FIRST DIVISION

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts

On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The
trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.

On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest
Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of
the trees to be cut.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees
under the following terms and conditions:

2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;

3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an
appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same
is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall
be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the
planted seedlings;

4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and

5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and
regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
 This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon
as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio
Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without
proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from
CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago)
and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab),
who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12
were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of
the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut without permit
was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.

An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner,
Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or
permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total
volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00
bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at
Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the
permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession
of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit
for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.

Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the
permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were
rotten.

Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners
instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He
stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting
down the trees in petitioners presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his
superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the
cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He
claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago
were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR,
MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government
in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest charges
on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the costs.

The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.

On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS
are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their
provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper
receipt therefor.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial
court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.

Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto
Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto
Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to
supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he
possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had
control over their acts. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder
action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The
Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit,
while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which
were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that
the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted
Santiago because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

 The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of
PD 705.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts
and not questions of law. We do not agree.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[10] For questions to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.[12]

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal

documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was
not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD
705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for
repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused
were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than
what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if
he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his
acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a
partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of
the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of
the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.
!
! !
 FIRST&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%152160.%January%13,%2004]%

VIRGILIO%BON,%petitioner,%vs.%PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%respondent.%

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
PANGANIBAN,%J.:%

Testimony&of&what&one&heard&a&party&say&is&not&necessarily&hearsay.&It&is&admissible&in&evidence,&
not&to&show&that&the&statement&was&true,&but&that&it&was&in&fact&made.&If&credible,&it&may&form&part&of&the&
circumstantial&evidence&necessary&to&convict&the&accused.&

The%Case%

Before& us& is& a& Petition& for& Review[1]&under& Rule& 45& of& the& Rules& of& Court,& seeking& to& nullify& the&
August&22,&2001&Decision[2]&and&the&February&15,&2002&Resolution[3]&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&(CA)&in&CA&
Q&GR&CR&No.&15673.&The&dispositive&part&of&the&assailed&Decision&reads&as&follows:&

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen
(14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre,
Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED.[4]

The&assailed&Resolution,&on&the&other&hand,&denied&petitioners&Motion&for&Reconsideration.&

The%Antecedents%

The&antecedents&are&summarized&by&the&CA&as&follows:&

[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and
one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00,
without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained
from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon
entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution
presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian
Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand,
presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.

The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:

Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel
Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-
Mendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and]
sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the
report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in
turn wrote a letter to one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian
Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four
(4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land,
Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that
sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.;
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of
Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his
estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x
x.

In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:

All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He said]
that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the
purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.

Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as
such] by Teresitas father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [Dangalan-
Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural
Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees
in the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed
by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his
complaint.

Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the
lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him.In a drinking
spree, he happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.

On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro
Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision,
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA].[5]

In&their&appeal&to&the&CA,&petitioner&and&Jeniebre&questioned&the&prosecution&witnesses&credibility&
and&the&sufficiency&of&the&evidence&proving&their&guilt.&

Ruling%of%the%Court%of%Appeals%

The& CA& sustained& the& trial& courts& assessment& of& the& credibility& of& Prosecution& Witnesses& Julian&
Lascano&and&Manuel&Dangalan.&Both&testified&that&petitioner&had&admitted&to&having&ordered&the&cutting&
of&trees&on&Teresita&DangalanQMendozas&land.&
Furthermore,&the&appellate&court&held&that&despite&the&absence&of&direct&evidence&in&this&case,&the&
circumstantial& evidence& was& sufficient& to& convict& petitioner.&It& ruled& that& the& requirements& for& the&
sufficiency&of&the&latter&type&of&evidence&under&Section&4&of&Rule&133[6]&of&the&Rules&of&Court&were&amply&
satisfied& by& the& following& established& facts:& 1)& in& the& presence& of& Dangalan,& Lascano& and& Natividad&
Legaspi,&petitioner&admitted&that&he&had&ordered&the&cutting&of&the&trees\&2)&on&February&12,&1990,&he&
and&his&son&Rosalio&went&to&DangalanQMendoza,&demanding&that&she&pay&the&value&of&the&trees&cut\&
and&3)&on&February&13,&1990,&petitioner&asked&her&to&forgive&him&for&cutting&the&trees.&
The& CA& held,& however,& that& the& same& circumstances& did& not& support& the& conviction& of&
Jeniebre.&Aside& from& the& testimony& of& Oscar& Narvaez& that& Jeniebre& hired& him& to& cut& the& trees& into&
flitches,& no& other& evidence& was& presented& to& show& the& latters& participation& in& the& offense&
charged.&Moreover,&the&appellate&court&held&that&the&res$inter$alios$acta$rule&under&Section&28&of&Rule&
130[7]&of&the&Rules&of&Court&would&be&violated&by&binding&Jeniebre&to&petitioners&admission,&which&did&
not&constitute&any&of&the&exceptions[8]&to&this&provision.&It&thus&acquitted&him.&
As& to& petitioner,& the& CA& modified& the& penalty& imposed,& pursuant& to& Section& 68& of& the& Revised&
Forestry&Code&as&amended,&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code,&and&Section&1&of&the&
Indeterminate&Sentence&Law.&
Hence,&this&Petition.[9]&

Issues%
 Petitioner&submits&the&following&issues&for&our&consideration:&
I%

Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in
evidence against him.

II%

Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or
media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if
voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his
fault if they do not (U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).

III%

Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his
guilt to them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are
being quoted in media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In other words, how much probity should
we give a lying witness?

IV%

Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses,
[whether or not] x x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?[10]

Simply&put,&the&points&challenged&by&petitioner&are&as&follows:&1)&the&admissibility&of&his&purported&
extrajudicial&admission&of&the&allegation,&testified&to&by&the&prosecution&witnesses,&that&he&had&ordered&
the&cutting&of&the&trees\&and&2)&the&credibility&and&the&sufficiency&of&the&testimonies&of&those&witnesses.&

The%Courts%Ruling%

The&Petition&has&no&merit.&

First%Issue:%
Admissibility3of3the3Extrajudicial3Admission%

At&the&outset,&it&must&be&emphasized&that&the&present&Petition&is&grounded&on&Rule&45&of&the&Rules&
of&Court.&Under&Section&1&thereof,&only&questions&of&law&which&must&be&distinctly&set&forth&may&be&raised.&
A&reading&of&the&pleadings&reveals&that&petitioner&actually&raised&questions&of&fact&QQ&the&credibility&of&the&
prosecution&witnesses&and&the&sufficiency&of&the&evidence&against&him.&Nonetheless,&this&Court,&in&the&
exercise&of&its&sound&discretion&and&after&taking&into&account&the&attendant&circumstances,&opts&to&take&
cognizance& of& and& decide& the& factual& issues& raised& in& the& Petition,& in& the& interest& of& the& proper&
administration&of&justice.[11]&
In&the&main,&petitioner&contends&that&Lascanos&and&Dangalans&separate&testimonies[12]&regarding&
his& alleged& extrajudicial& admission& constitute& hearsay& evidence& and& are,& therefore,& inadmissible.&He&
also&argues&that&his&supposed&admission&should&not&have&been&admitted,&because&it&had&been&taken&
without&the&assistance&of&counsel&at&a&time&when&he&was&already&regarded&as&a&suspect.&
We&disagree.&
Section&36&of&Rule&130&of&the&Rules&of&Court&states&the&rule&on&hearsay&evidence&as&follows:&

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Under&the&above&rule,&any&evidence&QQ&whether&oral&or&documentary&QQ&is&hearsay&if&its&probative&
value&is&not&based&on&the&personal&knowledge&of&the&witness,&but&on&that&of&some&other&person&who&is&
not& on& the& witness& stand.[13]&Hence,& information& that& is& relayed& to& the& former& by& the& latter& before& it&
reaches&the&court&is&considered&hearsay.[14]&
In& the& instant& case,& Lascano& and& Dangalan& testified& that& on& February& 12,& 1990,& they& had& heard&
petitioner&admit&to&having&ordered&the&cutting&of&the&trees.&Their&testimonies&cannot&be&considered&as&
hearsay&for&three&reasons.&First,&they&were&indisputably&present&and&within&hearing&distance&when&he&
allegedly&made&the&admission.&Therefore,&they&testified&to&a&matter&of&fact&that&had&been&derived&from&
their&own&perception.&
Second,&what&was&sought&to&be&admitted&as&evidence&was&the&fact&that&the&utterance&was&actually&
made&by&petitioner,&not&necessarily&that&the&matters&stated&therein&were&true.&On&this&basis,&a&statement&
attributed&to&a&person&who&is&not&on&the&witness&stand&is&admissible\&it&is&not&covered&by&the&hearsay&
rule.[15]&Gotesco$Investment$Corporation$v.$Chatto[16]&ruled&that&evidence&regarding&the&making&of&such&
statement&is&not&secondary&but&primary,&because&the&statement&itself&may&constitute&a&fact&in&issue&or&
be&circumstantially&relevant&as&to&the&existence&of&that&fact.&
Third,&even&assuming&that&the&testimonies&were&hearsay,&petitioner&is&barred&from&questioning&the&
admission&of&Dangalans&testimony,&because&he&failed&to&object&to&it&at&the&time&it&was&offered.&It&has&
been&held&that&when&parties&fail&to&object&to&hearsay&evidence,&they&are&deemed&to&have&waived&their&
right&to&do&so\&thus,&it&may&be&admitted.[17]&The&absence&of&an&objection&is&clearly&shown&by&the&transcript&
of&the&stenographic&notes,&from&which&we&quote:&
"Atty.&Fajardo:&
Q&Did&you&reach&the&land&in&question?&
A&Yes,&sir.&
Q&And&upon&reaching&the&land&in&question,&what&did&you&do?&
A&We&were&able&to&see&the&cut&trees.&
Q&And&were&you&able&to&see&who&cut&the&trees?&
A&We&were&not&able&to&see.&
Q&And&how&many&trees&were&cut?&
A&There&were&newly&cut&trees&and&4&others&which&have&been&cut&for&a&long&time.&
Q&What&kind&of&trees&were&cut&according&to&you?&
A&Narra,&amogis&and&kuyawyaw.&
Q&Upon&seeing&these&cut&trees,&what&did&you&do?&
A&I&asked&Virgilio&Bon&why&those&trees&were&[cut]&down&and&he&said&that&he&took&the&liberty&of&
cutting&those&trees.&
Q&In&your&own&understanding,&[M]r.&[W]itness,&what&did&the&accused&mean&when&he&said&that&
he&took&[the]&liberty&of&cutting&those&trees?&
A&He&caused&the&cutting&of&the&trees.&
Q&And&during&the&time&you&were&conversing,&were&you&alone?&
A&I&was&with&the&barangay&tanod.&
Q&And&who&were&the&members&of&the&barangay&tanod&who&were&with&you&at&that&time?&
A&Julian&Lascano,&Jr.&and&Natividad&Legaspi.[18]&
Moreover,&a&partys&verbal&admission&that&is&established&through&the&testimonies&of&the&persons&who&
heard&it[19]&fall&under&Section&26&of&Rule&130&of&the&Rules&of&Court.According&to&this&provision,&[t]he&act,&
declaration&or&omission&of&a&party&as&to&a&relevant&fact&may&be&given&in&evidence&against&him.&This&rule&
is& based& upon& the& notion& that& no& man& would& make& any& declaration& against& himself,& unless& it& is&
true.[20]&The&testimony&of&petitioner&may,&therefore,&be&received&in&evidence&against&him.&
Regarding&his&alleged&uncounselled&admission,&suffice&it&to&stress&that&it&was&not&given&during&a&
custodial&investigation&and,&certainly,&not&to&police&authorities.&Custodial&investigation&has&been&defined&
as&any&questioning&initiated&by$law$enforcement$officers&after&a&person&has&been&taken&into&custody&or&
otherwise& deprived& of& freedom& of& action& in& any& significant& way.[21]&We& have& ruled& previously& that&
constitutional&procedures&on&custodial&investigation&do&not&apply&to&a&spontaneous&statement&that&is&not&
elicited&through&questioning&by&the&authorities,&but&is&given&in&an&ordinary&manner.[22]&
Verily,& the& inquiry& on& the& illegal& cutting& of& trees,& which& QQ& with& the& assistance& of& the&
barangay&tanods[23]$<<$was&conducted&by&the&owners&brother,&Manuel&Dangalan&cannot&be&deemed&a&
custodial& investigation.&Consequently,& the& guarantees& of& Section& 12& (1)& of& Article& III[24]&of& the& 1987&
Constitution,&or&the&soQcalled&Miranda&rights,&cannot&be&successfully&invoked&by&petitioner.[25]&
Furthermore,&allegations&of&impropriety&committed&during&custodial&investigation&are&relevant&and&
material&only&to&cases&in&which&an&extrajudicial&admission&or&confession&is&the&basis&of&conviction.[26]&In&
the&present&case,&the&conviction&of&petitioner&was&not&deduced&solely&from&his&admission,&but&from&the&
confluence&of&circumstantial&evidence&showing&his&guilt&beyond&reasonable&doubt.&
 Second%Issue:%
Credibility3and3Sufficiency3of3Prosecution3Evidence%

The&timeQtested&rule&is&that&the&factual&findings&and&conclusions&of&the&trial&court&on&the&credibility&
of& witnesses& deserve& to& be& respected& because& of& its& unique& advantage& of& having& observed& their&
demeanor&as&they&testified.[27]&Equally&established&is&the&rule&that&factual&findings&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&
are&conclusive&on&the&parties&and&carry&even&more&weight&when&such&findings&affirm&those&of&the&trial&
court,[28]&as& in& this& case.&This& Court& refrains& from& disturbing& the& CAs& findings,& if& no& glaring& errors&
bordering&on&a&gross&misapprehension&of&facts&can&be&gleaned&from&them.[29]&We&have&no&reason&to&
depart&from&this&rule.&Hence,&we&affirm&the&lower&courts&assessment&of&the&credibility&of&the&prosecution&
witnesses.&
We&now&come&to&the&sufficiency&of&the&prosecutions&evidence.&
Section&68&of&the&Forestry&Code,&as&amended,[30]&provides:&

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Punishable&under&the&above&provision&are&the&following&acts:&(1)&cutting,&gathering,&collecting&or&
removing&timber&or&other&forest&products&from&the&places&therein&mentioned&without&any&authority\&and&
(b)&possessing&timber&or&other&forest&products&without&the&legal&documents.[31]&
Petitioner&was&charged&with&the&first&offense.[32]&It&was&thus&necessary&for&the&prosecution&to&prove&
the&alleged&illegal&cutting,&gathering&or&manufacture&of&lumber&from&the&trees.&
It&is&undisputed&that&no&direct&evidence&was&presented.&This&kind&of&evidence,&however,&is&not&the&
only&matrix&from&which&the&trial&court&may&draw&its&conclusions&and&findings&of&guilt.[33]&Conviction&may&
be& based& on& circumstantial& evidence,& as& long& as& the& circumstances& proven& constitute& an& unbroken&
chain& that& leads& to& a& fair& and& reasonable& conclusion& that& the& accused& is& guilty& beyond& reasonable&
doubt.[34]&
To& sustain& a& conviction& based& on& circumstantial& evidence,& it& is& necessary& that& the& following&
elements&concur:&
1.&There&is&more&than&one&circumstance.&
2.&The&facts&from&which&the&inferences&are&derived&are&proven.&
3.&The&combination&of&all&the&circumstances&is&such&as&to&produce&a&conviction&beyond&reasonable&
doubt.[35]&
Did&the&circumstances&in&this&case&satisfy&the&above&requirements?&We&rule&in&the&affirmative.&In&its&
assessment&of&the&evidence,&the&regional&trial&court&(RTC)&considered&the&following&proven&facts&and&
circumstances:&

x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and
big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay
[t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the]
saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar
Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible
evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation.[36]

The&appellate&court,&on&the&other&hand,&found&that&the&following&circumstances&sufficiently&proved&
petitioners&culpability:&

x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad
Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon
and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value
of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private
complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees.[37]
 A&review&of&the&records&also&shows&that&the&fact&of&the&alleged&cutting,&gathering&and&manufacture&
of&lumber&from&the&trees&was&proven&by&the&prosecution&through&the&following&pieces&of&documentary&
evidence:& photographs& of& tree& stumps,[38]&the& investigation& report& of& an& officer& of& the& Community&
Environment& and& Natural& Resources& (CENRO)& that& no& permit& was& secured& for& the& cutting& of& the&
trees,[39]&and& the& CENROs& computation& of& the& value[40]&of& the& timber& generated& from& the& felled&
trees.&This&fact,&together&with&the&circumstantial&evidence,&indubitably&points&to&no&other&conclusion&than&
that&petitioner&was&guilty&as&charged.&

Correct3Penalty%

We&now&go&to&the&penalty.&We&deem&it&necessary&to&discuss&this&matter&because&of&the&differing&
penalties&imposed&by&the&appellate&and&the&trial&courts.&The&RTC&imposed&an&indeterminate&sentence&
of&seven&(7)&years,&four&(4)&months&and&one&(1)&day&of&prision$mayor&as&minimum\&to&eleven&(11)&years,&
six&(6)&months&and&twentyQone&(21)&days&of&prision$mayor&as&maximum.&The&CA,&however,&increased&
the&penalty&to&imprisonment&ranging&from&ten&(10)&years&of&prision$mayor&as&minimum\&to&fourteen&(14)&years&
and&eight&(8)&months&of$reclusion$temporal&as&maximum.&
Article&68&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Law,&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&No.&277,[41]&provides&that&
any&violation&thereof&shall&be&punished&with&the&penalties&imposed&under&Articles&309[42]&and&310[43]&of&
Revised&Penal&Code.&This&amendment&QQ&which&eliminated&the&phrase&shall&be&guilty&of&qualified&theft&
as&defined&and&punished&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code&QQ&has&already&been&
interpreted& by& this& Court.&According& to& its& interpretation,& the& quoted& phrase& means& that& the& acts& of&
cutting,& gathering,& collecting,& removing& or& possessing& forest& products& without& authority& constitute&
distinct& offenses& that& are& now& independent& of& the& crime& of& theft& under& Articles& 309& and& 310& of& the&
Revised&Penal&Code&(RPC),&but&that&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&is&that&which&is&provided&under&these&
articles.[44]&
Both&the&trial&court[45]&and&the&CA[46]&found&that&the&value&of&the&lumber&was&P12,000.&Under&Articles&
309&and&310&of&the&RPC,&the&statutory&penalty&should&be&two&degrees&higher&than&prision$correccional&in&
its&medium&and&maximum&periods\[47]&or&prision$mayor$in&its&maximum&period&to&reclusion$temporal&in&
its& minimum& period.&The& Indeterminate& Sentence& Law,[48]&however,& reduces& the& sentence& to& an&
indeterminate& penalty& anywhere& in& the& range& of&six& (6)& years& and& one& (1)& day& of&prision$ mayor,&as&
minimum,&to&14&years&and&eight&(8)&months&of&reclusion$temporal&as&maximum.&Clearly,&the&sentences&
imposed&by&the&trial&court&and&the&CA&are&within&the&allowable&range.&In&view,&however,&of&the&finding&of&
the&RTC&that&no&mitigating&or&aggravating&circumstance&attended&the&commission&of&the&offense,&the&
penalty&it&imposed&was&more&in&accord&with&the&liberal&spirit&of&the&law&towards&the&accused.&Hence,&we&
adopt&the&trial&courts&indeterminate&sentence&of&seven&(7)&years,&four&(4)&months&and&one&(1)&day&of&prision$
mayor&as& minimum\& to& eleven& (11)& years,& six& (6)& months& and& twentyQone& (21)& days& of&prision$ mayor&as&
maximum.&
WHEREFORE,& the& assailed& Decision& of& the& Court& of& Appeals& is& hereby&AFFIRMED&with&
the&MODIFICATION$that& petitioner& is& sentenced& to& suffer& an& indeterminate& penalty& of& imprisonment&
of&seven&(7)&years,&four&(4)&months&and&one&(1)&day&of&prision$mayor&as&minimum\&to&eleven&(11)&years,&six&
(6)&months&and&twentyQone&(21)&days&of&prision$mayor&as&maximum.&Costs&against&appellant.&
SO%ORDERED.%
!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION

[G.R.%No.%115634.%April%27,%2000]

FELIPE%CALUB%and%RICARDO%VALENCIA,%DEPARTMENT%of%ENVIRONMENT%and%NATURAL%
RESOURCES%(DENR),%CATBALOGAN,%SAMAR,%petitioners,3vs.3COURT%OF%APPEALS,%
MANUELA%T.%BABALCON,%and%CONSTANCIO%ABUGANDA,%respondents.

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N

QUISUMBING,%J.:

For&review&is&the&decision.[1]&dated&May&27,&1994,&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&in&CAQG.R.&SP&No.&29191,&
denying&the&petition&filed&by&herein&petitioners&for&certiorari,&prohibition&and&mandamus,&in&order&to&
annul&the&Order&dated&May&27,&1992,&by&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Catbalogan,&Samar.&Said&Order&
had&denied&petitioners&(a)&Motion&to&Dismiss&the&replevin&case&filed&by&herein&private&respondents,&as&
well&as&(b)&petitioners&Motion&for&Reconsideration&of&the&Order&of&said&trial&court&dated&April&24,&1992,&
granting&an&application&for&a&Writ&of&replevin..[2]&h&Y

The&pertinent&facts&of&the&case,&borne&by&the&records,&are&as&follows:

On&January&28,&1992,&the&Forest&Protection&and&Law&Enforcement&Team&of&the&Community&
Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office&(CENRO)&of&the&DENR&apprehended&two&(2)&motor&
vehicles,&described&as&follows:

"1.&Motor&Vehicle&with&Plate&No.&HAKQ733&loaded&with&one&thousand&and&twenty&six&
(1,026)&board&feet&of&illegally&sourced&lumber&valued&at&P8,544.75,&being&driven&by&one&
Pio&Gabon&and&owned&by&[a&certain]&Jose&Vargas.

2.&Motor&Vehicle&with&Plate&No.&FCNQ143&loaded&with&one&thousand&two&hundred&twenty&
four&and&ninety&seven&(1,224.97)&board&feet&of&illegallyQsourced&lumber&valued&at&
P9,187.27,&being&driven&by&one&Constancio&Abuganda&and&owned&by&[a&certain]&
Manuela&Babalcon.&".[3]

Constancio&Abuganda&and&Pio&Gabon,&the&drivers&of&the&vehicles,&failed&to&present&proper&documents&
and/or&licenses.&Thus,&the&apprehending&team&seized&and&impounded&the&vehicles&and&its&load&of&
lumber&at&the&DENRQPENR&(Department&of&Environment&and&Natural&ResourcesQProvincial&
Environment&and&Natural&Resources)&Office&in&Catbalogan..[4]Seizure&receipts&were&issued&but&the&
drivers&refused&to&accept&the&receipts..[5]&Felipe&Calub,&Provincial&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&
Officer,&then&filed&before&the&Provincial&Prosecutors&Office&in&Samar,&a&criminal&complaint&against&
Abuganda,&in&Criminal&Case&No.&3795,&for&violation&of&Section&68&[78),&Presidential&Decree&705&as&
amended&by&Executive&Order&277,&otherwise&known&as&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.[6]&Mis&sc

On&January&31,&1992,&the&impounded&vehicles&were&forcibly&taken&by&Gabon&and&Abuganda&from&the&
custody&of&the&DENR,&prompting&DENR&Officer&Calub&this&time&to&file&a&criminal&complaint&for&grave&
coercion&against&Gabon&and&Abuganda.&The&complaint&was,&however,&dismissed&by&the&Public&
Prosecutor..[7]

On&February&11,&1992,&one&of&the&two&vehicles,&with&plate&number&FCN&143,&was&again&apprehended&
by&a&composite&team&of&DENRQCENR&in&Catbalogan&and&Philippine&Army&elements&of&the&802nd&
Infantry&Brigade&at&Barangay&Buray,&Paranas,&Samar.&It&was&again&loaded&with&forest&products&with&an&
equivalent&volume&of&1,005.47&board&feet,&valued&at&P10,054.70.&Calub&duly&filed&a&criminal&complaint&
against&Constancio&Abuganda,&a&certain&Abegonia,&and&several&John&Does,&in&Criminal&Case&No.&
3625,&for&violation&of&Section&68&[78],&Presidential&Decree&705&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&277,&
otherwise&known&as&the&Revised&Forestry&Code..[8]

In&Criminal&Cases&Nos.&3795&and&3625,&however,&Abegonia&and&Abuganda&were&acquitted&on&the&
ground&of&reasonable&doubt.&But&note&the&trial&court&ordered&that&a&copy&of&the&decision&be&furnished&
the&Secretary&of&Justice,&in&order&that&the&necessary&criminal&action&may&be&filed&against&Noe&Pagarao&
and&all&other&persons&responsible&for&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.&For&it&appeared&that&it&
was&Pagarao&who&chartered&the&subject&vehicle&and&ordered&that&cut&timber&be&loaded&on&it..[9]

Subsequently,&herein&private&respondents&Manuela&Babalcon,&the&vehicle&owner,&and&Constancio&
Abuganda,&the&driver,&filed&a&complaint&for&the&recovery&of&possession&of&the&two&(2)&impounded&
vehicles&with&an&application&for&replevin&against&herein&petitioners&before&the&RTC&of&Catbalogan.&The&
trial&court&granted&the&application&for&replevin&and&issued&the&corresponding&writ&in&an&Order&dated&
April&24,&1992..[10]&Petitioners&filed&a&motion&to&dismiss&which&was&denied&by&the&trial&court.[11]
Thus,&on&June&15,&1992,&petitioners&filed&with&the&Supreme&Court&the&present&Petition&for&Certiorari,&
Prohibition&and&Mandamus&with&application&for&Preliminary&Injunction&and/or&a&Temporary&Restraining&
Order.&The&Court&issued&a&TRO,&enjoining&respondent&RTC&judge&from&conducting&further&
proceedings&in&the&civil&case&for&replevin\&and&enjoining&private&respondents&from&taking&or&attempting&
to&take&the&motor&vehicles&and&forest&products&seized&from&the&custody&of&the&petitioners.&The&Court&
further&instructed&the&petitioners&to&see&to&it&that&the&motor&vehicles&and&other&forest&products&seized&
are&kept&in&a&secured&place&and&protected&from&deterioration,&said&property&being&in&custodia$legis&and&
subject&to&the&direct&order&of&the&Supreme&Court..[12]&In&a&Resolution&issued&on&September&28,&1992,&
the&Court&referred&said&petition&to&respondent&appellate&court&for&appropriate&disposition..[13]

On&May&27,&1994,&the&Court&of&Appeals&denied&said&petition&for&lack&of&merit.&It&ruled&that&the&mere&
seizure&of&a&motor&vehicle&pursuant&to&the&authority&granted&by&Section&68&[78]&of&P.D.&No.&705&as&
amended&by&E.O.&No.&277&does&not&automatically&place&said&conveyance&in&custodia$legis.&According&
to&the&appellate&court,&such&authority&of&the&Department&Head&of&the&DENR&or&his&duly&authorized&
representative&to&order&the&confiscation&and&disposition&of&illegally&obtained&forest&products&and&the&
conveyance&used&for&that&purpose&is&not&absolute&and&unqualified.&It&is&subject&to&pertinent&laws,&
regulations,&or&policies&on&that&matter,&added&the&appellate&court.&The&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&
59,&series&of&1990,&is&one&such&regulation,&the&appellate&court&said.&For&it&prescribes&the&guidelines&in&
the&confiscation,&forfeiture&and&disposition&of&conveyances&used&in&the&commission&of&offenses&
penalized&under&Section&68&[78]&of&P.D.&No.&705&as&amended&by&E.O.&No.&277..[14]

Additionally,&respondent&Court&of&Appeals&noted&that&the&petitioners&failed&to&observe&the&procedure&
outlined&in&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&59,&series&of&1990.&They&were&unable&to&submit&a&report&of&
the&seizure&to&the&DENR&Secretary,&to&give&a&written&notice&to&the&owner&of&the&vehicle,&and&to&render&
a&report&of&their&findings&and&recommendations&to&the&Secretary.&Moreover,&petitioners&failure&to&
comply&with&the&procedure&laid&down&by&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&59,&series&of&1990,&was&
confirmed&by&the&admission&of&petitioners&counsel&that&no&confiscation&order&has&been&issued&prior&to&
the&seizure&of&the&vehicle&and&the&filing&of&the&replevin&suit.&Therefore,&in&failing&to&follow&such&
procedure,&according&to&the&appellate&court,&the&subject&vehicles&could&not&be&considered&in&custodia$
legis..[15]

Respondent&Court&of&Appeals&also&found&no&merit&in&petitioners&claim&that&private&respondents&
complaint&for&replevin&is&a&suit&against&the&State.&Accordingly,&petitioners&could&not&shield&themselves&
under&the&principle&of&state&immunity&as&the&property&sought&to&be&recovered&in&the&instant&suit&had&not&
yet&been&lawfully&adjudged&forfeited&in&favor&of&the&government.&Moreover,&according&to&respondent&
appellate&court,&there&could&be&no&pecuniary&liability&nor&loss&of&property&that&could&ensue&against&the&
government.&It&reasoned&that&a&suit&against&a&public&officer&who&acted&illegally&or&beyond&the&scope&of&
his&authority&could&not&be&considered&a&suit&against&the&State\&and&that&a&public&officer&might&be&sued&
for&illegally&seizing&or&withholding&the&possession&of&the&property&of&another..[16]

Respondent&court&brushed&aside&other&grounds&raised&by&petitioners&based&on&the&claim&that&the&
subject&vehicles&were&validly&seized&and&held&in&custody&because&they&were&contradicted&by&its&own&
findings..[17]&Their&petition&was&found&without&merit.[18]&Rtc&spped

Now,&before&us,&the&petitioners&assign&the&following&errors:.[19]

(1)&THE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&ERRED&IN&HOLDING&THAT&MERE&SEIZURE&OF&A&
CONVEYANCE&PURSUANT&TO&SECTION&68QA&[78QA]&OF&P.D.&NO.&705&AS&
AMENDED&BY&EXECUTIVE&ORDER&277&DOES&NOT&PLACE&SAID&CONVEYANCE&
IN&CUSTODIA$LEGIS\

(2)&THE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&ERRED&IN&NOT&HOLDING&THAT&THE&OPERATIVE&
ACT&GIVING&RISE&FOR&THE&SUBJECT&CONVEYANCE&TO&BE&IN&CUSTODIA&LEGIS&
IS&ITS&LAWFUL&SEIZURE&BY&THE&DENR&PURSUANT&TO&SECTION&68QA&[78QA]&OF&
P.D.&NO.&705,&AS&AMENDED&BY&E.O.&NO.&277\&AND

(3)&THE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&ERRED&IN&HOLDING&THAT&THE&COMPLAINT&FOR&
REPLEVIN&AGAINST&THE&PETITIONERS&IS&NOT&A&SUIT&AGAINST&THE&STATE.

In&brief,&the&pertinent&issues&for&our&consideration&are:

(1)&Whether&or&not&the&DENRQseized&motor&vehicle,&with&plate&number&FCN&143,&is&in&custodia$legis.

(2)&Whether&or&not&the&complaint&for&the&recovery&of&possession&of&impounded&vehicles,&with&an&
application&for&replevin,&is&a&suit&against&the&State.

We&will&now&resolve&both&issues.
The&Revised&Forestry&Code&authorizes&the&DENR&to&seize&all&conveyances&used&in&the&commission&of&
an&offense&in&violation&of&Section&78.&Section&78&states:

Sec.&78.&Cutting,$Gathering,$and$or$Collecting$Timber,$or$Other$Forest$Products$without$
License.$Any&person&who&shall&cut,&gather,&collect,&remove&timber&or&other&forest&
products&from&any&forestland,&or&timber&from&alienable&or&disposable&public&land,&or&from&
private&land,&without&any&authority,&or&possess&timber&or&other&forest&products&without&
the&legal&documents&as&required&under&existing&forest&laws&and&regulations,&shall&be&
punished&with&the&penalties&imposed&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&
Codeslx&mis

The&Court&shall&further&order&the&confiscation&in&favor&of&the&government&of&the&timber&or&
any&forest&products&cut,&gathered,&collected,&removed,&or&possessed,&as&well&as&the&
machinery,&equipment,&implements&and&tools&illegally&used&in&the&area&where&the&timber&
or&forest&products&are&found.

This&provision&makes&mere&possession&of&timber&or&other&forest&products&without&the&accompanying&
legal&documents&unlawful&and&punishable&with&the&penalties&imposed&for&the&crime&of&theft,&as&
prescribed&in&Articles&309Q310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code.&In&the&present&case,&the&subject&vehicles&
were&loaded&with&forest&products&at&the&time&of&the&seizure.&But&admittedly&no&permit&evidencing&
authority&to&possess&and&transport&said&load&of&forest&products&was&duly&presented.&These&products,&
in&turn,&were&deemed&illegally&sourced.&Thus&there&was&a&prima$facie&violation&of&Section&68&[78]&of&the&
Revised&Forestry&Code,&although&as&found&by&the&trial&court,&the&persons&responsible&for&said&violation&
were&not&the&ones&charged&by&the&public&prosecutor.

The&corresponding&authority&of&the&DENR&to&seize&all&conveyances&used&in&the&commission&of&an&
offense&in&violation&of&Section&78&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&is&pursuant&to&Sections&78QA&and&89&of&
the&same&Code.&They&read&as&follows:&Sc

Sec.&78QA.&Administrative$Authority$of$the$Department$Head$or$His$Duly$Authorized$
Representative$to$Order$Confiscation.$<<$In&all&cases&of&violation&of&this&Code&or&other&
forest&laws,&rules&and&regulations,&the&Department&Head&or&his&duly&authorized&
representative,&may&order&the&confiscation&of&any&forest&products&illegally&cut,&gathered,&
removed,&or&possessed&or&abandoned,&and&all&conveyances&used&either&by&land,&water&
or&air&in&the&commission&of&the&offense&and&to&dispose&of&the&same&in&accordance&with&
pertinent&laws,&regulations&or&policies&on&the&matter.

Sec.&89.&ArrestL$Institution$of$criminal$actions.$<<&A&forest&officer&or&employee&of&the&
Bureau&[Department]&or&any&personnel&of&the&Philippine&Constabulary/Philippine&
National&Police&shall&arrest$even$without$warrant&any&person&who&has&committed&or&is&
committing&in&his&presence&any&of&the&offenses&defined&in&this&Chapter.&He&shall&
also&seize$and$confiscate,$in$favor$of$the$Government,$the$tools$and$equipment$used$in$
committing$the$offense...&[Emphasis&supplied.]

Note&that&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&59,&series&of&1990,&implements&Sections&78QA&and&89&of&the&
Forestry&Code,&as&follows:

Sec.&2.&Conveyances$Subject$to$Confiscation$and$Forfeiture.$<<&All&conveyances&used&in&
the&transport&of&any&forest&product&obtained&or&gathered&illegally&whether&or&not&covered&
with&transport&documents,&found&spurious&or&irregular&in&accordance&with&Sec.&68QA&[78Q
A]&of&P.D.&No.&705,&shall&be&confiscated&in&favor&of&the&government&or&disposed&of&in&
accordance&with&pertinent&laws,&regulations&or&policies&on&the&matter.

Sec.&4.&Who$are$Authorized$to$Seize$Conveyance.$<<&The&Secretary&or&his&duly&
authorized&representative&such&as&the&forest&officers&and/or&natural&resources&officers,&
or&deputized&officers&of&the&DENR&are&authorized$to$seize&said&conveyances&subject&to&
policies&and&guidelines&pertinent&thereto.&Deputized&military&personnel&and&officials&of&
other&agencies&apprehending&illegal&logs&and&other&forest&products&and&their&
conveyances&shall&notify&the&nearest&DENR&field&offices,&and&turn&over&said&forest&
products&and&conveyances&for&proper&action&and&disposition.&In&case&where&the&
apprehension&is&made&by&DENR&field&officer,&the&conveyance&shall&be&deposited&with&
the&nearest&CENRO/PENRO/RED&Office&as&the&case&may&be,&for&safekeeping&wherever&
it&is&most&convenient&and&secured.&[Emphasis&supplied.]

Upon&apprehension&of&the&illegallyQcut&timber&while&being&transported&without&pertinent&documents&
that&could&evidence&title&to&or&right&to&possession&of&said&timber,&a&warrantless&seizure&of&the&involved&
vehicles&and&their&load&was&allowed&under&Section&78&and&89&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.&Slxs&c
Note&further&that&petitioners&failure&to&observe&the&procedure&outlined&in&DENR&Administrative&Order&
No.&59,&series&of&1990&was&justifiably&explained.&Petitioners&did&not&submit&a&report&of&the&seizure&to&
the&Secretary&nor&give&a&written&notice&to&the&owner&of&the&vehicle&because&on&the&3rd&day&following&
the&seizure,&Gabon&and&Abuganda,&drivers&of&the&seized&vehicles,&forcibly&took&the&impounded&
vehicles&from&the&custody&of&the&DENR.&Then&again,&when&one&of&the&motor&vehicles&was&
apprehended&and&impounded&for&the&second&time,&the&petitioners,&again&were&not&able&to&report&the&
seizure&to&the&DENR&Secretary&nor&give&a&written&notice&to&the&owner&of&the&vehicle&because&private&
respondents&immediately&went&to&court&and&applied&for&a&writ&of&replevin.&The&seizure&of&the&vehicles&
and&their&load&was&done&upon&their&apprehension&for&a&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.&It&
would&be&absurd&to&require&a&confiscation&order&or&notice&and&hearing&before&said&seizure&could&be&
effected&under&the&circumstances.

Since&there&was&a&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&and&the&seizure&was&in&accordance&with&law,&
in&our&view&the&subject&vehicles&were&validly&deemed&in&custodia$legis.&It&could&not&be&subject&to&an&
action&for&replevin.&For&it&is&property&lawfully&taken&by&virtue&of&legal&process&and&considered&in&the&
custody&of&the&law,&and&not&otherwise..[20]

In&Mamanteo,&et.&al.&v.&Deputy&Sheriff&Magumun,&A.M.&No.&PQ98Q1264,&promulgated&on&July&28,&1999,&
the&case&involves&property&to&be&seized&by&a&Deputy&Sheriff&in&a&replevin&suit.&But&said&property&were&
already&impounded&by&the&DENR&due&to&violation&of&forestry&laws&and,&in&fact,&already&forfeited&in&
favor&of&the&government&by&order&of&the&DENR.&We&said&that&such&property&was&deemed&in&custodia$
legis.&The&sheriff&could&not&insist&on&seizing&the&property&already&subject&of&a&prior&warrant&of&seizure.&
The&appropriate&action&should&be&for&the&sheriff&to&inform&the&trial&court&of&the&situation&by&way&of&
partial&Sheriffs&Return,&and&wait&for&the&judges&instructions&on&the&proper&procedure&to&be&observed.

