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Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 9(20) June 2015, Pages: 154-163

ISSN:1991-8178

Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences

Journal home page: www.ajbasweb.com

Evaluation Safety Integrity Level Using Layer of Protection Analysis in Recycle Gas
First Stage Cycle Compressor at PT.Pertamina Persero
1
Silvana D. Costa, 2Justian Pujanto, 3Totok R. Biyanto, 4Ali Musyafa, 5Adi Suprijanto
1,2,3,4
Department of Engineering Physics, 5Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Industrial Technology, Sepuluh Nopember
Institute of Technology , Surabaya , Indonesia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Article history: The objective of this research is to Safety Integrity Level (SIL) using Layer of
Received X X 201X Protection Analysis (LOPA) for Compressor 013K101A. The advantage using this
Received in revised form X method is identifying hazard and providing evaluation Independent Protection Layer
X X 201X (IPL) management for compressor unit refinery IV Cilacap, PT.Pertamina Persero.
Accepted X X 201X HAZOP of compressor is used for identify hazard in Compressor process. Identify every
IPL which prevent hazard at compressor. Determine target mitigated event likelihood
Keywords: (TMEL) and initiating event likelihood (IEL). The comparison of TMEL and IEL will
Please insert Keywords determine target SIL. The result from SIL evaluation using will determine SIL for SIS
which used for recommendation for hazard at compressor process. SIS
Recommendation is done with calculates Probability failure demand (PFD) SIS with
various combinations of sensors and emergency shutdown valves (ESDV) configuration.
Recommendation is the combinations which SIL target which identifies 3 hazards level.
Case 1 needs SIL 2 with PFD value 0.0063. Case 2 got no SIL with PFD value 0.3600;
therefore SIS isn’t needed for condition. Case 3 got no SIL with PFD value 3.6000.
Therefore SIS isn’t needed for Case 3. SIS recommendation for case is PLC logic will
trip emergency shutdown valve with 1oo1 configuration at high 013V104 level using a
high level switch LSH. This SIS can fulfill the requirement of target SIL 2 with PFD
value 0.0087

© 2015 AENSI Publisher All rights reserved.
To Cite This Article: Silvana D. Costa, Justian Pujanto, Totok R. Biyanto, Ali Musyafa, Adi Suprijanto., Evaluation Safety Integrity Level
Using Layer of Protection Analysis in Recycle Gas First Stage Cycle Compressor at PT.Pertamina Persero. Aust. J. Basic & Appl. Sci.,
9(20): 154-163, 2015

INTRODUCTION HAZOP and IPLs (Independent Protection Layer)
data to identify hazard event and protection for risk
Compressors are grouped into two types: reduction. The result from evaluation is target SIL of
centrifugal compressors and reciprocating SIS for each hazard.
compressor. Reciprocating compressors often used to The advantage for this method is hazard
compress the gas in the range of (20-60) kg/cm2. identification and basic rational for IPLs
This compressor has a main component in the form management which out of service. Safety Integrity
of; pistons, connecting rods, piston cylinder, suction Level (SIL) is a level of safety provided by safety
valve, pressure valve, and the crank shaft. This components which forms a SIS. SIL is determined
compressor has work principle where the air from PFD (Probability Failure on Demand) value of
compressor (gas) consists of a piston. The first SIS. SIL is started from the lowest level SIL 1 to
principle works the piston will be drawn to increase highest SIL 4. The SIL value consist SIL 1 with
the volume and pressure. The gas pressure will enter Probability of Failure on Demand Average (PFDavg)
the cylinder through the valve, and then the piston = 0.1-0.01; SIL 2 with (PFDavg) = 0.01-0.001; SIL 3
will compress the gas to the pressure specified. The with (PFDavg) = 0.001-0.0001 and SIL 4 with
high pressure gas will flow through valve pressure. (PFDavg) = 0.0001–0.00001
Cross section reciprocating compressor can be seen
in Figure 1. In the Atmospheric distillation unit MATERIAL AND METHODS
(ADU) process in units of 013 plant Fluid Catalytic
Cracking (FCC) II RU Cilacap refinery, compressors This compressor is used to compress the H2 gas.
used are reciprocating compressor. H2 gas is derived from the first stage product
LOPA method is used to evaluate SIL of separator 013V103 [13]. This .Gas flow in to first
compressor 013K101A process. This method needs stage recycle gas compressor suction drum 013V104
Corresponding Author: Ali Musyafa’, Department of Engineering Physics, Faculty of Industrial Technology, Sepuluh.
Nopember Institute Of Technology,
E-mail: musyafa@ep.its.ac.id, Kampus ITS Keputih, Sukolilo, Surabaya 60111.

