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OCTOBER 8, 2018
SUCCESSION 6:30PM – 9:00PM (MON); 7:30PM – 9:00PM (TUE)

G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905


 Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December,

1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared
the legitimate heir of the deceased.
 The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to
the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were
instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January,
1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased,
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.
 In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her
guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the
deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of
the deceased — a fact which this new relative did not deny — be required to
render an account of the property of the estate.
 Petitioner claims that, although she is one degree lower in the line of
succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is
entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo
Linart, by representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece,
she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. However, the court ruled that the grandniece was
entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to.

Whether or not herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart
and is entitled to half of the estate of the deceased.


NO. The error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is
very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the
same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law,
the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not
a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the
daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different
had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In
that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana
Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the
portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider
that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren."
The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December
31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were
rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In both
cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the
operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named certain persons as heirs
and, they failing, that the property should pass to their children, it was held that
"Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in
such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation,
"for the reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and
regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to.

And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the fact that it was stated with
more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based
upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right
which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case
of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and give force to
the intention of the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first
named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term
"children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions,
reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident
that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the
sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.
We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased
cannot participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a
nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line
the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the
brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of
the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976


 The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit,

Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli)
and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in
1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
 After Valentina’s death, her estate was administered by her daughter
Ambrosia. The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the
death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga, in their names
 The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio
Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of
Valentin Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said fishpond.
 The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao,
Sr. ½ of the fishpond and the other half from the donation of his auntie
Ambrosia Salao.
 It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao
had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital and
that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint
venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties
supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were
used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no
documentary evidence to support that theory.
 The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter
dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a
one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession
thereof in 1945, in which he refused to give Benita and Victorina’s children
their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to
P200,000. However, there was no mention on the deeds as to the share of
Valentin and Alejandra.
 Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically
stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds
and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as
shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani
was the donee of Ambrosia’s one-half share.
 Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the
donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the
Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao’s supposed one-third share in the
145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao.

Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional rights
over Ambrosia’s share.

Succession: Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have
any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was
her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin
Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir,
together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of
Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia
since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children
of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil
Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews
like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998


 Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde (wife of herein petitioner Lauro Vizconde); Antonio
Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters were
killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita,
Rafael and Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from
Estrellita’s estate.
 On May 22, 1979, Esrellita purchased a parcel of land from Rafael for
P135,000, which she later sold to Amelia Lim and Maria Chiu for P3.4M. In
the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land
and a car using the proceeds of the prior sale. The balance of which was
deposited in a bank. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her daughters were
killed. The NBI conducted investigations and found that Estrellita died
ahead of her daughters. Thus, petitioner survived his daughters who died
later than their mother, Estrellita.
 Petitioner executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud,
Estrellita's parents which provided for the division of the properties of
Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and The Parañaque
property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and
Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as
heirs" in the said properties.
 Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding
was instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon,
among other things, averred that petitioner should be impleaded as one of
Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court,
petitioner filed a Manifestation contending that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s motion. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.


(1) Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate
proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.
(2) Should the Paranaque property be subject to collation?


(1) No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is
exclusive, which negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be
included in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of
decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged
into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as
he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.

(2) No. The records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage. There is nothing to prove that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs
has been impaired to warrant collation. Pursuant to Article 1035, it is the duty of
the plaintiffs to prove that the donations received by Estrellita were inofficious in
whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime of hereditary portion to which they
are entitled. The probate court's order of collation against petitioner is
unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and
not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate.
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael,
is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
Therefore, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for collation covers
only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his
compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque
property. For even if collation would be proper, it is not the Paranaque property
that is to be collated, but should have been the same property given by the
decedent to the heir during his lifetime, which in this case is the Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece
1. of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother
Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit

from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

No The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their
death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue
of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the
rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation
prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment."
While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to
illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992,
prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be
represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be
represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is
legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law
provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of
representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the
kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at bar, the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding
Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article
992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by
any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to
use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the word
"relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. During his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land
1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration.
His mother, Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the
following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels
which Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of the properties to
spouses Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse’s estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares of heirs” and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking
Art 892, Claro insisted that after deducting Perfecta’s ½ share from the conjugal
property, the remaining property shall be divided as: ¼ for Perfecta and ¾ for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to
another ½ of the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse
Perfecta is entitled to ½ of Pedro’s estate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the
only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.
Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art
996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the
case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of
his father’s share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and
Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may
indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount
of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As
such, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.
In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child
surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, ½ of the estate goes to the
child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to
“children or descendants,” the rule in statutory construction that the plural can
be understood to include the singular in this case.
The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premised on the
following arguments:
a.Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is only one
“child” and as such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial
construction and analogy
b.Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only ¼ while
in testacy, she would get ½ shares
It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular.
As such, “children” in Art 996 also refers to a “child.”
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance
whereas Art 834 Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2
paragraphs governing two contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children; and (b) where the widow or widower survives with only
one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for the second situation, it can
be deemed that the legislator’s intent was to promulgate only one general rule
applicable to both situations.
G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992

 Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since
then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro
Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed
mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for
rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to
pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal
amount of about P70,000 as damages.
 The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation
having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig,
Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder
for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a
certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
 On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period,
petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203,
for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of
the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that
being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be
held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are
co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of
land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of
the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse
shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners
of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way
from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
G.R. No. 5343 September 16, 1910

 Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas
Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina,
Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites,
among other things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno
died in the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion,
Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among themselves
the said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and
several carabaos, the legal portions which pertained to four of them,
Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and these latter
continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to their shares, and
were also associated in business separately from their other coheirs.
 The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by EspiridionBarte, in
common accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving heirs,
by force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro
and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said
Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and sisters
continued their partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro
as administrator; that during the latter's administration, MateaBarte also
died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his father
Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, JorgiaBarte
and Donato Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas decided upon the
distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to
Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan
would not agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix of
that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
 That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the
debts having been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself, the latter
was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do,
and that she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the
said property, without the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that
JorgiaBarte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of MateaBarte, and the heirs of
Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were
then entitled to the property in question, which should be divided among
them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to JorgiaBarte, another to
Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

Whether or not partition should be granted.

No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding
real estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may
compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for
partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and name
each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the
status of a co-proprietor or co-owner of the property the partition of which is
asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son of
MateaBarte, through his representative, aver that they are the co-owners of the
said Mandaue lands of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon,
they have not proved their averment by titles which establish the common
ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the
defendant party, representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte,
absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the
parties are all co-owners or co-proprietors of the undivided property to be
partitioned. The question of common ownership need not be gone into at the time
of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said
property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties
by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered
that the hereditary succession of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left
no legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight
brothers and sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of these have
died, the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and
nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the
provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which
prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the
whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes,"
representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the
The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her
death, and if she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner
provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers
and sisters cannot affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the
deceased predecessor in interest successions.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that the partition
prayed for be denied