Note&that&property&that&is&validly&deposited&in&custodia$legis&cannot&be&the&subject&of&a&replevin&suit.&In&
Mamanteo&v.&Deputy&Sheriff&Magumun,&we&elucidated&further:

".&.&.&the&writ&of&replevin&has&been&repeatedly&used&by&unscrupulous&plaintiffs&to&retrieve&
their&chattel&earlier&taken&for&violation&of&the&Tariff&and&Customs&Code,&tax&assessment,&
attachment&or&execution.&Officers&of&the&court,&from&the&presiding&judge&to&the&sheriff,&
are&implored&to&be&vigilant&in&their&execution&of&the&law&otherwise,&as&in&this&case,&valid&
seizure&and&forfeiture&proceedings&could&easily&be&undermined&by&the&simple&devise&of&a&
writ&of&replevin...".[21]&Scslx

On&the&second&issue,&is&the&complaint&for&the&recovery&of&possession&of&the&two&impounded&vehicles,&
with&an&application&for&replevin,&a&suit&against&the&State?

Well&established&is&the&doctrine&that&the&State&may&not&be&sued&without&its&consent..[22]&And&a&suit&
against&a&public&officer&for&his&official&acts&is,&in&effect,&a&suit&against&the&State&if&its&purpose&is&to&hold&
the&State&ultimately&liable..[23]&However,&the&protection&afforded&to&public&officers&by&this&doctrine&
generally&applies&only&to&activities&within&the&scope&of&their&authority&in&good&faith&and&without&
willfulness,&malice&or&corruption.[24]&In&the&present&case,&the&acts&for&which&the&petitioners&are&being&
called&to&account&were&performed&by&them&in&the&discharge&of&their&official&duties.&The&acts&in&question&
are&clearly&official&in&nature.[25]&In&implementing&and&enforcing&Sections&78QA&and&89&of&the&Forestry&
Code&through&the&seizure&carried&out,&petitioners&were&performing&their&duties&and&functions&as&
officers&of&the&DENR,&and&did&so&within&the&limits&of&their&authority.&There&was&no&malice&nor&bad&faith&
on&their&part.&Hence,&a&suit&against&the&petitioners&who&represent&the&DENR&is&a&suit&against&the&State.&
It&cannot&prosper&without&the&States&consent.

Given&the&circumstances&in&this&case,&we&need&not&pursue&the&Office&of&the&Solicitor&Generals&line&for&
the&defense&of&petitioners&concerning&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies.&We&ought&only&to&recall&
that&exhaustion&must&be&raised&at&the&earliest&time&possible,&even&before&filing&the&answer&to&the&
complaint&or&pleading&asserting&a&claim,&by&a&motion&to&dismiss..[26]&If&not&invoked&at&the&proper&time,&
this&ground&for&dismissal&could&be&deemed&waived&and&the&court&could&take&cognizance&of&the&case&
and&try&it.[27]&Mesm

ACCORDINGLY,&the&Petition&is&GRANTED,&and&the&assailed&Decision&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&in&CAQ
G.R.&SP&No.&29191&is&SET%ASIDE.&Consequently,&the&Order&issued&by&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&
Catbalogan,&dated&May&27,&1992,&and&the&Writ&of&replevin&issued&in&the&Order&dated&April&24,&1992,&
are&ANNULLED.&The&Sheriff&of&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Catbalogan,&Branch&29,&is&directed&to&take&
possession&of&the&subject&motor&vehicle,&with&plate&number&FCN&143,&for&delivery&to&the&custody&of&
and&appropriate&disposition&by&petitioners.&Let&a&copy&of&this&decision&be&provided&the&Honorable&
Secretary&of&Justice&for&his&appropriate&action,&against&any&and&all&persons&responsible&for&the&
abovecited&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.

Costs&against&private&respondents.
SO%ORDERED.

!
! !
Digest:!

CALUB V. CA

Replevin3cannot3be3issued3to3recover3a3property3lawfully3taken3by3virtue3of3legal3process3and3
considered3in3the3custody3of3the3law.3A3replevin3case3against3the3State,3without3its3consent,3
cannot3prosper.&
FACTS:

Petitioner&from&DENR&apprehended&two&vehicles&carrying&illegally&sourced&lumber&and&thereafter&
confiscated&them.&The&owners&of&the&vehicles&filed&an&action&for&replevin&to&recover&the&vehicles.&They&
won&in&the&trial&court&on&the&ground&that&petitioner&did&not&act&in&accordance&with&the&law.&So&petitioner&
appeals&on&the&ground&that&the&replevin&in&this&case&is&a&suit&against&the&State&and&is&therefore&valid.&

&
ISSUE:

1)&Whether&or&not&a&replevin&may&be&instituted&for&recovery&of&property&under&custodia&legis.&
2)&Whether&or&not&replevin&in&this&case&is&a&suit&against&the&State&

&
RULING:

1)&No!&Replevin&cannot&be&issued&to&recover&a&property&lawfully&taken&by&virtue&of&legal&process&and&
considered&in&the&custody&of&the&law.&

2)&Yes!&This&suit&is&not&valid&because&the&State&may&not&be&sued&without&its&consent&or&when&the&
public&official&acted&in&bad&faith&in&the&discharge&of&his&duties.&It&has&been&established&that&the&DENR&
acted&within&its&authority.&Hence,&its&action&is&the&action&of&the&State.&
&
!
! !
 [G.R.%No.%152823.%September%23.%2003]%

RUFINA%CHUA,%petitioner,3vs.%THE%COURT%OF%APPEALS%(FORMER%FIRST%DIVISION),%WILFRED%
N.% CHIOK% and% THE% PEOPLE% OF% THE% PHILIPPINES% (as% an% indispensable%
party),%respondents.%

[G.R.%No.%152824.%September%23,%2003]%

PEOPLE% OF% THE% PHILIPPINES,%petitioner,3 vs.% COURT% OF% APPEALS% (FIRST% DIVISION)% and%
WILFRED%N.%CHIOK,%respondents.%

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
YNARES]SANTIAGO,%J.:%

These&are&two&consolidated&petitions&assailing&the&Resolutions&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&in&CAQG.R.&
CR&No.&23309,&dated&May&7,&2001[1]&and&February&14,&2002.[2]&
Respondent&Wilfred&N.&Chiok&was&charged&with&estafa&in&Criminal&Case&No.&109927,&filed&by&private&
complainant& Rufina& Chua.&On& February& 1,& 1999,& the& Regional& Trial& Court& of& Pasig,& Branch& 165,&
rendered&judgment&convicting&respondent&of&the&crime&charged.&He&filed&a&Motion&for&Reconsideration,&
but& the& same& was& denied& by& the& trial& court& in& an& Omnibus& Order& dated& May& 28,& 1999.[3]&Thus,&
respondent&filed&an&appeal&from&the&judgment&of&conviction&to&the&Court&of&Appeals.&
On& April& 5,& 2000,& respondent& filed& an& Urgent& Manifestation& and& Motion,& alleging& that& when& his&
counsel& went& to& the& Court& of& Appeals& to& examine& the& records& of& the& case& preparatory& to& filing& his&
appellants& brief,& he& learned& that& the& Office& of& the& Solicitor& General& (OSG)& had& borrowed& the&
same.[4]&Thus,&respondent&prayed&that&the&OSG&be&directed&to&return&the&records&of&the&case&to&the&
Court&of&Appeals.[5]&
The&appellate&court&issued&a&Resolution&directing&the&OSG&to&return&the&records&of&the&case&and&
suspending&respondents&period&for&filing&the&appellants&brief.[6]&
The&prosecution,&through&the&OSG,&filed&a&Manifestation&and&Motion&stating&that&the&aforementioned&
records& could& not& be& found& despite& diligent& efforts& to& search& the& same.[7]Thus,& on& May& 7,& 2001,& the&
Court&of&Appeals&issued&a&Resolution&ordering&the&reconstitution&of&the&records&of&the&case&before&the&
trial&court.&The&dispositive&portion&of&the&Resolution&reads&as&follows:&

WHEREFORE, the court a quo is hereby directed to receive evidence in behalf of this Court, pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. 129 (as amended by R.A. 7902). The trial court shall rule on the matter of admissibility of
such evidence presented before it by the parties and shall submit such evidence and render a report thereon
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof. The evidence adduced by the parties and received by the trial court,
and its report as submitted to Us, shall be used to enable this Court to determine whether or not to affirm or set
aside the appealed judgment of December 3, 1998. In the meantime, the legal effects of the appealed judgment
are hereby suspended.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner& Chua& filed& a& Motion& for& Clarification& and/or& Reconsideration,[9]&while& the& OSG& filed& a&
Motion&for&Partial&Reconsideration.[10]&Both&motions&were&denied&by&the&Court&of&Appeals.[11]&
Hence,& petitioner& Chua& and& the& prosecution& filed& two& separate& petitions& which& were& ordered&
consolidated&by&this&Court.[12]&
In& her& petition& for&certiorari&and&mandamus,& petitioner& Chua& argues,& in& fine,& that& the& Court& of&
Appeals&should&have&declared&the&records&of&CAQG.R.&CR&No.&22309&as&fully&reconstituted,&pursuant&
to&Rule&135,&Section&5&(h)\[13]&that&respondent&is&duty&bound&to&help&reconstitute&the&missing&records\&
and& that& respondent& is& estopped& from& challenging& the& authenticity& of& copies& of& the& missing& records&
which&were&already&with&the&Court&of&Appeals.[14]&
For&its&part,&the&prosecution&anchors&its&petition&for&certiorari&on&the&following&grounds:&
I%

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND

EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN SUSPENDING THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE TRIAL COURTS
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AS APPEAL MAY PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AVAILABLE
RECORDS WHICH HAVE REMAINED INTACT (HANDWRITTEN AND CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF
THE JUDGMENT AND TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES), AND CHIOK IS ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING THE VERACITY OF THE JUDGMENT, ORDERS AND PLEADINGS WHICH HE
ATTACHED TO HIS VERIFIED PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP No. 53340.

II%

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND

EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PARTIES WILL BE ITS BASIS FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO AFFIRM OR REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.[15]

In& the& meantime,& while& these& petitions& were& pending& before& this& Court,& the& prosecution& filed& a&
Manifestation&and&Motion[16]&stating&that&the&missing&records&were&finally&located&by&an&OSG&employee&
in&the&cubicle&of&Solicitor&Brigido&Artemon&M.&Luna&II,&the&lawyer&who&had&handled&the&case&before&he&
was&appointed&to&the&judiciary,&and&that&the&records&have&been&returned&to&the&Court&of&Appeals&on&
January&28,&2003.[17]&
Notwithstanding&this&development,&respondent&insists&that&the&reconstitution&of&the&records&before&
the&trial&court&is&still&necessary&because&he&entertains&serious&doubts&on&the&authenticity&of&the&records&
that&were&returned&to&the&Court&of&Appeals.[18]&
Petitioner&Chuas&petition&for&mandamus&in&G.R.&No.&152823,&which&seeks&to&compel&the&Court&of&
Appeals&to&consider&the&records&of&the&case&as&reconstituted,&must&fail.Reconstitution&is&not&a&ministerial&
task.&It& involves& the& exercise& of& discretion& on& the& part& of& a& court& in& evaluating& the& authenticity& and&
relevance&of&all&evidence&to&be&presented&before&it.&Thus,&the&extraordinary&writ&of&mandamus&cannot&
be& used& to& dictate& upon& the& court& how& it& will& rule& in& the& admission& of& the& reconstituted& evidence,&
inasmuch&as&this&calls&for&the&exercise&of&discretion.&We&have&ruled&that&the&court&may&be&compelled&by&
mandamus&to&pass&and&act&upon&a&question&submitted&to&it&for&decision,&but&it&cannot&be&enjoined&to&
decide&for&or&against&one&of&the&parties.&A&judicial&act&is&not&compellable&by&mandamus\&the&court&has&
to&decide&a&question&according&to&its&own&judgment&and&understanding&of&the&law.[19]&
In&G.R.&No.&152824,&the&prosecution&argues&that&suspending&the&effects&of&the&trial&courts&judgment&
is&short&of&saying&that&private&respondent&is&considered&innocent&of&the&crime&for&which&he&was&convicted&
unless&and&until&the&records&are&found&or&reconstituted,[20]&and&that&the&assailed&Resolutions&had&the&
effect&of&automatically&setting&aside&the&trial&courts&judgment.[21]&The&prosecution&further&contends&that&
the&appellate&court&erred&when&it&ruled&that&the&report&to&be&submitted&by&the&trial&court&regarding&the&
reconstitution& will& be& the& basis& for& determining& whether& or& not& to& affirm& or& reverse& the& judgment& of&
conviction,&since&the&parties&still&have&to&file&their&appellants&and&appellees&briefs,&respectively.[22]&
We&agree&that&the&sweeping&statement&made&in&the&assailed&Resolution&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&as&
to&the&suspension&of&the&legal&effects&of&the&appealed&judgment&may&give&rise&to&an&interpretation&that&
the&legal&effects&of&the&conviction&shall&likewise&be&suspended.&Surely,&this&could&not&have&been&the&
intendment& of& the& Court& of& Appeals.&Rather,& the& import& of& the& statement& to& our& mind& is& that& the&
reconstitution&proceedings&will&only&suspend&the&periods&of&the&parties&to&file&their&briefs,&and&this&should&
have&been&qualified&by&the&Court&of&Appeals.&In&the&same&vein,&the&Court&of&Appeals&declaration&that&
the&evidence&received&by&the&trial&court&will&be&used&in&its&determination&of&whether&to&affirm&or&reverse&
the&conviction,&should&be&understood&to&mean&that&such&determination&will&be&made&after&the&parties&
shall&have&been&allowed&to&file&their&respective&appeal&briefs.&Nevertheless,&there&is&need&to&clarify&the&
assailed&Resolution,&making&sure&that&ambiguous&judgments&must&be&construed&in&such&a&way&as&to&do&
justice&and&avoid&wrong.[23]&Thus,&the&dispositive&portion&of&the&assailed&Resolution&must&be&clarified&
and&modified&accordingly.&
The&procedure&for&the&reconstitution&of&records&of&judicial&proceedings&and&other&official&documents&
is&governed&by&Act&No.&3110.&The&said&Act&covers&the&loss&or&destruction&of&records&due&to&causes&other&
than&fire&or&public&calamity.[24]&
There&is&no&provision&in&the&Act&for&the&reconstitution&of&records&before&the&Court&of&Appeals&for&the&
simple& reason& that& the& said& Court& was& not& yet& in& existence& at& the& time& of& the& enactment& of& the&
statute.[25]&However,&the&provisions&thereof&which&pertain&to&the&Supreme&Court&are&applicable,&to&wit:&

SEC. 66. Upon receipt of the notice provided for in sections fifty-four and fifty-five hereof, the Court of First
Instance shall cause a complete list to be made of all criminal actions appealed to the Supreme Court, which list
shall contain the names of the stenographers who have reported each case. Copies of this list shall be sent to the
provincial fiscal, the Attorney-General, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 67. Upon the preparation of the list provided for in the next preceding section, the Courts of First Instance
shall proceed to reconstitute all criminal actions included in said list, in accordance with the rules and procedure
established in sections thirteen to forty-five hereof, and every time they declare any record reconstituted or its
reconstitution a failure, they shall report the same to the Supreme Court. (italics ours)
 Section&13&provides:&

SEC. 13. Pending criminal actions shall be reconstituted by means of copies filed by the fiscal and the counsel
for the defendant or the defendant himself, or certified by them under oath as being correct, and whatever
cannot be reconstituted in this manner shall be reconstructed by means of the supplementary procedure,
provided for the reconstitution of ordinary civil cases. (italics ours)

The&aforementioned&supplementary&procedure&in&ordinary&civil&cases&that&is&applicable&to&the&case&
at&bar&is&embodied&in&the&following&provisions:&

SEC. 4. Civil cases pending trial shall be reconstituted by means of the copies presented and certified under
oath as correct by the counsels or the parties interested. In case it is impossible to find a copy of a motion,
decree, order, document, or other proceeding of vital importance for the reconstitution of the record, the same
may be replaced by an agreement on the facts entered into between the counsels or the parties interested, which
shall be reduced to writing and attached to the proper record.

SEC. 5. In case the counsels or parties are unable to come to an agreement, the Court shall determine what may
be proper in the interest of equity and justice, and may also consider the proceeding in question as non-existent
and reconstitute only that part of the record which can stand without such proceeding, and continue proceedings
upon the record so reconstituted.

In& the& case& at& bar,& the& authenticity& of& the& records& that& were& returned& is& assailed& by&
respondent.&Clearly,& therefore,& there& is& a& need& to& reconstitute& the& records& in& accordance& with& the&
procedure&outlined&in&the&law,&in&order&to&dispel&any&doubt&as&to&the&integrity&of&the&records&that&were&
lost& and& recovered& in& the& Office& of& the& Solicitor& General.&Indeed,& the& authenticity& of& the& evidence&
contained&in&the&records&has&been&compromised&when&the&same&were&misplaced&by&the&OSG.&Every&
aspect&of&the&right&to&due&process&must&be&afforded&the&accusedQappellant,&and&this&includes&the&right&
to&examine&and&assail&the&veracity&of&every&piece&of&evidence&contained&in&the&recovered&records.&This&
must&be&done&in&the&trial&court,&as&provided&for&in&the&law.&
Respondent&must&participate&in&the&reconstitution&proceedings.&The&reconstitution&is&as&much&the&
duty&of&the&prosecution&as&of&the&defense.[26]&The&principle&enunciated&in&the&following&ruling&is&apropos:&

Every person who finds himself in a court of justice, in whatever capacity, must hold himself while there,
subject to those unforeseen events which suddenly and unavoidably intervene and change the whole aspect of
things. The sickness or death of the judge, or of counsel for the prosecution, the destruction by fire or flood of
the court-house and all the records and evidence of the pending trial any of these things are sufficient to
interrupt the course of the proceedings and to require that they be begun anew. Such events weigh equally
against all. As no one can be charged with their occurrence, so no one can legally lose or profit by their
results. While the law protects persons charged with crime from the unjust and arbitrary acts of man, there is no
shield which may be interposed against the tyranny of unforeseen events. Until the proceedings which, under
the system which the law provides, constitute his trial are terminated, the happening of an unforeseen event
which renders the continuance of his trial for the time impossible, as it can not be used for his conviction, can
not be urged for his absolution.[27]

We& cannot& overemphasize& the& necessity& for& a& regulated,& orderly,& and& careful& handling& of& court&
records\&and&the&loss,&tampering,&or&any&other&form&of&alteration&or&destruction&of&the&same&does&not&
only&contribute&to&inordinate&delay&in&judicial&proceedings&but&more&importantly&erodes&the&credibility&
and&reliability&of&our&courts.[28]&In&this&connection,&we&note&that,&despite&repeated&directives&from&this&
Court,& the& National& Bureau& of& Investigation& has& not& submitted& its& report& on& the& cause& of& the& loss& or&
disappearance&of&the&records&in&the&Office&of&the&Solicitor&General.&
WHEREFORE,&in&view&of&the&foregoing,&the&Resolution&of&the&Court&of&Appeals&in&CAQG.R.&CR&No.&
23309&dated&May&7,&2001&is&MODIFIED.&The&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Pasig&City,&Branch&165,&is&directed&
to& reconstitute& the& records& and& evidence& of& Criminal& Case& No.& 109927,& in& accordance& with& the&
procedure&laid&down&in&Act&No.&3110.&The&trial&court&shall&submit&such&records&and&evidence&and&render&
a& report& to& the& Court& of& Appeals& within& sixty& (60)& days& from& notice& hereof.&During& the& reconstitution&
proceedings,& the& periods& for& filing& appeal& briefs& shall& be& suspended.&After& receipt& of& the& report& and&
reconstituted&records&and&evidence&from&the&trial&court,&the&Court&of&Appeals&shall&require&the&parties&to&
submit&their&respective&appeal&briefs,&and&thereafter&to&resolve&the&appeal&based&on&said&briefs&and&the&
reconstituted&evidence.&
The&National&Bureau&of&Investigation&is&directed&to&immediately&and&without&further&delay&submit&its&
report&on&the&cause&of&the&loss&or&disappearance&of&the&records&in&the&Office&of&the&Solicitor&General.&
No&costs.&
SO%ORDERED.%
!
! !
 Republic&of&the&Philippines&
SUPREME%COURT&
Manila&

EN%BANC&

A.M.%No.%RTJ]06]2017%%%%%%%%%%%%%June%19,%2008&

LT.%GEN.%ALFONSO%P.%DAGUDAG%(Ret.),&complainant,&&
vs.&
JUDGE%MAXIMO%G.W.%PADERANGA,%Regional&Trial&Court,&Branch&38,&Cagayan&de&Oro&
City,&respondent.&

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N&

PER%CURIAM,%J.:&

This&is&a&complaint&for&gross&ignorance&of&the&law&and&conduct&unbecoming&a&judge&filed&by&retired&Lt.&
Gen.&Alfonso&P.&Dagudag&(Gen.&Dagudag),&Head&of&Task&Force&Sagip&Kalikasan,&against&Judge&
Maximo&G.&W.&Paderanga&(Judge&Paderanga),&Presiding&Judge&of&the&Regional&Trial&Court,&Branch&
38,&Cagayan&de&Oro&City.&

On&or&about&30&January&2005,&the&Region&VII&Philippine&National&Police&Regional&Maritime&Group&
(PNPRMG)&received&information&that&MV&General&Ricarte&of&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&was&shipping&
container&vans&containing&illegal&forest&products&from&Cagayan&de&Oro&to&Cebu.&The&shipments&were&
falsely&declared&as&cassava&meal&and&corn&grains&to&avoid&inspection&by&the&Department&of&
Environment&and&Natural&Resources&(DENR).1&

On&30&and&31&January&2005,&a&team&composed&of&representatives&from&the&PNPRMG,&DENR,&and&
the&Philippine&Coast&Guard&inspected&the&container&vans&at&a&port&in&Mandaue&City,&Cebu.&The&team&
discovered&the&undocumented&forest&products&and&the&names&of&the&shippers&and&consignees:&

Container&Van&No.& Shipper& Consignee&

NCLU&–&2000492Q22GI& Polaris&Chua& Polaris&Chua&
IEAU&–&2521845Q2210& Polaris&Chua& Polaris&Chua&
NOLU&–&2000682Q22GI& Rowena&Balangot& Rowena&Balangot&
INBU&–&3125757QBB2210& Rowena&Balangot& Rowena&Balangot&
NCLU&–&20001591Q22GI& Jovan&Gomez& Jovan&Gomez&
GSTU&–&339074QUS2210& Jovan&Gomez& Jovan&Gomez&
CRXU&–&2167567& Raffy&Enriquez& Raffy&Enriquez&
NCLU&–&2001570Q22GI& Raffy&Enriquez& Raffy&Enriquez&

The&crew&of&MV&General&Ricarte&failed&to&produce&the&certificate&of&origin&forms&and&other&pertinent&
transport&documents&covering&the&forest&products,&as&required&by&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&07Q
94.&Gen.&Dagudag&alleged&that,&since&nobody&claimed&the&forest&products&within&a&reasonable&period&
of&time,&the&DENR&considered&them&as&abandoned&and,&on&31&January&2005,&the&Provincial&
Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office&(PENRO)&OfficerQinQCharge&(OIC),&Richard&N.&Abella,&
issued&a&seizure&receipt&to&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.2&

On&1&February&2005,&Community&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office&(CENRO)&OIC&Loreto&A.&
Rivac&(Rivac)&sent&a&notice&to&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&asking&for&explanation&why&the&government&
should&not&confiscate&the&forest&products.3&In&an&affidavit4&dated&9&February&2005,&NMC&Container&
Lines,&Inc.’s&Branch&Manager&Alex&Conrad&M.&Seno&stated&that&he&did&not&see&any&reason&why&the&
government&should&not&confiscate&the&forest&products&and&that&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&had&no&
knowledge&of&the&actual&content&of&the&container&vans.&

On&2,&9,&and&15&February&2005,&DENR&Forest&Protection&Officer&Lucio&S.&Canete,&Jr.&posted&notices&
on&the&CENRO&and&PENRO&bulletin&boards&and&at&the&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&building&informing&
the&unknown&owner&about&the&administrative&adjudication&scheduled&on&18&February&2005&at&the&
Cebu&City&CENRO.&Nobody&appeared&during&the&adjudication.5&In&a&resolution6&dated&10&March&2005,&
Rivac,&acting&as&adjudication&officer,&recommended&to&DENR&Regional&Executive&Director&Clarence&L.&
Baguilat&that&the&forest&products&be&confiscated&in&favor&of&the&government.&

In&a&complaint7&dated&16&March&2005&and&filed&before&Judge&Paderanga,&a&certain&Roger&C.&Edma&
(Edma)&prayed&that&a&writ&of&replevin&be&issued&ordering&the&defendants&DENR,&CENRO,&Gen.&
Dagudag,&and&others&to&deliver&the&forest&products&to&him&and&that&judgment&be&rendered&ordering&the&
defendants&to&pay&him&moral&damages,&attorney’s&fees,&and&litigation&expenses.&On&29&March&2005,&
Judge&Paderanga&issued&a&writ&of&replevin8&ordering&Sheriff&Reynaldo&L.&Salceda&to&take&possession&
of&the&forest&products.&

In&a&motion&to&quash&the&writ&of&replevin,9&the&defendants&DENR,&CENRO,&and&Gen.&Dagudag&prayed&
that&the&writ&of&replevin&be&set&aside:&(1)&Edma’s&bond&was&insufficient\&(2)&the&forest&products&were&
falsely&declared&as&cassava&meal&and&corn&grains\&(3)&Edma&was&not&a&partyQinQinterest\&(4)&the&forest&
products&were&not&covered&by&any&legal&document\&(5)&nobody&claimed&the&forest&products&within&a&
reasonable&period&of&time\&(6)&the&forest&products&were&already&considered&abandoned\&(7)&the&forest&
products&were&lawfully&seized&under&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&of&the&Philippines\&(8)&replevin&was&
not&proper\&(9)&courts&could&not&take&cognizance&of&cases&pending&before&the&DENR\&(10)&Edma&failed&
to&exhaust&administrative&remedies\&and&(11)&the&DENR&was&the&agency&responsible&for&the&
enforcement&of&forestry&laws.&In&a&motion&to&dismiss&ad$cautelam10&dated&12&April&2005,&the&
defendants&prayed&that&the&complaint&for&replevin&and&damages&be&dismissed:&(1)&the&real&defendant&
is&the&Republic&of&the&Philippines\&(2)&Edma&failed&to&exhaust&administrative&remedies\&(3)&the&State&
cannot&be&sued&without&its&consent\&and&(4)&Edma&failed&to&allege&that&he&is&the&owner&or&is&entitled&to&
the&possession&of&the&forest&products.&

In&an&order11&dated&14&April&2005,&Judge&Paderanga&denied&the&motion&to&quash&the&writ&of&replevin&
for&lack&of&merit.&

Gen.&Dagudag&filed&with&the&Office&of&the&Court&Administrator&(OCA)&an&affidavitQcomplaint12&dated&8&
July&2005&charging&Judge&Paderanga&with&gross&ignorance&of&the&law&and&conduct&unbecoming&a&
judge.&Gen.&Dagudag&stated&that:&

During&the&x&x&x&hearing,&[Judge&Paderanga]&showed&manifest&partiality&in&favor&of&x&x&x&Edma.&
DENR’s&counsel&was&lambasted,&cajoled&and&intimidated&by&[Judge&Paderanga]&using&words&
such&as&"SHUT&UP"&and&"THAT’S&BALONEY."&

x&x&x&x&

Edma&in&the&replevin&case&cannot&seek&to&recover&the&wood&shipment&from&the&DENR&since&he&
had&not&sought&administrative&remedies&available&to&him.&The&prudent&thing&for&[Judge&
Paderanga]&to&have&done&was&to&dismiss&the&replevin&suit&outright.&

x&x&x&x&

[Judge&Paderanga’s]&act[s]&of&taking&cognizance&of&the&x&x&x&replevin&suit,&issuing&the&writ&of&
replevin&and&the&subsequent&denial&of&the&motion&to&quash&clearly&demonstrates&[sic]&ignorance&
of&the&law.&

In&its&1st&Indorsement13&dated&1&August&2005,&the&OCA&directed&Judge&Paderanga&to&comment&on&the&
affidavitQcomplaint.&In&his&comment14&dated&6&September&2005,&Judge&Paderanga&stated&that&he&
exercised&judicial&discretion&in&issuing&the&writ&of&replevin&and&that&he&could&not&delve&into&the&issues&
raised&by&Gen.&Dagudag&because&they&were&related&to&a&case&pending&before&him.&

In&its&Report15&dated&10&July&2006,&the&OCA&found&that&Judge&Paderanga&(1)&violated&the&doctrine&of&
exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies\&(2)&violated&the&doctrine&of&primary&jurisdiction\&and&(3)&used&
inappropriate&language&in&court.&The&OCA&recommended&that&the&case&be&reQdocketed&as&a&regular&
administrative&matter\&that&Judge&Paderanga&be&held&liable&for&gross&ignorance&of&the&law&and&for&
violation&of&Section&6,&Canon&6&of&the&New&Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&for&the&Philippine&Judiciary\16&and&
that&he&be&fined&P30,000.&

In&its&Resolution17&dated&16&August&2006,&the&Court&reQdocketed&the&case&as&a&regular&administrative&
matter&and&required&the&parties&to&manifest&whether&they&were&willing&to&submit&the&case&for&decision&
based&on&the&pleadings&already&filed.&Judge&Paderanga&manifested&his&willingness&to&submit&the&case&
for&decision&based&on&the&pleadings&already&filed.18&Since&Gen.&Dagudag&did&not&file&any&
manifestation,&the&Court&considered&him&to&have&waived&his&compliance&with&the&16&August&2006&
Resolution.19&

The&Court&finds&Judge&Paderanga&liable&for&gross&ignorance&of&the&law&and&for&conduct&unbecoming&a&
judge.&

The&DENR&is&the&agency&responsible&for&the&enforcement&of&forestry&laws.&Section&4&of&Executive&
Order&No.&192&states&that&the&DENR&shall&be&the&primary&agency&responsible&for&the&conservation,&
management,&development,&and&proper&use&of&the&country’s&natural&resources.&
Section&68&of&Presidential&Decree&No.&705,&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&No.&277,&states&that&
possessing&forest&products&without&the&required&legal&documents&is&punishable.&Section&68QA&states&
that&the&DENR&Secretary&or&his&duly&authorized&representatives&may&order&the&confiscation&of&any&
forest&product&illegally&cut,&gathered,&removed,&possessed,&or&abandoned.&

In&the&instant&case,&the&forest&products&were&possessed&by&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&without&the&
required&legal&documents&and&were&abandoned&by&the&unknown&owner.&Consequently,&the&DENR&
seized&the&forest&products.&

Judge&Paderanga&should&have&dismissed&the&replevin&suit&outright&for&three&reasons.&First,&under&the&
doctrine&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies,&courts&cannot&take&cognizance&of&cases&pending&
before&administrative&agencies.&In&Factoran,$Jr.$v.$Court$of$Appeals,20&the&Court&held&that:&

The%doctrine%of%exhaustion%of%administrative%remedies%is%basic.&Courts,&for&reasons&of&
law,&comity&and&convenience,&should%not%entertain%suits%unless%the%available%
administrative%remedies%have%first%been%resorted%to%and%the%proper%authorities%have%
been%given%an%appropriate%opportunity%to%act%and%correct%their%alleged%errors,%if%any,%
committed%in%the%administrative%forum.&(Emphasis&ours)&

In&Dy$v.$Court$of$Appeals,21&the&Court&held&that&a&party&must&exhaust&all&administrative&remedies&
before&he&can&resort&to&the&courts.&In&Paat$v.$Court$of$Appeals,22&the&Court&held&that:&

This&Court&in&a&long&line&of&cases&has&consistently&held&that&before%a%party%is%allowed%to%seek%
the%intervention%of%the%court,%it%is%a%pre]condition%that%he%should%have%availed%of%all%the%
means%of%administrative%processes%afforded%him.&Hence,&if%a%remedy%within%the%
administrative%machinery%can%still%be%resorted%to&by&giving&the&administrative&officer&
concerned&every&opportunity&to&decide&on&a&matter&that&comes&within&his&jurisdiction&then%such%
remedy%should%be%exhausted%first%before%court’s%judicial%power%can%be%sought.&The%
premature%invocation%of%court’s%intervention%is%fatal%to%one’s%cause%of%action.&
Accordingly,&absent&any&finding&of&waiver&or&estoppel&the&case&is&susceptible&of&dismissal&for&
lack&of&cause&of&action.&(Emphasis&ours)&

In&the&instant&case,&Edma&did&not&resort&to,&or&avail&of,&any&administrative&remedy.&He&went&straight&to&
court&and&filed&a&complaint&for&replevin&and&damages.&Section&8&of&Presidential&Decree&No.&705,&as&
amended,&states&that&(1)&all&actions&and&decisions&of&the&Bureau&of&Forest&Development&Director&are&
subject&to&review&by&the&DENR&Secretary\&(2)&the&decisions&of&the&DENR&Secretary&are&appealable&to&
the&President\&and&(3)&courts&cannot&review&the&decisions&of&the&DENR&Secretary&except&through&a&
special&civil&action&for&certiorari&or&prohibition.&In&Dy,23&the&Court&held&that&all&actions&seeking&to&
recover&forest&products&in&the&custody&of&the&DENR&shall&be&directed&to&that&agency&—&not&the&courts.&
In&Paat,24&the&Court&held&that:&

Dismissal%of%the%replevin%suit%for%lack%of%cause%of%action%in%view%of%the%private%
respondents’%failure%to%exhaust%administrative%remedies%should%have%been%the%proper%
course%of%action%by%the%lower%court%instead%of%assuming%jurisdiction%over%the%case%and%
consequently%issuing%the%writ&[of%replevin].&Exhaustion%of%the%remedies%in%the%
administrative%forum,&being&a&condition&precedent&prior&to&one’s&recourse&to&the&courts&and&
more&importantly,&being&an&element&of&private&respondents’&right&of&action,&is%too%significant%
to%be%waylaid%by%the%lower%court.&

x&x&x&x&

Moreover,&the%suit%for%replevin%is%never%intended%as%a%procedural%tool%to%question%the%
orders%of%confiscation%and%forfeiture%issued%by%the%DENR&in&pursuance&to&the&authority&
given&under&P.D.&705,&as&amended.&Section&8&of&the&said&law&is&explicit&that%actions%taken%by%
the&

Director%of%the%Bureau%of%Forest%Development&concerning&the&enforcement&of&the&provisions&
of&the&said&law&are%subject%to%review%by%the%Secretary%of%DENR%and%that%courts%may%not%
review%the%decisions%of%the%Secretary%except%through%a%special%civil%action%for%certiorari%
or%prohibition.&(Emphasis&ours)&

Second,&under&the&doctrine&of&primary&jurisdiction,&courts&cannot&take&cognizance&of&cases&pending&
before&administrative&agencies&of&special&competence.&The&DENR&is&the&agency&responsible&for&the&
enforcement&of&forestry&laws.&The&complaint&for&replevin&itself&stated&that&members&of&DENR’s$Task$
Force$Sagip$Kalikasan&took&over&the&forest&products&and&brought&them&to&the&DENR$Community$
Environment$and$Natural$Resources$Office.&This&should&have&alerted&Judge&Paderanga&that&the&
DENR&had&custody&of&the&forest&products,&that&administrative&proceedings&may&have&been&
commenced,&and&that&the&replevin&suit&had&to&be&dismissed&outright.&In&Tabao$v.$Judge$Lilagan25&—&a&
case&with&a&similar&set&of&facts&as&the&instant&case&—&the&Court&held&that:&

The&complaint&for&replevin&itself&states&that&the&shipment&x&x&x&[was]&seized&by&the&NBI&for&
verification&of&supporting&documents.&It&also&states&that&the&NBI&turned&over&the&seized&items&to&
the&DENR&"for&official&disposition&and&appropriate&action."&x&x&x&To&our&mind,&these%
allegations&[should]&have%been%sufficient%to%alert%respondent%judge%that%the%DENR%has%
custody%of%the%seized%items%and%that%administrative%proceedings%may%have%already%been%
commenced%concerning%the%shipment.%Under%the%doctrine%of%primary%jurisdiction,%courts%
cannot%take%cognizance%of%cases%pending%before%administrative%agencies%of%special%
competence.&x&x&x&The%prudent%thing%for%respondent%judge%to%have%done%was%to%dismiss%
the%replevin%suit%outright.&(Emphasis&ours)&

In&Paat,26&the&Court&held&that:&

[T]he&enforcement&of&forestry&laws,&rules&and&regulations&and&the&protection,&development&and&
management&of&forest&lands&fall&within&the&primary&and&special&responsibilities&of&the&
Department&of&Environment&and&

Natural&Resources.&By&the&very&nature&of&its&function,&the%DENR%should%be%given%a%free%hand%
unperturbed%by%judicial%intrusion%to%determine%a%controversy%which%is%well%within%its%
jurisdiction.%The%assumption%by%the%trial%court,%therefore,%of%the%replevin%suit%filed%by%
private%respondents%constitutes%an%unjustified%encroachment%into%the%domain%of%the%
administrative%agency’s%prerogative.%The%doctrine%of%primary%jurisdiction%does%not%
warrant%a%court%to%arrogate%unto%itself%the%authority%to%resolve%a%controversy%the%
jurisdiction%over%which%is%initially%lodged%with%an%administrative%body%of%special%
competence.&(Emphasis&ours)&

Third,&the&forest&products&are&already&in&custodia$legis&and&thus&cannot&be&the&subject&of&replevin.&
There&was&a&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&and&the&DENR&seized&the&forest&products&in&
accordance&with&law.&In&Calub$v.$Court$of$Appeals,27&the&Court&held&that&properties&lawfully&seized&by&
the&DENR&cannot&be&the&subject&of&replevin:&

Since%there%was%a%violation%of%the%Revised%Forestry%Code%and%the%seizure%was%in%
accordance%with%law,%in%our%view%the&[properties%seized]&were%validly%deemed%in%custodia3
legis.&[They]&could%not%be%subject%to%an%action%for%replevin.&For&it&is&property&lawfully&taken&
by&virtue&of&legal&process&and&considered&in&the&custody&of&the&law,&and&not&otherwise.&
(Emphasis&ours)&

