William Carroll's misrepresentation of Aquinas' ontology of Creation

Joseph Hannon

Abstract

It has been argued that divine creation should be understood solely in a metaphysical and

theological sense, and not within the context of modern cosmology and biology. In this way, any

conflict between science and religion is avoided. William Carroll is a scholar of Aquinas who has

justified this by citing arguments made by Thomas, specifically that creation does not involve

change which properly falls within the investigative framework of science. It is also claimed that an

eternal universe would not, in fact, alter the relationship between Creator and creatures. Here, I

argue that this is a major distortion of the views of Aquinas to preclude the possibility of divine

agency to effect change within Nature. The ontology of creation formulated is found to be

fundamentally incoherent and inadequate. A more traditional approach to creation is recommended.

Keywords: Theistic naturalism; Creation; Aquinas; Origins; Deism; Metaphysics

Introduction

As part of an effort to counter the criticism of atheistic materialism, which sees science as denying

God space to exist in any meaningful way, many theologians and philosophers of religion have

attempted to interpret divine creation in such a way that it will never contradict or come into

conflict with contemporary scientific understanding. Indeed, they argue that such an interpretation

has always been correct, and is not just liberal revisionism and accommodationism on their part

(Goodenough 2017). Opposing the extremism of the creationists, they maintain that God's act of

creation should be appreciated only within a theological or a philosophical context (Gunton 1997).

“Theistic naturalism” has described been described by Knight (2013) as, “an approach to divine

action in which theistic belief is upheld but descriptions of events that invoke divine interference

with the world are rejected.” Some have suggested that theistic naturalism is really much more

consonant with the principles of deism and a strictly non-interventionist God (Harbin 1997).

Underpinning this paradigm is the pragmatic acceptance that “methodological naturalism”, which

science uses as a procedural framework to explain all observed phenomena, works well (Dawes

2011; Smith 2017). William Carroll, a distinguished research fellow of theology at the University of

Oxford, is a notable advocate of this approach. He focuses on the life and work of the medieval

Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas, and, in particular, the meaning of creation which is fundamental

to the interface of theology and science. Carroll's interpretation of Aquinas' core theology and

philosophical outlook, drawn mainly from his most outstanding compendium, Summa Theologiae,

comprises the basis of his ontology of divine creation which seeks to align Thomism with

naturalism. Carroll (2011) has defined it as “the activity by which God causes things to be” rather

than as the outcome of this activity, which he calls “the created order”. This is in contrast to the

general meaning of creation which refers to both the activity and its outcome. God, he claims, is the

uncaused primal cause, prima causa radicalis, through which all other secondary causes subsist.
Creation, as Caroll defines it (2012), “is the radical causing of the whole existence of whatever

exists”. In this way, natural causes and events in the world ultimately have God as their cause by

virtue of the fact that they depend on God for their being. His argument is based on that of Aquinas

who explained that, “To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things.” (ST

I:45:6). As we shall learn, this is quite complicated. Creation is also ongoing; if God were to cease

his creative act, all would completely cease to exist. This is the doctrine of conservation (Feser

2007) that, citing Aquinas in De Potentia Dei (5:1:2), he maintains as the continuation of creation.

Carroll (2008) assumes that the proper meaning of creation preserves the autonomy of the natural

order because God, as the ultimate cause, allows all other causal agents to act with freedom. As a

consequence, the universe is able to evolve in its own direction. This definition, however, prevents

God from interacting with other causes which properly fall within the domain of science. Were this

not the case, God would become a contingent agent that was part of the cause-effect chain of the

universe rather than its supreme author. Creation, as properly understood, is thus the complete and

independent causing of all that which exists rather than any partial or complementary explanation.

Creation versus Change

Central to the concept of creation in Aquinas' philosophy, argues Carroll, is that it does not mean

change in any way. He cites Aquinas stating that, “creatio non est mutatio” (ST I:45:2). Carroll

(2013) uses these words to distinguish between the metaphysical realm of divine action and the

physical realm of change and changing things, which falls within the study of the natural sciences:

Ironically, science is itself based on physical laws and constants they do not change. He sees the

failure to understand this point as a main cause of confusion in the discourse of science and religion.