Disturbance at λDU: Failure rate dangerous undetected.155 Silvana D. The equation  Capability for each IPL determined by its PFD value ( DU xTi ) 3  TMEL (Target Mitigated Event Likelihood) PFD avg  (3) 4 compared to IEL (Intermediate Event Likelihood). PFDSIS : PFDavgof a SIS. This will determine the PFD of target SIL. 2010). 1: Component of reciprocating compressor This process is used for increasing kerosene PFDavg  (DU xTi) 2 (5) quality. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. Ti : Time interval Therefore a SIL evaluation is needed for compressor PFD of SIS is a calculation from PFD of each 013K101A process. Pages: 154-163 to separate the gas from the liquid with demister. often needed in oil refinery process. Costa et al. Then H2 gas is supplied to the compressor for Compressor is used for increasing the pressure of the compressed up to a certain pressure. et al. System has one channel [4]. These are several configurations with PFD equation of SIS (CCPS. 2010). To meet these Fig. Compressor 013K101A is used to compress Where: H2 gas (Allen-Bradley. The equation TMEL = PFD TMEL IEL = PFD IEL TMEL is target probability hazard to occur. PFDSIS=ΣPFDS+ΣPFDA+ΣPFDL+ ΣPFD PS (6) 2007): 1oo1. 2002): component on demand. The equation PFDPS : power supply from PFDavgof a SIF is. The equation Where: is. System needs 2 output from 2 output for The equation for PFD calculation for PFD of shutdown (CCPS. 2oo2. Ti PFDA : Valve from PFDavgof a SIF PFD   DU x (1) avg PFDS : sensor from PFDavg of a SIF 2 1oo2. The PFD is probability of failure from a system or equation is (ISA.. 2010). IEL is probability hazard to occur after IPLs . A. System needs 2 output from 3 output for Where: shutdown (CCPS. individual component which forms a SIS. System needs one output from three  Initiating likelihood for each hazard channels for shutdown (CCPS. gas. (DU xTi ) 2 PFDavg  (2) Analysis needed for this are: 3  Severity each hazard 1oo3. LOPA is one of method to evaluate SIS. compressor can disturb the treatment process. The equation is: (CCPS. 9(20) June 2015. 2010). needs a compressor is used in oil refinery. High pressure H2 gas is needed for treatment process. target SIL is shown below (Musyafa. Unit 013 FOC II Cilacap refinery process is Pressurized gas with range (20– 60) kg/cm2 is kerosene treatment. 2010). The value is determined from severity level from hazard event. 2013): 2010) PFDSIL = TMEL/IEL (7) PFDavg   xTi DU (4) 2003.System needs one output from two PFDL : logic solver from PFDavgof a SIF channels for shutdown (CCPS.

156 Silvana D. The equation to determine IEL is shown in PFDBPCS = PFD basic process control system Equesiton 8.10-5 per year to three on-site fatalities Identify Impact event description and Initiating Cause according consequence and cause description of HAZOP Table 1. Methodology: IEL = fi x ΣPFDAMD x ΣPFDAR x ΣPFDAMR x This research use HAZOP data and P&ID ΣPFDGPD x ΣPFDBPCS (8) compressor 013K101A.10-5 per year 5 CE More than one and up 1. Costa et al. Calculation of SIL Target using LOPA PFDAR = PFD Alarms and operator response.10-2 per year 2 CB Multiple first aid injuries 3. Method: PFDAMR = PFD Additional Restricted Access PFDGPD= PFD general process design Table 1: HAZOP of Compressor 013K101A b. Severity can be classified using Table 2. . LOPA method is done with several steps: Identify hazard using HAZOP Table 1.10-4 per year multiple serious injuries 4 CD Single on-site fatality 3. Table 2: Target mitigated event Likelihood for safety hazards adapted from Nordhagen (2007) S Severity Level Safety consequence Target mitigated event likelihood 1 CA Single first aid injury 3. severity level must be classified. Initiating Likelihood can be determined using Table 3. Table 1 shows the HAZOP Where: compressor 013K101A. 9(20) June 2015. Pages: 154-163 work.10-3 per year 3 CC Single disabling injury or 3. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. For every consequence at HAZOP. Fi = Initiating Causes Likelihood PFDAMD = PFD Additional mitigation dike a.

