had been diverted from that facility. It is true that ‗losing continuity of knowledge‘ happens sometimes in other NNWSs, but it is of far greater concern when it
Kesav Murthy Wable, “The U.S.-India Strategic Nuclear Partnership: A Debilitating Blow to the Non-Proliferation Regime,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 33 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 719, 2008
takes place in a state that has been deliberately in non-compliance for some two decades.‖ (emphasis in original)
This is the paragraph that precedes the sentence quoted by Goldschmidt from GOV/2006/53:
―Since the Director General‘s last report to the Board, the Agency has completed its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at UCF carried out between 20 and 24 May 2006 (GOV/2006/38, para. 11). The Agency concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with similar size conversion plants.‖146
Goldschmidt is obviously insane. The physical inventory declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV. If Iran had diverted ―say 200 to 400 Kg UF6‖, then the results of the PIV would not have been consistent. The IAEA can detect if 800 pounds of a material disappears. Because the results of the PIV were consistent with inventory, that means that no material was diverted. If no material was diverted, then there is no diversion.147 This is easy to understand. This movement of a cylinder was a minor issue, and it is very strange that Goldschmidt brings it up.148 The issue was closed, and was never brought up by the IAEA again.149 Also, Goldschmidt is correct; countries like Germany and Spain have had issues with losing continuity of knowledge
GOV/2006/53: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-53.pdf “Indeed, on one occasion the IAEA did lose continuity of knowledge of a 48X UF6 cylinder in Iran (see GOV/2006/53, para. 19), although there is no evidence that a diversion took place on that occasion.” http://www.vertic.org/publications/VM8.pdf 148 The website ArmsControlWonk.com, when discussing this report, did not even mention this issue, and they are certainly not afraid to make accusations against Iran. See http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1173/iaea200653 and http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1175/get-enriched-or-die-tryin-2 149 About the issue being closed, the US Ambassador said the following at a BOG meeting: “As the DG reported, this has led to a lapse in the Agency’s ability to monitor and verify the nuclear material in the process. Although the DG also reports that this anomaly has been closed, we would welcome further information from the Secretariat on whether Iran could have diverted a small amount of uranium hexafluoride for use in undeclared tests, such as with P2 centrifuge R&D that Iran refuses to discuss with the IAEA.” (emphasis added) Statement of Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, IAEA BoG Meeting, 13 Sept 2006: http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iran/State/sp_iaea_board.pdf
and there was no mention of any referral to the Security Council, or sanctions, or bombings in those cases.150 This is a non-issue.
All three of Goldschmidt‘s statements claiming that the IAEA verification of nondiversion was incorrect are BS.
8) The Additional Protocol
―Therefore, for the Agency to repeat thereafter that ‗all the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for‘ may be misleading and sounds more reassuring than it is, especially when it is disconnected from the other part of the Agency‘s statement explaining that because of the gaps in the Agency‘s knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran‘s nuclear programme, the Agency is unable ‗to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme‘ (GOV/2007/8-22 February 2007-§29).‖ (emphasis in original)
Yet another obnoxiously misleading statement by Goldschmidt. As explained in Appendix A of this paper, which discusses North Korea‘s dealings with the IAEA, the NPT safeguards relate only to declared nuclear activities. Under the NPT, the IAEA
“And at the Greifswald interim storage centre in Germany, safeguards arrangements in the wet store continued ‘to provide cause for concern with the current approach resulting in an almost permanent loss of continuity of knowledge due to the movement of partially filled flasks.’” Nuclear Engineering International, “Security; Safeguards Across Europe,” 31 March 2004, by Keith Nuthall, page 30. “The work environment in some reactors in Spain led to technical reliability problems with permanently installed surveillance systems so that during the refuelling period additional temporary surveillance systems had to be installed. Intrusive measures (ion fork) had to be applied in Vandellos after a communications breakdown between Euratom Safeguards and the operator led to a loss of continuity of knowledge of the core material.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0764:FIN:EN:PDF
monitors these declared activities, and watches for any diversion of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons. If no diversion has taken place, then the IAEA will say so (which they have done repeatedly with respect to Iran), and this certification of non-diversion means that the state is in compliance with their safeguards agreement. If, however, a state has signed and ratified the Additional Protocol, then the IAEA has the authority to look for undeclared nuclear activities within a state, and if they don‘t find any, the IAEA can then make assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities within that state.151 El Baradei explains this:
―But our experience in Iraq before the first Gulf War, and our recent experience in Iran and Libya, have also highlighted the importance to verification of the additional protocol that is, the supplement to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that provides the Agency with significant additional authority with regard to both information and physical access. Without the authority provided by the protocol, our ability to draw conclusions is mostly limited to the non-diversion of material already declared, with little authority to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities .‖152
Goldschmidt himself explains the same difference between NPT safeguards and the Additional Protocol (again, this is when he was with the IAEA and had to tell the truth, and he was no allowed to be a dirty liar):
―Traditional nuclear material verification activities are designed to provide a set of ‗indicators‘ of diversion or of circumstances where the possibility of diversion cannot be excluded. These indicators (such as a statistically significant amount of ‗material unaccounted-for‘) are used for assessing the correctness of a State‘s declarations regarding its nuclear material inventories, material flows and facility operations.
“When the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12 above have been completed, and no indication has been found by the Secretariat that, in its judgement, would give rise to a possible proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State has remained in peaceful activities.” http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2008.pdf 152 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing World,” Keynote Address at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, available here: http://www.nci.org/04nci/06/ElBaradei%20Carnegie%20speech%20062104.htm
Safeguards strengthening measures, when supported by the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol, provide for a different set of ‗indicators‘ that can be used for assessing both the correctness and completeness of a State‘s declarations and whether there is a possibility of undeclared nuclear activities in that State.‖153
Goldschmidt also explains the different conclusions that the IAEA can draw depending on whether or not a state has ratified the Additional Protocol:
―When fully implemented in a State, the strengthening measures provided by a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol will allow the Agency to draw safeguards conclusions both about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State.‖154 (emphasis added)
INFCIRC/153 safeguards allow the IAEA to certify non-diversion of declared nuclear material, and the Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to certify the absence of undeclared nuclear material. The reason that the IAEA is unable ―to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme‖ is because Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol! In the same IAEA report that Goldschmidt quotes above, the IAEA explains this:
―The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency remains unable, however, to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran‘s nuclear programme and certain aspects relevant to its scope and nature. Hence, the Agency is unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification
Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into the 21 Century,” Supplement to the IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1991, available here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull414/41403450122su.pdf 154 Ibid
issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but has not yet brought into force) and the required transparency measures.‖155
When Goldschmidt says that the IAEA is unable ―to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme,‖ all he is saying is that Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol. So the f%*& what! As of 2008, there are 70 countries that do not have the Additional Protocols in force. Of the 84 states that do have the Additional Protocols in force, the IAEA cannot assure the absence of undeclared nuclear activity for 33 of them. When are we going to bomb all of those countries? In addition, there are 36 countries that do not even have safeguards agreements in place! 156 If you do not have safeguards in place, you are in violation of the NPT. When are we going to bomb those countries? There are 133 countries where the IAEA is unable ―to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities...or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.‖ So why is it that only Iran is being singled out? Could it be because Israel wants to bomb Iran?
As explained above, Iran was illegally referred to the Security Council. Iran has said repeatedly that if their case is sent back the IAEA from the Security Council, then they will be happy to ratify the Additional Protocol and abide by it. Iran‘s offer to ratify the Additional Protocol if their case is dealt with according to the law is perfectly reasonable, but USrael will never act within the confines of any law, because they are a rogue nation. The US is under Israeli orders to bomb Iran, and no law or treaty will stop them.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf For these numbers, see the Safeguards Statement for 2008: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2005.html
The statement that IAEA is unable ―to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme‖ is made constantly in the media. The reason they do this is the same reason Goldschmidt does it: pure propaganda. In reality, the statement is meaningless. It is very funny that Goldschmidt puts this statement in bold print, as if it is a smoking gun. Imbecile.
9) Dirty, Dirty Liar
―The essential conclusion is that ‗The Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded‘, giving the Board the authority (under Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement) to ‗make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute‘ which includes reporting the case to the Security Council.‖ (emphasis in original)
Goldschmidt is a dirty liar. He uses the following quote, ―the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,‖ and says that this is the ―essential conclusion‖ that was made by the Director General which gave the BoG the authority to report the case to the Security Council. The only problem is that
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL NEVER
MADE THIS FINDING IN RELATION TO IRAN. This quote is not from any
report related to Iran! This quote is from Article 19 of the Safeguards agreement! For Goldschmidt to quote the safeguards agreement and pretend that it was a conclusion that was found in relation to Iran shows what a deceptive, dirty, filthy rotten liar he really is. Not only did the IAEA never say that it is ―not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,‖ they have, in reality, made
the opposite finding many, many times. 157 This quote probably wins the award for the most obnoxious of the entire paper, but I am not done looking at the whole thing yet. There is still plenty of time for an even more obnoxious one.
10) If Iran Has Not Violated The NPT, Then Let‘s Make a New Treaty!
―In his report of November 2003 to the BoG, the Director General states that ‗to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme‘. This statement is troubling, in that it appears to be setting a standard of proof for the Agency that is too high. In practice inspectors are unlikely to find irrefutable proof of weaponisation: a state facing certain exposure because inspectors have sought access to a location where there will be such proof will simply refuse access, preferring to be reported for lack of cooperation rather than a clear act of proliferation. As indicated in the IAEA November 2004 Report (GOV/2004/83-§113) ‗absent some nexus to nuclear material, the Agency‟s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activities is limited‘.‖ (italics in original)
Now Goldschmidt is in fantasyland. He got frustrated using pathetic arguments to show that the BoG actions were legal when they obviously were not, so now he wants to change the entire treaty. He says the finding that Iran‘s undeclared program was not related to a nuclear weapons program ―appears to be setting a standard of proof for the Agency that is too high.‖ Too bad! That is what the NPT and the Safeguards agreement allows for. Unless Goldschmidt wants to write a new treaty and get all the nations of the world to sign it, then he has to live by the one that exists now. Let‘s stay in reality here.
See footnote 13
Besides, isn‘t a finding that Iran‘s nuclear program is not related to nuclear weapons enough? Isn‘t that the entire issue? Goldschmidt says that ―in practice inspectors are unlikely to find irrefutable proof of weaponisation.‖ Problem is, you do not have to find ―irrefutable proof of weaponization‖. Article 28 of the safeguards agreement says that the objective of safeguards is to detect the diversion of nuclear material from ―peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown‖ (emphasis added). The IAEA does not need to prove that the diverted nuclear material went towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons; they only need to show that the material was diverted, even if they do not know where the material went. This point is well-known:
―…the rationale of safeguards implies a certain suspicion on behalf of the international community that in their absence…states may attempt the diversion of nuclear materials. The political delicacy, and technical complications of safeguards lie in the need to balance the advantages of the cooperative approach (maximum acceptability) with the adversary approach (maximum credibility). The adversary approach does not only refer to, for instance, inspectors adopting a maximalist interpretation for their rights in the pursuit of suspected diversion. More basically, it also encompasses the legal and institutional framework in which all verification activities occur. An example of this is the inclusion in INFCIRC/153‘s objectives of the clause that diversion for ‗purposes unknown‘ (para. 28) constitutes an infringement of the systems rules. In other words, the Agency does not have to prove that diversion to weapons manufacture has occurred.‖ 158
By claiming that the IAEA has to show ―irrefutable proof of weaponization,‖ Goldschmidt is pretending that Safeguards do less than what they actually do, so he can claim that there is something wrong with the treaty.
Mark F. Imber, Contemporary Security Policy, 1(2), (1980), p. 180. pp. 177-198
In Iran‘s case, Iran showed that the undeclared material was used for peaceful purposes. By doing so, they proved that diversion had not occurred, which is why the IAEA has verified countless times that diversion has not occurred.
Goldschmidt also mentions having access to locations not associated with declared material. This is not allowed under 153 safeguards, but under the AP the IAEA is allowed to perform environmental testing in other locations, which would easily detect the presence of highly enriched uranium nearby. Once again, Iran is perfectly willing to ratify the AP if their case is sent back to the IAEA from the SC, which is perfectly reasonable considering it was sent to the SC illegally to begin with.
11) The Laptop of Death
―A number of IAEA findings in Iran could be considered to be indication if not evidence that nuclear material and activities are or were related to a nuclear weapons program. These findings include alleged studies related ‗to high explosive testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension‘ (GOV/2006/27-§27)…‖ (italics in original)
The issue Goldschmidt brings up here is referred to by the IAEA as the ―alleged studies‖ issue. As we will see, the ―alleged studies‖ issue originates from documents that were allegedly stolen from Iran on a laptop computer. Sane people that are familiar with the facts of this issue treat it as a joke, because it is. As a result, the issue is sometimes jokingly referred to as the ―Laptop of Death.‖ This entire issue is a fabrication which is similar in many ways to the ―weapons of mass destruction‖ story that was fabricated to justify the invasion of Iraq. In order to describe this issue accurately, it will be best to start at the very beginning.
A) The EU3/Iran Deal
On 25 November 2004, the BoG of the IAEA was scheduled to have a meeting, in part to decide if Iran should be (illegally) referred to the UN Security Council:
―On Nov. 25, the 35-country governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to decide whether to accept the Bush administration's call for Iran's case to be referred to the Security Council for possible sanctions over its nuclear program.‖ 159
Israel‘s number one goal at the time was to bomb Iran (which automatically made it the goal of the US as well, since the US is a puppet state of Israel). The route chosen by Usrael to start the war with Iran is through sanctions, which is now becoming more clear as the war draws near. Here is Ron Paul speaking about sanctions on Iran:
―This legislation, whether the House or Senate version, will lead us to war on Iran. The sanctions in this bill, and the blockade of Iran necessary to fully enforce them, are in themselves acts of war according to international law. A vote for sanctions on Iran is a vote for war against Iran. I urge my colleagues in the strongest terms to turn back from this unnecessary and counterproductive march to war.‖ 160
In order to impose sanctions, Usrael needed to get Iran‘s case at the IAEA sent to the Security Council (illegally). By November of 2004, the date of the BoG meeting we are discussing, Usrael had been trying to do just that for quite a while. This quote is from a year earlier:
The New York Times, “Iran Gives Pledge on Uranium, But Europeans Are Cautious,” 15 Nov 2004 by Elaine Sciolino http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/15/international/europe/15iran.html 160 See “Statement of Congressman Ron Paul,” United States House of Representatives, Statement on Motion to Instruct Conferees on HR 2194, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act , 22 April 2010, available here: http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/tx14_paul/IranSanctions2194.shtml Regarding the legality of sanctions, see: Cassandra LaRae-Perez, “Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force: ReEvaluating the Legality o Sanctions from an Effects-Based Perspective,” Boston University International Law Journal, Spring, 2002
―The United States has been pushing for months to refer the Iran nuclear matter to the U.N. Security Council, where Iran could face sanctions.‖161
Usrael was doing everything in their power to get the votes needed to get Iran‘s case sent to the Security Council so they could start their war. However, on 15 Nov 2004, 10 days before the BoG meeting, Iran made an agreement with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) to suspend uranium enrichment in return for not having their case sent to the Security Council:
―‘This is a success,‘ said an E.U. diplomat, referring to Iran's weekend agreement with Britain, France and Germany to suspend uranium enrichment activities, thereby averting U.S. demands that the issue be reported to the United Nations Security Council.‖ 162 ―Although the deal commits Iran only to a temporary suspension, EU officials say its implementation would mean they would not seek to have Iran hauled before the U.N. Security Council for allegedly contravening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as the United States has sought.‖163 ―Earlier Sunday, a Western diplomat told CNN Iran made the agreement in exchange for a promise not to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.‖ 164 ―A European diplomat in Vienna said it was now ‗out of the question‘ for the IAEA to take Iran to the Security Council.‖165
The Washington Times, “U.S. Urges 'Appropriate Action' on Iran's nukes; U.N. Report Cites Program's Pattern of Violations,” 12 Nov 2003 by Tom Carter http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/nov/11/20031111-113139-4265r/ 162 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “E.U. Hails "Win-Win" Deal with Iran, Puts Focus on Long-Term Pact,” 15 Nov 2004 163 AP Worldstream, “EU's Solana says Nuclear Deal Could Start New Chapter in Relations with Iran,” 15 Nov 2004 by Paul Ames 164 UPI, “Iran to Suspend Uranium Enrichment,” 15 Nov 2004 165 AFP, “UN Says Found No Proof of Secret Iranian Nuclear Program,” 15 Nov 2004
―But diplomats say the European efforts for a negotiated deal on the issue mean the United States does not currently have the votes to push sanctions through the Security Council.‖166 ―Tehran has agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment program, which it says is intended solely for making nuclear-reactor fuel rods. In exchange, the IAEA board won't refer Tehran to the UN Security Council.‖167
Iran, of course, has the absolute, legal right to enrich uranium under the NPT, and sending Iran to the Security Council, which was eventually done anyway, was illegal (as I detailed above). Hence, the deal made between Iran and the EU-3 was essentially that Iran would agree to suspend their legal rights in exchange for not having their case sent to the Security Council; which is an illegal action. But it is Iran is unreasonable.
B) Usrael‘s Response to the EU3/Iran Deal
This deal between the EU-3 and Iran was a huge blow to Usrael. Their war plans were ruined, or at least delayed, by the agreement, and Washington was ―clearly irked with the European deal.‖168 The hawks in the Bush regime were pissed, and they decided to respond in their usual way:
―‘Iran is the most urgent problem facing the West,‘ said a European diplomat who has been involved in the discussions with Washington and Tehran. ‗We are trying to coax the administration one way, but the instincts of a lot of its top people are to go the other way.‘ Administration officials say that one way the hawks are trying to gain the upper
Voice of America News, “US Skeptical About Iran Nuclear Pledge,” 15 Nov 2004 by Gary Thomas The Globe and Mail (Canada), “Nuclear Accusation Puts Iran Deal at Risk; Tehran Trying to Mate Missiles, Warheads, Washington Says Ahead of Key IAEA Talks,” 19 Nov 2004 by Paul Koring 168 Ibid
hand in the internal debate is through periodic, calculated disclosures of scary details about Iran's nuclear program.‖169
Usrael‘s response was to release some ―scary details‖ about Iran‘s nuclear program to try and derail the EU/Iran deal. Although the quote above does not say so, these ―scary details‖ that Usrael likes to release are usually less than accurate:
―‘Since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence that's come to us has proved to be wrong,‘ a senior diplomat at the IAEA said.‖170 ―Much of the intelligence on Iran's nuclear facilities provided to UN inspectors by American spy agencies has turned out to be unfounded, according to diplomatic sources in Vienna…At the heart of the debate are accusations, spearheaded by the US, that Iran is secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons. However, most of the tip-offs about supposed secret weapons sites provided by the CIA and other US intelligence agencies have led to dead ends when investigated by IAEA inspectors, according to informed sources in Vienna. ‗Most of it has turned out to be incorrect,‘ said a diplomat at the IAEA with detailed knowledge of the agency's investigations. ‗They gave us a paper with a list of sites. [The inspectors] did some follow-up, they went to some military sites, but there was no sign of [banned nuclear] activities.‘ ‗Now [the inspectors] don't go in blindly. Only if it passes a credibility test.‘‖171
(Regarding the Laptop of Death story, here is what the L.A. Times article above had to say: ―Diplomats here were less convinced by documents recovered by U.S. intelligence from a laptop computer apparently stolen from Iran…‘We don't know. Are they genuine, are they real?‘ asked a senior U.N. official here. Another official who was briefed on the
The International Herald Tribune, “Crisis? Opportunity?; U.S. and Europe Differ, This Time on Iran,” 19 Nov 2004 by Steven R. Weisman 170 The L.A. Times, “U.N. Calls U.S. Data On Iran's Nuclear Aims Unreliable,” 25 Feb 2007 by Bob Drogin and Kim Murphy http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/25/world/fg-usiran25 171 The Guardian, “US Intelligence on Iran Does Not Stand Up, Say Vienna Sources,” 23 Feb 2007 by Julian Borger http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/23/topstories3.usa
documents said he was ‗very unconvinced.‘‖ The Guardian article says that ―there are still reservations about its authenticity in the IAEA, according to officials with knowledge of the internal debate inside the agency.‖) In response to the Iran/EU3 deal, Usrael decided to release some fabricated ―scary details‖ about Iran‘s nuclear program. Usrael is usually not very shy about fabricating lies about Iran, but sometimes their lies are too embarrassing, even for them. In that situation, Usrael has another option for disseminating their lies, and that option is the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK). The MEK is a terrorist cult responsible for killing US citizens and soldiers, but who are now close allies with the Usrael government.172 (Isn‘t
The MEK is listed as a terrorist organization in the US and the EU. For background on the MEK, see: FrontPage Magazine, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” 13 Jan 2006 by Michael Rubin, copy here http://126.96.36.199/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=6036 The Christian Science Monitor, “Inside a Group Caught Between Three Powers,” 31 Dec 2003 by Scott Peterson, copy here: http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1231/p10s01-woiq.html See: “In 1979, the MEK announced that, ‘After the Shah, it's America's turn.’ And that same day, MEK members took part in the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. U.S. hostages were held captive, with MEK help, for 444 days,” and chronology of attacks in the The National Post, “Americans hold Canadians on Iran-Iraq border: 50 people left Canada to join 'terror' group opposing Iran regime,” 17 April 2004, copy here: http://www.iraninterlink.org/files/News/April04/NationalPost170404.htm , The New York Times, “Iranian Opposition Movement's Many Faces,” 30 June 2003 by Elaine Sciolino, copy here: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/30/world/iranianopposition-movement-s-many-faces.html , The New Yorker, “Exiles: How Iran's Expatriates are Gaming the Nuclear Threat,” 6 March 2006 by Connie Bruck, copy here: http://www.iraninterlink.org/files/News4/Mar06/NewYorker060306.htm , The New York Times, “An implacable opponent to the mullahs of Iran” 24 Sept 2005 by Craig S. Smith, copy here: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/23/world/africa/23iht-profile.html , see a paper submitted to a class taught by Raymond Tanter, a nutbag Zionist and MEK supporter: “The Mujahadeen-e Khalq: Should Washington Embrace the MEK?,” Fall, 2003 by Eli Segall, copy here: http://www.iraninterlink.org/files/info/EliSegal2003.htm , for a Human Rights Watch report and supporting article, see: “No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin Khalq Camps” May, 2005, copy here: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/index.htm, and the supporting article from The Guardian, “'Tank girl' army accused of torture,” 31 May 2005 by David Keigh, copy here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/31/iran.usa , for a personal account see the five part special in The National Post: Part 1: 23 Sept 2006: “Children of 'the resistance'”: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=94a2aa55-56ab-4786-93a1-5f5ed073b98e&k=7636 , Part 2, 25 Sept 2006: “Losing a son”: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=775aac97-b88d439e-8ad5-a0eaa7bbadec&p=1 , Part 3, 26 Sept 2006: “Father's sacrifice”: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=eb5a4184-ebee-4e44-93ceb9b8485efa33&k=51167&p=1 , Part 4, 28 Sept 2006: “Getting out of an Iraqi terror camp”: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=28105d48-5960-4dc9-bae9-3a2f0ea939d1&k=92036 , Part 5, 28 Sept 2006: “'I'm with the Mujahedin'”; http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=fd90eb7f-ccc9-4e70-b500-d9c993ddc3b2 , a White
it cute how Usrael can get along with terrorists if they really want to?) The MEK originated in Iran, and their goal is to overthrow the present Iranian government so they can assume power. It took Usrael and their terrorist buddies two days to figure out what BS stories they were going to use as a response to the EU/Iran agreement. They gave the more ridiculous ones to the terrorist group:
―An Iranian opposition group leveled startling but unconfirmed charges on Wednesday that Iran had bought blueprints for a nuclear bomb and obtained weapons-grade uranium on the black market. The group also charged that Iran was still secretly enriching uranium at an undisclosed Defense Ministry site in Tehran, despite an agreement with the Europeans two days ago to suspend all enrichment activities.‖ 173
I will not address the first two allegations, since Goldschmidt did not even find them credible enough to mention. The third allegation about enrichment activities at an undisclosed site has to do with the Lavisan issue, which is addressed later in the paper.
C) Powell and the Design of a Missile Re-Entry Vehicle
House background paper for a UN speech to be given by Bush said: “Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians,” The Washington Post, “A Decade of Deception and Violence,” 12 Sept 2002, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/onpolitics/transcripts/whitehouse_iraq091202.htm , see: “An Iranian royalist acquaintance of mine, who did some jail time with members of the organization, describes *the MEK+ in two words: ‘Pol Pot.’ ‘They would have killed hundreds of thousands if they took over,’ he says. ‘Even more than the ayatollahs.’,”Newsweek, “Shadowland: Most-Favored Terrorists,” 27 June 2003 by Christopher Dickey, copy here: http://terrorwatch.blogspot.com/ , from an FBI report on the MEK given to Congress at the request of John McCain [Go to http://www.thomas.gov/ , click on Congressional Record, then on 103rd Congress, and search “MEK”. Results = “Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq”+, “MEK perpetrated bombings and assassinations, after the aborted maiden effort in 1971, resumed in 1972. The organization’s targets included US military advisors stationed in Iran. For example, the MEK claimed responsibility for the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins in 1973, the assassination of US Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer in 1975, and the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, also in 1975. The MEK also targeted US civilians associated with defense projects (five killed in 1976)…the MEK was also intimately involved in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Eyewitnesses and MEK documents indicate that the MEK led the assault on the Embassy and then pleaded with Khomeini not to engage in dialogue with the United States government, nor release the American hostages seized during the action. In fact, Congressional testimony indicates that Rajavi insisted to Khomeini that there was much more to gain by holding the hostages than by releasing them.” 173 The New York Times, “Exiles Add to Claims on Iran Nuclear Arms,” 18 Nov 2004 by Elaine Sciolino http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E7DF103FF93BA25752C1A9629C8B63&pagewanted=all
A couple of hours after the terrorist cult made their accusations; Powell made his accusation that relates to the ―design of a missile re-entry vehicle‖ issue that is brought up by Goldschmidt.174 Why is it that the US government coordinates their propaganda with terrorist groups and nobody questions the practice??
Powell made his accusations to reporters that were travelling with him when he was travelling to Santiago, Chile. Here is an excerpt of the interview which relates to the ―design of a missile re-entry vehicle‖:
―QUESTION: Looking back on the past four years, I'm interested in a slightly more general piece for next week, is there one piece of unfinished business that stands out to you most? SECRETARY POWELL: Well, foreign policy is never finished….The EU-3 has made some progress on Iran. We have to be cautious, I think, until verification teams can go in. And there is some new information that you've seen, dissident [―terrorist cult‖ –ed] reporting on Iranian possession of plans as to how they would actually weaponize a warhead if they were able to create a warhead. So, these are areas that bubble up to the surface of requiring constant attention, and of course will be priorities of Dr. Rice and for the President in the next term….
QUESTION: Can I take you back to what you were saying about Iran, and the latest accusations? The group that has made this has sometimes been right with the facts and has sometimes been wrong. You also talked about verification, so what's the US attitude to this? Is this something that looks credible, or do you need to look into it further?
Regarding the timing of the two terrorist groups’ (the MEK and the US government) press releases, see: “*Powell+ spoke just hours after an Iranian opposition group charged that Tehran has a secret, military-run uranium-enrichment plant and has bought the blueprints for a nuclear bomb.” The Washington Times, “Iran Said to be Developing Weapons-Delivery Systems,” 18 Nov 2004 by Jennifer Joan Lee http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/nov/17/20041117-094509-8506r/
SECRETAERY POWELL: I have seen intelligence which would corroborate what this dissident group [―terrorist cult‖ – ed] is saying. And it should be of concern to all parties…
QUESTION: If I can ask a follow-up to the first part of the question, when you say that you have seen evidence that corroborates what...which elements? They're saying three things: one, that A.Q. Khan gave both a warhead design and bomb-grade uranium, and then the other thing they're saying is that they are developing uranium at a secret northeast location.
SECRETARY POWELL: I have seen information...I haven't seen the entire report on my blackberry, we're all blackberried together. But I have seen information that suggests...I can't say it came from A.Q. Khan...but I have seen some information that would suggest that they had been actively working on delivery systems, to deliver
QUESTION: Deliver? What deliveries?
SECRETARY POWELL: You don't have a weapon until you put it in something that can deliver a weapon.
QUESTION: But, you're talking about missiles?
SECRETARY POWELL: I'm talking about delivery systems.
QUESTION: So, no necessarily the uranium, the bomb-grade uranium?
SECRETARY POWELL: No, I'm not talking about uranium. I'm not talking about fissile material. I'm not talking about a warhead. I'm talking about what one does with a warhead. So, in other words, there is no doubt in my mind, and it is clearly straightforward, I think, from what we've been saying for years, that they have been interested in a nuclear weapon that has utility, meaning that it is something they would be able to deliver, not just something that sits there.
QUESTION: Sir, excuse me, but, isn't it a matter of public record that they have delivery systems, missiles capable of delivering such weapons?
SECRETARY POWELL: I'm not talking about whether they had the missiles. I'm talking about information that says that they not only had these missiles, but I'm aware of information that suggests they were working hard as to how to put the two together.‖ 175
i) The Response to Powell‘s Story It was a year and a half before this interview that Powell gave his speech at the UN about Iraq‘s weapons of mass destruction– claims that were later shown to be the usual fabricated nonsense. (Of course, it didn‘t matter to Usrael that those claims were shown to be lies, because by that time the war had already started. Usrael doesn‘t care if their intelligence is shown to be false after the war starts, because it is too late then, and they know that the sheeple will forget about it by the time more lies are needed to start another war.) Maybe Usrael went too far by using the same liar for this new fabrication, however, because the response to Powell‘s new lies was not favorable:
―Secretary of State Colin L. Powell shared information with reporters Wednesday about Iran's nuclear program that was classified and based on an unvetted, single source who provided information that two U.S. officials said yesterday was highly significant if true but has not yet been verified…According to one official with access to the material, a ‗walk-in‘ source approached U.S intelligence earlier this month with more than 1,000 pages purported to be Iranian drawings and technical documents, including a nuclear warhead design and modifications to enable Iranian ballistic missiles to deliver an atomic strike. The official agreed to discuss the information on the condition of anonymity and only because Powell had alluded to it publicly. But U.S. intelligence officials have been combing the information carefully and with a wary eye, mindful of the mistakes made in trusting intelligence information alleging that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
State Department, Secretary of State Press Releases, “Remarks to the Press En Route to Santiago, Chile,” 17 Nov 2004, copy here: http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2004_11/alia/a4111803.htm&plaintext=1
destruction. Powell, who announced earlier this week that he would not stay on for a second term, presented that intelligence in a February 2003 speech to the U.N. Security Council that was meant to convince the world that Saddam Hussein needed to be forcefully removed from power. Much of his presentation turned out to be based on information provided by unreliable sources… The information provided by the source, who was not previously known to U.S. intelligence…The official said the CIA remains unsure about the authenticity of the documents and how they came into the informant's possession. A second official would say only that there are questions about the source of the information. Officials interviewed by The Washington Post did not know the identity of the source or whether the individual is connected to an Iranian exile group that made fresh accusations about Iran at a news conference Wednesday in Paris.‖176
The documents that led to Powell‘s remarks came from a ―walk in‖ source ―who was not previously known to U.S. intelligence.‖ The Washington Post says that they don‘t know if the source is the terrorist MEK cult or not, but a member of the German Foreign Ministry (and the source was supposedly aided by Germany), 177 says that the source was the MEK:
―Karsten Voigt, coordinator for German-American relations at the German Foreign Ministry, raised doubts about Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent charge that Iran may be working on a nuclear-warhead design. Mr. Voigt noted that the information had been provided by an Iranian dissident group and said the U.S. and Europe ‗shouldn't let their Iran policy be influenced by single-source headlines.‘‖178
Other German officials agree:
The Washington Post, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified,” 19 November 2004 by Dafna Linzer, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html 177 See: “An intelligence source, solicited with German help, provided the U.S. tens of thousands of pages of Farsilanguage computer files, diagrams and test data from Iran's missile program.” The Wall Street Journal, “As Evidence Grows Of Iran's Program, U.S. Hits Quandary,” 18 March 2005 by Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: www.strategicpolicyconsulting.com/WSJ-AJ-nuclear-March18-05.doc (document) 178 Wall Street Journal, “Bush Pushes His Top Priorities At APEC Meeting ,” 22 Nov 2004 by Alex Keto, Geraldo Samor, and Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgibin/news.pl?l=en&y=2004&m=11&d=22&a=5
―A German official familiar with the issue confirmed to this writer that the NCRI had been the source of the laptop documents. ‗I can assure you that the documents came from the Iranian resistance organisation,‘ the source said.‖179
It is not surprising that people were not very impressed with Powell‘s information received from their terrorist allies:
―One source, however, described the intelligence mentioned by Powell as ‗weak.‘ Some administration officials ‗were surprised he went public on something that was weak and, because it was weak, was not supposed to be used,‘ the source said…‘I was surprised the administration put him out there or he put himself out there on this,‘ said David Kay, the former head of the U.S. weapons search team in Iraq. ‗I thought if there was anyone in the administration that had been sufficiently burned by such sources, it would be Powell.‘‖180
Kenneth Pollack (a war-loving propagandist himself), had this to say:
―‘Prior to the invasion of Iraq, we knew our intelligence on Iraq was inadequate but we did not realize how poor it actually was,‘ said Kenneth M. Pollack, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who is the author of a new book on Iran. ‗Today, most intelligence officials believe that our intelligence about Iranian decision making and weapons of mass destruction is even more fragmentary and uncertain than what we believed to be our state of knowledge about Iraq.‘‖181
IPS, “Iran Nuke Laptop Data Came from Terror Group,” 29 Feb 2008 by Gareth Porter, see here: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41416 180 L.A. Times, “Powell's Talk of Arms Has Fallout,” 19 Nov 2004 by Sonni Efron, Tyler Marshall and Bob Drogin http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/19/world/fg-irannuke19 181 New York Times, “Doubts Persist on Iran Nuclear Arms Goals,” 20 Nov 2004 by Douglas Jehl and William J. Broad, copy here: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E0DD1E3FF933A15752C1A9629C8B63&pagewanted=1
It was pretty obvious to most sentient beings that the BS stories from both the terrorist cult and the terrorist government were designed as a reply to the EU deal that pissed them off:
―But Joseph Cirincione, a proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: ‗The US scenario was to bring the Iranians to the security council. The European-Iranian deal killed any chance of that. This may be part of a counter-attack to derail the European deal without overtly opposing it.‘‖182
ii) Powell‘s Defense
So how did Powell defend himself after his comments were largely discounted? A few days after Powell made his remarks, someone did ask him to defend himself:
―Mr. Secretary, on Iran. First of all, do you have any further sense of whether or not you will be meeting with your Iranian counterpart in a one-on-one fashion at Sharm? And also, there were some questions raised about the information that you talked about with the technology for arming missiles with nuclear warheads and whether or not it was accurate? Some suggested point blank that this was information that had not yet been vetted and may well not be reliable.‖183
Here was Powell‘s response:
―The people raising the questions are people who had not seen the information. Period. Iran has been working on long-range missiles. Long-range missiles tend to be inaccurate, therefore they are not designed to carry conventional warheads. This is not, in my judgement, terribly complicated.‖184
The Guardian, “Powell Accuses Iran of Trying to Develop Nuclear Missiles,” 19 Nov 2004 by Julian Borger http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/19/iran.usa 183 State Department Press Release, “Remarks to the Press En Route to Tel Aviv,” 21 November 2004 184 Ibid
This is his defense? What a nitwit.