Judge&Paderanga’s&acts&of&taking&cognizance&of&the&replevin&suit&and&of&issuing&the&writ&of&replevin&
constitute&gross&ignorance&of&the&law.&In&Tabao,28&the&Court&held&that:&

Under&the&doctrine&of&primary&jurisdiction,&courts&cannot&take&cognizance&of&cases&pending&
before&administrative&of&special&competence.&x&x&x&[T]he%plaintiff%in%the%replevin%suit%
who&[sought]&to%recover%the%shipment%from%the%DENR%had%not%exhausted%the%
administrative%remedies%available%to%him.%The%prudent%thing%for%respondent%judge%to%
have%done%was%to%dismiss%the%replevin%suit%outright.&

Under&Section&78QA&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code,&the&DENR&secretary&or&his&authorized&
representatives&may&order&the&confiscation&of&forest&products&illegally&cut,&gathered,&removed,&
or&possessed&or&abandoned.&

x&x&x&x&

Respondent%judge’s%act%of%taking%cognizance%of%the&x&x&x&replevin%suit%clearly%
demonstrates%ignorance%of%the%law.&x&x&x&[J]udges&are&expected&to&keep&abreast&of&all&laws&
and&prevailing&jurisprudence.&Judges&are&duty&bound&to&have&more&than&just&a&cursory&
acquaintance&with&laws&and&jurisprudence.&Failure%to%follow%basic%legal%commands%
constitutes%gross%ignorance%of%the%law%from%which%no%one%may%be%excused,%not%even%a%
judge.&(Emphasis&ours)&

Canon&6&of&the&New&Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&for&the&Philippine&Judiciary&states&that&competence&is&a&
prerequisite&to&the&due&performance&of&judicial&office.&Section&3&of&Canon&6&states&that&judges&shall&
take&reasonable&steps&to&maintain&and&enhance&their&knowledge&necessary&for&the&proper&
performance&of&judicial&duties.&Judges&should&keep&themselves&abreast&with&legal&developments&and&
show&acquaintance&with&laws.29&
The&rule&that&courts&cannot&prematurely&take&cognizance&of&cases&pending&before&administrative&
agencies&is&basic.&There&was&no&reason&for&Judge&Paderanga&to&make&an&exception&to&this&rule.&The&
forest&products&were&in&the&custody&of&the&DENR&and&Edma&had&not&availed&of&any&administrative&
remedy.&Judge&Paderanga&should&have&dismissed&the&replevin&suit&outright.&In&Español$v.$Toledo<
Mupas,30&the&Court&held&that:&

Being&among&the&judicial&frontQliners&who&have&direct&contact&with&the&litigants,&a&wanton&
display&of&utter&lack&of&familiarity&with&the&rules&by&the&judge&inevitably&erodes&the&confidence&of&
the&public&in&the&competence&of&our&courts&to&render&justice.&It&subjects&the&judiciary&to&
embarrassment.&Worse,&it&could&raise&the&specter&of&corruption.&

When&the&gross&inefficiency&springs&from&a&failure&to&consider&so&basic&and&elemental&a&rule,&a&
law,&or&a&principle&in&the&discharge&of&his&or&her&duties,&a&judge&is&either&too&incompetent&and&
undeserving&of&the&exalted&position&and&title&he&or&she&holds,&or&the&oversight&or&omission&was&
deliberately&done&in&bad&faith&and&in&grave&abuse&of&judicial&authority.&

The&OCA&found&Judge&Paderanga&liable&for&using&inappropriate&language&in&court:&"We&x&x&x&find&
respondent’s&intemperate&use&of&"Shut&up!"&and&"Baloney!"&well&nigh&inappropriate&in&court&
proceedings.&The&utterances&are&uncalled&for."31&

Indeed,&the&14&and&22&April&2005&transcripts&of&stenographic&notes&show&that&Judge&Paderanga&was&
impatient,&discourteous,&and&undignified&in&court:&

Atty.&Luego:&Your&Honor,&we&want&to&have&this&motion&because&that&is...&

Judge&Paderanga:&I&am&asking&you&why&did&you&not&make&any&rejoinder[?]&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Luego:&I&apologize,&Your&Honor.&We&are&ready&to...&

Judge&Paderanga:&Ready&to&what?&Proceed.&

Atty.&Luego:&Yes,&Your&Honor.&We&filed&this&motion&to&quash&replevin,&Your&Honor,&on&the&
grounds,&first&and&foremost,&it&is&our&contention,&Your&Honor,&with&all&due&respect&of&[sic]&this&
Honorable&Court,&that&the&writ&of&replevin&dated&March&29,&2005&was&improper,&Your&Honor,&for&
the&reasons&that&the&lumber,&subject&matter&of&this&case,&were&apprehended&in&accordance&
with...&

Judge&Paderanga:&Where&is&your&proof&that&it&was&apprehended?&Where&is&your&proof?&Is&that&
apprehension&proven&by&a&seizure&receipt?&Where&is&your&seizure&receipt?&

Atty.&Luego:&Under&the&rules...&

Judge&Paderanga:&Where&is&your&seizure&receipt?&You&read&your&rules.&What&does&[sic]&the&
rules&say?&Where&in&your&rules&does&it&say&that&it&does&not&need&any&seizure&receipt?&You&look&
at&your&rules.&You&point&out&the&rules.&You&take&out&your&rules&and&then&you&point&out.&Do&you&
have&the&rules?&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Luego:&Your&Honor,&there&was&no&seizure&receipt,&but&during&the&apprehension,&Your&
Honor,&there&was&no&claimant.&

Judge&Paderanga:&Answer&me.&Is&there&a&seizure&receipt?&

Atty.&Luego:&But&during&the&apprehension,&Your&Honor,&no&owner&has&[sic]&appeared.&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Luego:&According&to&[the]&rules,&Your&Honor,&if&there&is&no...&

Judge&Paderanga:&Whom&are&you&seizing&it&from?&To&[sic]&whom&are&you&taking&it&from?&

Atty.&Luego:&From&the&shipping&company,&Your&Honor.&

x&x&x&x&
 Atty.&Luego:&Your&Honor&please,&the&shipping&company&denied&the&ownership&of&that&lumber.&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Luego:&But&the&shipping&company,&Your&Honor,...&

Judge&Paderanga:&Shut%up.%That’s%baloney.&You&are&seizing&it&from&nobody.&Then&how&can&
you&seize&it&from&the&shipping&company.&Are&you&not?&You&are&a&lawyer.&Who&is&in&possession&
of&the&property?&The&shipping&company.&Why&did&you&not&issue&[a]&seizure&receipt&to&the&
shipping&company?&

Atty.&Luego:&But&the...&May&I&continue,&Your&Honor?&

x&x&x&x&

Judge&Paderanga:&Stop&talking&about&the&shipping&company.&Still&you&did&not&issue&a&seizure&
receipt&here.&Well,&I’m&telling&you&you&should&have&issued&[a]&seizure&receipt&to&the&shipping&
company.&

x&x&x&x&

Judge&Paderanga:&You&are&a&lawyer.&You%should%know%how%to%write%pleadings.&You&write&
the&pleadings&the&way&it&should&be,&not&the&way&you&think&it&should&be.&

Atty.&Luego:&I’m&sorry,&Your&Honor.&

Judge&Paderanga:&You&are&an&officer&of&the&court.&You%should%be%careful%with%your%
language.&You&say&that&I&am&wrong.&It’s%you%who%are&[sic]&wrong%because%you%do%not%read%
the%law.&

x&x&x&x&

Judge&Paderanga:&Then&you&read&the&law.&How%dare%you%say%that%the%Court%is%wrong.&

x&x&x&x&

Judge&Paderanga:&Are&you&not&representing&[the&DENR]?&

Atty.&Luego:&Yes,&in&this&case,&Your&Honor.&

Judge&Paderanga:&Then&you&are&representing&them.&They&are&your&clients.&What%kind%of%a%
lawyer%are%you?32&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Tiamson:&Specifically&it&was&stated&in&the&[Factoran]&versus&Court&of&Appeals&[case]&that&
the&Court&should&not&interfere,&Your&Honor.&

Judge&Paderanga:&No.&

x&x&x&x&

Judge&Paderanga:&The%problem%with%you%people%is%you%do%not%use%your%heads.&

Atty.&Tiamson:&We&use&our&heads,&your&Honor.&

x&x&x&x&

Atty.&Tiamson:&Your&Honor,&we&would&like&to&put&on&record&that&we&use&our&heads,&your&
Honor.33&(Emphasis&ours)&

Section&6,&Canon&6&of&the&New&Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&for&the&Philippine&Judiciary&states&that&
judges&shall&be&patient,&dignified,&and&courteous&in&relation&to&lawyers.&Rule&3.04,&Canon&3&of&the&
Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&states&that&judges&should&be&patient&and&courteous&to&lawyers,&especially&
the&inexperienced.&They&should&avoid&the&attitude&that&the&litigants&are&made&for&the&courts,&instead&of&
the&courts&for&the&litigants.&
Judicial&decorum&requires&judges&to&be&temperate&in&their&language&at&all&times.&They&must&refrain&
from&inflammatory,&excessively&rhetoric,&or&vile&language.34&They&should&(1)&be&dignified&in&demeanor&
and&refined&in&speech\&(2)&exhibit&that&temperament&of&utmost&sobriety&and&selfQrestraint\&and&(3)&be&
considerate,&courteous,&and&civil&to&all&persons&who&come&to&their&court.35&In&Juan$de$la$Cruz$v.$
Carretas,36&the&Court&held&that:&

A&judge&who&is&inconsiderate,&discourteous&or&uncivil&to&lawyers&x&x&x&who&appear&in&his&sala&
commits&an&impropriety&and&fails&in&his&duty&to&reaffirm&the&people’s&faith&in&the&judiciary.&He&
also&violates&Section&6,&Canon&6&of&the&New&Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&for&the&Philippine&
Judiciary.&

x&x&x&x&

It&is&reprehensible&for&a&judge&to&humiliate&a&lawyer&x&x&x.&The&act&betrays&lack&of&patience,&
prudence&and&restraint.&Thus,&a&judge&must&at&all&times&be&temperate&in&his&language.&He&must&
choose&his&words&x&x&x&with&utmost&care&and&sufficient&control.&The&wise&and&just&man&is&
esteemed&for&his&discernment.&Pleasing&speech&increases&his&persuasiveness.&

Equanimity&and&judiciousness&should&be&the&constant&marks&of&a&dispenser&of&justice.&A&judge&
should&always&keep&his&passion&guarded.&He&can&never&allow&it&to&run&loose&and&overcome&his&
reason.&He&descends&to&the&level&of&a&sharpQtongued,&illQmannered&petty&tyrant&when&he&utters&
harsh&words&x&x&x.&As&a&result,&he&degrades&the&judicial&office&and&erodes&public&confidence&in&
the&judiciary.&

Judge&Paderanga’s&refusal&to&consider&the&motion&to&quash&the&writ&of&replevin,&repeated&interruption&
of&the&lawyers,&and&utterance&of&"shut&up,"&"that’s&baloney,"&"how&dare&you&say&that&the&court&is&
wrong,"&"what&kind&of&a&lawyer&are&you?,"&and&"the&problem&with&you&people&is&you&do&not&use&your&
heads"&are&undignified&and&very&unbecoming&a&judge.&In&Office$of$the$Court$Administrator$v.$
Paderanga,37&the&Court&already&reprimanded&Judge&Paderanga&for&repeatedly&saying&"shut&up,"&being&
arrogant,&and&declaring&that&he&had&"absolute&power"&in&court.&He&has&not&changed.&

Section&8,&Rule&140&of&the&Rules&of&Court&classifies&gross&ignorance&of&the&law&as&a&serious&offense.&It&
is&punishable&by&(1)&dismissal&from&the&service,&forfeiture&of&benefits,&and&disqualification&from&
reinstatement&to&any&public&office\&(2)&suspension&from&office&without&salary&and&other&benefits&for&
more&than&three&months&but&not&exceeding&six&months\&or&(3)&a&fine&of&more&than&P20,000&but&not&
exceeding&P40,000.38&Section&10&of&Rule&140&classifies&conduct&unbecoming&a&judge&as&a&light&
offense.&It&is&punishable&by&(1)&a&fine&of&not&less&than&P1,000&but&not&exceeding&P10,000\&(2)&censure\&
(3)&reprimand\&or&(4)&admonition&with&warning.39&

The&Court&notes&that&this&is&Judge&Paderanga’s&third&offense.&In&Office$of$the$Court$Administrator$v.$
Paderanga,40the&Court&held&him&liable&for&grave&abuse&of&authority&and&simple&misconduct&for&
unceremoniously&citing&a&lawyer&in&contempt&while&declaring&himself&as&having&"absolute&power"&and&
for&repeatedly&telling&a&lawyer&to&"shut&up."&In&Beltran,$Jr.$v.$Paderanga,41&the&Court&held&him&liable&for&
undue&delay&in&rendering&an&order&for&the&delay&of&nine&months&in&resolving&an&amended&formal&offer&
of&exhibits.&In&both&cases,&the&Court&sternly&warned&Judge&Paderanga&that&the&commission&of&another&
offense&shall&be&dealt&with&more&severely.&The&instant&case&and&the&two&cases&decided&against&him&
demonstrate&Judge&Paderanga’s&arrogance,&incorrigibility,&and&unfitness&to&become&a&judge.&

Judge&Paderanga&has&two&other&administrative&cases&pending&against&him&—&one42&for&gross&
ignorance&of&the&law,&knowingly&rendering&an&unjust&judgment,&and&grave&abuse&of&authority,&and&the&
other43&for&gross&misconduct,&grave&abuse&of&authority,&and&gross&ignorance&of&the&law.&

The&Court&will&not&hesitate&to&impose&the&ultimate&penalty&on&those&who&have&fallen&short&of&their&
accountabilities.&It&will&not&tolerate&any&conduct&that&violates&the&norms&of&public&accountability&and&
diminishes&the&faith&of&the&people&in&the&judicial&system.44&

WHEREFORE,&the&Court&finds&Judge&Maximo&G.W.&Paderanga,&Regional&Trial&Court,&Branch&38,&
Cagayan&de&Oro&City,&GUILTY%of%GROSS%IGNORANCE%OF%THE%LAW&and&UNBECOMING%
CONDUCT.&Accordingly,&the&Court&DISMISSES&him&from&the&service,&with&forfeiture&of&all&retirement&
benefits,&except&accrued&leave&credits,&and&with&prejudice&to&reinstatement&or&appointment&to&any&
public&office,&including&governmentQowned&or&controlled&corporations.&

SO%ORDERED.&

!
! !
Digest:!

Dagudag&v&Judge&Paderanga
FACTS:
Illegal&forest&products&were&possessed&by&NMC&Container&Lines,&Inc.&weres e i z e d & b y & t h e & D E N R . &
The&items&were&found&to&be&lacking&the&
r e q u i r e d l e g a l & d o c u m e n t s & a n d & w e r e & c o n s e q u e n t l y & a b a n d o n e d & b y & t h e & u n k n o w n own
er.Later&a&certain&Roger&C.&Edma&filed&a&writ&of&replevin&for&the&release&of&said&confiscated&
products.&Respondent&Judge&issued&the&writ&despite&thefact&that&an&administrative&case&was&already&
pending&before&the&DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether&or&not&Judge&Paderanga&is&liable&for&gross&ignorance&of&the&lawand&for&conduct&
unbecoming&a&judge.
HELD:
&Yes.&Judge&Paderanga&should&have&dismissed&the&replevin&suit&outright&forthree&reasons.&First,&
under&the&doctrine&of&exhaustion&of&
administrativer e m e d i e s , & c o u r t s & c a n n o t & t a k e & c o g n i z a n c e & o f & c a s e s & p e n d i n g & b
e f o r e administrative&agencies.&In&the&instant&case,&Edma&did&not&resort&to,&oravail&of,
any
administrative&remedy.&He&went&straight&to&court&and&filed&acomplaint&for&replevin&and&
damages.Second,&under&the&doctrine&of&primary&jurisdiction,&courts&cannot&takecognizance&
of&cases&pending&before&administrative&agencies&of&
specialcompetence.&Third,&the&forest&products&are&already&in
custodia legis
and&thus&cannotbe&the&subject&
of&replevin.&Judge&Paderanga’s&acts&of&taking&cognizance&of&the&replevin&suit&and&of&issuing&the&writ&of&
replevin&constitute&gross&ignorance&of&the&law.Canon&6&of&the&New&Code&of&Judicial&Conduct&for&
the&Philippine&
Judiciarys t a t e s & t h a t & c o m p e t e n c e & i s & a & p r e r e q u i s i t e & t o & t h e & d u e & p e r f o r m a n c e & o f & &judic
ial&office.&Section&3&of&Canon&6&states&that&judges&shall&takereasonable&steps&to&maintain&and&
enhance&their&knowledge&necessary&forthe&proper&performance&of&judicial&duties.&Judges&should&keep&
themselvesabreast&with&legal&developments&and&show&acquaintance&with&laws.&Therule&
that&courts&cannot&prematurely&take&cognizance&of&cases&pendingbefore&administrative&
agencies&is&basic.&There&was&no&reason&for&JudgePaderanga&to&make&an&exception&to&this&rule.&
The&forest&products&were&inthe&custody&of&the&DENR&and&Edma&had&not&availed&of&any&
administrativer e m e d y . & J u d g e & P a d e r a n g a & s h o u l d & h a v e & d i s m i s s e d & t h e & r e p l e v i n
& s u i t outright.
!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%108619.%July%31,%1997]%

EPIFANIO% LALICAN,%petitioner,%vs.% HON.% FILOMENO% A.% VERGARA,% Presiding% Judge,% RTC%

Branch%52,%Puerto%Princesa%City%and%PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%respondents.%

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
ROMERO,%J.:%

The& issue& posed& for& resolution& in& this& petition& for&certiorari&and& prohibition& with& prayer& for& the&
issuance&of&a&temporary&restraining&order&is&whether&or&not&a&charge&of&illegal&possession&of&"lumber"&
is&excluded&from&the&crime&of&illegal&possession&of&"timber"&as&defined&in&Sec.&68&of&Presidential&Decree&
No.& 705& (The& Forestry& Reform& Code& of& the& Philippines),& as& amended,& to& warrant& the& quashal& of& an&
information&charging&the&former&offense&or&a&"nonexistent&crime."&
On& July& 23,& 1991,& an& information& for& violation& of& Section& 68& of& P.D.& No.& 705,& as& amended& by&
Executive&Order&No.&277,&was&filed&by&the&City&Prosecutor&of&Puerto&Princesa&City&against&petitioner&
Epifanio&Lalican,[1]&Ruben&Benitez,&Allan&Pulgar&and&Jose&Roblo&before&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&that&
city.&Docketed&as&Criminal&Case&No.&9543,&the&information&reads:&

"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful
authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted
species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos
(14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

At&their&arraignment&on&August&9,&1991,&all&the&accused&pleaded&not&guilty&to&the&crime&charged.&
On&August&23,&1991,&petitioner&Lalican&filed&a&motion&to&quash&the&information&on&the&ground&that&
the& facts& charged& did& not& constitute& an& offense.&Contending& that& Sec.& 68& of& P.D.& No.& 705& refers& to&
"timber&and&other&forest&products"&and&not&to&"lumber,"&and&asserting&that&"timber"&becomes&"lumber"&
only&after&it&is&sawed&into&beams,&planks&or&boards,&petitioner&alleged&that&said&decree&"does&not&apply&
to&'lumber.'"&He&added&that&the&law&is&"vague&and&standardless"&as&it&does&not&specify&the&authority&or&
the&legal&documents&required&by&existing&forest&laws&and&regulations.&Hence,&petitioner&asserted&that&
the& information& should& be& quashed& as& it& violated& his& constitutional& rights& to& due& process& and& equal&
protection&of&the&law.[2]&
The&prosecution&opposed&the&motion&to&quash&on&the&ground&that&it&is&not&for&the&courts&to&determine&
the&wisdom&of&the&law&nor&to&set&out&the&policy&of&the&legislature&which&deemed&it&proper&that&the&word&
"timber"&should&include&"lumber"&which&is&a&"product&or&derivative&after&the&timber&is&cut."&The&position&
of&the&prosecution&was&that&to&hold&otherwise&would&result&in&the&easy&circumvention&of&the&law,&for&one&
could& stealthily& cut& timber& from& any& forest,& have& it& sawn& into& lumber& and& escape& criminal&
prosecution.&The&prosecution&asserted&that&the&issue&raised&by&petitioner&was&more&semantical&than&a&
question&of&law.[3]&
On& September& 24,& 1991,& the& lower& court,[4]&guided& by& the& principles& that& penal& laws& should& be&
construed&strictly&against&the&state&and&that&all&doubts&should&be&resolved&in&favor&of&the&accused,&issued&
an& Order& quashing& the& information.&It& held& that& the& distinction& between& "timber"& and& "lumber"& is& not&
artificial&nor&a&matter&of&semantics&as&the&law&itself&distinguishes&the&two&terms.&Sec.&3(q)&of&P.D.&No.&
705&classifies&"timber"&as&a&forest&product&while&Sec.&3(aa)&thereof&considers&"lumber"&as&a&finished&
wood&product.&Adding&that&unlicensed&cutting,&gathering&and/or&collecting&of&"timber"&is&penalized&under&
Sec.&68&while&sale&of&"lumber"&without&compliance&with&grading&rules&established&by&the&government&is&
prohibited&by&Sec.&79,&the&lower&court&categorically&stated&that:&

"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut,
gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to
lumber."

The&court,&however,&refrained&from&exploring&the&constitutional&issues&raised&by&petitioner&upon&a&
holding&that&the&case&could&be&resolved&on&some&other&grounds&or&issues.[5]&
 The& prosecution& filed& a& motion& for& the& reconsideration& of& this& Order,& pointing& out& that& under& the&
Primer&on&Illegal&Logging&of&the&Department&of&Energy&and&Natural&Resources&(DENR),&timber&is&not&
just&any&piece&of&wood&for&it&may&consist&of&squared&and&manufactured&timber&or&one&which&has&been&
sawn& to& pieces& to& facilitate& transportation& or& hauling.& It& stressed& that& to& consider& a& person& who& had&
made&lumber&out&of&timber&as&not&criminally&liable&is&an&absurd&interpretation&of&the&law.&
Moreover,&the&prosecution&underscored&the&facts&that&when&apprehended,&the&accused&presented&
Private&Land&Timber&Permit&No.&030140&dated&February&10,&1991&which&had&expired\&that&while&the&
certificate&of&origin&indicated&Brgy.&Sta.&Cruz,&the&product&actually&came&from&Sitio&Cadiz,&and&that&the&
two&jeeps&bearing&the&product&were&not&equipped&with&certificates&of&transport&agreement.&Added&to&this&
was&the&fact&that,&if&the&product&were&indeed&lumber,&then&the&accused&could&have&presented&a&certificate&
of&lumber&origin,&lumber&sale&invoices&in&case&of&sale,&tally&sheets&and&delivery&receipts&for&transportation&
from&one&point&to&another.[6]&
Petitioner&opposed&the&motion&for&reconsideration&contending&that&the&DENR&primer's&definition&of&
"timber"& is& erroneous& because& the& law& itself& distinguishes& "timber"& from& "sawn& lumber."& The& nonQ
inclusion& of& "lumber"& in& Sec.& 68& could& only& mean& a& clear& legislative& intent& to& exclude& possession& of&
"lumber"&from&the&acts&penalized&under&that&section.[7]&
Pending&resolution&of&the&motion&for&reconsideration,&the&Presiding&Judge&of&Branch&49&inhibited&
himself&from&taking&cognizance&of&Criminal&Case&No.&9543.&The&case&was&subsequently&assigned&to&
Branch&52.&
On&June&10,&1992,&the&lower&court[8]&issued&the&herein&questioned&Order&setting&aside&the&quashal&
Order&of&the&previous&judge.&It&declared&that&from&the&law&itself,&it&is&evident&that&what&is&sought&to&be&
penalized&is&not&the&possession,&without&the&required&legal&documents,&of&timber&only&but&also&of&"other&
forest& products."&It& stated& that& even& if& lumber& is& not& timber,& still,& lumber& is& a& forest& product& and&
possession&thereof&without&legal&documents&is&equally&prohibited&by&the&law&which&includes&"wood"&in&
the&definition&of&forest&products.&
Petitioner&sought&the&reconsideration&of&this&Order&but&the&lower&court&denied&it.&Hence,&the&instant&
petition&arguing&that&the&lower&court&gravely&abused&its&discretion&amounting&to&lack&of&jurisdiction&in&
setting&aside&the&quashal&order&and&in&denying&his&motion&for&reconsideration&on&the&ground&that&Sec.&
68&of&P.D.&No.&705&neither&specifies&nor&includes&"lumber"&in&the&phrase&"timber&or&other&forest&products."&
The&petition&is&devoid&of&merit.&
Sec.&68&of&P.D.&No.&705,&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&No.&277&which&was&issued&on&July&25,&
1987&by&then&President&Corazon&C.&Aquino,&provides:&

"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)

Punished&then&in&this&section&are:&(a)&the&cutting,&gathering,&collection,&or&removal&of&timber&or&other&
forest&products&from&the&places&therein&mentioned&without&any&authority\&or&(b)&possession&of&timber&or&
other& forest& products& without& the& legal& documents& as& required& under& existing& forest& laws& and&
regulations.&
In&the&recent&case&of&Mustang$Lumber,$Inc.$v.$Court$of$Appeals,[9]&this&Court,&thru&Justice&Hilario&
Davide,&held:&
"The&Revised&Forestry&Code&contains&no&definition&of&either&timber&or&lumber.&While&the&former&is&
included&in&forest&products&as&defined&in&paragraph&(q)&of&Section&3,&the&latter&is&found&in&paragraph&(aa)&
of&the&same&section&in&the&definition&of&'Processing&plant,'&which&reads:&

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the
market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."

Be&that&as&it&may,&the&legislative&intent&to&include&possession&of&lumber&in&Sec.&68&is&clearly&gleaned&
from& the& expressed& reasons& for& enacting& the& law& which,& under& Executive& Order& No.& 277,& are& the&
following:&

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement
and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws
more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"

To&exclude&possession&of&"lumber"&from&the&acts&penalized&in&Sec.&68&would&certainly&emasculate&
the&law&itself.&A&law&should&not&be&so&construed&as&to&allow&the&doing&of&an&act&which&is&prohibited&by&
law,& nor& so& interpreted& as& to& afford& an& opportunity& to& defeat& compliance& with& its& terms,& create& an&
inconsistency,& or& contravene& the& plain& words& of& the& law.[10]&After& all,& the& phrase& "forest& products"& is&
broad& enough& to& encompass& lumber& which,& to& reiterate,& is& manufactured& timber.& Hence,& to& mention&
lumber&in&Sec.&68&would&merely&result&in&tautology.&As&the&lower&court&said:&

"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot
be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the
same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code
defines forest products, viz., x x x

Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow
the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to
circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape
criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the
loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were
procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is
not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the
law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest
products without lawful authority."

The&Court,&therefore,&finds&that&the&lower&court&did&not&gravely&abuse&its&discretion&in&denying&the&
quashal&of&the&information.&The&petition&simply&has&no&legal&basis.&Certiorari&may&be&issued&only&where&
it&is&clearly&shown&that&there&is&patent&and&gross&abuse&of&discretion&as&to&amount&to&an&evasion&of&
positive&duty&or&to&virtual&refusal&to&perform&a&duty&enjoined&by&law,&or&to&act&at&all&in&contemplation&of&
law,& as& where& the& power& is& exercised& in& an& arbitrary& and& despotic& manner& by& reason& of& passion& or&
personal&hostility.[11]&Grave&abuse&of&discretion&implies&a&capricious&and&whimsical&exercise&of&power.[12]&
On&the&other&hand,&certiorari&may&not&be&availed&of&where&it&is&not&shown&that&the&respondent&court&
lacked& or& exceeded& its& jurisdiction& or& committed& grave& abuse& of& discretion.[13]&Where& the& court& has&
jurisdiction&over&the&case,&even&if&its&findings&are&not&correct,&its&questioned&acts&would&at&most&constitute&
errors&of&law&and&not&abuse&of&discretion&correctible&by&certiorari.[14]&As&this&Court&said:&

"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action
of certiorari."[15]
In& other& words,& certiorari& will& issue& only& to& correct& errors& of& jurisdiction& and& not& to& correct& errors& of&
procedure&or&mistakes&in&the&judge's&findings&and&conclusions.[16]&
The&unavailability&of&the&writ&of&certiorari,&and&even&that&of&prohibition,&in&this&case&is&borne&out&of&
the& fact& that& what& petitioner& considers& as& grave& abuse& of& discretion& in& this& case& is& the& denial& of& his&
motion&to&quash&the&information&filed&against&him&and&three&others.&This&Court&has&consistently&defined&
the&proper&procedure&in&case&of&denial&of&a&motion&to&quash.&The&accused&has&to&enter&a&plea,&go&to&
trial&without&prejudice&on&his&part&to&present&the&special&defenses&he&had&invoked&in&his&motion&and,&if&
after&trial&on&the&merits,&an&adverse&decision&is&rendered,&to&appeal&therefrom&in&the&manner&authorized&
by&law.[17]&
Certiorari&is& not& the& proper& remedy& where& a& motion& to& quash& an& information& is& denied.&That& the&
appropriate&recourse&is&to&proceed&to&trial&and&in&case&of&conviction,&to&appeal&such&conviction,&as&well&
as&the&denial&of&the&motion&to&quash,&is&impelled&by&the&fact&that&a&denial&of&a&motion&to&quash&is&an&
interlocutory& procedural& aspect& which& cannot& be& appealed& nor& can& it& be& the& subject& of& a& petition&
for&certiorari.[18]&The& remedies& of& appeal& and&certiorari&are& mutually& exclusive& and& not& alternative& or&
successive.[19]&An&interlocutory&order&may&be&assailed&by&certiorari&or&prohibition&only&when&it&is&shown&
that&the&court&acted&without&or&in&excess&of&jurisdiction&or&with&grave&abuse&of&discretion.[20]&However,&
this&Court&generally&frowns&upon&this&remedial&measure&as&regards&interlocutory&orders.&To&tolerate&the&
practice&of&allowing&interlocutory&orders&to&be&the&subject&of&review&by&certiorariwould&not&only&delay&the&
administration&of&justice&but&also&would&unduly&burden&the&courts.[21]&
Petitioner&may&not&seek&refuge&under&Flordelis$v.$Himalaloan[22]$for&his&contention&that&a&denial&of&a&
motion&to&quash&may&be&the&subject&of&a&petition&for&certiorari.&That&case&has&an&entirely&different&factual&
milieu&from&the&one&at&bar.&The&information&herein&not&being&"patently&defective"&nor&that&the&offense&
charged& has& prescribed,[23]&this& case& may& not& be& considered& an& exception& to& the& rule& on& the& proper&
remedy&for&the&denial&of&a&motion&to&quash.&
With&respect&to&the&constitutionality&of&Sec.&68&of&P.D.&No.&705&which&petitioner&would&have&this&
Court&consider,[24]&this&Court&has&always&desisted&from&delving&on&constitutional&issues.&Thus,&even&if&
all&the&requisites&for&judicial&review&of&a&constitutional&matter&are&present&in&a&case,[25]&this&Court&will&not&
pass&upon&a&constitutional&question&unless&it&is&the&lis$mota&of&the&case&or&if&the&case&can&be&disposed&
of&on&some&other&grounds,&such&as&the&application&of&the&statute&or&general&law.[26]&
The&Court&can&well&take&judicial&notice&of&the&deplorable&problem&of&deforestation&in&this&country,&
considering&that&the&deleterious&effects&of&this&problem&are&now&imperiling&our&lives&and&properties,&more&
specifically,&by&causing&rampaging&floods&in&the&lowlands.&While&it&is&true&that&the&rights&of&an&accused&
must&be&favored&in&the&interpretation&of&penal&provisions&of&law,&it&is&equally&true&that&when&the&general&
welfare&and&interest&of&the&people&are&interwoven&in&the&prosecution&of&a&crime,&the&Court&must&arrive&
at&a&solution&only&after&a&fair&and&just&balancing&of&interests.&This&the&Court&did&in&arriving&at&the&foregoing&
interpretation&of&Sec.&68&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Reform&Code.&This&task,&however,&has&not&at&all&been&
a&difficult&one&considering&that,&contrary&to&petitioner's&assertion,&his&rights&to&due&process&and&equal&
protection&of&the&law&have&not&been&clearly&shown&to&have&been&jeopardized.&
WHEREFORE,&the&instant&petition&for&certiorari&and&prohibition&is&hereby&DISMISSED.&The&lower&
court&is&enjoined&to&proceed&with&dispatch&in&the&prosecution&of&Criminal&Case&No.&9543.&This&Decision&
is&immediately&executory.&Costs&against&petitioner.&
!
! !
 Republic&of&the&Philippines&
SUPREME%COURT&
Manila&

FIRST%DIVISION&

G.R.%No.%158182%%%%%%%%%%%%%June%12,%2008&

SESINANDO%MERIDA,&petitioner,&&
vs.&
PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,&respondent.&

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N&

CARPIO,%J.:&

The&Case&

This&is&a&petition&for&review1&of&the&Decision2&dated&28&June&2002&and&the&Resolution&dated&14&May&
2003&of&the&Court&of&Appeals.&The&28&June&2002&Decision&affirmed&the&conviction&of&petitioner&
Sesinando&Merida&(petitioner)&for&violation&of&Section&68,3&Presidential&Decree&No.&705&(PD&705),4&as&
amended&by&Executive&Order&No.&277.&The&Resolution&dated&14&May&2003&denied&admission&of&
petitioner's&motion&for&reconsideration.5&

The&Facts&

Petitioner&was&charged&in&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Romblon,&Romblon,&Branch&81&(trial&court)&with&
violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended,&for&"cut[ting],&gather[ing],&collect[ing]&and&remov[ing]"&
a&lone&narra&tree&inside&a&private&land&in&Mayod,&Ipil,&Magdiwang,&Romblon&(Mayod&Property)&over&
which&private&complainant&Oscar&M.&Tansiongco&(Tansiongco)&claims&ownership.6&

The&prosecution&evidence&showed&that&on&23&December&1998,&Tansiongco&learned&that&petitioner&cut&
a&narra&tree&in&the&Mayod&Property.&Tansiongco&reported&the&matter&to&Florencio&Royo&(Royo),&
the&punong$barangay&of&Ipil.&On&24&December&1998,7&Royo&summoned&petitioner&to&a&meeting&with&
Tansiongco.&When&confronted&during&the&meeting&about&the&felled&narra&tree,&petitioner&admitted&
cutting&the&tree&but&claimed&that&he&did&so&with&the&permission&of&one&Vicar&Calix&(Calix)&who,&
according&to&petitioner,&bought&the&Mayod&Property&from&Tansiongco&in&October&1987&under&a&pacto$
de$retro&sale.&Petitioner&showed&to&Royo&Calix's&written&authorization&signed&by&Calix's&wife.8&

On&11&January&1999,&Tansiongco&reported&the&treeQcutting&to&the&Department&of&Environment&and&
Natural&Resources&(DENR)&forester&Thelmo&S.&Hernandez&(Hernandez)&in&Sibuyan,&Romblon.&When&
Hernandez&confronted&petitioner&about&the&felled&tree,&petitioner&reiterated&his&earlier&claim&to&Royo&
that&he&cut&the&tree&with&Calix's&permission.&Hernandez&ordered&petitioner&not&to&convert&the&felled&tree&
trunk&into&lumber.&

On&26&January&1999,&Tansiongco&informed&Hernandez&that&petitioner&had&converted&the&narra&trunk&
into&lumber.&Hernandez,&with&other&DENR&employees&and&enforcement&officers,&went&to&the&Mayod&
Property&and&saw&that&the&narra&tree&had&been&cut&into&six&smaller&pieces&of&lumber.&Hernandez&took&
custody&of&the&lumber,9&deposited&them&for&safekeeping&with&Royo,&and&issued&an&apprehension&
receipt&to&petitioner.&A&larger&portion&of&the&felled&tree&remained&at&the&Mayod&Property.&The&DENR&
subsequently&conducted&an&investigation&on&the&matter.10&

Tansiongco&filed&a&complaint&with&the&Office&of&the&Provincial&Prosecutor&of&Romblon&(Provincial&
Prosecutor)&charging&petitioner&with&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&During&the&
preliminary&investigation,&petitioner&submitted&a&counterQaffidavit&reiterating&his&claim&that&he&cut&the&
narra&tree&with&Calix's&permission.&The&Provincial&Prosecutor11&found&probable&cause&to&indict&
petitioner&and&filed&the&Information&with&the&trial&court&(docketed&as&Criminal&Case&No.&2207).&

During&the&trial,&the&prosecution&presented&six&witnesses&including&Tansiongco,&Royo,&and&Hernandez&
who&testified&on&the&events&leading&to&the&discovery&of&and&investigation&on&the&treeQcutting.&Petitioner&
testified&as&the&lone&defense&witness&and&claimed,&for&the&first&time,&that&he&had&no&part&in&the&treeQ
cutting.&

The%Ruling%of%the%Trial%Court&

In&its&Decision&dated&24&November&2000,&the&trial&court&found&petitioner&guilty&as&charged,&sentenced&
him&to&fourteen&(14)&years,&eight&(8)&months&and&one&(1)&day&to&twenty&(20)&years&of&reclusion$
temporal$and$ordered&the$seizedlumber&forfeited&in&Tansiongco's&favor.12&The&trial&court&dismissed&
petitioner's&defense&of&denial&in&view&of&his&repeated&extrajudicial&admissions&that&he&cut&the&narra&tree&
in&the&Mayod&Property&with&Calix's&permission.&With&this&finding&and&petitioner's&lack&of&DENR&permit&
to&cut&the&tree,&the&trial&court&held&petitioner&liable&for&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&

Petitioner&appealed&to&the&Court&of&Appeals&reiterating&his&defense&of&denial.&Petitioner&also&
contended&that&(1)&the&trial&court&did&not&acquire&jurisdiction&over&the&case&because&it&was&based&on&a&
complaint&filed&by&Tansiongco&and&not&by&a&forest&officer&as&provided&under&Section&80&of&PD&705&and&
(2)&the&penalty&imposed&by&the&trial&court&is&excessive.&