19. Combination Sensor 2oo3 with ESDV 1oo3. 17. Combination Sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo2. Combination Sensor 2oo3 with ESDV 2oo3. (ESDV) research shown in Table 5. Combination Sensor 2oo2 with ESDV 2oo2. Combination Sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo3. Costa et al. 12.0 year 0.01 4 Rupture disk 0. 4. Combination Sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 2oo2. 23. 3. combination of configuration of sensor and ESDV .025 facility life Could occur once during 2 4-20 year 12. Combination Sensor 1oo2 with ESDV 2oo2. 9.157 Silvana D.00002. 8. 20. logic solver and.10 6 Bund/dike 0. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. Table 4: Probability Failure of Demand for IPLs No IPL PFD 1 BPCS 0. Combination Sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 2oo3. The PFD value of logic solver used in this research is 0. Combination Sensor 2oo2 with ESDV 1oo1. Combination Sensor 2oo2 with ESDV 1oo3. 16. Recommendation SIS is The result is plotted in 3D graphic. Emergency Shutdown Valve. 22. Combination Sensor 1oo3 with ESDV 1oo2. SIS is needed if target SIL isn’t λDU sensor and λDU ESDV with range 4x10-3 to 10-1 NO SIL. Combination Sensor 1oo3 with ESDV 2oo2.240516. Table 5: Combination of Configuration of sensor and ESDV No. Can be has been identified using safeguard description of used for determines IPL. using graphic of group SIL. Combination Sensor 1oo2 with ESDV 1oo1. The first step is Equation (8) is used for calculate IEL.01 7 Inherently Safe Design 0. Next step is verified with fault tree analysis. Combination Sensor 1oo2 with ESDV 2oo3. 14. Area 1. 13. is used for calculation. 9(20) June 2015. Combination Sensor 2oo3 with ESDV 1oo1. The combinations The result of target calculation can be used for of configuration sensor and ESDV used in this determined sensor. Combination Sensor 1oo3 with ESDV 1oo3. Pages: 154-163 Table 3: Initiation likelihood Probability Failure of Demand Initiation Likelihood Like- li. Combination Sensor 2oo2 with ESDV 2oo3 25. Combination Sensor 2oo2 with ESDV 1oo2. PFDSIS is c. Combination Sensor 1oo2 with ESDV 1oo2. Next don’t reduce hazard risk IPL will be given Table 4. 18. 21. 10. The result of PFD can be using equation (6). Combination Sensor 2oo3 with ESDV 2oo2. Description Probability occurrence in year sample fi hood Not expected to occur during 1 > 20 year 40. 5.01 5 NRV or check valve 0. SIS Recommendation: classified into SIL using standard. 24. And P&ID compressor.10 PFDSIS can be calculated using equation (7). Combination Sensor 1oo3 with ESDV 1oo1. Combination Sensor 2oo3 with ESDV 1oo2. 11.10 3 Relief valve/PSV 0. 7. TMEL can be creating a group SIL according to PFD SIS calculation determined using Table 2.0 year 0. PFD value for IPLs which HAZOP Table 1. 6. Combination Sensor 1oo3 with ESDV 2oo3 The calculation is done using Matlab Software.10 2 Operator response to alarm with response time at least 10 minute 0. Component data determined components recommendation and used for recommendation is shown at Table 5. For PFD sensor and PFD ESDV. Combination Sensor 1oo2 with ESDV 1oo3. 15. Combination Sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo1 2. classified into SIL.083 facility life Determine existing IPLs for every hazard which determined PFD value for each IPL Table 4.

