Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184

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Research in Transportation Economics

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Hybrid steering cultures in the governance of public transport: A successful way

to meet demands?
Lisa Hansson*
Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, SE-581 95 Linköping, Sweden

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper concerns steering aspects in the governance context of public transport. Various theoretical
Available online 4 July 2012 views of steering have been presented over the years, and it has been argued that a multiple-principal
context often leads to fragmented steering. The paper aims to identify steering culture models found
Keywords: among principals operating in the same public transport context, and to explain how a successful
Governance procurement outcome is possible, despite the hybrid of steering cultures. The paper is based on an
Public transport
empirical analysis of a Swedish county’s planning process that resulted in a very successful procurement
Steering models
outcome that met high environmental and safety standards at a relatively low cost. This procurement
Metagovernance
was seen as a triumph by principals. The findings presents the existence of various steering cultures
among the principals, leading to the conclusion that a “metagovernor,” in this case the PTA, is central to
achieving successful outcomes. The metagovernor designed the planning process and formulated
a procurement document that satisfied the principals. In this process, the metagovernor negotiated
separately with each principal, focusing on the particular characteristics of each principal.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction: multiple organizations and fragmented
steering
In many countries, the governance of public transport involves
a mixture of organizations belonging to various institutional
settings (van de Velde, 1999). For example, in Sweden, four insti-
tutions are often involved in a county’s public transport gover-
nance; the county council, regional cooperation body, and
municipalities, has a more strategic role and are in this context
often referred to as principals. The fourth organization, i.e., the
county public transport authority (PTA), is responsible for carrying
out the tenders, and is often referred to as the agent (a more
detailed description of these organizations is found in Section 4).1
Various theoretical views of steering have been presented over the
years, and it has been argued that a multiple-principal context often
leads to fragmented steering, leaving a governance gap between
principals and agent (see, e.g., Hansson, 2010; Longva & Osland, 2010;
O’Sullivan & Patel, 2004). Fragmented steering is often seen as
a problem and, because of this, debate has emerged as to what
steering model is the most successful (see Sørensen & Torfing, 2009,
* Tel.: þ46 13 204038.
E-mail address: lisa.hansson@vti.se.
1
According to law, each county can decide how to organize its public transport;
the description given here concerns the most common organization of responsi-
bility in Sweden (Trivector, 2009).
for a good overview of the debate). This paper aims to identify
steering cultures found among principals operating in the same
public transport context, and to explain how a successful procure-
ment outcome is possible, despite the hybrid of steering cultures.
The paper makes an important contribution to the public
transport research, both empirically and theoretically. It contrib-
utes new findings regarding the steering models found in public
transport governance, e.g. showing that several models exist within
the same public transport governance context. It also shows the
role of a metagovernor and how metagovernance tools are effi-
ciently applied to a transport governance context.
1.1. Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. First the theoretical frame-
work is described. The framework is focusing on how steering
cultures can be defined within a network and the relevance of
a metagovernor. The next section describes the design of the
empirical study and the methodological choices that was made. In
the following section, the empirical example is presented and the
theoretical concepts are applied. This section demonstrates that
principals can be categorized according to their steering cultures
and explains how a network consisting of hybrid steering cultures
may be effective, due to the actions taken by the metagovernor. The
last part of the paper summarize the overall conclusions.