The%Ruling%of%the%Court%of%Appeals&

In&its&Decision&dated&28&June&2002,&the&Court&of&Appeals&affirmed&the&trial&court's&ruling&but&ordered&
the&seized&lumber&confiscated&in&the&government's&favor.13&The&Court&of&Appeals&sustained&the&trial&
court's&finding&that&petitioner&is&bound&by&his&extrajudicial&admissions&of&cutting&the&narra&tree&in&the&
Mayod&Property&without&any&DENR&permit.&The&Court&of&Appeals&also&found&nothing&irregular&in&the&
filing&of&the&complaint&by&Tansiongco&instead&of&a&DENR&forest&officer&considering&that&the&case&
underwent&preliminary&investigation&by&the&proper&officer&who&filed&the&Information&with&the&trial&court.&

On&the&imposable&penalty,&the&Court&of&Appeals,&in&the&dispositive&portion&of&its&ruling,&sentenced&
petitioner&to&14&years,&8&months&and&1&day&to&17&years&of&reclusion$temporal.$However,&in&the&body&of&
its&ruling,&the&Court&of&Appeals&held&that&"the&penalty&to&be&imposed&on&[petitioner]&should&be&(14)&
years,&eight&(8)&months&and&one&(1)&day&to&twenty&(20)&years&of&reclusion$temporal,"14&the&same&
penalty&the&trial&court&imposed.&

Petitioner&sought&reconsideration&but&the&Court&of&Appeals,&in&its&Resolution&dated&14&May&2003,&did&
not&admit&his&motion&for&having&been&filed&late.15&

Hence,&this&petition.&Petitioner&raises&the&following&issues:&

I.&WHETHER&x&x&x&SECTION&68&OF&P.D.&705&AS&AMENDED&PROHIBITING&THE&CUTTING,&
GATHERING,&COLLECTING&AND&REMOVING&TIMBER&OR&OTHER&FOREST&PRODUCTS&
FROM&ANY&FOREST&LAND&APPLIES&TO&PETITIONER.&

II.&WHETHER&x&x&x&POSSESSION&OF&THE&NARRA&TREE&CUT&IN&PRIVATE&LAND&
CONTESTED&BY&VICAR&CALIX&AND&PRIVATEQCOMPLAINANT&OSCAR&TANSIONGCO&IS&
COVERED&BY&SECTION&80&OF&P.D.&705&AS&AMENDED.&

III.&WHETHER&PRIVATEQCOMPLAINANT&CAN&INITIATE&THE&CHARGE&EVEN&WITHOUT&
THE&STANDING&AUTHORITY&COMING&FROM&THE&INVESTIGATING&FOREST&OFFICER&
OF&THE&DEPARTMENT&OF&ENVIRONMENT&AND&NATURAL&RESOURCES&AS&MANDATED&
BY&SECTION&80&OF&P.D.&705&AS&AMENDED.&

[IV.]&WHETHER&x&x&x&THE&TRIAL&COURT&ERRED&IN&TAKING&COGNIZANCE&OF&THE&CASE&
FILED&BY&PRIVATEQCOMPLAINANT&BECAUSE&IT&WAS&NOT&THE&INVESTIGATING&
OFFICER&AS&REQUIRED&BY&SECTION&80&OF&P.D.&705&AS&AMENDED&WHO&MUST&BE&THE&
ONE&TO&INSTITUTE&THE&FILING&OF&THE&SAME.16&

In&its&Comment&to&the&petition,&the&Office&of&the&Solicitor&General&(OSG)&countered&that&(1)&the&trial&
court&acquired&jurisdiction&over&the&case&even&though&Tansiongco,&and&not&a&DENR&forest&officer,&filed&
the&complaint&against&petitioner&and&(2)&petitioner&is&liable&for&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&
amended.&

The%Issues&

The&petition&raises&the&following&issues:17&

1)&Whether&the&trial&court&acquired&jurisdiction&over&Criminal&Case&No.&2207&even&though&it&was&
based&on&a&complaint&filed&by&Tansiongco&and&not&by&a&DENR&forest&officer\&and&

2)&Whether&petitioner&is&liable&for&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&

The%Ruling%of%the%Court&

The&petition&has&no&merit.&
 The3Trial3Court3Acquired3Jurisdiction3Over3
Criminal3Case3No.32207&

We&sustain&the&OSG's&claim&that&the&trial&court&acquired&jurisdiction&over&Criminal&Case&No.&2207.&The&
Revised&Rules&of&Criminal&Procedure&(Revised&Rules)&list&the&cases&which&must&be&initiated&by&a&
complaint&filed&by&specified&individuals,18&nonQcompliance&of&which&ousts&the&trial&court&of&jurisdiction&
from&trying&such&cases.19&However,&these&cases&concern&only&defamation&and&other&crimes&against&
chastity20&and&not&to&cases&concerning&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&Further,&Section&80&of&PD&
705&does&not&prohibit&an&interested&person&from&filing&a&complaint&before&any&qualified&officer&for&
violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&Section&80&of&PD&705&provides&in&relevant&parts:&

SECTION&80.&Arrest\&Institution&of&criminal&actions.&Q&x&x&x&x&

Reports%and%complaints%regarding%the%commission%of%any%of%the%offenses%defined%in%this%
Chapter,&not&committed&in&the&presence&of&any&forest&officer&or&employee,&or&any&of&the&
deputized&officers&or&officials,%shall%immediately%be%investigated%by%the%forest%
officer&assigned&in&the&area&where&the&offense&was&allegedly&committed,&who&shall&thereupon&
receive&the&evidence&supporting&the&report&or&complaint.&

If%there%is%prima%facie%evidence%to%support%the%complaint%or%report,%the%investigating%
forest%officer%shall%file%the%necessary%complaint%with%the%appropriate%official%authorized%
by%law%to%conduct%a%preliminary%investigation%of%criminal%cases%and%file%an%information%in%
Court.&(Emphasis&supplied)&

We&held&in&People$v.$CFI$of$Quezon21&that&the&phrase&"reports&and&complaints"&in&Section&80&refers&to&
"reports&and&complaints&as&might&be&brought&to&the&forest&officer&assigned&to&the&area&by%other%forest%
officers%or%employees%of%the%Bureau%of%Forest%Development%or%any%of%the%deputized%officers%or%
officials,&for&violations&of&forest&laws&not&committed&in&their&presence."22&

Here,&it&was&not&"forest&officers&or&employees&of&the&Bureau&of&Forest&Development&or&any&of&the&
deputized&officers&or&officials"&who&reported&to&Hernandez&the&treeQcutting&in&the&Mayod&Property&but&
Tansiongco,&a&private&citizen&who&claims&ownership&over&the&Mayod&Property.&Thus,&Hernandez&
cannot&be&faulted&for&not&conducting&an&investigation&to&determine&"if&there&is&prima&facie&evidence&to&
support&the&complaint&or&report."23&At&any&rate,&Tansiongco&was&not&precluded,&either&under&Section&
80&of&PD&705&or&the&Revised&Rules,&from&filing&a&complaint&before&the&Provincial&Prosecutor&for&
petitioner's&alleged&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&For&its&part,&the&trial&court&correctly&
took&cognizance&of&Criminal&Case&No.&2207&as&the&case&falls&within&its&exclusive&original&jurisdiction.24&

Petitioner3is3Liable3for3Cutting3Timber3in3Private3
Property3Without3Permit&

Section&68,&as&amended,&one&of&the&12&acts25&penalized&under&PD&705,&provides:&

SECTION&68.&Cutting,$Gathering$and/or$Collecting$Timber,$or$Other$Forest$Products$Without$
License.&Q&Any&person&who&shall&cut,&gather,&collect,&remove&timber&or&other&forest&products&
from&any&forest&land,&or&timber%from&alienable&or&disposable&public&land,&or&from%private%land,&
without&any&authority,&or&possess&timber&or&other&forest&products&without&the&legal&documents&
as&required&under&existing&forest&laws&and&regulations,&shall&be&punished&with&the&penalties&
imposed&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code:&Provided,&That&in&the&case&of&
partnerships,&associations,&or&corporations,&the&officers&who&ordered&the&cutting,&gathering,&
collection&or&possession&shall&be&liable,&and&if&such&officers&are&aliens,&they&shall,&in&addition&to&
the&penalty,&be&deported&without&further&proceedings&on&the&part&of&the&Commission&on&
Immigration&and&Deportation.&

The&court&shall&further&order&the&confiscation&in&favor&of&the&government&of&the&timber&or&any&
forest&products&cut,&gathered,&collected,&removed,&or&possessed&as&well&as&the&machinery,&
equipment,&implements&and&tools&illegally&used&in&the&area&where&the&timber&or&forest&products&
are&found.&(Emphasis&supplied)&

Section&68&penalizes&three&categories&of&acts:&(1)&the&cutting,&gathering,&collecting,&or&removing&of&
timber&or&other&forest&products&from&any&forest&land&without&any&authority\&(2)&the&cutting,&gathering,&
collecting,&or&removing&of%timber&from&alienable&or&disposable&public&land,&or&from&private%land%
without%any%authority\26&and&(3)&the&possession&of&timber&or&other&forest&products&without&the&legal&
documents&as&required&under&existing&forest&laws&and&regulations.27&Petitioner&stands&charged&of&
having&"cut,&gathered,&collected&and&removed&timber&or&other&forest&products&from&a&private&
land28%without&x&x&x&the&necessary&permit%x&x&x%"&thus&his&liablity,&if&ever,&should&be&limited&only&for&
"cut[ting],&gather[ing],&collect[ing]&and&remov[ing]&timber,"&under&the&second&category.&Further,&the&
prosecution&evidence&showed&that&petitioner&did&not&perform&any&acts&of&"gathering,&collecting,&or&
removing"&but&only&the&act&of&"cutting"&a&lone&narra&tree.&Hence,&this&case&hinges&on&the&question&of&
whether&petitioner&"cut%x&x&xtimber"%in%the%Mayod%Property%without%a%DENR%permit.29&

We&answer&in&the&affirmative&and&thus&affirm&the&lower&courts'&rulings.&

On&the&question&of&whether&petitioner&cut&a&narra&tree&in&the&Mayod&Property&without&a&DENR&permit,&
petitioner&adopted&conflicting&positions.&Before&his&trial,&petitioner&consistently&represented&to&the&
authorities&that&he&cut&a&narra&tree&in&the&Mayod&Property&and&that&he&did&so&only&with&Calix's&
permission.&However,&when&he&testified,&petitioner&denied&cutting&the&tree&in&question.&We&sustain&the&
lower&courts'&rulings&that&petitioner's&extrajudicial&admissions&bind&him.30&Petitioner&does&not&explain&
why&Royo&and&Hernandez,&public&officials&who&testified&under&oath&in&their&official&capacities,&would&lie&
on&the&stand&to&implicate&petitioner&in&a&serious&criminal&offense,&not&to&mention&that&the&acts&of&these&
public&officers&enjoy&the&presumption&of&regularity.&Further,&petitioner&does&not&deny&presenting&Calix's&
authorization&to&Royo&and&Hernandez&as&his&basis&for&cutting&the&narra&tree&in&the&Mayod&Property.&
Petitioner&has&no&use&of&Calix's&authorization&if,&as&he&claimed&during&the&trial,&he&did&not&cut&any&tree&
in&the&Mayod&Property.&

We&further&hold&that&the&lone&narre&tree&petitioner&cut&from&the&Mayod&Property&constitutes&"timber"&
under&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended.&PD&705&does&not&define&"timber,"&only&"forest&product"&
(which&circuitously&includes&"timber.")31&Does&the&narra&tree&in&question&constitute&"timber"&under&
Section&68?&The&closest&this&Court&came&to&defining&the&term&"timber"&in&Section&68&was&to&provide&
that&"timber,"&includes&"lumber"&or&"processed&log."32&In&other&jurisdictions,&timber&is&determined&by&
compliance&with&specified&dimensions33&or&certain&"stand&age"&or&"rotation&age."34&In&Mustang&Lumber,&
Inc.&v.&Court&of&Appeals,35&this&Court&was&faced&with&a&similar&task&of&having&to&define&a&term&in&
Section&68&of&PD&705&Q&"lumber"&Q&to&determine&whether&possession&of&lumber&is&punishable&under&
that&provision.&In&ruling&in&the&affirmative,&we&held&that&"lumber"&should&be&taken&in&its&ordinary&or&
common&usage&meaning&to&refer&to&"processed&log&or&timber,"&thus:&

The&Revised&Forestry&Code&contains&no&definition&of&either&timber&or&lumber.&While&the&former&
is&included&in&forest&products&as&defined&in&paragraph&(q)&of&Section&3,&the&latter&is&found&in&
paragraph&(aa)&of&the&same&section&in&the&definition&of&"Processing&plant,"&which&reads:&

(aa)&Processing&plant&is&any&mechanical&setQup,&machine&or&combination&of&machine&
used&for&the&processing&of&logs&and&other&forest&raw&materials&into&lumber,&veneer,&
plywood,&wallboard,&blackboard,&paper&board,&pulp,&paper&or&other&finished&wood&
products.&

This&simply&means&that&lumber&is&a&processed&log&or&processed&forest&raw&material.&Clearly,&
the&Code&uses&the&term&lumber&in&its&ordinary&or&common&usage.&In&the&1993&copyright&edition&
of&Webster's&Third&New&International&Dictionary,&lumber&is&defined,&inter$alia,&as&"timber&or&logs&
after&being&prepared&for&the&market."&Simply&put,&lumber&is&a&processed&log&or&timber.&

It%is%settled%that%in%the%absence%of%legislative%intent%to%the%contrary,%words%and%phrases%
used%in%a%statute%should%be%given%their%plain,%ordinary,%and%common%usage%meaning.&
And&in&so&far&as&possession&of&timber&without&the&required&legal&documents&is&concerned,&
Section&68&of&PD&No.&705,&as&amended,&makes&no&distinction&between&raw&and&procesed&
timber.&Neither&should&we.36&x&x&x&x&(Italicization&in&the&original\&boldfacing&supplied)&

We&see&no&reason&why,&as&in&Mustang,&the&term&"timber"&under&Section&68&cannot&be&taken&in&its&
common&acceptation&as&referring&to&"wood&used&for&or&suitable&for&building&or&for&carpentry&or&
joinery."37&Indeed,&tree&saplings&or&tiny&tree&stems&that&are&too&small&for&use&as&posts,&panelling,&
beams,&tables,&or&chairs&cannot&be&considered&timber.38&

Here,&petitioner&was&charged&with&having&felled&a&narra&tree&and&converted&the&same&into&"several&
pieces&of&sawn&lumber,&about&three&(3)&pcs.&2x16x6&and&three&(3)&pcs.&2x18x7&x&x&x&consisting&of&111&
board&feet&x&x&x."&These&measurements&were&indicated&in&the&apprehension&receipt&Hernandez&issued&
to&petitioner&on&26&January&1999&which&the&prosecution&introduced&in&evidence.39&Further,&Hernandez&
testified&that&the&larger&portion&of&the&felled&log&left&in&the&Mayod&Property&"measured&76&something&
centimeters&[at&the&big&end]&while&the&smaller&end&measured&65&centimeters&and&the&length&was&2.8&
meters."40&Undoubtedly,&the&narra&tree&petitioner&felled&and&converted&to&lumber&was&"timber"&fit&"for&
building&or&for&carpentry&or&joinery"&and&thus&falls&under&the&ambit&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&
amended.&

The3Penalty3Imposable3on3Petitioner&
Violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&amended,&is&punishable&as&Qualified&Theft&under&Article&310&in&
relation&to&Article&309&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code&(RPC),&thus:&

Art.&310.&Qualified&theft.&Q&The&crime&of&qualified&theft&shall&be&punished&by&the&penalties&next&
higher&by&two&degrees&than&those&respectively&specified&in&the&next&preceding&article&x&x&x.&

Art.&309.&Penalties.&Q&Any&person&guilty&of&theft&shall&be&punished&by:&

1.&The&penalty&of&prisión&mayor&in&its&minimum&and&medium&periods,&if&the&value&of&the&
thing&stolen&is&more&than&12,000&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&22,000&pesos\&but&if&the&
value&of&the&thing&stolen&exceeds&the&latter&amount,&the&penalty&shall&be&the&maximum&
period&of&the&one&prescribed&in&this&paragraph,&and&one&year&for&each&additional&ten&
thousand&pesos,&but&the&total&of&the&penalty&which&may&be&imposed&shall&not&exceed&
twenty&years.&In&such&cases,&and&in&connection&with&the&accessory&penalties&which&may&
be&imposed&and&for&the&purpose&of&the&other&provisions&of&this&Code,&the&penalty&shall&
be&termed&prisión&mayor&or&reclusión&temporal,&as&the&case&may&be.&

2.&The&penalty&of&prisión&correccional&in&its&medium&and&maximum&periods,&if&the&value&
of&the&thing&stolen&is&more&than&6,000&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&12,000&pesos.&

3.&The&penalty&of&prisión&correccional&in&its&minimum&and&medium&periods,&if&the&value&of&
the&property&stolen&is&more&than&200&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&6,000&pesos.&

4.&Arresto&mayor&in&its&medium&period&to&prisión&correccional&in&its&minimum&period,&if&
the&value&of&the&property&stolen&is&over&50&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&200&pesos.&

5.&Arresto&mayor&to&its&full&extent,&if&such&value&is&over&5&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&50&
pesos.&

6.&Arresto&mayor&in&its&minimum&and&medium&periods,&if&such&value&does&not&exceed&5&
pesos.&

7.&Arresto&menor&or&a&fine&not&exceeding&200&pesos,&if&the&theft&is&committed&under&the&
circumstances&enumerated&in&paragraph&3&of&the&next&preceding&article&and&the&value&of&
the&thing&stolen&does&not&exceed&5&pesos.&If&such&value&exceeds&said&amount,&the&
provisions&of&any&of&the&five&preceding&subdivisions&shall&be&made&applicable.&

.&

8.&Arresto&menor&in&its&minimum&period&or&a&fine&not&exceeding&50&pesos,&when&the&
value&of&the&thing&stolen&is&not&over&5&pesos,&and&the&offender&shall&have&acted&under&
the&impulse&of&hunger,&poverty,&or&the&difficulty&of&earning&a&livelihood&for&the&support&of&
himself&or&his&family.&

The&Information&filed&against&petitioner&alleged&that&the&six&pieces&of&lumber&measuring&111&board&feet&
were&valued&at&P3,330.&However,&if&the&value&of&the&log&left&at&the&Mayod&Property&is&included,&the&
amount&increases&to&P20,930.40.&To&prove&this&allegation,&the&prosecution&relied&on&Hernandez's&
testimony&that&these&amounts,&as&stated&in&the&apprehension&receipt&he&issued,&are&his&"estimates"&
based&on&"prevailing&local&price."41&

This&evidence&does&not&suffice.&To&prove&the&amount&of&the&property&taken&for&fixing&the&penalty&
imposable&against&the&accused&under&Article&309&of&the&RPC,&the&prosecution&must&present&more&than&
a&mere&uncorroborated&"estimate"&of&such&fact.42&In&the&absence&of&independent&and&reliable&
corroboration&of&such&estimate,&courts&may&either&apply&the&minimum&penalty&under&Article&309&or&fix&
the&value&of&the&property&taken&based&on&the&attendant&circumstances&of&the&case.43&In&People$v.$
Dator44&where,&as&here,&the&accused&was&charged&with&violation&of&Section&68&of&PD&705,&as&
amended,&for&possession&of&lumber&without&permit,&the&prosecution's&evidence&for&the&lumber's&value&
consisted&of&an&estimate&made&by&the&apprehending&authorities&whose&apparent&lack&of&corroboration&
was&compounded&by&the&fact&that&the&transmittal&letter&for&the&estimate&was&not&presented&in&evidence.&
Accordingly,&we&imposed&on&the&accused&the&minimum&penalty&under&Article&309(6)45&of&the&RPC.46&

Applying&Dator$in&relation&to$Article&310&of&the&RPC&and&taking&into&account&the&Indeterminate&
Sentence&Law,&we&find&it&proper&to&impose&on&petitioner,&under&the&circumstances&obtaining&here,&the&
penalty&of&four&(4)&months&and&one&(1)&day&of&arresto$mayor,&as&minimum,&to&three&(3)&years,&four&(4)&
months&and&twentyQone&(21)&days&of&prision$correcional,&as&maximum.&
WHEREFORE,&we&AFFIRM&the&Decision&dated&28&June&2002&and&the&Resolution&dated&14&May&2003&
of&the&Court&of&Appeals&with&the&modification&that&petitioner&Sesinando&Merida&is&sentenced&to&four&(4)&
months&and&one&(1)&day&of&arresto$mayor,&as&minimum,&to&three&(3)&years,&four&(4)&months&and&
twentyQone&(21)&days&of&prision$correcional,&as&maximum.&

SO%ORDERED.&

!
! !
Digest:

Merida v People (Natural Resources)

MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS)

G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008

FACTS:

on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with
Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar
Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco
in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written
authorization signed by Calix's wife.

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez)
in Sibuyan, Romblon.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the
narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement
officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six
smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for
safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger
portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the matter.

* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra
tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over
which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.

* CA: affirmed trial court.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though
it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and

YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

[NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the
preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer
assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating
forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by
law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in
Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in
the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the
Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation
to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's
alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive
original jurisdiction.
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

YES.

Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra
tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However,
when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower
courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.

3) Is the narra tree timber?

YES.

The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide
that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."

In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or

certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 -
"lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that
provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its
ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be
taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or
for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for
use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.

Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit
"for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended.

!
!
! !
! !
 Republic&of&the&Philippines&
SUPREME%COURT&
Manila&

THIRD&DIVISION&

&&

A.M.%No.%MTJ]93]874%March%14,%1995%

AUGUSTUS%L.%MOMONGAN,%Regional%Director,%Department%of%Environment%and%Natural%
Resources,%Region%VIII,%Tacloban%City,%petitioner,&&
vs.&
JUDGE%RAFAEL%B.%OMIPON,%6th%Municipal%Circuit%Trial%Court,%Hinunangan%Silago,%Southern%
Leyte,%respondent.&

R&E&S&O&L&U&T&I&O&N&

&

ROMERO,%J.:&

At&around&10:00&o'clock&of&November&14,&1992,&police&officers&of&the&Municipality&of&Hinunangan,&
Southern&Leyte&apprehended&Dionisio&Golpe&while&he&was&driving&his&truck&loaded&with&illegally&cut&
lumber.&The&truck&and&logs&were&impounded.&A&complaint&was&filed&against&Basilio&Cabig,&the&alleged&
owner&of&the&logs.&After&conducting&the&preliminary&investigation,&respondent&Judge&Rafael&B.&Omipon&
found&that&a$prima$facie&case&exists&against&Mr.&Cabig&but&he&ordered&the&release&of&the&truck&
inasmuch&as&the&owner/driver,&Mr.&Golpe,&was&not&charged&in&the&complaint.&

Regional&Director&Augustus&L.&Momongan&of&the&Department&of&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&
filed&the&instant&complaint&against&respondent&Judge&alleging&that&his&order&releasing&the&truck&used&in&
the&transport&of&illegally&cut&forest&products&violated&Presidential&Decree&705,&as&amended&by&
Executive&Order&No.&277,&Section&68&and&68QA1and&Administrative&Order&No.&59,&Series&of&
1990.2&Complainant&claims&that&respondent&Judge&has&no&authority&to&order&the&release&of&the&truck&
despite&the&nonQinclusion&of&Mr.&Golpe&in&the&complaint.&The&truck&should&have&been&turned&over&to&
the&Community&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office&of&San&Juan,&Southern&Leyte&for&
appropriate&disposition&as&the&same&falls&under&the&administrative&jurisdiction&of&the&Department&of&
Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office.&

In&his&comment,&respondent&Judge&explained&that&after&conducting&the&preliminary&investigation,&he&
found&that&Golpe,&the&owner&of&the&truck,&is&principally&engaged&in&the&hauling&of&sand&and&gravel&and&
the&delivery&of&hollow&blocks.&On&his&way&home&after&delivering&hollow&blocks&in&Barangay&Sto.&Niño&II,&
he&met&his&friend&Cabig&who&requested&him&to&load&sliced&lumber&and&deliver&the&same&at&Brgy.&
LungsodQdaan,&Hinundayan&to&be&used&for&the&construction&of&a&barangay&high&school&building.&They&
were&apprehended&when&the&truck&had&a&flat&tire.&After&changing&the&tire,&both&the&lumber&and&the&
truck&were&ordered&deposited&at&the&police&station&of&Hinunangan.&

Respondent&Judge&observed&that&Golpe&has&a&lesser&participation&in&the&crime&of&illegal&logging&and,&
being&a&mere&accessory,&he&might&be&utilized&by&the&Acting&Chief&of&Police&as&prosecution&witness&
against&Cabig.&More&importantly,&the&fact&that&the&complaint&charged&only&Cabig,&respondent&Judge,&in&
the&exercise&of&his&sound&discretion,&ordered&the&release&of&the&truck&owned&by&Golpe.&

The&Memorandum&of&the&Office&of&the&Court&Administrator&recommended&that&a&formal&investigation&
be&conducted.&An&excerpt&from&its&Memorandum&states:&

We&find&the&explanation&of&respondent&unsatisfactory.&While&he&is&authorized&to&conduct&
preliminary&investigation&in&all&cases&of&violations&of&P.D.&705,&as&amended,&otherwise&
known&as&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&of&the&Philippines,&Sec.&68QA&thereof&provides&that&
it&is&the&Department&Head&or&his&duly&authorized&representative&who&may&order&the&
confiscation&and&disposition&of&the&forest&products&illegally&cut,&gathered,&removed,&or&
possessed&or&abandoned,&and&all&conveyances&used&either&by&land,&water&or&air&in&the&
commission&of&the&offense&and&to&dispose&of&the&same&in&accordance&with&pertinent&
laws,&regulations&or&policies&on&the&matter.&

There&may&be&some&facts&that&are&not&extant&in&the&records&which&can&only&come&out&
during&a&formal&investigation&to&better&establish&clear&culpability&or&exoneration&over&the&
respondent.&
 In&view&thereof,&and&to&give&respondent&an&opportunity&to&clear&himself,&it&is&respectfully&
recommended&that&this&matter&be&referred&to&Acting&Executive&Judge&Leandro&T.&Loyao,&
Jr.,&RTC,&Branch&26,&San&Juan,&Southern&Leyte,&for&investigation,&report&and&
recommendation&within&sixty&days&from&receipt&of&the&records.3&

In&the&Resolution&of&November&8,&1993,&the&Court&resolved&to&refer&the&case&to&Acting&Executive&
Judge&Leandro&T.&Loyao,&Jr.,&RTC,&Branch&26,&San&Juan,&Southern&Leyte,&for&investigation,&report&
and&recommendation,&within&sixty&(60)&days&from&receipt&of&the&records.4&

During&the&first&two&hearing&dates,&complainant&was&unable&to&attend&but&sent&his&representatives,&
DENR&lawyer&Constantino&Esber&and&legal&assistant&Romeo&Gulong.&Respondent&Judge&appeared&
with&his&counsel.&However,&on&the&third&hearing&date,&respondent&Judge&failed&to&appear&as&he&
suffered&a&stroke&and&was&hospitalized.&Thereafter,&DENR&counsel&Esber&manifested&that&their&office&
has&filed&a&motion&for&reinvestigation&and&for&the&turnover&of&the&jeep&to&the&PNP&and&subsequently,&to&
the&DENR.&He&also&manifested&that&the&complainant&is&submitting&the&administrative&matter&for&
resolution&and&recommendation&without&adducing&evidence&against&respondent.&Respondent's&
counsel&did&not&object&to&complainant's&manifestation.&The&counsel&of&both&complainant&and&
respondent&jointly&agreed&to&submit&the&case&for&appropriate&action.&

The&Investigating&Judge's&confidential&report,&in&part,&states:&

In&view&of&this&development&in&the&course&of&an&intended&investigation&this&investigator&
could&not&elicit&additional&facts&than&are&found&in&the&records,&whether&inculpatory&or&
exculpatory.&Respondent&was&given&an&opportunity&to&explain&the&unfavorable&
circumstances&against&him&but&he&was&overtaken&by&a&serious&illness.&So&much&was&
expected&from&the&complainant&to&supply&the&facts&not&extant&in&the&records,&but&he&lost&
interest&in&substantiating&his&April&1993&report&to&the&Supreme&Court.&In&fact,&he&was&
submitting&this&administrative&matter&for&resolution&without&adducing&evidence&against&
respondent.&

Except&for&the&21&January&1994&motion&for&reinvestigation&of&DENR&counsel&Esber&
which&sought&for&the&inclusion&of&jeep&owner&and&driver&Dionisio&Golpe&in&the&criminal&
information,&there&is&nothing&new&that&can&be&added&to&the&facts&found&by&the&Honorable&
Deputy&Court&Administrator&as&reflected&in&his&Memorandum&for&the&Honorable&Chief&
Justice&dated&12&October&1993.&

There&being&no&actual&investigation&conducted,&no&additional&facts&could&be&reported&
and&consequently,&there&is&no&basis&for&a&recommendation&on&the&basis&of&facts.&

This&investigator&can&only&recommend&appropriate&action&by&the&Supreme&Court&on&the&
basis&of&the&facts&already&extant&in&the&records&with&a&prayer&for&consideration&of&
respondent&plight&especially&so&since&on&account&of&this&investigation&his&health&has&
deteriorated&and&may&affect&his&efficiency&output&as&a&judge.&Perhaps,&allowing&him&to&
bow&out&of&the&service&with&honor&and&corresponding&benefits.5&

During&the&pendency&of&this&case,&respondent&Judge&filed&for&disability&retirement.&His&application&was&
approved&but&his&pension&was&not&released&pending&the&outcome&of&this&case.&

We&find&respondent&Judge's&order&to&release&the&truck&owned&and&driven&by&Mr.&Dionisio&Golpe&legally&
justifiable,&hence,&he&is&not&subject&to&any&disciplinary&sanction.&

According&to&the&Revised&Penal&Code,&Art.&45,&first&paragraph:&"[E]very&penalty&imposed&for&the&
commission&of&a&felony&shall&carry&with&it&the&forfeiture&of&the&proceeds&of&the&crime&and&the&instrument&
or&tools&with&which&it&was&committed."&However,&this&cannot&be&done&if&such&proceeds&and&instruments&
or&tools&"be&the&property&of&a&third&person&not&liable&for&offense."&In&this&case,&the&truck,&though&used&to&
transport&the&illegally&cut&lumber,&cannot&be&confiscated&and&forfeited&in&the&event&accused&therein&be&
convicted&because&the&truck&owner/driver,&Mr.&Dionisio&Golpe&was&not&indicted.&Hence,&there&was&no&
justification&for&respondent&Judge&not&to&release&the&truck.&

Complainant&is&correct&in&pointing&out&that&based&on&Pres.&Decree&No.&705,&Sec.&68QA&and&Adm.&
Order&No.&59,&the&DENR&Secretary&or&his&duly&authorized&representative&has&the&power&to&confiscate&
any&illegally&obtained&or&gathered&forest&products&and&all&conveyances&used&in&the&commission&of&the&
offense&and&to&dispose&of&the&same&in&accordance&with&pertinent&laws.&However,&as&complainant&
himself&likewise&pointed&out,&this&power&is&in&relation&to&the&administrative&jurisdiction&of&the&DENR.&

We&do&not&find&that&when&respondent&Judge&released&the&truck&after&he&conducted&the&preliminary&
investigation&and&satisfied&himself&that&there&was&no&reason&to&continue&keeping&the&truck,&he&violated&
Pres.&Decree&No.&705&and&Adm.&Order&No.&59.&The&release&of&the&truck&did&not&render&nugatory&the&
administrative&authority&of&the&DENR&Secretary.&The&confiscation&proceedings&under&Adm.&Order&No.&
596&is&different&from&the&confiscation&under&the&Revised&Penal&Code,&which&is&an&additional&penalty&
imposed&in&the&event&of&conviction.&Despite&the&order&of&release,&the&truck&can&be&seized&again&either&
by&filing&a&motion&for&reinvestigation&and&motion&to&include&the&truck&owner/driver,&as&coQaccused,&
which&complainant&has&done&as&manifested&before&the&lower&court&or&by&enforcing&Adm.&Order&No.&59.&
Section&12&thereof&categorically&states&that&"[t]he&confiscation&of&the&conveyance&under&these&
regulations&shall&be&without&prejudice&to&any&criminal&action&which&shall&be&filed&against&the&owner&
thereof&or&any&person&who&used&the&conveyance&in&the&commission&of&the&offense."&

Petitioner&is&of&the&opinion&that&under&the&circumstances,&respondent&Judge&should&have&turned&over&
the&truck&to&the&Community&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&Office&(CENRO)&of&San&Juan,&
Southern&Leyte&for&appropriate&disposition.&No&doubt,&this&would&have&simplified&matters&and&
prevented&the&present&situation&from&occurring&wherein&one&government&official&files&a&complaint&
against&another.&Under&Sec.&4&of&Adm.&Order&No.&59,&if&the&apprehension&is&not&made&by&DENR&field&
offices,&deputized&military&personnel&and&officials&of&other&agencies&apprehending&illegal&logs&and&
other&forest&products&and&their&conveyances&shall&notify&the&nearest&DENR&field&offices&and&turn&over&
said&forest&products&and&conveyances&for&proper&action&and&disposition.&A&period&of&about&two&weeks&
lapsed&from&the&time&the&seizure&was&made&before&a&complaint&was&filed.&During&this&period,&the&
apprehending&policemen&had&enough&time&to&turn&over&the&logs&and&the&truck&to&the&nearest&DENR&
field&office&for&proper&action&and&disposition&since&the&duty&to&turn&over&the&truck&to&the&nearest&DENR&
field&office&rests&on&the&officials&apprehending&the&illegal&logs.&There&being&no&mandatory&duty&on&the&
part&of&respondent&Judge&to&turn&over&the&truck,&he&should&not&be&visited&with&disciplinary&sanction&
when&he&did&not&refer&the&same&to&the&DENR&field&office&in&San&Juan,&Southern&Leyte.&

The&Court&takes&this&opportunity&to&enjoin&the&National&Police,&the&DENR,&the&prosecutors,&and&the&
members&of&the&bench&to&coordinate&with&each&other&for&a&successful&campaign&against&illegal&
logging.&It&behooves&all&the&concerned&agencies&to&seriously&strive&for&the&attainment&of&the&
constitutionallyQdeclared&policy&to&"protect&and&advance&the&right&of&the&people&to&a&balanced&and&
healthful&ecology&in&accord&with&the&rhythm&and&harmony&of&nature"7&in&order&to&preserve&our&natural&
resources&for&the&benefit&of&the&generations&still&to&come.&

WHEREFORE,&the&complaint&is&DISMISSED.&

SO&ORDERED.&

!
! !
Digest:!
!
Momongan!v.!Judge!OmiponA.M.!No.!MTJ8938874,!March!14,!1995,! 4 !!"#A!33 !
Syllabus:The!confiscation!proceedings!under!AO!No.!59!isdifferent!from!the!confiscation!under!the!
Revised enal!!ode"!#hich!is!an!additional!penalty!imposed!inthe!event!of!conviction.!$espite!the!order!of!
release"the!truc%!can!be!sei&ed!again!either!by!filing!a!motionfor!reinvestigation!and!motion!to!include!
thetruc%o#ner'driver"!as!co(accused"!#hich!complainanthas!done!as!manifested!before!the!lo#er!court!or!
byenforcing!AO!No.!59.!Section!)*!thereof!categoricallystates!that!+,t8he!confiscation!of!the!conveyance!under!
these!regulations!shall!be!#ithout!pre udice!to!anycriminal!action!#hich!shall!be!filed!against!theo#ner!
thereof!or!any!person!#ho!used!the!conveyance!inthe!commission!of!the!offense./!
$ac%&'!
$ionisio!0olpe!#as!apprehended!by!police!officers#hile!he!#as!driving!his!truc%!loaded!#ith!illegallycutlumber.!
1t!#as!later!found!that!a!certain!2asilio!abig!o#ned!the!logs"!thus"!a!complaint!#as!filedagainst!him.!3udge!
Rafael!Omipon"!the!respondent!inthis!case"!+found!that!a!prima!facie!case!e4istsagainst!abig!but!he!ordered!
the!release!of!the!truc%inasmuch!as!the!o#ner'driver"!0olpe"!#as!notcharged!inthe!complaint./!Augustus!
omongan"!the!Regional!$irector!of!the$6NR"!filed!the!present!complaint!against!3udgeOmipon!alleging!that!
his!order!releasing!the!truc%used!in!the!transport!of!illegally!cut!forest!productsviolated!Section!78!and!78(A!
of! $!No.! 5!and!AONo.!59"!Series!of!)99 .! omongan!further!claims!that3udge!Omipon!is!devoid!of!
authority!to!release!thetruc%!despite!the!non(inclusion!of!0olpe!in!thecomplaint.!
(&&ue'!
;hether!3udge!Omipon!had!authority!to!release!theassailed!truc%!and!thus!be!free!from!any!
disciplinarysanction.!
#u)ing'!
<es.!3udge!Omipon!had!the!authority!to!order!therelease!of!the!truc%.!Although!the!$6NR!Secretary!or!his!
duly!authori&edrepresentatives!have!the!po#er!to!confiscate!anyillegally!obtained!or!gathered!forest!products!
and!allconveyances!used!in!the!commission!of!the!offense"based!on!Section!78(A!of! $!No.! 5!and!AO!
No.!59"this!po#er!is!in!relation!to!the!administrative! urisdiction!of!the!$6NR.!The!act!of!3udge!Omipon!of!
releasing!the!truc%!did!not!violate! $!No.! 5!and!AONo.!59!because!his!act!did!not!render!nugatory!
theadministrative!authority!of!the!$6NR!Secretary.!+Theconfiscation!proceedings!under!Administrative!Order!
No.!59!is!different!from!the!confiscation!under!theRevised! enal!!ode"!#hich!is!an!additional!penaltyimposed!
in!the!event!of!conviction./ omongan!assails!that!3udge!Omipon!should!haveturned!over!the!truc%!to!the!
!ommunity!6nvironmentand!Natural!Resources!Office!=!6NRO>.!3udgeOmipon!ho#ever!had!no!mandatory!
duty!to!do!so"and!should!therefore!not!be!visited!#ith!disciplinaryaction.!
!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%111107.%January%10,%1997]%

