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EPZA vs CHR

Facts:
• Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly
violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 the
PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants.
• The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite
Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold
to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2
weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of
injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist fromdoing work
on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said
motion wasdismissed.
• EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of
itsvjurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private
respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that
CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a
TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from enforcing/implementing the
injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation
(Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue:
WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violatorsof human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the
acts complained of.

Held:
The SC held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may
be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even aquasi-judicial agency or official.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court
of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction
may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district],
or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court .A writ of preliminary injunction is
an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or
protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is
granted.
PBM Employees vs PBM Co. Inc

Facts:
• The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
• Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management.
• The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution
but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company.
• Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly ,
the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
• Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.

Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.

Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.

The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality
— abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis
the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as
well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.

The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights
has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer,
as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the
aspects of freedom of expression.

If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised
of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded
as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution.

Baldoza vs. Dimaano

Facts:
• In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,
Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with
abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Dimaano,
in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access
to official court records; that although court records are among public documents open to
inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have
legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected.
• He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use
or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where
the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of
whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and
report. At the preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Cañiza filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in
the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal
investigation, he recommended the exoneration of Dimaano.

Issue:
Whether the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the
docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

Held:
No. Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge,
Dimaano allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of Dimaano under certain
conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and
conditions imposed by Dimaano were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on
the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.

The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters
of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents
of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy.

There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.

As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain
order.

David vs Arroyo

FACTS:
• On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,”
and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

• On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
• David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
• During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed
forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

HELD:
NO. The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the
Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President


Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.


The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”

To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over


Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.


(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress.

Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
unconstitutional.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC.,
vs
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et. al

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensiblestandards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ asto its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failureto accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid.Statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to aparticular defendant. Thus,
absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, avagueness analysis of the assailed
statute is legally impermissible.

Facts:
• Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007.They
assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad thedefinition of
the crime of terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread andextraordinary
fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in toan unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard tomeasure the
prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrines ofvoid-for-
vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since thesedoctrines
apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Issue:Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute.

HELD:
Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge.

A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to theConstitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially theparties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid.In this jurisdiction, penal
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typicallyare invalidated only “as applied” to a
particular defendant.

This means that in determiningthe constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in acase must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited
vagueness analysis ofthe assailed statute is legally impermissible.

Therefore, in this case, since the petitionershave not been charged with violation of the assailed
law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia

Facts:
• Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
• The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.

• Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

HELD:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi:

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not
apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court
took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;


(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their
treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of
the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan,
and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez

Facts:
• During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.
• On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP
Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
• On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
• Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUES
1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal
order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB?
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated
the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their
cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement
as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?
4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be
brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint
of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision
on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury
which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case is too
general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more,
is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in time,
the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and
declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other
aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death
and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to
demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the burial
of Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for
failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary
ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct
himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order.
Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the
decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which
has control and supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).

Hierarchy of Courts

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases,which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of
facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law and jurisprudence.

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial
Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law
should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To
complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and
instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle
blowing and reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' eliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art.XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also
misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in
teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of
Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of
Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being
the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in
nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of
law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to
obey and execute them.

There is no violation of RA 289.

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the
LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the
LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land
subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by
President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos'
Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has
deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on
National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the
establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave"
or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of
each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President
under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed
interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does
not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the
purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to
the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors,"
without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of
Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public
respondents.

No violation of RA 10639 .
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368
are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to
extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the
LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and
should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is
irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details
into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public
respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and
the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A.
No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal,
whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-
375.

There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.

The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting
through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not,
the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and
minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the
preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive;
it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims
Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical
Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government agency responsible for history and
is authorized to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine history.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No.
105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The
proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be
proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:(1) As stated, Marcos issued
P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death
of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been
a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the
LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither
does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or
will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war dead, " as originally
contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That
being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical,
historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is
empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and
control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise
be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by
the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to
amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine
policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use
and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land
shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in
which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The
allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of
Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the
public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the
burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was
inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the
guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang
na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-
evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They
failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of
facts.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal
of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of National
Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired
military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty,
active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat
related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the
PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i)
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment
or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b)
Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375
remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at
the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did
not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of
Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the
President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable
showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete,
whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the
word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may
attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically
attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid
therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has
neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those
interred therein should be treated as a "hero."

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since
1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-
related activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their significant
contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen, national
artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or
not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to
be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar
since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-
related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a
legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor
awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as
a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged
based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the
proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not
all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications
stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense
involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military
service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral
turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard
because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the
privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the
Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to
have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not
met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and
a former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only
to the members of the military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the
three Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of
them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification
between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation
No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also
an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred
therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him
as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he
was dishonorably discharged from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987
(Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95
and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire military
career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a
military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment,
probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP.
Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is outside the context of
"service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military
service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the
1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can
hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as
contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful
revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the
ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the
so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a
particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To
do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices
from multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is not the
function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of the number
of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in public
assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and
oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its
recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous
and confusing messages from the actions of the people.