Thomas was himself heavily influenced by Aristotle, chiefly his philosophy of causality, such as his
division of efficient and material causes, and the difference between actuality and potentiality

(O'Connor 1967). He was also mindful of Hellenistic thinking, particularly the school of Stoicism,

which considered the material of the universe to be eternal and that, as a principle of both logic and

physics, ex nihilo nihil fit. Baldner and Carroll (1997) correctly infer that Aquinas argued that

“creation is not a change” in defense of the position of creatio ex nihilo. For Aquinas, “Creation is

not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same

something should be different now from what it was previously.” (ST I:45:2) The originality of

creation is that God created without using any pre-existing matter. Neither does God transmute

“nothing” into something”, which would involve change, but rather the whole substance of a thing

is produced. In creatio ex nihilo, God is the sole efficient cause but there is no material cause at all.

An important distinction is made by Carroll (2016a) between creation in the ordinary human sense

of the meaning of the word and creation by divine action. He argues that humans create a whole

variety of things by reworking existing stuff. “These types of making or creating are radically

different from what to create means when one refers to God.....Creation is the ultimate causing by

God, the Creator, of the very existence of all the features of the universe.” The Latin word creatio,

from the verb creare, properly means to “beget” or bring into existence. Fabricatio, on the other

hand, refers to “making” as is commonly understood in everyday life. However, on the subject of

change, Aquinas is decidedly equivocal as he goes on to explain that, "To make and to be made are

more suitable expressions here than to change and to be changed, because they import a relation of

cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.” (ST I:45:3)

Creatio ex nihilo, as properly understood, therefore means that God created all things with nothing

other than his own omnipotence. This is different from the idea that the created world is an

emanation of God's essence that has since become separated from him (Armstrong 1937). Rather, as

Col 1:16 indicates, creation represents the manifestation of the glory of God's essence in its fullness
and entirety. A manifestation of something, however, is not equivalent to its essence. It is, instead, a

reflection or representation of all of the qualities and potential that are inherent and innate within it.

We can see, therefore, why Thomas Aquinas is insistent that creatio ex nihilo does not entail change

per se. If it did, then the immutable Creator himself must have changed in the act of creating. “To

create is to make something from nothing” (ST I:45:5) so he writes, and compares and contrasts this

with a carpenter who uses wood to make an artefact but does not make the wood itself. Carroll is

reticent about whether creatio ex nihilo means that God actually produced anything material. More

likely, he thinks that all that what God did was to provide the necessary cause that allows anything

to exist at all. What Aquinas was not doing, however, was insisting that creation was limited to a

metaphysical explanation as to why anything existed at all – the crux of Carroll's argument. It is just

that, in this instance, he is referring specifically to the making of the actual physical substance that

the whole of the universe consists of. He explains that, “God created all things together so far as

regards their substance in some measure formless” (ST I:74:3). This is the primordial “formless

matter”, as he calls it, which God brought into existence and from which all was made (Lang 1998).

In the very same passage, he qualifies that this was just the first stage in creation (prima creatio):

“But He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in

distinction and adornment. Hence the word 'creation' is significant.” Thomas, thus, believes that

God's creative acts continued after this initial production, and that he subsequently produced change

in all of what he created as part of his opus distinctionis and opus ornatus. This completely detracts

from Carroll's (2011) assertion that, “creation is not a transforming of formless material into the

structure of the world.” Only in so far as creation from nothing is concerned is this position correct.

Aquinas may not use these following two terms, as I will here, but creatio ex nihilo can be regarded

as creatio sensu stricto, whereas the fashioning of the material, fabricatio ex materia, into new

forms and adornments (like stars, planets, plants, animals), can be regarded as creatio sensu lato. In
a discussion on whether God ceased working on the seventh day in Genesis, Aquinas remarks that

God is, in fact, continually performing new work: “The work of the Incarnation was a new work, of

which it is said (Jer 31:22): 'The Lord has created a new thing upon the earth.' Miracles also are new

works, of which it is said (Eccles 36:6): 'Renew your signs, and work new miracles.'” (ST I:73:2)

As such, taking Aquinas' specific treatment of creatio ex nihilo in isolation to everything else that

he discusses, and turning this into a sweeping philosophical and theological point that God's causal

agency does not effect change in the world, is a gross misinterpretation of his ontology of creation.