LEONARDO%A.%PAAT,%in%his%capacity%as%Officer]in]Charge%(OIC),%Regional%Executive% Director%
(RED),%Region%2%and%JOVITO%LAYUGAN,%JR.,%in%his%capacity%as%Community%Environment%
and% Natural% Resources% Officer% (CENRO),% both% of% the% Department% of% Environment% and%
Natural% Resources% (DENR),%petitioners,3 vs.% COURT% OF% APPEALS,% HON.% RICARDO% A.%
BACULI% in% his% capacity% as% Presiding% Judge% of% Branch% 2,% Regional% Trial% Court% at%
Tuguegarao,% Cagayan,% and% SPOUSES% BIENVENIDO% and% VICTORIA% DE%
GUZMAN,%respondents.%

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
TORRES,%JR.,%J.:%

Without& violating& the& principle& of& exhaustion& of& administrative& remedies,& may& an& action&
for&replevin&prosper& to& recover& a& movable& property& which& is& the& subject& matter& of& an& administrative&
forfeiture&proceeding&in&the&Department&of&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&pursuant&to&Section&68Q
A&of&P.&D.&705,&as&amended,&entitled&The&Revised&Forestry&Code&of&the&Philippines?&
Are& the& Secretary& of& DENR& and& his& representatives& empowered& to& confiscate& and& forfeit&
conveyances&used&in&transporting&illegal&forest&products&in&favor&of&the&government?&
These&are&two&fundamental&questions&presented&before&us&for&our&resolution.&
The&controversy&on&hand&had&its&incipiency&on&May&19,&1989&when&the&truck&of&private&respondent&
Victoria&de&Guzman&while&on&its&way&to&Bulacan&from&San&Jose,&Baggao,&Cagayan,&was&seized&by&the&
Department& of& Environment& and& Natural& Resources& (DENR,& for& brevity)& personnel& in& Aritao,& Nueva&
Vizcaya&because&the&driver&could&not&produce&the&required&documents&for&the&forest&products&found&
concealed&in&the&truck.&Petitioner&Jovito&Layugan,&the&Community&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&
Officer&(CENRO)&in&Aritao,&Cagayan,&issued&on&May&23,&1989&an&order&of&confiscation&of&the&truck&and&
gave&the&owner&thereof&fifteen&(15)&days&within&which&to&submit&an&explanation&why&the&truck&should&not&
be& forfeited.&Private& respondents,& however,& failed& to& submit& the& required& explanation.&On& June& 22,&
1989,[1]&Regional&Executive&Director&Rogelio&Baggayan&of&DENR&sustained&petitioner&Layugans&action&
of&confiscation&and&ordered&the&forfeiture&of&the&truck&invoking&Section&68QA&of&Presidential&Decree&No.&
705&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&No.&277.&Private&respondents&filed&a&letter&of&reconsideration&dated&
June&28,&1989&of&the&June&22,&1989&order&of&Executive&Director&Baggayan,&which&was,&however,&denied&
in&a&subsequent&order&of&July&12,&1989.[2]&Subsequently,&the&case&was&brought&by&the&petitioners&to&the&
Secretary&of&DENR&pursuant&to&private&respondents&statement&in&their&letter&dated&June&28,&1989&that&
in& case& their& letter& for& reconsideration& would& be& denied& then& this& letter& should& be& considered& as& an&
appeal&to&the&Secretary.[3]&Pending&resolution&however&of&the&appeal,&a&suit&for&replevin,&docketed&as&
Civil&Case&4031,&was&filed&by&the&private&respondents&against&petitioner&Layugan&and&Executive&Director&
Baggayan[4]&with& the& Regional& Trial& Court,& Branch& 2& of& Cagayan,[5]&which& issued& a& writ& ordering& the&
return&of&the&truck&to&private&respondents.[6]&Petitioner&Layugan&and&Executive&Director&Baggayan&filed&
a&motion&to&dismiss&with&the&trial&court&contending,&inter$alia,&that&private&respondents&had&no&cause&of&
action&for&their&failure&to&exhaust&administrative&remedies.&The&trial&court&denied&the&motion&to&dismiss&
in&an&order&dated&December&28,&1989.[7]&Their&motion&for&reconsideration&having&been&likewise&denied,&
a&petition&for&certiorari&was&filed&by&the&petitioners&with&the&respondent&Court&of&Appeals&which&sustained&
the&trial&courts&order&ruling&that&the&question&involved&is&purely&a&legal&question.[8]&Hence,&this&present&
petition,[9]&with&prayer&for&temporary&restraining&order&and/or&preliminary&injunction,&seeking&to&reverse&
the&decision&of&the&respondent&Court&of&Appeals&was&filed&by&the&petitioners&on&September&9,&1993.&By&
virtue& of& the& Resolution& dated& September& 27,& 1993,[10]&the& prayer& for& the& issuance& of& temporary&
restraining&order&of&petitioners&was&granted&by&this&Court.&
Invoking&the&doctrine&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies,&petitioners&aver&that&the&trial&court&
could& not& legally& entertain& the& suit& for& replevin& because& the& truck& was& under& administrative& seizure&
proceedings&pursuant&to&Section&68QA&of&P.D.&705,&as&amended&by&E.O.&277.&Private&respondents,&on&
the&other&hand,&would&seek&to&avoid&the&operation&of&this&principle&asserting&that&the&instant&case&falls&
within&the&exception&of&the&doctrine&upon&the&justification&that&(1)&due&process&was&violated&because&
they&were&not&given&the&chance&to&be&heard,&and&(2)&the&seizure&and&forfeiture&was&unlawful&on&the&
grounds:&(a)&that&the&Secretary&of&DENR&and&his&representatives&have&no&authority&to&confiscate&and&
forfeit&conveyances&utilized&in&transporting&illegal&forest&products,&and&(b)&that&the&truck&as&admitted&by&
petitioners&was&not&used&in&the&commission&of&the&crime.&
Upon&a&thorough&and&delicate&scrutiny&of&the&records&and&relevant&jurisprudence&on&the&matter,&we&
are&of&the&opinion&that&the&plea&of&petitioners&for&reversal&is&in&order.&
 This&Court&in&a&long&line&of&cases&has&consistently&held&that&before&a&party&is&allowed&to&seek&the&
intervention& of& the& court,& it& is& a& preQcondition& that& he& should& have& availed& of& all& the& means& of&
administrative&processes&afforded&him.&Hence,&if&a&remedy&within&the&administrative&machinery&can&still&
be&resorted&to&by&giving&the&administrative&officer&concerned&every&opportunity&to&decide&on&a&matter&
that& comes& within& his& jurisdiction& then& such& remedy& should& be& exhausted& first& before& courts& judicial&
power& can& be& sought.& The& premature& invocation& of& courts& intervention& is& fatal& to& ones& cause& of&
action.[11]&Accordingly,&absent&any&finding&of&waiver&or&estoppel$the&case&is&susceptible&of&dismissal&for&
lack&of&cause&of&action.[12]&This&doctrine&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies&was&not&without&its&
practical&and&legal&reasons,&for&one&thing,&availment&of&administrative&remedy&entails&lesser&expenses&
and&provides&for&a&speedier&disposition&of&controversies.&It&is&no&less&true&to&state&that&the&courts&of&
justice& for& reasons& of& comity& and& convenience& will& shy& away& from& a& dispute& until& the& system& of&
administrative&redress&has&been&completed&and&complied&with&so&as&to&give&the&administrative&agency&
concerned&every&opportunity&to&correct&its&error&and&to&dispose&of&the&case.&However,&we&are&not&amiss&
to&reiterate&that&the&principle&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies&as&tested&by&a&battery&of&cases&
is&not&an&ironclad&rule.&This&doctrine&is&a&relative&one&and&its&flexibility&is&called&upon&by&the&peculiarity&
and&uniqueness&of&the&factual&and&circumstantial&settings&of&a&case.&Hence,&it&is&disregarded&(1)&when&
there&is&a&violation&of&due&process,[13]&(2)&when&the&issue&involved&is&purely&a&legal&question,[14]&(3)&when&
the&administrative&action&is&patently&illegal&amounting&to&lack&or&excess&of&jurisdiction,[15]&(4)&when&there&
is&estoppel&on& the& part& of& the& administrative& agency& concerned,[16]&(5)& when& there& is& irreparable&
injury,[17]&(6)&when&the&respondent&is&a&department&secretary&whose&acts&as&an&alter&ego&of&the&President&
bears& the& implied& and& assumed& approval& of& the& latter,[18]&(7)& when& to& require& exhaustion& of&
administrative& remedies& would& be& unreasonable,[19]&(8)& when& it& would& amount& to& a& nullification& of& a&
claim,[20]&(9)&when&the&subject&matter&is&a&private&land&in&land&case&proceedings,[21]&(10)&when&the&rule&
does& not& provide& a& plain,& speedy& and& adequate& remedy,& and& (11)& when& there& are& circumstances&
indicating&the&urgency&of&judicial&intervention.[22]&
In&the&case&at&bar,&there&is&no&question&that&the&controversy&was&pending&before&the&Secretary&of&
DENR& when& it& was& forwarded& to& him& following& the& denial& by& the& petitioners& of& the& motion& for&
reconsideration& of& private& respondents& through& the& order& of& July& 12,& 1989.&In& their& letter& of&
reconsideration& dated& June& 28,& 1989,[23]&private& respondents& clearly& recognize& the& presence& of& an&
administrative&forum&to&which&they&seek&to&avail,&as&they&did&avail,&in&the&resolution&of&their&case.&The&
letter,&reads,&thus:&

xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as
an appeal to the Secretary.[24]

It&was&easy&to&perceive&then&that&the&private&respondents&looked&up&to&the&Secretary&for&the&review&
and&disposition&of&their&case.&By&appealing&to&him,&they&acknowledged&the&existence&of&an&adequate&
and&plain&remedy&still&available&and&open&to&them&in&the&ordinary&course&of&the&law.&Thus,&they&cannot&
now,&without&violating&the&principle&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies,&seek&courts&intervention&
by& filing& an& action& for& replevin& for& the& grant& of& their& relief& during& the& pendency& of& an& administrative&
proceedings.&
Moreover,&it&is&important&to&point&out&that&the&enforcement&of&forestry&laws,&rules&and&regulations&
and&the&protection,&development&and&management&of&forest&lands&fall&within&the&primary&and&special&
responsibilities& of& the& Department& of& Environment& and& Natural& Resources.& By& the& very& nature& of& its&
function,& the& DENR& should& be& given& a& free& hand& unperturbed& by& judicial& intrusion& to& determine& a&
controversy& which& is& well& within& its& jurisdiction.&The& assumption& by& the& trial& court,& therefore,& of& the&
replevin&suit&filed&by&private&respondents&constitutes&an&unjustified&encroachment&into&the&domain&of&the&
administrative& agencys& prerogative.& The& doctrine& of& primary& jurisdiction& does& not& warrant& a& court& to&
arrogate&unto&itself&the&authority&to&resolve&a&controversy&the&jurisdiction&over&which&is&initially&lodged&
with& an& administrative& body& of& special& competence.[25]&In& Felipe& Ismael,& Jr.& and& Co.& vs.& Deputy&
Executive&Secretary,[26]&which&was&reiterated&in&the&recent&case&of&Concerned&Officials&of&MWSS&vs.&
Vasquez,[27]&this&Court&held:&

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.

To&sustain&the&claim&of&private&respondents&would&in&effect&bring&the&instant&controversy&beyond&
the&pale&of&the&principle&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies&and&fall&within&the&ambit&of&excepted&
cases&heretofore&stated.&However,&considering&the&circumstances&prevailing&in&this&case,&we&can&not&
but&rule&out&these&assertions&of&private&respondents&to&be&without&merit.&First,&they&argued&that&there&
was&violation&of&due&process&because&they&did&not&receive&the&May&23,&1989&order&of&confiscation&of&
petitioner&Layugan.&This&contention&has&no&leg&to&stand&on.&Due&process&does&not&necessarily&mean&or&
require&a&hearing,&but&simply&an&opportunity&or&right&to&be&heard.[28]&One&may&be&heard&,&not&solely&by&
verbal& presentation& but& also,& and& perhaps& many& times& more& creditably& and& practicable& than& oral&
argument,&through&pleadings.[29]&In&administrative&proceedings&moreover,&technical&rules&of&procedure&
and&evidence&are&not&strictly&applied\&administrative&process&cannot&be&fully&equated&with&due&process&
in&its&strict&judicial&sense.[30]&Indeed,&deprivation&of&due&process&cannot&be&successfully&invoked&where&
a&party&was&given&the&chance&to&be&heard&on&his&motion&for&reconsideration,[31]&as&in&the&instant&case,&
when&private&respondents&were&undisputedly&given&the&opportunity&to&present&their&side&when&they&filed&
a&letter&of&reconsideration&dated&June&28,&1989&which&was,&however,&denied&in&an&order&of&July&12,&1989&
of&Executive&Director&Baggayan.&In&Navarro&III&vs.&Damasco,[32]&we&ruled&that&:&

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

Second,& private& respondents& imputed& the& patent& illegality& of& seizure& and& forfeiture& of& the&
truck&because&the&administrative&officers&of&the&DENR&allegedly&have&no&power&to&perform&these&acts&
under&the&law.&They&insisted&that&only&the&court&is&authorized&to&confiscate&and&forfeit&conveyances&used&
in&transporting&illegal&forest&products&as&can&be&gleaned&from&the&second&paragraph&of&Section&68&of&
P.D.&705,&as&amended&by&E.O.&277.&The&pertinent&provision&reads&as&follows:&

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and
tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

A&reading,&however,&of&the&law&persuades&us&not&to&go&along&with&private&respondents&thinking&not&
only&because&the&aforequoted&provision&apparently&does&not&mention&nor&include&conveyances&that&can&
be&the&subject&of&confiscation&by&the&courts,&but&to&a&large&extent,&due&to&the&fact&that&private&respondents&
interpretation& of& the& subject& provision& unduly& restricts& the& clear& intention& of& the&law& and& inevitably&
reduces&the&other&provision&of&Section&68QA&,&which&is&quoted&herein&below:&

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and
policies on the matter. (Underline ours)

It& is,& thus,& clear& from& the& foregoing& provision& that& the& Secretary& and& his& duly& authorized&
representatives&are&given&the&authority&to&confiscate&and&forfeit&any&conveyances&utilized&in&violating&
the&Code&or&other&forest&laws,&rules&and&regulations.&The&phrase&to&dispose&of&the&same&is&broad&enough&
to&cover&the&act&of&forfeiting&conveyances&in&favor&of&the&government.&The&only&limitation&is&that&it&should&
be&made&in&accordance&with&pertinent&laws,&regulations&or&policies&on&the&matter.&In&the&construction&of&
statutes,& it& must& be& read& in& such& a& way& as& to& give& effect& to& the& purpose& projected& in& the&
statute.[33]&Statutes&should&be&construed&in&the&light&of&the&object&to&be&achieved&and&the&evil&or&mischief&
to&be&suppressed,&and&they&should&be&given&such&construction&as&will&advance&the&object,&suppress&the&
mischief,&and&secure&the&benefits&intended.[34]&In&this&wise,&the&observation&of&the&Solicitor&General&is&
significant,&thus:&

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and
in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add
Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement
of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-
is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement
and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present
situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have
no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in
EO 277, supra.[35]

Private& respondents,& likewise,& contend& that& the& seizure& was& illegal& because& the& petitioners&
themselves&admitted&in&the&Order&dated&July&12,&1989&of&Executive&Director&Baggayan&that&the&truck&of&
private& respondents&was&not&used&in&the&commission&of&the&crime.&This&order,& a&copy&of&which& was&
given&to&and&received&by&the&counsel&of&private&respondents,&reads&in&part&,&viz.&:&

xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold
your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against
her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx[36]

We&observed&that&private&respondents&misread&the&content&of&the&aforestated&order&and&obviously&
misinterpreted&the&intention&of&petitioners.&What&is&contemplated&by&the&petitioners&when&they&stated&
that&the&truck&"was&not&used&in&the&commission&of&the&crime"&is&that&it&was&not&used&in&the&commission&
of& the& crime& of& theft,& hence,& in& no& case& can& a& criminal& action& be& filed& against& the& owner& thereof& for&
violation&of&Article&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code.&Petitioners&did&not&eliminate&the&possibility&
that&the&truck&was&being&used&in&the&commission&of&another&crime,&that&is,&the&breach&of&Section&68&of&
P.D.705&as&amended&by&E.O.&277.&In&the&same&order&of&July&12,&1989,&petitioners&pointed&out:&

xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No.277
specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered
by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx[37]

Private& respondents,& however,& contended& that& there& is& no& crime& defined& and& punishable& under&
Section&68&other&than&qualified&theft,&so&that,&when&petitioners&admitted&in&the&July&12,&1989&order&that&
private&respondents&could&not&be&charged&for&theft&as&provided&for&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&
Revised& Penal& Code,& then& necessarily& private& respondents& could& not& have& committed& an& act&
constituting&a&crime&under&Section&68.&We&disagree.&For&clarity,&the&provision&of&Section&68&of&P.D.&705&
before& its& amendment& by& E.O.& 277& and& the& provision& of& Section& 1& of& E.O.& No.277& amending& the&
aforementioned&Section&68&are&reproduced&herein,&thus:&

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person who
shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours;
Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With& the& introduction& of& Executive& Order& No.& 277& amending& Section& 68& of& P.D.& 705,& the& act& of&
cutting,&gathering,&collecting,&removing,&or&possessing&forest&products&without&authority&constitutes&a&
distinct&offense&independent&now&from&the&crime&of&theft&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&
Penal&Code,&but&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&is&that&provided&for&under&Article&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&
Penal&Code.&This&is&clear&from&the&language&of&Executive&Order&No.&277&when&it&eliminated&the&phrase&
shall&be&guilty&of&qualified&theft&as&defined&and&punished&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&Revised&
Penal&Code&and&inserted&the&words&shall&be&punished&with&the&penalties&imposed&under&Article&309&and&
310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code&.&When&the&statute&is&clear&and&explicit,&there&is&hardly&room&for&any&
extended&court&ratiocination&or&rationalization&of&the&law.[38]&
 From&the&foregoing&disquisition,&it&is&clear&that&a&suit&for&replevin&can&not&be&sustained&against&the&
petitioners&for&the&subject&truck&taken&and&retained&by&them&for&administrative&forfeiture&proceedings&in&
pursuant&to&Section&68QA&of&the&P.&D.&705,&as&amended.&Dismissal&of&the&replevin&suit&for&lack&of&cause&
of&action&in&view&of&the&private&respondents&failure&to&exhaust&administrative&remedies&should&have&been&
the& proper& course& of& action& by& the& lower& court& instead& of& assuming& jurisdiction& over& the& case& and&
consequently& issuing& the& writ& ordering& the& return& of& the& truck.& Exhaustion& of& the& remedies& in& the&
administrative& forum,& being& a& condition& precedent& prior& to& ones& recourse& to& the& courts& and& more&
importantly,&being&an&element&of&private&respondents&right&of&action,&is&too&significant&to&be&waylaid&by&
the&lower&court.&
It& is& worth& stressing& at& this& point,& that& a& suit& for& replevin& is& founded& solely& on& the& claim& that& the&
defendant&wrongfully&withholds&the&property&sought&to&be&recovered.&It&lies&to&recover&possession&of&
personal&chattels&that&are&unlawfully&detained.[39]&To&detain&is&defined&as&to&mean&to&hold&or&keep&in&
custody,[40]&and&it&has&been&held&that&there&is&tortuous&taking&whenever&there&is&an&unlawful&meddling&
with&the&property,&or&an&exercise&or&claim&of&dominion&over&it,&without&any&pretense&of&authority&or&right\&
this,&without&manual&seizing&of&the&property&is&sufficient.[41]&Under&the&Rules&of&Court,&it&is&indispensable&
in& replevin& proceedings,& that& the& plaintiff& must& show& by& his& own& affidavit& that& he& is& entitled& to& the&
possession&of&property,&that&the&property&is&wrongfully&detained&by&the&defendant,&alleging&the&cause&of&
detention,& that& the& same& has& not& been& taken& for& tax& assessment,& or& seized& under& execution,& or&
attachment,& or& if& so& seized,& that& it& is& exempt& from& such& seizure,& and& the& actual& value& of& the&
property.[42]&Private&respondents&miserably&failed&to&convince&this&Court&that&a&wrongful&detention&of&the&
subject&truck&obtains&in&the&instant&case.&It&should&be&noted&that&the&truck&was&seized&by&the&petitioners&
because& it& was& transporting& forest& products& with& out& the& required& permit& of& the& DENR& in& manifest&
contravention& of& Section& 68& of&P.D.& 705& as& amended& by& E.O& 277.&Section& 68QA& of& P.D.& 705,& as&
amended,&unquestionably&warrants&the&confiscation&as&well&as&the&disposition&by&the&Secretary&of&DENR&
or&his&duly&authorized&representatives&of&the&conveyances&used&in&violating&the&provision&of&forestry&
laws.&Evidently,&the&continued&possession&or&detention&of&the&truck&by&the&petitioners&for&administrative&
forfeiture&proceeding&is&legally&permissible,&hence&,&no&wrongful&detention&exists&in&the&case&at&bar.&
Moreover,& the& suit& for& replevin& is& never& intended& as& a& procedural& tool& to& question& the& orders& of&
confiscation&and&forfeiture&issued&by&the&DENR&in&pursuance&to&the&authority&given&under&P.D.705,&as&
amended.&Section&8&of&the&said&law&is&explicit&that&actions&taken&by&the&Director&of&the&Bureau&of&Forest&
Development&concerning&the&enforcement&of&the&provisions&of&the&said&law&are&subject&to&review&by&the&
Secretary&of&DENR&and&that&courts&may&not&review&the&decisions&of&the&Secretary&except&through&a&
special&civil&action&for&certiorari&or&prohibition.&It&reads&:&

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon
appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory
after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the
President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head
may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE,&the&Petition&is&GRANTED\&the&Decision&of&the&respondent&Court&of&Appeals&dated&
October&16,&1991&and&its&Resolution&dated&July&14,&1992&are&hereby&SET&ASIDE&AND&REVERSED\&
the& Restraining& Order& promulgated& on& September& 27,& 1993& is& hereby& made& permanent\& and& the&
Secretary&of&DENR&is&directed&to&resolve&the&controversy&with&utmost&dispatch.&
SO%ORDERED.%

!
! !
CASE!DIGEST:!Leonardo!Paat!vs!CA!G.R.!no.!111107!(266!SCRA!167)!
Concept:!!!Doctrine!of!Prior!Resort!
!
!
Facts:!
d!!!!!!May19,!1989.!The!truck!of!Victoria!de!Guzman!was!seized!by!the!DENR!because!the!driver!of!the!truck!was!
not!able!to!produce!the!required!documents!for!the!forest!products.!
d!!!!!!Jovitio!Layugan,!the!Community!Environment!and!Natural!Resources!Officer!(CENRO),!issued!an!order!of!
confiscation!of!the!truck!and!gave!the!owner!15!days!to!submit!an!explanation.!Owner!was!not!able!to!sumbit!
an!explanation!and!the!order!of!the!CENRO!was!enforced.!
d!!!!!!The!issue!was!brought!to!the!secretary!of!the!DENR.!While!pending,!the!owner!filed!a!suit!for!replevin!
against!the!Layugan.!Layugan!filed!a!motion!to!dismiss!on!the!ground!that!the!owner!failed!to!exhaust!
administrative!remedies.!Trial!court!ruled!in!favor!of!the!owner.!CA!sustained!Trial!Court’s!decision!
!
Issue:!W/ON!the!trial!court!has!jurisdiction?!
!
Held.!No.!This!Court!in!a!long!line!of!cases!has!consistently!held!that!before!a!party!is!allowed!to!seek!the!
intervention!of!the!court,!it!is!a!pre8condition!that!he!should!have!availed!of!all!the!means!of!administrative!
processes!afforded!him.!Hence,!if!a!remedy!within!the!administrative!machinery!can!still!be!resorted!to!by!
giving!the!administrative!officer!concerned!every!opportunity!to!decide!on!a!matter!that!comes!within!his!
jurisdiction!then!such!remedy!should!be!exhausted!first!before!courts!judicial!power!can!be!sought.!The!
premature!invocation!of!courts!intervention!is!fatal!to!ones!cause!of!action.!
!
!
July!21,!2016!
CASE!DIGEST:!PAAT!VS!CA!
Paat!v.!Court!of!Appeals!
G.R.!No.!111107!
10!January!1997!
!
Facts:!
!!!!!!On!May!19,!1989,!the!truck!of!private!respondent!Victoria!de!Guzman!was!seized!by!DENR!because!the!
driver!could!not!produce!the!required!documents!for!the!forest!products!found!concealed!in!the!truck.!Four!
days!later,!Petitioner!Jovito!Layugan,!CENRO,!issued!an!order!of!confiscation!and!asked!the!owners!to!submit!
an!explanation!why!the!truck!should!not!be!forfeited!within!fifteen!days.!Private!respondent,!however,!failed!
to!do!so.!R.E.D.!Rogelio!Baggayan!of!DENR!sustained!Layugan's!action!of!confiscation!and!ordered!the!
forfeiture!of!the!truck.!de!Guzman!filed!a!letter!of!reconsideration!but!was!subsequently!denied.!The!letter!
was!forwarded!to!the!Secretary!of!DENR!pursuant!to!the!respondent’s!wishes.!During!the!pendency!of!the!
resolution,!however,!the!respondent!filed!a!suit!for!replevin.!The!petitioners!filed!a!motion!to!dismiss!but!was!
later!denied!by!the!RTC.!Their!motion!for!reconsideration!was!likewise!denied!and!the!petition!for!certiorari!
filed!before!the!Court!of!Appeals!affirmed!the!decision!of!the!RTC.!Hence,!this!petition.!
!
Issue:!
!!!!!!!Whether!or!not!the!confiscation!of!the!truck!was!valid.!
!
Held:!
!!!!!Yes.!The!suit!for!replevin!is!never!intended!as!a!procedural!tool!to!question!the!orders!of!confiscation!and!
forfeiture!issued!by!the!DENR!in!pursuance!to!the!authority!given!under!P.D.!705,!as!amended.!The!provision!
of!Section!68!of!P.D.!705!before!its!amendment!by!E.O.!277!and!the!provision!of!Section!1!of!E.O.!No.!277!
amending!the!aforementioned!Section!68!could!never!be!clearer.!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION

[G.R.%No.%131270.%March%17,%2000]

PERFECTO%PALLADA,%petitioner,%vs.%PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%respondent.%Spped

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N

MENDOZA,%J.:

This&is&a&petition&for&review&of&the&decision[1]&of&the&Court&of&Appeals$affirming&petitioner's&conviction&of&
illegal&possession&of&lumber&in&violation&of&68[2]&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code[3]&(P.D.&No.&705,&as&
amended)&by&the&Regional&Trial&Court,&Branch&8,&Malaybalay,&Bukidnon.

The&facts&are&as&follows:

Sometime&in&the&latter&part&of&1992,&the&Department&of&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&(DENR)&
office&in&Bukidnon&received&reports&that&illegally&cut&lumber&was&being&delivered&to&the&warehouse&of&
the&Valencia&Golden&Harvest&Corporation&in&Valencia,&Bukidnon.&The&company&is&engaged&in&rice&
milling&and&trading.

DENR&officers,&assisted&by&elements&of&the&Philippine&National&Police,&raided&the&company's&
warehouse&in&Poblacion,&Valencia&on&the&strength&of&a&warrant&issued&by&the&Regional&Trial&Court,&
Branch&8,&Malaybalay,&Bukidnon&and&found&a&large&stockpile&of&lumber&of&varying&sizes&cut&by&a&chain&
saw.&As&proof&that&the&company&had&acquired&the&lumber$by&purchase,&petitioner&produced&two&
receipts&issued&by&R.L.&Rivero&Lumberyard&of&Maramag,&Bukidnon,&dated&March&6&and&17,&1992.&The&
DENR&officers&did&not,&however,&give&credit&to&the&receipts&considering&that&R.&L.&Rivero&Lumberyard's&
permit&to&operate&had&long&been&suspended.&What&is&more,&the&pieces&of&lumber&were&cut&by&chain&
saw&and&thus&could&not&have&come&from&a&licensed&sawmill&operator.&Jo&spped

The&team&made&an&inventory&of&the&seized&lumber&which,&all&in&all,&constituted&29,299.25&board&feet,&
worth&P488,334.45&in&total.&The&following&day,&September&29,&1992,&the&first&batch&of&lumber,&
consisting&of&162&pieces&measuring&1,954.66&board&feet,&was&taken&and&impounded&at&the&FORE&
stockyard&in&Sumpong,&Malaybalay,&Bukidnon.&The&seizure&order[4]&was&served&on&petitioner&Perfecto&
Pallada&as&general&manager&of&the&company,&but&he&refused&to&acknowledge&it.

On&October&1,&1992,&the&raiding&team&returned&for&the&remaining&lumber.&Company&president&
Francisco&Tankiko&and&a&certain&Isaias&Valdehueza,&who&represented&himself&to&be&a&lawyer,&asked&
for&a&suspension&of&the&operations&to&enable&them&to&seek&a&lifting&of&the&warrant.&The&motion&was&
filed&with&the&court&which&issued&the&warrant&but,&on&October&5,&1992,&the&motion&was&
denied.[5]&Accordingly,&the&remaining&lumber&was&confiscated.&By&October&9,&1992,&all&the&lumber&in&
the&warehouse&had&been&seized.&As&before,&however,&petitioner&Pallada&refused&to&sign&for&the&
seizure&orders&issued&by&the&DENR&officers&(Exhs.&E,&F&&&G).

On&February&23,&1993,&petitioner,&as&general&manager,&together&with&Noel&Sy,&as&assistant&operations&
manager,&and&Francisco&Tankiko,&as&president&of&the&Valencia&Golden&Harvest&Corporation,&and&
Isaias&Valdehueza,&were&charged&with&violation&of&68&of&P.D&.No.&705,&as&amended.&The&Information&
alleged:[6]

That&on&or&about&the&1st&day&of&October,&1992,&and&prior&thereto&at&the&Valencia&Golden&
Harvest&Corporation&Compound,&municipality&of&Valencia,&province&of&Bukidnon,&
Philippines,&and&within&the&jurisdiction&of&this&Honorable&Court,&the&aboveQnamed&
accused,&conspiring,&confederating&and&mutually&helping&one&another,&with&intent&of&
gain,&did&then&and&there&willfully,&unlawfully&and&criminally&possess&2,115&pieces&[of]&
lumber&of&different&dimensions&in&the&total&volume&of&29,299&.25&board&feet&or&equivalent&
to&69.10&cubic&meters&with&an&estimated&value&of&FOUR&HUNDRED&EIGHTY&EIGHT&
THOUSAND&THREE&HUNDRED&THIRTY&FOUR&PESOS&AND&45/100&(P488,334.45)&
Philippine&Currency,&without&any&authority,&license&or&legal&documents&from&the&
government,&to&the&damage&and&prejudice&of&the&government&in&the&amount&of&
P488,334.45.

Contrary&to&and&in&violation&of&Section&68,&P.D.&705&as&amended&by&E.O.&277.

As&all&the&accused&pleaded&not&guilty,&trial&ensued.&Then&on&July&27,&1994,&judgment&was&rendered&as&
follows:[7]
 WHEREFORE,&judgment&is&hereby&rendered&finding&accused&Perfecto&Pallada&and&
Francisco&Tankiko&guilty&beyond&reasonable&doubt&of&having&in&their&possession&timber&
products&worth&of&P488,334.45&without&the&legal&documents&as&charged&in&the&
information&in&violation&of&Section&68&of&Presidential&Decree&705,&as&amended&and&are,&
therefore,&each&sentenced&to&suffer&imprisonment&of&TEN&(10)&YEARS&of&prision&
mayor&as&minimum&to&TWENTY&(20)&YEARS&of&Reclusion&temporal&as&maximum.&The&
lumber&subject&of&the&crime&are&confiscated&in&favor&of&the&government.&Spped&jo

Accused&Isaias&Valdehueza&and&Noel&Sy&are&ACQUITTED&for&lack&of&evidence&against&
them.

Petitioner&and&Francisco&Tankiko&appealed&to&the&Court&of&Appeals,&which,&on&October&31,&1997,&
affirmed&petitioner's&conviction&but&acquitted&Tankiko&for&lack&of&proof&of&his&participation&in&the&
purchase&or&acquisition&of&the&seized&lumber.[8]

Hence&this&petition&which&raises&the&following&issues:[9]

I.&WHETHER&OR&NOT&THE&HONORABLE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&WAS&CORRECT&IN&
UPHOLDING&THE&RULING&OF&THE&TRIAL&COURT&THAT&THE&PROSECUTION&HAD&
PROVED&BEYOND&REASONABLE&DOUBT&THE&GUILT&OF&THE&ACCUSEDQ
PETITIONER&PALLADA.

II.&WHETHER&OR&NOT&THE&HONORABLE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&WAS&CORRECT&IN&
UPHOLDING&THE&DECISION&OF&THE&TRIAL&COURT&THAT&THE&CERTIFICATE&OF&
TIMBER&ORIGIN&WAS&NOT&THE&PROPER&DOCUMENT&TO&JUSTIFY&PETITIONER'S&
POSSESSION&OF&THE&SQUARED&TIMBER&OR&FLITCHES.

III.&WHETHER&OR&NOT&THE&HONORABLE&COURT&OF&APPEALS&WAS&CORRECT&IN&
UPHOLDING&THE&RULING&OF&THE&TRIAL&COURT&THAT&THE&PRESENCE&OF&
ERASURES&IN&THE&CERTIFICATE&OF&TIMBER&ORIGIN&RENDER&THEM&
VALUELESS&AS&EVIDENCE.

First.&During&the&trial,&the&defense&presented&the&following&documents,&as&summarized&by&the&trial&
court,&to&establish&that&Valencia&Golden&Harvest&Corporation's&possession&of&the&seized&lumber&was&
legal:[10]

1.&Exh.&6&Q&Certificate&of&Timber&Origin&(CTO&for&short),&dated&December&15,&1991,&for&
56&pieces&of&flitches&equivalent&to&12.23&cubic&meters,&transported&from&Bombaran,&
Lanao&del&Sur&of&the&Autonomous&Region&of&Muslim&Mindanao.&Taken&from&the&forest&
area&of&Wahab&and&H.D.&Pangcoga

Exh.&6QA&Q&Auxiliary&InvoiceMiso

Exh.&6QB&Q&Certificate&of&Transport&Agreement&(CTA,&for&short)

Exh.&6QC$Q&Tally&Sheet,&dated&December&14,&1992,&for&463&pieces&of&lumber&equivalent&
to&5,056.94&board&feet

Exh.&6QD&Q&Delivery&Receipt,&dated&December&16,&1991,&from&WHP&Enterprises&of&
Maguing,&Lanao&del&Sur,&to&the&Corporation&for&the&lumber&mentioned&in&Exh.&"6QC"

Exh.&6QF&Q&Cash&Voucher&for&P58,832.45&in&payment&to&WHP&Enterprises,&dated&
December&16,&1991,&for&the&5,056.94&board&feet&of&lumber

Exh.&6QDQ1&Q&[C]arbon&copy&of&Exh.&"6QD"&above

2.&Exh.&7&Q&CTO,&(undated),&for&961&pieces&of&log&equivalent&to&25.4&cubic&meter[s]&taken&
from&the&forest&area&of&a&certain&Somira&M.&Ampuan&in&Lama&Lico,&Bombaran&of&the&
ARMM

Exh.&7QA&Q&Auxiliary&Invoice

Exh.&7QB&Q&CTA

Exh.&7QC&Q&Tally&Sheet,&dated&February&6,&1992,&for&961&pieces&of&lumber&equal&to&
10,758.2&board&feet
 Exh.&7QD&Q&Delivery&Receipt&to&Golden&Harvest&Corporation&issued&by&SMA&Trading&
Company,&dated&February&6,&1992

Exh.&7QE&Q&Official&Receipt&for&environmental&fee&issued&to&Somira&M.&Ampuan,&dated&
August&9,&1991

Exh.&7QF&Q&Cash&Voucher&for&P126,562.05&issued&by&the&Corporation&in&payment&to&SMA&
Trading&Company&for&10,758.02&board&feet&of&lumber,&dated&February&6,&1992

3.&Exh.&8&Q&CTO&for&678&pieces&of&chainQsawn&lumber&with&an&equivalent&volume&of&18.93&
cubic&meter&from&the&forest&area&of&Wahab&Pangcoga&and&H.D.&Pangcoga,&dated&
February&25,&1992

Exh.&8QA&Q&Auxiliary&InvoiceNex&old

Exh.&8QB&Q&CTA

Exh.&8QC$Q&Tally&Sheet&for&the&678&pieces&of&lumber

Exh.&8QD&Q&Delivery&Receipt&to&Golden&Harvest&Corporation&issued&by&WHP&Enterprises,

Exh.&8QE&Q&Official&Receipt&for&environmental&fee

Exh.&8QF&Q&Cash&Voucher&for&P93,614.50&in&payment&for&8,024.99&board&feet&of&lumber&
issued&by&the&Corporation&payable&to&WHP&Enterprises

4.&Exh.&9&Q&CTO&for&426&pieces&of&logs&(?)&with&an&equivalent&volume&of&12.24&cubic&
meters&from&licensee&Somira&M.&Ampuan&of&Lama&Lico,&Bombaran,&Lanao&del&Sur,&
consigned&to&the&Corporation,&(undated).&Stamped&"Release&3/2/92"

Exh.&9QA&Q&Auxiliary&Invoice

Exh.&9QB&Q&CTA,&dated&March&20,&1992

Exh.&9QC$Q&Tally&Sheet,&dated&March&20,&1992

Exh.&9QD&Q&Delivery&Receipt&issued&by&SMA&Trading&Company&to&the&Corporation,&dated&
March&20,&1992

Exh.&9QE&Q&Official&Receipt&for&environmental&fee

Exh.&9QF&Q&Cash&Voucher,&for&P64,299.50&to&pay&[for]&5,189&board&feet&of&lumber

Exh.&9QDQ1&Q&Xerox&copy&of&Exh.&"9QD"

The&trial&court&acted&correctly&in&not&giving&credence&to&the&Certificates&of&Timber&Origin&presented&by&
petitioner&since&the&lumber&held&by&the&company&should&be&covered&by&Certificates&of&Lumber&
Origin.[11]&For&indeed,&as&BFD&Circular&No.&10Q83[12]&states&in&pertinent&parts:&Mani&kx

In&order&to&provide&an&effective&mechanism&to&pinpoint&accountability&and&responsibility&
for&shipment&of&lumber&.&.&.&and&to&have&uniformity&in&documenting&the&origin&thereof,&the&
attached&Certificate&of&Lumber&Origin&(CLO)&.&.&.&which&form[s]&part&of&this&circular&[is]&
hereby&adopted&as&accountable&forms&for&official&use&by&authorized&BFD&officers.&.&.&.