a 013LAH-006 is installed According Figure 2. Costa et al. Initiating cause likelihood case 1 is 0. According Table 5. IEL calculations 1. Compressor 013K101A around 0. According Table 3. Pages: 154-163 Start Collecting data HAZOP and P&ID of compressor 013K101A process Determined hazard event from HAZOP of compressor 013K101A process Determined cause and init iating cause and initiating l ikel ihood of hazard event of compressor 013K101A process Determined existing IPL and PFD IPL of compressor 013K101A process calculate PFD S IS to determined target SIL of compressor 013K101A Process Calculate SIL of exi sting SIS whi ch is installed at compressor 013K101A Make a recommendation S IS according to SIL evaluation of compressor 013K101A process NO SIL of Recommendation SIS achive target SIL? YES end Fig. PFDAR and PFDGPD are 0.001 so the target SIL is SIL 2. PFD case 2 is 0. 2: Compressor 013K101A P&ID for case 1 According Figure 2. hazard high level. Initiating causes likelihood severity level is CD. Result of SIL Evaluation with LOPA Method at is determined using Table 3. Initiating cause likelihood a. Because Existing SIL doesn’t achieved Target SIL 2. PFDAMD are given 1 because they don’t prevent the a recommendation SIS with SIL 2 is needed for case hazard case 1.00444.01 – 0. Using equation (7). HAZOP compressor 013K101A shows 3 case hazards.00628. According Table 1 PFD are determined using Table 3. Initiating cause likelihood is calculation is 0. 013V104 doesn’t have SIS for which design as high level alarm.1.083. P&ID for case 2 is shown at Figure 3. According Table 2. hazard case 2 has severity 0. hazard case 1has Fig. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. 1: Research flowchart RESULTS AND DISCUSSION severity level 4 which listed CD. PFDAMR and. TMEL is 0.00003 as level 3 which listed CC. According Table 2. 9(20) June 2015.158 Silvana D.Using equation (8). Therefore Existing SIL is NO SIL.44. Compressor 013K101A Compressor 013K101A process: P&ID for case 1 is shown at Figure 2. . PFDBPCS.

PFD case 3 is 0. Initiating cause likelihood is calculation is 0. actuator 50 0. Pages: 154-163 Fig. Because PFDAR are given 1 because they don’t prevent the Existing SIL achieved Target SIL. According Table 2. determined using Table 4. IEL calculation is According Table 2. TMEL is 0. PFDAR and temperature.1.16 0. Tabel 6: MTTF and λ of Safety Integrity System components Instrument MTTF (years) λ Source Switch/sensor 60 0. hazard case 3 has severity 0.1.01667 CPPS XV/ESV incl.0003 as level 3 which listed CC. Therefore target SIL for to atmosphere when gas pressure exceed the case 3 is NO SIL.02927 Allen-Bradley b. and pressure. The overall result of calculation is 0. IEL SIS isn’t needed for case 3. Therefore target SIL for case 2 is NO Fig. According Table 5.159 Silvana D.01 and PFDGPD is given 0. 0. 9(20) June 2015. 4: Compressor 013K101A P&ID for case 3 According Figure 4. I/O card (single PLC) 34.02 data Logic incl. Using equation (7). Using equation (8). According Table 5. PFDGPDare given 0. recommendation hazard case 3 PFDAMR using equation (8). Therefore Existing SIL is NO SIL.00. Because paper limitation only several are determined using group SIL. Costa et al. Therefore Existing SIL is NO SIL. hazard case 2. λDUsensor is plotted Y axis and. PFDBPCS. PFDAMD are given 1 because they don’t prevent the recommendation SIS isn’t needed for case 2.0003 as severity level is CC. classification.02000 TR84. PFDBPCS. Using equation (7). PFDAMD is compressor doesn’t have SIS for hazard high given 0. The Group SIL is graphic are shown. discharge compressor 013TAH-040 is installed which design as high 013K101A doesn’t have SIS for hazard high temperature alarm. Because Existing SIL achieved Target SIL.36. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. discharge line determined pressure. λDU ESDV is plotted at X . a 013TI-040 connected with SIL. a pressure relief valve PFD calculation is 3. According Table 3.083.00083. Compressor 013K101A According Table 1 PFD isn’t included in SIL P&ID for case 3 is shown at Figure 4. Initiating causes likelihood severity level is CC. PFD is plotted The configuration for Sensor and ESDV of SIS at Z axis. PFDAMR and. According Table 1 PFD not 013PSV-004A is installed which design to relief gas include in SIL classification. SIS Recommendation: axis. The color meaning in graphic are: represented as 3D graphics. According Figure 3. According Figure 4. 3: Compressor 013K101A P&ID for case 2 According Figure 3.000083.6. TMEL is evaluation SIL is shown at Table 6.

