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AUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO (GR No. 48006. July 8, 1942)

Facts: A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned
and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he
received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When
the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.
Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab

Issue: Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making him primarily and directly


(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil Code. However, the principle
enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant’s) liability as
an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility
of employers may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver’s
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE
BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence
or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the “confusion worse confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code are:

“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.

“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and
that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities
above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is primarily and
directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees. G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]

Facts of the Case:

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint was instituted
against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple
with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting
subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon
City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissedupon motion for reconsideration.


1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married.

Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly, there is
a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently
instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else
contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT,
VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979


Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his car
and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents
moved for the suspension of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111
of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner
elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance
dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the
criminal action.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code is
quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made
essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which
caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision;
that a direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-
driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is
principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and character.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent court action as
specifically provided for in Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising
from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and
3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising
from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries
to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm"
is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage
to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is finally

BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS (GR No. 97336 February 19, 1993)

FACTS: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan
City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would
get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited
Marilou’s parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she
did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from
which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement,
saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh
denied the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money
and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.


1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.

3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in this case.


The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).”

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive
the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal
of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of
morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person
to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the
performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.



 December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa
Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay

 Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp.
(Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury

 Superguard:

 Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

 civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code

 CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela
is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

 Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused

 Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

 Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary

 extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused

 It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death;
that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was
Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.



 August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for
the purpose of attending a conference

 August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km,
it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
Pedro Tumala

 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization

 Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car

 RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case

 essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,

 a) act or omission of the private respondents

 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car

 c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision

 d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents

 e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

 violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners

 petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused

 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover
them in the present civil case

 petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil
action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.



 Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land

 inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction

 July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action

 February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages

 CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the
related Criminal Case

 spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict

ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety


 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

 (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff

 (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond

 (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff

 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners
have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent

 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.

 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and
the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.



 September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature

 After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces

 they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground

 These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity

 They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power

 the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home

 After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's

 The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps

 trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result

 break the cap with a stone - failed

 opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got

 David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents

 An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three

 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck

 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded

 David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by
the surgeons

 Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable


1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage - NO

HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

 in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

1. Damages to the plaintiff

2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.

3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

 while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have
relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury
were attributable to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received

 cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted

 Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred

 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a
month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15

 The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie
who even ran away

 True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.

 The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on
the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences

 he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his
own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury

 rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire

 just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he
can not demand reparation therefor from another

 Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.



 September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur
Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused
his instantaneous death

 Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case while criminal case is pending

 RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt

 subsequently, the civil case was dismissed

ISSUE: W/N the civil case based on quasi-delict should be barred by the acquittal in a criminal case.

HELD: NO. order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside

 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a
felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

 All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting
fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3)
direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.

PART 2 (SYLL. 2-B.1)


PADILLA v CA (G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984)


1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise


Vergara Family

1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of
the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.

Roy Padilla, et al

1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence

2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall
because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se

3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate
the market premise


(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no
civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him

2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.


No, the Court of Appeals is correct.

1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions
are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the
accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the
liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against
the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be

What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal
act or omission.

The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil
case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

FF CRUZ v CA and MABLE (G.R. No. L-52732; August 29, 1988)


The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of private
respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant
manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence.

The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke
out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their
efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the
ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens
from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances.

Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.

On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for a judgment in their
favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.


(1) CFI - renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the defendant.

(2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages

ISSUE: Whether the of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable


Yes. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing itself speaks”)

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management
or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.

negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals
found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as
required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and
alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop.

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city
ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a
firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city
ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an
act of negligence.

Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the

rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the
person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]

The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only
entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.


Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The
court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their
standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action;
that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior
to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but
not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest
therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the
extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction
of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

PEOPLE VS LIGON (G.R. NO. 74041 JULY 29, 1987)

Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a
cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused,
lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.

Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability

Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.

Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be
established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil

On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and
applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat
by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage

PART 3 (SYLL. 2-B.2)


FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he was an employee.
As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight from the train, Cangco
accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim
when it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the sacks of melons upon
the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an obstruction upon the platform,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at the station. There
could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to
take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of
the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

FORES V. MIRANDA (G.R. NO. L-12163 MARCH 4, 1959)

Facts: Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the
Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious
injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of
contract of carriage, contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.


(1) Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without
conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

(2) To what damages is the respondent entitled?


(1) Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should
be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the
property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service
Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the

public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or
operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.

(2) The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals
to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's
appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses
and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee
(respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that respondent was a painter by profession and a professor
of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The attorney's fees in the sum of
P3,000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provided for
the same, and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to
award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages
under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable. We see no reason to alter
these awards.

Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled
that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation.
Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per
se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no
other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. C.A. & LUIS LUNA (G.R. No. 108164 Feb 23, 1995)

FACTS: Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card issued by petitioner FEBTC. Clarita
informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In
cases of this nature, the bank’s internal security procedures and policy would be to record the lost card, along with the
principal card, as a “Hot Card” or “Cancelled Card” in its master file. Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close
friend. Then he presented his Far East card to pay for the lunch, the card was not honored, forcing him to pay in cash the
bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian Festejo, a vice president of the bank, expressed the bank’s apologies, admitting
that they have failed to inform Luis about its security policy. Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in
the RTC, which rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages.

HELD: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his
own card’s cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. The failure to inform Luis is not considered
to be so gross that it would amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will. Article 23 of
the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant’s disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree
of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 23 is a mere declaration of a

general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2224 of
the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad
faith. The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its
stead, petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under Article 2223 of the Civil Code.

AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOSO (G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966)

FACTS: Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a pilgrimage. From
Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in ‘first class,’ but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat in
favor of a ‘white man’ who had a ‘better right to the seat.’ Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint
the contract of carriage between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award for moral damages
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages.

HELD: The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat in the tourist
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no
specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from
the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties.
But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

NOTA BENE: Here there is a contract of carriage between the parties and such contract was breached by Air
France when it wrongfully forced Carrascoso to vacate the first class seat which he paid for. The wrongful
expulsion is independent of the breach since even without the contract, such wrongful expulsion may still make
Air France liable for damages. In other words, the wrongful expulsion is in itself a tort.

SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, (G.R. No. 84698; February 4, 1992)

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration. Assailants, who
were not members of the schools academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This
incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against them based on
quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their
motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was
forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution
sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting
in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the
student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore held liable
for his death. PETITION DENIED.

98695 January 27, 1993)

1. Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they
filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict.
2. According to the complaint, the petitioners and respondent to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978. They also alleged that the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the
deceased had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter. Upon opening the vault, it became apparent that there
was evidence of total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged and the exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were
3. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00
for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, etc.


1. Trial Court: dismissed the complaint. the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would
be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and
because there was a pre- existing contractual relation.
Contention of the defense: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will
(sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved
(sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."
2. Court of Appeals: affirmed dismissal.

ISSUE: whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively,

whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.

RULING: NO, there was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of aculpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi- delict.

Syquia’s and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care" on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective
rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal
provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is
expected of a good father of a family.

Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water
inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.


FACTS: Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva,
bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga. She filed a compliant for damages
against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint
against Salva, the owner of the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was the truck owner
who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of
contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict. Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident which negates
petitioner’s liability?

RULING: No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage.

In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

More so, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract
of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part, which
makes him liable.

PART 4 (SYLL. 3-A.1)

PICART vs. SMITH, JR. (G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918, STREET, J.:)

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get
over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that
the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

HELD: The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages.

YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable

consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.

PART 5 (SYLL. 3-A.2)


COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, Respondents. (G.R. No. 129792. December 21,

FACTS: When respondent Criselda was signing her credit card slip at payment and verification counter in Syvels
Department Store in Makati, she felt a sudden gust of wind a heard a loud sound. She looked behind her and saw her
daughter Zhieneth (6 years old) on the floor pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter. She was rushed to
the hospital but died after 14 days.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages.

Petitioners on the other hand, denied any liability imputing the negligence to Criselda for allowing her daughter to roam
freely in the department store. Alleging further, that the deceased committed contributory negligence when she
climbed the counter. Also herein petitioners defense is that they have exercised due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection, supervision and control of their employees.

Trial Court favored petitioners, contemplating that Zhieneth’s action is the proximate cause of the accident.

CA favored respondents on it declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident,
was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years could not be held
liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a mere mischief
or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily
allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.


(1) Whether or not Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence.

(2) Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence.


1 - NO. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability.

The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

2 - NEGLIGENCE. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be
attributed to negligence.

Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae



 August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric Company on Dimas-Alang Street for
the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs

 Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its connections

 the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the

 Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon
station of the Manila Electric Company

 2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they would send an inspector

 4 p.m.: neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home

 Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touch the wire

 Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to touch
a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current

 Alberto del Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling
challenged put out his index finger and touch the wire

 He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre"

 The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post

 A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body

 Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.

 Trial Court: absolved Manila Electric Company

ISSUE: W/N Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the death of Alberto

HELD: YES. judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the sum of
P1,250, with costs of both instances

 The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these
wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to
keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.

 presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from the breakage of this wire has not
been overcome, and it is in our opinion responsible for the accident

 It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature
years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact
that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the
case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the
deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such negligence would
not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident.


FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational
institution located in Pangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. As part of work education,
private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered
remnants of World War II.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils
got out of the hole. Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see
Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the

After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to
scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to the
wall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, he died. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case,
filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE: Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the death of Ylarde.

RULING: SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the
way private respondent Aquino did. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure
that the children are protected from all harm in his company. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate
incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to
his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.


Facts: Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing
trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline consumer
to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in machinery
engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be
installed. In the course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline and other
fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine
stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The
crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against
Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not due to the fault
of Quest.

Issue:Whether or not Quest was negligent.

Ruling: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors,
but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the
dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been
sufficiently warned from those circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against
the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for
Quest’s carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.

US V. PINEDA (G.R. NO. L-12858 JANUARY 22, 1918)


 Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and
which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling.
(Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist)

 Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of 6 papers
marked Botica Pineda

 Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two
of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses.

 Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which
had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards.

 Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs.
Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not
potassium chlorate but barium chlorate.

 At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should
be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.)

 Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the
result of poisoning

 RTC: held Pineda liable

ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant,
without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted

 Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell
or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or
administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or
pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug,
chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section
if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.

 The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person violating
the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing that: Any
person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the
Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for
each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more
than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

 As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is
provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one
word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this
restrictive adjective?

 Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove
to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that
when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as
positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the
purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury.

 Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question
of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he
sells. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.

BPI V. CA (216 SCRA 51)

FACTS: Someone who identified herself to be Eligia Fernando called up BPI, requesting for the pre-termination of
her money market placement with the bank. The person who took the call, Reginaldo Eustaquio, didn't bother to
verify with Fernando’s office if whether or not she really intended to pre-terminate her money market placement.
Instead, he relied on the verification stated by the caller. He proceeded with the processing of the termination.
Thereafter, the caller gave delivery instructions that instead of delivering the checks to her office, it would be
picked up by her niece and it indeed happen as such. It was found out later on that the person impersonated
Fernando and her alleged niece in getting the checks. The dispatcher also didn’t bother to get the promissory note
evincing the placement when he gave the checks to the impersonated niece. This was aggravated by the fact that this
impersonator opened an account with the bank and deposited the subject checks. It then withdrew the amounts.

The day of the maturity of the money market placement happened and the real Eligia Fernando surfaced herself. She
denied pre-terminating the money market placements and though she was the payee of the checks in issue, she didn’t
receive any of its proceeds. This prompted the bank to surrender to CBC the checks and asking for reimbursement
on alleged forgery of payee’s indorsements.

HELD: The general rule shall apply in this case. Since the payee’s indorsement has been forged, the instrument is wholly
inoperative. However, underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery isn’t applicable. The
issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessitates the
determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks.

The acts of the employees of BPI were tainted with more negligence if not criminal than the acts of CBC. First, the act of
disclosing information about the money market placement over the phone is a violation of the General Banking Law.
Second, there was failure on the bank’s part to even compare the signatures during the termination of the placement,
opening of a new account with the specimen signature in file of Fernando. And third, there was failure to ask the
surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement.

The acts of the BPI employees were the proximate cause to the loss. Nevertheless, the negligence of the employees of
CBC should be taken also into consideration. They closed their eyes to the suspicious large amount withdrawals made
over the counter as well as the opening of the account.


FACTS: August 8, 1909 night time: Wright, who was intoxicated, drove in his calesa and as his horse leapt forward along
the rails of the Manila Electric company and it fell. Wright was thrown and got injured.

It was alleged in the trial that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from 1/3 to 1/2of their depth out of the
ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.

RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the
authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000.

ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury (NOT contributory)
thereby he cannot recover.

HELD: NO. RTC AFFIRMED. Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the
other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if
no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober

Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a
street where there is a large amount of travel.

If Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken
condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received.

Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although the Wright, in the judgment of the
court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages.

No facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent.

It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.

It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the
appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in
the opinion of the court below which justifies a larger verdict than the one found.

Dissenting Opinion by Carson: If the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these findings
sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright. The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence
though not fully sustained should be assumed that there were evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to
sustain that there is negligence.

US v. BAGGAY (20 PHIL 142; J. TORRES; September 1, 1911)

NATURE: Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910,whereby he was declared exempt
from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000,to
pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.

FACTS: About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of
Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the
Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with
a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise
inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named
Dioalan. For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the
non-Christian Baggay, Jr., with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted
separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental
aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to
this court.

ISSUE: W/N an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable.

HELD: YES. Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor
is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because
of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.

Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition
of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his
harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to
protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and
indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection
does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his

Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable.

Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of Article 8 does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall been forced, subject to the following:(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the
persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this
age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise
of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legalguardianship or power, unless they prove that there
was no blame or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or
power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting
that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.