5.&Lumber&.&.&.&transported/shipped&without&the&necessary&Certificate&of&Lumber&Origin&
(CLO)&.&.&.&as&herein&required&shall&be&considered&as&proceeding&from&illegal&sources&
and&as&such,&shall&be&subject&to&confiscation&and&disposition&in&accordance&with&LOI&
1020&and&BFD&implementing&guidelines.

Petitioner&contends&that&the&term&"timber"&includes&lumber&and,&therefore,&the&Certificates&of&Timber&
Origin&and&their&attachments&should&have&been&considered&in&establishing&the&legality&of&the&
company's&possession&of&the&lumber.[13]&In&support&of&his&contention,&petitioner&invokes&our&ruling&in&
Mustang&Lumber,&Inc.&v.&Court&of&Appeals.[14]

The&contention&has&no&merit.&The&statement&in&Mustang$Lumber$that&lumber&is&merely&processed&
timber&and,&therefore,&the&word&"timber"&embraces&lumber,&was&made&in&answer&to&the&lower&court's&
ruling&in&that&case&that&the&phrase&"possess&timber&or&other&forest&products"&in&68&of&P.D.&No.&705&
means&that&only&those&who&possess&timber&and&forest&products&without&the&documents&required&by&
law&are&criminally&liable,&while&those&who&possess&lumber&are&not&liable.&On&the&other&hand,&the&
question&in&this&case&is&whether&separate&certificates&of&origin&should&be&issued&for&lumber&and&timber.&
Indeed,&different&certificates&of&origin&are&required&for&timber,&lumber&and&nonQtimber&forest&
products.[15]&As&already&noted,&the&opening&paragraph&of&BFD&Circular&No.&10Q83&expressly&states&that&
the&issuance&of&a&separate&certificate&of&origin&for&lumber&is&required&in&order&to&"pinpoint&
accountability&and&responsibility&for&shipment&of&lumber&.&.&.&and&to&have&uniformity&in&documenting&the&
origin&thereof."

Even&assuming&that&a&Certificate&of&Timber&Origin&could&serve&as&a&substitute&for&Certificate&of&Lumber&
Origin,&the&trial&court&and&the&Court&of&Appeals&were&justified&in&convicting&petitioner,&considering&the&
numerous&irregularities&and&defects&found&in&the&documents&presented&by&the&latter.&According&to&the&
trial&court:[16]

Although&the&CTO&marked&Exh.&"6"&mentions&56&pieces&of&flitches,&the&supporting&
documents,&like&the&Tally&Sheet,&the&Delivery&Receipt&from&the&lumber&dealer&and&the&
Cash&Voucher&describe&463&pieces&of&lumber.&.&.&.&Maniks

In&like&manner,&Exh.&"7"&and&Exh.&"9"&mention&961&and&420&pieces&of&log,&respectively.&
But&the&supporting&documents&describe&the&forest&product[s]&as&lumber.

The&CTO&marked&Exh.&"[8]"&reveals&a&halfQtruth:&it&mentions&678&pieces&of&handQsawn&
lumber.&Its&Auxiliary&Invoice&also&states&the&same&load&of&lumber.&Someone&may&have&
noticed&the&"mistake"&of&mentioning&lumber&in&the&Auxiliary&Invoice&and&so&the&words&
"flitches&87&pieces"&were&written&down&and&enclosed&in&parenthesis.

The&said&exhibits&also&appear&to&be&questionable,&[t]hus[:]

The&CTO&marked&Exh.&"6"&is&consigned&to&"any&buyer&(sic)&Cagayan&de&Oro",&but&its&
Auxiliary&Invoice&(Exh.&"6QA")&mentions&Valencia&Golden&Harvest&Corporation&as&the&
consignee.&Moreover,&the&CTO&states&(at&the&back&page)&that&the&same&is&covered&by&
Auxiliary&Invoice&No.&00491\&in&fact,&the&Auxiliary&Invoice&(Exh.&6QA)&has&invoice&number&
000488.

In&the&CTO&marked&Exhibit&"7",&the&original&typewritten&name&of&the&consignee&was&
clearly&erased&and&changed&to&"Valencia&Golden&Harvest&Corporation,&Valencia,&
Bukidnon".&In&the&Auxiliary&Invoice&(Exh.&"7QA")&the&blank&space&for&the&name&and&
address&of&the&consignee&was&smudged&with&a&typewriter&correction&fluid&(the&better&to&
erase&what&was&originally&typewritten&in&it?)&and&changed&to&"Valencia&Golden&Harvest&
Corporation,&Valencia,&Bukidnon".

The&CTO&marked&Exh.&"9"&and&its&Auxiliary&Invoice&marked&Exh.&"9QA"&[were]&"doctored"&
in&the&same&manner&as&Exh.&"[7]"&and&Exh.&"[7QA]".[17]

Additionally,&all&the&Auxiliary&Invoice&were&not&properly&accomplished:&the&data&required&
to&be&filled&are&left&in&blank.&Manikan

Indeed,&aside&from&the&fact&that&the&Certificate&of&Timber&Origin&in&Exh.&7&bears&no&date,&the&dorsal&
side&bears&the&certification&that&the&logs&were&"scaled&on&August&7,&1991,"&while&the&receipt&attached&
to&that&Certificate&is&dated&February&6,&1992.&Moreover,&the&four&delivery&receipts&list&the&sizes&and&
volume&of&the&lumber&sold,&indicating&that&the&company&purchased&cut&lumber&from&the&dealers,&thus&
belying&the&testimony&of&petitioner&that&when&the&company&bought&the&forest&products,&they&were&still&
in&the&form&of&flitches&and&logs,&and&they&were&cut&into&lumber&by&the&company.[18]

These&irregularities&and&discrepancies&make&the&documents&in&which&they&are&found&not&only&
questionable&but&invalid&and,&thus,&justified&the&trial&court&in&giving&no&credence&to&the&same.[19]

It&is&argued&that&the&irregularities&in&the&documentary&exhibits&should&not&be&taken&against&petitioner&
because&the&documents&came&from&lumber&dealers.&In&addition,&it&is&contended&that&the&CTOs&and&
Auxiliary&Receipts,&being&public&documents,&should&be&accorded&the&presumption&of&regularity&in&their&
execution.[20]

This&contention&is&untenable.&What&render&these&documents&without&legal&effect&are&the&patent&
irregularities&found&on&their&faces.&That&petitioner&may&not&have&any&responsibility&for&such&irregularity&
is&immaterial.&In&any&case,&as&the&corporate&officer&in&charge&of&the&purchase&of&the&lumber,&petitioner&
should&have&noticed&such&obvious&irregularities,&and&he&should&have&taken&steps&to&have&them&
corrected.&He&cannot&now&feign&ignorance&and&assert&that,&as&far&as&he&is&concerned,&the&documents&
are&regular&and&complete.[21]

The&presence&of&such&glaring&irregularities&negates&the&presumption&that&the&CTOs&were&regularly&
executed&by&the&DENR&officials&concerned.&The&presumption&invoked&by&petitioner&applies&only&when&
the&public&documents&are,&on&their&faces,&regular&and&properly&accomplished.[22]

Second.%The&penalty&imposed&should&be&modified.&Art.&309&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code,&made&
applicable&to&the&offense&by&P.D.&No.&705,&68,&provides:

ART.&309.&Penalties.<$Any&person&guilty&of&theft&shall&be&punished&by:&Oldmis&o

1.&The&penalty&of&prision$mayor$in&its&minimum&and&medium&periods,&if&the&value&of&the&
thing&stolen&is&more&than&P12,000&pesos&but&does&not&exceed&P22,000&pesos\&but&if&the&
value&of&the&thing&stolen&exceeds&the&latter&amount,&the&penalty&shall&be&the&maximum&
period&of&the&one&prescribed&in&this&paragraph,&and&one&year&for&each&additional&ten&
thousand&pesos,&but&the&total&of&the&penalty&which&may&be&imposed&shall&not&exceed&
twenty&years.&In&such&cases,&and&in&connection&with&the&accessory&penalties&which&may&
be&imposed&and&for&the&purpose&of&the&other&provisions&of&this&Code,&the&penalty&shall&
be&termed&prision$mayor$or&reclusion$temporal,$as&the&case&may&be.&.&.&.

As&the&lumber&involved&in&this&case&is&worth&P488,334.45,&and&applying&the&Indeterminate&Sentence&
Law,[23]&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&should&be&six&(6)&years&of&prision$correccional$to&twenty&(20)&years&
of&reclusion$temporal.

WHEREFORE,&the&decision&of&the&Court&of&Appeals,&dated&October&31,&1997,&is&AFFIRMED&with&the&
MODIFICATION&that&petitioner&is&sentenced&to&six&(6)&years&of&prision$correccional,$as&minimum,&to&
twenty&(20)&years&of&reclusion$temporal,$as&maximum.

SO%ORDERED.

!
! !
Case Digest: Pallada v. People
Posted on May 23, 2016
PALLADA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000

FACTS

Pallada, as general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, a ricemilling company, was
convicted of possessing 29,299.25 board feet of lumber, worth P488,334.45 in total, which were
confiscated during a raid by police and DENR officers. On the scene, the company provided 2
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard, whose permit to operate had already been suspended.

ISSUE

whether the term “timber” includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their
attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company’s possession of
the lumber.

RULING

No, the statement in the Mustang Lumber case that lumber is merely processed timber and,
therefore, the word “timber” embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court’s ruling in that
case that the phrase “posses timber or other forest products” in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 means
that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are
criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable.

On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be
issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber
and non-timber forest products.

!
! !
 Republic&of&the&Philippines&
SUPREME%COURT&
Manila&

FIRST&DIVISION&

&&

G.R.%No.%L]46772%February%13,%1992%

PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%petitioner,&&
vs.&
COURT%OF%FIRST%INSTANCE%OF%QUEZON%(BRANCH%VII),%GODOFREDO%ARROZAL%AND%LUIS%
FLORES,%respondents.&

Felipe$B.$Pagkanlungan$for$private$respondents.&

&

MEDIALDEA,%J.:&

This&petition&seeks&the&annulment&of&the&order&of&the&Court&of&First&Instance&(now&Regional&Trial&
Court)&of&Quezon&in&Criminal&Case&No.&1591,&entitled&"People&of&the&Philippines&vs.&Godofredo,&
Arrozal,&Luis&Flares&and&twenty&other&John&Does,"&dismissing&the&information&filed&therein.&

The&antecedent&facts&are&as&follows:&

The&private&respondents&were&charged&with&the&crime&of&qualified&theft&of&logs,&defined&and&punished&
under&Section&68&of&Presidential&Decree&No.&705,&otherwise&known&as&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&of&
the&Philippines,&in&an&information&which&read:&

That&on&or&about&the&28th,&29th&and&30th&days&of&July&1976,&at&Barangay&Mahabang&
Lalim,&Municipality&of&General&Nakar,&Province&of&Quezon,&Philippines,&and&within&the&
jurisdiction&of&this&Honorable&Court,&the&aboveQnamed&accused,&Godofredo&Arrozal&and&
Luis&Flores,&together&with&twenty&(20)&other&John&Does&whose&identities&are&still&
unknown,&the&firstQnamed&accused&being&the&administrator&of&the&Infanta&Logging&
Corporation,&with&intent&to&gain,&conspiring&and&confederating&together&and&mutually&
helping&one&another,&did&then&and&there&willfully,&unlawfully&and&feloniously&enter&the&
privatelyQowned&land&of&one&Felicitacion&Pujalte,&titled&in&the&name&of&her&deceased&
father,&Macario&Prudente,&under&Original&Certificate&of&Title&No.&6026,&and&once&inside,&
illegally&cut,&gather,&take,&steal&and&carry&away&therefrom,&without&the&consent&of&the&
said&owner&and&without&any&authority&under&a&license&agreement,&lease&license&or&
permit,&sixty&(60)&logs&of&different&species,&consisting&of&about&541.48&cubic&meters,&with&
total&value&of&FIFTY&THOUSAND&TWO&HUNDRED&FIVE&PESOS&and&FIFTY&TWO&
CENTAVOS&(P50,205.52)&including&government&charges,&to&the&damage&and&prejudice&
of&the&said&owner&in&the&aforesaid&amount.&

Contrary&to&Law.&

Lucena&City,&7&January&1977.&(p.17,&Rollo).&

On&March&23,&1977,&the&named&accused&filed&a&motion&to&quash&the&information&on&two&(2)&grounds,&
to&wit:&(1)&that&the&facts&charged&do&not&constitute&an&offense\&and,&(2)&that&the&information&does&not&
conform&substantially&to&the&prescribed&form.&

On&April&13,&1977,&the&trial&court&dismissed&the&information&on&the&grounds&invoked&(pp.&32Q42,&Rollo),&
The&reconsideration&sought&was&denied&on&August&9,&1977&(p.42,&Rollo).&

On&October&15,&1977,&this&petition&was&filed&directly&with&this&Court,&raising&the&following&questions&of&
law:&(1)&whether&or&not&the&information&charged&an&offense\&and&(2)&whether&or&not&the&trial&court&had&
jurisdiction&over&the&case.&

On&the&first&issue,&the&People&alleged&that,&contrary&to&the&allegation&of&the&private&respondents&and&
the&opinion&of&the&trial&court,&the&information&substantially&alleged&all&the&elements&of&the&crime&of&
qualified&theft&of&logs&as&described&in&Section&68&of&P.D.&705.&While&it&was&admitted&that&the&
information&did&not&precisely&allege&that&the&taking&of&the&logs&in&question&was&"without&the&consent&of&
the&state,"&nevertheless,&said&information&expressly&stated&that&the&accused&"illegally&cut,&gather,&take,&
steal&and&carry&away&therefrom,&without&the&consent&of&said&owner&and&without&any&authority&under&a&
license&agreement,&lease,&lease,&license&or&permit,&sixty&(60)&logs&of&different&species.&.&.&."&Since&only&
the&state&can&grant&the&lease,&license,&license&agreement&or&permit&for&utilization&of&forest&resources,&
including&timber,&then&the&allegation&in&the&information&that&the&asportation&of&the&logs&was&"without&
any&authority"&under&a&license&agreement,&lease,&license&or&permit,&is&tantamount&to&alleging&that&the&
taking&of&the&logs&was&without&the&consent&of&the&state.&

We&agree&with&the&petitioner.&

Sec.&68.&Cutting,$gathering$and/or$collecting$timber$or$other$products$without$license.—&
Any&person&who&shall&cut,&gather,&collect&or&remove&timber&or&other&forest&products&from&
any&forest&land,&or&timber&from&alienable&or&disposable&public&lands,&or&from&private&
lands,&without&any&authority&under&a&license&agreement,&lease,&license&or&permit,&shall&
be&guilty&of&qualified&theft&as&defined&and&punished&under&Articles&309&and&310&of&the&
Revised&Penal&Code.&.&.&.&

When&an&accused&invokes&in&a&motion&to&quash&the&ground&that&the&facts&charged&do&not&constitute&an&
offense&(Rule&117,&Sec.&2&[a]&Rules&of&Court),&the&sufficiency&of&the&Information&hinges&on&the&question&
of&whether&the&facts&alleged,&if&hypothetically&admitted,&meet&the&essential&elements&of&the&offense&
defined&in&the&law&(People&v.&Segovia,&103&Phil.&1162&[1958]\&People&v.&Abad,&LQ55132,&August&30,&
1988,&165&SCRA&57).&

The&elements&of&the&crime&of&qualified&theft&of&logs&are:&1)&That&the&accused&cut,&gathered,&collected&
or&removed&timber&or&other&forest&products\&2)&that&the&timber&or&other&forest&products&cut,&gathered,&
collected&or&removed&belongs&to&the&government&or&to&any&private&individual\&and&3)&that&the&cutting,&
gathering,&collecting&or&removing&was&without&authority&under&a&license&agreement,&lease,&license,&or&
permit&granted&by&the&state.&

The&Order&dismissing&the&complaint&concluded&that&the&information&was&defective&because:&

.&.&.,&it&is&noted&that&the&Information&alleges&that&the&cutting,&gathering&and&carrying&away&
of&the&logs&were&done&without&the&consent&of&the&owner&of&the&land.&While&the&
prosecution&admits&that&timber&is&a&forest&product&that&belongs&to&the&state,&the&
information,&however,&fails&to&allege&that&the&taking&was&without&the&consent&of&the&latter,&
for&which&reason&the&Information&is&patently&defective.&(p.&39,&Rollo)&

The&failure&of&the&information&to&allege&that&the&logs&taken&were&owned&by&the&state&is&not&fatal.&It&
should&be&noted&that&the&logs&subject&of&the&complaint&were&taken&not&from&a&public&forest&but&from&a&
private&woodland&registered&in&the&name&of&complainant's&deceased&father,&Macario&Prudente.&The&
fact&that&only&the&state&can&grant&a&license&agreement,&license&or&lease&does&not&make&the&state&the&
owner&of&all&the&logs&and&timber&products&produced&in&the&Philippines&including&those&produced&in&
private&woodlands.&The&case&of&Santiago$v.$Basilan$Company,&G.R.&No.&LQ15532,&October&31,&1963,&
9&SCRA&349,&clarified&the&matter&on&ownership&of&timber&in&private&lands.&This&Court&held&therein:&

The&defendant&has&appealed,&claiming&that&it&should&not&be&held&liable&to&the&plaintiff&
because&the&timber&which&it&cut&and&gathered&on&the&land&in&question&belongs&to&the&
government&and&not&to&the&plaintiff,&the&latter&having&failed&to&comply&with&a&requirement&
of&the&law&with&respect&to&his&property.&

The&provision&of&law&referred&to&by&appellant&is&a&section&of&the&Revised&Administrative&
Code,&as&amended,&which&reads\&

"Sec.&1829.&Registration$of$title$to$private$forest$land.&—&Every&private&
owner&of&land&containing&timber,&firewood&and&other&minor&forest&products&
shall&register&his&title&to&the&same&with&the&Director&of&Forestry.&A&list&of&
such&owners,&with&a&statement&of&the&boundaries&of&their&property,&shall&be&
furnished&by&said&Director&to&the&Collector&of&Internal&Revenue,&and&the&
same&shall&be&supplemented&from&time&to&time&as&occasion&may&require.&

Upon&application&of&the&Director&of&Forestry&the&fiscal&of&the&province&in&
which&any&such&land&lies&shall&render&assistance&in&the&examination&of&the&
title&thereof&with&a&view&to&its&registration&in&the&Bureau&of&Forestry."&

In&the&above&provision&of&law,&there&is&no&statement&to&the&effect&that&nonQcompliance&
with&the&requirement&would&divest&the&owner&of&the&land&of&his&rights&thereof&and&that&
said&rights&of&ownership&would&be&transferred&to&the&government.&Of&course,&the&land&
which&had&been&registered&and&titled&in&the&name&of&the&plaintiff&under&that&Land&
 Registration&Act&could&no&longer&be&the&object&of&a&forester&license&issued&by&the&
Director&of&Forestry&because&ownership&of&said&land&includes&also&ownership&of&
everything&found&on&its&surface&(Art.&437,&New&Civil&Code).&

Obviously,&the&purpose&of&the&registration&required&in&section&1829&of&the&Administrative&
Code&is&to&exempt&the&title&owner&of&the&land&from&the&payment&of&forestry&charges&as&
provided&for&under&Section&266&of&the&National&Internal&Revenue&Code,&to&wit:&

"Charges$collective$on$forest$products$cut,$gathered$and$removed$from$
unregistered$private$lands.&—&The&charges&above&prescribed&shall&be&
collected&on&all&forest&products&cut,&gathered&and&removed&from&any&
private&land&the&title&to&which&is&not&registered&with&the&Director&of&Forestry&
as&required&by&the&Forest&Law\&Provided,&however,&That&in&the&absence&of&
such&registration,&the&owner&who&desires&to&cut,&gather&and&remove&timber&
and&other&forest&products&from&such&land&shall&secure&a&license&from&the&
Director&of&Forestry&Law&and&Regulations.&The&cutting,&gathering&and&
removing&of&timber&and&the&other&forest&products&from&said&private&lands&
without&license&shall&be&considered&as&unlawful&cutting,&gathering&and&
removing&of&forest&products&from&public&forests&and&shall&be&subject&to&the&
charges&prescribed&in&such&cases&in&this&chapter.&

xxx&xxx&xxx&

On&the&other&hand,&while&it&is&admitted&that&the&plaintiff&has&failed&to&register&the&timber&in&
his&land&as&a&private&woodland&in&accordance&with&the&oftQrepeated&provision&of&the&
Revised&Administrative&Code,&he&still&retained&his&rights&of&ownership,&among&which&are&
his&rights&to&the&fruits&of&the&land&and&to&exclude&any&person&from&the&enjoyment&and&
disposal&thereof&(Art.&429,&New&Civil&Code)&—&the&very&rights&violated&by&the&defendant&
Basilan&Lumber&Company.&

While&it&is&only&the&state&which&can&grant&a&license&or&authority&to&cut,&gather,&collect&or&remove&forest&
products&it&does&not&follow&that&all&forest&products&belong&to&the&state.&In&the&just&cited&case,&private&
ownership&of&forest&products&grown&in&private&lands&is&retained&under&the&principle&in&civil&law&that&
ownership&of&the&land&includes&everything&found&on&its&surface.&

Ownership&is&not&an&essential&element&of&the&offense&as&defined&in&Section&60&of&P.D.&No.&705.&Thus,&
the&failure&of&the&information&to&allege&the&true&owner&of&the&forest&products&is&not&material\&it&was&
sufficient&that&it&alleged&that&the&taking&was&without&any&authority&or&license&from&the&government.&

Anent&the&second&issue&raised,&Section&80&of&Presidential&Decree&705,&provides:&

Sec.&80.&Arrest\&Institution$of$Criminal$Actions.&—&A&forest&officer&or&employee&of&the&
Bureau&shall&arrest&even&without&warrant&any&person&who&has&committed&or&is&
committing&in&his&presence&any&of&the&offenses&defined&in&this&Chapter.&He&shall&also&
seize&and&confiscate,&in&favor&of&the&Government,&the&tools&and&equipment&used&in&
committing&the&offense,&and&the&forest&products&cut,&gathered&or&taken&by&the&offender&in&
the&process&of&committing&the&offense.&The&arresting&forest&officer&or&employee&shall&
thereafter&deliver&within&six&(6)&hours&from&the&time&of&arrest&and&seizure,&the&offender&
and&the&confiscated&forest&products,&tools&and&equipment&to,&and&file&the&proper&
complaint&with,&the&appropriate&official&designated&by&law&to&conduct&preliminary&
investigations&and&file&informations&in&court.&

If&the&arrest&and&seizure&are&made&in&the&forests,&far&from&the&authorities&designated&by&
law&to&conduct&preliminary&investigations,&the&delivery&to,&and&filing&of&the&complaint&with,&
the&latter&shall&be&done&within&a&reasonable&time&sufficient&for&ordinary&travel&from&the&
place&of&arrest&to&the&place&of&delivery.&The&seized&products,&materials&and&equipment&
shall&be&immediately&disposed&of&in&accordance&with&forestry&administrative&orders&
promulgated&by&the&Department&Head.&

The&Department&Head&may&deputize&any&member&or&unit&of&the&Philippine&Constabulary,&
police&agency,&barangay&or&barrio&official,&or&any&qualified&person&to&protect&the&forest&
and&exercise&the&power&or&authority&provided&for&in&the&preceding&paragraph.&

Reports&and&complaints&regarding&the&commission&of&any&of&the&offenses&defined&in&this&
Chapter,&not&committed&in&the&presence&of&any&forest&officer&or&employee,&or&any&of&the&
deputized&officers&or&officials,&shall&immediately&be&investigated&by&the&forest&officer&
 assigned&in&the&area&where&the&offense&was&allegedly&committed,&who&shall&thereupon&
receive&the&evidence&supporting&the&report&or&complaint.&

If&there&is&a$prima$facie&evidence&to&support&the&complaint&or&report,&the&investigating&
forest&officer&shall&file&the&necessary&complaint&with&the&appropriate&official&authorized&by&
law&to&conduct&a&preliminary&investigation&of&criminal&cases&and&file&an&information&in&
Court.&

The&above&cited&provision&covers&two&(2)&specific&instances&when&a&forest&officer&may&commence&a&
prosecution&for&the&violation&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&of&the&Philippines.&The&first&authorizes&a&
forest&officer&or&employee&of&the&Bureau&of&Forestry&to&arrest&without&a&warrant,&any&person&who&has&
committed&or&is&committing,&in&his&presence,&any&of&the&offenses&described&in&the&decree.&The&second&
covers&a&situation&when&an&offense&described&in&the&decree&is&not&committed&in&the&presence&of&the&
forest&officer&or&employee&and&the&commission&is&brought&to&his&attention&by&a&report&or&a&complaint.&In&
both&cases,&however,&the&forest&officer&or&employee&shall&investigate&the&offender&and&file&a&complaint&
with&the&appropriate&official&authorized&by&law&to&conduct&a&preliminary&investigation&and&file&the&
necessary&informations&in&court.&

The&circumstances&in&the&instant&case&do&not&fall&under&any&of&the&situations&covered&by&Section&80&of&
P.D.&705.&The&alleged&offense&was&committed&not&in&the&presence&of&a&forest&officer&and&neither&was&
the&alleged&commission&reported&to&any&forest&officer.&The&offense&was&committed&in&a&private&land&
and&the&complaint&was&brought&by&a&private&offended&party&to&the&fiscal.&

The&trial&court&erred&in&dismissing&the&case&on&the&ground&of&lack&of&jurisdiction&over&the&subject&matter&
because&the&information&was&filed&not&pursuant&to&the&complaint&of&any&forest&officer&as&prescribed&in&
Section&80&of&P.D.&705.&We&agree&with&the&observation&of&the&Solicitor&General&that:&

.&.&.,&the&authority&given&to&the&forest&officer&to&investigate&reports&and&complaints&
regarding&the&commission&of&offenses&defined&in&P.D.&No.&705&by&the&said&last&and&
penultimate&paragraphs&of&Section&80&may&be&considered&as&covering&only&such&reports&
and&complaints&as&might&be&brought&to&the&forest&officer&assigned&to&the&area&by&other&
forest&officers&or&employees&of&the&Bureau&of&Forest&Development,&or&any&of&the&
deputized&officers&or&officials,&for&violations&of&forest&laws&not&committed&in&their&
presence.&Such&interpretation&becomes&cogent&when&we&consider&that&the&whole&of&
Section&80&deals&precisely&with&the&authority&of&forest&officers&or&employees&to&make&
arrests&and&institute&criminal&actions&involving&offenses&defined&in&the&Decree.&(p.&
26,&Rollo).&

Likewise,&the&Solicitor&General&was&correct&in&insisting&that&P.D.&705&did&not&repeal&Section&1687&of&
the&Administrative&Code&giving&authority&to&the&fiscal&to&conduct&investigation&into&the&matter&of&any&
crime&or&misdemeanor&and&have&the&necessary&information&or&complaint&prepared&or&made&against&
persons&charged&with&the&commission&of&the&crime.&

Sec.&1687.&Authority$of$fiscal$to$conduct$investigation$in$criminal$matter.&—&A&provincial&
fiscal&shall&have&authority,&if&he&deems&it&wise,&to&conduct&an&investigation&into&the&
matter&of&any&crime&or&misdemeanor.&To&this&end,&he&may&summon&reputed&witnesses&
and&require&them&to&appear&and&testify&upon&oath&before&him.&.&.&.&

With&the&exception&of&the&soQcalled&"private&crimes"&1&and&in&election&offenses,&2&prosecutions&in&
Courts&of&First&Instance&may&be&commenced&by&an&information&signed&by&a&fiscal&after&conducting&a&
preliminary&investigation.&Section&80&of&P.D.&705&did&not&divest&the&fiscals&of&this&general&authority.&
Neither&did&the&said&decree&grant&forest&officers&the&right&of&preliminary&investigations.&In&both&cases&
under&said&Sec.&80&namely,&1)&after&a&forest&officer&had&made&the&arrest&(for&offenses&committed&in&his&
presence)\&or&2)&after&conducting&an&investigation&of&reports&or&complaints&of&violations&of&the&decree&
(for&violations&not&committed&in&his&presence)&—&he&is&still&required&to&file&the&proper&complaint&with&the&
appropriate&official&designated&by&law&to&conduct&preliminary&investigations&in&court.&Said&section&
should&not&be&interpreted&to&vest&exclusive&authority&upon&forest&officers&to&conduct&investigations&
regarding&offenses&described&in&the&decree&rather,&it&should&be&construed&as&granting&forest&officers&
and&employees&special&authority&to&arrest&and&investigate&offenses&described&in&P.D.&705,&to&reinforce&
the&exercise&of&such&authority&by&those&upon&whom&it&is&vested&by&general&law.&

ACCORDINGLY,&the&petition&is&GRANTED.&The&questioned&order&of&the&trial&court&dismissing&the&
information&is&SET&ASIDE.&Criminal&Cases&No.&1591&is&reinstated.&

SO&ORDERED.&

Narvasa,$C.J.,$Cruz$and$Griño<Aquino,$JJ.,$concur.&
%&

Footnotes%

1&Concubinage,&adultery,&seduction,&abduction,&rape,&acts&of&lasciviousness&and&
defamation&imputing&any&of&the&aforesaid&offenses&where&the&rule&provides&that&these&
crimes&shall&not&be&prosecuted&except&upon&a&complaint&filed&by&the&offended&party.&

2&In&People&v.&Inting,&G.R.&No.&88919,&July&25,&1990,&187&SCRA&788,&We&hold&that&the&
Comelec&has&the&exclusive&power&to&conduct&preliminary&investigations&in&cases&
involving&election&offenses&and&to&prosecute&such&offenses.&However,&if&the&Comelec&
fails&to&act&on&any&complaint&within&two&(2)&months&from&filing,&the&complainant&may&file&
the&complaint&with&the&office&of&the&Fiscal&or&with&the&Department&of&Justice&for&
preliminary&investigation&and&prosecution,&if&warranted.&

!
! !
eople v CFI Quezon (Natural resources)

PEOPLE V CFI QUEZON

G.R. No. L-46772
February 13, 1992

FACTS:

on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim,
Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and
Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still
unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased
father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside,
illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the
said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or
permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with
total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount.

Contrary to Law.

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two
(2) grounds, towit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that
the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: dismissed the information on the grounds
invoked.

Then, directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and

YES.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No.
705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products
is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority
or license from the government.

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or
other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or
to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was
without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the
state.

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is
not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a
public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's
deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license
agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber
products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or
remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In
the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is
retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything
found on its surface.

(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

YES. [NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR]

With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2
prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by
a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not
divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest
officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely,
1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence); or
2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree
(for violations not committed in his presence) — he is still required to file the proper
complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority
upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree
rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority
to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such
authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.

SECOND&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%136142.%October%24,%2000]%

PEOPLE% OF% THE% PHILIPPINES,%plaintiffNappellee,3 vs.3ALFONSO% DATOR% and% BENITO%

GENOL,%accused3(Acquitted)%
PASTOR%TELEN,%accusedNappellant.&

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
DE%LEON,%JR.,%J.:%

Before&us&on&appeal&is&the&Decision[1]&of&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&Branch&
25,&in&Criminal&Case&No.&1733&convicting&the&appellant&of&the&crime&of&violation&of&Presidential&Decree&
No.&705.&
Pastor&Telen&and&his&coQaccused,&Alfonso&Dator&and&Benito&Genol,&were&charged&with&the&crime&of&
violation& of& Section& 68[2]&of& Presidential& Decree& No.& 705,& otherwise& known& as& the& Revised& Forestry&
Code,[3]&in&an&Information&that&reads:&

That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, in barangay Laboon,
municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent of gain,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber flitches
valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency,
without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon&being&arraigned&on&May&27,&1994,&Pastor&Telen&and&his&coQaccused,&Alfonso&Dator&and&Benito&
Genol,& assisted& by& counsel,& separately& entered& the& plea& of& Not& guilty& to& the& charge& in& the&
Information.&Thereafter,&trial&on&the&merits&ensued.&
It& appears& that& on& October& 29,& 1993,& Police& Station& Commander& Alejandro& Rojas& of& Maasin,&
Southern& Leyte,& and& SPO1& Necitas& Bacala,& were& on& board& a& police& patrol& vehicle& heading& towards&
Barangay& San& Rafael,& Maasin,& Southern& Leyte.&Upon& reaching& Barangay& Laboon& of& the& same&
municipality,& they& noticed& a& Isuzu& cargo& truck& loaded& with& pieces& of& lumber& bound& toward& the& town&
proper& of& Maasin.&Suspicious& that& the& cargo& was& illegally& cut& pieces& of& lumber,& Police& Station&
Commander&Rojas&maneuvered&their&police&vehicle&and&gave&chase.[4]&
 Upon&catching&up&with&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&in&Barangay&SoroQsoro,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&they&
ordered&the&driver,&accused&Benito&Genol,&to&pull&over.&Benito&Genol&was&left&alone&in&the&truck&after&his&
companions&hurriedly&left.&When&asked&if&he&had&the&required&documents&for&the&proper&transport&of&the&
pieces&of&lumber,&Genol&answered&in&the&negative.&Genol&informed&the&police&authorities&that&the&pieces&
of&lumber&were&owned&by&herein&appellant,&Pastor&Telen,&while&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&bearing&Plate&No.&
HAF& 628& was& registered& in& the& name& of& Southern& Leyte& Farmers& AgroQIndustrial& Cooperative,& Inc.&
(SLEFAICO)& which& is& a& local& cooperative.&Consequently,& Police& Officers& Rojas& and& Bacala& directed&
Benito& Genol& to& proceed& to& the& Maasin& Police& Station,& Maasin,& Southern& Leyte& for& further&
investigation.[5]&
On&November&5,&1993,&Forest&Ranger&Romeo&Galola&was&fetched&from&his&office&at&the&Community&
Environment& and& Natural& Resources& Office& (CENRO),& Maasin,& Southern& Leyte& by& SPO1& Necitas&
Bacala&to&inspect&the&pieces&of&lumber&that&were&confiscated&on&October&29,&1993&in&SoroQsoro,&Maasin,&
Southern&Leyte&from&Pastor&Telen.&Galola&and&his&immediate&supervisor,&Sulpicio&Saguing,&found&that&
the&cargo&consisted&of&fortyQone&(41)&pieces&of&Dita&lumber&and&ten&(10)&pieces&of&Antipolo&lumber&of&
different&dimensions&with&a&total&volume&of&1,560.16&board&feet.[6]&
Subsequently,& SPO1& Bacala& issued& a& seizure& receipt[7]&covering& the& fiftyQone& (51)& pieces& of&
confiscated&Dita&and&Antipolo&lumber&and&one&(1)&unit&of&Isuzu&cargo&truck&with&Plate&No.&HAF&628.&The&
confiscated& pieces& of& lumber& and& the& cargo& truck& were& turned& over& to& SPO3& Daniel& Lasala,& PNP&
Property&Custodian,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&who,&in&turn,&officially&transferred&custody&of&the&same&to&
the&CENRO,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte.[8]&
The& defense& denied& any& liability& for& the& crime& charged& in& the& Information.&Pastor& Telen,& a& utility&
worker&at&the&Integrated&Provincial&Health&Office,&Southern&Leyte&for&nineteen&(19)&years,&testified&that&
he&needed&lumber&to&be&used&in&renovating&the&house&of&his&grandparents&in&Barangay&Abgao,&Maasin,&
Southern& Leyte& where& he& maintained& residence.Knowing& that& it& was& prohibited& by& law& to& cut& trees&
without&appropriate&permit&from&the&Department&of&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&(DENR),&Telen&
sought&the&assistance&of&a&certain&Lando&dela&Pena&who&was&an&employee&at&the&CENRO,&Maasin,&
Southern& Leyte.&Dela& Pena& accompanied& Telen& to& the& office& of& a& certain& Boy& Leonor,& who& was& the&
Officer&in&Charge&of&CENRO&in&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte.&Leonor&did&not&approve&of&the&plan&of&Telen&to&
cut&teak&or&hard&lumber&from&his&(Telen)&mothers&track&of&land&in&Tabunan,&San&Jose,&Maasin,&Southern&
Leyte.&However,&Leonor&allegedly&allowed&Telen&to&cut&the&aging&Dita&trees&only.&According&to&Telen,&
Leonor&assured&him&that&a&written&permit&was&not&anymore&necessary&before&he&could&cut&the&Dita&trees,&
which&are&considered&soft&lumber,&from&the&private&land&of&his&mother,&provided&the&same&would&be&
used&exclusively&for&the&renovation&of&his&house&and&that&he&shall&plant&trees&as&replacement&thereof,&
which&he&did&by&planting&Gemelina&seedlings.[9]&
On&September&15,&1993,&Telen&requested&his&cousin,&Vicente&Sabalo,&to&hire&for&him&a&cargo&truck&
in&order&to&haul&the&sawn&lumber&from&the&land&of&his&mother&in&Tabunan,&San&Jose,&Maasin,&Southern&
Leyte.&His&cousin&obliged&after&Telen&assured&him&that&he&had&already&secured&verbal&permission&from&
Boy&Leonor,&Officer&in&Charge&of&CENRO&in&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&before&cutting&the&said&lumber.[10]&
After&having&been&informed&by&Vicente&Sabalo&on&October&29,&1993&at&about&4:00&oclock&in&the&
afternoon&that&a&cargo&truck&was&available&for&hire,&Telen&instructed&his&cousin&to&personally&supervise&
the&hauling&of&the&sawn&lumber&for&him&inasmuch&as&he&was&busy&with&his&work&in&the&office.&At&around&
7:00&oclock&in&the&evening,&Telen&learned&from&his&daughter&that&the&sawn&lumber&were&confiscated&by&
the&police&in&Barangay&SoroQsoro,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte.[11]&
Upon&arrival&in&Barangay&SoroQSoro,&Telen&was&accosted&by&Police&Station&Commander&Alejandro&
Rojas&who&demanded&from&him&DENR&permit&for&the&sawn&lumber.&After&confirming&ownership&of&the&
sawn&lumber,&Telen&explained&to&Rojas&that&he&had&already&secured&verbal&permission&from&Boy&Leonor&
to&cut&Dita&trees,&which&are&considered&soft&lumber,&to&be&used&in&the&renovation&of&his&house&and&that&
he&had&already&replaced&the&sawn&Dita&trees&with&Gemelina&seedlings,&but&to&no&avail.&Rojas&ordered&
that&the&pieces&of&lumber&and&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&be&impounded&at&the&municipal&building&of&Maasin,&
Southern&Leyte&for&failure&of&Telen&to&produce&the&required&permit&from&the&DENR.[12]&
Pastor&Telen&appeared&before&Bert&Pesidas,&CENRO&hearing&officer,&in&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&for&
investigation&in&connection&with&the&confiscated&pieces&of&lumber.&Telen&had&tried&to&contact&OfficerQinQ
Charge&Boy&Leonor&of&the&CENRO&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&after&the&confiscation&of&the&sawn&lumber&
on&October&29,&1993&and&even&during&the&investigation&conducted&by&the&CENRO&hearing&officer&for&
three&(3)&times&but&to&no&avail,&for&the&reason&that&Boy&Leonor&was&assigned&at&a&reforestation&site&in&
Danao,&Cebu&province.[13]&
Alfonso&Dator,&was&the&accounting&manager&of&SLEFAICO,&Inc.,&a&local&cooperative&engaged&in&
buying&and&selling&abaca&fibers.&Dator&testified&that&on&October&29,&1993&at&3:00&oclock&in&the&afternoon,&
a&certain&Vicente&Sabalo,&accompanied&by&their&company&driver,&Benito&Genol,&proposed&to&hire&the&
Isuzu&cargo&truck&owned&by&SLEFAICO,&Inc.&to&haul&pieces&of&coconut&lumber&from&Barangay&San&Jose&
to&Barangay&SoroQsoro&in&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte.&He&readily&acceded&to&the&proposal&inasmuch&as&the&
owner&of&the&alleged&coconut&lumber,&according&to&Sabalo,&was&Pastor&Telen,&who&is&a&long&time&friend&
and&former&officemate&at&the&provincial&office&of&the&Department&of&Health.&Besides,&the&fee&to&be&earned&
from&the&hauling&services&meant&additional&income&for&the&cooperative.[14]&
At&about&6:00&oclock&in&the&evening&of&the&same&day,&Dator&met&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&of&SLEFAICO,&
Inc.& at& the& Canturing& bridge& in& Maasin,& Southern& Leyte,& being& escorted& by& a& police& patrol& vehicle,&
heading&towards&the&municipal&town&proper.&At&the&municipal&hall&building&of&Maasin,&he&learned&that&
the& Isuzu& truck& was& apprehended& by& the& police& for& the& reason& that& it& contained& a& cargo& of& Dita& and&
Antipolo&lumber&without&the&required&permit&from&the&DENR.&He&explained&to&the&police&authorities&that&
the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&was&hired&merely&to&transport&coconut&lumber,&however,&it&was&impounded&at&the&
municipal&building&just&the&same.[15]&Due&to&the&incident&Dator&lost&his&job&as&accounting&manager&in&
SLEFAICO,&Inc.[16]&
For&his&defense,&Benito&Genol&testified&that&he&was&employed&by&the&SLEFAICO,&Inc.&as&driver&of&
its&Isuzu&cargo&truck.&Aside&from&transporting&abaca&fibers,&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&was&also&available&for&
hire.[17]&
While&Genol&was&having&the&two&tires&of&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&vulcanized&on&October&29,&1993&in&
Barangay&Mantahan,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&Vicente&Sabalo&approachedhim&and&offered&to&hire&the&
services&of&the&cargo&truck.&Genol&accompanied&Sabalo&to&the&residence&of&the&accounting&manager&of&
SLEFAICO,&Inc.,&Alfonso&Dator,&which&was&nearby,&and&the&latter&agreed&to&the&proposal&of&Sabalo&to&
hire&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&to&haul&pieces&of&coconut&lumber&from&San&Jose,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&for&
a&fee.[18]&
At& 4:00& oclock& in& the& afternoon& of& the& same& day,& Genol,& Sabalo& and& a& son& of& Alfonso& Dator,&
proceeded&to&San&Jose&after&fetching&about&six&(6)&haulers&along&the&way&in&Barangay&SoroQsoro.&Upon&
arrival&in&San&Jose,&Genol&remained&behind&the&steering&wheel&to&take&a&rest.&He&was&unmindful&of&the&
actual&nature&of&the&lumber&that&were&being&loaded.&After&the&loading,&Genol&was&instructed&to&proceed&
to&Barangay&SoroQsoro&in&front&of&the&lumberyard&of&a&certain&Jimmy&Go.&Before&the&lumber&could&be&
unloaded&at&8:00&oclock&in&the&evening&Genol&was&approached&by&Police&Station&Commander&Alejandro&
Rojas&who&demanded&DENR&permit&for&the&lumber.&The&pieces&of&lumber&were&confiscated&by&Rojas&
after&Genol&failed&to&produce&the&required&permit&from&the&DENR&office.[19]&
Vicente&Sabalo&corroborated&the&testimonies&of&the&three&(3)&accused&in&this&case.&He&testified&in&
substance&that&he&was&requested&by&his&cousin,&Pastor&Telen,&to&engage&the&services&of&a&cargo&truck&
to&transport&sawn&pieces&of&lumber&from&San&Jose&to&be&used&in&the&renovation&of&his&house&in&Abgao,&
Maasin,&Southern&Leyte\&that&he&approached&Benito&Genol&and&offered&to&hire&the&services&of&the&Isuzu&
cargo&truck&that&he&was&driving\&that&both&of&them&asked&the&permission&of&Alfonso&Dator&who&readily&
acceded&to&the&proposal&for&a&fee&of&P500.00\[20]&that&he&saw&Genol&remained&behind&the&steering&wheel&
as&the&loading&of&the&lumber&was&going&on&in&San&Jose\&and&that&the&lumber&and&the&Isuzu&cargo&truck&
were&confiscated&in&Barangay&SoroQsoro&for&failure&of&his&cousin,&Pastor&Telen,&to&show&to&Police&Station&
Commander&Alejandro&Rojas&any&written&permit&from&the&DENR&for&the&subject&lumber.[21]&
After&analyzing&the&evidence,&the&trial&court&rendered&a&decision,&the&dispositive&portion&of&which&
reads:&