9(20) June 2015. …. This combination needs a sensor and three ESDVs.. 5: PFDSIS combination sensor vote 1oo1 and ESDV 1oo2 Result of Graphic PFDSIS combination Sensor 1oo1with ESDV 1oo3shown at Figure 6..  Color indicates PFD is SIL 4. This Combinationhas84..31% SIL 2. Restricted Access 10 IPL : Independent Protection Layer 11 AD : Additional Mitigations Dike (Bunds)... This Combinationhas79. …..69 % SIL 1 and 20. Pages: 154-163  Color indicates PFD is NO SIL.160 Silvana D.  Color indicates PFD is SIL 2.  Color indicates PFD is SIL 1.…. This combination needs a sensor and two ESDVs. .. ……. ……. Fig.  Color indicates PFD is SIL 3. Result of Graphic PFDSIS combination Sensor 1oo1with ESDV 1oo2 shown at Figure 5. ……. Table 7: SIL Evaluation with LOPA method for compressor 013K101A 1 C : Cause 2 SL : Severity Level 3 IED : Impact event description 4 IC : Initiating cause 5 IL : Initiation cause Likelihood 6 GP : General Process Design 7 BP : Basic Process Control System 8 AR : Alarms and operator response 9 AM : Additional Mitigation.80% SIL 2.20%SIL 1 and 15.….. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. Costa et al.

0200 and 4. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. Costa et al.86% SIL 3. 5n – the number of component used for SIS. Pages: 154-163 Pressure Relief 12 IEL : Intermediate Event Likelihood 13 TM :Target Mitigated Event Likelihood EL 14 PFD : Probability Failure on Demand 15 SIL : Safety Integrity Level Result of Graphic PFDSIS combination Sensor and three ESDVs. According Table 7. 53. Combination has 42.01% SIL 1. This data that will be used for recommendation SIS. 7: PFDSIS combination sensor vote 2oo3 and ESDV 2oo3 c. 6: PFDSIS combinationsensor vote 1oo1 and ESDV 1oo3 Fig. Table 7. Shows the Component 2oo3 with ESDV 2oo3shown at Figure 7. This combination needs three sensors λDU sensor value is 0.161 Silvana D. Overall result for group Safety Integrity Level The result SIL of SIS using component Table 7.13% SIL 2 and. λDU ESDV value is 0. . Fig.0167. Table 8: Overall result group Safety Integrity Level . 9(20) June 2015. is shown at Table 8: And group SIL graphic scan be shown at Table 8.

The proposed shown at Figure 6. 2 fail. 1oo2 2 2oo2 2 1 9. ESDV 1 and ESDV Tree analysis. PFD for each component is calculated. SIS will fail on shows PLC logic will trip ESDVs on high 013V104 demand if one of these following events occurs: level using a high level switch LSH. of component.0200 years-1) SIL No. as the red part. and. Sensor (λDU= 0. 1oo1 1 2oo2 2 1 4. 1oo3 3 1oo3 3 4 13. generate trip signal. 1oo3 3 2oo2 2 1 14. 2oo3 3 2oo2 2 1 24. ESDV 2 and Solenoid 2 fail. fails to generate trip signal. 1oo2 2 2oo3 3 3 10. PFD for each component is calculated. case 1 needs SIS Combination vote sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo2 is with SIL 2. 8: Proposed SIS at Compressor 013K101A case 1 The recommended SIS is verified using Fault ESDV 2 and Solenoid 2 fail. 1oo1 1 1oo2 2 2 3. 1oo1 1 1oo1 1 1 2.The recommended SIS satisfied target SIL fails to detect abnormal high level. fail. 2oo2 2 1oo3 3 1 18.01667 years-1) ESDV(λDU= 0. And Solenoid 1 and Solenoid 2 fail. combination vote sensor SIS can be shown at Figure 8. 9(20) June 2015. Solenoid 1 and Solenoid 2 fail. 1oo2 2 1oo1 1 1 6. shows three combinations that chosen for recommendation SIS. ESDV 1 and Solenoid 1 fail. ESDV 1 and Solenoid 1 Fig. 1oo1 with ESDV 2oo3 shown at Figure 7. 2oo3 3 1oo2 2 3 22. ESDV 1 and ESDV 2 Tree analysis. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. 2oo2 2 1oo1 1 1 16. The result is shown at figure 9. Table 9: SIL of SIS using group SIL Graphic and component data. Pages: 154-163 According SIL Evaluation. They are combination vote combination satisfied SIL 2 and has low requirement sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo2 shown at Figure 5. 2oo3 3 1oo3 3 3 23. This SIS still LSH fails to detect abnormal high level. 1oo1 1 2oo3 3 1 5. 1oo2 2 1oo3 3 3 8.162 Silvana D. 2oo2 2 1oo2 2 1 17. Table 9. PLC fails to shown in Figure 9. 1oo3 3 1oo2 2 3 12. This will reduce the maintenance and combination vote sensor 1oo1 with ESDV 1oo3 installation cost for component SIS. 2oo3 3 1oo1 1 1 21. The result of The result is shown at figure 9. 2oo2 2 2oo3 3 1 20. 2oo2 2 2oo2 2 1 19. 1oo3 3 2oo3 3 3 15. 1oo2 2 1oo2 2 3 7. The reason is this satisfied target SIL. Costa et al. PLC funtion even one of ESDV fail. Vote n5 Vote n 1. SIS will fail on Fault tree analysis Verification shows this SIS has demand if one of these following events occurs: LSH SIL 2. 2oo3 3 2oo3 3 2 25. 1oo3 3 1oo1 1 1 11. 1oo1 1 1oo3 3 2 The recommended SIS is verified using Fault fail. Figure 8. .