First of all, with a range of about 1,280 kilometers, the Shahab-3 is a medium-range, not a long-range, ballistic missile.185 Actually, according to how the US classifies ballistic missiles, there is no such thing as a ―long-range‖ ballistic missile.186 Shouldn‘t Powell know that? The State Department seems to know it. A month earlier at a State Department briefing someone asked: ―What is the United States reaction to Iran's testing of a Shahab-3 missile?‖ The reply was:
―It is well known that Iran has had an active missile program for almost two decades, has been in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), and has been working on longer-range systems.‖187
Voice of America News knows it, too:
―Iran's recent test firing of a medium range ballistic missile is raising more concerns about the country's proliferation efforts, especially in light of its alleged efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.‖188
The Shahab is a medium range missile. There are many medium range ballistic missiles that exist that, although they are able to carry nuclear warheads, are designed to carry conventional warheads as well. The US is spending over $500 million to equip Trident missiles (whose range is anywhere in the world) with conventional warheads.189 Israel‘s
See: “The Iranian Shahab-3 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled, road-mobile, medium-range ballistic missile…,” Federation of American Scientists, “Shahab-3 / Zelzal-3”: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html 186 See: “The United States divides missiles into four range classes: [Short-Range Ballistic missile, Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile+,” Federation of American Scientists, “Ballistic Missile Basics”: http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/missile/basics.htm 187 State Department, 12 Aug 2004. ”U.S. Has ‘Serious Concerns’ About Iran's Missile Programs; Continues to Monitor Shahab-3 System and Longer-Range Programs” 188 Voice of America News, “Iran Missile Test Raises Concerns,” 12 August 2004 by Nick Simeone 189 Global Security, “Conventional Strike Missile, Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM)” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ctm.htm
Jericho-3 has a range of 4,000 kilometers and can carry conventional warheads.190 Pakistan‘s Shaheen-3 will have a similar range as the Jericho-3, and can carry conventional warheads.191 These countries can have medium range (or longer) missiles that can carry conventional warheads – why can‘t Iran? Powell says that ―long-range‖ missiles ―tend to be inaccurate.‖ It‘s funny that Usrael whines on and on about Iran being a terrorist state that targets civilians, but then Powell assumes that Iran would care if their missiles are accurate? Well, actually, they do care:
―More recently it was learned that in August 2004 that China has helped Iran integrate a new GPS aided laser inertial guidance system coupled with GPS back up input into the Shahab-3B MRBM.‖192
With the GPS system, claimed accuracy is within 190 meters, which is accurate. 193 China helped Iran with the GPS system in August of 2004, which is before Powell made his accuracy comment. I guess he hadn‘t heard the news. The question can then be raised: Why is Iran working so hard on the accuracy of the Shahab-3 if its intended use is for nukes? (More about the accuracy issue in the pages that follow).
Also, what about the Israeli Arrow anti-missile shield? The purpose of this system was specifically to intercept conventional ballistic missiles, and not nuclear weapons:
Haaretz, “Missile Test 'Will Improve Deterrence',” 18 Jan 2008 by Yuval Azoulay: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945859.html 191 Defense News, “Pakistan Pushes To Improve Missile Strike Capability,” by Usman Ansari: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3823118 192 Global Security, “The Operational Shahab-4/No-dong-B Flight Tested in Iran for Iran & North Korea Confirmed,” by Charles P. Vick: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2006/cpvick-no-dong-b_2006.htm 193 Global Security lists the Shahab-3’s CEP (Circular Error Probable) as 190-250 meters after the “Aug. 2004 introduction of Inertial GPS support input based guidance package with Chinese help” in “No-Dong-A, Ghauri-II, & Shahab-3, Technical Data,” 27 Feb 2007 by Charles P. Vick: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-aspecs.htm Also, the Federation of American Scientists talks about the accuracy in “Shahab-3 / Zelzal-3”, mentioning the same CEP: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html
―Until recently, most senior officers, especially those in the air force involved in the issue, accepted that if and when a nuclear-missile threat were realized, the only way to deal with it was through deterrence. That is why in discussions on the definitions of the Arrow missile-defense system, it was clear its goal would not be designated as the interception of nuclear missiles. The purpose of the Arrow, they agreed, would be to try to intercept conventional missiles, and possibly also chemical and biological ones, but under no circumstances nuclear missiles.‖194 (emphasis added)
The reason that the Arrow was designed for conventional weapons is that it is useless for nukes:
―According to Israeli military intelligence estimates, by mid-decade, the Iranians, and perhaps the Iraqis as well, will have nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in their arsenal. And when that happens, the Arrow defense system will be totally useless, because even its developers are not prepared to guarantee that the Arrow can intercept every missile fired at us.‖195 ―The Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile would be ineffective against chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, or even a large number of simple Scuds that are fired almost simultaneously at the country, according to a leading US defense expert.‖196
Why did the US taxpayers give Israel well over a billion dollars197 to develop their Arrow missile defense system when they knew Iran was developing nuclear weapons and not conventional ones? Shouldn‘t the Arrow system have been discontinued as soon as it was know that the Shahab-3 was intended for nukes? Or could it be that in reality
“A Dangerous Error in Logic,” Ha’aretz, 20 Aug 2000, by Pedatzur Reuven “The Arrow's Toadies,” Ha’aretz, 17 July 2000, by Pedatzur Reuven 196 The Jerusalem Post, “US Expert: Arrow Missile Won't Work,” 22 Jan 1998 by Arieh O'Sullivan 197 “The system was due to become operational in 1995 but the 2.2 billion dollar project, which is 70 percent funded by the United States, fell well behind schedule.” AFP, “Israel Says Arrow Missiles Score Another Successful Test,” 14 Sept 2000, copy here: http://www1.albawaba.com/en/news/israel-says-arrow-missiles-score-anothersuccessful-test
Usrael knows that Iran‘s missiles really are conventional, and the Arrow system was developed for that very reason?
There is another very simple reason that Iran is developing medium-range missiles for conventional weapons. Iran does not have an Air Force that can strike Israel, and missiles are their way of being able to do so. All of this information is common knowledge, and in my judgment, is ―not terribly complicated.‖ Powell should be able to understand it. Not surprisingly, when Voice of America News reported Powell‘s remark, they left out the stupid part about how ―longrange‖ missiles can‘t carry conventional warheads:
―Meanwhile, Secretary of State Colin Powell said he ‗stick[s] with‘ his comments that Iran is working on adapting ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads. ‗The people raising...questions are people who had not seen the information,‘ said Mr. Powell.‖ 198
It‘s funny that Powell comments on how people had not seen the information, because in the years to come it was Usrael‘s policy to not show the information to almost anyone, including the IAEA and Iran. They learned their lesson with the yellowcake document that was shown to be a fake. If you don‘t show anyone your fabricated information, they won‘t have a chance to show it is bogus. More on this later. Intitially, then, Usrael had a problem getting people to believe their lie, so it was time to get the propaganda machine into gear. So let‘s follow the development of this story chronologically, and we‘ll see what happens.
D) RV Design Morphs into Nuclear Warhead
On 18 November, the day after Powell‘s comments, Robin Wright and Keith B. Richburg wrote an article for the Washington Post199 about the accusations of both Powell and
Voice of America News, “Editorial: Bush on Iranian Nukes,” 29 Nov 2004
the MEK (the article makes sure to say that the two announcements were made ―separately.‖ Of course! It was a coincidence that their accusations came only a few hours apart, and that both accusations came only 2 days after the EU/Iran deal that they were both irate over.) Overall, this article is fairly accurate in repeating what Powell actually said, but this article appeared on the day after Powell‘s remarks. The propaganda starts soon afterwards. It is not long before the media began talking not about ―missile re-entry vehicles‖ (which is what Goldschmidt brings up), but about nuclear warheads instead. Let‘s recall what Powell said:
―No, I'm not talking about uranium. I'm not talking about fissile material. I'm not talking about a warhead. I'm talking about what one does with a warhead…. I'm talking about information that says that they not only had these missiles, but I'm aware of information that suggests they were working hard as to how to put the two together.‖ (emphasis added)
Powell specifically says that the documents do not contain any information about a nuclear warhead, or any warhead for that matter. His claim is that the Iranians are working on modifying the ―delivery system‖ of their missile to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. When Powell says ―delivery system,‖ he is talking about the missile‘s re-entry vehicle (RV). This is why Goldschmidt‘s quote of the IAEA mentions the ―design of a missile re-entry vehicle.‖
The day after the Wright/Richburg WaPO article (which was relatively accurate) appeared, another article appeared in the same paper, this time written by Dafna
The Washington Post, “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb; Evidence Cited of Effort to Adapt Missile,” 18 Nov 2004 by Robin Wright and Keith B. Richburg, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A57465-2004Nov17.html
Linzer.200 In the second half of Linzer‘s article, she repeats the same Powell quote that Wright/Richburg quoted word-for-word, the original statement by Powell being: ―I'm not talking about a warhead.‖201 That‘s great. Problem is, earlier in the article, she says:
―The information provided by the source, who was not previously known to U.S. intelligence, does not mention uranium or any other area of Iran's known nuclear program, according to the official with access to the material. It focuses instead on a warhead design and modifications to Iran's long-range Shahab-3 missile and a mediumrange missile in its arsenal.‖
Powell said, ―I'm not talking about a warhead,‖ and Linzer quoted a slightly modified version of this statement. In the same article, however, Linzer also says that the information ―focuses…on a warhead design‖! In two days, we go from the information not being about a warhead, to it focusing on warhead design. Amazing. Linzer also writes that the documents ―[included] a nuclear warhead design,‖ and elsewhere says that the documents ―included a specific warhead design.‖ Also, Linzer wonders why U.N. nuclear inspectors ―found no evidence that Tehran possesses a nuclear warhead design.‖ Jesus Christ. How many times can Linzer mention nuclear warhead design after quoting Powell saying ―I'm not talking about a warhead.‖ It only took one day for the same newspaper to go from fairly accurate reporting to total propaganda.
Less than 2 weeks later Bill Gertz wrote an article for the Washington Times, saying that ―recent intelligence shows Iran has been working to produce a missile re-entry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead,‖ and that ―the warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design.‖202 He quoted one ―official‖ as saying, ―they are moving ahead with a
The Washington Post, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified,” 19 Nov 2004, by Dafna Linzer, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html 201 Linzer slightly modifies the original in the same way that Wright/Richburg does, quoting Powell as saying, “I'm not talking about uranium or fissile material or the warhead; I'm talking about what one does with a warhead.” 202 The Washington Times, “U.S. Told of Iranian Effort to Create Nuclear Warhead,” 2 Dec 2004 by Bill Gertz http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/dec/01/20041201-114749-5010r/
design for a warhead.‖ He also added that ―other officials said the intelligence revealed that Iranians belonging to the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran were conducting research and testing on development of a nuclear warhead for a missile.‖ Gertz also says that ―Iran's new nuclear warhead program includes what specialists call the basic ‗physics package‘ for fitting a nuclear bomb inside the nose cone of a missile.‖ So we start with Powell saying ―I‘m not talking about a warhead,‖ and six weeks later we are starting to get details about ―Iran‘s new nuclear warhead program.‖ Propaganda.
E) The ―Black Box‖ of Death
A few months later Carla Anne Robbins wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal, and part of the title is: ―New Data Suggest Big Effort to Build Nuclear Warhead.‖ 203 Remember how Powell looked at this data and said it was not about a warhead? Four months later, the title of an article says that that same data suggest a ―big effort to build [a] nuclear warhead.‖ Now that‘s propaganda. Remember how we talked about nobody believing Powell when the story first broke? We find out in Robbins article that‘s only because we didn‘t know the whole story!:
―Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell created a brief stir in November when he told reporters he had seen information that Iran was developing a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. But interest faded after other officials described the source providing the evidence as unvetted and unsolicited. Full details about the extent of the intelligence bonanza weren't disclosed at the time.‖ 204
Robbins reveals for us the ―full details about the extent of the intelligence bonanza‖ in her article:
The Wall Street journal, “As Evidence Grows Of Iran's Program, U.S. Hits Quandary: New Data Suggest Big Effort To Build Nuclear Warhead, But Will World Believe It? Checking Out a Toilet Tank,” 18 March 2005 by Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: http://www.forum.militaryltd.com/todays-headlines/m9879-evidence-grows-iran-s-programu-s-hits-quandary.htm 204 Ibid
―U.S. officials say the materials document Iran's efforts between 2001 and 2003 to adapt its Shahab-3 missile for delivering a ‗black box‘ that experts at the nation's nuclearweapons laboratories believe is almost certainly a nuclear warhead.‖
Now we discover that what is in the documents is not a nuclear warhead, but a ―black box‖ which ―experts‖ believe is ―almost certainly a nuclear warhead.‖ It turns out that these ―full details‖ regarding the ―black box‖ were just what was needed to make this story credible. Nobody believed the story when Powell first announced it, but now the ―U.S. officials‖ are convinced that the documents are authentic:
―Meanwhile, U.S. officials are weighing how to use the missile intelligence that Mr. Powell revealed last November. After worrying that the find might be disinformation, perhaps by Israel, they say they are now persuaded that their source and the documents are real.‖
I am not sure why a ―black box‖ convinces everyone that Iran is working on nuclear warheads. Previously, I quoted Linzer as saying ―the information…focuses on a warhead design.‖ If the documents contain a ―black box,‖ is it accurate for Linzer to say that the documents ―[focus] on a warhead design‖? Does drawing a ―black box‖ constitute ―[focusing] on a warhead design‖? Linzer said the documents ―included a specific warhead design.‖ Is a ―black box‖ a ―specific warhead design‖? Would a purple triangle also constitute a ―specific warhead design‖? I also quoted Gertz as saying ―recent intelligence shows Iran has been working to produce a missile re-entry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead.‖ Shouldn‘t Gertz have mentioned that the ―small nuclear warhead‖ in the missile re-entry vehicle is really a ―black box‖? Gertz says that ―the warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design.‖ Does that mean that the Iranians designed the ―black box‖? How long does it take to design a black box? Was it the Russians that designed the ―purple triangle‖?
The next mention of the story was in The Economist a couple months later, where the ―black box‖ is referred to as an ―unexplained object‖:
―America's intelligence on Iran's programme is limited. However, it is increasingly confident that a cache of computer files that came into its possession, and were said to be from Iran's missile programme, are genuine. These show design work on cones for missiles built around an unexplained object that it is thought could represent a relatively compact nuclear warhead.‖205
Robbins then wrote another article for the WSJ two months later where she repeats her story about the scary ―black box‖:
―The missile intelligence, which U.S. officials acquired covertly last year, documents Iran's efforts from 2001 to 2003 to adapt its Shahab-3 missile to deliver a ‗black box‘ that experts at the U.S. nuclear-weapons laboratories believe almost certainly is a nuclear warhead.206
Strangely enough, in this new article Robbins says that the documents ―don't include a warhead design.‖ How funny. Robbins writes an article whose title says that the documents ―suggest [a] big effort to build [a] nuclear warhead.‖ That article also mentions a ―black box‖ that ―experts at the nation's nuclear-weapons laboratories believe is almost certainly a nuclear warhead.‖ Four months later, the same author says that the documents ―don't include a warhead design.‖ Why do people even bother reading the paper? A few months later Michael Adler also talks about the ―black box‖ in an article for AFP:
The Economist, “Now It Gets Sticky; Iran's Nuclear Ambitions,” 14 May 2005 The Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Gives Briefing On Iranian Missile To Nuclear Agency,” 27 July 2005 by Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Dpr/iranmissile.pdf
―The intelligence, the existence of which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal in March, contains diagnostic test information on putting a package, a so-called black box, inside the cone of the medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile, a diplomat told AFP… The black box, actually a round container, is not identified as a nuclear warhead nor do blueprints show pits for uranium or plutonium, the two atomic bomb materials, but experts believe the package is meant to be atomic, diplomats said.‖207
Now we find out that the ―black box‖ is actually round. To Adler‘s credit, he specifically says that the ―round container‖ is not identified as a nuclear warhead. I guess the French press is not part of the propaganda campaign. In Adler‘s article we also find out the name of the program to install the ―black box‖ into the Shahab is ―Project 111‖. Scary. This was talked about in later articles as well:
―Other unconfirmed reports emerged that Iran was planning to arm its long-rang Shahab3 missile with nuclear warheads. However, the senior official refused to comment on the issue, coined Project 111, when questioned.‖208 ―In 2004, a walk-in defector at an embassy in the Middle East provided US intelligence with a laptop computer, reportedly taken without the knowledge of its owner, which contained thousands of documents relating to ‗Project 111‘, a nuclear research effort apparently under the control of the Iranian military. Drawing the most immediate attention were schematics for Iran‘s Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, showing a series of attempts between 2001 and 2003 to redesign the size, weight and diameter of the nose cone – or reentry vehicle – to accommodate a spherical object with the characteristics of a nuclear implosion weapon.‖209
AFP, “US Briefs on Alleged Iranian Nuclear Warhead Work – Diplomats,” 9 Oct 2005 by Michael Adler, copy here: http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzg.html 208 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Confusion Surrounds IAEA Meeting on Iran Nuclear Crisis,” 6 March 2006 209 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 5–26, copy here: http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/fitzpatrick.pdf
In what way does a ―black box‖ have the ―characteristics of a nuclear implosion weapon‖? These guys can deduce an awful lot from a drawing of a black box. Nonproliferation ―experts‖ drew the same conclusion:
―Non-proliferation expert Gary Samore, a former US White House official under thenPresident Bill Clinton, described the data as ‗basically computer calculations of different configurations for a warhead delivery.‘ ‗I'm very confident that it's authentic,‘ Samore said of the information, adding that it was ‗pretty clear that it was a nuclear warhead that was being designed.‘‖210
This guy can look at a drawing of a ―black box‖ and conclude that it is ―pretty clear‖ that it is a nuclear warhead. Amazing. We will return to the ―black box‖ soon.
i) David Albright
Before we talk about the next article that appeared in the press, we need to say a few words about a guy named David Albright. Albright in the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), an NGO whose ―efforts focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, and achieving deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.‖211 The media continually presents Albright as a ―former UN weapons inspector‖:
―David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington and a former United Nations weapons inspector…‖212 ―David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector…‖213
AFP, “US briefs on alleged Iranian nuclear warhead work – diplomats,” 9 Oct 2005 by Michael Adler http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzg.html 211 http://isis-online.org/about/ 212 The New York Times, “U.N. Nuclear Inspectors to Visit Syria,” 3 June 2008 by William J. Broad http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/middleeast/03syria.html
―David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector…‖214 ―On Tuesday, the ISIS, which is headed by former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright…‖215 ―David Albright, a physicist, former UN weapons inspector…‖216
The only problem with this description of Albright is that it is essentially a lie. Scott Ritter, who actually was a UN weapons inspector, explains this. Read his article.217 Now.
Albright is also repeatedly referred to as a physicist and a PhD, sometimes in the same sentence:
―As for the new inspectors' chances, Dr. Albright, a physicist…‖218
Most people reading this would assume that Albright has a PhD in physics. Most people don‘t realize, however, that the mainstream media constantly lies and deceives. (This goes double for William J. Broad, as we will see in a moment.) Albright has Master‘s degrees in Physics from Indiana University. In 2007, Albright received an
The Washington Post, “White House Voices Concern On North Korea and Uranium,” 8 Jan 2009 by Glenn Kessler http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/07/AR2009010703530.html 214 The Independent (London), “Father of Pakistan Bomb Denies Passing on Secrets,” 4 June 2008 by Saeed Shah http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/father-of-pakistan-bomb-denies-passing-on-secrets-839610.html 215 The Washington Times, “U.S. Seeks $5 Donations for Refugees,” 20 May 2009 by Nicholas Kralev http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/20/us-seeks-5-donations-for-refugees/ 216 The Guardian (London), “Blueprint for Nuclear Warhead Found on Smugglers' Computers,” 16 June 2008 by Ian Traynor http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/16/nuclear.pakistan 217 Truthdig, “The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was,” 26 June 2008 by Scott Ritter: http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20080626_the_nuclear_expert_who_never_was/ For further commentary on Albright, see “Consider the Source,” PBS, by Muhammed Sahimi: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/03/consider-the-source.html 218 The New York Times, “U.N. Arms Team Taking Up Its Task,” 19 Nov 2002 by William J. Broad: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/19/international/middleeast/19INSP.html
honorary doctorate of humane letters from Wright State University. He does not, however, have a PhD in physics. Here is Scott Ritter‘s evaluation of Albright:
―I have no objection to an academically based think tank capable of producing sound analysis about the myriad nuclear-based threats the world faces today. But David Albright has a track record of making half-baked analyses derived from questionable sources seem mainstream. He breathes false legitimacy into these factually challenged stories by cloaking himself in a résumé which is disingenuous in the extreme. Eventually, one must begin to question the motives of Albright and ISIS. No self-respecting think tank would allow itself to be used in such an egregious manner. The fact that ISIS is a creation of Albright himself, and as such operates as a mirror image of its founder and president, only underscores the concerns raised when an individual lacking in any demonstrable foundation of expertise has installed himself into the mainstream media in a manner that corrupts the public discourse and debate by propagating factually incorrect, illogical and misleading information….Whatever physics work Albright may or may not have done in his life, one thing is certain: He has never worked as a nuclear physicist on any program dedicated to the design and/or manufacture of nuclear weapons. He has never designed nuclear weapons and never conducted mathematical calculations in support of testing nuclear weapons, nor has he ever worked in a facility or with an organization dedicated to either. At best, Albright is an observer of things nuclear. But to associate his sub-par physics pedigree with genuine nuclear weaponsrelated work is, like his self-promotion as a ‗former U.N. weapons inspector,‘ disingenuous in the extreme…. In that he never has designed or worked in a nuclear reactor, never has designed or worked on nuclear weapons, in fact never has done anything of a practical, hands-on nature in the nuclear field, to call Albright an expert is a disservice to the term and, again, misleading in the extreme. It is not a sin to merely be informed, or to possess a specialty. But informed specialists are a dime a dozen. There is a reason mainstream media do not turn to bloggers when seeking out expert opinion. And yet, when they turn to ‗Dr. Albright, former U.N. weapons inspector,‘ they are getting little more than a well-funded, well-connected blogger. "
Albright is a blogger, but one that the masses listen to because of his access to the media and his fabricated résumé. In reality, Albright exists solely for the government to pass off their propaganda and not have it look like propaganda. Here again is Ritter explaining this process:
―On each occasion, Albright is fed sensitive information from a third party, and then packages it in a manner that is consumable by the media. The media, engrossed with Albright‘s misleading résumé (‗former U.N. weapons inspector,‘ ‗Doctor,‘ ‗physicist‘ and ‗nuclear expert‘), give Albright a full hearing, during which time the particulars the thirdparty source wanted made public are broadcast or printed for all the world to see. More often than not, it turns out that the core of the story pushed by Albright is, in fact, wrong.‖
This is how propaganda works, people. Albright is a propaganda outlet for the US government. As an example, the following is a report from a recent ―smoking gun‖ report on Iran. Notice how Albright gets quoted to help the story gain credibility in the eyes of the sheeple (go to the link to hear a scary television report as well):
―Confidential intelligence documents obtained by The Times show that Iran is working on testing a key final component of a nuclear bomb. The notes, from Iran's most sensitive military nuclear project, describe a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, the component of a nuclear bomb that triggers an explosion. Foreign intelligence agencies date them to early 2007, four years after Iran was thought to have suspended its weapons programme. An Asian intelligence source last week confirmed to The Times that his country also believed that weapons work was being carried out as recently as 2007 - specifically, work on a neutron initiator. The technical document describes the use of a neutron source, uranium deuteride, which independent experts confirm has no possible civilian or military use other than in a nuclear weapon. Uranium deuteride is the material used in Pakistan's bomb, from where Iran obtained its blueprint. ‗Although Iran might claim that this work is for civil purposes, there is no civil application,‘ said David Albright, a physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security
in Washington, which has analysed hundreds of pages of documents related to the Iranian programme. ‗This is a very strong indicator of weapons work.‘‖ 219
It took two weeks before this document was shown to be a forgery.220 That the document was shown to be a forgery means little in terms of propaganda. The original story was posted on the front page of every newspaper in the world along with talk of a ―smoking gun‖ (complete with ―expert‖ commentary by David Albright). But when the document is shown to be a fake, the MSM doesn‘t report it. Actually, the MSM doesn‘t mind bringing up the issue even after the document was shown to be a fake. Here is a quote from Newsweek 2 weeks later:
―America and its allies, say the U.S. and foreign officials, have also been poring over documents that purport to show Iranian research on a ‗neutron initiator,‘ a device most often used for bombs--not electricity, which the Iranians insist is their nuclear program's goal.‖221
Soon afterward, this ―smoking gun‖ story did disappear, even in the MSM. I guess they found a new lie to report on. I am sure they gave Albright a call when the new fabrication started. Here‘s another weird thing. Let‘s read a couple sentences from Albright‘s comments on the Laptop of Death story:
The Times (London), “Secret Document Exposes Iran's Nuclear Trigger,” 14 Dec 2009 by Catherine Philp http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6955351.ece 220 See IPS, “U.S. Intelligence Found Iran Nuke Document Was Forged,” 28 Dec 2009 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49833, Also, see IPS, “New Revelations Tear Holes in Nuclear Trigger Story,” 5 Jan 2010 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49889 221 Newsweek, “Coming Around On Iran,” 25 Jan 2010 by Mark Hosenball http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/01/15/coming-around-on-iran.html
―Some have suggested that the issue of the so-called laptop documents was first raised with Iran by the IAEA in 2008.‖222
2008? Who the hell said that? Albright continues:
―In fact, the story of the laptop documents was broken in 2005 and 2006 by three excellent reporters, Carla Anne Robbins, then at the Wall Street Journal, Dafna Linzer, at the time writing for the Washington Post, and Michael Adler, writing for the Agence France-Presse. Their articles describing the content and origins of the laptop as well as how it came into U.S. custody can be found here, here and here (subscription required for WSJ). U.S. officials briefed the IAEA on the contents of the so-called laptop documents in July of 2005.‖
Albright links to a Robbins article (which we already talked about) from 18 March 2005, a Linzer article from 8 February 2006, and an Adler article from 9 October 2005. This information is repeated by CSIS (another ―think tank‖) who is quoting Albright, the ―physicist and former UN weapons inspector‖:
―The story of the laptop documents was broken in 2005 and 2006 by Carla Anne Robbins, then at the Wall Street Journal, and Dafna Linzer, at the time writing for the Washington Post.‖223
Isn‘t that weird? We know that the story broke on 17 December 2004 with Powell‘s remarks. There were dozens of articles written on the story before 18 March 2005 (the earliest article listed by Albright and CSIS). In fact, both Robbins and Linzer wrote articles on this subject far earlier than the ones cited by Albright.224 Why does Albright
ISIS, “Misconceptions about Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 8 July 2009 by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/static/297/ 223 See slide 89 here: http://csis.org/files/publication/090812_iranbrief.pdf 224 See The Wall Street Journal, “Bush Pushes His Top Priorities At APEC Meeting,” 22 Nov 2004 by Alex Keto, Geraldo Samor, and Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2004&m=11&d=22&a=5
want to pretend like the story began in March of 2005? The answer is because the early articles talked primarily about how nobody believed the pathetic, fabricated story. So those articles are ignored.
Albright is not the only propagandist working for Usrael. Ollie Heinonen, who succeeded Goldschmidt as head of Safeguards in July 2005 (and worked for Goldschmidt before then), is a key part of the propaganda machine:
―A key question that must be asked is why, then, does the IAEA continue to permit Olli Heinonen, the agency‘s Finnish deputy director for safeguards and the IAEA official responsible for the ongoing technical inspections in Iran, to wage his one-man campaign on behalf of the United States, Britain and (indirectly) Israel regarding allegations derived from sources of such questionable veracity (the MEK-supplied laptop computer)? Moreover, why is such an official given free rein to discuss such sensitive data with the press, or with politically motivated outside agencies, in a manner which results in questionable allegations appearing in the public arena as unquestioned fact? Under normal circumstances, leaks of the sort which have occurred regarding the ongoing investigation into Iran‘s alleged past studies on nuclear weapons would be subjected to a thorough investigation to determine the source and to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to end them. And yet, in Vienna, Heinonen‘s repeated transgressions are treated as a giant ‗non-event,‘ the 800-pound gorilla in the room that everyone pretends isn‘t really there. Heinonen has become the pro-war yin to the anticonfrontation yang of his boss, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Every time ElBaradei releases the results of the IAEA probe of Iran, pointing out that the IAEA can find no evidence of any past or present nuclear weapons program, and that there is a full understanding of Iran‘s controversial centrifuge-based enrichment program, Heinonen throws a monkey wrench into the works. Well-publicized briefings are given to IAEA-
The Washington Post, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified,” 19 Nov 2004, by Dafna Linzer, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html
based diplomats. Mysteriously, leaks from undisclosed sources occur. Heinonen‘s Finnish nationality serves as a flimsy cover for neutrality which long ago disappeared. He is no longer serving in the role as unbiased inspector, but rather a front for the active pursuit of an American- and Israeli-inspired disinformation campaign designed to keep alive the flimsy allegations of a nonexistent Iranian nuclear weapons program in order to justify the continued warlike stance taken by the U.S. and Israel against Iran.‖225
Heinonen has a ―special relationship‖ with Israel:
―For years, Israeli intelligence has maintained shadowy relationship with the IAEA, passing on intelligence information concerning non-proliferation activities through the Israeli Mission in Vienna…The Israelis, according to some sources, maintain a similar relationship with the leadership of Operations Division B…In 2002 the Chief of Operations Division B was the newly appointed Finnish nuclear expert named Olli Heinonen…Sources close to the IAEA claim that the Israeli-IAEA interaction had increased consider in the eriod between August 2002 and February 2003. Both the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt, and the Chief of Operations Division B (responsible for the Iranian file in the IAEA), Olli Heinonen, had been meeting, with the permission of Mohammed ElBaradei, Israeli intelligence personnel.‖226
Ideally, people working for international organizations should not be the puppet of an individual nation.
Many have realized that Heinonen as a propaganda source:
Scott Ritter, “Acts of War,” Truthdig.com, 29 July 2008 http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20080729_acts_of_war/ 226 Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 48-49 and 57
―With respect to Heinonen, in his previous reports on Iran he has shown an uncanny willingness to adopt certain ‗information‘ of dubious value funneled by the US government.‖227
Heinonen was a key factor in using fabricated documents as a tool for getting Iran illegally referred to the Security Council:
―Olli Heinonen, the Finnish nuclear engineer who resigned Thursday after five years as deputy director for safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was the driving force in turning that agency into a mechanism to support U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran.‖228
We will talk more about Heinonen as specific issues that relate to him arise.
F) Return to the Laptop of Death
So let‘s get back to the ―black box.‖ In November of 2005, one year after Powell‘s original comments, the New York Times came out with an article that was a new beginning for the ―laptop‖ fabrication. They published a 3,367 word front-page story that was simply over-the-top with respect to the crude propaganda that was used. This article was so full of crap, it prompted calls for a correction from David Albright! This article was so bad and so dripping with lies and distortions that it even embarrased Albright! Wow! Here are some quotes from the Times article relating to nuclear warheads:
Asia Times, “Iran’s Moment of Nuclear Scrutiny,” 7 July 2007 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IG07Ak01.html 228 Gareth Porter, “Heinonen Pushed Dubious Iran Nuclear Weapons Intel,” 2 July 2010 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52043
―In fact, some nations that were skeptical of the intelligence on Iraq…are deeply concerned about what the warhead discovery could portend…‖ ―The Washington Post and other publications have revealed some details of the intelligence, including that the United States has obtained thousands of pages of Iranian documents on warhead development.‖ (Wow! Linzer reported a year earlier that there were ―more than 1,000 pages‖ of information that was received in total. Now there are ―thousands of pages‖ on warhead development alone!) ―The Americans flashed on a screen and spread over a conference table selections from more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments, saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead…‖ ―The computer contained studies for crucial features of a nuclear warhead…‖ ―If Iran hid parts of its atomic program, it boldly displayed its missiles. And in August 2004, it conducted a test that deepened suspicions that it was at work on a nuclear warhead.‖ ―Even if the documents accurately reflect Iran's advances in designing a nuclear warhead, Western arms experts say that Iran is still far away from producing the radioactive bomb fuel that would form the warhead's heart.‖ ―The 43-page unclassified briefing includes no reference to the warhead documents…‖229
In response to the Times article, Albright wrote an E-mail asking for a correction regarding the warhead comments:
The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print
―The November 13, 2005 New York Times article ‗Relying on Computer, US Seeks to
Prove Iran‘s Nuclear Aims‘ has a deep and misleading flaw. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger repeatedly characterize the contents of computer files as containing information about a nuclear warhead design when the information actually describes a reentry vehicle for a missile. This distinction is not minor, and Broad should understand the difference between the two objects, particularly when the information does not contain any words such as nuclear or nuclear warhead. The ‗black box‘ carried by the reentry vehicle may appear to be a nuclear warhead, but the documents do not state what the warhead is.‖230
Albright points out that the ―black box‖ is not necessarily a nuclear warhead and constantly referring to it as a warhead is misleading, or, more accurately, lying. When a head of a propaganda organization writes you a letter about your misleading reporting, you know your newspaper has a problem.
The punch line to this story comes in the E-mail response by Bill Broad, one author of the New York Times article, to Albright. In this E-mail from the New York Times reporter we find out what the ―black box‖ really is. This is the ―black box‖ that ―experts at the U.S. nuclear-weapons laboratories believe almost certainly is a nuclear warhead.‖ So what is it really?:
―I'm told it was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights. It seemed to have little to do with the nuclear case so we left it out, having been warned off it by our sources.‖231
See copy of Albright’s letter here at the ISIS website: http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/lettertonyt.html (A screenshot of this letter on the ISIS website is in Appendix B) 231 “I'm told it was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights. It seemed to have little to do with the nuclear case so we left it out, having been warned off it by our sources.”
The ―black box‖ is “a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test
Un-flippin‘ believable!! And the New York Times reporter says that this little piece of information ―seemed to have little to do with the nuclear case so we left it out‖ (emphasis added). Of course they left it out! That‘s because the New York Times, like all mainstream media, are nothing more than propaganda outlets. If they find out that a ―black box‖ that ―experts at the U.S. nuclear-weapons laboratories believe almost certainly is a nuclear warhead‖ is actually a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights, they certainly will not report it, because their job is not to question the propaganda, their job is to disseminate it. This is how the media works, sheeple. The reason Broad let this little tidbit of information slip by in his E-mail is because he is so stupid he doesn‘t even know what he is revealing. He says:
―Setting up a straw man, you raise the issue of the ‗black box,‘ which we knew about from out reporting but didn't refer to in our story. I'm told it was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights. It seemed to have little to do with the nuclear case so we left it out, having been warned off it by our sources. Instead, we talked about the how studies wrestled with best positioning a heavy ball – ‗presumably of nuclear fuel,‘ as we put it in the story -- in the interior of the nosecone.‖232
Broad thinks that inside the RV is both a ―black box‖ and a ―heavy ball‖. The nitwit doesn‘t realize that the ―black box‖ that has been discussed in the media IS the heavy ball in the interior of the nosecone. Recall Adler‘s quote above:
The text of the E-mail correspondence can be found at this link: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/866/isis-against-gray-lady (As of 20 Sept 2010, this link is already starting to disappear down the memory hole. In Appendix C is a screenshot of the cached Google document containing the quoted part. I also printed the entire text of the E-mail correspondence.)