Origins, not Beginnings?

One of Carroll's most strident points is that creation is not an “event” but rather an act or expression

of God's goodness (Carroll 1999). Creation is, thus, predicated firmly on a moral and philosophical

foundation rather than an historical or scientific one. All created beings have their origin in God, but

the question as to whether there ever was a temporal beginning to creation is an entirely moot point

in his view. Irrespective of whether the universe is past eternal or finite in duration, all things

depend entirely on the uncaused divine cause (Carroll 1998). Likewise, Howe (2003) agrees that,

according to Aquinas, “the notion that God created the world is a claim about a certain ontological

relationship that exists between God and his creatures.” This is certainly a valid enough theological

position, and Augustine in The Confessions (11:10) is keen to stress that God's will to create must

have been co-eternal with his essence or else something in God would have changed. However, an

eternal will to create in no way means there must necessarily be an eternally existing created order.

Kragh (2017) and Kerr (2012) also note that Aquinas in De Aeternitate Mundi states that the

antecedence of the Creator to his creatures is, “not a priority in time or of duration, such as that

what did not exist before does exist later, but a priority of nature” (DAM 7). The corollary to the act

of creation is the contingency of all creatures. However, Aquinas is not here claiming that the

universe might not actually have a temporal beginning, even as a metaphysical possibility. What he
is adamant to point out is that there was never first nothing and then something afterwards; as

Augustine does in The Confessions (12:33), he believed the beginning of the world marked the start

of time itself. Hence, the notion of any possible priority in a temporal sense is totally illogical since

there was never ever a “moment” when the Creator existed but the created order did not. Moreover,

if there were always some material in existence, this would make a “creation from nothing” absurd.

Rejecting the scientific and philosophical proposition that existence may itself be just “a brute fact”,

Carroll (2016a) fails to explain why an eternally existing universe would have to depend on God as

the cause for its existence. Indeed, the reason why it can be argued God does not need a cause to

exist is because he has always existed. But if the universe has also, then it becomes a special

pleading on his part that it requires a cause with its origin in God. Rather, an eternal God and an

eternal physical universe would be causally independent of each other, existing in parallel. Carroll

(2016a) postulates that “Being itself needs a cause”; Aquinas argues for the aseity of God, namely

that “the essence of God is existence itself” (ST: I:4:3). But if existence requires a cause then should

not God, as the source of all existence, need a cause as a result? What Aquinas actually means,

however, is that all existing things partake of God's essential existence that is itself totally uncaused.

Steadfastly maintaining that it doesn't matter to theology what cosmology decides is the best

explanation for the history of the universe and nature of reality, Carroll (1999) claims that any

theory entailing change has nothing to do with creation. This includes the Big Bang theory in which

all that materially exists was created from seemingly nothing approximately 13.77 billion years ago.

Craig (1992) and other theists have argued it can be used as evidence for an absolute beginning to

the universe and supernatural intervention in as much as God is initiator of the Big Bang. With

some justification here, Carroll cautions that the Big Bang should not be seen as an act of creation

as it may not actually represent the beginning of the natural order; he notes that some cosmologists

speculate that there may have been some pre-Bang “quantum vacuum”, or that the Big Bang was

simply the recycling of already existing materials as part of an endless process of similar events.
Devoting a considerable part of his intellectual efforts to exploring cosmic origins, Carroll (1998)

appears determined to show that none of the current scientific models could ever threaten creation

as a theological paradigm which, “accounts for the existence of things, not for changes in things”.