P.The Instrumented Protective Systems. Simplified Process Risk Assessment. (AJBAS). "Retrospective Hazop UP. CCPS – Center Stat Eng. ISA – The Instrumentation. Pertamina RU IV Cilacap.36. 2007. A. The result Equations. Hydrodesulphurizer Unit 1300. composed of 1 component LSH with 1oo1 Musyafa. Pertamina. ISA – The Instrumentation. a PLC and. 2015 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences. SIS with SIL 2 is proposed for case 1. 2002. Guard PLC Controller Distillation Unit. Systems. CCPS – Center for Instrumentation.Techniques method at compressor 013K101A shows case 1 has Part 1: Introduction. and Automation Society Chemical Process. and H. part at Figure 8. and Technology Justification .Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation .00874. Layer of protection analysis 4267) Volume 03 Issue 05.163 Silvana D. The proposed SIS is shown in red Boiler in Power Systems Unit 5.00628. 2010. et al.. Musyafa. Rockwell Automation Transactions on Engineering (ATE ISSN: 2221- Lassen. Indonesia. Target PFD . Risk Management REFERENCES Using HAZOP Study Method Base Fault Tree Analysis on Emergency Shutdown System-Vacuum Allen-Bradley.Norwegian University of Science and Instrumented Systems : Design. 2002.. et al. Risk Management and configuration. 2002. Dumai. C. Layer of Protection Analysis: Tahap 3. Pages: 154-163 Fig. Techniques for case 3 is 0. Paiton -Indonesia. Target PFD for case 2 is ISA. 2013. (ISSN: 1991-8178. Operating Manual Gas Oil for Chemical Process Safety. 2010. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) 0. Therefore SIS isn’t need for case Part 2: Determining the SIL of a SIF via Simplified 3. and of SIS recommendation for case 1 shows SIS is Automation Society.2nd Edition” United States of CCPS. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) The safety integrity level evaluation with LOPA .Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation. Guidelines for Safe and Reliable America.36. 9: Fault Tree Analysis SIS Conclusion: ISA. Analysis.IV CCPS.. and Automation Society..A. Cheddie. Therefore SIS with Systems." Pertamina RU IV Cilacap. Cilacap . 9(20) June 2015. Asian Systems. Systems. (LOPA) for determination of safety integrity level Gruhn. PT. Safety (SIL). 2007. Costa et al. 2 ESDV swith 1oo2 Safety System Assessment from Power Plant Steam configurations. This SIS achieved target SIL 2 with Australian journal of Basic and Applied Science PFD 0. target SIL 2 with PFD 0. 2006. SIL 2 is needed for case 2.PQR. 2010. United States of America: ISA . Therefore SIS isn’t need for case 2. A. 2013.

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