―The intelligence, the existence of which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal in March, contains diagnostic test information on putting a package, a so-called black box, inside the cone of the medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile, a diplomat told AFP… The black box, actually a round container…‖
The black box is the round container is the heavy ball. It is only because Broad is an imbecile that we even found out about the ―black box‖ being a telemetry unit. (And the only people who found this out are the people who read the website ―Arms Control Wonk,‖ which is the only place where the Broad E-mail to Albright was printed. The number of people who read ―Arms Control Wonk‖ is about two dozen.) If Broad knew what he was revealing, he never would have brought up the telemetry unit at all.
Gertz, writing in the Washington Times 2 weeks later, decided not to say that the object was a telemetry unit:
―Documents from an Iranian laptop computer obtained from an Iranian source in 2004 are at the center of the intelligence case for Iran's nuclear-arms program. The intelligence shows that from 2001 to 2003, Iran was working to configure the Shahab-3, a 620-mile-range mobile missile, to deliver a warhead that has all the physical characteristics of a nuclear warhead, in terms of its size and shape.‖233
Broad and Sanger knew before 13 November 2005 that the scary black box/round container/heavy ball was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights. It is strange then, that over 2 years later the same authors are still talking about the story, and they still don‘t feel like mentioning the telemetry part of the story:
―In the summer of 2005, senior American intelligence officials began traveling the world with a secret slide show drawn from thousands of pages that they said were downloaded from a stolen Iranian laptop computer, trying to prove that Iran was lying when it said it
The Washington Times, “U.S. says Tehran is pursuing nuke arms,” 25 Nov 2005 by Bill Gertz http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/nov/24/20051124-113242-1914r/
had no interest in building a nuclear weapon. The slides detailed efforts to build what looked like a compact warhead for an Iranian missile and were portrayed by the Americans as suggesting that the Iranian military was working to solve the technical problems in building a bomb.‖234
In 2008, Sanger published a book where he talks about ―Project 111,‖ but forgets to say that the ―sphere‖ is actually a ―telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights‖:
―He saved Project 111 for last. Here, he said, was ‗some of the information that the agency had wanted to show Iran but they had not been in a position to see.‘ The members of the Iranian delegation, who had already been jeering at Heinonen, suddenly began looking at one another. Realizing that some detailed Iranian memorandums about Project 111 were about to be thrown onto the screen, they whipped out their cell phone cameras to take photographs and video; back in Tehran, people would want to see exactly what Heinonen possessed, and presumably try to figure out how it leaked. The first slide was a ‗status report‘ on Project 111, written in Farsi. The opening page bore an epigraph, which Heininen‘s staff had translated: ‗Fate changes no man, unless he changes fate.‘ The remainder of the slides, also in Farsi, detailed work on how to design a warhead so that it could be placed in the nose cone of Iran‘s most sophisticated longrange missile, the Shahab-3. The cramped space inside the nose cone looked as if it was designed to accommodate a sphere like the one the diplomats had just seen, the one surrounded by detonators. But it was unclear exactly how the two projects related, and nowhere in the documents was there any reference to a nuclear warhead. That was the implication, but the Iranians could argue that this was just a conventional weaponand thus none of the IAEA‘s business.‖235
The New York Times, “U.S. Showed the World Exhibit A, Iran as Nuclear Threat; Now Exhibit B Upends It,” 4 December 2007 by William J Broad and David E Sanger http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E6DB1F3BF937A35751C1A9619C8B63 235 David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: Harmony, 2008), p. 93
In 2009, Sanger again brings up ―Project 111‖ in the NY Times, and forgets once again to say that the object inside the nosecone is not a nuclear warhead, but is actually a ―telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights‖:
―Despite Mr. Dagan's public comments, most Israeli officials believe that Iran could create a bomb much more quickly. They cite the murky evidence surrounding two secret programs in Iran, Project 110 and Project 111. Those are the code names for what are believed to be warhead-design programs run by an academic, Mohsen Fakrizadeh.‖236
It‘s almost as if Broad and Sanger know their jobs are to lie to the sheeple, and not to tell them the truth. The same goes for Robbins as well. Robbins is the Wall Street Journal author who originally reported on the ―black box.‖ Over a year after her original story, and after the news was out that the ―black box‖ was a telemetry unit, she is still saying it is a warhead:
‖…[they had been] developing a program and designs for a -- to adapt the Shahab-3 missile to deliver a black box -- never got to see inside the black box in this data, but a block box that had a shape and a weight and a blast type that, to the labs, looked like it was potentially -- quite seriously potentially -- a nuclear warhead that was inside the black box.‖237
Guess who else forgets to mention that the ―black box‖ is a telemetry unit. David Albright! The guy who received the E-mail telling him that the ―black box‖ is a telemetry unit!:
―The Agency has a large number of other documents from several countries, including elements specific to Project 111. During the briefing the Agency showed a report presented at a P111 status meeting, prepared by its project leader. This is the fourth
The New York Times, “U.S. Says Iran Could Expedite Nuclear Bomb,” 10 Sept 2009 by David E Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/world/middleeast/10intel.html 237 Council on Foreign Relation Symposia, “Iran's Nuclear Program Symposium: Iran's Nuclear Development and Production: A Status Report ,” 5 April 2006, transcript here: http://www.cfr.org/publication/10392/
P111 meeting and covers all the activities of the project during the period from July 9, 2003, to January 14, 2004. The first slide of the report, in Farsi, was headed with a motto, ‗Fate changes no man unless he changes fate.‘ Several slides showing the tasks of the project were then presented, from which the following elements were noted: -development of a chamber capable of accommodating a warhead -the chamber within the head must be simple to install -the internal part must be replaceable -the chamber must be sealed -the dimensions and the mass of the head must not be changed. Several sketches for a missile head integrating the chamber described above were shown, indicating the electronic mechanism and the spherical warhead. They do not however give an explicit indication that it‘s a nuclear weapon.‖238
Albright knows damn well that the ―spherical warhead‖ is a telemetry unit, because Broad told him so. Albright declined to mention this in his report. Shocking. Others also did not get the memo about the item being a telemetry unit, for example:
―US officials reportedly briefed the IAEA last July on designs it claims were found on a laptop - stolen by an Iranian, and acquired by US intelligence - which it said showed warhead designs modified to accommodate a compact nuclear warhead.‖239 ―The IAEA has also been investigating Tehran's work on a new ballistic missile warhead, called Project 111. The warhead would be mounted on the Shahab-3, an Iranian medium-range missile that can reach the entire Middle East and parts of Europe. Technical documents in the IAEA's possession indicate that Iran may have been working to redesign the payload chamber of the Shahab-3's re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.‖240
ISIS, “Briefing Notes from February 2008 IAEA Meeting Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 11 April 2008 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Briefing_Weaponization.pdf 239 Christian Science Monitor, “Iran's nuclear gambit - the basics,” 9 May 2006 by Scott Peterson http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0509/p01s04-wome.html 240 The Washington Times, “Iran’s Upper Hand,” 5 Dec 2008
―According to an intelligence report given to Reuters by a non-U.S. diplomat, a covert Iranian programme run by people closely linked to Iran's military includes plans to arm its Shahab-3 missiles, which experts believe have a maximum range of around 2,000 km (1,240 miles), with nuclear warheads. The report, which could not be independently confirmed, surfaced as the United States and its allies seek to highlight the potential security dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran. The report said it was code-named Project 111 and that the ‗aim is arming Shahab-3 missiles with nuclear warheads.‘‖241 ―Based on multilateral intelligence provided by member states, the IAEA judged that Iran was working on a nuclear warhead known as ‗Project 111‘ for mating with the Shahabclass ballistic missile.‖242 ―The head of the Orchid Office apparently thought he needed a little extra emphasis to make his point. The place was somewhere in Iran, shortly after Jan. 14, 2004. The occasion was a status report on activities of the Orchid Office - also known as ‗Project 111,‘ Iran's effort to take a missile nose cone and outfit it with something that looks very much like a nuclear bomb.‖243
The media in the US is pure propaganda. If you believe the exact opposite of what you read in the MSM, your world view will be very close to reality.
G) Iran‘s missile test
Usrael‘s story about the ―black box‖ being a nuclear warhead was not a random fabrication. An outside event prompted the lie, and the ―black box‖ was part of a larger propaganda story.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/05/irans-upper-hand/ 241 Reuters, “Iran said to step up plans for Shahab missiles,” 6 March 2006, by Louis Charbonneau, copy here: http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/1108/70/ 242 States News Service, “Flashpoint: Satellite Subterfuge,” 5 June 2009 243 Christian Science Monitor, “The roots of Iran's nuclear program,” 30 Nov 2009 by Peter Grier http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1130/p25s01-wome.html
On 11 August 2004, two months before Powell‘s comments were made that broke the story, Iran tested a new version of their Shahab-3 missile:
―Iran on Wednesday test fired a new version of its ballistic Shahab-3 missile, which was already capable of reaching U.S. forces in the Middle East and has since been upgraded in response to Israeli missile development. The Shahab-3, which Iran last successfully tested in 2002 before providing it to the elite Revolutionary Guards, is the country's longest-range ballistic missile, with a range of about 810 miles. It has since been modified to improve its range and accuracy.‖244
The new missile was known as the Shahab-3B and it had a nosecone that was shaped differently than the older Shahab-3. Here is a drawing of both side-by-side obtained from the web:
When the Usrael propagandists saw the new missile, they knew it was an opportunity to fabricate a good story. The initial reports were that the purpose of the new missile
AP, “Iran test fires new version of ballistic Shahab-3 missile,” 11 Aug 2004 by Ali Akbar Dareini, copy here: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/17/world/main636553.shtml
design was to ―improve its range and accuracy,‖ but the propagandists knew they could fabricate something much more exciting than that. Their idea was to say that the shape of the nosecone itself was evidence that the missile was meant to carry a nuclear warhead. At the same time, they released the ―laptop‖ story, which is about the re-entry vehicle containing a ―black box‖ which ―experts at the nation's nuclear-weapons laboratories believe is almost certainly a nuclear warhead.‖ This was quite ingenious, since they were coming at the same idea from two different angles, one of which was visual; something that everyone could see with their own eyes. The idea was to get the sheeple to look at the shape of the new nosecone, to picture a ―black box‖ inside it, and to trust the ―experts‖ that are telling them the ―black box‖ is a nuclear warhead. As long as you don‘t let the sheeple know that the ―black box‖ is actually a ―telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights,‖ you got a great little propaganda story.
This entire propaganda story about the Laptop of Death, then, was fabricated in response to the Shahab test in August of 2004. Usrael did not want it to appear that this was the case, so they had to adjust the timeline of events. When the story was first reported, and the official story had not yet been finalized, Linzer reported that the laptop was obtained in November of 2004, 3 months after the Shahab test:
―According to one official with access to the material, a ‗walk-in‘ source approached U.S intelligence earlier this month with more than 1,000 pages purported to be Iranian drawings and technical documents, including a nuclear warhead design and modifications to enable Iranian ballistic missiles to deliver an atomic strike.‖245
(This article was published on 19 Nov 2004, so when Linzer says the ―walk in‖ source approached U.S. intelligence ―earlier this month,‖ that means in early November of 2004.)
The Washington Post, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified,” 19 Nov 2004, by Dafna Linzer, copy here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html
On 8 Feb 2006, Linzer said that U.S. intelligence received the documents over 20 months previous:
―Iranian engineers have completed sophisticated drawings of a deep subterranean shaft, according to officials who have examined classified documents in the hands of U.S. intelligence for more than 20 months.‖246
Twenty months before 8 Feb 2006 is 8 June 2004, so ―more than 20 months‖ is May of 2004. First, Linzer reported than the source approached U.S. intelligence in November of 2004, then, after receiving the ―official‖ version of events, she reports that the source approached U.S. intelligence in May of 2004. How cute. Now, under the ―revised‖ version of events, the source approached the US 3 months before the Shahab test, and not 2 months after. Under the new version of events, the propaganda story was not fabricated in response to the test, because it happened first. How clever!
H) Instrument Section Stays with the RV
Before addressing the idea that the shape of the re-entry vehicle suggests that there is a nuclear weapon inside, we will address a related issue. Soon after the Iranian missile test, an article appeared in Jane‘s Defence Weekly that was essentially a long quote from Uzi Rubin, who is the former director of Israel‘s Arrow anti-missile project. (The Arrow program is designed to intercept incoming missiles). Although this article did mention the new shape of the RV, saying that ―the Shahab re-entry vehicle of conical design has been replaced by a smaller vehicle shaped like a ‗baby bottle‘ neck,‖ this issue was not stressed in this article, and it was not tied to the issue of nuclear weapons. However, Rubin tied a different aspect of the new design to nuclear weapons, saying that ―the new Shahab‘s instrument section…will travel with the re-entry vehicle,
The Washington Post, “Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case against Iran” 8 February 2006, See here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020702126.html
rather than be discarded. This is a useful arrangement for precise altitude fusing of nuclear warheads.‖247 This theory of Rubin‘s was repeated Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine:
―The new design appears to be a warhead capable of carrying an avionics unit on separation from the booster — a design that could enable air-burst nuclear weapons fusing during reentry.‖248
The theory was then expanded upon in a ―strategic dossier‖ put out by the IISS249:
―…the instrumentation raceway that runs up the side of the missile body extends to the bottom of the flared skirt. This suggests that the instrumentation package-including the navigation, guidance and control equipment-may be designed to remain with the warhead after separation from the main missile body. This raises the possibility that the safety, arming and fusing system for the Shahab-3M may be more sophisticated than that seen in its predecessor. If this hypothesis is correct, the Shahab-3M may be intended to perform several new missions, including airburst detonations, at a specified altitude, or the effective and efficient dispersal of submunition packages. Either of these new capabilities would enhance the dispersal of chemical or biological agent even if loaded into the warhead as bulk agent. In addition, were there the intent to mount a nuclear weapon on the missile, a sophisticated safety-arming and fusing system-capable of initiating before the warhead impacts the ground – would be needed to maximize the effects of such a weapon.‖250
Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iran Unveils Redesigned Shahab Missile,” 27 Sept 2004 by Alon Ben-David Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Iran’s ‘Sputnik,’” 29 November 2004 by Craig Covault 249 The IISS is the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a UK-based think tank: http://www.iiss.org/ You can think of them as the UK version of ISIS, which will be discussed later. Basically, these think tanks are propaganda outlets. 250 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes,” (New York: Routledge, 2005)
This all sounds very scary, but it turns out that there is no need to address any of this. This is because buried in the endnote that follows the above quote in the IISS paper is the following:
―Uzi Rubin initially posited the idea. However, upon further analysis he now doubts his original hypothesis.‖ (emphasis added)
Are you freakin‘ kidding me? Once again, an ―expert‖ makes up some BS crap, it gets published in the media (and on the web 251), and then, in a footnote in some obscure booklet that is read by maybe 50 people worldwide, it says that the originator of the idea thinks that his own idea is a bunch of crap. This is how propaganda works. Publish the lies everywhere, and if the lie is exposed or later denied, either don‘t report it at all or bury it in some obscure place. Of course, Rubin knew his theory was crap from the start, but the point is to publish the lies first, and then say that you changed your mind in some obscure publication in order to cover your ass. Here is the real reason that the ―instrumentation package-including the navigation, guidance and control equipment-may be designed to remain with the warhead after separation from the main missile body,‖ and it has nothing to do with nuclear weapons:
―The new re-entry vehicle has now place [sic] for a rocket-nozzle control system so that no spin stabilization is needed anymore - at least not during all of the flight after the boost phase. Nevertheless, this new nozzle-control system enables the Shahab-3B guidance and steering in all phases of the flight, so that course corrections can be done at any time. The new Shahab-3B was for the first time officially tested only a very short time after the Israeli Arrow ABM system scored a first hit against a SS-1 SCUD ballistic missile. The Iranian defence minister said that the missile would be Iran‘s answer to the Arrow and behind this statement are credible reasons. Around one year ago Iran claimed for the first time to have developed and produced a laser gyroscope INS system
Iran Watch, “Iran’s New Shihab Missile and the Russian Connection,” by Uzi Rubin, 24 Sept 2004 http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/memonitor/perspex-memonitor-iranshihabmissile-092404.htm
coupled with GPS as backup. For full-guided flight with trajectory of the Shahab-3B, an accurate INS and/or GPS is needed: laser gyroscope and GPS are two of the most accurate technologies, used for course calculations. It is not yet known if this technology is also used in the Shahab-3B, but the coincidence is striking, especially as with such an accurate navigation system the Shahab-3 could archive several objectives. The missile could change its trajectory several times during re-entry and even terminal phase, effectively preventing pre-calculated intercept points of radar systems - which is a method nearly all ABM systems using these days.‖252
The instrumentation remains with the re-entry vehicle to allow for trajectory changes, which helps to defeat Israel‘s Arrow anti-missile system. Interestingly, the fact that the new missile was a response to Israel‘s Arrow program was accidentally reported in the media before the propaganda story was concocted. The truth sometimes accidentally leaks out in the first few days of a story, before the propaganda line is established:
―Iran on Wednesday test fired a new version of its ballistic Shahab-3 missile, which was already capable of reaching U.S. forces in the Middle East and has since been upgraded in response to Israeli missile development.‖253
Also, Iran made it quite clear that the reason for the redesign was to respond to Israel‘s Arrow program:
―Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani said that the missile would undergo more upgrading as long as the Israeli Arrow missile is upgraded…I want to clarify three points regarding the Shahab-3 missile. First, our military strategy is in essence a defensive one, not hostile and offensive. This is an established fact that is put in writing. Second, the
Air Combat Information Group, “Shahab 3: An Advanced IRBM,” by Tom Cooper and Pedro B.D. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_396.shtml Tom Cooper is the editor of the Air Combat Information Group, and has written several books on combat aircraft, and has also written for Jane’s Defence. For example: “Arab MiGs Volume1, MiG-15s and MiG-17s, 1955-1967,” (Harpia Publishing, 2009), “Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat,” (Osprey Publishing, 2004), Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iran Returns Upgraded Tomcats to Service,” 22 Aug 2007 253 AP, “Iran Test Fires New Version of Ballistic Shahab-3 Missile,” 11 Aug 2004 by Ali Akbar Dareini copy here: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/17/world/main636553.shtml
Islamic Republic of Iran has confirmed in practice this strategic choice over the past 25 years. We have not launched attacks on any country, and all our military operations have been in self-defence. On these grounds, I would say that the Shahab-3 missile is a defensive and deterrent weapon. But the message I want to send is that the Shahab-3 missile will be developed as long as the Israeli Arrow missile is upgraded. I will not give further details, but I make myself clear.‖254
Rubin was head of the Arrow program, and is an expert on this issue. He knew immediately what the real reason was to have the instrumentation remain with the reentry vehicle. His fabricated reason was for propaganda purposes only.
I) The New, ―Triconic‖ RV
Now let‘s talk about the idea that the shape of the new missile is proof that it was designed for a nuclear warhead. This ridiculous story was first mentioned by our friends Broad and Sanger from the New York Times. The following is from their famous propaganda masterpiece talked about above:
―Tehran test-fired an upgraded version of the Shahab - shooting star in Persian - in a flight that featured the first appearance of an advanced nose cone made up of three distinct shapes. Missile experts noted that such triconic nose cones have great range, accuracy and stability in flight, but less payload space. Therefore, experts say, they have typically been used to carry nuclear arms.‖255
I have searched Lexis Nexis and every other database that exists, and have read every article available that mentions this fabrication. There is not a single ―expert‖ anywhere in the world that has attached his name to this nonsense.
BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, “Iranian Will Develop Missile ‘As Long as Israeli missile Upgraded’ – Minister,” 12 Aug 2004, Sourse: Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1400 gmt 11 Aug 04 255 The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, copy here: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print
The idea that the shape of the nosecone means that there is a nuclear weapon inside is ridiculous. Isn‘t it strange that Iran tried so hard to keep their nuclear weapons program a secret for so long, and then they let the cat out of the bag by releasing videotape of a missile whose very shape reveals their whole secret? How silly of them.
The triconic nosecone supposedly indicates that there is a nuclear weapon inside. The first time I heard this BS story, I thought of this famous ―triconic‖ nosecone:
Wow! I didn‘t know that the Apollo spacecraft had a nuclear weapon on board! Were they planning on nuking the moon?
Broad from the NY Times waited only a week to repeat this nonsense story:
―In August, a new surprise emerged as Iran test-fired a rocket that bore a suspiciouslooking nose cone. The rocket was an updated version of their Shahab-3 missile, and
the test ignited a quiet debate among experts over whether its advanced nose cone was designed to carry a nuclear warhead.‖256
A quiet debate among what experts? Please show me an expert anywhere that backs this lie.
This mantra was repeated endlessly since then. Some examples:
―In August 2004, Iran tested the Shihab-3 with a much modified nose-cone design, which just happens to be well designed for fitting a simple nuclear weapon into the missile.‖ 257 ―Iran has successfully developed ballistic missiles with the capability to carry nuclear warheads. Detailed analysis of recent test firings of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile by military experts has concluded that Iran has been able to modify the nose cone to carry a basic nuclear bomb…Experts who have studied the latest version of the Shahab have identified modifications to the nose cone. Instead of the single cone normally attached to this type of missile, the new Shahab has three cones, or a triconic, warhead. A triconic warhead allows the missile to accommodate a nuclear device and this type of warhead is normally found only in nuclear weapons.‖258 ―The 3a model predates the atomic jitters that arose with the debut of the Shahab-3b in August 2004. The 3b‘s distinctive nosecone — known as triconic and made up of three distinct shapes— is viewed by Western experts as ideal for carrying a nuclear warhead.‖259
The New York Times, “Doubts Persist on Iran Nuclear Arms Goals,” 20 Nov 2004 by Douglas Jehl and William J. Broad http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E0DD1E3FF933A15752C1A9629C8B63&pagewanted=1 257 Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran: continuity and chaos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 258 The Daily Telegraph, “Iran has Missiles to Carry Nuclear Warheads-Update Scud Puts Israel in Tehran’s SitesReports Con Coughlin,” 7 April 2006 by Con Coughlin 259 The New York Times, “Iran Reports Missile Test, Drawing Rebuke,” 10 July 2008 by Alan Cowell and William J. Broad, copy here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/world/asia/10iran.html
Reuters has been inserting slight variations of the same quote in all of its Iran articles for over 2 years. Some examples:
―Olli Heinonen raised a diplomatic stir in February with a power-point presentation indicating links in Iran between projects to process uranium, test explosives and modify a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.‖260 ―Diplomats said the point of Heinonen's trip was to push for Iranian responses to the intelligence reports, which indicated that Iran linked projects to process uranium, test high explosives and modify a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.‖ 261 ―The intelligence documents (which have not been provided to Iran because of US concerns that could compromise sources) reportedly point to links in Iran between uranium processing, explosives testing and attempts to modify a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.‖262 ―He also said the IAEA had no mandate to consider Western intelligence, which alleges that Iran had linked projects to process uranium, test high explosives and modify a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.‖263 ―The agency has been investigating for several years western intelligence reports indicating Iran has co-ordinated efforts to process uranium, test explosives at high altitude and revamp a ballistic missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.‖ 264
I guess repeating a lie helps.
Reuters, “Atom Watchdog to Press Arms Issue in Iran Talks,” 18 April 2008 by Mark Heinrich http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-33114520080418 261 The New York Times, “Iran to Address Allegations that it Sought Nuclear Arms, UN Says,” 23 April 2008 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/africa/23iht-iran.4.12279830.html 262 The New Zealand Herald, “In Defence of Iran,” 14 June 2008 by Phil Taylor http://www.nzherald.co.nz/international-atomic-energy-agency/news/article.cfm?o_id=375&objectid=10516241 263 Reuters, “Iran Says Sanctions will not stop nuclear work,” 18 Sept 2008 by Parisa Hafezi http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-35539720080918 264 Reuters printed in the Irish Times, “UN watchdog fears Iran now working on nuclear payload,” 19 Feb 2010 http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0219/1224264800136.html
i) The ―Triconic‖ RV is Bigger; Room Needed fur Nukes
As I mentioned above, no expert has ever publically supported the lie that the shape of the RV shows that it is meant to carry nukes. The media, however, did try to explain why the new nosecone design shows that it is meant to carry nuclear warheads, rather than simply making the unsupported comment that ―Western experts‖ say that it is so. The explanation was that the new nosecone was larger, which, if it were true, would make perfect sense. Any nuclear weapon that Iran would be able to actually construct would be a crude one, which would be very large and heavy. If Iran wanted to carry a nuclear warhead in their missiles, they would definitely need a large nosecone.
The idea that the new nosecone was larger began in the Aviation Week article I quoted above, where they mention that the new Shahab has a ―more bulbous nose‖:
―At nearly 60 ft. long, the upgraded Shahab-3 carries about 15% more propellant and has a more bulbous nose (see photo).‖265
This is one of the most stupid statements quoted in my paper so far. Not only does Aviation Week make a totally false statement, but they actually show a picture that proves it is false. The photo that was used in the Aviation Week article is now all over the web. This is it:
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Iran’s ‘Sputnik,’” 29 November 2004 by Craig Covault
How in God‘s name can you show this picture and call the nose ―bulbous‖? This is a ―bulbous‖ nosecone:
The Aviation Week picture of the Shahab-3B is what I showed in the drawing above when I compared it to the old Shahab. Here is a blowup of the two nosecones side-byside, taken from the web:
Here is the new nosecone laid on top of the old:
See how the new nosecone is smaller than the old one? Iran makes a smaller nosecone, and our media calls it ―more bulbous.‖ Unbelievable. For another more recent comparison of the old and new nosecones, see this picture 266:
Taken from here: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2763/iranian-warhead-evolution The nosecone on the left is the old one, and the one in the middle is the new one. (the one on the right is very new, which is years after what we are talking about here).
Only can the f%#&ed up American media call the nosecone on the right ―more bulbous‖ than the one on the left. Calling the new nosecone ―more bulbous‖ certainly implies that it is bigger. Jane‘s Defense Weekly was much more direct when they talked about the ―larger nose section‖ of the new missile:
―The missile has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. ‗It is not a copy of a known missile but the new Shahab has a major-league design. It's clear that it is the work of seasoned missile engineers, probably Russian, rather than an experimental beginners‘ version, added Rubin. Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country's first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough
to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests.‖267
Oh no! Was I wrong when I said that there is no expert anywhere that supports the idea that the new nosecone design indicates that it is meant for nuclear weapons? Uzi Rubin is certainly an expert, and he seems to be supporting the idea here by saying that Iran is making a larger nosecone.
No, I am not wrong. This is simply an example of propaganda. The quote above is from the 8 Dec 2004 issue of Jane‘s Defense. Earlier in this paper, we quoted Uzi Rubin saying the following in the 27 Sept 2004 issue of Jane‘s Defence:
―the Shahab re-entry vehicle of conical design has been replaced by a smaller vehicle shaped like a ‗baby bottle‘ neck.‖268 (emphasis added)
In Jane‘s 24 Sept 2004 issue, Alon Ben-David quotes Rubin as saying the new nosecone is smaller, but in Jane‘s 8 Dec 2004 issue, Andrew Koch uses Rubin to support his idea that the new nosecone is larger. It is important to note that in the latter article, Koch does not use an actual quote of Rubin talking about the size of the RV. He does not quote him because Rubin never said that the new RV is larger, and he actually said the opposite. Because Rubin says the opposite of what Koch wants him to say, Koch uses deception to make it seem like Rubin supports Koch‘s theory. Let‘s see how this is done.
Jane's Defence Weekly, "Tehran Altering Ballistic Missile," 8 Dec 2004 by Andrew Koch, Robin Hughes, and Alon Ben-David http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1309284/posts 268 Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iran Unveils Redesigned Shahab Missile,” 27 Sept 2004 by Alon Ben-David, partial copy here: http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index.php?showtopic=37335
If you read closely, you will see that in the Koch quote, Rubin actually says nothing at all about the new nosecone design, its size, or either being related to a nuclear weapon. Koch has skillfully inserted an unrelated Rubin quote into the middle of his crap about the ―larger‖ nosecone, with the intent of making it look like Rubin endorses the idea that the new nosecone is larger and is therefore an effort to adapt the missile to carry nukes. In the first sentence of the paragraph quoted above, Koch introduces the idea that ―the missile has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device.‖ In the next sentence, Koch says that ―Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation.‖ This refers to Rubin‘s theory that we talked about earlier, which was discussed by Rubin in the earlier issue of Jane‘s written by Ben-David. In that issue, Rubin said that ―the new Shahab‘s instrument section…will travel with the reentry vehicle, rather than be discarded. This is a useful arrangement for precise altitude fusing of nuclear warheads.‖ (We found out in a footnote of an obscure booklet that Rubin himself decided this theory was crap.) This separation theory, however, has nothing to do with the theory that the new nosecone‘s shape or size is suited for carrying a nuclear weapon. Koch conflates the two issues when he says that ―Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation.‖ Rubin talked about the separation issue, but never said anything about a larger nosecone. By putting the idea of a ―larger nose section‖ right next to Rubin‘s idea of the nosecone being ―capable of separation,‖ the reader assumes that Rubin (or at least ―Israeli officials‖) are also agreeing that the new nosecone is larger. In the next sentence of the Koch‘s article, Rubin is quoted as saying that the new design originated within Iran, which again is not related at all to the idea that the new shape of the RV or size is related to nukes. After Rubin is injected into the paragraph in these two sentences, the author continues with his nonsense about the larger RV: ―Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country's first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles…‖. WTF?? The insertion of Rubin‘s unrelated theory and Rubin‘s unrelated quote in the middle of
Koch‘s nonsense about the new ―larger‖ nosecone being related to nukes is deliberate deception. Koch is trying to use Rubin to back up his lie. The idea that the new RV is larger is the idea of the author, Andrew Koch. Andrew Koch has a M.A. in International Affairs. He is a propagandist and a liar, not a missile expert. There is no missile expert anywhere who has ever said that the size (or shape) of the new RV indicates that it is meant to carry nukes. But wait! In the Alon Ben-David article, Rubin said that ―the Shahab re-entry vehicle of conical design has been replaced by a smaller vehicle shaped like a ‗baby bottle‘ neck.‖269 Even though Rubin said that the new RV is smaller, he did not relate this to the issue on fitting a nuclear warhead inside of it. He simply made a comment on the relative sizes of the RV‘s. Maybe Rubin thinks that smaller RV‘s are better for nukes. No. That isn‘t it, either. Years after Ben-David quoted him in Jane‘s, Rubin made more detailed comments about the size of the RV in an interview with the ―Iran Watch‖ website:
―The new triconic warhead is not a move toward accommodating a nuclear warhead. This warhead has less volume than the conical warhead Iran was using before. And the diameter of the central section is about 60 cm, which is very constrained for a nuclear bomb. It could be a gun type, but that would be heavy.‖270
This is a very clear statement on Rubin‘s position regarding the size of the new RV and its suitability for nukes. Rubin says that the warhead is smaller, and because it is smaller, that means it is not meant for nukes. When Koch said that ―extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country's first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests,‖ he was correct. If Iran was building missiles with the objective to be able to carry
Ibid Iran Watch, “Iran’s Missile Program Making Steady Progress: An interview with Uzi Rubin,” 17 Sept 2009: http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/roundtables/interview-rubin-091709.htm
nukes, they would need a much larger nosecone than even the original Shahab 3 had; something like what I showed above:
Instead of building nosecones larger, however, Iran is building them smaller. Think real hard. What could that mean? Could it mean that their missiles are not meant to carry nuclear weapons? Gee whiz!!
There is simply no way that Iran could make a nuclear weapon small enough to fit into the new Shahab RV, or the original Shahab for that matter. In a Time magazine article, they mention how big the ―hollow metallic sphere‖ (a.k.a.‖black box,‖ a.k.a. ―telemetry unit‖) is:
―According to a Western diplomat familiar with the U.S. intel brief, a Farsi-language PowerPoint presentation on the laptop has "catchy graphics," including diagrams of a hollow metallic sphere 2 ft. in diameter and weighing about 440 lbs.‖271
There is no freakin‘ way Iran could build a nuclear weapon that small.272 In comparison, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki by that peace-loving democracy was over 10 feet long and weighed over 10,000 pounds. I wonder if a telemetry unit is 2 feet in diameter!
Time, “Iranian Bombshell?” 5 March 2006 by Elaine Shannon http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1169919,00.html 272 See “No way Iran can build a weapon that small,” and the enclosed link here: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1007/iranian-nuclear-weapons-errata
The new RV is smaller, not bigger. It is way too small to accommodate a crude nuclear weapon.
ii) Back to the Shape Issue
Although the issue of size is BS, maybe there is something special about the shape of the new RV that is more suited for nuclear weapons. Rubin doesn‘t like that idea, either:
‗All three RV designs have the same length and diameter, but the triconic designs are less suitable for carrying an initial nuclear weapon. For that purpose, the initial conic design is more efficient.‘‖273
The shape itself is also less suitable for nukes. So what is the overall conclusion that Rubin reaches regarding the new nosecone design?:
―…I must be clear on one important point here. The new triconic warhead is not a move toward accommodating a nuclear warhead.‖ 274
What?!? You certainly wouldn‘t guess that by reading in the New York Times that ―Iran test-fired a rocket that bore a suspicious-looking nose cone‖ which ―ignited a quiet debate among experts over whether its advanced nose cone was designed to carry a
Also, see the Rubin quote above: “And the diameter of the central section is about 60 cm, which is very constrained for a nuclear bomb.” 273 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Parade Provides Glimpse Of Possible Revised Shahab 3,” Vol. 172, No. 17, 3 May 2010, page 26 274 Iran Watch, “Iran’s Missile Program Making Steady Progress: An Interview with Uzi Rubin,” 17 Sept 2009 http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/roundtables/interview-rubin-091709.htm
nuclear warhead.‖ You also wouldn‘t guess it by reading another New York Times article that says ―the 3b‘s distinctive nosecone — known as triconic and made up of three distinct shapes— is viewed by Western experts as ideal for carrying a nuclear warhead.‖ The media in Usrael is useless, and is 100% propaganda. The only expert anywhere that addressed the issue of the new RV‘s size and shape said the exact opposite of what the US media claimed. The expert said that ―the new triconic warhead is not a move toward accommodating a nuclear warhead.‖
iii) Sometimes, Smaller is Better So why does Iran keep building smaller re-entry vehicles? Rubin addresses that as well:
―The newest version appears an attempt to improve even more the stability and accuracy of the RV, but in the cost of reduced volume for the warhead …the newer, baby-bottle-shaped RV is believed to be more accurate that the 3A and 3B models and provide an improved lift to drag ratio.‖275
This is the same as what he said in the ―Iran Watch‖ interview:
―I‘m guessing that the conical nosecone had a stability problem that was stressing the missile and harming its accuracy. The triconic shape is naturally stable if designed correctly, which would improve accuracy. I‘d say the new shape is designed for simplicity and accuracy, not necessarily for nuclear capability.‖276
The main reason for the triconic design is not so that it can hold a nuclear warhead, but because it provides more stability and accuracy. As we mentioned with the previous issue, the initial news reports (before the propaganda line was set) mention the real reason, even Voice of America News:
―Experts say the latest test is part of Iran's effort to improve the accuracy of a missile capable of reaching Israel as well as U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf.‖277
Sometimes when a story first breaks, the truth will leak out before the propaganda line is established. We talked about how Jane‘s Defence ratcheted up the propaganda in their 24 Sept 2004 and 8 Dec 2004 issues when they reported on the new missile design. When the issues first broke, and the propaganda story was not established, Jane‘s also talked about the new missile‘s accuracy:
―‘The Israelis are trying hard to improve the [capability] of their [Arrow] missiles and we are also trying to improve the Shahab-3 in a short time,‘ said Iranian Defence Minister Rear Adm Ali Shamkhani on 7 August while disclosing the pending test. The improvements to the missile ‗not only concern its range, but other specifications as well‘, he noted. Regional intelligence sources told JDW that these enhancements include guidance equipment of Chinese origin to improve the missile‘s accuracy.‖278
Rational sources report the same thing:
―The Ghadr missile also has a ―baby bottle‖ style nose for extra aerodynamic efficiency.‖279
The accuracy of the new re-entry vehicle means that it is OK if it is smaller:
―As a high-speed ballistic missile and pre-mission fuelling capability, the Shahab-3 has an extremely short launch/impact time ratio. This means that the INS/gyroscope guidance would also remain relatively accurate until impact (important, given the fact that the gyrosopes tend to become inaccurate the longer the flight lasts). With that guidance system, the Shahab-3B could archive an accuracy of around 30-50m CEP or even less. The Iranians have already proved of developing even more precise systems,
Voice of America News, “Iran Missile Test Raises Concerns,” 12 Aug 2004 by Nick Simeone Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iran, Israel Trade Barbs Over New Missile Tests,” 18 August 2004 by Michael Sirak 279 INESAP, “Is an Iranian Missile Threat Imminent?” by Bharath Gopalaswamy http://inesap.org/node/93
then their Fateh-110 missiles have an electro-optical terminal guidance system: Shahab3B is not known of having anything similar, but should be fully dependent on INS and – likely – GPS. This new improved accuracy was apparently the reason why the warhead weight has been significantly decreased - to suggested 500kg. This, namely, is sufficient for pin-point target attack capability.‖280
The same theme is talked about by Scott Ritter:
―The Shahib-3 missile had a longer range than the SCUD missile upon which it was based, and as such had a much greater re0entry speed as it neared impact. This higher speed was too much for the conventional warhead design to handle, and as a result the warhead would tumble and spin, either failing to detonate or missing its intended target by many miles. The use of a tri-conic design would enable the Shahib-3 warhead to remain relatively stable during re-entry, increasing the reliability and accuracy of the missile.‖281
It‘s OK with Iran to have a smaller re-entry vehicle if it is more accurate. Remember Powell‘s comment that ―long-range missiles tend to be inaccurate, therefore they are not designed to carry conventional warheads‖? What an imbecile.