For Carroll (2012), “We do not get closer to creation by getting closer to the Big Bang” because

“creation is not within the explanatory domain of cosmology; it is a subject for metaphysics and

theology.” However, if the Big Bang does represent the moment at which matter, energy, space and

time were all brought into existence, then it is hard to see why creation both in a general and

physical sense, and in the theological or metaphysical sense of the “radical causing to exist”, need

be so different. This is not to suggest, of course, that creation can be contained and condensed into a

single moment. But by the logic of Carroll's own ontological definition of creation, at the moment

of the Big Bang we would be closer at least to the physical manifesting of this causation even

though the metaphysical act of creation endures as much to the present as it did 14 billion years ago.

Many theologians, though certainly not most, appear very unwilling to countenance any inferred

connection between theology and cosmology, treating them as entirely different approaches to a

knowledge of reality. Creation is seen mainly as a powerful metaphor of divine grace even though it

is admitted that without creation there would be no science. But if creation really is the ultimate

cause of all that exists, and science is a method of enquiry into all that can be observed, then it is

difficult to see why such a dichotomy is needed even on procedural grounds. Clearly, empirical

evidence does have a consequential bearing on theological claims about creation because

epistemological practices can lead to an understanding of ontology. Likewise, creation as the cause

for all of existence should be of interest to science, however ineffable it may be, since it is

continually seeking answers to the most profound questions about the existential nature of reality.

Although he only scantily mentions it, preferring to focus on biological evolution, the origin of life

– at least in a physical sense - does have a definite beginning. There was a time on earth when there
were no living organisms, only non-living chemicals, and a time subsequent to this when some of

those chemicals had become constituents of a living cell. The origin of life is one of those seminal

moments in earth's history that have never been repeated. The emergence of organic life from non-

living chemicals has only occurred once even though, from a scientific perspective, the conditions

of the early earth may have been conducive to it. It is, thus, an exceptional historical event, not a

scientifically observed and reproducible process. It is also a rare example of where supernatural

intervention does at least appear plausible due to the lack of a naturalistic explanation (Rice 2010).

Indeed, Charles Darwin, the founding father of the theory of evolution by natural selection, wrote in

a later edition of The Origin of Species (1859) that, “There is grandeur in this view of life, with its

several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one.” In

part, this is a play on Gen 2:7 where God breathes life into Adam to make him become a living soul.

The dogmatic position that God, as prima causa radicalis, creates but does not produce any change,

necessitates that the first living organisms must have been produced exclusively by natural causes.

Despite its importance as the start of an evolutionary journey leading to human existence, the origin

of life has nothing to do with any divine plan. In a swipe at “intelligent design” teleology, Carroll

(2016b) denies that God is a master craftsman, as conceived of by Paley (1809), who imposes order

and design, which falls in principle solely within the explanatory purview of natural mechanisms.

God does not need to compete with or supplement any other causes that he has brought into being.

However, even if we do allow for some divine guidance, God need not “compete” with any natural

mechanisms because ordinary causes may have themselves been insufficient to account for the

generation of life. Rather, God may have acted as the extra-ordinary and over-arching providential

cause, giving direction to a series of ordinary causes that were themselves completely natural. But

without the necessary activity of the former, the originating process of life would never have been

realized. This is more than just a case of “supplementing”, and it in no way detracts from origins of

life research because physical causes were always involved in this process. As Worthing (2010)
remarks, “it is entirely possible for a special act of providence that intervenes in human or natural

history to take place without violating any laws of nature.” The exact modality of any theistic

causation is not the focus here, but it is thought to be viable, at least in principle (Peacocke 1990).

Indeed, in Summa Contra Gentiles (3:99), Aquinas explicitly mentions the possibility that God can

act in the world where natural forces are unable to bring about extremely improbable changes:

“Divine power can sometimes produce an effect, without prejudice to its providence, apart from the

order implanted in natural things by God.” Carroll (2011), however, scoffs at the idea of God as

causa supera inter alia, insisting that physical necessity and the random spontaneity present within

the natural order is sufficient to produce all of the changes that confer order and design in the world.

This is, of course, an entirely naturalist perspective but it is not, as he likes to claim, a Thomist one.

The origination of the universe and of life, both events which scientists themselves commonly refer

to as “creation”, albeit in a naturalistic sense, are apparently not related to the activity of creation as

delineated within a “Thomist” framework whereby creation is not about physical change, but about

the fundamental causal relationship between an immanent Creator and his creatures. As such, these

events are no more acts of “creation” than the reaction of oxygen with hydrogen to make water!

