JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE V CA & PEOPLE G.R. NO.

189122
March 17, 2010 CORONA, J.

SUMMARY: Jose Antonion Leviste was charged with homicide. He appealed with the CA regarding
the conviction. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for bail reasoning his health and age.
Leviste petitioned that bail must be granted if the circumstances in Rule 114, Sec. 5 of the Rules
of Court are complied. The SC reiterates that bail is a matter of judicial discretion. If none
of the circumstances are present as mentioned in the Rules of Court, the court still has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. By denying Leviste's bail, it is not an abuse of
discretion.

HOW THE CASE REACHED SC: Rule 65 petition, alleging there was grave abuse of
discretion (GAOD) in the CA Decision and Resolution denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on his petition for bail.

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course
of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER: Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six
years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

WON the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. – NO. “Discretionary” implies
that it is left to the sound decision of the court.

Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be
discretionary.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk
of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances)
not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied
even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.

In the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines,
it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any
of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish
whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving
the application for bail pending appeal and

(2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. On
the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s
stringent discretion requi res that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination
of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny
or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.

DISPOSITIVE: No GAOD. Denial of bail even if the circumstances/ conditions under Rule 115,
Sec 5, Par 3 are absent does not constitute GAOD. CA’s judgment AFFIRMED. Bail denied.