Here is some detail about why the shape allows for a more stable trajectory and a faster incoming re-entry vehicle which helps to negate Israel‘s Arrow system:
―Shockwaves are formed at ―discontinuities‖ along a rocket‘s airframe. They radiate energy away from the point on the missile where they are created. As the missile moves along, this constant creation of shocks form what appears to be a continuous ―cone‖ that trails along the rocket. The angle the cone makes with the rocket is therefore related to the rocket‘s speed. Of course, the more discontinuities there are on the airframe, the more shockwaves are formed and the more energy is radiated away. That, by the way,
Air Combat Information Group, “Shahab 3: An Advanced IRBM,” by Tom Cooper and Pedro B.D. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_396.shtml 281 Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 183
explains why the ―baby-bottle nose cone‖ of the Ghadr (also sometimes know as Shahab-3B and various other names, I wish we could all agree on names) has a higher drag coefficient than the simple cone on a Nodong or Shahab-3. Of course, as my friend and fellow former UNMOVIC inspector, Mike Elleman points out, the baby bottle shape allows the weight to cross sectional area of the detached warhead to be increased. This ratio is also known as the ballistic coefficient or Beta of the warhead and allows both a faster reentry and a more stable trajectory.‖282
The triconic shape allows a faster, more accurate trajectory to defeat Israel‘s Arrow system. It is not for carrying nuclear weapons.
iv) Stupid Media
Now that we know a little more about this issue, let‘s look again at a quote from the beginning of this story from the Broad and Sanger propaganda masterpiece:
―Tehran test-fired an upgraded version of the Shahab - shooting star in Persian - in a flight that featured the first appearance of an advanced nose cone made up of three distinct shapes. Missile experts noted that such triconic nose cones have great range, accuracy and stability in flight, but less payload space. Therefore, experts say, they have typically been used to carry nuclear arms.‖283
Broad and Sanger actually have the key information into their article! They say that the new design is more accurate, stable, and has less room. They take this information, however, and draw exactly wrong conclusion when they continue with: ―therefore, experts say, they have typically been used to carry nuclear arms.‖ What?!? Why do you
Arms Control Wonk, “Shocking Good Fun,” by Geoffrey Forden http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2636/shocking-good-fun 283 The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print
need a more accurate missile for a nuclear weapon? I think if a nuclear missile is within a kilometer or so, that is just fine. Remember when Powell said that inaccurate missiles ―are not designed to carry conventional warheads‖ and are for carrying nukes instead? Remember how he added that ―this is not, in my judgement, terribly complicated‖?284 I guess it is too complicated for Broad and Sanger. As for the second part, I for not know why a nuclear-tipped missile needs to be more stable. The stability is related to the accuracy. Broad and Sanger then say that the new design has less room, and therefore they are typically used for nukes. This, of course, is exactly wrong once again. As we discussed earlier, Iran needs more room for a crude nuke, not less. Broad and Sanger are complete imbeciles. Here‘s another example of our wonderful media. In 2008, Iran tested another new missile. The media quoted ―Western experts‖ as saying the following about the new missile:
―Despite the claims of a new weapon system, Western experts said it was probably just another name given to the Shahab 3 missile which had been test-fired on previous occasions.‖285
Here is a quote about the same test from Yiftah Shapir from the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University:
―Developing a solid fuel propelled two-stage missile indicates not inconsiderable technological know-how in a specialized field that differs greatly from the liquid fuel technology that has characterized Iranian missiles to date. Therefore, claims made by experts that this is in fact a Shahab-3 missile with a different logo have no foundations whatsoever.‖286
State Department Press Release, “Remarks to the Press En Route to Tel Aviv,” 21 November 2004 The London Times, “Military Experts Say 'New' Missile is Just an Old One with a Different Name,” 12 Nov 2008 by Michael Evans http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5140676.ece 286 Defense Update, “Sejil: A New Iranian Missile?,” by Yiftah Shapir
Israeli experts sure don‘t seem to agree with the US media often. If you have to ignore the media in your country and go to Israel to get the truth, your media is in bad shape.
J) Who Stole the Laptop of Death?
So let‘s talk about who the source was for these laptop documents. The following is from a book written by our friend David Sanger. I assume that since Sanger is from the New York Times that this is the ―official‖ version of the story:
―In mid-2004 the CIA had gotten its hands on a laptop computer that arrived courtesy of a senior Iranian technician. Recruited at a scientific conference outside of Iran, the technician appeared to be in his forties or early fifties. He made it clear that he despised the Iranian regime, and strongly hinted to his handlers that he had access to the evidence that Iran was trying to design a weapon. Soon he was engaged in a huge gamble, one that likely cost him his life. The technician either possessed or was provided with a laptop computer, and he agreed to move onto its hard drive the designs and projects that his fellow Iranian engineers had on the drawing boards. Over time, he copied thousands of pages of Iranian computer simulations, accounts of experiments written in Farsi, and detailed schematic diagrams. The information revealed a progression of development projects, from 2001 until sometime in late 2003, that ranged from designing detonators that could fire simultaneously (essential to making a nuclear core implode) to digging a 400-meter-deep shaft and hooking it to an ignition system that could be operated from miles away. There was also the computer image of a schematic drawing of what international inspectors benignly called a ‗reentry vehicle.‘ The rest of the world would call it a warhead. (In 2008, in its first public description of the evidence, the IAEA said that the dimensions and the layout showed that the warhead design was ‗quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.‘) The evidence
copied onto the laptop made it clear the warhead would be sent aloft by the Shahab-3 missile, Persian for ‗Shooting Star.‘ Eventually the technician suspected that Iran‘s feared counterintelligence teams were on to him. As he grew increasingly nervous, he gave the laptop to his wife, who managed to get out of the country with their children. Within weeks, CIA analysts poring over the information about Iran‘s secret efforts to design a weapon, much more than America had ever known before. But the technician himself never made it out of Iran. ‗We never figured out whether he was imprisoned or executed,‘ one former intelligence official who was involved in the operation told me. ‗But you have to think that it didn‘t work out well for him.‘‖287
Sounds just like a Hollywood movie! How exciting! The guy was recruited and copied the files ―over time.‖ I suspect it took a while to find and secretly copy thousands of pages of material without being caught. The ―official‖ story doesn‘t quite match what was reported initially:
―The information provided by the source, who was not previously known to U.S. intelligence, does not mention uranium or any other area of Iran's known nuclear program, according to the official with access to the material…The official said the CIA remains unsure about the authenticity of the documents and how they came into the informant's possession.‖288
―Not previously known to U.S. intelligence?‖ That‘s funny. The ―official‖ version seems to state that he was known for quite some time, and was even recruited. Once again, when the initial reports come out, sometimes they don‘t match the ―official‖ version of events that come out later, because the ―facts‖ of the ―official‖ version has not been hammered out yet. Linzer also says that the CIA ―remains unsure about … how [the
David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: Harmony, 2008), p. 65. 288 The Washington Post, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified,” 19 November 2004 by Dafna Linzer http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html
documents] came into the informant's possession.‖ But didn‘t the CIA recruit him? Wouldn‘t they have talked to him about how to obtain the documents? I don‘t get it.
Things get confusing only if you believe what you read in the MSM. If you are a thinking person, you know that the documents originated in Israel.289 Israel fabricated the documents, and had their MEK buddies bring them to the US, just as Karsten Voigt told the press. (see above).
David E. Sanger wrote that the guy who actually stole the laptop never made it out of Iran, and was likely executed:
But the technician himself never made it out of Iran. ‗We never figured out whether he was imprisoned or executed,‘ one former intelligence official who was involved in the operation told me. ‗But you have to think that it didn‘t work out well for him.‘‖
This is what the same as what he said when he wrote his propaganda masterpiece:
―American officials have said little in their briefings about the origins of the laptop, other than that they obtained it in mid-2004 from a source in Iran who they said had received it from a second person, now believed to be dead.‖
In the same newspaper article, Sanger says that the reason Usrael can‘t provide details about where the laptop came from is due to their ―need to protect their source.‖ This is the same reason that Usrael could not show any of the laptop documents to Iran:
―A lot is in documents which we cannot share with the Iranians because of the need to protect sources and methods. Iran says, how can I tell you if it is fake or authentic if I am not getting a copy? So in many ways it's like a merry-go-round.‖290
IPS, “Report Ties Dubious Iran Nuclear Docs to Israel,” 3 June 2009 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47081 290 Newsweek, “Mohamed ElBaradei: ‘They Are Not Fanatics’,” 23 May 2009 by Christopher Dickey http://www.newsweek.com/2009/05/22/mohamed-elbaradei-they-are-not-fanatics.html
Usrael can‘t say anything about the origin of the documents, and they can‘t show the documents to Iran, all because they are protecting their source. But then they say that their source is captured and likely dead. They are protecting a dead guy? It‘s all BS surrounding a BS story.
K) High Explosive Testing
Goldschmidt also brings up the issue of ―high explosive testing.‖ This information was completely generic and could be found anywhere:
―The high-explosive test data likewise was so general as to provide nothing of substance towards linking it to any nuclear-specific activity.‖291
Even Heinonen has ―admitted Iran had provided open source publications showing spherical firing systems similar to the one depicted in the intelligence documents on alleged tests of high explosives.‖292
Usrael copied this information from the internet or book, and this story is a joke.
Furthermore, the link between the high explosives data on the laptop and earlier claims by Israel about high explosive testing at the Parchin military base made many suspicious:
―What made this particular data somewhat suspicious, however, was that the Israelis had been telling the IAEA, in particular Olli Heinonen, about high explosive tests being conducted at the Parchin military facility. The link between the laptop data and Israel‘s
Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 154 Gareth Porter, “Heinonen Pushed Dubious Iran Nuclear Weapons Intel,” 2 July 2010 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52043
earlier intelligence could be viewed as coincidence, but some European intelligence officials believe that there is a link, and that link is Israel, and as such the whole package of intelligence data is questionable in terms of its overall veracity.‖293
Not everyone believes Usrael‘s crude propaganda.
L) The Run-Up to the Security Council Referral
The reason the laptop documents were fabricated was to create enough suspicion about Iran‘s nuclear program to convince the IAEA BoG to refer Iran to the Security Council. Only then could sanctions be applied, which would then be followed by war – the ultimate goal of all peace-loving countries. For the first year after Powell first broke the laptop story, the focus of the propaganda was on the warhead design issue, along with the issue of ―high explosive testing.‖ About eight months after the story first broke, in July of 2005, the US briefed ElBaradei on the contents of the laptop:
―In July, as the Bush administration began stepping up the pressure on the United Nations to take punitive action against Tehran, it decided to brief Dr. ElBaradei on the contents of the laptop…The briefing primarily revealed computer simulations and studies of various warhead configurations rather than laboratory work or reports on test flights, according to officials in Europe and the United States. But one American official said notations indicated that the Iranians had performed experiments. ‗This wasn't just some theoretical exercise,‘ he said.‖294
The briefing was concerned primarily with the story of the nuclear warhead design. The problem with this story, besides it being complete bullshit, is that the IAEA has no authority to investigate it. With respect to safeguards, the IAEA is authorized…
Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 154 The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print
―to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose‖295
Unless there is a connection to fissionable material, the IAEA has no right to be involved. Since there was no evidence that fissionable material was involved with Iran‘s missile program296 (the US did not even make this claim), then it was none of the IAEA‘s business.
Of course, the IAEA got involved anyway, because laws and treaties mean nothing anymore, but they only got involved to the point of investigating the issue. To send Iran‘s case to the Security Council over an issue that the IAEA should not even be involved with to begin with was something that even they could not do. The obvious solution to this problem was for the US to fabricate another story that would link the missile program to fissionable material. The needed link would be supplied by a new fabricated document.
First, however, a little propaganda was needed to get the sheeple on track. Remember that Powell‘s initial disclosure of this story was not received very well by most, given Powell‘s record of telling lies. For this reason, the story was allowed to fade away for a few months, enough time for most sheeple to forget about it completely. By the time Usrael briefed ElBaradei in July of 2005, the story was receiving little coverage at all. It was not until November of 2005 that the story was re-introduced to the public via Broad and Sanger‘s 3,367-word front-page NY Times propaganda masterpiece. From that point on, the coverage of this story was constant and relentless. It was only a few
IAEA Statute "However, it should be noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard." GOV/2008/4 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf
months later that Iran was referred to the Security Council, and I will talk about that period now.
i) The Paris Agreement
First, remember at the start of this story we mentioned that the laptop story was broken by Powell two days after the EU3 and Iran reached an agreement that averted Iran‘s referral to the Security Council, at least for the time being. This agreement was called the ―Paris Agreement,‖ and involved Iran voluntarily suspending their uranium enrichment while negotiations took place on a final deal. The goals of the negotiations were to ―provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes,‖ and, from Iran‘s point of view, to ―equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.‖297 The Paris Agreement explicitly recognized that Iran‘s suspension of uranium was voluntary, and was not in response to any legal obligation:
―The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.‖298
Also, Iran‘s rights under the NPT, which include development of the full nuclear cycle, were also recognized:
―The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.”
(Recognizing Iran‘s rights!?! No wonder Usrael was so pissed off at this agreement!)
INFCIRC/637, 26 November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf Ibid
When the negotiations actually took place, it became very clear in a very short time that the EU was only interested in making demands of Iran, and was prepared to give little in return. For example, one of the EU3‘s demands was that Iran make their temporary uranium suspension permanent, which was exactly the opposite of what the original Paris Agreement stated. This stance by the EU3 surprised no one.299
As one would expect, Iran became disgusted with the EU3 not negotiating in good faith, and they decided to resume their uranium enrichment in response. This action was justified due to the fact that the issue of the contamination of Iranian equipment with highly enriched uranium, which is what led to the agreement, had already been resolved:
"After more than two and half years of voluntary suspension, the triggering issue of contamination being resolved, there is no reason for Iranian Government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research. The Agency was thus informed on 3 January 2006 that it will resume R&D as 10 January 2006, and requested the Agency to conduct timely and necessary preparations. Iran reiterated that such activities will be conducted in accordance with the Safeguards agreement of Iran with the IAEA. It further informed that it R&D is in small scale and not planned for nuclear fuel production. Thus, the suspension of enrichment on commercial scale, started since 2003, will be sustained."300
Usrael called this response by Iran a ―major escalation‖ :
―The United States said Tuesday Iran's move to reopen previously sealed nuclear sites represents a ‗major escalation‘ of the diplomatic confrontation over its nuclear intentions. U.S. officials say the action has triggered intense diplomacy among permanent U.N. Security Council members and other concerned parties about how to respond. In
For example, see The Financial Times, “Europe’s Mendacity Doomed Iran Talks to Failure,” by Trita Parsi http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0cfd2c90-1980-11da-804e-00000e2511c8.html 300 INFCIRC/665, 27 Jan 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc665.pdf
coordinated statements, both the White House and State Department called the latest Iranian moves a serious escalation of the dispute over its nuclear program.‖301
It was the EU3 that ignored the terms of the Paris Agreement. Also, Iran had every legal right to resume uranium enrichment, since the suspension was voluntary. Nevertheless, when Iran resumed their enrichment, the US called it a ―major escalation.‖ Why do they hate us?
The fact that Iran only restarted its uranium enrichment on and R&D scale went unreported. Even if Iran wanted a bomb, enriching uranium on this small scale would take a thousand years to build one. ii) The IAEA ―Update Brief‖ and the ―Green Salt‖ Project Iran‘s decision to begin enriching uranium again, although completely legal and completely justified, was exactly what Usrael needed to get Iran sent to the Security Council (illegally). Usrael‘s first response to the Iranian move was to pressure the IAEA (through their puppet states), to call an emergency session of the BoG, where the BoG members would vote on whether or not to refer Iran to the Security Council (illegally):
―The International Atomic Energy Agency said Thursday it will hold an emergency meeting on Feb. 2 in Vienna on Iran's nuclear activities at the request of Britain, France and Germany. The IAEA's 35-member Board of Governors will discuss whether to refer Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council after Tehran removed U.N. seals on uranium enrichment equipment earlier this month.‖302
In order to get the necessary votes, Usrael needed ElBaradei to write a full report on Iran‘s nuclear program, and they needed that report to be damning. Specifically, what they needed was a link between Iran‘s nuclear program and diversion activities
Voice of America News, “US Call Iran's Reopening of Nuclear Site a 'Serious Escalation',” 10 Jan 2006 Japan Economic Newswire, “IAEA to hold emergency meeting on Iran's nuclear program on Feb. 2,” 19 Jan 2006
associated with the military. This is what would get the BoG member to vote in favor of the illegal referral.
The next meeting of the IAEA was not until March, however, and ElBaradei refused to write a full report earlier than then. He did, however, agree to write an ―update brief,‖ but most did not expect anything new in the brief, and that it would not be enough to get the case referred to the Security Council:
―Another blow to Western efforts to press Iran came Monday from Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the atomic energy agency, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring body. Dr. ElBaradei rebuffed an American and European request to issue a sweeping ‗progress report‘ on Iran's case in the next few weeks, presumably condemning its nuclear activities. In letters written to American and other ambassadors to the atomic agency, Dr. ElBaradei said that ‗a detailed report will only be available‘ in March, but that the agency would provide ‗an update brief in February on where it stands in its investigation of outstanding issues.‘ A European diplomat, who along with other diplomats spoke on the condition of anonymity because the agency's board of governors had not taken an official position yet on Dr. ElBaradei's letter, said that without a tough assessment on Iran from the director general, it would be very difficult to get the board to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council, as the United States and Europe are seeking. Taken together, Dr. ElBaradei's move and the Russian resistance to an early referral posed the threat of a major setback for the West in its efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically at an early date.‖303
The update brief was to be written by ElBaradei, like all official IAEA correspondence, but it was to be read by a deputy at the emergency meeting on 2 February:
The New York Times, “West's Push to Refer Iran to U.N. Hits Snags,” 24 Jan 2006 by Steven R. Weisman with David E Sanger and Elaine Sciolino contributing http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE6DF103FF937A15752C0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagew anted=all
―IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei, meanwhile, rejected a request by the United States and several other member nations for a full report on the agency's investigation into Iran's nuclear program, signaling his resistance to ratcheting up pressure on Tehran. In a letter dated Friday, Gregory L. Schulte, the chief U.S. representative to the IAEA, asked ElBaradei to prepare a written report on the ‗status of IAEA efforts to investigate indications of an Iranian nuclear weapons program‘ and on other activities Washington says are a cover for such a program. Supporting letters from the other countries also asking for a special report were dated Monday. In a written reply dated Monday, ElBaradei said ‗a detailed report‘ would only be available in March, the next scheduled meeting of the IAEA board. Instead, he offered an ‗update brief‘ for the Feb. 2 meeting, to be read by a deputy.‖304
Earlier, we mentioned that what was needed to get Iran‘s case referred to the Security Council was a link between Iran‘s nuclear power program and fissionable material. Even as the emergency meeting of the IAEA was approaching, however, such a link had not been made, nor was there even an accusation of such a link. This was about to change, and in a rather suspicious way. As just stated, ElBaradei was going to prepare the ―update brief,‖ which was to be read at the emergency IAEA meeting on 2 February by a deputy. This, however, is not what happened. The update brief that was released was written by our friend Ollie Heinonen, and he released it the day before the meeting:
―The International Atomic Energy Agency says it has evidence that suggests links between Iran's ostensibly peaceful nuclear program and its military work on high explosives and missiles, according to a report from the agency that was released to member countries on Tuesday. The four-page report, which officials say was based at least in part on intelligence provided by the United States, refers to a secretive Iranian entity called the Green Salt Project, which worked on uranium processing, high explosives and a missile warhead design. The combination suggests a ‗military-nuclear
Associated Press Online. “Iran Threatens Full Uranium Enrichment,” 23 Jan 2006 by George Jahn, copy here: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/24/content_514937_2.htm
dimension,‘ the report said, that if true would undercut Iran's claims that its nuclear program is solely aimed at producing electrical power.‖ 305
Usrael needed a link that would connect Iran‘s nuclear program to fissionable material, which would then be connected to Iran‘s military. Coincidentally, that is exactly what Heinonen‘s ―update brief‖ did:
―On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (‗green salt‘), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections.‖306
The update brief that was released by Heinonen contained information about documents that referred to the ―Green Salt Project.‖ These documents made all the connections that were needed to get the votes that were required to get Iran sent to the Security Council. What an incredible stroke of luck that this information came out at the exact right time!! Some have noticed the coincidence:
―The timing of this finding couldn't have been more ideal as far as the anti-Iran forces within the IAEA are concerned.‖307
The New York Times, “Iran's Civilian Nuclear Program May Link to Military, U.N. Says,” 1 Feb 2006 by Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/international/middleeast/31cndiran.html 306 Ollie Heinonen, “Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran’s Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/heinonen31012006.pdf 307 Some have noticed the incredible timing of this issue: “The timing of this finding couldn't have been more ideal as far as the anti-Iran forces within the IAEA are concerned.” Asia Times, “The IAEA and the New World Order,” 3 Feb 2006, by Kaveh L Afrasiabi http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HB03Ak04.html
The ―anti-Iran forces‖ within the IAEA are, of course, Heinonen and his lackeys. ElBaradei was expected to write an update brief and have it read by a deputy at the emergency IAEA meeting. The brief was expected to say nothing new, and was not expected to be what was needed to get Iran sent to the Security Council. But what happened instead was that Heinonen wrote the brief, and not ElBaradei. Heinonen presented the brief the day before the meeting, not at the meeting. Instead of the brief containing no new real information, it turned out to contain the exact information that Usrael had been waiting for, and just in the nick of time! I wonder what could explain all of this…
I know! Maybe Heinonen released his own version of the update brief that contained Usrael‘s new fabricated document. He did it the day before it was supposed to be released by ElBaradei to preempt the real update brief, which was expected to say nothing new. The ―Green Salt‖ documents released by Heinonen‘s update brief were, of course, part of the laptop documents. For well over a year, then, Usrael had these crucial ―Green Salt‖ documents in their possession that were the key to getting Iran‘s case sent to the Security Council, but they decided not to make them public until the day before an emergency meeting of the IAEA that would decide whether or not Iran would be referred to the Security Council. Are you freaking kidding me? Are you really stupid enough to believe that? Why did it take them nearly a year and a half to release this information? Thinking people, of course, realize that the ―Green Salt‖ documents were yet more fabrications which just happened to appear just at the right time to achieve Usrael‘s goals. ElBaradei has a certain amount of integrity, and would not have released these forgeries. Because of this, Usrael simply had their man Heinonen release Usrael‘s ―version‖ of the update brief a day early. The forged documents made the connections that needed to be made in order to get Iran referred to the SC. Mission Accomplished.
c) The Documents So let‘s take a look at these documents and the story that was drawn from them. 1) Usrael‘s version A week after Heinonen released Usrael‘s ―update brief,‖ some details began to emerge in the media about the ―Green Salt‖ project. According to Usrael, in 2001 a private company was set up under the direction of the Iranian Republican guard to construct a secret uranium-conversion facility. The purpose of the facility was to provide a supply of UF4 that was outside the IAEA safeguard system, which could then be further refined in a large scale plant, and then used for an atomic weapon. Also, one of the documents involved with this secret facility was ―found with design modifications for Iran's ballistic missile program.‖308 These ―design modifications‖ were, of course, related to the ―triconic‖ RV, which we have already discussed. (As we saw above, these ―design modifications‖ actually illustrate that Iran‘s ballistic missile program has nothing to do with nuclear warheads, but crude propaganda is all that is needed to convince the sheeple in the US.) Usrael‘s version of the story amounted to a virtual smoking gun which all but proved that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program. The Iranian military was secretly building a mine to procure the needed nuclear material for the nuclear weapons, and there was also a direct link to efforts at putting these weapons into missiles.
What a bonanza of damning information! I must repeat the same point made above. Why did Usrael sit on these damning documents for over a year?!? These documents prove everything that Usrael had been trying to say about a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program, but they decided not to release this information for over a year?!? When Powell broke this story over a year earlier, he
The Washington Post, “Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case against Iran” 8 February 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020702126.html
made a claim that Iran was working on adapting a RV to accommodate a nuclear warhead. Why didn‘t he also say that they have proof that Iran has a secret mine that they are using to get the material needed to make the nuclear weapon! Wouldn‘t that have made his story a lot better? Do you know why the story didn‘t come out for over a year? Because they didn‟t invent it until a year later. If you believe this story, then you are a true imbecile. 2) Iran‘s story
Iran had been discussing the issue of the GChine mine with the IAEA since 2003, and the IAEA visited the mine in 2004.309 By September of 2005, the IAEA had already concluded that there were ―no indications of undeclared mining or milling activities at Gchine,‖310 and in 2008 they detailed their full investigation into the issue, including the involvement of the Kimia Maadan company. During the investigation, Iran stated that the Kimia Madaan company began in 2000 to construct a UOC plant into operation at the GChine mine, and UF4 was never produced there. Kimia Madaan was under contract by the AEOI, a civilian agency, and work had stopped in 2003 due to funding issues.311 After their investigation, the IAEA found that ―the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.‖312 There was nothing going on at the GChine mine regarding illegal UF4 production. 3) Usrael‘s ―proof‖
“Since the June 2004 Board meeting, the Agency has carried out complementary access in Iran on six occasions at five locations: twice at ENTC, and once each at TNRC, Lashkar Ab’ad, Karaj and the Bandar Abbas uranium mine and production plant at Gchine.” Paragraph 43 of GOV/2004/60 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf 310 Paragraph 26 of GOV/2005/67 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf 311 Paragraphs 25-34 of GOV/2008/4 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf 312 Paragraph 34 of GOV/2008/4 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf
There were two documents that related to the ―Green Salt‖ issue. One was of a ―flowsheet purportedly originating from the Kimia Maadan Company (KM), which shows a process of bench scale conversion of UO2 to UF4,‖ and the other was a ―one page annotated letter of May 2003 in Farsi from an engineering company to KM requesting instructions regarding the supply of a programmable logic control (PLC) system.‖ 313
4) Forgery #1
The former document about Kimia Maadan being involved in UF4 production was addressed by Iran as follows:
―[Iran] stated that all national efforts had been devoted to the UCF project, and that it would not make sense to develop indigenous capabilities to produce UF4 when such technology had already been acquired from abroad. According to information provided earlier by Iran, the company alleged to have been associated with the so called Green Salt Project had, however, been involved in procurement for UCF and in the design and construction of the Gchine ore processing plant. The Agency is assessing this and other information available to it, and is waiting for Iran to address the other topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, as mentioned above.‖314
As shown above, when the IAEA was done ―assessing this and other information available to it,‖ they concluded that ―the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.‖ Kimia Maadan was involved in constructing a UOC facility, and any document claiming that they were involved in producing UF 4 has no basis in fact.
Appendix A.1 of GOV/2008/15 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf Paragraph 39 of GOV/2006/15 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf
This document identifies the Green Salt project as subproject 5/13. The actual project (for the UOC facility) that the Kimia Maadan company was involved with was project 5/15.315 The project designation of 5/15 was given to it by the AEOI, which is a civilian agency.316 If the Iranian military had a secret project where a uranium conversion facility was making UF4 for a clandestine nuclear weapons program, why would they follow the project numbering designation being used by a civilian agency? Know what? They wouldn‟t. This is another indication that this document is a fabrication. Also, Iran pointed out that the flowsheet contained ―technical errors.‖317 Even when Usrael fabricates documents, they can‘t the facts right, and Iran has to point out their mistakes! Hilarious.
5) Forgery #2
The other document mentioned above (from an engineering company to Kimia Maadan regarding PLC systems) is what connected the GChine mine to Iran‘s ballistic missile program, because the document included information on re-entry vehicle designs:
―His most animated comments concerned reports that the nuclear agency's inspectors had identified a secretive Green Salt Project, which worked on uranium processing, high explosives and missile warhead design. The agency based its findings at least in part on a document that it said provided information on the design of a missile ‗re-entry vehicle.‘‖318
Footnote 5 of Annex A.1 of GOV/2008/15 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf 316 For a discussion of this point and others in this section, see the Raw Story, “Documents Linking Iran to Nuclear Weapons Push May Have Been Fabricated,” 10 Nov 2008 by Gareth Porter http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html See also: IPS, “ElBaradei Foes Leak Stories to Force His Hand on Iran,” 25 Aug 2009 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48213 See also: IPS, “IAEA Conceals Evidence Iran Documents Were Forged,” 14 Sept 2009 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48435 317 “There are technical errors in the outline process.” ISIS, “Briefing Notes from February 2008 IAEA Meeting Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 11 April 2008 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Briefing_Weaponization.pdf 318 The New York Times, “Call Made for Atomic Agency to Act on Iran,” 2 Feb 2006 by Elaine Sciolino
It turns out that the document itself has nothing at all to do with missile re-entry vehicles, but handwritten notes that were on the documents do:
―One of the communications included in the laptop documents – a letter allegedly sent to Kimia Maadan from an unnamed Iranian engineering firm in May 2003 – is at the center of the authenticity argument. This letter is described in the May 26, 2008 IAEA report as ‗a one page annotated letter of May 2003 in Farsi.‘ According to a US source who has been briefed on the matter, the letter has handwritten notes on it which refer to studies on the redesign of a missile reentry vehicle.‖319
The actual document is irrelevant, because it has nothing at all to do with a nuclear weapons program or a military program. It is concerned with nuclear power production. It is the handwritten notes that connected the GChine mine to Iran‘s missile program. (The fabricated flowsheet document was needed in addition in order to make the accusation that the GChine mine was for UF 4 production, which was then connected to missiles with document #2). These handwritten notes were crucial, then, to getting Iran referred to the Security Council.
It turns out that the document itself is actually a genuine document. In January of 2008, Iran turned over all of their documentation they had that related to the GChine mine.320 (This documentation was investigated by the IAEA, and they found that ―the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.‖) One of the documents that
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/world/africa/02iht-iran.html 319 Raw Story, “Documents Linking Iran to Nuclear Weapons Push May Have Been Fabricated,” 10 Nov 2008 by Gareth Porter http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html 320 See “Last January, however, Iran turned over to the IAEA a copy of the same May 2003 letter with no handwritten notes on it.” Raw Story, “Documents linking Iran to nuclear weapons push may have been fabricated Gareth Porter” 10 Nov 2008: http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html Also, notes on a IAEA meeting in February of 2008 stated that“some of the correspondence is identical to that provided by Iran, with the addition of handwritten notes,” which means by that time Iran had already turned over their copies. See here: http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Briefing_Weaponization.pdf
Iran turned over to the IAEA was the document we are talking about here. Iran did not know that this document was the same as the one Usrael had showed the IAEA, because Iran was not allowed to see Usrael‘s copy of the document until 4 months after they gave their copy to the IAEA.321 The crucial point is that the document turned over by Iran did not contain the handwritten notes:
―Last January, however, Iran turned over to the IAEA a copy of the same May 2003 letter with no handwritten notes on it. This was confirmed by the director of the IAEA Safeguards Department, Olli Heinonen, during a February briefing for member states. Heinonen referred to ‗correspondence‘ related to Kimia Maadan that is ‗identical to that provided by Iran, with the addition of handwritten notes.‘‖322
The crucial question, then, is who added the handwritten notes? Usrael‘s claim would be that the Iranians did, but why would they do this? If Iran did had a nuclear weapons program, why would they draw ―design modifications‖ of a missile onto a document that is intended for a conversion facility? Are the Iranians that stupid? Or is it really the sheeple in the US that are that stupid to believe that any country would do something like that. Also, what do these ―design modifications‖ consist of? How much information on missile ―design modification‖ can you actually fit onto an existing document? Here is my representation of what the handwritten ―design modifications‖ on this document actually looks like:
See GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, where it says “Documents shown to Iran in connection with the alleged studies” in the Appendix. See also Gareth Porter’s story above. 322 Raw Story, “Documents Linking Iran to Nuclear Weapons Push May Have Been Fabricated,” 10 Nov 2008 by Gareth Porter http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html
So what was the Usrael‘s explanation of why the original did not have the handwritten notes? This was the initial attempt at an excuse:
―The senior official sought to discredit the original letter by suggesting that the Iranians might have ‗whited out the handwritten notes‘.‖
Of course! Those evil Iranians simply ―whited out‖ the missile drawing on the document! That‘s believable! I guess the ―senior official‖ realized pretty quickly that even stupid Americans might not accept that excuse, so he quickly came up with another one:
―But the official then offered an alternative theory, asserting that there were two original letters, one of which was kept by the sender, and that the handwritten notes had been found on the second original.‖323
IPS, “IAEA Conceals Evidence Iran Documents Were Forged,” 14 Sept 2009 by Gareth Porter, see here: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48435
This, however, also does not make any sense:
―The subject of the letter was Kimia Maadan's inquiry to the engineering firm about procurement of a programmable logic control (PLC) system, according to the IAEA's May 26 report. A PLC system is one of many types of technology that the United States has long sought to deny to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Iran had informed the IAEA even before 2006 that Kimia Maadan had assisted the AEOI in getting around that denial strategy by procuring various technologies for the planned uranium conversion facility at Esfahan. Given that Kimia Maadan‘s role in procurement for the conversion facility was both unrelated to its technical work for the AEOI and part of a covert effort to get around U.S. restrictions, it seems unlikely that they would have made multiple copies of the letter. Even if multiple copies were made, the firm would certainly have taken normal security precautions for a document of that type, marking each copy with a number or name. A security procedure of that kind would have identified any missing copies. However, this was not the case with the 2003 letter.‖
The explanation that does make sense is the simplest one: Usrael got hold of an original document that, by itself, was meaningless. They then wrote something on it that made the connection they needed to convince the BoG to refer Iran to the Security Council.