This extreme naturalism precludes any possibility that God can causally act to effect change in the

material world. The only thing that God can do is act to prevent everything from becoming nothing.

Scripture and Doctrine

Regarding the applicability of scripture to an understanding of creation, Carroll (2011) maintains

that the Bible itself does not consist of a list of theological propositions and so its interpretation,

particularly the six day account of creation in Genesis, should be treated cautiously so as not clash

with scientific knowledge. He notes the fact that Augustine in Book 13 of The Confessions provides

a fulfilling allegorical interpretation of the six days of creation. In this way, he conveniently glosses
over scripture, although he does dwell upon Gen 1:1, remarking that the meaning of the Hebrew

word, bara, which is always translated as creavit, is not universally agreed upon by exegetes.

Accordingly, there is ambiguity if it really refers to creatio ex nihilo. This much is true, but no

scholar has ever proposed it means to “radically cause to exist” either. Bara is also distinct from the

word asah used later in Genesis 1 and 2 to refer to the common act of “making”. Asah is also found

in Job 9:9 and Amos 5:8 when referring to God's forming of the Pleiades and Orion constellations.

Conversely, Koons and Gage (2013) insist that Aquinas treats the Genesis narrative as factual,

having both exoteric and esoteric meanings: Thomas believed Adam was made from the “slime of

the earth” and that Eve was formed from his rib (ST I.92.4). Chaberek (2017) also concludes that

Aquinas did not think that any secondary (natural) causes could, even in principle, have been

responsible for the generation of all living species, including mankind. Although from our

contemporary view such creative acts may be interpreted as “miraculous”, Thomas likely regarded

them as just a case of fabrication using existing materials. Human creation, after all, works with

physical matter and causes to produce effects. It never resorts to anything “magical” or “unnatural”.

Maurer (2004) and Tabaczek (2015), however, see a consistency between the secondary causes of

Thomism and those of Darwinism even though Aquinas never assumes or mentions evolution at all.

The doctrines of the Church, however, may serve as a better formative guide since they are the

result of the reflections of Christians over the centuries both to scripture and to its interpretation in

light of other sources of knowledge and revelation. The fourth Lateran council, in particular, is

frequently cited as it refers to creation in terms of God's production of all things corporeal and

spiritual, but not the six days of Gen 1. This doctrine, however, was developed to state the fact of

creation rather than the exact manner it assumed with all of the minutia included. Saliently, Carroll

is content to examine this but not the doctrine of the Incarnation, first formulated by the Nicene

council (Fergusson 2001), in any discussion about creation. The Incarnation is itself regarded as an
act of creation in so far as the divine Word of God became flesh (Jn 1:14), a very consequential

change in the world. As Clark and Johnson (2015) explain, “The creative act of the Holy Spirit in

the birth of Christ was not a creation from nothing, but a creation from the virgin womb of Mary.”

Creatio in utero, however, is not limited to the personage of Jesus Christ. In the Old Testament,

several verses (Job 31:15 ; Ps 139:13; Isa 44:2; Jer 1:5) all speak of God forming the foetus in the

womb of its mother (Raby 2018). But unlike with the origin of life, or the Incarnation of Christ, this

is a regular and natural process even if ontogeny, as it is scientifically known as, is still poorly

understood and for many people a genuinely marvellous process. Irrespective, however, of whether

any special action is required to explain it, or if God just superintends over a natural process, as

exegetes prefer, ontogeny is really a form of creation in the broad sense of the meaning of the term.

Moreover, just as God is responsible for generating new bodies, Aquinas asserts that, “God creates

daily new souls.” (ST I:73:2). This is a markedly different form of creatio continua compared to

Carroll's understanding whereby God sustains the universe with his enduring act of creation. It also

shows that Thomas accepts creationism over traducianism in accordance with Catholic catechecism.