0739-8859/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.06.011
176 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
2. Theoretical point of departure
In this paper, public transport governance refers to the context
in which public authorities seek to coordinate resources to
enhance the collective goals of public transport. Governance is an
emerging theoretical perspective in public transport research
(Hansson, 2011a). Although the body of relevant research is
growing, the issue of the political values (i.e., traditions, norms,
and practices) that shape or constrain political behaviour (Pierre,
1999) among the public transport authorities in this governance
context need more attention (Eerdmans, van Kooij, van de Velde, &
Westerink, 2010; Hansson, 2011a; Longva & Osland, 2010). A great
amount of studies has focusing on the relations between the public
transport authorities and the operators (Gwilliam, 2008). However
the relationship between the organizations on the authority side
has not been as central. Longva and Osland (2010) have studied the
establishment of separate procuring and planning organizations in
the context of local bus services and are discussing the outcome of
such establishing using both principal-agent theory and new
public management theory. This article establishes that the
steering might become fragmented when the new procuring body
are established. Hansson (2011b) has shown there are power
resource exchanges among the political authorities and the public
transport authority, making the public transport authority
a dominant coalition and in this sense also constraining the
political behaviour. Macario (2001) have addressed the question of
an effectiveness regulatory regime and are arguing that it success
strongly depends on the effectiveness of the relationship between
authorities and operators. She addresses that the public transport
is regulated and governed differently, and arguing that institu-
tional and external contextual variables differ making public
transport systems context specific (Macario, 2001). All articles
have in common that the context is important for understanding
governance of public transport and that institutional variables
matters for the outcome. They also stress the fact that besides
vertical interactions also horizontal relationships exist within the
networks. This article belongs to the same research tradition and
will complement the existing studies by binging in models that
can explain the different institutional factors within each organi-
zation in a network as well as complementing the understanding
of effective governance, this by introducing the term meta-
governance. Each organization has its own values, norms and ideas
which that influence how it acts. Formal rules make up a small
part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; the governing
structure is also defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour
and conventions (North, 1990). It is impossible to fully understand
the governance of public transport unless new institutional vari-
ables are further brought into the analysis. The new institutional
variables help us to capture the diversity of principals that exist in
a multi-principal setting and to explain why different principals
within the same governance context may act differently towards
an agent. The fact that different principals possess different values,
norms and ideas is central to this paper, and it is essential to take
account of these if we are to understand public transport
governance.
Table 1
Four models of steering culture and their defining characteristics; source: Pierre (1999).
Managerial model Corporatist model
Policy objectives Efficiency Distribution
Key instruments Contracts Deliberations
Steering focus Outcome Process
Participation Professionals Intra-organizational
Key evaluative criterion Efficiency Participation
2.1. Different steering cultures in the governance network
Steering cultures is in this paper defined to the values, norms,
rules actions are shaping the principals way of acting. To understand
the steering cultures a verified version of Pierre’s (1999) models of
urban governance is used. Pierre argues for the existence of various
governance objectives, described as various systems of values,
norms, beliefs, and practices. Pierre reduces the variety of urban
governance objectives to four general models, i.e., the managerial,
corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare governance models, each
deploying its own type of governance with regard to participants,
objectives, instruments, and outcomes (Pierre, 1999: 373).
A detailed description of the models is found in Pierre (1999). In
the present paper, I have chosen to modify Pierre’s models some-
what. First, the models were originally constructed for the analysis
of urban governance. Pierre has demonstrated that these models
can be found within an urban governance system, and that involved
sectors (e.g., social, eldercare, health, and educational) in an urban
governance system may possess different governance models. In
this paper, the models are used in analysing one sector, i.e., public
transport, being applied to various organizations in this sector.
Second, the characteristics of public transport also mean that the
models are applied in a context involving organizations from
several administrative levels. Multi-tier systems are becoming
more common in Western Europe, and are dominant in public
transport. To clarify that the models are applied to one sector/
governance system (i.e., public transport), I call them “steering
culture” models instead of “governance” models. Third, not all
characteristics of Pierre’s models are described in this paper, for
example, some characteristics are integrated into a single variable.
Despite the modifications to the original models, the benefit of
introducing and using Pierre’s (1999) framework is that it provides
tools that let us identify and explain the variety of steering models
found in public transport governance. Each model is described
using five variables: main objectives, instruments for achieving
main objectives, steering focus, participation, and key evaluative
criterion; see Table 1 for an overview of the models.
The managerial model emphasizes professional participation
over elite political involvement, the key players being the managers
of organizations producing and delivering public services. The
model assumes a consensus approach in the political exchange,
since it assumes that elected officials’ main role is defining long-
term objectives for service production, which is conducted at
a distance from politics. Its main objective is to enhance the effi-
ciency of public service production and delivery and its key eval-
uation criterion is output efficiency. The managerial model attains
the goal of efficiency by introducing and addressing various
private-sector management strategies into public service produc-
tion and delivery, for example, increased use of contracting,
promoting public sector managerial positions, increasing the
discretion available to these positions, and redefining the role of
elected officials. The managerial model could be described as
purpose driven because of its focus on outcomes, the process itself
being of little interest (Pierre, 1999). Compared with the managerial
model, the corporatist model is clearly process driven, focusing on
Pro-growth model Welfare model
Growth Redistribution
Partnerships Networks
Outcome Process
Local elite and senior elected officials Local government officials
Growth Equity
 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
representation and participation. The participation is intra orga-
nizational rather than strictly political, and only the top organiza-
tional leaders are involved in the process. The model’s main
objective is distributive, i.e., ensuring that the interests of the
organization’s membership shape services and policies. The inclu-
sion of interest representation is the key instrument for achieving
the main objectives of the corporatist model. This is done by
bringing key interested actors into the process, which creates a high
degree of decision making acceptance. The interests of groups not
involved in the process tend, on the other hand, to be neglected.