Not only was the referral illegal, but it was based on forged documents. When forged document #2 was revealed, ElBaradei wanted to make the information public, but he lost an internal struggle to do so and this story was buried:
―After the IAEA received the copy of the letter without notes from Iran, some officials began pushing for an acknowledgment by the Agency that there were serious questions about the whether the laptop documents were fabricated, according to the Vienna-based source close to the IAEA. ‗There was an effort to point out that the Agency isn‘t in a position to authenticate the documents,‘ said the source. Heinonen and other IAEA
Safeguards Department officials have continued, however, to defend the credibility of the document in question.‖324
Of course Heinonen defended the authenticity of the documents. He is bought and paid for by Usrael. Initially, ElBaradei realized that this issue raised serious questions about the origin of the ―laptop of death,‖ and he thought that in response the IAEA should distance itself from the fraudulent documents:
―Senior IAEA officials then demanded that Heinonen distance the organisation from the documents by inserting a disclaimer in future agency reports on Iran that it could not vouch for the authenticity of the documents.‖325 ―During preparations by the IAEA and the board for a routine board meeting held last month, sources close to the IAEA said that senior officials in two departments, responsible for verification and diplomacy, respectively, had strongly disagreed over whether data obtained by the IAEA concerning alleged nuclear weaponization activities by Iran is authentic…Officials at the Department of External Relations and Policy Coordination, or Expo, which is the diplomatic arm of the agency, have raised concerns that evidence may be faked, as Iran has charged... Since 2003, when the IAEA determined that evidence brought forth by the US suggesting Iraq had resumed nuclear weapons work was fabricated, officials at Expo and at the Office of the Director General have been wary that the US has tried to manipulate the IAEA during its investigation of Iran, according to officials from IAEA states.‖326
With Usrael backing him, Heinonen won the struggle, and the story that showed the document was a forgery was buried by the IAEA. (ElBaradei did not press the issue of publicizing this story. His ethics only go so far).
Raw Story, “Documents Linking Iran to Nuclear Weapons Push May Have Been Fabricated,” 10 Nov 2008 by Gareth Porter http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html 325 Gareth Porter, “Heinonen Pushed Dubious Iran Nuclear Weapons Intel,” 2 July 2010 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52043 326 Nucleonics Week, “Iran Plant Disclosure May Prompt IAEA to Focus on Weapons Data,” 1 Oct 2009 by Mark Hibbs
Strangely enough, even the ―official‖ version of the story concedes that some of the documents are fake:
―The documents show details about development work on nuclear weapons and design problems, but not all the papers are considered authentic.‖327
If some of the documents are not authentic, then who put the fake documents there? How do you know which is fake and which isn‘t? If some documents are fabricated, doesn‘t that draw suspicion on all of them?
M) The Super-Duper Secret Annex
By the end of 2009, the ―laptop‖ story was losing steam, and more and more people were beginning to realize that the whole story was bogus. It was time for the propagandists to give the story new life by trying to give it some legitimacy. Up until this time, the IAEA was investigating the ―alleged studies,‖ which, in light of the details discussed to this point, was as much as could be expected of them. During their investigation, the IAEA had repeatedly said that nothing in the ―laptop‖ documents proves that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. At this point, Usrael decided to fabricate another story which would explain why the IAEA had said that there is nothing in the documents that prove that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. Their idea was to claim that the IAEA actually did conclude that the laptop documents proved the existence of a secret nuclear weapons program in Iran. The evidence, however, was being hidden in a ―secret annex‖ that ElBaradei refused to publish! Yes, I am serious. This unsourced, laughable twist was first revealed in the Israeli paper Ha‘aretz:
―The world's nuclear weapons watchdog is hiding data on Iran's drive to obtain nuclear arms, senior Western diplomats and Israeli officials told Haaretz. The officials and
The Washington Times, “U.S. Says Tehran is Pursuing Nuke Arms,” 24 Nov 2005 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/nov/24/20051124-113242-1914r/
diplomats said that the International Atomic Energy Agency under Director General Mohamed ElBaradei was refraining from publishing evidence obtained by its inspectors over the past few months that indicate Iran was pursuing information about weaponization efforts and a military nuclear program. ElBaradei, who will soon vacate his post, has said that the agency does not have any evidence that suggests Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. But the sources told Haaretz that the new evidence was submitted to the IAEA in a classified annex written by its inspectors in the Islamic Republic. The report was said to have been signed by the head of the IAEA team in Iran. The classified report, according to the sources, was not incorporated into the agency's published reports. The details, they said, were censored by senior officials of the IAEA in the organization's Vienna headquarters.‖328
A few other news outlets reported the Ha‘aretz story, but they made sure to explain where the story came from, not wanting to take credit for the BS themselves:
―Israel has accused the UN nuclear watchdog of hiding evidence that Iran is pursuing plans to develop nuclear weapons, it was reported yesterday. Israeli newspaper Haaretz said…‖329 ―Israel is accusing the UN nuclear weapons watchdog of holding back incriminating evidence of Iran's drive to obtain nuclear weapons, the Haaretz newspaper reported on Wednesday.‖330 ―Israeli officials and Western diplomats say the International Atomic Energy Agency censored evidence of Iran's race to build military nuclear weapons. A report in Haaretz Wednesday said…‖331
Ha’aretz, “Sources: UN Watchdog Hiding Evidence on Iran Nuclear Program,” 19 Aug 2008 by Barak Ravid http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/sources-un-watchdog-hiding-evidence-on-iran-nuclear-program1.282217 329 The Australian, “UN Nuclear Chief `Hiding Iranian Plan for Weapons',” 20 Aug 2009 by John Lyons http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/un-nukes-chief-hiding-iran-evidence/story-e6frg6so1225764127472 330 Agence France Presse, “Israel Says UN Covering up Iran's Nuclear Arms Drive: Report,” 19 Aug 2009, copy here: http://www.orange.ug/news/?p=25097
―Israel on Monday accused the outgoing head of the UN nuclear weapons watchdog Mohamed ElBaradei of ‗dereliction of duty‘, claiming he deliberately withheld incriminating information on Iran's nuclear drive. ElBaradei ‗has been quite negligent in revealing all the difficulties that the monitors have in Iran and also in not exposing the full picture of the deception and acceleration of (its) illegal military nuclear activities,‘ the official told AFP on condition of anonymity…Last week, the Haaretz newspaper quoted unnamed Israeli officials as saying the IAEA was refraining from publishing data obtained in recent months that indicated Iran was pursuing information about weaponisation efforts and a military nuclear programme.‖332
The day after the original Ha‘aretz story, the AP and Reuters published two articles which broke the story worldwide.333 These articles forgot to say that the story first appeared in Ha‘aretz, which quoted only unnamed ―Israeli officials‖ along with ―Western diplomats.‖ It took nearly three weeks before the ―free press‖ of the Western world got around to asking the IAEA about the allegation. When they did, this was their response:
―‘Information from a variety of sources ... is critically assessed by a team of experts working collectively in accordance with the agency's practices,‘ [an agency statement] said. ‗The IAEA reiterates that all relevant information and assessments that have gone through the above process have already been provided to the IAEA Board of Governors in reports of the director general.‘‖334
UPI, “Report Accuses IAEA of Hiding Details,” 19 Aug 2009 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/08/19/Report-accuses-IAEA-of-hiding-details/UPI-66461250682415/ 332 Agence France Presse, “Israel Slams UN Atomic Agency Chief Anew Over Iran,” 24 Aug 2009 333 AP, “Outgoing IAEA Chief Has Tough Choice on Iran,” 20 Aug 2009 by George Jahn http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8372685 Reuters, “UN Urged to Tell All on Iran Atomic Work-Diplomats,” 20 Aug 2009 by Louis Charbonneau http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20520119 334 Associated Press, “Nuke Agency Says Iran Can Make Bomb,” 18 Sept 2009 by George Jahn http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32898772
And more from ElBaradei:
―UN atomic watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei on Monday dismissed allegations he withheld key evidence on Iran's alleged weaponisation studies as ‗politically motivated and totally baseless.‘ ‗I am dismayed by the allegations of some member states, which have been fed to the media, that information has been withheld from the board,‘ ElBaradei told the International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-member board of governors at the start of a week-long meeting here. ‗These allegations are politically motivated and totally baseless. Such attempts to influence the work of the secretariat and undermine its independence and objectivity are in violation ... of the IAEA statute and should cease forthwith,‘ the diplomat said.‖335
Who is in violation of the IAEA statute with the release of this information? It‘s not Iran, but Usrael, of course. The IAEA response got very little attention in the MSM. When the IAEA statement was released, however, the story of the ―Secret Annex‖ died pretty quickly.336 This is from the above article:
―A number of diplomats close to the IAEA are skeptical whether such an annex really exists.‖
No shit. This fabricated ―Secret Annex‖ story is pretty funny in light of the previous section of this paper. In that section, we talked about how hard evidence that shows a key document in the ―laptop of death‖ was fabricated. This story, however, was buried by ElBaradei and the IAEA, and did not appear at all in the MSM. In reality, then, ElBaradei hid key information that proves Iran‘s version of events, and proved that the only ―evidence‖ that remains that points to a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program
Agence France Presse, “IAEA Chief Dismisses Charges of Hiding Evidence on Iran,” 17 Sept 2009 by Simon Morgan, cioy here: http://www.hindustantimes.com/IAEA-chief-dismisses-charges-of-hiding-evidence-on-Iran/Article1-451292.aspx See also Reuters, “IAEA Denies Report it is Sure Iran Seeking Atom Bomb,” 17 Sept 2009 by Mark Heinrich http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58G60W20090917 336 Some die hard propagandists continued to parrot the story weeks later, including our friends Broad and Sanger from the New York Times: “Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb,: 4 October 2009 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/world/middleeast/04nuke.html
is bogus. So what does Usrael claim? The opposite, of course. They claim that ElBaradei is hiding evidence of Iran‘s guilt! The key to good propaganda is to consistently claim that the opposite of reality is really the truth.
N) English vs. Farsi
Early reports claimed that the laptop documents are in Farsi, which you would expect. It would be insane for anyone to believe that internal documents in Iran are written in English, right? Let‘s follow this story.
Around the time Broad and Sanger of the Times came out with their 3,367-word propaganda masterpiece a year after this story broke, one theme was that the documents were written in Farsi, which is something the propagandists surely thought would help to give their fabrications some legitimacy. Here are some reports:
―An intelligence source, solicited with German help, provided the U.S. tens of thousands of pages of Farsi-language computer files, diagrams and test data from Iran's missile program.‖337 ―While none of the data, written in Persian, provides proof Iran has an atomic bomb, the Bush administration hoped it would swell support for clamping down harder on nuclear development by Tehran.‖338 ―Officials said they found the warhead documents, written in Persian, convincing because of their consistency and technical accuracy and because they showed a progression of developmental work from 2001 to early 2004.‖ 339
See: “An intelligence source, solicited with German help, provided the U.S. tens of thousands of pages of Farsilanguage computer files, diagrams and test data from Iran's missile program.” The Wall Street Journal, “As Evidence Grows Of Iran's Program, U.S. Hits Quandary,” 18 March 2005 by Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: www.strategicpolicyconsulting.com/WSJ-AJ-nuclear-March18-05.doc (document) 338 UPI, “Iranian Laptop Tough Sell to U.S. Allies,” 13 Nov 2005
―As for the laptop computer, American officials have said in secret briefings that it contained more than 1,000 pages of documents, written in Persian, showing what they described as a long Iranian effort to design a nuclear warhead.‖340 ―The documents, written in Farsi and obtained last year, are said to reveal experiments with warhead designs characteristic of nuclear devices.‖341
Of the above quotes, four out of five were published within eleven days of each other, and two are from our friends Broad and Sanger from the NY Times. Would I be a conspiracy theorist to claim that propaganda is coordinated? After this rash of reports on the language of the documents, this aspect is not mentioned again, even though the laptop story itself has been reported continually ever since. Two years later, however, a different story emerged:
"‘First of all, if you have a clandestine programme, you don't put it on laptops which can walk away,‘ one official said. ‗The data is all in English which may be reasonable for some of the technical matters, but at some point you'd have thought there would be at least some notes in Farsi. So there is some doubt over the provenance of the computer.‘‖342
The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, copy here: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print 340 The New York Times, “Bush and Putin Want Iran To Treat Uranium in Russia,” 19 Nov 1005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, see here: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E5DB1E3EF93AA25752C1A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagew anted=all 341 The Daily Telegraph, “US reveals details of Iran's nuclear ambition,” 24 Nov 2005 by Anton La Guardia, see here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1503845/US-reveals-details-of-Irans-nuclearambition.html 342 The Guardian, “US Iran intelligence 'is incorrect',” 22 Feb 2007 by Julian Borger http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/22/iran.usa
―IAEA officials remain suspicious of the information in part because most of the papers are in English rather than Persian, the Iranian language.‖343
Previously, the blanket statements about the documents being written in Farsi gave the impression that they all were. Two years later, we find out that most of the documents are actually written in English.
I quoted William J Broad of the New York Times twice saying that the documents were written in Farsi. After the news came out that they were not, (which meant that the early stories by Broad were lies), he had to change his story:
―The documents cited by the inspectors in Vienna carry dates like 1984, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Many are in Persian.‖344
Originally, Broad said that the laptop ―contained more than 1,000 pages of documents, written in Persian.‖ This quote implies that all of the documents are in Farsi. After the truth came out that most of the documents are in English, Broad says that ―many‖ of the documents are written in Farsi; which means most are not. Dirty liar.
Why does Iran write most of their documents in English? Do Americans working on nuclear missiles write their documents in Farsi? That seems weird. Doesn‟t it?
Here‘s another weird thing. None of the Iranian government documents that supposedly discuss their top secret nuclear weapons program have any security markings!:
The L.A. Times, “UN Calls US Data on Iran's Nuclear Aims Unreliable,” 25 Feb 2007 by Bob Drogin and Kim Murphy http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/25/world/fg-usiran25/2 344 The New York Times, “Look Who's Tough on Iran Now,” 1 June 2008 by William J. Broad http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E6DC1439F932A35755C0A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagew anted=2
―In fact, however, Iran has submitted serious evidence that the documents are fraudulent. Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations in Vienna, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, told IPS in an interview he had pointed out to a team of IAEA officials in a meeting on the documents in Tehran in spring 2008 that none of the supposedly top secret military documents had any security markings of any kind, and that purported letters from defence ministry officials lacked Iranian government seals. Soltanieh recalled that he had made the same point ‗many times‘ in meetings of the Board of Governors since then. ‗No one ever challenged me,‘ said the ambassador. The IAEA has never publicly acknowledged the problem of lack of security markings or official seals in the documents, omitting mention of the Iranian complaint on that issue from its reports. Its May 26, 2008 report said only that Iran had ‗stated, inter alia, that the documents were not complete and that their structure varied‘. But a senior official of the agency familiar with the Iran investigation, who spoke with IPS on condition that he would not be identified, confirmed that Soltanieh had indeed pointed out the lack of any security classification markings, and that he had been correct in doing so. The ‗alleged studies‘ documents include purported correspondence between the overall ‗project leader‘ in Iran's Defence Ministry and project heads on what would have been among the regime's most sensitive military secrets.‖345
And what is Usrael‘s ―official‖ explanation as to why there are no security markings?:
―Even though the official conceded that the lack of security markings could be considered damaging to the credibility of the documents, he defended the agency's refusal to acknowledge the issue. ‗It's not a killer argument,‘ said the official. The official suggested that the states that had provided the documents might claim that they had taken the markings out before passing them on to the IAEA. It is not clear, however, why an intelligence agency would want to remove from the documents markings that would be important in proving their authenticity. ‗We don't know whether the original letters were marked confidential or not,‘ he said, indicating that the IAEA had not questioned the United States and other states contributing documents on the absence of the
IPS, “IAEA Conceals Evidence Iran Documents Were Forged,” 14 Sept 2009 by Gareth Porter http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48435
confidential markings. The IAEA's apparent lack of concern about the absence of security markings and seals on the documents contrasts sharply with the IAEA's investigation of the Niger uranium documents cited by the George W. Bush administration as justification for invading Iraq in 2002-2003. In the Niger case, the agency concluded that the documents were fabricated based on a comparison of the ‗form, format, contents and signature‘ of the documents with other relevant correspondence, according to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's Mar. 7, 2003 statement to the U.N. Security Council.‖
Of course! The first thing the US did when they received the documents was to remove the security markings! That makes perfect sense! ARE THE FREAKIN‘ KIDDING ME? Why would the US do this? What a pathetic explanation. The other excuse is that the original documents had no security markings. This is just as pathetic. Here is Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA, Dr Ali Asghar Soltanieh, talking about this insane issue in an interview:
―Apart from these issues, among all the documents and material received from the United States against Iran, those essentially forged documents and communications, none of them have any seals of ‗confidential‘ or ‗highly confidential‘ or ‗top secret‘. How can one imagine that a country has had some sort of a Manhattan nuclear weapon project and all these communications between the Ministry of Defence and all other organisations related to it lack any level of confidentiality on such papers and that this is just normal communication? While they have put some secret codes in order to show that they are some secret projects, at the same time one of the sheets in the third line in parenthesis explains that 111 or 12 or whatever, that this code is about a ‗nuclear weapon warhead‘! This is ridiculous; and there are numerous points like this that we have fully explained to the agency inspectors.‖346
It‘s OK if the propaganda in the US is as crude as it is. The US sheeple are so stupid they‘ll accept anything.
CASMII, “Interview with Iran's Ambassador to IAEA,” by Mohammad Kamaali http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/5439
O) A Stolen Laptop??
From the start, the official story was that the laptop was stolen from Iran:
―…U.S. authorities have seized a stolen laptop containing nuclear data…‖ 347 ―…senior American intelligence officials called the leaders of the international atomic inspection agency to the top of a skyscraper overlooking the Danube in Vienna and unveiled the contents of what they said was a stolen Iranian laptop computer.‖348 ―The report made no reference to information from what American officials contend is a stolen Iranian laptop computer.‖349 ―…and that new evidence, acquired from a stolen laptop computer in Iran…‖350 ―Starting in 2004, the CIA conducted a road show presenting what it said were the contents of a laptop computer stolen from Iran.‖351 ―Iran, while dismissing as baseless the assertions that such a program exists, has agreed to examine documents that the United States uncovered on a stolen laptop which it says pertain to Green Salt.‖352
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “U.S. claims nuclear data found on stolen laptop, Iran denies report,” 13 Nov 2005 The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran’s Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” 13 Nov 2005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?pagewanted=print 349 The New York Times, “Bush and Putin Want Iran To Treat Uranium in Russia,” 19 Nov 1005 by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E5DB1E3EF93AA25752C1A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagew anted=all 350 The New York Times, “U.S. to Punish 9 Companies Said to Help Iran on Arms ,” 28 Dec 2005 by David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/international/asia/28china.html 351 Newsweek, “Countdown to a Showdown,” 23 Jan 2006 by Christopher Dickey http://www.newsweek.com/2006/01/22/countdown-to-a-showdown.html 352 The New York Times, “Report Showing Rise in Iran's Nuclear Activity Exposes Split Between U.S. and U.N.,” 31 Aug 2007 by Elaine Scolino and William J. Broad http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/world/middleeast/31nuke.html
―In the summer of 2005, senior American intelligence officials began traveling the world with a secret slide show drawn from thousands of pages that they said were downloaded from a stolen Iranian laptop computer…‖353
The fact that the sheeple accept the idea that a country will put top secret documents on a laptop computer is pretty funny. The Iranians sure thought it was funny:
"‘Iran does not save classified data on laptops and the recent claims are not only baseless but also made us laugh,‘ foreign ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Assefi told reporters in Teheran.‖354
Hamid-Reza Assefi on Iranian TV:
―This is a worthless attempt to fabricate a scenario. We don't use laptops to carry out our confidential work. [Speaking with amusement] We have telexes and such things; we use those. This is another amateurish attempt to fabricate a scenario. They have raised this on the threshold of the meeting of the Board of Governors. We had this sort of thing in the past too. If you remember, in the previous cases, they spoke about Parchin, about Shian [Lavizan]. This is another attempt to fabricate a scenario; that they should steal someone's laptop and so on. It caused amusement at the Foreign Ministry.‖ 355
Over the years more and more people began to say how ridiculous it is to think that Iran had its top secret files on laptop computers. Some had a simple solution as to finding out if the laptop is genuine or not:
―Now, I have a simple solution to the issue of the laptop computer: Give it the UNSCOM treatment. Assemble a team of CIA, FBI and Defense Department forensic computer analysts and probe the computer, byte by byte. Construct a chronological record of how
The New York Times, “U.S. Showed the World Exhibit A, Iran as Nuclear Threat; Now Exhibit B Upends It,” 4 December 2007 by William J Broad and David E Sanger http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E6DB1F3BF937A35751C1A9619C8B63 354 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “U.S. claims nuclear data found on stolen laptop, Iran denies report,” 13 Nov 2005 355 BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Iranian spokesman rejects New York Times ‘laptop’ story,” 13 Nov 2005
and when the data on the computer were assembled. Check the ―logic‖ of the data, making sure everything fits together in a manner consistent with the computer‘s stated function and use. Tell us when the computer was turned on and logged into and how it was used. Then, with this complex usage template constructed, overlay the various themes which have been derived from the computer‘s contents, pertaining to projects, studies and other activities of interest. One should be able to rapidly ascertain whether or not the computer is truly a key piece of intelligence pertaining to Iran‘s nuclear programs.‖356
Questions like this were making the laptop story look silly. So what do you do if you‘re a propagandist and a part of your story starts damaging its‘ credibility? You change the story! The new story was immediately and unquestioningly accepted by David Albright, of course:
―ISIS now understands that the term ‗laptop‘ might refer to the method by which the United States shares sensitive data and not the form in which the data were removed from Iran. ISIS has learned from intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the case that electronic media was smuggled out of Iran by the wife of an Iranian who was recruited by German intelligence.‖357
Even though the documents were described for years in countless stories as being retrieved from a ―stolen laptop,‖ now we must accept that this is not really what happened. It‘s easy to change stories whenever you wish. The sheeple don‘t care. They just accept the revised story as the new ―truth,‖ like good little imbeciles. By the way, in the above article, Albright says:
Scott Ritter, “Acts of War,” Truthdig.com, 29 July 2008 http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20080729_acts_of_war/ 357 ISIS, “Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged Iranian Nuclear Weaponization,” 2 Oct 2009 http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_info_3October2009.pdf
―The Alleged Studies conducted by Iran refer, inter alia, to the development work performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.‖
How funny! Albright forgot about the E-mail from Bill Broad where he told Albright that the ball in the re-entry vehicle was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test
flights. P) Don‘t Show the Documents, and they can‘t prove their fake!
There is a reason that this crude propaganda stunt as survived for so long. When the Niger yellowcake documents were given to the IAEA, it took them only a few hours to show that they were forgeries. So how did Usrael decide to avoid having this type of thing happen with their ―laptop‖ documents? They didn‘t let anyone see them for a long time, and when they did, they did not let anyone keep hard copies. They didn‘t let anyone have the chance to show that these documents were forgeries.
It was not until February of 2008, over 3 years after this story became public, that Iran was allowed to see any information related to the issue of the design of the RV:
―During the meetings on 3–5 February 2008…the Agency also described parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle.‖358
Paragraph 39 of GOV/2008/4 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf See also: “The Bush administration has agreed to turn over to international inspectors intelligence data it has collected that it says proves Iran worked on developing a nuclear weapon until a little more than four years ago, according to American and foreign diplomats. The decision reverses the United States’ longstanding refusal to share the data, citing the need to protect intelligence sources.” The New York Times, “U.S. to Produce Data on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 15 Feb 2008, by David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino
These meetings in February of 2008 are the ones talked about in the quote above from Sanger‘s book. Here is the quote again:
―He saved Project 111 for last. Here, he said, was ‗some of the information that the agency had wanted to show Iran but they had not been in a position to see.‘ The members of the Iranian delegation, who had already been jeering at Heinonen, suddenly began looking at one another. Realizing that some detailed Iranian memorandums about Project 111 were about to be thrown onto the screen, they whipped out their cell phone cameras to take photographs and video; back in Tehran, people would want to see exactly what Heinonen possessed, and presumably try to figure out how it leaked. The first slide was a ‗status report‘ on Project 111, written in Farsi. The opening page bore an epigraph, which Heininen‘s staff had translated: ‗Fate changes no man, unless he changes fate.‘ The remainder of the slides, also in Farsi, detailed work on how to design a warhead so that it could be placed in the nose cone of Iran‘s most sophisticated longrange missile, the Shahab-3. The cramped space inside the nose cone looked as if it was designed to accommodate a sphere like the one the diplomats had just seen, the one surrounded by detonators. But it was unclear exactly how the two projects related, and nowhere in the documents was there any reference to a nuclear warhead. That was the implication, but the Iranians could argue that this was just a conventional weaponand thus none of the IAEA‘s business.‖359 (emphasis added)
Even when Iran was finally shown this information, it was in the form of a slide show. The Iranians were reduced to filming it on their cell phones. In the next IAEA report, the story was the same:
―The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.‖360
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/15/world/middleeast/15iran.html?fta=y 359 David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: Harmony, 2008), p. 65 360 GOV/2008/15 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Iran_Report_26May2008.pdf
And even when Usrael finally showed some of their information, many were not impressed:
―For the second time in recent weeks, Washington has given the U.N. nuclear watchdog information on what it says were Tehran's attempts to make atomic weapons, but much of it is of doubtful value, diplomats said Thursday… The newest U.S. nuclear information, including some intelligence declassified for sharing with the agency, was handed over to IAEA Deputy Director Oli Heinonen last Friday, just a few weeks after a first batch of material was forwarded by the Americans, the diplomats said. But much of the information shed little new light on what the Americans say were Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weapons. ‗It's not the amount but the quality that counts,‘ said one of the diplomats who was dismissive of the new U.S. file. Another diplomat said senior agency officials also dismissed the information as relatively insignificant and coming too late.‖361
Regarding the Shahab RV and connections between it and the ―Green Salt‖ project, even the IAEA was not allowed to have those documents:
―Concerning the documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead, Iran stated that, since some of the documents were not shown to it by the Agency, it could not make an assessment of them. Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.‖362
If these documents are authentic, why the hell can‘t Iran be given copies of them? Don‘t they supposedly have these documents anyway? Why do the documents have to be kept a secret from the very country they have supposedly been stolen from? Is it because giving them actual copies would allow the Iranians to prove they are fakes?
AP, “New US Info on Iran Nuclear Program,” 21 Feb 2008 by George Jahn http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb21/0,4670,NuclearIran,00.html 362 GOV/2008/15
Q) The Work Plan
In August of 2007,363 Iran and the IAEA agreed to a ―work plan‖ which contained timelines for resolving the outstanding issues in the Iranian case.364 In the work plan, several items are discussed. ―Present issues‖ are discussed first, which include relatively minor things like the issuing of visas. Then, four ―past outstanding issues‖ are listed, and modalities are discussed concerning how these issues will be resolved. Then there is a section titled ―Modalities of Resolution of other Outstanding Issues,‖ where two further issues are discussed, including how they will be resolved. These six issues were dealt with according to the work plan, and Iran complied with all the procedures required of them that were detailed in the work plan. After the Feb 2008 report, El Baradei said:
―In the last four months, in particular, we have made quite good progress in clarifying the outstanding issues that had to do with Iran´s past nuclear activities, with the exception of one issue, and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past. We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme.‖365
These six issues were dealt with, and are no longer an issue. In the Work Plan, it says:
―These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.‖
See The Washington Post, “IAEA: Iran Cooperating In Nuclear Investigation,” 31 Aug 2007 by John Ward Anderson and Joby Warrick http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/30/AR2007083000460.html 364 INFCIRC/711 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf 365 http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/iranreport0208.html For details, see GOV/2008/4: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf None of these issues are discussed any more as being outstanding issues.
Since the six issues discussed covered all the remaining issues, and since these issues were taken care of, that means the case with Iran should be closed, and sent back to the IAEA by the Security Council. This has not happened, and is yet another example of Iran being screwed over. The only thing that the IAEA has left to cling to is the ―alleged studies.‖ After the modalities of the six outstanding issues were discussed in the Work Plan, a separate section was included where the ―alleged studies‖ are discussed. First, it says:
―The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle.‖
This never happened. Iran never received these documents, because the US will not provide the documents, because they know they are forged. For example, in relation to the Shahab-3 issue:
―Concerning the documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead, Iran stated that, since some of the documents were not shown to it by the Agency, it could not make an assessment of them. Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.‖366
Once again, what other possible reason could there be for the US to not allow Iran to see documents other than they know the documents are forgeries? The IAEA has also acknowledged that they have never shown Iran any documents showing any internal consistency between the various fabricated stories that make up the ―alleged studies.‖ From an Iranian letter to the IAEA:
―The Agency has explicitly expressed in a written document dated 13 May 2008 that: ‗... no document establishing the administrative interconnections between ‗Green Salt‘ and the other remaining subjects on Alleged Studies, namely ‗Highly Explosive Testing‘ and ‗Re-entry Vehicle‘, have been delivered or presented to Iran by the Agency‘.‖367
After saying that the IAEA will show Iran the ―laptop‖ documents, the Work Plan says this:
―As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.‖368
Notice that there are no modalities for this issue in order for it to be resolved. The only thing required of Iran, once it receives the documents, is to review them and inform the IAEA of their assessment of them. That‘s it. Iran did review and assess the documents:
―Soltanieh said that Tehran had already given a 117-page report about its alleged investigations into developing a nuclear warhead, convert uranium and test high explosives and a missile re-entry vehicle. ‗Iran considers the (alleged) documents to be fabricated and baseless, and in our 117-page response to the IAEA we have provided much evidence that the claims have been fabricated,‘ Soltanieh added .‖369
The IAEA has received Iran‘s assessment:
―In connection with the outstanding issues, Iran has provided to the Agency: (a) its overall assessment of the documentation related to the alleged studies…‖370
See page 9 of INFCIRC/786 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2010/infcirc786.pdf INFCIRC/711 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf 369 Agence France Presse, “Iran's IAEA envoy says it will continue uranium enrichment,” 15 Sept 2008, copy here: http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Iran_s_IAEA_envoy_says_it_will_cont_09152008.html 370 GOV/2008/15
Unlike Usrael and the EU3, Iran does what they say they will do, and abides by their agreements.Iran is not required to do anything else regarding this issue.
The laptop story is a joke, and this issue is not ―evidence that nuclear material and activities are or were related to a nuclear weapons program‖.
12) Dual Use Materials
―…the involvement of individuals and companies associated with the Ministry of Defense in procuring nuclear and dual use equipment and materials…‖
The story about people from the Ministry of Defense procuring dual use materials was detailed in Heinonen‘s ―update brief‖ discussed above:
―Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at Lavizan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities.‖ 371
Five months after Goldschmidt wrote his paper, the IAEA published a report which contained the results of their investigation into this issue. After going over the details of the investigation, they state:
“Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran’s Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities Deputy Director General for Safeguards,” 31 Jan 2006, see: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf
―The Agency took note of the information and supporting documents provided by Iran as well as the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency and concluded that the replies were not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment.‖372
What this means is that Iran was telling the truth, and the issue was dropped. 373 Goldschmidt can stop losing sleep over this issue, and this issue is not ―evidence that nuclear material and activities are or were related to a nuclear weapons program‖.
The issue of dual-use materials was raised in relation to the Lavizan site, as mentioned by Heinonen above. The Lavizan site is the source of endless fabrications, and I will address a few here.
A) Russian Nukes
The first time an accusation was made about Lavizan was in 1998, when the Jerusalem Post ran a story about Iran obtaining 4 nuclear warheads from Russia back in 1991, saying that the nukes were being stored at Lavizan.374 (It is strange that the current Iranian nuclear saga is such a big deal when Iran has supposedly had nukes for nearly 20 years!) The article states that it is retelling a story that was published in 1992:
―A detailed account of the Iranian effort, released on January 20, 1992, by the US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research
Section A.1.2 of GOV/2008/4 here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf For example, when Arms Control Today addresses this issue (under the heading “Procurement efforts by former head of Iran’s Physics Research Center (PHRC)”), the “Current Status” is that “the issue is no longer considered outstanding”. See Arms Control Association, “Iran’s Outstanding Nuclear Issues at a Glance”: http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3754 374 The Jerusalem Post, “Iran Has Up to Four Nuclear Bombs,” 9 April 1998 by Steve Rodan, copy here: http://www.fas.org/news/iran/1999/980409-iran-jp.htm
Committee, asserted that by the end of 1991 there was a ‗98 percent certainty that Iran already had all (or virtually all) of the components required for two to three operational nuclear weapons (aerial bombs and SSM warheads) made with parts purchased in the ex-Soviet Moslem republics.‘‖
A Lexis Nexis search shows that the original article that broke this story back in 1992 was from…..the Jerusalem Post! Surprise! The original article was based on…
―… a February report on Iran's strategy and nuclear capabilities, published by a US House of Representatives Republican research committee called the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare.‖375
So what exactly is the ―US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee‖? It sounds pretty official, and they are probably getting their information through ―US intelligence‖, right? Is that why I should believe these articles? Here is some info on this ―Task Force‖:
―The House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare is an arm of the House Republican Research Committee. Both Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress have research committees. The research committees have no official status within the U.S. Congress but they do use official stationery and list members of the U.S. Congress with their titles and the state that they represent on their letterhead. This task force with 15 congressional members lists Congressman Bill McCollum of Florida as its chairman and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California as its cochairman. Its chief of staff is Vaughn S. Forrest who is also listed as the chief of staff for Congressman McCollum's official congressional staff office. Its director is Yossef Bodansky who is not only an Israeli citizen but also an ex-Israeli military official.
The Jerusalem Post, “Thinking the Unthinkable about Iran,” 23 April 1992
It is very unusual to have a non-American as a director of a U.S. congressional task force, particularly one which deals with international affairs. When I contacted this task force for my original article, I was told that Bodansky did almost all of the writing for their research papers which were distributed to Congress, to Washington decision makers, to the media and to U.S. academic and political organizations.‖376
―Bodansky did almost all of the writing‖? The person that writes the research papers that are presented in the media as being from the ―U.S. Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee‖ is an Israeli citizen? Isn‘t that interesting? And it was Bodansky who wrote the paper behind this story:
―The author of the latest newsletter report, Yossef Bodansky, who is well-known in Israeli lobby circles in the US, went further; he said that Iran was in a position to assemble components into three warheads by April and had the delivery systems to make these weapons a viable threat.‖377
A few weeks before this story actually broke in 1992, it was the MEK who was bringing up the idea of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons:
―The threat of Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons was raised at the beginning of the month by the Iranian opposition People's Mujahedin organisation, which is committed to the overthrow of the clerical regime in Tehran. The Mujahedin said Iran was carrying out research at five secret sites to enable it to produce nuclear weapons.‖ 378
We actually don‘t know for sure where this story originated, but it was either from an Israeli citizen, or a terrorist group. Take your pick, but neither source is credible, which
Moneyclips, “Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Continues to Influence U.S. Political Thought,” 27 July 1993. Regarding his Israeli citizenship: Bodansky was originally described as “an Israeli expert on the Soviet military,” The New York Times, “Soviet’s Grip on Afghans Called Tight,” 9 Nov 1983 by Drew Middleton 377 The Independent (London), “Scare Over Nuclear Arms Leaks Focuses on Iran,” 25 February 1992 378 Ibid
is why when this story was reported (both in 1992 and 1998) is was almost entirely ignored by the media outside of Israel. The story is a joke, as are most stories about Iran. Bodanksy (who lately goes by the name of ―Seffi‖, and not ―Yossef‖) was Director of the terrorism ―Task Force‖ from 1988 to 2004379, and his writings are the origin of plenty of propaganda stories.380 He is still a ―senior advisor‖ on the Congressional Task Force. By the way, guess how much Iran paid for their nukes? 25 million.381 I think Bodanksy should have made up a bigger number. 25 million sounds awful cheap for 4 nuclear weapons.