For all of Carroll's focus on cosmology, and the scientific baggage associated with it, the creation of

humans, as reflected in God's constant production of souls and bodies, is the most manifest example

of divine activity. In this sense, God is, thus, “Creator of body and soul”, not in a metaphysical or

metaphorical way, but in a quintessentially physical and real manner. This, I propose, is closer to the

meaning of “creation” as the Church fathers originally intended to be the basis of all theistic belief.

Conclusion

It has been declared that creation is not a cosmological or historical event but instead the ongoing

act of divine beneficence. But the God of this theology is a remote Atlas-like figure, keeping all that

exists in place, only passively watching as everything unfolds. God exists but he does nothing other

than, in some abstract metaphysical sense, cause everything to exist. This is similar in concept to
the “One” of Neo-Platonism through whose supra-existence all things exist. But this is not the

dynamic God of the Abrahamic religions who is not just omnipotent but also engages and interacts

with the world that he has created. Such a deity is merely a static ontological factor, a power supply

source that is necessary only if we cannot accept that existence itself is a “brute fact” that does not

require any explanation. However, many scientists might be inclined to think it is just that,

rendering any “cause for existence” superfluous. They almost certainly would reject Carroll's view

that, were it not for God's continuing activity, all would cease to exist. The first law of

thermodynamics, regarding the conservation of energy, is sufficient to reject this fragile contention.

Creation is, thus, along with God, liable to become merely a theological and metaphysical construct.

This is definitely not the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas whose writings, as we have seen, has been

distorted to advance a false distinction between the act of creation and natural process. The

insistence that creation can never involve change, and that all change within the world must be

natural in origin, much of the Christian creed is voided. For example, the belief that God raised his

Son from the dead by his creative power (Acts 2:24) becomes untenable unless we admit special

action. Even worse, God would have no way of ensuring that mankind, whom Christ saved, ever

evolved. What seems as a useful and simple solution becomes self-defeating and self-contradicting.

Many naturalists will, no doubt, see the dichotomy between theology and the natural sciences as

attractive and worth preserving since it allows them to smoothly co-exist and even complement

each other. However, it only prevents conflict by completely isolating the two from each other. That

does not make science and religion any more compatible or amenable. It is the equivalent of a

marriage counsellor advising a couple to divorce so they don't ever run the risk of being at odds

with one another - the use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Of course, disagreement between any

two disciplines is perfectly normal, and it would be extremely unusual for any one set of beliefs to

be in perfect harmony with another set of beliefs or facts. There is no need to minimise any

differences but, instead, to appreciate them. Moreover, scientific observations, assumptions and
hypotheses are liable to be overturned by future research in a way in which logic and fundamental

truths about God are not. Therefore, just as science is the study of physical change, it is also itself

changing. The science of tomorrow may be far more congruent with religious belief than of today.

Retreating to the safety of higher ground in the face of the deluge of atheistic materialism is an act

of intellectual capitulation rather than prudence. In such a theology of creation, we have the

ultimate retreat since divine agency is banished to an obscure place where science can never touch

it. In doing so, “scientism”, not just naturalism, has prevailed. Theologians, at least those who work

within a theistic framework, should be prepared to form a cogent alternative paradigm to confront

ontological materialism rather than meekly find accommodation with it. Examining the operational

viability of theistic causation, as a way in which God can effect change in Nature but not alter any

physical laws, is more productive than one in which God is simply the reason why anything exists.

Unless and until this happens, there will be those who continue to obfuscate and to reject the real

possibility of God's agency within the created order, perhaps because they are not inclined to do the

work required to explain it. I will freely admit to having been uncompromisingly hard on Carroll

throughout. This it is not intended as an excoriation against him personally, or a judgement on his

ability and knowledge as a scholar which is outstanding. It is a critique, rather, of the philosophical

choices he has made, and the way in which he has misrepresented the views of Thomas Aquinas to

suit his own agenda. It is the sincere hope of this author that he will re-evaluate them in response.

Abbreviations Used

ST = Summa Theologiae/Theologica
DAM = De Aeternitate Mundi
Gen = Genesis
Isa = Isaiah
Jer = Jeremaiah
Ps = Pslams
Eccles = Ecclesiastes
Jn = John
Col = Colossians
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