Pierre (1999) argues that fiscal discipline is a problem in the
corporatist model. Although there is considerable interest in
obtaining input regarding public expenditures, there is much less
incentive to participate in discussions of urban revenues, except
when organizational interests are at stake (Pierre, 1999). The pro-
growth model has economic growth as its main objective, though
opinions as to what sources may contribute to such growth may
change over time. To achieve economic growth, the model uses
a wide variety of local government instruments, such as planning,
the mobilization of regional and national government resources,
and various development projects. Like the managerial model, the
pro-growth model can be described as purpose driven because its
focus is distinctly on outcomes. Typical participants in the pro-
growth model include the downtown elite and senior elected
officials, who share an interest in boosting the local economy. The
model emphasizes consensus among the participants. This model is
arguably the least participatory of the four governance models.
Pierre (1999) explains that mass involvement could never be an
option in this model, simply because such participation would
immediately politicize the pro-growth strategy by bringing in
competing local government spending options, such as neigh-
bourhood redevelopment and other distributive measures. Growth
is the key evaluation criterion; a facilitating accommodation
between political and economic power is what is evaluated, which
entails the assessment of various choices made to facilitate growth
(Pierre, 1999). The welfare model is often found in geographic
contexts with limited local economic growth potential. Most capital
enters such economies through the welfare system, which
accordingly fosters dependency on the state. The short-term
objective is to secure the inflow of state funds to sustain the local
economy, while the long-term objectives are more unclear and may
vary within the model. The main participants in the welfare model
are local government officials and state officials and bureaucrats.
The model’s key instrument is networking with higher echelons of
government, and the networks exploited may be political, admin-
istrative, or both. In this model, local political leadership relies
greatly on the state to provide compensatory programmes for the
city. The welfare model’s key evaluative criterion is equity in terms
of the redistribution of public funds and other public resources
from other governmental bodies (Pierre, 1999).
Each model represents a different steering culture. I have used
the models to organize and analyse the empirical material in order
to identify the type of steering culture characterizing each principal.
2.2. Effective network governance despite different steering cultures
e the importance of a metagovernor
Governance network actors interact through negotiations that
possibly combine hard-nosed bargaining with consensus-seeking
deliberation. When a governance network is first formed “there
are no agreed upon norms, procedures or constitution to prede-
termine where and whose legitimate design is to be taken” argue
Sørensen and Torfing (2009: 236). This makes policy making within
a network problematic, since it may lack in achieving concrete
policy decisions (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009).
177
Sørensen and Torfing (2009) argue that a governance network
may enhance its efficiency and democratic performance by meta-
governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). “Metagovernor” is a theo-
retical concept referring to a single actor or group of actors that
seeks to secure cooperation and coordination in complex situations.
Instead of the hierarchical tools of government, it uses various
modes of coordination, such as framing, facilitation, and negotiation
(Hovik & Vabo, 2005). For a network to function properly, some
actor must assume the role of metagovernor. From an analyse of
a large amount of studies concerning effective governance
networks Sørensen and Torfing (2009) has tried to summarize the
actions taken by an effective metagovernor. They have identified
four different tools that can be used to enhance network gover-
nance; network design, network framing, network management
and network participation. Network design, which is referred to the
metagovernor is influence the scope, character, composition and
institutional procedures of the network. In order to archive an
effective network design the focus should be strict on objectives and
innovative capacities when composing the network. The network
design is important in the initial face when the network is formed,
but the actions also involve subsequent adjustments to the design.
The design of appropriated procedures helps reducing transaction
costs of networking by lowering the risks of confusion and uncer-
tainty of involved actors’ roles within the network, argue the
authors. Network framing, is referred to the determination of
political goals, fiscal conditions, legal basis and discursive story-line
of the network. The relevance of a common determined goal is
important for the effectiveness of the network, when actors chare
a common goal the incentives for further cooperation are increased.