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1.&CONVICTING& the& accused& PASTOR& TELEN& beyond& reasonable& doubt& of& the& offense&
charged&and&there&being&no&modifying&circumstances,&and&with&the&Indeterminate&Sentence&
Law& being& inapplicable,& the& herein& accused& is& hereby& sentenced& to& suffer& the& indivisible&
penalty&of&RECLUSION&PERPETUA,&with&the&accessory&penalties&provided&by&law,&which&is&
two&(2)&degrees&higher&than&PRISION&MAYOR&maximum,&the&authorized&penalty&similar&to&
Qualified&Theft,&and&to&pay&the&costs.&His&bail&for&his&provisional&liberty&is&hereby&cancelled&
and& he& shall& be& committed& to& the& New& Bilibid& Prisons,& Muntinlupa,& Metro& Manila& thru& the&
Abuyog& Regional& Prisons,& Abuyog,& Leyte& via& the& Provincial& Warden,& Maasin,& Southern&
Leyte\&
2.&ACQUITTING& coQaccused& Alfonso& Dator& and& Benito& Genol& on& reasonable& doubt& for&
insufficiency&of&evidence\&and&cancelling&their&bail\&
3.&CONFISCATING&and&SEIZING&the&1,560.16&board&feet&of&illegal&lumber&worth&P23,500.00&
and&ORDERING&the&CENRO&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&to&sell&the&lumber&at&public&auction&
under& proper& permission& from& the& Court,& with&the& proceeds&thereof&turned& over& to& the&
National&Government&thru&the&National&Treasury&under&proper&receipt,&and&to&REPORT&the&
fact&of&sale&to&this&Court&duly&covered&by&documents&of&sale&and&other&receipts&by&evidencing&
the&sale&within&five&(5)&days&from&the&consummation&of&sale\&and&
4.& DIRECTING& the& CENRO& authorities& to& coordinate& with& its& Regional& Office& for& immediate&
administrative& proceedings& and& determination& of& any& administrative& liability& of& the& truck&
owner,&SLEFAICO&Inc.&if&any,&otherwise,&to&release&the&truck&to&its&owner.&

SO ORDERED.
 In&his&appeal&Pastor&Telen&interpose&the&following&assignments&of&error:&
I%

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY
TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH DENR
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.

II%

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF

RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT
BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.

III%

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER IS
P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.

The&appeal&is&not&impressed&with&merit.&
It&is&not&disputed&that&appellant&Pastor&Telen&is&the&owner&of&the&fiftyQone&(51)&pieces&of&assorted&
Antipolo& and& Dita& lumber& with& a& total& volume& of&1,560.16& board& feet.&He& alleged& that& the& pieces& of&
lumber&were&cut&from&the&track&of&land&belonging&to&his&mother&in&San&Jose,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&
which& he& intended& to& use& in& the& renovation& of& his& house& in& Barangay& Abgao& of& the& same&
municipality.&After& having& been& confiscated& by& the& police,& while& in& transit,& in& Barangay& SoroQsoro,&
appellant&Telen&failed&to&produce&before&the&authorities&the&required&legal&documents&from&the&DENR&
pertaining&to&the&said&pieces&of&lumber.&
The&fact&of&possession&by&the&appellant&of&the&subject&fiftyQone&(51)&pieces&of&assorted&Antipolo&and&
Dita&lumber,&as&well&as&his&subsequent&failure&to&produce&the&legal&documents&as&required&under&existing&
forest& laws& and& regulations& constitute& criminal& liability& for& violation& of& Presidential& Decree& No.& 705,&
otherwise&known&as&the&Revised&Forestry&Code.[22]&Section&68&of&the&code&provides:&

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in
the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection
or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The&Court&shall&further&order&the&confiscation&in&favor&of&the&government&of&the&timber&or&any&forest&
products& cut,& gathered,& collected,& removed,& or& possessed,& as& well& as& the& machinery,& equipment,&
implements&and&tools&illegally&used&in&the&area&where&the&timber&or&forest&products&are&found.&
Appellant&Telen&contends&that&he&secured&verbal&permission&from&Boy&Leonor,&OfficerQinQCharge&of&
the&DENRQCENRO&in&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&before&cutting&the&lumber,&and&that&the&latter&purportedly&
assured&him&that&written&permit&was&not&anymore&necessary&before&cutting&soft&lumber,&such&as&the&
Antipolo&and&Dita&trees&in&this&case,&from&a&private&track&of&land,&to&be&used&in&renovating&appellants&
house,&provided&that&he&would&plant&trees&as&replacements&thereof,&which&he&already&did.&It&must&be&
underscored&that&the&appellant&stands&charged&with&the&crime&of&violation&of&Section&68&of&Presidential&
Decree& No.& 705,& a& special& statutory& law,& and& which& crime& is& considered&mala& prohibita.&In& the&
prosecution&for&crimes&that&are&considered&mala&prohibita,&the&only&inquiry&is&whether&or&not&the&law&has&
been&violated.[23]&The&motive&or&intention&underlying&the&act&of&the&appellant&is&immaterial&for&the&reason&
that&his&mere&possession&of&the&confiscated&pieces&of&lumber&without&the&legal&documents&as&required&
under&existing&forest&laws&and&regulations&gave&rise&to&his&criminal&liability.&
In& any& case,& the& mere& allegation& of& the& appellant& regarding& the& verbal& permission& given& by& Boy&
Leonor,&Officer&in&Charge&of&DENRQCENRO,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&is&not&sufficient&to&overturn&the&
established&fact&that&he&had&no&legal&documents&to&support&valid&possession&of&the&confiscated&pieces&
of&lumber.&It&does&not&appear&from&the&record&of&this&case&that&appellant&exerted&any&effort&during&the&
trial&to&avail&of&the&testimony&of&Boy&Leonor&to&corroborate&his&allegation.&Absent&such&corroborative&
evidence,&the&trial&court&did&not&commit&an&error&in&disregarding&the&bare&testimony&of&the&appellant&on&
this&point&which&is,&at&best,&selfQserving.[24]&
 The& appellant& cannot& validly& take& refuge& under& the& pertinent& provision& of& DENR& Administrative&
Order& No.& 79,& Series& of& 1990[25]&which& prescribes& rules& on& the& deregulation& of& the& harvesting,&
transporting&and&sale&of&firewood,&pulpwood&or&timber&planted&in&private&lands.&Appellant&submits&that&
under&the&said&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&79,&no&permit&is&required&in&the&cutting&of&planted&trees&
within&titled&lands&except&Benguet&pine&and&premium&species&listed&under&DENR&Administrative&Order&
No.& 78,& Series& of& 1987,& namely:&narra,& molave,& dao,& kamagong,& ipil,& acacia,& akle,& apanit,& banuyo,&
batikuling,&betis,&bolongQeta,&kalantas,&lanete,&lumbayao,&sangilo,&supa,&teak,&tindalo&and&manggis.&
Concededly,&the&varieties&of&lumber&for&which&the&appellant&is&being&held&liable&for&illegal&possession&
do&not&belong&to&the&premium&species&enumerated&under&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&78,&Series&of&
1987.&However,&under&the&same&DENR&administrative&order,&a&certification&from&the&CENRO&concerned&
to&the&effect&that&the&forest&products&came&from&a&titled&land&or&tax&declared&alienable&and&disposable&
land& must& still& be& secured& to& accompany& the& shipment.&This& the& appellant& failed& to& do,& thus,& he& is&
criminally& liable& under& Section& 68& of& Presidential& Decree& No.& 705& necessitating& prior& acquisition& of&
permit& and& legal& documents& as& required& under& existing& forest& laws& and& regulations.& The& pertinent&
portion&of&DENR&Administrative&Order&No.&79,&Series&of&1990,&is&quoted&hereunder,&to&wit:&

In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by owners of
private lands and give incentives to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19,
1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber
produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other
tree species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no
permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with
corresponding application for patent or acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and
premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a certification
of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable
and disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment.

Appellant& Telen& next& contends& that& proof& of& value& of& the& confiscated& pieces& of& lumber& is&
indispensable,&it&being&the&basis&for&the&computation&of&the&penalty&prescribed&in&Article&309&in&relation&
to&Article&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code\&and&that&in&the&absence&of&any&evidence&on&record&to&prove&
the& allegation& in& the& Information& that& the& confiscated& pieces& of& lumber& have& an& equivalent& value& of&
P23,500.00&there&can&be&no&basis&for&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&and&hence,&he&should&be&acquitted.&
The& appellants& contention& is& untenable.&It& is& a& basic& rule& in& criminal& law& that& penalty& is& not& an&
element&of&the&offense.&Consequently,&the&failure&of&the&prosecution&to&adduce&evidence&in&support&of&
its& allegation& in& the& Information& with& respect& to& the& value& of& the& confiscated& pieces& of& lumber& is& not&
necessarily& fatal& to& its& case.&This& Court& notes& that& the& estimated& value& of& the& confiscated& pieces& of&
lumber,&as&appearing&in&the&official&transmittal&letter[26]&of&the&DENRQCENRO,&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte&
addressed& to& the& Office& of& the& Provincial& Prosecutor& of& the& same& province,& is& P23,500.00& which& is&
alleged&in&the&Information.&However,&the&said&transmittal&letter&cannot&serve&as&evidence&or&as&a&valid&
basis&for&the&estimated&value&of&the&confiscated&pieces&of&lumber&for&purposes&of&computing&the&proper&
penalty&to&be&imposed&on&the&appellant&considering&that&it&is&hearsay&and&it&was&not&formally&offered&in&
evidence&contrary&to&Section&34&of&Rule&132&of&the&Revised&Rules&of&Court.&
In&the&case&of&People&vs.&Elizaga,[27]&the&accusedQappellant&therein&was&convicted&of&the&crimes&of&
homicide&and&theft,&and&the&value&of&the&bag&and&its&contents&that&were&taken&by&the&accusedQappellant&
from&the&victim&was&estimated&by&the&prosecution&witness&to&be&P500.00.&In&the&absence&of&a&conclusive&
or&definite&proof&relative&to&their&value,&this&Court&fixed&the&value&of&the&bag&and&its&contents&at&P100.00&
based& on& the& attendant& circumstances& of& the& case.&More& pertinently,& in& the& case& of& People& vs.&
Reyes,[28]&this&Court&held&that&if&there&is&no&available&evidence&to&prove&the&value&of&the&stolen&property&
or& that& the& prosecution& failed& to& prove& it,& the& corresponding& penalty& to& be& imposed& on& the& accusedQ
appellant&should&be&the&minimum&penalty&corresponding&to&theft&involving&the&value&of&P5.00.&
In&the&case&at&bench,&the&confiscated&fiftyQone&(51)&pieces&of&assorted&Dita&and&Antipolo&lumber&
were&classified&by&the&CENRO&officials&as&soft,&and&therefore&not&premium&quality&lumber.&It&may&also&
be&noted&that&the&said&pieces&of&lumber&were&cut&by&the&appellant,&a&mere&janitor&in&a&public&hospital,&
from&the&land&owned&by&his&mother,&not&for&commercial&purposes&but&to&be&utilized&in&the&renovation&of&
his&house.&It&does&not&appear&that&appellant&Telen&had&been&convicted&nor&was&he&an&accused&in&any&
other&pending&criminal&case&involving&violation&of&any&of&the&provisions&of&the&Revised&Forestry&Code&
(P.D.&No.&705,&as&amended).&In&view&of&the&attendant&circumstances&of&this&case,&and&in&the&interest&of&
justice,&the&basis&for&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&on&the&appellant&should&be&the&minimum&amount&under&
Article&309&paragraph&(6)&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code&which&carries&the&penalty&of&arresto&mayor&in&its&
minimum&and&medium&periods&for&simple&theft.&
Considering&that&the&crime&of&violation&of&Section&68&of&Presidential&Decree&No.&705,&as&amended,&
is&punished&as&qualified&theft&under&Article&310&of&the&Revised&Penal&Code,&pursuant&to&the&said&decree,&
the&imposable&penalty&on&the&appellant&shall&be&increased&by&two&degrees,&that&is,&from&arresto&mayor&in&
its&minimum&and&medium&periods&to&prision&mayor&in&its&minimum&and&medium&periods.[29]&Applying&the&
Indeterminate&Sentence&Law,[30]&the&penalty&to&be&imposed&on&the&appellant&should&be&six&(6)&months&
and&one&(1)&day&of&prision&correccional&to&six&(6)&years&and&one&(1)&day&of&prision&mayor.&
WHEREFORE,&the&decision&of&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Maasin,&Southern&Leyte,&Branch&25,&in&
Criminal& Case& No.& 1733& is& AFFIRMED& with& the& MODIFICATION& that& appellant& Pastor& Telen& is&
sentenced&to&six&(6)&months&and&one&(1)&day&of&prision&correccional,&as&minimum,&to&six&(6)&years&and&
one&(1)&day&of&prision&mayor,&as&maximum.&
SO%ORDERED.%

!
! !
!
Case!digest[G.R.!No.!136142.!October!24,!2000]PEOPLE!OF! !E!P!"L"PP"NE#,!
!plaintiff8appellee,!vs.!
!$LFON#O!%$ OR!a&d!'EN" O!GENOL,!
accused!(Acquitted)!
P$# OR! ELEN,!
accused8appellant!!
.Facts(!
Police!officers!confiscated!pieces!of!lumber!from!an!Isuzu!cargo!for!failure!of!the!driver,!accused!BenitoGenol,!
to!show!the!required!documents!for!the!proper!transport!of!the!pieces!of!lumber!consisting!of!forty8one( !"!
pieces!of!#ita!lumber!and!ten!(!$"!pieces!of!%ntipolo!lumber!with!a!total!volume!of!!,&'$ !'!board!
feet Pastor!)elen,!owner!of!lumber,!testified!that!the!lumber!will!be!used!in!renovating!his!residence !Boy!
*eonor,!who!was!the!+fficer!in! harge!of! ./+!0aasin,!1outhern!*eyte!allegedly!allowed!)elen!to!cut!
theaging!#ita!trees!only !%ccording!to!)elen,!*eonor!assured!him!that!a!written!permit!was!not!anymore!
necessary!!before!he!could!cut!the!#ita!trees,!which!are!considered!soft!lumber,!from!the!private!land!of!his!
mother,provided!the!same!would!be!used!e2clusively!for!the!renovation!of!his!house!and!that!he!shall!plant!
trees!asreplacement!thereof,!which!he!did!by!planting!Gemelina!seedlings )he!trial!court!convicted!Pastor!
)elen!of!!violation!of!1ec!'3!of!P#!.o !4$&!which!)elen!appealed !
"ss)e(!
!5+.!*egal!#ocuments!6!Permit!is!still!required!for!cutting6transporting!the!soft!lumber !
!e*d(!
)he!1upreme! ourt!upheld!the!conviction )he!fact!of!possession!by!the!appellant!of!the!sub7ect!lumber,!as!
well!as!his!subsequent!failure!to!producethe!legal!documents!as!required!under!e2isting!forest!laws!and!
regulations!constitute!criminal!liability!for!violation!of!Presidential!#ecree!.o !4$&,!1ection!'3 )he!appellant!
stands!charged!with!the!crime!of!violation!of!1ection!'3!of!P#!.o !4$&,!a!special!statutory!law,!and!which!
crime!is!considered!mala!prohibita !In!the!prosecution!for!crimes!that!are!considered!malaprohibita,!the!only!
inquiry!is!whether!or!not!the!law!has!been!violated !)he!motive!or!intention!underlying!theact!of!the!
appellant!is!immaterial!for!the!reason!that!his!mere!possession!of!the!confiscated!pieces!of!lumber!without!
the!legal!documents!as!required!under!e2isting!forest!laws!and!regulations!gave!rise!to!his!
criminalliability 8nder!the!# ./!%dministrative!+rder!.o !43,!1eries!of!!934,!a!certification!from!the! ./+!
concernedto!the!effect!that!the!forest!products!came!from!a!titled!land!or!ta2!declared!alienable!and!
disposable!land!muststill!be!secured!to!accompany!the!shipment !)his!the!appellant!failed!to!do,!thus,!he!is!
criminally!liable!under1ection!'3!of!P#!.o !4$&!necessitating!prior!acquisition!of!permit!and!:legal!documents!
as!required!undere2isting!forest!laws!and!regulations ;!
!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%120365.%December%17,%1996]%

PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%plaintiffNappelle,%vs.%WILSON%B.%QUE,%accusedNappellant.%

D%E%C%I%S%I%O%N%
PUNO,%J.:%

AccusedQappellant& Wilson& B.& Que& appeals& from& his& conviction& for& violation& of& Section& 68& of&
Presidential&Decree&(P.D.)&705[1]&as&amended&by&Executive&Order&(E.O.)&277.[2]&
The& facts& show& that& two& weeks& before& March& 8,& 1994,& SPO1& Dexter& Corpuz,& a& member& of& the&
Provincial&Task&Force&on&Illegal&Logging,&received&an&information&that&a&tenQwheeler&truck&bearing&plate&
number& PADQ548& loaded& with& illegally& cut& lumber& will& pass& through& Ilocos& Norte.&Acting& on& said&
information,&members&of&the&Provincial&Task&Force&went&on&patrol&several&times&within&the&vicinity&of&
General&Segundo&Avenue&in&Laoag&City.[3]&
On& March& 8,& 1994,& SPO1& Corpuz,& together& with& SPO1& Zaldy& Asuncion& and& SPO1& Elmer& Patoc&
went&on&patrol&around&the&area.&At&about&1:00&in&the&morning,&they&posted&themselves&at&the&corner&of&
General&Segundo&Avenue&and&Rizal&Street.&Thirty&minutes&later,&they&saw&a&tenQwheeler&truck&with&plate&
number&PADQ548&pass&by.&They&followed&the&truck&and&apprehended&it&at&the&Marcos&Bridge.[4]&
There& were& three& persons& on& board& the& truck:&driver& Wilfredo& Cacao,& accusedQappellant& Wilson&
Que,&and&an&unnamed&person.&The&driver&identified&accusedQappellant&as&the&owner&of&the&truck&and&
the&cargo.[5]&
SPO1& Corpuz& checked& the& cargo& and& found& that& it& contained& coconut& slabs.&When& interviewed,&
accusedQappellant&told&SPO1&Corpuz&that&there&were&sawn&lumber&inserted&in&between&the&coconut&
slabs.[6]&
SPO1& Corpuz& asked& accusedQappellant& for& the& Cargos& supporting& documents,& specifically:&(1)&
certificate&of&lumber&origin,&(2)&certificate&of&transport&agreement,&(3)&auxiliary&invoice,&(4)&receipt&from&
the& DENR,& and& (5)& certification& from& the& forest& ranger& regarding& the& origin& of& the& coconut&
slabs.&AccusedQappellant& failed& to& present& any& of& these& documents.&All& he& could& show& was& a&
certification[7]&from& the& Community& Environment& and& Natural& Resources& Office& (CENRO),& Sanchez&
Mira,& Cagayan& that& he& legally& acquired& the& coconut& slabs.&The& certification& was& issued& to& facilitate&
transport&of&the&slabs&from&Sanchez&Mira,&Cagayan&to&San&Vicente,&Urdaneta,&Pangasinan.[8]&
SPO1&Corpuz&brought&accusedQappellant&to&the&office&of&the&Provincial&Task&Force&at&the&provincial&
capitol.&Again,&accusedQappellant&admitted&to&the&members&of&the&Provincial&Task&Force&that&there&were&
sawn&lumber&under&the&coconut&slabs.[9]&
At& 10:00& oclock& in& the& morning,& the& members& of& the& Provincial& Task& Force,& together& with& three&
CENRO&personnel&examined&the&cargo.&The&examination&confirmed&that&the&cargo&consisted&of&coconut&
slabs&and&sawn&tanguile&lumber.&The&coconut&slabs&were&piled&at&the&sides&of&the&truck,&concealing&the&
tanguile& lumber.[10]&When& the& CENRO& personnel& inventoried& and& scaled& the& seized& forest& products,&
they&counted&two&hundred&fifty&eight&(258)&pieces&of&tanguile&lumber&with&a&total&volume&of&3,729.3&board&
feet&(8.79&cubic&meters)&and&total&assessed&value&of&P93,232.50.[11]&
On&June&23,&1994,&accusedQappellant&was&charged&before&the&Regional&Trial&Court&of&Laoag&with&
violation&of&Section&68&of&P.D.&705&as&amended&by&E.O.&277.&The&Information&alleged:&
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu
Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of
Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or
equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary
permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision
of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
AccusedQappellant&denied&the&charge&against&him.&He&claimed&that&he&acquired&the&258&pieces&of&
tanguile& lumber& from& a& legal& source.&During& the& trial,& he& presented& the& private& land& timber& permits&
(PLTP)& issued& by& the& Department& of& Environment& and& Natural& Resources& (DENR)& to& Enrica&
Cayosa[13]&and&Elpidio&Sabal.[14]&The&PLTP&authorizes&its&holder&to&cut,&gather&and&dispose&timber&from&
the&forest&area&covered&by&the&permit.&He&alleged&that&the&tanguile&lumber&came&from&the&forest&area&
covered&by&th&PLTPs&of&Cayosa&and&Sabal&and&that&they&were&given&to&him&by&Cayosa&and&Sabal&as&
payment&for&his&hauling&services.[15]&
AccusedQappellant&also&objected&to&the&admission&of&the&258&pieces&of&lumber&as&evidence&against&
him.&He& contended& that& they& were& fruits& of& an& illegal& search& and& seizure& and& of& an& uncounselled&
extrajudicial&admission.&
The& trial& court& found& accusedQappellant& guilty& and& sentenced& him& to&reclusion$ perpetua.&It& also&
ordered& the& confiscation& of& the& seized& lumber& and& the& tenQwheeler& truck& owned& by& accusedQ
appellant.&The&dispositive&portion&of&the&Decision[16]&states:&
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant&now&comes&before&us&with&the&following&assignment&of&errors:[18]&
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277
for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for
the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest
products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
under custodial investigation.
On& the& first& assignment& of& error,& appellant& argues& that& he& cannot& be& convicted& for& violation& of&
Section&68&of&P.D.&705&because&E.O.&277&which&amended&Section&68&to&penalize&the&possession&of&
timber& or& other& forest& products& without& the& proper& legal& documents& did& not& indicate& the& particular&
documents&necessary&to&make&the&possession&legal.&Neither&did&the&other&forest&laws&and&regulations&
existing&at&the&time&of&its&enactment.&
Appellants&argument&deserves&scant&consideration.&Section&68&of&P.D.&705&provides:&
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant& interprets& the& phrase& existing& forest& laws& and& regulations& to& refer& to& those& laws& and&
regulations& which& were& already& in& effect& at& the& time& of& the& enactment& of& E.& O.& 277.&The& suggested&
interpretation&is&strained&and&would&render&the&law&inutile.&Statutory&construction&should&not&kill&but&give&
life&to&the&law.&The&phrase&should&be&construed&to&refer&to&laws&and&regulations&existing&at&the&time&of&
possession& of& timber& or& other& forest& products.&DENR& Administrative& Order& No.& 59& series& of& 1993&
specifies&the&documents&required&for&the&transport&of&timber&and&other&forest&products.&Section&3&of&the&
Administrative&Order&provides:&
Section 3. Documents Required.

Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest
products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with
appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
 xxx&

3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a
CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized
representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber
firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the
company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.

xxx&
When&apprehended&on&March&8,&1994,&accusedQappellant&failed&to&present&any&certificate&of&origin&
of&the&258&pieces&of&tanguile&lumber.&The&trial&court&found:&
xxx&
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single
document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed
documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by
Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and
a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were
cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on
board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered
inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its
cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not
only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen
from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which
were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he
needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore,
concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to
the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be
transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo,
Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject
lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has
doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter
in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an
employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the
lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The
letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are
not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency
gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document
with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-
examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned
the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were already
reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if
that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
 Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
x&x&x&
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am
hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19]
xxx&
AccusedQappellants&possession&of&the&subject&lumber&without&any&documentation&clearly&constitutes&an&
offense&under&Section&68&of&P.D.&705.&
We&also&reject&appellants&argument&that&the&law&only&penalizes&possession&of&illegal&forest&products&
and& that& the& possessor& cannot& be& held& liable& if& he& proves& that& the& cutting,& gathering,& collecting& or&
removal& of& such& forest& products& is& legal.&There& are& two& (2)& distinct& and& separate& offenses& punished&
under&Section&68&of&P.D.&705,&to&wit:&
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In&the&first&offense,&one&can&raise&as&a&defense&the&legality&of&the&acts&of&cutting,&gathering,&collecting&
or&removing&timber&or&other&forest&products&by&presenting&the&authorization&issued&by&the&DENR.&In&the&
second&offense,&however,&it&is&immaterial&whether&the&cutting,&gathering,&collecting&and&removal&of&the&
forest& products& is& legal& or& not.Mere& possession& of& forest& products& without& the& proper& documents&
consummates&the&crime.&Whether&or&not&the&lumber&comes&from&a&legal&source&is&immaterial&because&
E.O.& 277& considers& the& mere& possession& of& timber& or& other& forest& products& without& the& proper& legal&
documents&as&malum&prohibitum.&
On& the& second& and& third& assignment& of& error,& appellant& contends& that& the& seized& lumber& are&
inadmissible&in&evidence&for&being&fruits&of&a&poisonous&tree.&Appellant&avers&that&these&pieces&of&lumber&
were&obtained&in&violation&of&his&constitutional&right&against&unlawful&searches&and&seizures&as&well&as&
his&right&to&counsel.&
We&do&not&agree.&
The&rule&on&warrantless&search&and&seizure&of&a&moving&vehicle&was&summarized&by&this&court&in&
People&vs.&Bagista,[20]&thus:&
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of
a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned
right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the
 instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
As&in&Bagista,&the&police&officers&in&the&case&at&bar&had&probable&cause&to&search&appellants&truck.&A&
member& of& the& Provincial& Task& Force& on& Illegal& Logging& received& a& reliable& information& that& a& tenQ
wheeler& truck& bearing& plate& number& PADQ548& loaded& with& illegal& lumber& would& pass& through& Ilocos&
Norte.&Two& weeks& later,& while& members& of& the& Provincial& Task& Force& were& patrolling& along& General&
Segundo&Avenue,&they&saw&the&tenQwheeler&truck&described&by&the&informant.&When&they&apprehended&
it&at&the&Marcos&Bridge,&accusedQappellant,&the&owner&of&the&truck&and&the&cargo,&admitted&that&there&
were& sawn& lumber& in& between& the& coconut& slabs.&When& the& police& officers& asked& for& the& lumbers&
supporting& documents,& accusedQappellant& could& not& present& any.&The& foregoing& circumstances& are&
sufficient&to&prove&the&existence&of&probable&cause&which&justified&the&extensive&search&of&appellants&
truck&even&without&a&warrant.&Thus,&the&258&pieces&of&tanguile&lumber&were&lawfully&seized&and&were&
thus&properly&admitted&as&evidence&to&prove&the&guilt&of&accusedQappellant.&
The&foregoing&disquisition&renders&unnecessary&the&issue&of&whether&appellants&right&to&counsel&
under&custodial&investigation&was&violated.&The&Resolution&of&the&issue&will&not&affect&the&finding&of&guilt&
of&appellant.&
IN% VIEW% WHEREOF,& the& instant& appeal& is& DISMISSED.&The& decision& appealed& from& is&
AFFIRMED.&Costs&Against&appellant.&
SO%ORDERED.%
!
! !
 SECOND&DIVISION&

[G.R.%No.%161798.%October%20,%2004]%

PICOP%RESOURCES,%INC.,%petitioner,3vs.3HON.%AUGUSTUS%L.%CALO,%Presiding%Judge,%RTC%of%
Agusan% del% Norte% and% Butuan% City,% 10th%Judicial% Region,% Branch% 5,% Butuan% City,% HON.%
VICTOR%A.%TOMANENG,%Acting%Presiding%Judge,%RTC%of%Agusan%del%Norte%and%Butuan%
City,%10thJudicial%Region,%Branch%5,%Butuan%City,%EDUARDO%CASIA,%ROGELIO%CASTILLO,%
ULDARICO%CASINGINAN,%ELADIO%GALANO,%CATALINO%VIRTUDAZO,%RICARDO%BALAD]
ON,% JOEL% VILLAREAL,% TIBURCIO% IMPUERTO,% HILARIO% FERNANDEZ,% ANDREA%
VASQUEZ,% SPOUSES% REMELITO% CODERA% and% MARILYN% RANOSO]CODERA,% and%
FLORIO% JOSAFAT,% JR.,% for% himself% and% in% representation% by% way% of% a% class% suit% the%
Members%of%the%UNIFIED%FARMERS%ASSOCIATION%OF%BISLIG%(UFAB),%respondents.%