B) More MEK propaganda
The next allegation related to Lavizan occurred on 15 May 2003, when Alireza Jafarzadeh and Soona Samsami from the terrorist MEK cult conducted a press briefing where they, among other things, accused Iran of using the Lavizan site as a biological weapons research center. The following is from their statement:
―During the Khatami's presidency, the Ministry of Defense formed a new biological weapons center to expand biological bomb. That was called Malek Ashtar University and
“The next day I called Seffi Bodansky. From 1988 to 2004 he was director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, where he is still senior advisor”: UPI, “Atlantic Eye: Flags of our Fathers,” 1 Nov 2006 by Marc S. Ellenbogen, copy here: http://www.globalpanel.net/english/presscenter/Board_Member_Articles/Ellenbogen/Atlantic%20Eye/2006/0610-31-flags-fathers.html 380 In one example, Bodansky’s unsourced allegations could not even be cross-examined by the media, because he could not be interviewed, supposedly for fear of his life: “The story, datelined Washington and under the byline of Yossef Bodansky, gave no sources for these amazing allegations, beyond the usual vague ‘defectors' and ‘intelligence sources.' But Jane's let it be known that Bodansky was a defector and could not be interviewed, since he feared for his life.” The Nation, “They Stop at Nothing,” 15 Feb 1986 by Alexander Cockburn 381 The Jerusalem Post, “Iran Paid $ 25m. for Nuclear Weapons, Documents Show,” 10 April 1998 by Steve Rodan and Hillel Kuttler
is based in Lavizan Shian Technological Research Center. Dr. Maqsudi heads this center, which is the most important research center for biological WMD…‖382
This was just another baseless accusation from a psychotic terrorist cult. Although this MEK meeting was termed a ―press briefing,‖ a Lexis Nexis search shows that not a single media outlet reported on the MEK‘s accusations at the time. This story was too ridiculous for the mainstream media, which is saying a lot. This ―press briefing‖ was alluded to when the next Lavizan allegation hit the media a year later, which we will get to shortly.
Jafarzadeh, by the way, is now on the payroll of FOX News as a foreign news analyst. It is not surprising that FOX News employs terrorists:
―Jafarzadeh joined the Mujahedin-e Khalq soon after that time, and became a fanatically dedicated member, even going so far as to volunteer to set himself on fire outside the U.N. Headquarters building in New York City to draw attention to the MEK‘s cause.‖ 383
Jafarzadeh defends himself by saying that although he was the US representative of the NCRI, he held this post before the NCRI was named as a terrorist organization. 384 This is misinformation. As stated in the US Court of Appeals in relation to the NCRI terrorist designation:
‗‗[i]t is the unanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in and familiar with the FBI‘s investigation of the [MEK] that the NCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and has been, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times.‘‘ (emphasis added)385
Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, “Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race?” (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), p. 168. See also: http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/NCRI/perspex-ncri-cbw-051503.htm 383 Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. xix 384 See The Washington Post, “The Reliable Source,” 29 January 2004 by Richard Leiby 385 U.S. Court of Appeals, No. 01-1480, 9 July 2004 NCRI vs. Department of State, See: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mek-usca070904.pdf
The NCRI and the MEK have always been the same organization, and Jafarzadeh obviously knows this, because he has always been a member. The MEK has been on the US terrorist list since 1997, and Jafarzadeh has been a member of the MEK since the mid 1980‘s, if not before. Jafarzadeh has now cleaned up his image, and he is now described as the head of ―Strategic Policy Consulting, Inc.‖, a Washington D.C. based think tank. Sounds a lot more impressive that member of a terrorist cult, doesn‘t it? Now he can hang out with members of the NCRI when they give their news conferences, and still appear ―respectable‖.386
C) Disappearing Buidings
The next allegation related to Lavizan occurred in mid-2004 with the following wellknown story:
―Satellite photos showed several buildings had been destroyed and topsoil had been removed at Lavizan Shiyan, one diplomat said on condition of anonymity. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said in Washington that commercial satellite photography showed the complete dismantling and the razing of a facility on the site, previously thought to be a possible location for weapons of mass destruction.‖387
See The Jerusalem Post, “Teheran regime has accelerated its nuclear program, opposition group warns. MKs off to Europe to warn of Iranian threat.” The article begins with yet another baseless accusation from the terrorist group: “Teheran has accelerated its nuclear weapons program, including the production of atomic warheads, an exiled Iranian opposition group claimed in Belgium on Wednesday. The Iran regime entered a new phase in its nuclear project said Muhammad Mohaddessin, a representative of the Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran, while speaking at a news conference in Brussels.” In the picture accompanying the article, Mohaddesin is pictured with Jafarzadeh, and the caption is: “Alireza Jafarzadeh, head of Washington-based think tank Strategic Policy Consulting Inc., and Muhammad Mohaddessin speak to the media in Brussels.” 387 AP, “IAEA rebukes Iran over nuclear program and warns it has little time left to comply,” 18 June 2004 by George Jahn
First of all, when the quote mentions ―commercial satellite photography,‖ they are talking about Google maps. If you downloaded Google Earth onto your computer, you have you own intelligence operation! When the quote above says that the Lavizan site was ―previously thought to be a possible location for weapons of mass destruction,‖ they are talking about the press conference held by the MEK in May of 2003, discussed above.388 As mentioned before, not a single news outlet anywhere in the world reported on the MEK press conference when it happened, but now that some buildings were torn down at the site a year later, the baseless MEK accusation was used to show that it was already known that something evil was happening at Lavizan. The fact that the MEK claimed that the Lavizan site was the ―most important research center for biological WMD‖ did not deter the US from presenting the Lavizan site one year later as a center for uranium enrichment. Details like this are unimportant, and the sheeple don‘t care about such silly details.
When the press brings up the Lavizan issue, they do so as follows:
―The IAEA is also interested in activities at a former research center at Lavizan-Shian, which Iran razed before allowing agency inspectors access.‖389 State Department spokesman Sean McCormack: ―Whether Iran is addressing the IAEA's concerns about why Iran bulldozed the Lavizan facility to the ground before allowing the IAEA to visit the site.‖390
A clearer statement showing this can be found here: “The ABC report also said that in May 2003, the National Council of the Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition group, said the government had built a bacterial weapons plant at Lavizan Shiyan.” AFP, “Washington accuses Iran of razing nuclear sites,” 17 June 2004 (The ABC News report mentioned in the quote is what broke the story about Lavizan. Notice how AFP calls the NCRI an “opposition group,” and not a terrorist group). 389 AP Worldstream, “No nuclear weapons technology for Iran, says German foreign minister,” 17 Jan 2008 by George Jahn 390 States News Service, “State Department Holds Briefing,” 23 Aug 2005
Statements like this can be classified more as a lie than simple deception. While it is true that Iran tore down some buildings, the part that is left out is that the IAEA was
not asking for access to the site when Iran tore down the buildings.
Most of the statements in the media regarding Lavizan hint at the following chronology: first, the IAEA asked for access to Lavizan, then Iran tore down the buildings, then Iran allowed access to the site. Usually, this is not spelled out that clearly, but it is the impression that is given. This, of course, is intentional.
I was able to find one reference where it is specifically claimed that the IAEA asked for access to Lavizan before the buildings were torn down. This source of this claim is….. Broad and Sanger from the New York Times! The source is the same article we already discussed above in relation to the Powell/black box/nuclear warhead story. (The same article that was so full of lies that in prompted a call for a retraction by David Albright.) In the online version of that article there is a link to a graphic titled ―Clues About Iran's Nuclear Activity.‖391 Clicking on that link brings up a page that says the Lavizan site ―was bulldozed before inspectors were allowed to visit the site.‖ 392 This is similar to the above quotes. The Times goes one step further with the lie, however. The caption of the picture on the left (from 11 Aug 2003) says ―Site condition when the International Atomic Energy Agency requested inspection.‖ The caption of the picture on the right (from 10 May 2004) says ―Site condition-buildings and topsoil removed-when inspectors were given access.‖ Here is the page:
The New York Times, “The Laptop: Decoding Iran's Ambitions; Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks To Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” David E. Sanger http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html 392 That page is here: http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2005/11/12/international/20051113_NUKE_GRAPHIC.html
This clearly states that when the IAEA asked Iran for access to the site, the buildings were still standing.
This is a lie.
When the BoG has their quarterly meetings, they publish a chronology of events from that quarter. Everything that happens with regard to site inspections and other relevant events is detailed. Here are the BoG reports that contain chronologies from June 2003 through August 2004: GOV/2003/63393 GOV/2003/75394 GOV/2004/12395
GOV/2003/63 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf GOV/2003/75 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
The Lavisan issue is not mentioned in the chronologies of the first 4 reports above. It is first mentioned in GOV/2004/60. In that report, it says:
―On 22 June 2004, during the same mission, the Agency requested access to the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran…‖
The IAEA asked to visit Lavizan on 22 June 2004. This is LONG AFTER the buildings had been torn down. All articles that allude to the idea that Iran tore down buildings after the IAEA asked for access to the site are lying.
i) Whole Body Counters
There is one more example where the media claims that the IAEA was asking about Lavizan before the satellite images were made public. This article comes from our friend Carla Anne Robbins from the Wall Street Journal, the same article talked about above in relation to the ―laptop‖ documents:
―Iran's razing of yet another suspect facility has raised concerns. In May 2003, Mr. Jafarzadeh's Iranian exile group charged that biological weapons research was being conducted at the Lavisan-Shian military-industrial complex in a Tehran suburb. In the fall of 2003, the IAEA started asking questions about purchases going to the site, including ‗whole-body counters‘ for detecting radiation. Soon after, U.S. and IAEA satellite photos
GOV/2004/12 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf GOV/2004/34 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-34.pdf 397 GOV/2004/60 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf
showed part of the complex being bulldozed and rubble hauled away. It would still take more than six months for the agency to get in.‖398
This is another flat-out lie. The IAEA did not ask any questions about the whole body counters until the accusations were made in June of 2004.399 The whole body counters were not mentioned in any IAEA document before this.
The first mention of whole body counters in the media was on 20 June 2004 in the Washington Post:
―According to the Institute for Science and International Security, an organization based in Washington that monitors nuclear proliferation, a layer of topsoil was also carted away from the area. A machine that detects radiation, called a whole body counter, was then brought to the site, according to the institute.‖400
Surprise, surprise! According to the Post, the original source for the whole body counter story is our friend David Albright, who published the story on his blog on 17 June 2004, 3 days before the first media report.401 Nobody brought up whole body counters before Albright. Albright‘s blog post was about the satellite images taken of Lavizan, but he does not mention where the information came from regarding the whole body counters. He simply prints what he is told like a good little propagandist. Albright says that the presence of the whole body counters at Lavizan ―is out of place at a site that was not declared by Iran to have any nuclear activity.‖ This comment was made without knowing what the hell the circumstances were, or before having heard what Iran had to say about the matter. Albright does not need the facts; he just says what he is told to say. When the IAEA investigated the matter, they did not say that the presence of the whole
The Wall Street Journal, “As Evidence Grows Of Iran's Program, U.S. Hits Quandary,” 18 March 2005 by Carla Anne Robbins, copy here: www.strategicpolicyconsulting.com/WSJ-AJ-nuclear-March18-05.doc (document) 399 Paragraphs 42-43 of GOV/2004/60 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf 400 The Washington Post, “Demolitions Raise Concern Of Nuclear Coverup in Iran,” 20 June 2004 by Karl Vick 401 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-imagery-brief-destruction-at-iranian-site-raises-new-questionsabout-i/
body counters was ―out of place.‖ The IAEA found that ―Iran‘s description of events concerning the whole body counters, as related to this site, appears to be plausible.‖402
Also, the whole body counters were tested for radiation, and none was found.
Also, there is this little detail that was not mentioned by Albright or any of the MSM:
―No data linking [Lavizan-Shian] to a nuclear weapons program (or even nuclear enrichment program) had been uncovered. However, the IAEA continued to pursue the presence at Lavizan-Shian of two whole-body counters, believing that these represented evidence of a potential involvement of the site in the manufacture of nuclear material. However, the whole-body counters detected gamma particles, while the manufacture of enriched uranium produced alpha and beta particles. As such, the whole-body counter theory was baseless, void of any other data linking the whole-body counters to nuclear weapons work.‖403
Supposedly, Iran bought whole-body counters for their nuclear enrichment program even though the body-counters they bought would have no use in a nuclear enrichment program. Right.
So how did the US come up with this story about the whole body counters? The answer may be found here:
―A Western diplomat and an independent nuclear expert who follow the Vienna-based U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told Reuters the radiation detection device - called a ‗whole body counter‘ - was identified as having been made by the Connecticut-based firm Canberra Industries, Inc.‖404
GOV/2004/83 Scott Ritter, Target Iran (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 185 404 Reuters, “US Device Seen at Supected Iran Atomic Site – Sources,” 25 June 2004 by Louis Charbonneau, copy here: http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/25683/newsDate/25-Jun-2004/story.htm
Iran bought the machines from the US. Here‘s what that article said about the machine:
―Canberra Industries declined to comment, but an industry source familiar with devices like whole-body counter said it was a ‗totally innocuous‘ device designed for peaceful activity.‖
A ―‗totally innocuous‘ device designed for peaceful activity‖? Sounds scary!
You would think that when Iran bought a machine that was supposedly to be used for their secret nuclear weapons program, they would have kept it a secret. They did not. The following is from the Iranian media from 1987, when they bought the machine:
―An instrument for measuring radiation which has entered the body as a result of polluted air or changes in the atmosphere is now checking people in the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation [AEO]. According to our correspondent, the instrument, which is called a Whole Body Counter, is currently in operation in the AEO's department of radiation safety. It is testing victims on a daily basis and establishing the level of radiation. Affected individuals can contact the department, following the advice of their doctor, and the necessary steps will be taken to help them.‖405
Iran needs a machine to help them make a nuclear bomb, so they decide to buy it from the US, and then to publicize the purchase in their media. That makes sense!
What really happened, for those of you who are not imbeciles, is the following: when Usrael came up with their Lavisan story, they looked through their records, found that they had sold Iran some ―totally innocuous‖ machine, and decided to use that event to try and add legitimacy to their story. I am sure the sheeple ate it up.
D) Back to the Disappearing Buildings
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Iran: Radiation 'Victims' Being Tested Daily,” December 8, 1987
In summary, nobody was asking about, or cared about, Lavizan until it was noticed that some buildings were torn down. Only at that point was a propaganda story constructed around it.
The media, then, made the event seem more sinister than it really was by reversing the order of events. The media says that the IAEA asked for access to Lavizan, and in response Iran tore down buildings and ―razed‖ the site. This is not what happened. Just before this story broke, nobody was asking for access to Lavizan, nobody was talking about Lavizan, nobody cared about Lavizan. Lavizan had not been heard of in the media for 6 years, which was when the Jerusalem Post ran their ridiculous story about Iran storing Russian nuclear weapons there – a story that most of the media completely ignored because it was too stupid. If Iran had not torn down a couple buildings at Lavizan, the site would never have been heard from again. So when Iran did tear down a couple buildings at the unknown site, they had no idea it would become a media sensation, or that anyone would give a damn. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said in an interview:
―America wages a psychological war against Iran and creates an adverse climate, but this should be ignored; for instance, they have raised an issue against Tehran municipality's decision to demolish a district of Lavizan for redevelopment; I suppose they expect the Iranian municipalities to obtain permit from the mayor of New York to carry out a redevelopment plans!‖406
Iran tore down some buildings. So what! Iran does not need to ask the IAEA if they can tear down some buildings. The site was basically unheard of before they tore down the buildings – why would Iran expect anyone to care if they tore them down?
BBC Summary of Workd Broadcasts, “Iran, Europeans to Hold Talks Soon on Nuclear Issue: Says Iranian Spokesman,” 27 June 2004
So why did Iran tear down these buildings anyway? To build a park! 407 How evil! Let‘s look at some photos to help see if this excuse is plausible. On David Albright‘s blog (ISIS), he has some satellite images posted of Lavizan, which shows the site before and after Iran removed the buildings.408 The images are reproduced here in chronological order:
“According to Iranian documents, the site was razed in response to a decision to return the site to the Municipality of Tehran from the Ministry of Defense.” Carnegie Endowment “Fact Sheet”: “Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium”: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Iran_fact_sheet.pdf 408 ISIS, “ISIS Imagery Brief: Destruction at Iranian Site Raises New Questions About Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” 17 June 2004: http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-imagery-brief-destruction-at-iranian-site-raises-new-questions-abouti/8#images See also: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/lavizan-shian/
The last image has been over-exposed, or ―photo-shopped,‖ probably to give the impression that the ground is now glowing with radiation. The photos above were obtained by ISIS from Google Earth, which has historical photos available for all areas. The May 10, 2004 photo above looks like this on Google Earth:
Looks different than the ISIS photo, huh. No propaganda technique is too crude for Albright. To get an idea of where this site is. Let‘s pan back a little. The next two images are of the same ISIS image as above, from March 2004, but showing progressively wider areas.409
These images are from Google Earth. The location of the Lavizan site is 35 degree, 46 minutes, 16 seconds North and 51 degrees, 30 minutes, 1 second East.
Do you see that giant dark area in the middle of the urban area? It‘s a park! Here is the park on Google maps:
To get an idea of the size of Lavizan park, here is the same map including an inset (in darker green) showing New York‘s central park on the same scale:
Lavizan Park is much, much larger than Central Park in New York. The Lavizan site where the buildings were torn down was a tiny little blip on the edge of a massive park. It makes complete sense that there would be a dispute between the Tehran Municipality and the Defense department concerning this site. If the US military had a few buildings on the edge of Central Park, I would expect the city of New York to want to the military to remove the buildings so the site could be absorbed by the park. This makes perfect sense. Iran gave the IAEA documents that described the details of this dispute:
―According to Iran, the site had been razed in response to a decision ordering the return of the site to the Municipality of Tehran in connection with a dispute between the Municipality and the Ministry of Defence. Iran recently provided documentation to support this explanation.‖410
Their documentation also made perfect sense to the IAEA:
―However, with regard to the razing of the Lavisan-Shian site, in August 2005, Iran provided further clarification and additional documentation in support of its statement
GOV/2006/60. Copy can be found here: http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/bb2007/partii/sectionq.pdf
that the site had been razed following the return of the site to the Municipality of Tehran in connection with a dispute between the Municipality and the Ministry of Defence. Iran explained further that the razing of the site had been carried out by the Municipality, and that it had begun in December 2003 and was completed within two or three months. The information provided by Iran appeared to be coherent and consistent with its explanation of the razing of the Lavisan-Shian area.‖411
So what did Iran do with the Lavizan site after they tore down the buildings? They built a soccer field. How evil! Here is the site today (from Google maps):
i) The IAEA Goes to Lavizan
The story about the buildings being torn down at Lavizan broke on 17 June, 2004. 412 Five days later, on 22 June 2004, the IAEA asked to visit the site. Iran had no legal obligation whatsoever to allow the visit, but they allowed it anyway. The IAEA inspected the site 6 days after they asked to do so, on 28 June 2004.413 Considering that schedules must be coordinated, flights arranged, etc., I can‘t imagine access being allowed any sooner. The Jerusalem Post, however, had a different story:
―Back in March 2004, the IAEA was convinced there was incriminating evidence about the Iranian nuclear program at the Lavizan Technological Research center near Teheran. The Iranians managed to postpone the IAEA visit for about 30 days…‖414
The IAEA inspected the site 6 days after they asked Iran to do so. Saying that Iran postponed the visit ―for about 30 days‖ is an outright lie in the Jerusalem Post. I am shocked. But they are certainly not alone. The following appeared in the LA Times less than a week before the Jerusalem Post story:
―Charles D. Ferguson, a nonproliferation expert and former State Department official now with the Council on Foreign Relations, recalled that when the so-called Lavizan site on the outskirts of Tehran came under suspicion as an undeclared nuclear site in 2003, Iran delayed access. Ultimately, the Iranians razed the building and covered it with topsoil, satellite photos have shown.‖415
To illustrate this, here is a list of the stories about Lavizan that came out on the 17 th and 18th: AP, “U.N. agency has photos that may show new Iran nuclear cover-up, diplomats say,” 17 June 2004 by George Jahn; AP Online, “Diplomat: Info May Show Iran Nuke Cover-Up,” 17 June 2004 by Andrea Dudikova; AFP, “Washington accuses Iran of razing nuclear sites,” 17 June 2004; AP Worldstream, “Iran faces rebuke with IAEA's harsh resolution; diplomats say photos may show new nuclear cover-up,” 17 June 2004, by Andrea Dudikova; VOA News, “US Backs European Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Program,” 17 June 2004, (Contains this Boucher quote: “commercial satellite photography shows the complete dismantling and the raising of a facility at Lavizan Shiyan.” from State Department, “Daily Press Briefing for June 17 – Transcript,” 17 June 2004) 413 GOV/2006/60: “On 22 June 2004, during the same mission, the Agency requested access to the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran which had been referred to in the June 2004 Board of Governors meeting as having been relevant to alleged nuclear activities in Iran before the site was razed after November 2003. The Agency visited the site on 28 June 2004.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf 414 The Jerusalem Post, “Waiting for the deadline on Iran – again,” 8 Oct 2009, by Dore Gold, copy here: http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1254861893777&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter 415 LA Times, “Access delay may give Iran time to obscure data,” 3 Oct 2009 by Paul Richter
First of all, Lavizan did not ―[come] under suspicion as an undeclared nuclear site in 2003.‖ In 2003, a terrorist group made some wild accusations about Lavizan that were so obnoxious not a single media outlet in the world reported it at the time. These terrorist accusations did not raise any suspicions amongst sentient people, which is why it was not reported. Also, the MEK accusation was not that Lavizan was an ―undeclared nuclear site,‖ but a ―new biological weapons center to expand biological bomb.‖ The story was simply changed, because the sheeple won‘t notice anyway. Then the LA Times says that ―Iran delayed access.‖ The IAEA inspected the site 6 days after they asked Iran to do so. Six days is delaying access?
Lie. What is strange is that lies like
this normally come from anonymous sources. The fact that ―Charles D. Ferguson‖ tells these lies openly shows that he is a true imbecile.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (where Goldschmidt published his BS paper) repeats the same nonsense:
“…Iran provided IAEA with access to the site only after much delay.‖416
Six days = much delay? Assholes.
These lies about Iran delaying access to Lavizan pales in comparison to this next lie. The mother of all lies about this issue comes from the New York Times (surprise!). For clarity, let‘s first recount some key dates:
17 June 2004: Lavizan story breaks 22 June 2004: IAEA asks Iran for access to Lavizan 28 June 2004: IAEA inspects the Lavizan site and takes environmental samples
Carnegie Endowment. “Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium,” Feb 2006, by Revati Prasad and Jill Marie Parillo http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Iran_fact_sheet.pdf
11 August 2004: First media report appears saying that no radiation was found in the samples417
The following comes from a NY Times article that appeared on the front page of the World Section on 30 Jan 2006, over a year and a half after the IAEA visited Lavizan:
―After more than a year and a half of resistance, Iran has given inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency access to a razed military site…Iran's decision to allow inspectors into the razed military facility in Tehran, named Lavisan, followed repeated demands by the atomic energy agency for access and information since June 2004, several months after the site was dismantled, the officials said. Inspectors were allowed to take environmental samples that they will examine for traces of uranium particles. They also examined equipment taken from the site when it was bulldozed, before it could be inspected, the officials said.‖418
The New York Times claims that it took Iran a year and a half for Iran to allow the IAEA to visit Lavizan. The truth is that it actually took 6 days. There is simply no lie that is too big to print, and there is no lie that is too big for the sheeple not to believe.
I found one even bigger lie about Lavizan, but from outside the media. This one is from our good friend David Albright, from a paper published on 29 Sept 2006:
“IAEA inspection of, and environmental samples from, the site reveal that the topsoil had not been removed – nor was there evidence of nuclear activity.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Iran Uranium Source Revealed,” 11 Aug 2004 by Andrew Koch. See also: AP, “Tests Show No Nuke Activity at Iran Site,” 28 Sept 2004 by George Jahn. See also In September 2004, Reuters reported that the analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan shows no sign of nuclear activity.” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Iran_fact_sheet.pdf 418 The New York Times, “Before Nuclear Regulators' Meeting, Iran Allows Inspectors Access to One Site,” 30 Jan 2006 by Elain Sciolino and Michael Slackman, David E. Sanger contributing http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E4DB1E3FF933A05752C0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagew anted=all
―Iran continues to deny the IAEA access to equipment and areas of the Physics Research Center at Lavisan-Shian‖419
Two years and three months after the IAEA visited Lavizan and took environmental samples (which came back negative for radioactivity), Albright is still claiming that Iran is still denying access. Awesome.
By this time, the site was already a soccer field. Here is a photo from 7 Dec 2005:
Albright claims that Iran is denying access to Lavizan after it is already been made into a soccer field? If the IAEA wants to go there, they can book a flight, drive there, and play soccer all they like. Albright is a f#%&ing imbecile.
ii) Propaganda for the IAEA Meeting
The reason that this story came out when it did is because there was an IAEA BoG meeting that same day where they were going to discuss sanctions against Iran. Every
ISIS, “Iran’s NPT Violations – Numerous and Possibly On-Going?” 29 Sept 2006 by Jacqueline Shire and David Albright http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irannptviolations.pdf
time there is a BOG meeting, Usrael makes up a BS story to try and influence the outcome of the meeting:
―Hours before the 35-member board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency was to convene Friday to pass the resolution, the United States accused Tehran of bulldozing sites to prevent discovery of evidence of a nuclear weapons program.‖420
iii) Iran Removed the Radiation by Truck! When the IAEA visited the site, they took environmental samples. The results showed no trace of nuclear radiation.421
The reason that there was no radiation found, according to Usrael, was because Iran removed the topsoil from the Lavizan site. This was mentioned constantly by every news source imaginable, and it was phrased in a way the presented the claim as fact, for example:
―Suspicion has surrounded the site since satellite images from a US commercial firm showed that buildings which had been there in August had been razed to the ground by March and that topsoil had been taken away.‖422
The New York Times:
―Recent satellite photos showed Iran had removed all the buildings and much of the topsoil at Lavizan, which is near a military installation.‖423
AP Worldstream, “Iran Faces Rebuke With IAEA's Harsh Resolution; Diplomats Say Photos May Show New Nuclear Cover-Up,” 17 June 2004 by Andrea Dudikova 421 “In September 2004, Reuters reported that the analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan shows no sign of nuclear activity.” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Iran_fact_sheet.pdf See: AP, “Tests Show No Nuke Activity at Iran Site,” 28 Sept 2004 by George Jahn 422 AFP, “Iranians say suspect site was used for military research,” 29 June 2004, by Michael Adler
―Inspectors are still at work in Iran: this week they took samples at what the government admits is a military site (though not a nuclear one), called Lavizan, in Tehran, where recent satellite photographs showed that buildings had been demolished and topsoil carted away.‖424
Voice of America News:
―Iran demolished the Lavizan site, and scraped away topsoil surrounding it, in late 2003 or early 2004 before the IAEA could access the site, in activity nuclear experts said was highly suspicious.‖425
The National Post:
―To ensure that no incriminating traces of nuclear activity were found, they even ploughed the site and removed six inches of topsoil.‖ 426
The Statesman (India):
―Satellite photos showed that several buildings had been destroyed and top soil had been removed at Lavizan Shiyan.‖427
―Satellite photos showed that several buildings had been destroyed and topsoil had been removed at Lavizan Shiyan, one diplomat said.‖428
New York Times, “Iran Drops Death Penalty for Professor Guilty of Blasphemy,” 29 June 2004, by Nazila Fathi The Economist, “A Common Flop; Europe and Iran,” 3 July 2004 425 Voice of America News, “US Concerned About Iranian Military's Nuclear Role,” 5 Oct 2005 426 The National Post, “Trees Axed as Iran Tries to Thwart UN Probe,” 6 March 2006, by Con Coughlin 427 The Statesman (India), “Nuke Watchdog Rebukes Iran,” 19 June 2004 428 AP, “U.N. Agency Has photos that may show new Iran nuclear cover-up, diplomats say,” 17 June 2004 by George Jahn
The only problem with the story about the topsoil having been removed is that it is unsourced, fabricated, and complete BS. First of all, many of the above quotes say that it is the satellite photos that show that the topsoil was removed. This is completely insane. Let‘s take a look at the picture above from Albright‘s blog (ISIS) that is labeled ―May 10, 2004‖. We‘ll take that image from Google Earth, which has a normal exposure level (as stated above, the ISIS photo of May 10, 2004 is overexposed using Photoshop, probably to give it the appearance of it glowing with radiation):
How in the name of all that is holy does this picture show that topsoil has been removed? All it shows is that the buildings are gone. Nearly all of the media reports say that the site was ―razed.‖ Do you know what term people in construction use instead of the term ―razed‖? They call it ―grading‖. When you knock down buildings, especially if they have foundations below ground level, you need to push dirt around. This is especially true when your goal is to build a soccer field. People like to play soccer on a level surface. The satellite photos show a construction site, and that dirt was pushed around. So f#cking what.
So where did such a dumb-ass notion about soil removal come from? This AP report gives the answer:
―Satellite photos showed several buildings had been destroyed and topsoil had been removed at Lavizan Shiyan, one diplomat said on condition of anonymity. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said in Washington that commercial satellite photography showed the complete dismantling and the razing of a facility on the site, previously thought to be a possible location for weapons of mass destruction.‖429
The source is anonymous. Of course nobody wants their name to be associated with such BS. Notice how the State Department spokesman says that the site was ―razed,‖ but he made sure not to say anything about topsoil being removed, because he knows the story is fabricated nonsense. That part of the story was left to the ―anonymous source‖.430 The BS story about the topsoil being removed was reported continually in every major media outlet in the world (and it is still being reported today, see below). When the IAEA went to Lavizan to inspect the site, however, they saw no evidence at all that any soil was removed. This fact, however, was barely reported at all. It was mentioned once in an online Reuters report on the New York Times website (it never appeared in print):
AP, “IAEA Rebukes Iran Over Nuclear Program and Warns it has Little Time Left to Comply,” 18 June 2004 by George Jahn 430 There is one report that claims Boucher made the topsoil comment: “Satellite photos showed that several buildings had been destroyed and topsoil had been removed at Lavizan Shiyan, said the State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher.” The Independent, “UN Deplores Lack of Co-operation by Iran on Nuclear Research,” 19 June 2004 by Anne Penketh. This statement is a lie. Boucher never said anything about the topsoil. Here is everything Boucher said about Lavizan: “The - once again, just let me start by referring to the report that Dr. ElBaradei presented to the board. That report shows that Iran does have a track record of trying to hide clandestine nuclear activities, since for many years, including a practice of trying to remove equipment and sanitize buildings. It's deplorable, but not surprising, that Iran's deception has gone to the extent of bulldozing entire sites to prevent the IAEA from discovering evidence of its nuclear weapons program. I can't give you any independent information, but commercial satellite photography shows the complete dismantling and the razing of a facility at Lavizan Shian. And that's a site that was previously disclosed as a possible Iranian weapons of mass destruction related site. This raises serious concerns and fits a pattern, as I've said, that we've seen from Iran of trying to cover up on its activities, including by trying to sanitize locations which the IAEA should be allowed to visit and inspect.State Department,” Daily Press Briefing for June 17 – Transcript, 17 June 2004
―But another diplomat close to the IAEA told Reuters that on-site inspections of Lavizan produced no proof that any soil had been removed at all.‖431
It was also mentioned in Jane‘s Defense Weekly, which is read by nobody:
IAEA inspection of, and environmental samples from, the site
reveal that the topsoil had not been removed – nor was
there evidence of nuclear activity.‖432 (emphasis added)
The lie gets reported non-stop, and the truth is buried. Not only did the truth go basically unreported, but the lie about topsoil removal was expanded over time. For years the media said that topsoil had been removed, but said nothing specific about it. Years later, the media started elaborating on the lies:
―To ensure that no incriminating traces of nuclear activity were found, they even ploughed the site and removed six inches of topsoil.‖ 433
Now the media knows exactly how much soil was removed! The fact that the IAEA inspection showed that no soil was removed is ignored. A few years later, the amount of soil that was supposedly removed has grown even further:
―…they razed several buildings at the facility and even dug out two meters of the earth where they had previously stood in order to make it more difficult for inspectors to take soil samples that contained radioactive materials.‖434
Now it‘s over 6 feet of soil that was removed!! I suppose in 10 more years the story will be that the Iranians dug a hole a mile deep. The Lavizan site is about 330 yards by 100
Reuters, "No Sign of Nuke Work at Suspect Iran Site,” 28 Sept 2004, copy here: http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0409nn/040928nn.htm#023 432 Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Iran Uranium Source Revealed,” 11 Aug 2004 by Andrew Koch 433 The Daily Telegraph, “Teheran Park 'Cleansed' of Traces from Nuclear Site,” 6 March 2006 by Con Coughlin 434 The Jerusalem Post, “Waiting for the Deadline on Iran – Again,” 8 Oct 2009, by Dore Gold, copy here: http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1254861893777&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
yards (measured using Google Earth). The amount of dirt removed (at 2 yards deep) comes out to be 66,000 cubic yards. Here is a picture of a truck that can carry 20 cubic yards of material:
Iran needed to remove 3,300 truckloads of dirt of this size from the Lavizan site! Wow! I would hate to be one of the people living across the street with all that going on! That people do live across the street brings up another issue. Let‘s look again at the site:
Do you see all the housing directly across the street? How would you like to live there with over three thousand truckloads of dirt being hauled away! (But we all know how evil Iran is towards its citizens.) My question is, if Iran dug a hole 6 feet deep over the whole Lavizan site, then why didn‘t the IAEA simply walk across the street and take a soil sample there? Why didn‘t they walk into the woods at the bottom of the picture and get a sample there? How weird. In reality, the IAEA most likely did take samples from these obvious locations, and they showed no nuclear activity. a) Environmental Testing Let‘s talk more about environmental testing in relation to the supposed soil removal. Presumably, the supposed uranium enrichment took place in the large building that existed at the upper right section of the site:
The soil was supposedly removed within the following distances from that building: 0.08 kilometers to the south, 0.25 kilometers to the west, 0.00 kilometers to the north, and 0.00 kilometers to the east. First of all, isn‘t it strange that the radioactive particles emitted from this building travelled a short distance to the south and west, but not at all to either the north or east? I did not realize that radioactive particles could make conscious decisions about which direction they are going to travel. Even if soil had been removed 0.25 kilometers in all directions (which would have taken over 23,000 truckloads of dirt!), it still would have not been enough to stop the detection of any enrichment that might have occurred at the site. The soil removal story fails to account for the fact that environmental monitoring has become an extremely sensitive tool for detecting radioactivity, and the idea that you can remove soil to hide the evidence is completely insane, and can only be believed by the ignorant masses. Monitoring techniques can detect radioactivity from the presence of 10,000 to 100,000
atoms.435 (I think soil removal would likely miss a few atoms). In reality, radioactivity from an enrichment plant can be detected several kilometers away from the site:
―The combination of on-site samples and particle analysis was so sensitive that samples taken in common areas in enrichment plants showed comparable results to process room samples. However, the field trials also demonstrated that other sampling and analytical techniques work well too; nuclear activities can be detected at least several kilometers away from the emission point, and bulk analysis gave the same general results as particle analysis, although not as clearly.‖ 436 (emphasis added)
This assessment was made in 1995, and the sensitivity of environmental monitoring has grown exponentially since then. Soil removal 2 yards deep at a distance of 3 kilometers in all directions would take over 3.3 million truckloads of dirt. (One truckload every ten seconds for one year straight!). Wow! Also, radioactivity can be detected in needles of trees. In one study, radioactivity was detected in trees 300 meters from an enrichment facility at a University in São Paulo, Brazil .437 Here is a picture highlighting the area within 300 meters of the building that once stood at Lavizan:
A. Glaser and S. Burger, “Verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The Case of Enrichment Facilities and the Role of Ultra-Trace Level Isotope Ratio Analysis,” Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 280 (1), Apr 2009, pp. 85-90 436 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards, OTA-BP-ISS168 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995) 437 J.H. Buchmann, et al., “Environmental Monitoring as an Important Tool for Safeguards of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Forensics,” Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 270 (2), Nov 2006, pp. 291-298
There are hundreds of trees within this radius, and the IAEA most certainly took samples from some of them. No radioactivity was found. b) Tree Removal But wait! What about the story that Iran also removed trees at the Lavizan site?:
―Iran's Revolutionary Guards have taken the extraordinary step of cutting down thousands of trees in Teheran to prevent United Nations inspectors from finding traces of enriched uranium from a top-secret nuclear plant …According to western intelligence sources, more than 7,000 trees which may have contained incriminating nuclear traces have been lost in a popular parkland area in the city near the Lavizan atomic research centre.‖438
This is yet another BS Lavizan fabrication. It is true that a tree cutting incident did occur, but the reality was much different than what was reported in the media. First of all, the trees were removed for highway construction, and they were cut down by a contractor, not Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards:
―In a report released by its Public Relations Office, [Tehran Municipality] laid the blame on contractor of Shahid Zeineddin Highway Project. It said that the contractor embarked on felling the trees in clear breach of the law.‖439
Secondly, the trees were removed nearly 2 years after the IAEA took their samples to test for radioactivity. How in God‘s name does removing trees two years after the IAEA takes samples prevent the IAEA from finding radioactivity in the samples? Can you see the stupidity here? Next, let‘s look at a couple of photos of the Lavizan site and the surrounding area to find out where the trees were removed. The next two photos were taken before (9 May 2004) and after (28 July 2008) the tree removal story:
The Telegraph, “Teheran Park 'Cleansed' of Traces from Nuclear Site,” 6 March 2006 by Con Coughlin http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1512242/Teheran-park-cleansed-of-traces-fromnuclear-site.html 439 Iran Daily, “8,000 Trees Chopped In Lavizan Highway Project,” 16 Feb 2006, copy here: http://www.nitc.co.ir/iran-daily/1384/2500/pdf/i5.pdf Copy of this reference is in Appendix D
How strange! I don‘t see where a single tree was removed! The answer to this conundrum can be found in the Iran Daily article from above:
―Mohammad Eyidian told Fars news agency that the commission had given the goahead to the contactor for obliteration of 8,000 pine trees in the south of the park.‖ 440
The ―south of the park‖?? But the Lavizan site is at the north end of the park! If we look at the south end of the park, we solve the riddle of where the trees were cut down (the following two pictures are from 7 December 2005 and 28 July 2008, before and after the tree removal story):
See how the tree removal occurred in a strip, right next to the highway? It‘s almost as if Iran‘s story of the tree removal being related to highway construction was actually the truth! How weird! The next picture, then, shows the location where the trees were removed and the location of the Lavizan site, both in the same picture:
Those stupid Iranians! What a pathetic attempt at hiding uranium traces present in the pine trees! First, they wait 2 years after the IAEA already took their samples, then they remove trees nearly a mile away from the Lavizan site, and left the trees right next to the sight untouched! There are probably over 100,000 trees closer to the Lavizan site than the ones Iran cut down! Shouldn‘t they have removed those trees first? How can
the Iranians be smart enough to make a nuclear bomb if this is how they try and hide their nuclear enrichment tracks? I hope you recognized this as sarcasm, since it is obvious that the issue is not that the Iranians are stupid by cutting down trees a mile away from the site they are trying to conceal, but it is the American public that is stupid for believing what they read in the paper. The Iranians cut down some trees nearly a mile away from the Lavizan site for highway construction, and Usrael fabricated a story around it, and the sheeple believe it.