Also other presumptive conflicting goals are undermined by the
metagovernor taking different actions that leads to strategies that
everyone can agree on. Network management, is when the meta-
governor attempts to reduce tensions, resolve conflicts, empower
particular actors and lower the transaction costs in network by
providing different kinds of material and immaterial inputs and
resources. One way of doing this is to strive of a transparency within
the network by insuring that all relevant information that is circu-
lated among the network is clear and understandable. The last tool
is network participation, which means influencing the policy
agenda, the range of feasible options, the premises for decision
making and the negotiated policy outputs. By participating actively
in the process the metagovernor can both control the actions taken
in the network but also be able to gain and build trust among the
network actors (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009: 245e251).
Hence, a metagovernor chooses among the different institu-
tional forms of governance, tackling the dilemmas and potential
failures associated with different metagovernance tools (Sørensen
& Torfing, 2009). This means that despite being a network con-
sisting of principals with different steering cultures effective
governance can be achieved, if a metagovernor is emerging.
3. Material and methods
The empirical material concerns events occurring during the
process of planning a new public transport procurement. The case
took place in a county in Sweden and was chosen based on several
criteria. First, the planning process had to have occurred in a county
where the PTA is 50% county council owned and 50% municipally
owned. The county also needed to have a regional cooperation
body. This criterion was important to allow for generalization, as
joint ownership is the most common ownership structure in
Sweden. Second, to capture the diversity of the principals, it was
important that all principals (i.e., municipalities, county council,
and regional cooperation body) be involved in the planning, so
a case of procurement to purchase both regional and local public
178 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
transport was chosen. Third, due to tendency criteria, the events
had to have occurred recently.
I used a case study approach, more specifically, the process
tracing method, in selecting and analysing the empirical material
(George & Bennet, 2005). When analysing the material, I asked
questions such as “Who initiated the actions/questions etc?”, “Who
participated in them?”, and “What meetings were held, and
when?” Public documents are often the main data source in process
tracing; such data played a large role in this study, and a great
number of protocols, letters, and reports were analysed (totalling
approximately 1350 documents). Interviews were also a vital data
source. To understand the steering cultures, it was important to
grasp the actors’ perspectives as conveyed in their statements and
narratives concerning their roles in the process. Based on the
documents, I reconstructed the overall planning process and then
used this reconstruction in the interviews. When the actors spoke
about their involvement in the process, it was possible to raise
other questions concerning their role and everyday work. Using
process tracing in combination with interviewing is productive,
since this also makes it possible to capture the context in which the
process takes place (Tansley, 2007). Eighteen public officials (i.e.,
politicians and bureaucrats) belonging to 12 municipalities, the
county council, the regional cooperation body, and the PTA were
chosen for the first interview round. I selected the municipalities
based on factors distinguishing them from each other (e.g., pop-
ulation, size, and geographic location) as well as on their activity/
lack of activity in the planning process as indicated by the public
documents. I chose interviewees based on their positions in the
delegation chain in relation to public transport responsibility in
each organization. I considered interviewing additional actors from
other municipalities, if necessary, in a second interview round.
However, the results of the first-round interviews were often
similar, so I decided that the first round was sufficient for building
an understanding of the processes (Yin, 2003). In addition to the 18
interviewees, I also attempted to interview four others, but for
various reasons (e.g., living abroad or no response to the request) it
was impossible to contact them.
4. Empirical findings
4.1. Introduction to the case
Government in Sweden is multi-layered, and central govern-
ment creates a framework in which local government operates. The
latter comprises 21 counties in which 290 municipalities and 21
county councils (two of which are organized as regions) operate;
these bodies in turn may delegate responsibility to other agencies,
for example, local public companies (Montin, 2007). In Sweden, the
main responsibility for ensuring that public transport is provided to
citizens lies at the local government level, where four public
institutions are usually involved in public transport governance.2
These institutions are: the county council, regional cooperation
body, municipalities in the country, and public transport authority
(PTA). Three institutions; the county council, regional cooperation
body, and municipalities can be seen as principals relative to the
PTA. The county council and municipalities have joint financial
responsibility for providing public transport, the county council
being responsible for regional traffic and the municipalities for local
traffic. The regional cooperation body has no financial
2
Each county can organize its public transport as it sees fit, deciding, for
example, whether it wants to divide responsibility between the county council and
the municipalities or whether it wants the county council or the municipalities to
shoulder all responsibility (SFS, 1978:438). The description given here concerns the
most common organization of responsibility in Sweden (Trivector, 2009).
responsibility but rather a strategic planning responsibility for
regional traffic. The fourth institution, the PTA, is responsible for
detail planning and supplying the transport services. Through
procurement, the PTA in turn delegates the actual traffic operations
to private operators. This paper focuses on the interaction between
the public actors involved in the public at the local government
level (see Table 2).