R%E%S%O%L%U%T%I%O%N%
Tinga,%J.:%

Petitioner&PICOP&Resources,&Inc.&(PICOP)&owns&and&operates&a&multiQbillion&peso&pulp&and&paper&
manufacturing& facility& in& Bislig& City,& Agusan& del& Norte.& It& holds& governmentQissued& Pulpwood& and&
Timber&License&Agreement&(PTLA)&No.&47&and&Integrated&Forest&Management&Agreement&(IFMA)&No.&
35&which&gave&petitioner&the&exclusive&right&to&coQmanage&and&develop&with&the&State&almost&130,000&
hectares&of&forest&land&within&the&AgusanQDavaoQSurigao&Forest&Reserve.&
The& Department& of& Environment& and& Natural& Resources& (DENR),& through& its& officers,& rendered&
three&Memoranda,&dated&August&22,&1997,[1]&February&16,&2001,[2]&and&April&6,&2001,[3]&by&virtue&of&which&
petitioner& was& designated& a& DENR& depository& and& custodian& for& apprehended& forest& products& and&
conveyances&within&its&concession.&On&May&25,&2001,&the&Office&of&the&CENROQBislig&and&petitioner&
entered&into&a&Memorandum&of&Agreement&(MOA)&containing&Procedural&Guidelines&in&the&Conduct&of&
Verification& of& Private& Tree& Plantation.[4]&The& MOA& provided,& among& others,& that& field&
validation/verification& of& applications& for& Certificates& of& Private& Tree& Ownership& (CTPOs)& shall& be&
conducted&jointly&by&the&DENR,&the&local&government&unit&concerned,&and&petitioner.&Pursuant&to&these&
Memoranda,&petitioners&security&personnel&were&deputized&as&DENR&officers&to&apprehend&and&seize&
the&tools,&equipment&and&conveyance&used&in&the&commission&of&illegal&logging&and&the&forest&products&
removed&and&possessed&by&the&offenders.&
In& the& course& of& the& enforcement& of& the& aforesaid& Memoranda,& petitioner& PICOP,& through& its&
security&personnel,&had&on&numerous&occasions&apprehended&within&its&concession&and&tree&plantation&
area,& violators& who& loaded& the& illegally& cut& trees& in& trucks& and& other& forms& of& conveyance,& such& as&
carabaos,&for&transport&out&of&the&plantation&area.&These&illegally&cut&forest&products&and&conveyances&
were&kept&in&PICOPs&impounding&area.&
On& June& 18,& 2001,& private& respondents& Eduardo& Casia,& Rogelio& Castillo,& Uldarico& Casinginan,&
Eladio& Galano,& Catalino& Virtudazo,& Ricardo& BaladQon,& Joel& Villareal,& Tiburcio& Impuerto,& Hilario&
Fernandez,& Andrea& Vasquez,& Spouses& Remelito& Codera& and& Marilyn& RanosoQCodera,& and& Florio&
Josafat,&Jr.,&for&himself&and&in&representation,&by&way&of&a&class&suit,&of&the&members&of&the&UNITED&
FARMERS& ASSOCIATION& OF& BISLIG& (UFAB),& filed& a& complaint& for& damages& and& injunction& with&
prayer&for&issuance&of&writ&of&preliminary&mandatory&injunction&before&the&Regional&Trial&Court&(RTC),&
Branch&5,&Agusan&del&Norte&and&Butuan&City&against&the&DENR&Regional&Office&XIII&(CARAGA)&and/or&
its&Regional&Executive&Director&Elias&C.&Seraspi,&Jr.,&Provincial&Environment&and&Natural&Resources&
Offices&(PENRO)&of&Surigao&del&Sur,&Agusan&del&Norte&and&Butuan&City&and/or&their&respective&PENR&
Officers,& Community& Environment& and& Natural& Resources& Offices& (CENRO)& of& San& Francisco,&
Bunawan,& Lianga& and& Bislig& and/or& their& respective& CENR& Officers,& and& herein& petitioner&
PICOP/Wilfredo&D.&Fuentes.[5]&
Private&respondentsQcomplainants&were&some&of&those&apprehended&by&PICOPS&security&officers&
transporting& without& any& permit& several& hundred& cubic& meters& of&falcata&logs& allegedly& grown& in&
petitioners&plantation.&The&logs,&trucks&and&other&forms&of&conveyance&on&which&they&were&carried&were&
confiscated&and&kept&in&petitioners&impounding&area.&Private&respondents&alleged&in&their&complaint&that&
the&Memoranda&dated&August&22,&1997,&February&16,&2001&and&April&6,&2001&and&the&MOA&dated&May&
25,&2001&were&illegal&for&having&been&issued&with&grave&abuse&of&discretion.&They&sought&to&have&the&
Memoranda&declared&null&and&void&for&this&reason&and&also&sought&to&restrain&the&DENR&and&all&those&
acting&for&and&in&its&behalf,&including&herein&petitioner,&from&enforcing&or&implementing&said&Memoranda.&
On& September& 21,& 2001,& the& RTC& rendered& its& Decision.[6]&With& regard& to& private& respondents&
allegation&that&the&aforesaid&Memoranda&were&illegally&issued,&the&trial&court&disregarded&the&claim&and&
sustained& the& validity& of& the& Memoranda.& The& Memoranda& were& issuances& of& a& dulyQauthorized&
government& agency& in& the& normal& and& regular& course& of& its& duty& to& enforce& forestry& laws& and&
procedures.&The&RTC&added&that&the&application&for&the&writ&of&preliminary&injunction&was&the&wrong&
remedy&to&assail&the&legality&of&the&Memoranda,&such&an&action&being&merely&a&collateral&attack.&Private&
respondents&should&instead&have&filed&a&petition&to&declare&the&Memoranda&null&and&void.&However,&the&
trial& court& granted& private& respondents& prayer& for& preliminary& mandatory& injunction.& It& noted& that&
administrative&or&criminal&cases&had&been&filed&against&private&respondents&involving&the&apprehended&
conveyances.& The& RTC& ordered& RED& Elias& R.& Seraspio,& Jr.& to& recall,& withdraw& and& abrogate& the&
enforcement&of&the&assailed&Memorandum&dated&February&16,&2001&and&commanded&all&those&acting&
pursuant&to&said&Memorandum&to&refrain&and&desist&from&implementing&the&Memorandum.&Petitioner&
was&also&ordered&to&release&the&confiscated&falcata$logs&and&vehicles&to&the&owners&thereof,&or&to&the&
CENROQBislig&or&the&Office&of&the&Government&ProsecutionQSurigao&del&Sur,&where&the&administrative&
and&criminal&proceedings&were&ongoing.[7]&
Petitioner&moved&for&reconsideration&but&this&was&denied&for&lack&of&merit&on&October&17,&2001.[8]&
On& January& 21,& 2002,& DENRQRegion& XIII& RED& Benjamin& T.& Tumaliuan& issued& a& Memorandum&
revoking&the&February&16,&2001&Memorandum&issued&by&former&OICQRED&Constancio&A.&Paye,&Jr.[9]&
On&April&29,&2002,&petitioner&filed&a&petition&for&certiorari&with&prayer&for&issuance&of&a&temporary&
restraining&order&and/or&writ&of&injunction&before&the&Court&of&Appeals.&The&petition&was&dismissed&for&
lack&of&merit&on&July&23,&2003.[10]&The&appellate&court&held&there&was&no&grave&abuse&of&discretion&when&
the&RTC&issued&the&assailed&Decision&and&Resolution.&Petitioner&had&no&right&or&interest&to&protect&in&
the&confiscated&forest&products&and&conveyances.&Petitioners&compound&was&used&only&as&a&depository&
for& the& confiscated& logs& and& conveyances& by& virtue& of& the& Memorandum& dated& February& 16,& 2001.&
Neither&did&petitioner&claim&ownership&of&the&confiscated&conveyances.&While&it&claimed&that&some&of&
the&confiscated&forest&products&may&have&come&from&its&concession&area,&petitioner&admitted&that&the&
ownership& of& the& confiscated& products& was& still& to& be& determined& in& the& cases& pending& either& at& the&
CENROQBislig& or& at& the& Office& of& the& Government& ProsecutionQSurigao& del& Sur.& Hence,& petitioners&
interest& in& the& confiscated& forest& products& was& merely& contingent& and& cannot& be& material& as&
contemplated&under&Section&2,&Rule&3&of&the&Revised&Rules&of&Civil&Procedure.&Necessarily&therefore,&
petitioner&had&no&basis&to&bring&the&action&against&respondents&and&it&was&not&entitled&to&the&ancillary&
remedy&of&a&writ&of&preliminary&injunction.&
On& August& 15,& 2003,& petitioner& filed& a& Motion& for& Reconsideration& but& this& was& denied& in& the&
Resolution&of&January&16,&2004.[11]&
Petitioner&then&filed&this&petition&for&review.&
Petitioner&argues&that&it&is&a&proper&partyQinQinterest,&vested&with&a&material&interest&in&the&outcome&
of&the&case.&It&allegedly&has&more&than&just&a&contingent&interest&in&the&outcome&of&the&dispute.&
Petitioner&contend&that&private&respondents&intrusion&was&in&violation&of&petitioners&PTLA&No.&47&
and& IFMA& No.& 35.& These& license& agreements& gave& petitioner& the& exclusive& right& to& coQmanage& and&
develop& forest& lands,& and& recognized& petitioner& as& owner& of& the& trees& and& other& products& in& the&
concession&area.[12]&In&filing&this&petition,&petitioner&is&merely&defending&its&subsisting&proprietary&interest&
pursuant&to&these&license&agreements.&
Public& respondents& never& refuted& petitioner& PICOPs& allegation& that& private& respondents& were&
apprehended&by&the&DENRQdeputized&PICOP&guards&at&its&checkpoint&within&PICOPs&concession&area.&
Private&respondents&also&never&denied&that&PICOPs&guards&had&been&deputized&as&DENR&officers&to&
enforce& the& Memoranda.& Petitioner& was& therefore& within& its& rights& in& exercising& control& over& its&
concession&area&pursuant&to&its&duty&as&DENR&depository.&
Petitioner&also&argues&that&the&RTC&intruded&upon&the&primary&jurisdiction&of&the&DENR&when&it&took&
cognizance&of&private&respondents&complaint&for&damages&and&issued&the&writ&of&injunction.&Petitioner&
invokes& DENR& Department& Administrative& Order& (DAO)& No.& 97Q32[13]&in& asserting& that& it& has& the&
obligation&to&keep&custody&of&the&apprehended&forest&products,&tools&and&conveyances,&the&disposal&of&
which&rests&solely&on&the&DENR.&
The&RTC&also&allegedly&committed&grave&abuse&of&discretion&in&granting&private&respondents&prayer&
for&issuance&of&injunction&in&violation&of&the&doctrine&of&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies.&Petitioner&
argues&that&private&respondents&should&have&awaited&the&results&of&the&administrative&procedure&for&
summary&administrative&apprehensions&and&seizures&of&the&DENR&under&Sections&5&and&6&of&DAO&No.&
97Q32,&instead&of&filing&the&complaint&before&the&trial&court.&This&would&have&allegedly&allowed&the&proper&
administrative&officer&to&ascertain&whether&a&prima$facie$case&lies&against&the&offenders&and&whether&
the&apprehended&articles&should&answer&for&the&offense.&By&issuing&the&assailed&writ&of&injunction,&the&
trial&court&arrogated&unto&itself&the&power&to&rule&on&the&rightful&possession&of&the&subject&conveyances.&
Petitioner&also&contends&that&the&injunctive&writ&was&issued&without&due&process&of&law&since&the&
transfer&of&custody&of&the&forest&products&and&conveyances&was&not&even&sought&by&private&respondents&
in& their& complaint.& Consequently,& the& matter& of& the& return& of& the& seized& conveyances& was& never&
ventilated& during& the& hearing& and& the& issuance& of& the& writ& not& sought& for& violates& the& rules& of& due&
process.&
 Petitioners&arguments&do&not&convince&us.&The&petition&should&be&denied.&
It&is&clear&that&petitioner&has&no&material&interest&to&protect&in&the&confiscated&forest&products&and&
conveyances.&It&has&no&subsisting&proprietary&interest,&as&borne&out&by&its&licensing&agreements,&which&
need&to&be&protected&by&annulling&the&writ&of&injunction&issued&by&the&trial&court.&As&observed&by&the&
Court&of&Appeals,&any&interest&petitioner&has&in&the&confiscated&properties&is&dependent&on&the&outcome&
of&the&proceedings&before&the&CENROQBislig&and&the&Office&of&the&Government&ProsecutionQSurigao&
del&Sur.&The&issue&of&ownership&and&possession&of&the&confiscated&products&still&has&to&be&determined&
in&those&proceedings.&Petitioner&had&not&refuted&this.&
Petitioner&also&cannot&claim&the&right&to&retain&custody&of&the&apprehended&logs&and&conveyances&
by&virtue&of&its&being&designated&a&depository&of&the&DENR&pursuant&to&the&assailed&Memoranda.&As&
such&depository,&petitioner&merely&holds&the&confiscated&products&and&conveyances&in&custody&for&the&
DENR&while&the&administrative&or&criminal&proceedings&regarding&said&products&are&pending.&
The& trial& court& noted& that& the& confiscated& vehicles& were& already& subject& of& administrative&
proceedings&before&the&CENROQBislig&and&criminal&complaints&before&the&Office&of&the&Government&
ProsecutionQSurigao&del&Sur.&There&were&also&letters&or&notices&to&petitioner&from&officers&of&the&CENRO&
and&the&Office&of&the&Government&Prosecution&requesting&the&release&of&some&of&the&conveyances&to&
their&owners.[14]&There&is&no&reason&for&petitioner&to&refuse&to&hand&over&possession&of&the&vehicles&and&
forest& products& since,& being& confiscated& items,& they& will& have& to& be& handed& over& to& the& proper&
government&agencies&for&appropriate&disposition&proceedings.&
Furthermore,&the&transfer&of&custody&of&the&confiscated&products&and&conveyances&will&not&in&any&
way& place& petitioner& at& a& disadvantage.& Petitioner& is& merely& a& depository& and& the& release& of& the&
conveyances& and& products& to& the& government& agencies& concerned& has& to& be& done& but& only& in&
compliance&with&lawful&court&orders.&
It&should&also&be&remembered&that&the&Memorandum&dated&February&16,&2001,&which&designated&
petitioner&as&a&DENR&depository,&had&been&revoked&by&the&Memorandum&of&January&21,&2002.&As&of&
the&filing&of&the&petition&for&review&before&this&Court&on&March&11,&2004,&petitioner&no&longer&had&any&
right,&as&a&depository,&to&retain&possession&of&the&conveyances.&
All& the& foregoing& considered,& petitioners& contention& that& the& trial& court& violated& the& doctrines& of&
primary&jurisdiction&and&exhaustion&of&administrative&remedies&should&also&fail.&The&transfer&of&custody&
of&the&confiscated&products&to&the&CENRO&and&the&Office&of&the&Government&Prosecution&was&for&the&
purpose&of&resolving&the&cases&with&dispatch.&
WHEREFORE,&in&view&of&the&foregoing,&the&Petition$for$Review$is&DENIED.&
SO%ORDERED.%

!
! !
 [G.R. No. 152989.September 4, 2002]

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 04%SEPT 2002.

G.R. No. 152989(Manuel Jorge Roldan, Jr. vs. Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona Pairing Judge,
RTC Branch 12, Ormoc City and Hon. Alberto L. Conopio, City Prosecutor, Ormoc City,
ATTY. FIEL MARMITA, OIC, DENR-CENRO, Albuera, Leyte.)

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Herein petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain
Ildefonso O. Maglasang.

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a
proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the
various government agencies.

While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by some
employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he
could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting
approval.

Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the
roadway.He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages.

About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of
Tacloban City raided petitioner's place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory
of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a
barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that time.

About two days later, the CENRO representatives came back with members of the media
and ISAFP charging illegal logging but they failed to get the logs, again for alleged lack of
search warrant.

Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a
search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506
board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00
per board foot.

Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705

as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of
Ormoc City. Thereafter, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution dated November 16, 2001
finding probable cause to convict petitioner for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended.

A motion for reconsideration proved futile for, as it turned out, the information had already
been filed in court. Jurisdiction over the case was transferred to the regional trial court,
also a public respondent in this case.

A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof,
herein petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and the recall of his warrant of arrest.
After hearing the said motion, public respondent Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, in an order
dated February 15, 2000 denied the motion but reduced the recommended bail of
petitioner.

Hence, the instant petition.

Before us, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the owner of a private land,
the petitioner in this case, is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees
within his own property; (2) whether the owner of the private property is administratively
liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he
did not transport the logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural
purposes therein and (3) whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to
the petitioner considering that the same were not transported out and merely used for his
own agricultural purposes.

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that he should not be held liable under Section
68 of PD 705 as amended since the timberthat was cut and gathered came from his titled
property.

He further asserts that the part of Section 68, PD 705 incorporating the provisions of
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code regarding qualified theft should not be
made to apply to his case since the aforestated articles of the penal code apply only to
those who commit theft, which under the law is a crime committed when there is unlawful
taking of a property belonging to another. He insists that both penal provisions should not
be made to apply since he is the owner of the property and as owner he cannot be accused
of stealing his own property. Petitioner concludes that Article 309 therefore applies only
to other persons or strangers gathering timber from the titled property of another while
Article 310 is inapplicable in his case since such pertains to theft of coconuts in a
plantation.

At the outset, the Court notes that while petitioner continues to harp on the alleged
questions of law present in this case, the petition at bar was filed via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Nothing is more settled than the rule that a writ of certiorari lies
only where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The Court believesthat none of the aforementioned circumstances is present in
this case.

Be that as it may, although this Court at the outset had pointed out that herein petitioner
adopted the wrong remedy and committed certain technical violations of the Rules on Civil
Procedure which necessitate its outright dismissal, nevertheless, in the interest of
substantial justice and in view of the novelty of the question of law involved, the Court in
the exercise of its judicial discretion shall treat this petition as having been filed under
Rule 45.

The fundamental question of law we seek to resolve in this case is: may a person who
cuts trees for his own use within his property without the necessary permit from the DENR
and without transporting the same outside said property, be criminally charged for
violating PD 705?

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines provides:
SEC.& 68.&Cutting,$ Gathering$ and/or$ collecting$ Timber,$ or$ Other$ Forest$ Products$
Without$License.<$Any%person%who%shall%cut,%gather,%collect,%remove%timber%or%other%
forest%products%from%any%forest%land,%or%timber%from%alienable%or%disposable%public%
land,% or% from% private% land,% without% any% authority,&or& possess& timber& or& other& forest&
products&without% the% legal% documents&as& required& under& existing& forest& laws& and&
regulations,&shall% be% punished% with% the% penalties% imposed% under% Articles% 309% and%
310%of%the%Revised%Penal%Code:Provided,&That&in&case&of&partnerships,&associations,&or&
corporations,& the& officers& who& ordered& the& cutting,& gathering,& collection& or& possession&
shall&be&liable,&and&if&such&officers&are&aliens,&they&shall,&in&addition&to&the&penalty,&be&
deported&without&further&proceedings&on&the&part&of&the&Commission&on&Immigration&and&
Deportation.
The& Court& shall& further& order& the& confiscation& in& favor& of& the& government& of& the&
timber&or&any&forest&products&cut,&gathered,&collected,&removed,&or&possessed,&as&well&as&
 the& machinery,& equipment,& implements& and& tools& illegally& used& in& the& area& where& the&
timber&or&forest&products&are&found.&(Emphasis&supplied)

Herein petitioner argues that even if the phrase pertaining to Articles 309 and 310 of the
penal code was only meant to prescribe the imposable penalty, since the cut trees were
from his private land, his penalty should not be equated with that imposable on those who
commit theft inasmuch as theft and qualified theft involve the unlawful taking of a
property belonging to another.

The argument of petitioner is specious. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O.
277, it is clear that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified
theft. Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose
of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute qualified
theft.

Moreover, petitioner's argument that the provisions of the law regarding qualified theft
should not be applied to him since he is the owner of the property is devoid of merit. It
must be stressed that petitioner is not being charged for qualified theft but for violation
of Section 68, PD 705 hence his ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does
not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under
the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining
the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with
its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time
he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.

As to his assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated
with that for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the
wisdom of the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of
PD 705 a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question
beyond the power of this Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty
of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh
- dura lex sed lex. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive oran
amendment of the law by the legislature.

We come now to the second issue posed by herein petitioner on whether the owner of a
private property is administratively liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and
used them for his own agricultural purposes.

Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised Guidelines in the Issuance
of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit," provides:

SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products

covered by these regulations which are transported without the
prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore,
subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be
disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the
matter.
DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and other transport
documents required in this Order shall be subject to suspension without
prejudice to the imposition of other penalties as may be warranted by extant
Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations.

The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of
transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense
which is subject to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that
he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that such is a factual
issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving
questions of law.

On the issue of whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to petitioner,
any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the petitioner
has not been legally established. The records of the case indicate that trial on the merits
is still in progress. Hence, this Court is not in a position to speculate on or prescribe the
courses of action or remedies the petitioner may avail of under the aforementioned law.
Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not duty bound to render advisory opinions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

!
! !
Digest:!

Roldan v Madrona (Natural Resources)

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA

G.R. No. 152989
September 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain
Ildefonso O. Maglasang.

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a
proposed road and poultry farm in his property.

While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by some
employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he
could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting
approval.

Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the
roadway.He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages.

About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of
Tacloban City raided petitioner's place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory
of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a
barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that time.

Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a
search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506
board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at
P27.00 per board foot.

Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705

as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of
Ormoc City.

A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view
thereof, herein petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and the recall of his warrant of arrest.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: denied the motion but reduced the
recommended bail of petitioner

TRIAL STILL IN PROGRESS... ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally liable
under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property;

YES, he is still liable. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that
the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose of
determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute qualified
theft.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised

Forestry Code of the Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code:Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers
who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the
punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity
involved or charged with its violation POSSESSES THE REQUIRED PERMIT, LICENSE OR
AUTHORIZATION FROM DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or
other forest products.

(2) whether the owner of the private property is administratively liable under Sec. 14 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the
logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural purposes therein
and

The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any
wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject
to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that he never
transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that such is a factual issue
which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving questions
of law.

Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised Guidelines in the Issuance
of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit," provides:

SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by these
regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be considered
illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be
disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.

DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and other transport documents
required in this Order shall be subject to suspension without prejudice to the imposition
of other penalties as may be warranted by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and
regulations.

(3) whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to the petitioner
considering that the same were not transported out and merely used for his own
agricultural purposes.

any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the
petitioner has not been legally established. The records of the case indicate that trial on
the merits is still in progress. Hence, this Court is not in a position to speculate on or
prescribe the courses of action or remedies the petitioner may avail of under the
aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not duty bound to
render advisory opinions.

!
! !
 FIRST DIVISION
AMADO TAOPA, G.R. No. 184098
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
TINGA, JJ. ∗

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:
November 25, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered
with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and
a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705,[1] as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against
them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 oclock in the morning at Barangay
Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally
possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products,
particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and
Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684)
board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty
(Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found
them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.[3]
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but
Taopas conviction was affirmed.[4] The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant

Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt,
and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by
reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[5]
In this petition,[6] Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed
to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because Cuisons testimony proved Taopas
active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck
was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopas house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck
driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopas (and Ogalescos)
exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused
Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely
indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,[7] refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified
theft.[8] The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license
as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis
supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articlesxxx (emphasis
supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.[9] Following Article 310 in relation to
Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period
ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess
of P47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence[10] imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower
to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to
14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
 The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period[11] of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and
21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months
and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.
!
! !
Case!Digest:!
MADO!TAOPA!vs.!People!of!the!PhilippinesG.R.!No.!184098!November!2 !!2008!
Corana,!J.:!
FACTS:The!Community!Environment!and!Natural!Resources!Office!of!Virac,!Catanduanes!seized!a!truc !
loaded!ith!ille"ally#cut!$$%!&ieces!of!lum'er!of!(hili&&ine!)aho"any!*rou&!and!A&iton"!s&ecies!!ithout!
anyauthority!and+or!le"al!documents!as!re uired!under!e8istin"!forest!la!s!and!re"ulations,!&re.udicial!to!
the&u'lic!interest,!and!there'y!arrested!its,!driver,!(lacido!Cuison/!The!lum'er!!as!covered!!ith!'undles!of!a'aca!
fi'er!to!&revent!detection/!On!investi"ation,!Cuison!&ointed!to!&etitioner!Amado!Tao&a!and!acertain!Rufino!
O"alesco!as!the!o!ners!of!the!seized!lum'er,!Tao&a,!O"alesco!and!Cuison!!ere!char"edfor!violatin"!Sec/!01!of!(2!
No/!345!as!amended,!in!the!RTC!Virac,!Catanduanes/!They!&leaded!not!"uiltyu&on!arrai"nment/!After!trial,!
RTC!found!them!"uilty!as!char"ed!'eyond!reasona'le!dou't/!Only!Tao&aand!Cuison!a&&ealed!to!CA,!Cuison!!as!
ac uitted!'ut!Tao&a6s!conviction!!as!affirmed/!7o!ever,!a&etition!!as!filed!'y!Tao&a!see in"!his!ac uittal!
from!the!char"es!a"ainst!him!alle"in"!that!the&rosecution!failed!to!&rove!that!he!!as!the!o!ner!of!the!seized!
lum'er!as!he!!as!not!in!the!truc !!henthe!lum'er!!as!seized/8SS9E: hether!or!not!the!&etitioner!is!"uilty!of!
violatin"!Sec/!01!of!(2!No/!345/7E;2:The!RTC!and!CA!found!that!the!truc !!as!loaded!!ith!the!car"o!in!front!of!
Tao&a6s!house!and!that!Tao&aand!O"alesco!!ere!accom&anyin"!the!truc !drive!'y!Cuison!u&!to!!here!the!
truc !and!lum'er!!ereseized/!These!facts!&roved!Tao&a6s!e8ercise!of!dominion!and!control!over!the!lum'er!
loaded!in!the!truc /Thus,!the!court!!as!convinced!that!Tao&a!and!O"alesco!!ere!o!ners!of!the!seized!lum'er,!
Sec/!01!(2No/!345,!as!amended,!refers!to!Articles!%4<!and!%$4!of!the!R(C!for!the!&enalties!im&osed!on!
violators/Violation!of!Sec/!01,!(2!No/!345,!as!amended,!is!&unished!as! ualified!theft/!The!la!!treats!
cuttin","atherin",!collectin",!and!&ossessin"!tim'er!or!other!forest!&roducts!!ithout!license!as!an!offense!
as"rave!as!and!e uivalent!to!the!felony!of! ualified!theft/!The!actual!mar et!value!of!the!$$%!&cs!of!
lum'er!!as!(03,!0%4/44/!Follo!in"!Article!%$4!in!relation!to!%4<,!the!im&osa'le!&enalty!should!'e!
reclusiontem&oral!in!its!medium!and!ma8imum!&eriods!or!a!&eriod!ran"in"!from!$=!years,!ei"ht!months!and!
oneday!to!>4!years!&lus!as!additional!&eriod!of!four!years!for!the!e8cess!of!(=3,!0%4/44/!The!minimum!termof!
the!indeterminate!sentence!im&osa'le!on!Tao&a!shall!'e!the!&enalty!ne8t!lo!er!to!that!&rescri'ed!inthe!R(C!
! !
 Republic of the Philippines!
Supreme Court!
Manila!
!
FIRST DIVISION!
!
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and! ! G.R. No. 175289! !
ANIANO LATAYADA,! ! ! !
Petitioners,! ! Present:! !
! ! ! !
! ! CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,! !
! ! LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,! !
- versus -! ! BERSAMIN,! !
! ! DEL CASTILLO, and! !
! ! VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.! !
! ! ! !
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,! ! Promulgated:! !
Respondent.! ! August 31, 2011! !
!!

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x!
!
D E C I S I O N!
!
DEL CASTILLO, J.:!
!
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically
liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid
defense.!
!
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,
Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as
amended. Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for!
Reconsideration.[5]!
!
Factual Antecedents!
!
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by
Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force
Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three
others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and
Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277.[7]!
!
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution[8] dated
March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and
Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro
City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information
in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.!
!
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-
accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:!
!
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public
officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage
of his official position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named
accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
 confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a
total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00,
without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to
the damage and prejudice of the government.!
!
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]!
!
!
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint
Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin
as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal
knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn
statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime
charged.!
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27, 1997, directed
Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being
the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but
same was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the
grounds relied upon were not based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial
to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was directly
implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.!
!
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial
ensued.!
!
The Version of the Prosecution!
!
On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that
a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four
to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from
the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro
City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and
owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president of a community-based organization which serves as a
watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]!
!
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber
was already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was
surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she
learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered the timber.[23]!
!
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of January 1,
1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a
fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]!
!
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV
personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25]hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages
of more logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news
program on television.!
!
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces
of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for
safekeeping.!
!
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of
Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac
informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]!
 !
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed
for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.!
!
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.!
The Version of the Defense!
!
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De
Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of
the Barangay Council.!
!
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the
availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin
gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported
from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office
where they were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty.!
!
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court!
!
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs demise.[28] However, the trial court
did not act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court
found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo
insufficient. The dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:!
!
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.!
!
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.!
SO ORDERED.[29]!
!
!
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:!
!
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and
Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to
the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were
intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No.
110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the
flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains
though that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary authority and legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]!
!
!
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the!
!
RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.!
!
Ruling of the Court of Appeals!
!
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of
which reads:!
!
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-
[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement
as to cost.!
 !
SO ORDERED.[33]!
!
!
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.!
!
Issues!
!
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:!
!
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT;!
!
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE
SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;!
!
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY
IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN
CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS
MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]!
!
!
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due
process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by
Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They
also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the
Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for
reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute
the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the
Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.!
!
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since
they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on
the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the offense.!
!
Our Ruling!
!
The petition is unmeritorious.!
!
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.!
!
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and
Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did not state the known addresses
of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the
accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include
Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.!
!
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and
all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal
case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They
were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their
innocence.!
!
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in
denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a
preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the
public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted
that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief,
Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.[41]!
!
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is
to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after
the requisite preliminary investigation.[42]!
!
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the
Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits
by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the
trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the
Motion for Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary
investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation.!
!
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of the
offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any
right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised
in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper!
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.!
!
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.!
!
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:!
!
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.!
!
!
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:!
!
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and!
!
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.[45]!
!
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents.!
!
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the!
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these
missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.!
!
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a
Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number,
volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove
that the confiscated timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There
was a photograph of the timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]!
!
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who
testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]!
!
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber[51] for
the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to
transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to
show that his possession thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.!
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:!
!
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31,
1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like
forest lumber?!
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.!
!
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons
from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?!
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.!
!
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?!
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will
be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.!
!
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to
load illegally cut lumber?!
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay
Captain of Tagpangi.!
!
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?!
A Yes, sir.!
!
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay
Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at
Pagalungan?!
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house
and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.!
!
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge
in Pagalungan?!
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.!
!
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?!
A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.!
!
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?!
A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.!
!
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered
the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?!
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was
delivered.!
!
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?!
 A Boyatac.!
!
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the
delivery of those lumber?!
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.!
!
Q To whom did you give the advance?!
A To Latayada.!
!
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?!
A No, Sir.!
!
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from
Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
PROS. GALARRITA:!
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
COURT:!
Q Did you pay Latayada?!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
Q How much?!
A P2,000.!
!
Q And you gave this to the conductor?!
A Yes, Sir.!
!
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?!
A Yes, sir.!
!
Q What did the conductor say?!
A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from
Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)!
!
!
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, is!
malum prohibitum.!
!
!
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the
timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.[54]!
!
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal
documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or
permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners
contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is,
therefore, inconsequential.!
!
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime!
!
!
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established. They
assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.!
 !
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance
of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body
of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the
crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]!
!
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the
timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which
they consummated the offense they were charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.!
!
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial court
are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and
substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]!
!
The Proper Penalty!
!
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:!
!
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant,
or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or
if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.!
!
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:!
!
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x!
!
!
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal
documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued atP108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented
Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate
said amount. With the value of the timber exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the
penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.!
!
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which results
to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less
than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty
ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.!
!
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower
from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the
range of which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.!
!
 Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered its
Judgment.!
!
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated
September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners
Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.!
!
SO ORDERED.!
!
!
!
!

Republic&of&the&Philippines&
SUPREME%COURT&
Manila&

SECOND&DIVSION&

G.R.%No.%L]26551%February%27,%1976%

THE%PEOPLE%OF%THE%PHILIPPINES,%plaintiffQappellant,&&
vs.&
WENCESLAO%ALMUETE%FERNANDO%FRONDA,%FAUSTO%DURION%and%CIPRIANO%
FRONDA,%defendantsQappellees.&

Solicitor%General%Antonio%P.%Barredo,%Assistant%Solicitor%General%Antonio%G.%Ibarra%and%
Solicitor%Vicente%A.%Torres%for%appellant.&

Emiliano%D.%Castellanes%for%appellees.&

&

AQUINO,%J.:&

Wenceslao&Almuete&Fernando&Fronda,&Cipriano&Fronda&and&Fausto&Durion&were&charged&with&a&
violation&of&section&39&of&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&Law.&It&was&alleged&in&the&information&that&in&
December,&1963,&in&Muñoz,&Nueva&Ecija&the&accused&being&tenants&of&Margarita&Fernando&in&her&
riceland,&without&notice&to&her&or&without&her&consent,&preQthreshed&a&portion&of&their&respective&
harvests&of&five&(5)&cavans&of&palay&each&to&her&damage&in&the&amount&of&P187.50&at&P12.50&a&cavan&
(Criminal&Case&No.&SDQ179,&Court&of&First&Instance&of&Nueva&Ecija,&Sto.&Domingo&Branch&VI).&

Upon&arraignment&the&accused&pleaded&not&guilty.&They&filed&motion&for&a&bill&of&particulars&as&to&the&
exact&date&of&the&commission&of&the&offense&charged.&The&lower&court&denied&their&motion&because&
they&had&already&entered&their&plea.&

Thereafter,&they&Qfiled&a&motion&to&quash&the&information&on&that&grounds&(1)&that&it&does&not&allege&
facts&sufficient&to&constitute&the&crime&charged\&(2)&that&there&is&no&law&punishing&it,&and&(3)&that&the&
court&has,&no&jurisdiction&over&the&alleged&time&The&fiscal&opposed&the&motion.&

The&lower&court&granted&the&motion&and&dismissed&the&information&in&its&order&of&August&11,&1966.&It&
held&that&the&information&is&basically&deficient&because&it&does&not&describe&t&lie&circumstances&under&
which&the&cavans&of&palay&were&found&in&the&possession&of&the&accused&tenants\&it&does&not&specify&
the&date&agreed&upon&for&the&threshing&of&the&harvests,&and&it&does&not&allege&that&the&palay&found&in&
the&tenants'&possession&exceeded&ten&percent&of&their&net&share&based&on&the&last&normal&harvest.&

The&prosecution&appealed&from&the&order&of&dismissal.&The&Solicitor&General&argues&in&his&brief&that&
the&information&in&this&case&alleges&all&the&elements&of&the&offense&defined&in&section&39&of&Republic&
Act&No.&1199,&as&amended&of&Republic&Act&No.&2263.&Sections&39&and&57&of&the&same&law&reads&as&
follows:&

SEC.&39.&Prohibition$on$Pre<threshing.&—&It&shall&be&unlawful&for&either&the&tenant&or&landholder,&
without&mutual&consent,&to&reap&or&thresh&a&portion&of&the&crop&at&any&time&previous&to&the&date&set&for&
its&threshingQ&That&if&the&tenant&n&food&for&his&family&and&the&landholder&does&not&or&cannot&furnish&
such&and&refuses&to&allow&the&tenant&to&reap&or&thresh&a&portion&of&the&crop&previous&to&the&date&set&for&
its&threshing,&the&tenant&can&reap&or&thresh&not&more&than&ten&percent&of&his&net&share&in&the&last&
normal&harvest&after&giving&notice&thereof&to&the&landholder&or&his&representative.&Any&violation&of&this&
situation&by&either&party&shall&be&treated&and&penalized&in&accordance&with&this&Act&and/or&under&the&
general&provisions&of&law&applicable&to&that&act&committed.&

SEC.&57.&Penal$Provision.&—&Violation&of&the&provisions&of&...&sections&thirtyQnine&and&fortyQnine&of&this&
Act&shall&be&punished&by&a&fine&not&exceeding&two&thousand&pesos&or&imprisonment&not&exceeding&
one&year,&or&both,&in&the&discretion&of&the&Court.&...&*&

We&hold&that&the&order&of&dismissal&should&be&affirmed&because&as&held&in&People$vs.$Adillo,&LQ23M,&
November&27,&1975,&a&case&similar&to&the&instant&case,&section&99&was&impliedly&repealed&by&the&
Agricultural&Land&Reform&Code&of&1963,&as&amended&by&Republic&Act&No.&6389&168&O.G.&915)&and&as&
implemented&by&Presidential&Decrees&Nos.&2,&27&and&316.&That&Code&was&already&in&force&when&the&
act&complained&of&was&committed.&The&repeal&may&be&rationalized&in&this&manner:&

The&prohibition&against&preQreaping&or&preQthreshing&found&in&section&39&of&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&
Law&of&1954&is&premised&on&the&existence&of&the&rice&share&tenancy&system.&The&evident&purpose&is&to&
prevent&the&tenant&and&the&landholder&from&defrauding&each&other&in&the&division&of&the&harvests.&

The&Agricultural&Land&Reform&Code&superseded&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&Law&(except&as&qualified&in&
sections&4&and&35&of&the&Code).&The&Code&instituted&the&leasehold&system&and&abolished&share&
tenancy&subject&to&certain&conditions&indicated&in&section&4&thereof.&It&is&significant&that&section&39&is&
not&reproduced&in&the&Agricultural&Land&Reform&Code&whose&section&172&repeals&"all&laws&or&part&of&
any&law&inconsistent&with"&its&provisions.&

Under&the&leasehold&system&the&prohibition&against&preQthreshing&has&no,&more&raison&d'etre&because&
the&lessee&is&obligated&to&pay&a&fixed&rental&as&prescribed&in&section&34&of&the&Agricultural&Land&
Reform&Code,&or&the&Code&of&Agrarian&Reforms,&as&redesignated&in&Republic&Act&No.&6389&which&took&
effect&on&September&10,&1971.&Thus,&the&legal&maxim,&cessante&ratione&legis,&cessat&ipsa&lex&(the&
reason&for&the&law&ceasing,&the&law&itself&also&ceases).&applies&to&this&case.&

Section&4&of&the&Code&of&Agrarian&Reforms&declared&agricultural&share&tenancy&throughout&the&country&
as&contrary&to&public&policy&and&automatically&converted&it&to&agricultural&leasehold.&Presidential&
Decree&No.&2&proclaimed&the&entire&country&"as&a&land&reform&area".&Presidential&Decree&No.&27&
emancipated&the&tenant&from&the&bondage&of&the&soil.&And&Presidential&Decree&No.&316&interdicted&the&
ejectment&or&removal&of&the&tenantQfarmer&from&his&farmholding&until&the&promulgation&of&the&rules&and&
regulations&implementing&Presidential&Decree&No.&27.&(See&People&vs.&Adillo,&supra).&

The&legislative&intent&not&to&punish&anymore&the&tenant's&act&of&preQ&reaping&and&preQthreshing&without&
notice&to&the&landlord&is&inferable&from&the&fact&that,&as&already&noted,&the&Code&of&Agrarian&Reforms&
did&not&reenact&section&39&of&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&Law&and&that&it&abolished&share&tenancy&which&
is&the&basis&for&penalizing&clandestine&preQreaping&and&preQthreshing.&

All&indications&point&to&a&deliberate&and&manifest&legislative&design&to&replace&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&
Law&with&the&Code&of&Agrarian&Reforms,&formerly&the&Agricultural&Land&Reform&Code,&at&least&as&far&
as&ricelands&are&concerned.&

As&held&in&the&Adillo&case,&the&act&of&preQreaping&and&preQthreshing&without&notice&to&the&landlord,&
which&is&an&offense&under&the&Agricultural&Tenancy&Law,&had&ceased&to&be&an&offense&under&the&
subsequent&law,&the&Code&of&Agrarian&Reforms.&To&prosecute&it&as&an&offense&when&the&Code&of&
Agrarian&Reforms&is&already&in&force&would&be&repugnant&or&abhorrent&to&the&policy&and&spirit&of&that&
Code&and&would&subvert&the&manifest&legislative&intent&not&to&punish&anymore&preQreaping&and&preQ
threshing&without&notice&to&landholder.&

It&is&a&rule&of&legal&hermeneutics&that&"an&act&which&purports&to&set&out&in&full&all&that&it&intends&to&
contain&operates&as&a&repeal&of&anything&omitted&which&was&contain&in&the&old&act&and&not&included&in&
the&amendatory&act"&(Crawford,&Construction&of&Statutes,&p.&621&cited&in&the&Adillo&case).&

A&subsequent&statute,&revising&the&whole&subject&matter&of&a&former&statute,&and&evidently&intended&as&
a&substitute&for&it,&operates&to&repeal&the&former&statute"&(82&C.J.S.&499).&'The&revising&statute&is&in&
effect&a&'legislative&declaration&that&whatever&is&embraced&in&the&new&statute&shall&prevail,&and&
whatever&is&excluded&therefrom&shall&be&discarded"&(82&C.J.S.&500).&

The&repeal&of&appeal&law&deprives&the&courts&of&jurisdiction&to&punish&persons&charged&with&a&violation&
of&the&old&penal&law&prior&to&its&repeal&(People&vs.&Tamayo,&61&Phil.&225\&People&vs.&Sindiong&and&
Pastor,&77&Phil.&1000\&People&vs.&Binuya,&61&Phil.&208\&U.S.&vs.&Reyes,&10&Phil.&423\&U.S.&vs.&
Academia,&10&Phil.&431.&See&dissent&in&Lagrimas&vs.&Director&of&Prisons,&57&Phil.&247,&252,&254).&

WHEREFORE,&the&order&of&dismissal&is&affirmed&with&costs&de$oficio.&

SO&ORDERED.&

!
! !
!