E) They Moved Lavizan!
In footnote 417, we mentioned that in September 2004 the IAEA announced that no nuclear activity was found in the environmental samples taken from Lavizan. Usrael didn‘t want their Lavizan story to fade away, so a few weeks later they trotted out their favorite terrorist group to make some fresh allegations:
―Iran is secretly producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons at a military site in Teheran in direct breach of an agreement signed earlier this week, according to Iran's most prominent opposition group. The site is said to be in the Lavizan district in northeast Teheran, three miles from a former suspected secret nuclear development facility that the regime razed earlier this year after its existence was revealed by the opposition group. ‗The new site in Mozhdeh Street is controlled by Revolutionary Guards and staffed by Iran's four top nuclear scientists, who are working on producing enriched uranium,‘ said a spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran.‖441
Here is another report:
―Meanwhile, in Paris, the exile group charged that Iran was still enriching uranium and would continue to do so despite the pledge made Sunday to European foreign
The Daily Telegraph, “Iran 'Breaking Nuclear Deal with Secret Site',” 18 November 2004, by Robin Gedye http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1476936/Iran-breaking-nuclear-deal-with-secretsite.html
ministers…On Wednesday, Mohaddessin used satellite photos to pinpoint what he said was the new facility, inside a 60-acre complex in the northeast part of Tehran known as the Center for the Development of Advanced Defense Technology. The group said that the site also houses Iranian chemical and biological weapons programs and that uranium enrichment began there a year and a half ago, to replace a nearby facility that was dismantled in March ahead of a visit by a U.N. inspections team. The group gave no evidence for its claims, but Mohaddessin said, ‗Our sources were 100 percent sure about their intelligence.‘…Some diplomats and arms control experts privately discounted the Iranian group's latest claim, saying it appeared designed to undermine the deal that the Tehran government signed with Britain, France and Germany.‖442
This article calls the new site the ―Center for the Development of Advanced Defense Technology,‖ but elsewhere it is called the ―Modern Defensive Readiness and Technology Center.‖443 When making up stories, the least they could do is get the basic information to match.
In the first quote, the location of the new site is mentioned as being on Mozhdeh Street, Tehran. The Nuclear Control Institute has more information on the location, including a map, which is reproduced here444:
Washington Post, “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb; Evidence Cited of Effort to Adapt Missile,” 18 November 2004 by Robin Wright and Keith B. Richburg 443 The International Herald Tribune, “ Iran Seeks Atomic Arms, Opposition Group Says,” 17 Nov 2004 by Douglas Jehl 444 NCI, “Disclosing a Major Secret Nuclear Site under the Ministry of Defense”: http://www.nci.org/04nci/11/pbs/New-Nuke-Info.htm
Why can‘t the terrorist MEK group use Google maps? Instead, they use some old, fuzzy piece of crap map, but we can find out where the new site is anyway. First of all, notice how close the ―new‖ site is to the original one, which is just to the south of the area labelled ―Shian Area‖ in the MEK map above. Let‘s get a better idea of where this new site is. First, here is the MEK map with major roads highlighted:
In the next photo, we superimpose the roads from the MEK map onto a Google map to get an idea where the new site is:
Now that we know the location of the new site, let‘s compare it to the original, and also with where the trees were cut down by Iran in order to hide traces of radioactivity:
Although the article above says that the new site was 3 miles away from the original, it actually is 1.2 miles away (measured using Google Earth). (Also, the article says that the new site is a 60 acre complex. The site is 325 by 350 meters, which is 28 acres.) So the media wants you to believe that Iran cut down trees nearly a mile away from the original Lavizan site in order to hide traces of nuclear activity that could be found in the needles, but when they were forced to relocate their actual enrichment facility, they decided to pick a site 1.2 miles away. That makes perfect sense! In reality, if Iran actually did move their enrichment facility only 1.2 miles away, then its presence would be detected by environmental monitoring even if it was done at the original site (environmental monitoring can detect the presence of enrichment activities several kilometers away). Why would Iran hide their enrichment facility by moving it to a location so close to the original that its presence could be detected by testing the original site?
F) Summary of the Lavizan Issue if You Are an Imbecile
The following, then, is what happened at Lavizan, if you believe the media: Back in 1998, Iran was storing 4 nuclear weapons at Lavizan that they had bought from the Russians in 1991 for 25 million dollars. Although they already had 4 nukes, Iran wanted more, so they started enriching uranium to make their own, and one of the enrichment facilities was built at Lavizan in a building at the edge of a giant park, at the same place they were already storing 4 nuclear weapons. A terrorist cult based in Paris, (whose goal is to bring down the Iranian government so they can rule Iran, and who accordingly would like nothing more than to see Usrael attack Iran and remove their government), discovered that Iran had also started a biological weapons program at the Lavizan site, so they held a press conference to tell the world, but not a single media outlet on the planet reported their findings. Iran was terrified that eventually the IAEA would realize that the terrorist groups‘ accusation that Lavizan was a biological weapons center might really mean that Iran was enriching uranium there, and that they would insist on inspecting the site. In response to this fear, Iran decided to move all of their enriching equipment to another location. Experts in the field of environment testing for radioactivity would expect that the testing of environmental samples anywhere within a few kilometers of an enrichment facility would show evidence of radioactivity. The following map, then, shows where sampling might be expected to show evidence of an enrichment plant at Lavizan:
(radius approximately 3 kms) Iran, however, is much smarter than the ―experts.‖ Iran knows that the pattern in which radioactivity can be detected by environmental monitoring is not in a circular pattern with a radius of a few kilometers. Iran knows that the real pattern is much more complex, and looks more like this:
Here is a closer look at how radioactivity really spreads from a source, according to the media (a magnified view of the center of the above picture).
Iran knows that radioactivity can only be detected by environmental sampling a few feet in the easterly direction, and only about 45 feet to the north (not 3 kilometers!). It can be detected a little further to the south (200 feet), and up to 700 feet to the west. Within this
area, radioactivity burrows its way 6 feet into the soil. In addition, there is a thin strip about a mile to the south where radioactivity can be detected. Within this strip, radioactivity can only be measured in the trees, and not in the soil. Because Iran knows this secret pattern, they were able to map it onto the Lavizan site as shown here:
Iran knew that in order to hide any traces of radioactivity from the IAEA, they needed first to remove the soil around the building in the pattern described above to a depth of 6 feet, and then to cut down a strip of trees a mile to the south. After doing this, all radioactive traces are gone! All they had to do was move the centrifuges a mile away to a new location and they were back in business. They did not need to move the site any further than the one mile, because they know that radioactivity cannot travel as far as the experts think it can. Iran deliberately moved the new facility to the west of the original one, because they know that radioactivity cannot travel to the east, so there would be no chance of further environmental testing at the original site detecting the radioactivity from the new site. And the enrichment has gone on at the new site ever since…
G) Summary of the Lavizan Issue if You Are Not an Imbecile
Here is what non-imbeciles think happened at Lavizan. Iran never bought nukes from Russia. The military had a couple of buildings at the edge of a huge park, and the city convinced them to let them absorb it into the park, and the city built a soccer field where the buildings were. The construction of the park involves pushing dirt around, because there is no other way to tear down buildings and grade land for a soccer field. No dirt was removed, as the IAEA found. The IAEA found no traces of radioactivity, because no enrichment ever occurred at Lavizan. The site was not moved, because moving an enrichment site a mile away would be insane, since the radiation from the new site would easily be detected at the original site. Trees were cut down for highway construction. In brief, Iran is telling the truth, and the Usrael media lies consistently. Wake the f#%& up. By the way, anyone can play these stupid games. Here is a photo of a US army base in Oakland, CA from 2007:
Here is the same base in 2009:
Holy crap! The buildings are gone! The ground as been ―razed‖! That is proof that the US was doing research on banned biological weapons in those buildings! Someone nuke the US!
Goldschmidt doesn‘t bring up Parchin (an Iranian military site) in his paper, but I thought I would discuss it because of the similarity between the Parchin story and the story we just covered; Lavizan. The similarity is the reason that Usrael fabricated these two stories. In the last section, we mentioned how the Lavizan story was concocted just prior to the June, 2004 BoG meeting in order to pressure other countries to vote in favor of referring Iran to the Security Council. The Parchin story was fabricated for the same reason; this time at the following BoG meeting in September of 2004.
A) Ledeen and the Wall Street Journal
The earliest reference that made at least a vague connection between Parchin and Iran‘s supposed nuclear weapons program was a Wall Street Journal article written on 19 Dec 2003 by Michael Ledeen. This article was written about Ahmad Shirzad, who is a reformist politician in Iran. Ledeen was reporting on a speech Shirzad gave in the Majlis in which Shirzad criticized the Iranian government. Ledeen claims that in this speech, Shirzad mentioned an underground facility in Isfahan that contained centrifuges. Ledeen only mentions Parchin, however, as also having an underground facility, and of being a site of ―covert Iranian weapons projects.‖ The way I read the article, Ledeen does not specifically connect Parchin to either enrichment or nuclear weapons:
―Mr. Shirzad revealed that the regime had constructed a vast underground laboratory in Isfahan, 50 meters below the ground. He specifically referred to centrifuges and suggested that the underground facility covered more than 20,000 square meters, an enormous area. This is consistent with other information about covert Iranian weapons projects; there is another large underground facility near the city of Parchin, where the Shah started an industrial research and development operation.‖ 445
On Global Security‘s web page that deals with Parchin, however, they bring up Ledeen‘s Wall Street Journal article, but they read it differently than I do. Global Security claims that in Ledeen‘s article, he reports that Shirzad said Parchin contains a ―nuclear-related underground facility‖:
―The Wall Street Journal reported that in a public session of the Iranian Parliament on 24 November 2003, Ahmad Shirzad, a deputy from the city of Isfahan, stated that there was a large nuclear-related underground facility near the city of Parchin.‖446
AEI copy of Wall Street Journal article, “The Meaning of Iranian Inspections,” 18 Dec 2003 b Michael Ledeen http://www.aei.org/article/19645 446 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/parchin.htm
I am sure Global Security knows more than I do regarding this issue, so let‘s assume that the revelation that Parchin has an underground facility which is being used for nuclear weapons research was first made by Mr. Shirzad in November of 2003.
i) Shirzad Said What?
First, we have to ask the following: did Shirzad really say that Parchin (and Isfahan) contain underground laboratories that are involved with a secret nuclear weapons program? Shirzad‘s speech was covered by at least 16 different articles from around the world, including reformist news organizations from Iran. 447 Not one of these 16 news stories said a word about Shirzad mentioning military sites in either Isfahan or Parchin in his speech. There are two possible reasons for this. Either Ledeen has a mole in the
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Reformist MP Blames Iran's Islamic System for ‘Notorious’ Image,” Nov. 24, 2003 Agence France Presse, “War of Words Erupts in Iran over UN Rights Rebuke,” Nov. 24, 2003, by Siavosh Ghazi BBC Monitoring, “Iran: Majlis MP Defends Controversial Pre-Agenda Speech,” quoting ISNA, Nov. 24, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iranian Reformist MP's Pre-Agenda Speech Causes Uproar,” quoting Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, Nov. 24, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iranian Reformist MP’s Pre-Agenda Speech Causes Uproar,” quoting Central News Bureau, Nov. 24, 2003 United Press International, “Analysis: U.N. Rebuke Opens Debate in Iran,” Nov. 25, 2003, by Modher Amin, available here: www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-110542148.html BBC Monitoring, “Iran: MP Says World Views Islamic Republic as ‘Violent’, ‘Militarized’,” quoting Iran Daily newspaper, Nov. 25, 2003 Associated Press Worldstream, “Iranian Protesters Pelt Reformist Lawmaker's Office with Stones for Criticizing Hard-Liners,” Nov.26, 2003, available here: www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-87789011.html BBC Monitoring, “Iranian MP's Nuclear Energy Remarks ‘Relatively Biting’ - Deputy Speaker,” quoting Iran newspaper, Nov. 26, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iranian Daily Criticizes Nuclear Protocol Opponent,” quoting Aftab-e Yazd newspaper, Dec 1, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iranian Columnist Views "Intense Reaction" to MP's Controversial Remarks,” quoting Kayhan newspaper, Dec. 1, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iranian Editorial Rebuts Criticism of MP's Remarks,” quoting Mardom Salari newspaper, Dec. 2, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iran: Jurist Amends Noble Prize Winner's Statement on Majlis Incident,” quoting Aftab-e Yazd newspaper, Dec. 4, 2003 Agence France Presse, “Iranian Radicals Beat Up Reformist Member of Parliament,” Dec. 6, 2003 BBC Monitoring, “Iran: Reformist MP Says Attack Leading to his Injury Election Related,” quoting ISNA, Dec. 6, 2003 United Press International, “Analysis: Iran Attacks Fuel Tensions,” Dec. 11, 2003, available here: www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-88361214.html
Iranian Parliament and is able to get information that no other news organization in the world has access to, or he is a liar.
ii) Silencing Shirzad Just for fun, let‘s look at the rest of the Ledeen article. Ledeen talked about the ―lengthy speech‖ given by Shirzad in Iran‘s Parliament on Nov 24, 2003. In fact, the speech was at most 12 minutes long.448 Ledeen then says that Shirzad was ―instantly silenced‖ after giving his speech to the Majlis. If Ledeen‘s claims are true and Shirzad revealed Iran‘s secret nuclear program to the world, including locations of specific sites, I would not be surprised if Iran acted harshly. I would think any country would. However, it seems that Iran did a very poor job of silencing Shirzad. The month after Ledeen‘s article and two months after Shirzad‘s Parliament speech, Shirzad said this about the conservatives:
"If they succeed to form a mock parliament as they wish, the next scenario of the monopolists is to sponsor an impeachment motion against President Mohammad Khatami and weaken his cabinet to bring their conservative comrades to the cabinet." 449
Later in 2004 Shirzad continued his criticisms, saying that:
―this whole issue has turned into a point of weakness for the country, and the foreign powers are using it to exert pressure on us. In other words, instead of generating power and strength for Iran, the nuclear issue has only weakened it.‖450
BBC Monitoring Reports, “Iran: Jurist Amends Nobel Prize Winner’s Statement on Majlis Incident,” Dec. 4, 2003, quoting an editorial by Zahra Ansar titled “A Word with My Colleague Ms Ebadi!” which appeared in the Iranian newspaper Aftab-e Yazd on the same day, which said: “During the parliamentary session on Monday 3/9/82 (24 November 2003) not only did Dr Shirzad complete his 10-minute speech but as is usual, took up an extra one or two minutes beyond his permitted time slot.” 449 BBC Monitoring, “Iran: Reformist MP Says ‘Monopolists’ Plan to Impeach Khatami,” quoting IRNA, Jan. 27, 2004 450 BBC Monitoring, “Iran: Paper Analyses Stance of Key Political Forces on Nuclear Crisis,” quoting Shargh, Sept. 22, 2004
After Ahmadinejad won the presidential election the following year (2005), Shirzad was one of many reformists that continued their criticisms of the government:
―Lack of unity among reformists is not something you need special insight to detect. While most reformists talk about the strategy of silence as a rational policy to pass through the present stage, figures such as Mohsen Armin, Hamid Reza Jala'ipur, Ahmad Shirzad, and Mostafa Tajzadeh have already broken this silence and harshly criticized the government. They began with the decisions of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad on his cabinet members.‖451
Not only is the Iranian government unable to ―silence‖ Shirzad, they even let him publish articles in newspapers that criticize the government! They really have a hard time ―silencing‖ this guy! The following is from an article in the newspaper E‘temad written by Shirzad in 2006:
―To safeguard our major interests, we ought to choose a realistic course, act pragmatically, and avoid sloganeering. Sadly though, we sometimes see that the rhetoric announced from the tribune of, say, Friday prayer, or similar other medium, is also echoed from an official diplomatic tribune within the international community [as published], or repeated in a formal press interview for the general public to hear and form their opinion. If we say, and repeat relentlessly, that America is bad and evil, oppresses the weak, bullies other countries, etc, would anything be changed or improved?‖452
A few months later Shirzad criticized Ali Larijani, one of Khamenei‘s representatives on the Supreme National Security Council:
BBC Monitoring, “Iran Press: Writer Comments on Reformists' Reported ‘Silence’,” quoting E’temad newspaper, August 22, 2005 452 BBC Monitoring, “Iran Press Criticizes Government’s Use of ‘Threats’ in Foreign Policy,” quoting article by Ahmad Shirzad in E’temad newspaper, Jan. 4, 2006
―What is this ‗precious pearl‘ that Larijani refers to? This is not the right way to defend Iran's right to access nuclear technology. It is naive to think that it would be enough to just talk about freedom and human rights.‖453
Shirzad then turned his criticisms to Ahmadinejad:
''It is clear that the government did not study its consequences, like what Mr. Ahmadinejad said about the Holocaust…it made many wonder if he said it and then thought about it, or thought about it before saying it.‖454
Shirzad then criticized the Holocaust conference that Ahmadinejad held:
"I raise two questions about this conference…First, how much does this solve the problems our people are faced with? And secondly, which one of our goals were realized? It looks like he wants to make news and do provocative things."455
I can think of three ways to reconcile Ledeen‘s statement that Shirzad was ―instantly silenced‖ with the fact that he continually criticized the Iranian government for three years after his Parliament speech. First; maybe the Iranian government is the most pathetic example of an oppressive government on the planet. Second, maybe Shirzad is very wily, and the Iranian government cannot find him. Third, Ledeen is a propagandist. Ledeen also said that after giving his speech, Shirzad was ―now awaiting the inevitable charges from the regime's Islamic tribunals.‖ He certainly had a long wait, because before charging him, the Islamic tribunals decided to first let Shirzad publicly criticize the government for the next three years. That‘s a strange tactic for a despotic, ―axis of evil‖
BBC Monitoring, “Iranian MP Criticizes Nuclear Chief’s Diplomacy,” quoting ILNA, March 3, 2006 International Herald Tribune, “Ban on Daylight savings Leaves Iranians Irritable,” April 10, 2006, by Nazila Fathi www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/10/news/iran.php 455 International Herald Tribune, “News Analysis: Iran’s So-Called Holocaust Conference,” Dec. 13, 2006, by Michael Slackman www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/13/news/iran.php
government. I guess they finally got around to it, because in September of 2007, AFP quoted ISNA as saying:
"Tehran's penal court sentenced Ahmad Shirzad, a member of the sixth parliament, to jail and a fine. The accusations were spreading lies, disturbing people's minds and libel.‖ ISNA said that ‗there was no information on what length of jail sentence he could be given.‘‖456
I‘m sure the ―Islamic tribunal‖ must have given Shirzad life for revealing state secrets about Iran‘s nuclear program, including locations of specific secret sites. It turns out that we don‘t have to guess, because the following month it was reported that
―Penal Court 76 of Tehran Province sentenced Ahmad Shirzad to four months' imprisonment and payment of a 50,000-tuman (approximately 25 pounds) fine for a speech he made in November 2003.‖457
Four months and a 50 dollar fine for revealing Iran‘s nuclear program! Israel gave Vanunu458 18 years! (After first considering an extrajudicial execution459 - Israel‘s trademark). That ―Islamic tribunal‖ is pretty wimpy! What kind of dictatorship are they running!! The reports of jail time (both were from Iranian reformist sources) are also suspect. In December, 2007, two months after the supposed sentencing, Shirzad (refusing to be silenced), gave a speech in Yazd where he criticized Iran‘s nuclear program so thoroughly that Israel‘s foreign office characterized it as ―brave.‖460 Shirzad then wrote
Agence France Presse, Iran ex-MP Sentenced to Jail for ‘Spreading Lies’: Report,” Sept. 3, 2007 Saeed Barzin of BBC Monitoring, “Analysis Iranian Politicians Struggle with Nuclear Policy,” Oct. 15, 2007, quoting rahne.net 458 Vanunu is an Israeli who exposed Israel’s nuclear weapons program 459 The Times (London), “Spy Boss Reveals Mossad Considered Killing Vanunu,” Feb 8, 2004 by Peter Hounam www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1014344.ece 460 BBC Monitoring, “Israel Thanked Iran Politician Over Nuclear Remarks – Paper,” quoting Keyhan newspaper, Dec. 2, 2007
a reply to the newspaper that printed the Shirzad/Israel story.461 (Even after getting applauded by Israel, Shirzad‘s reply was not ―silenced‖, but was printed in the newspaper.) Three months after the sentencing, Shirzad entered his name on the ballot for the next election.462 Four months after the sentencing, he was complaining in the paper about being disqualified from the election. Although he was disqualified, he made sure to complain about it, without being ―silenced.‖463 The following month Shirzad published an editorial in the newspaper E‘temad.464 At this point in the chronology, it is 5 months after Shirzad was supposedly sentenced to 4 months in jail. I don‘t think all this activity in the media by Shirzad since his supposed sentencing happened from a jail cell. The story about jail time is highly doubtful.
Shirzad did not disappear after this. In August, 2008, he gave an interview with Rooznet.465 In October of 2008, Shirzad was again in the international news:
―‘The economic situation has become horrible in the last three years, as has Iran's international image, and he is not sure whether he can rebuild the necessary trust,'‘ said Ahmad Shirzad, a former MP and one of [Khatami‘s] leading supporters.‖ 466
In November of 2008, Shirzad wrote another Commentary in the newspaper E‘temad. 467 In May of 2009, Shirzad was back in the Iranian news:
BBC Monitoring, “Iran Paper Defends Report on Reformist Politician,” quoting Keyhan newspaper, Dec. 5, 2007 BBC Monitoring, “Iran Paper Gives Detailed Report on Poll Preparations,” quoting Javan, Jan. 14, 2008: “Some of the main candidates from the 2 Khordad Front included the following names: Aref, Alireza Mahjub, … Ahmad Shirzad…” 463 BBC Monitoring, “Iran Press Menu 3 Feb 08,” quoting ISNA, Feb. 3, 2008: “Ahmad Shirzad, a member of the Participation Party's central Council, criticized the disqualification of candidates and said that the ruling faction will be responsible for the future events in the country.” 464 BBC Monitoring, “Stand Up and Make an Effort,” 13 March 2008 465 BBC Monitoring, “Participation Party Gives No Guarantee About Khatami,” 28 Aug 2008, quoting Keyhan 466 The Sunday Telegraph (London), “In President Ahmadinejad's Hometown in Iran, Hope Goes Up in Opium Smoke,” 25 Oct 2008 by Colin Freeman http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/3260141/In-President-Ahmadinejads-hometownin-Iran-hope-goes-up-in-opium-smoke.html 467 BBC Monitoring, “Is It Over,” 13 Nov 2008
―Shirzad said that Iran's political parties were young and had not lived a long political life, ‗and yet we in the reformist front have greater political maturity compared to the opposite faction. We have to administer the extensive political front that we have at our disposal towards our common goal. This common goal, which is also the goal of our friends behind [Mehdi] Karrubi, is nothing other than to change this government.‘‖ 468
In January of 2010, Shirzad was back in the international news. 469 Jesus Christ! It‘s been nearly 7 years now since Shirzad‘s speech! How long will it take Iran to silence this guy! Ledeen said that Shirzad is ―destined to join the ranks of thousands of brave critics of the regime who have one glorious moment of protest and are then consigned to the regime's torture chambers.‖ It is now well over 6 years later, and what Shirzad has actually done is to complain endlessly about the Iranian government, including within Iranian newspapers, without seeing the inside of a jail cell, much less being tortured. Interestingly, Human Rights Watch has stated that according to the UN Human Rights Commission, Israel keeping Vanunu in solitary confinement for 11 years did constitute torture.470Ledeen‘s comment applies to Israel, not Iran. Shirzad was not ―destined‖ to be tortured, nor even jailed, but Ledeen is ―destined‖ to remain an imbecile.
Do you know why Shirzad was never put into jail? Because he never said anything about any clandestine nuclear sites. That‘s also why no other news outlet in the world reported Shirzad saying anything about any secret nuclear sites. Wake up.
BBC Monitoring, “Presence of Two Candidates ‘Helpful’ in Polls - Iran Reformist,” 18 May 2009, quoting Aftab-e Yazd 469 The Christian Science Monitor, “Killing of Iran Nuclear Scientist: Charges Fly Over Who's Responsible,” 12 Jan 2010 by Iason Athanasiadis http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0112/Killing-of-Iran-nuclear-scientist-charges-fly-over-whos-responsible 470 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999, Middle East and North Africa Section/Human Rights Developments. P. 362 http://books.google.com/books?id=LdWZrfsdqAEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
iii) The Source of the Wall Street Journal Article I posted an earlier version of this section on Ledeen‘s Wall Street Journal article on a thread that Ledeen was hosting on Pajamas Media.471 In that version, I ask Ledeen about some quotes he made of Shirzad in his article, and wondered where they came from (other news outlets have very different versions of what seemed like the same sentence). Mr. Ledeen informed me that he got the material from a blog titled ―Iran Press Service.‖472 Iran Press Service was run by someone named Safa Haeri. Mr. Haeri no longer runs his ―Iran Press Service‖ blog, but now instead runs a blog called ―Damavand.‖473
Why the hell is the Wall Street Journal running articles based on information written in a blog???
Also, the claim that Shirzad said that there are underground nuclear facilities in Parchin and Isfahan was not made on the Iran Press Service site. Where did that claim originate? In Michael Ledeen‘s head?
B) McInerney and the Washington Times
The next time Parchin was mentioned in the media was a few months later in a Washington Times article by Mansoor Ijaz and Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney474:
Pajamas Media, the thread is here: http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/2008/11/03/election-thoughts/ The specific IPS story he got his information from is here: http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2003/Nov-2003/shirzad_majles_speech_241103.htm 473 Homepage is: http://wwwdamavandsafa.blogspot.com/ 474 McInerney thinks that all Muslim men between the ages of 18 and 28 should be strip searched at airports: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/03/fox-news-guest-strip-sear_n_409545.html
―The second track makes use of Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment. These facts were revealed by Ahmad Shirzad, a member of Iran's Parliament representing Isfahan, in late 2003 as he passionately argued Iran's children were starving while the mullahs processed uranium at secret underground facilities near Parchin (southeast of Tehran) and in the mountains between Qazvin and Karaj (northwest of Tehran).‖475
This article is clearer than Ledeen‘s article regarding the claim that Iran is processing uranium at Parchin (while Iran‘s children are starving, of course). This article, like Ledeen‘s, claims that Shirzad said this, which we know now is BS. McInerney also claims that Shirzad said in his Parliament speech that Iran‘s nuclear program in Parchin ―makes use of Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment.‖ Where do they get this stuff? Why did 17 other news stories, including Ledeen‘s, not mention the part where Shirzad talked about ―Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment‖? Why did this information only come out over three months after the speech, and not before? Why didn‘t Iran punish Shirzad for releasing such detailed information on a secret nuclear program? How did Shirzad, a reformist, get all of this information? This is simply too ridiculous to even comment on. Even the Washington Times was too embarrassed to call this news, and published the article in the Commentary section. I‘m surprised someone didn‘t make the claim that Shirzad said in his speech that Iran was building a death star at Parchin.
C) The BoG Meeting
Nothing more was heard about Parchin in the press until September 10, 2004, when AFP broke a story quoting a ―diplomat close to the IAEA‖ who said that they had
Washington Times, “Iran’s Nuclear Menace,” March 7, 2004, by Mansoor Ijaz and Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/mar/6/20040306-102129-4558r/
requested a visit to the Parchin site.476 They also quoted a ―US official,‖ who claimed that the request had been dropped from a recent IAEA report. As for the request being dropped from the report, IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said that suggestions that the agency willfully omitted sensitive information were "totally baseless ... (and) not worthy of further comment," and that the report "reflects the facts in an objective manner, and we fully stand by them." Iran denied that the IAEA asked for a visit to Parchin.477
A few days later, another story broke about Parchin when good old David Albright wrote a paper where he analyzed satellite photos of Parchin and concluded that the site is nuclear weapons related.478 Supposedly, the photos show that the Iranians may be testing "high-explosive shaped charges with an inert core of depleted uranium" as a dry test for how a bomb with fissile material would work. 479 Here are the pictures:
AFP, “UN atomic agency seeks to visit key Iranian defense site: diplomats,” Sept. 10, 2004, copy here: www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=241 477 AP, “IAEA delegates wrestle with Iran resolution as U.S. expresses alarm about suspect site,” Sept. 16, 2004, copy here: www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/09/17/news/nation/16_38_309_16_04.txt 478 http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/parchin.html 479 AFP, “Lack of ‘unrestricted access’ hindering UN nuclear inspection of Iran,” Dec. 2, 2004, by Michael Adler http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202184943.db0lqz1a.html
Wow! Those ―US officials‖ sure know their stuff! When I look at the photos, I see a
little buildings and some hills. What do you see? It must take a lot of training to deduce that inside those buildings, they are testing "high-explosive shaped charges with an inert core of depleted uranium" as a dry test for how a bomb with fissile material would work! Do you really believe it is possible for anyone to look at these pictures and conclude that the site is for nuclear weapons work? Really?
The same day Albright published his paper, there was a report on ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings where they said that there was ―concern inside the US and European intelligence communities these satellite pictures of an Iranian military site may be new evidence Iran is trying to build a nuclear device.‖480 The entire report, however, consisted of an interview with………………… David Albright!
At least there was one article that pointed out that these claims were baseless:
―U.S. officials have told CNN there is ‗no evidence‘ any nuclear work has been done at an Iranian military complex near Tehran, although high explosives testing has been done there for many years. The comments were made in response to report by ABC News in the U.S. Wednesday evening that said Iran "may be taking steps toward developing a nuclear device" at the site, known as Parchin. An official at the International Atomic Energy Agency also told CNN that while the Parchin complex was watched ‗with interest,‘ he was unaware of intelligence suggesting nuclear work has been done there.‖481
This entire episode was an orchestrated propaganda campaign of baseless charges and silly propaganda from Albright. The reason for the flood of propaganda was happened at this point in time was because a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors
ABC News Transcripts, 15 Sept 2004, “Nuclear Device in Tehran?” http://articles.cnn.com/2004-09-15/world/iran.nuclear_1_parchin-nuclear-weapons-nuclearactivities?_s=PM:WORLD
was coming up. This is the same reason the Lavizan story came up when it did. Every time there was a BoG meeting, Usrael would fabricate a new story. At the meeting, they were going to make a decision on whether or not to refer Iran‘s file to the Security Council. Isn‘t that an amazing coincidence that these stories came out at such a critical time?!? Not everyone thought so. Some mentioned how the stories came out as US officials were ―stepping up pressure on their European partners in trying to persuade the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer the case to the UN Security Council where Iran will face stiff sanctions.‖482 As Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, said at the time: "This is the routine behavior of the Americans in every board of governors meeting, they raise such issues, like last time they raised Lavisan, this time Parchin.‖483 A ―Western diplomat close to the IAEA‖ agreed, saying, ―every time there is a board meeting, there is a new suspect site.‖484 This is crude propaganda, people. In reality, these are fabricated stories that were aimed at getting Iran‘s IAEA file transferred to the Security Council. It didn‘t work that time, because Baradei came out and said that Parchin ‖showed no signs of nuclear-related activities,‖485 the BOG report that followed the meeting did not mention Parchin486, and the file was not transferred to the Security Council. This time, the fabricated US stories had no effect.