The empirical case takes place in a medium-sized county in
Sweden. The case involves principals from 13 different organiza-
tions; 11 municipalities, one county council, and one regional
cooperation body. The municipalities range in population from
5912 to 62,239; four municipalities have increasing populations
while the others have declining populations (SCB, 2011). Each
organization has its own steering culture that influence how it acts,
and its own demands as to what should be prioritized in the
procurement. The county had early in the 2000 a fragmented
steering context but during the decade manage to get highly effi-
cient governance resulting in achieving a very successful public
procurement in 2008. The procurement has a contract value of
approximately SEK 3.5 billion (zEUR 365 million) and a contract
period of 6 þ 3 years (P.D. 1, 2008). The overall goals of the
procurement were to procure new bus services and, in the process,
to establish new bus routes; the specific requirements within these
overall goals were to be determined by the principals.
4.2. Defining the principals different steering models
First we need to establish the steering cultures among the
principals. By analysing the characteristic among each principal it is
possible to determine that the “authorities” belong to different
steering models. In this section, the various principals will be
described using the characteristics of the model of . I will demon-
strate that it is possible to relate the different steering culture
models to different principals.
Several characteristics of the regional cooperation body steering
culture resemble elements of the corporatist model, mainly process
aspects and attempts to seek participation with inter-
organizational actors. The regional cooperation body often initi-
ating documents/programmes and relating deliberative events to
them. The deliberative events take two forms: one is open to all
participants involved in public transport; the other is more tar-
geted, and includes only strategically important actors. The broader
approach is exemplified by events held in relation to a working
document entitled “Proposal for Public Transport Programme” (P.D.
2, 2005). This Proposal was initiated early in the planning process
by a bureaucrat in the regional cooperation body. Several events
were held in connection with this document. For example, the
regional cooperation body held an open meeting to which repre-
sentatives of the municipalities, county council, and PTA were
invited to discuss the transport programme. Besides broad open
deliberation forms, the regional cooperation body initiated the
creation of more targeted groups consisting of strategically selected
key people. These groups could also be related to different working
documents. For example, a bureaucrat at the regional cooperation
body commissioned a consulting firm to draft a proposal con-
cerning how public transport could contribute to regional devel-
opment. In relation to the consulting firm, the commissioning
bureaucrat appointed a “steering committee” to provide input to
the consulting firm. The steering committee consisted of strategi-
cally important bureaucrats from the involved organizations: two
from the regional cooperation body, two from the PTA, two from
two municipalities, and the leading bureaucrat at the county
council (P.D. 8, 2006). The actual content of the report did not seem
to be central; instead, it seemed that the main purpose of the
consultant’s report was to gather strategically important people to
 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
Table 2
Division of responsibility in public transport at the local government level in Sweden.
Principals The county council
Financial responsibility for regional public
transport (PTA ownership)
Agent The county public transport authority (PTA)
Responsibility for planning and conducting
public transport procurements
form a closed group. The main objective of the corporatist model is
distributive, i.e., ensuring that the interests of the organization’s
members shape services and policies. In the corporatist steering
model, the interests of groups not involved in the process
frequently tend to be neglected. Similarities to the corporatist
model are found at the level of the regional cooperation body. In the
case of the steering committee, a small part of the municipalities
and bureaucrats of the regional cooperation body constituted this
small group. It is also possible to see similarities to the corporatist
model when it comes to intra-organizational rather than strictly
political types of participation. According to the corporatist model,
as in the regional cooperation body, there is little incentive for the
participating actors to discuss revenue and fiscal issues. The formal
institutional setting gives the regional cooperation body no
budgetary responsibility for public transport. The municipalities
and county council have full say over the budget. This is also re-
flected in the regional cooperation body, in which the fiscal feasi-
bility of proposed goals is not always seen as important, according
to some of the interviews with municipal respondents (see for
example Interview D).