D) The IAEA Goes to Parchin
AFP, “Photos of suspected secret Iranian nuclear site released,” Sept. 16. 2004. Copy here: www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040916-iran-site.htm 483 VOA News, “Iran Accuses US of 'Lying' on Nukes,” Sept. 16, 2004, by Marlene Smith 484 AFP, “Iran denies any nuclear activity at suspect site Parchin,” Sept. 16, 2004, by Michael Adler. Copy here: www.nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0409nn/040916nn.htm 485 The Guardian, “West sets deadline for Iran to freeze uranium enrichment,” Sept. 18, 2004, by Ian Traynor www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/18/iran.iantraynor 486 GOV/2004/79: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-79.pdf
Although the Parchin fabrication did not convince countries to refer Iran to the Security Council, the story did pressure the IAEA to ask for a visit there on 25 Oct 2004. The next IAEA report following the Parchin story said:
―…in order to respond to Iran‘s concerns about such a transparency visit, the Agency sent on 25 October 2004 a note outlining modalities under which the visit could take place.‖487
For the reasons detailed in Appendix A, Iran has absolutely no legal obligation to allow the IAEA to inspect Parchin at all. Parchin is not a declared site, and any visit could only happen if Iran agrees to it.488 In fact, access to a military site goes beyond even the Additional Protocol.489 For Iran to give the IAEA access to Parchin in any form whatsoever would be a big concession in terms of transparency. Negotiations on the visit began, then, on Oct 25, 2004, an agreement was arrived at on January 7, 2005490, and the visit itself occurred shortly thereafter on Jan. 13, 2005.491 In the negotiations at Geneva, it was agreed that the IAEA would choose the area of highest interest in the Parchin site, and they would be allowed to search buildings within
GOV/2004/83: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea1104.pdf “…the [IAEA] is left in the awkward position of asking Iran to admit its monitors to the site voluntarily”: The New York Times, “Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Iran Sites,” Dec. 2, 2004, by William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/middleeast/02nuke.html?ex=1259643600&en=2416db0aed987a26 &ei=5090&partner=rssuserland 489 See Baradei: “On transparency I think I mentioned in my report access to military sites *including Parchin+ are beyond the Additional Protocol” www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2006/transcr06032006.html See: “IAEA's spokeswoman Melissa Fleming welcomed Iran's decision to allow the probe, terming the ‘voluntary’ and ‘confidence building’ move as ‘positive and vital’,” UPI, “Iran going beyond its nuclear pledge?,” Jan. 6, 2005, by Moodher Amin, copy here: www.nucnews.net/nucnews/2005nn/0501nn/050107nn.txt See: “*Melissa Fleming+ stressed, ‘this action was not taken based on the Additional Protocol, but it is an action to create transparency,’ BBC Monitoring quoting ISNA, “IAEA to inspect Iranian military site,” Jan. 10, 2005 490 Details of the negotiations can be found here: INFCIRC/657, Sept. 15, 2005, page 24 to 26. Copy here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 491 “’A team of IAEA inspectors today carried out an inspection at Parchin, including the taking of environmental samples,’ spokesman Mark Gwozedecky said,” AFP, “UN nuclear team visits suspect Iranian military site,” Jan. 13, 2005, copy here: www.spacewar.com/2005/050113171936.4ze7py6g.html
that area.492 Global Security mentions that the ―visit was limited to only one of four areas identified as being of potential interest and to only five buildings in that area.‖493 They deliberately give the impression that the visit was overly restrictive due to Iran being uncooperative. No mention is made that searching any buildings at all goes far beyond even the Additional Protocol, and that the visit was prompted in the first place by bullshit news stories (both the Shirzad story and the satellite photos) fabricated by Usrael, and that in fact Iran was being extremely cooperative by allowing the visit at all.
The visit happened, the buildings were searched, environmental samples were taken, nothing was found.
Five days after the visit, news reports began to claim that the IAEA wanted to revisit the Parchin site to search a new area. The source of these reports was the famous ―diplomat…who asked not to be named.‖494 The likely source of this story was that during the Jan. 7 negotiations between Iran and the IAEA, Blix ―asked to visit another area, emphasizing that the request was not part of the agreement.‖ Iran, however, limited the building search to the one area, as agreed. (Once at the site, however, the inspectors were given a chance to change their mind as to what area to search. 495) A new request to search Parchin after the visit, however, was not made. In response to the story about a new request after the visit, Melissa Fleming, an IAEA spokesman, said, "some diplomats, who are unknown, say something to the press and most of their remarks are false and completely wrong."496 Also, it was agreed on Jan. 7 that ―any future request for clarification or access will be made in accordance with the Iran's
Details of the negotiations can be found here: INFCIRC/657, Sept. 15, 2005, page 24 to 26. Copy here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 493 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/parchin-2.htm 494 AFP, “UN nuclear inspectors want to return to Parchin military site in Iran,” Jan. 18, 2005, copy here: www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmafp/is_200501/ai_n13260947 495 Details of the negotiations can be found here: INFCIRC/657, Sept. 15, 2005, page 24 to 26. Copy here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 496 BBC Monitoring quoting IRNA, “IAEA official denies report on IAEA second visit to Iran's Parchin site,” Jan, 19, 2005
Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol,‖497 which means no more access to buildings, and only environmental testing would be allowed. Although the IAEA eventually did ask for another search of Parchin, it seems unlikely that the IAEA would go back on their word within 5 days. Even for the IAEA this is hard to believe. The news reports claiming ht the IAEA immediately asked to revisit the Parchin site are lies. Of course, the IAEA eventually did go back on their word, but it wasn‘t until 6 months later. On June 14, Mark Gwozdecky of the IAEA announced that the IAEA wants to go back to Parchin, and that they are ―working together with [Iran] to reach an agreement on modalities.‖498 The IAEA broke their agreement with Iran and asked for another visit to search buildings. What did the ―axis of evil‖ Iran do? They allowed the visit, which occurred on Nov. 1, 2005 and included environmental testing, building searches, and interviews.499 The IAEA ―did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations.‖500
Here is the New York Times commenting on the Parchin story over two years after the second visit:
―In 2004, Mr. ElBaradei sought to purge mention of Iranian attempts to purchase beryllium metal, an important component in a nuclear charge, from IAEA documents. He also left unmentioned Tehran's refusal to grant IAEA inspectors access to the Parchin
Details of the negotiations can be found here: INFCIRC/657, Sept. 15, 2005, page 24 to 26. Copy here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf 498 VOA News, “IAEA Wants Access to Iran Military Site,” June 14, 2005, copy here: www.51voa.com/VOA_Standard_English/VOA_Standard_2044.html 499 The New York Times, “Iran Reports Making Bid to Resume Nuclear Talks,” Nov. 7, 2005, by Nazila Fathi, copy here: www.query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E0DA143EF934A35752C1A9639C8B63 500 GOV/2006/15: available here: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf
military complex, where satellite imagery showed a facility seemingly designed to test and produce nuclear weapons.‖501 (emphasis added)
The IAEA had visited Parchin twice. The New York Times claims two years later that Iran refused access to Parchin.
And what about the claim that ElBaradei ―[purged] mention of Iranian attempts to purchase beryllium metal‖ from an IAEA report? That claim was made on 11 Sept 2004, the same time the claim was made that Parchin was omitted from an IAEA report (which I talked about earlier):
―A US official said from Washington that the IAEA had, according to verbal accounts, dropped the mention of Parchin in the written report, as well as a reference to concern about Iran's work with beryllium.‖502
These are the claims that the IAEA said were "totally baseless ... (and) not worthy of further comment." 503 The claims that ElBaradei was leaving information out of IAEA reports was a pathetic attempt by Usrael to remove ElBaradei from his position in the IAEA. Other countries did not fall for the propaganda:
―There have also been orchestrated leaks by unnamed U.S. or Western officials who have told reporters that Iran was secretly improving upon a weapons program and that ElBaradei was trying to hide that information from the IAEA board. Yesterday, diplomats in Vienna, where the IAEA is based, said one of the more recent accusations -- that Iran had bought large quantities of the metal beryllium for a nuclear charge -- had proved to be unfounded. After the beryllium claim first surfaced in news reports from Vienna, U.S.
The New York Times, “ElBaradei's Real Agenda,” 25 Feb 2008 by Danielle Pletka and Michael Rubin http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120389990086289395.html 502 AFP, “UN atomic agency seeks to visit key Iranian defense site: diplomats,” 11 Sept 2004, copy here: http://iranfocus.com/en/?option=com_content&task=view&id=241 503 AP, “IAEA delegates wrestle with Iran resolution as U.S. expresses alarm about suspect site,” Sept. 16, 2004, copy here: www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/09/17/news/nation/16_38_309_16_04.txt
officials said ElBaradei had concealed the information from the public. But diplomats said yesterday that an exhaustive investigation found that Iran's attempts to buy the material, which has dozens of civilian applications, were unsuccessful. The new revelations are unlikely to help the U.S. case against the IAEA chief.‖504
To be continued…
Appendix A (IAEA Breaches Safeguards Agreement with DPRK)
The DPRK Safeguards Agreement entered into force on April 10, 1992, and the DPRK filed an initial report on nuclear material subject to safeguards on May 4, 1992. According to the summary contained in INFCIRC/419,505 after the ad hoc inspections started in May, the IAEA claimed that ―inconsistencies‖ between the DPRK declarations on the initial report and the inspector‘s findings began to emerge in July, 1992. When the details are examined, however, it becomes clear that there were, in reality, no inconsistencies. On July 22, 1992, which is when the ―inconsistencies‖ were supposedly emerging, a hearing was held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee titled ―North Korean Nuclear Program,‖ where IAEA Director Hans Blix testified about the ongoing inspections.506 At that point the IAEA inspectors had already ―gone to the installations which [the DPRK has] declared in the original inventory,‖ and were also ―taken to some places which were also not in the original inventory.‖ According to Blix‘ testimony, the IAEA had questions about why the DPRK was building what they called a ―radiochemical laboratory,‖ which the IAEA claimed was a reprocessing plant. The DPRK said it would be for waste disposal as part of a closed fuel cycle, which was completely reasonable, but Blix was suspicious that other reasons were initially given. Regardless
The Washington Post, “U.S. Alone in Seeking Ouster,” 22 Jan 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27841-2005Jan21.html 505 http://fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html 506 Hearing titled “North Korean Nuclear Program” held by the House Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 22 July 1992, HEARING-ID: HRG-1992-FOA-0031, SUDOC: Y4.F76/1:K84/12, CIS-NO: 93-H381-18
of his suspicions, the building of the facility was completely legal, and involved no ―inconsistencies.‖ Blix also wondered whether the core of their 5 Megawatt reactor was the original core. This was also not an ―inconsistency,‖ and the question would have been resolved on future routine inspections. Blix said himself that ―there is no sign they have been devoting themselves to an enrichment program‖ and that there was no evidence of the DPRK cooperating with others on their nuclear program. Regarding uranium, Blix said that ―we have not established any differences between or discrepancies between the inventory and what we have seen and verified so far.‖ Blix did not identify a single problem at the hearing, and it is doubtful there was any. The IAEA‘s illegal actions began on February 9, 1993, when the IAEA began to ask for access to two buildings at the Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Centre based on information from satellite photos obtained from the US. 507 This request was illegal and a breach of the Safeguards Agreement by the IAEA for two reasons. The first related to the fact that information was submitted to the IAEA by a third party. Details on how information is to be submitted to the IAEA by signatory States is given throughout the safeguards agreement (especially paragraph 8), but nowhere in the safeguards agreement are there provisions for the gathering of information by the IAEA from third parties. The IAEA Statute does contain details on the submission of information by member states in Article VIII, but this information relates only ―to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy,‖ and not to nuclear weapons programs. Accepting and acting on information supplied by a third party was illegal. The Director General first presented the idea of using third party intelligence to the BOG on
See GOV/2636, available here: http://www.fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3 Interestingly, it was not long before this that the US was confronted with a similar situation when negotiating the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. At issue was a provision for “anytime, anywhere” on-site inspections with no right of refusal, which is similar to what the DPRK was being asked to submit to. When the Soviet Union decided to accept the idea of these types of inspections, it was the West, including the US, who said that these types of inspections would pose grave risks to sensitive facilities. Therefore, in 1991, the US, UK, Japan and Australia “formally proposed less intrusive inspections than those that the Soviet Union had supported.” See: “Recommended Text for Article IX – Challenge Inspection” UN Conference on Disarmament, CD/CW/WP.352, 15 July 1991, quoted in “Cooperative Security and the CWC: A Comparison of the Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regimes,” in Contemporary Security Policy, V. 15, No. 3, 1994, p. 30-57, by Jessica Eve Stern. The US demands that other nations be subjected to these types of inspections, but reject the idea that they receive the same treatment. Are you surprised?
November 12, 1991508 by proposing that a two person team be created in order to compile and verify this type of information. There was widespread opposition to the idea (for example, Mr Lavina of the Philippines said that the idea was ―cynically encouraging espionage‖ and was ―in danger of promoting transgressions against the sovereignty of states,‖ and as a result, ―on the legal plane, [the idea] would not only violate the Statute but also international law.‖)509 Because of the opposition, the ―proposal was scrapped‖.510 Even though his idea was rejected by the Board, the Director General used deceptive language to make it appear to the outside world that it actually had been accepted. At the BOG meeting, the ―summing up‖ of the meeting said that the Board ―further reaffirmed the Agency‘s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency‘s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.‖511 This part of the summing up was included in a press release issued by the Director General on 26 February 1992. 512 In response to the press release, articles appeared saying that the Board approved the use of third party information.513 The Board, however, had not accepted the idea of using third party information, and had specifically rejected the only proposal that was made to do so. The reason for the confusion is in the wording of the statement, which said that the Board ―reaffirmed the Agency‘s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency‘s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.‖ This statement basically says that the Board made no changes at all, because ―reaffirming the Agency‘s rights‖ means that the Agency‘s rights remained unchanged. The key to understanding the situation is to know what the Agency‘s rights were before they were ―reaffirmed‖ by the Board, and by not detailing
See GOV/2554, 12 November 1991, Also see “IAEA Director Hans Blix: Keeping an Eye on A Nuclear World,” Arms Control Today, November 199: “I propose that member states give us information based upon whatever intelligence they have.” 509 See paragraphs 16 and 18 of GOV/OR/770, 6 December 1991 510 The Independent, “UN Agency Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspection,” Feb.29, 1992 by Michael Wise 511 See paragraph 48 of GOV/OR/776, also referred to in paragraph 4 of GC(36)/1017, available here: http://iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1017_en.pdf 512 PR 92/12, 26 February 1992 513 See, for example, AP, “UN Agency’s Board Agrees to Toughen Inspection Programs,” Feb, 27, 1992 by Mark J. Porubcansky
this, the statement makes it appear as though the Board agreed to the use of third party information. The reality, however, is that third party information was not allowed before the BOG meeting, and reaffirming the Agency as having ―access to additional information…in accordance with the Agency‘s Statute‖ simply means that third party information was not allowed after the meeting as well. The deception in this wording was pointed out by Mr. Villain XIIII of Belgium at the BOG meeting, who said that the summary did not ―[reflect] the opinions expressed‖ in the meeting but instead ―artificially [obliterated] their substance.‖ He said that the summing up ―made no reference to a very important point, namely the Agency‘s access to information which could indicate the need for a special inspection.‖ He was concerned that ―the Agency might act upon doubtful, arbitrary or biased information and …that the State against which the information was directed might not have any opportunity to refute it or to justify itself.‖ He said that although ―there was a reference [in the summing up] to the Agency‘s right to have access to additional information…that wording [was] taken from paragraph 73 of document INFCIRC/153, [and] referred to the quite different situation when during an inspection, Agency officials felt that they needed additional information or access to additional information. What [the Director General] had in mind, however, was initial information which could trigger a special inspection, and failure to include a reference to that might create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections‖.514 The Belgian representative likely realized that the wording was specifically designed to ―create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections.‖ It was not until the BOG passed resolution GC(39)/RES/17 on September 18, 1995 that the use of third party information become legal.515 In that 1995 resolution the BOG ―[endorsed]…the first part of the measures it has proposed‖ and ―[requested] the Director General to implement at an early date the measures outlined in Part 1 of
See GOV/OR/776, paragraphs 52, 52 and 55 See: “…these so-called ‘Part 1’ measures, agreed in 1995, included…arrangements to give the Agency access to national intelligence information, ” in David Fischer, “Verifying Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament” in VERTIC Verification yearbook 2000, available here: http://vertic.org/assets/VY00_Fischer.pdf
document GOV/2807.‖516 The Part 1 measures that were introduced under the 93+2 program for strengthening safeguards included ―improved analysis of information,‖ which included access to third party information.
Although these measures were
passed, there were many reservations about the legality of several of the proposed Part 1 measures, including those relating to third party information. Mr. Ahmad from Pakistan expressed concern that ―such third-party information could, for many reasons, be biased; the Agency should not be seen to adjust its response according to the perception of certain powerful States‖ and Mr. Saburido of Cuba said that ―recourse to data from intelligence sources should be explicitly excluded.‖ In response to legality questions, the Director General stated that ―acceptance of the recommendations…did not imply endorsement of the specific measures described in the document or the legal interpretation given.‖518 Access to third party information was endorsed by the BOG, then, even though this measure was illegal with respect to 153-type safeguards. That it is incompatible is clear when the legal justification for it is considered. The IAEA justified access to third party information under paragraph 90 of the INFCIRC/153 safeguard agreement.519
This is a bad joke, since nothing in paragraph 90 can be construed as relating to third party information, unless you have brain damage.
When the IAEA used third party information in early 1993 against North Korea, it was 2 and a half years before the practice gained any form of legality. Therefore, even an international lawyer who felt that the DPRK should have agreed to the special inspection in spite of the use of third party information had to admit that the IAEA
See number 3 and 5 of the resolution, available here: http://iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Resolutions/English/gc39res-17_en.pdf 517 See GOV/2807, paragraph 22, available here: http://iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Documents/English/gc39-17_en.pdf 518 See GOV/2807 above for all above quotes. 519 See chart in Annex 1 of GOV/2863
―breached its safeguards agreement with North Korea by using third party intelligence without Pyongyang‘s prior agreement.‖ 520
The second reason the IAEA action was a breach of the safeguards agreement relates to the fact that the IAEA wanted access to the buildings in Nyongbyon to search for evidence of an undeclared weapons program. There is absolutely nothing in 153-type safeguards agreements that allows for measures to detect undeclared programs.521 Above, it was mentioned how deceptive language was used to make it appear to some that a new agreement had been reached regarding special inspections (―the Board…reaffirmed the Agency‘s rights to undertake special inspections…‖). Similar deceptive language was used in the DG press release of 26 February 1992 522 with respect to allowing access to undeclared sights during a special inspection, even though there was no decision by the Board to do so. That these Board statements reflected no change in Agency‘s rights was recognized by some. A West European IAEA ambassador, for example, remarked that ―we had expectations and now we are rolling back to something which amounts to very little,‖ and a different Western delegate said the statement was little more than ―a gesture to demonstrate that the board is doing something.‖523 In reality, nothing was said at this meeting.
Susan Carmody, “Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 18, 1994 521 See: “*INFCIRC/153 safeguards were+ not designed to detect undeclared nuclear activities,” R. Hooper and J. Cooley, “An IAEA Development Programme for Strengthened and More Cost-Effective Safeguards,” in European Safeguards Research and Development Association, 17th Annual Symposium, Aachen 1995, page 31. See also: “The Agency cannot safeguard materials which have not been declared, or which cannot be found. It cannot become an espionage agency.” Lyn Parker, “International Safeguards Against the Diversion of Nuclear Materials to NonPeaceful Uses,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, Oct. 1978, p.722. See also: “A related problem is that the safeguards implemented pursuant to NPT are applied only to declared nuclear activities, as a consequence of which the inspections cannot detect that nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices are illegally imported from abroad or manufactured on the premises.” in The Utilization of Nuclear Energy and International Law, Vanda Lamm, 1984, p.96. See also: “Without being subjected to the authority of the Security Council the Agency could not have agreed to conduct on-site inspections on undeclared facilities in Iraq without facing objections by its members.” Eric Chauvistre, “The Implications of IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 11. 1992 522 PR 92/12, 26 February 1992 523 The Independent, “Atomic agency told to tighten controls,” 25 February 1992 by Micahel Wise
It was not until the additional protocol was approved by the BOG in May of 1997 that it became legal to search undeclared facilities. Lawyers state the fact repeatedly: ―Until the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997, the IAEA did not have the authority to inspect undeclared facilities.‖524 A similar statement: ―[The Additional Protocol] expanded the IAEA's authority to detect undeclared enrichment and reprocessing activities in a state.525 Also: ―Under INFCIRC/153 the Agency was entitled only to control the proper (i.e., peaceful) use of officially declared nuclear material in nonnuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the new safeguards document, called INFCIRC/540, the IAEA has the authority to assure itself that no undeclared nuclear activities go undetected and safeguarded in NNWS.‖526 Nevertheless, the IAEA tried to claim in the DPRK case that it did have the right to inspect these two undeclared facilities. According to the Vienna Convention on Treaties, any ambiguities in a treaty can be resolved by looking at the negotiating history of the treaty, so let‘s do that. Mohammed Shaker was a member of the Egyptian delegation to the Eighteen Member Disarmament Committee during the NPT negotiations. He states very clearly in his 3volume treatise on the NPT negotiating history that ―the NPT safeguards are not intended to detect hidden nuclear weapons or clandestine production of such weapons.‖527 William C. Foster was the principal negotiator for the US in the NPT negotiations. In a hearing before the Senate, Foster was asked to explain the NPT. In that hearing, Senator Claiborne Pell asked Foster: ―will the [IAEA] inspection be restricted only to the declared peaceful nuclear facilities or will they also apply to the undeclared or clandestine facilities?‖ Mr. Foster replied: ―The IAEA inspection would only be as to declared.‖528 This issue simply cannot be more clear. The IAEA breached
Natasha Bajema and Mary Beth Nikitin, “The Future of International Regimes: Organizations and Practices: Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determining Which States Should Have Access to What Nuclear Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Volume 28, Summer, 2004 525 David S. Jonas, “The New US Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way Out of the Wilderness?” Florida Journal of International Law, Volume 18, August, 2006 526 Erwin Hackel and Gotthard Stein, Tightening the Reins: Towards a Strengthened International Nuclear Safeguards System, 2000, Page 1 527 Shaker, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959 to 1979,” Volume 2, p.710 528 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 2nd session, “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”
the safeguards treaty by asking to inspect these buildings over 4 years before it was legal to do anything remotely close to this. Actually, even under the additional protocol, searching undeclared facilities is limited to performing ―location-specific environmental sampling‖,529 which involves taking air, water, vegetation, soil or smear samples and analyzing them for radioactivity. Even if the DPRK had travelled forward in time and signed the Additional Protocol, the demand to search buildings in an undeclared location would still be illegal. This type of search can only be performed if the state voluntarily agrees to it.
The IAEA, then, breached the safeguards agreement with the DPRK in at least two ways.
Appendix B (Screenshot of Albright letter to the New York Times):
See article 5.c of INFCIRC/540
Appendix C (E-Mail Correspondence Between Albright anf the New York Times)
Correspondence between ISIS President David Albright and the New York Times Re: William J. Broad and David E. Sanger titled, "Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims" which appeared on Sunday, November 13, 2005 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html). 1. ISIS President David Albright's reply to NYT Investigations Editor Matthew Purdy, after Purdy stated the Times would not run a correction, November 17, 2005 2. Purdy on the Times' decision, November 17, 2005 3. Albright's reply to Broad, November 15, 2005
4. Broad's reply to Albright, November 14, 2005 5. Albright's critique of the original article, as sent to the New York Times and the ISIS e-mail list, November 14, 2005 -----Original Message----From: David Albright Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 12:09 PM To: Matt Purdy Subject: RE: Response to your e-mail Mr. Purdy Thank you for your reply. We are disappointed by your response and still believe that Broad and Sanger's story is misleading and should be corrected. Thank you for being willing to help with a letter to the editor. I have not heard anything from the letters section on the letter I already sent them Sunday morning, and I would like to pursue that avenue. I do not view the e-mail exchange between Broad and me as confidential. He sent me his e-mail on his own initiative and did not seek any confidentiality in doing so. He also admitted to sending his e-mail to other people without telling me. I agreed to keep these e-mails confidential only during your deliberation process. I believe it is important to involve more people in this debate. Unfortunately, this is another example where the media has published WMD statements from this administration that are not balanced sufficiently, and the reporters have adopted misleading language from these sources to describe the underlying information. The use of this language serves to exaggerate what is known about a very sensitive issue in an on-going debate. Sincerely David Albright -----Original Message----From: Matt Purdy Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 11:17 AM To: David Albright Cc: Corey Hinderstein; Bill Broad; Subject: Iran Mr. Albright: Following your letters and our conversation we went back and reviewed our research and did some additional reporting. The result is that we believe our story accurately conveyed the facts as related by a substantial range of sources who have access to the intelligence in question. We also believe it reflected skepticism about the authenticity of the intelligence, largely because of
scant details about the origin of the laptop. If you would like to pursue a letter to the editor I will do what I can to facilitate that. If you're amenable, I'd like to give you a call the next time I'm in Washington to see if you have time for a cup of coffee. Thanks, Matt Purdy Investigations Editor -------- Original Message -------Subject: My reply Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2005 09:46:23 -0600 From: David Albright To: Bill Broad, Matt Purdy CC: Corey Hinderstein, New York Times Newsroom Hello Bill I apologize for not returning your phone calls yesterday afternoon, but I thought it was more appropriate to first wait to hear from the NYT editors to whom I sent my letter on Sunday morning. As of early this morning, I had yet to receive anything but a machine-generated reply. In any case, with your e-mail from last night in hand, I am happy to respond. I believe that you have made a serious mistake. You and the NYT should correct it. I felt the need to disseminate my critique publicly and quickly because much of the media produces stories based on NYT articles. Based on previous experience, I expected the NYT editors to respond slowly to my critique. I am sorry you expected me to call you first before I distributed my critique. Although I value our conversations, I judged that this path would not lead to a timely correction or a public debate about your very public article. There is a significant difference between a reentry vehicle and a nuclear warhead, particularly as discussed in these documents. The documents are almost exclusively about a reentry vehicle. It is not as you say that most people refer to everything on the pointy end of the missile as the warhead. In addition, the development of a re-entry vehicle involves internal parts, such as ballast, batteries, interfaces, and other objects. I would also remind you of what Colin Powell said on November 17, 2004 when he first revealed this information to the public. He said: "I'm not talking about a warhead. I'm talking about what one does with a warhead."
He added: "I'm not talking about whether they had the missiles. I'm talking about information that says that they not only had these missiles, but I'm aware of information that suggests they were working hard as to how to put the two together." Therefore, the attempt to distinguish between a warhead and a reentry vehicle goes back to the origin of the reporting on this story. I am frankly surprised that you say that your sources did not distinguish between the two. Your statement is more surprising given earlier media reports that do distinguish between these objects and base these statements on a range of sources familiar with the information. You state that you only used the phrase "nuclear warhead" four times and only in the context of allegations or speculation, but never as a fact. I think you are looking too narrowly for your use or implied use of the term "nuclear warhead." I found two statements where the clear implication is to a nuclear warhead: (1) "In fact, some nations that are deeply skeptical of the intelligence on Iraq-including France and Germany are deeply concerned about what the warhead discovery could portend" and (2) "...the United States has obtained thousands of pages of Iranian documents on warhead development." The use of warhead in this context gives the false impression that the documents focus on the development of the nuclear weapon itself. The four cases you cite serve to magnify the effect. Based on information I have collected on these documents over the last year, the documents do not discuss a nuclear core, the design of high explosives lenses, a neutron initiator, or other key parts of a nuclear weapon. The documents do discuss that inside the reentry vehicle is a spherical object involving high explosives and detonated by electrical bridge wires. That is a far cry from a nuclear warhead design or the development of a nuclear warhead. Although these documents do discuss the best positioning of a heavy spherical object, there is no mention of nuclear fuel, as you speculate. We can assess or infer that the object inside the reentry vehicle is likely a nuclear warhead, but the documents do not discuss its design or even mention that it is a nuclear warhead. This distinction is critical to make to the readers and the public. The first reason is to be accurate about such an important and sensitive issue. I do not have to tell you or your colleagues at the NYT that the media has a serious responsibility to present the evidence as accurately as possible. The media needs to be especially careful not to exaggerate any nuclear threat. I am afraid that your article, whether inadvertently or intentionally, has done just that. The words selected to describe or summarize information do matter. The documents imply that a nuclear weaponization group would have to exist outside this group of missile experts. As you state in your e-mail, the evidence for such a group is very spotty, however. That raises the question I posed earlier, namely did this missile group decide to conduct the studies to develop a more capable delivery capability without being part of a master plan to produce a nuclear weapon. By confounding technical issues involving a missile reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead, your article at best leaves the reader confused about this point. At worst, the reader would make the same erroneous conclusion as you do that that this group would have to be a "rogue element." I am also curious why you did not report on the technical flaws in the work by this group of engineers. Did your sources not tell you about these flaws of this missile group?
In addition, there are questions about the chronology related to this information and to the flight testing of the Shahab 3 in 2004 that had a triconic warhead. The information on the laptop does not appear to contain any information on a triconic reentry vehicle. Yet, the laptop information covers a period of 2001 to 2003. This raises the question whether the triconic warhead was developed with a non-nuclear mission in mind, given Iran's potential adversaries some of whom have regional ABM systems. As you state in your article, the reason to develop a "pointier" reentry vehicle is to increase its accuracy and speed as it approaches the target relative to the more traditionally shaped reentry vehicle. The cost is the development of a warhead small enough to fit down within the nose cone. I am not convinced based on the available evidence that Iran could build such a small warhead anytime soon. In terms of journalistic credit, it is not fair to argue that your colleagues do not deserve credit because you were told by your sources that they made mistakes in their reporting. The WSJ, WP, and AFP broke much new ground on the existence of the computer files, drawings, computer simulations, test results, the source of the information, height of burst, the modifications of the Shahab 3, and the existence of a spherical object inside the reentry vehicle, to name a few. ABC posted the entire unclassified briefing mentioned near the end of your article on its web site in September. By the way, a series of photos of the dummy building at Natanz has been on our web site since early May. Although you have added many details to the story, I found little of major significance in your story that had not previously been reported. Although these earlier stories did not, except in one case, use the term reentry vehicle, they used other equivalent words and the more recent ones deliberately avoided writing that the information was about a nuclear warhead. In that key way, they were more accurate. By the way, I used the term "black box" in the sense of an unknown complicated object, in this case the spherical object inside the reentry vehicle. I checked the WSJ article, and Carla Robbins used the term in the same way. Neither of us used the term literally as you seem to have done. I look forward to your response, and I hope you will now understand the need for a correction. Sincerely David Albright -----Original Message----From: Bill Broad Sent: Monday, November 14, 2005 5:28 PM To: David Albright Subject: your statement David I think you are off the mark in your criticism of our article of Nov 13. I'll address your points in the order in which you raised them.
First, in the story we never said the Iranian studies were for a nuclear warhead design, as you assert. We did, however, quote the Bush administration as claiming that the Iranian studies "showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead," which is also the judgment of many experts we interviewed and quoted. You say it would have been better to call it a "reentry vehicle" instead of a "warhead." In my book, that is a distinction without a difference, though "warhead" is the word normally used by most everyone in journalism when they refer to the pointy end of a military missile. Google defines "reentry vehicle" as "that part of the front section that can survive reentry though the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery." It is beyond me to see how that differs from a warhead. None -not one -- of the sources I spoke with for the article referred to the laptop studies as concerning a "reentry vehicle." In 22 years at the Times, I've used the phrase three times in stories. Of course, missile engineers probably use the word all the time, but that's another story. And using "reentry vehicle" in a narrow engineering sense as the outer layer or carrier of a warhead would be misleading since many of the Iranian studies went to deep, internal parts, such as the sphere of detonators. In the Iran article, we used the phrase "nuclear warhead" four times -- always doing so in the context of allegations or speculation but never as fact: 1) "The Americans...saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead..." 2) "The computer contained studies for crucial features of a nuclear warhead..." 3) "Even if the documents accurately reflect Iran's advances in designing a nuclear warhead..." 4) "...deepened suspicions that it was at work on a nuclear warhead." Setting up a straw man, you raise the issue of the "black box," which we knew about from out reporting but didn't refer to in our story. I'm told it was a telemetry unit for sending back signals on test flights. It seemed to have little to do with the nuclear case so we left it out, having been warned off it by our sources. Instead, we talked about the how studies wrestled with best positioning a heavy ball -- "presumably of nuclear fuel," as we put it in the story -- in the interior of the nosecone. In short, I think we made it very clear that no one has hard evidence that the Iranians are designing a nuclear warhead, only signs and indications. As for giving journalistic credit where credit was due, we tried to do that by citing "reports in the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and other publications." It is inaccurate for you to call these articles more accurate than ours as many contained substantial errors, which is understandable as they were early hits in a developing story. For instance, the Wall Street Journal called the "black box" part of the weapon design -- a point our sources warned us away from. Moreover, as far as I can tell, none of these stories ever referred to a "reentry vehicle" except, in one case, when you were quoted. In your second paragraph you get closer to what I think is bothering you -- the possibility that this work represents rogue elements in the Iranian missile program rather than a state plan. That, I assume, is why you would have preferred the term "reentry vehicle" -- to emphasize the possibility that it came out of a missile group unconnected to the makers of nuclear arms. But we clearly addressed this possibility with our quote from Joe Cirincione of the Carnegie
Endowment, who speculated that the work represented Iranian missile factions rather than state plans. Your final point about warhead size is technical and in my judgment is not worth discussing in any detail. However, it is perhaps worth noting that Iran's nuclear and missile programs have gotten much help from Pakistan, China and North Korea, among others. In sum, we tried hard to be careful and responsible and I am frankly at a loss to understand why you felt moved to send out what I see as a such misleading critique of our article, particularly without talking to me first. I called you several times today on your cell and at your office and have yet to hear back from you but am eager to discuss these issues further. Bill -------- Original Message -------Subject: Albright Responds to NYT Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2005 09:20:27 -0500 (EST) From: ISIS To: [ISIS Mailing List] Following is ISIS President David Albright's response to the article "Relying on Computer, US Seeks to Prove Iran‘s Nuclear Aims" in the November 13, 2005 issue of the New York Times: The November 13, 2005 New York Times article "Relying on Computer, US Seeks to Prove Iran‘s Nuclear Aims" has a deep and misleading flaw. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger repeatedly characterize the contents of computer files as containing information about a nuclear warhead design when the information actually describes a reentry vehicle for a missile. This distinction is not minor, and Broad should understand the difference between the two objects, particularly when the information does not contain any words such as nuclear or nuclear warhead. The "black box" carried by the re-entry vehicle may appear to be a nuclear warhead, but the documents do not state what the warhead is. In addition, much of what Broad and Sanger report has been reported elsewhere, including the important information about "a sphere of detonators meant to ignite conventional explosives"(see Agence France Press article by Michael Adler on October 9, 2005). These earlier and more accurate articles did not confuse a nuclear warhead with a reentry vehicle. By replacing warhead with re-entry vehicle throughout the article, the reasons for a healthy skepticism would also become more understandable. For example, a key question becomes much more clear, namely whether this work was initiated by an Iranian missile team on its own, or whether this work was ordered by Iran‘s political leadership as part of a concerted nuclear weapons effort? Another important question that is sidestepped by the misleading use of warhead in the article is whether Iran can build the relatively small nuclear warhead able to fit into the triconic re-entry vehicle apparent in photos of a 2004 flight test. Based on publicly available photos of the 2004 test launch, the nuclear warhead would require a diameter of about 600 millimeters. Achieving such a diameter would be challenging for Iran. For example, the diameter of the warhead in the design provided to Libya (and perhaps to Iran) by A.Q. Khan was about 900 millimeters. A legitimate question is whether Iran could successfully build such a small nuclear warhead without outside help. Sincerely
David Albright President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Appendix D (Iran Daily Newspaper About Trees in Lavizan)