Two steering models were found in the 11 municipalities
involved in planning the procurement. The first type, here referred
to as “type A municipality”, has characteristics similar to those of the
pro-growth model. Type A municipalities focus on economic growth
(local and regional), and public transport is seen as a tool for
expanding their central cities and workplaces. For such munici-
palities, the main target of the planning process was to enhance the
transport along strategic lines; the equity perspective of public
transport in rural areas was not prioritized (Interview F). The
preferred outcomes are set early in the planning of public transport,
for example the outcome of the procurement in 2008 was
set already in 2005. A bureaucrat illustrates how he worked with
the outcomes:
Already in 2005, I started sketching what we thought was
important. I called the paper “Some thoughts about future
transport” and posted it on our municipal website. I think we
have followed the posted goals very well. (Interview E)
The interviewees pointed out that, while it was important to set
outcomes, it was also important to desire to achieve the set
outcomes. The approach to achieving the outcomes is progressive,
both externally and internally, in type A municipalities. In these
municipalities, both politicians and bureaucrats are actively
involved in strategic partnerships and networks. For example,
bureaucrats from a type A municipality states that it is important to
have regular telephone calls with the senior PTA bureaucrat, the
regional cooperation body, and other municipalities seen as influ-
ential in the county (Interview G; Interview L). The official meetings
are clearly just a small part of the work: “I try to prepare, ask
questions, and get answers all the time, every week, every day if
possible .” (Interview E; similar strategies are found at the polit-
ical level, see, e.g., Interview F). The strategy is to anchor an issue in
various parties before it comes up for open discussion in a meeting.
In line with the pro-growth model, type A municipalities strove for
179
The regional cooperation body The municipalities
Strategic planning responsibility for Financial responsibility for local public transport
regional public transport (PTA ownership)
Strategic planning responsibility for local
public transport
consensus within their networks. For example, the leading
bureaucrats in the studied type A municipalities made sure that
they had agreed on what constituted the key issues in the planning
process (e.g., focusing on strategic transport routes) (Interview G).
Bureaucrats from a type A municipality has also served on several
working groups concerning public transport (P.D. 8, 2006). It is
clear that a key instrument for type A municipalities is participation
in strategic groups, to display active involvement. “You must act
and show interest, you must sell yourself . if you don’t make
yourself heard in a process like this, then you have no one to blame
but yourself” is an illustrative quotation from one bureaucrat from
a type A municipality (Interview E). This statement indicates
a pragmatic view of the democratic process, in which decisions are
made by a small elite and the anchoring process in the municipal
council is seen as a formality.
Type B municipalities differ considerably from type A munici-
palities, as type B features are in line with the welfare model. Such
municipalities are characterized by declining populations and
declining public transport fares. Due to the financial model of
public transport, they are not large financial contributors to the
public transport system. This financial model, which involves joint
beneficial ownership with costs divided between the county
council and the municipalities (i.e., municipalities pay for traffic
within the municipalities while the county council pays for traffic
going between municipalities), creates geographical benefits often
cited by type B municipalities. For a smaller municipality located
between two large populated municipalities, there is a “free-riding
effect”: the high volume of regional traffic, paid for by the county
council, means that one or several bus stops are located in the type
B municipality, since it is on the route between the larger munici-
palities. As in the welfare model, type B municipalities rely on
external actors to secure their transport, in this case, the county
council with the budgetary responsibility for regional traffic. Their
main objective is to get maximum transport service for a smaller
municipal outlay. Type B municipalities often cite fairness or
unfairness in relation to geographical location and, in turn, the
financial model. For example, a politician belonging to a type B
municipality stated: “We are fortunate in our municipality because
we are located in between two larger cities” (Interview D). Classic
welfare arguments are made by such municipalities. For example,
both politicians and bureaucrats from type B municipalities refer to
“systemic failure”, in that some municipalities lack access to regular
transport, despite decreasing population (Interview H). This view
differs from that of type A municipalities, where politicians say that
if only a few people are travelling in an area, it is not worth having
a bus route there, as it is more important to focus on commuter
routes (Interview F). Involvement in public transport issues is
promoted largely by bureaucrats (Interview I). The bureaucrats
attend meetings held by formal networks, such as the “transport
technical group”, which is open to bureaucrats from the munici-
palities, county council, and regional cooperation body; they do
not, however, participate actively in these meetings. As illustrated
above, the characteristics of type B municipal participation are also
in line with the welfare model. Type B municipalities are mainly
180 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
represented by bureaucrats, and rely on other public organizations
to provide traffic and services for them.
The county council has a clear division of roles in relation to the
PTA, the council being the purchaser/principal and the PTA the
supplier/agent. The main argument in favour of this division of
responsibilities is expertise and, in turn, efficiency. The county
council believes that the PTA has the best knowledge and expertise
of public transport and is therefore the actor that should be in
charge of public transport. In this, the council’s behaviour is in line
with the managerial model in several ways. As in the managerial
model, the county council believes that goals of efficiency are likely
to be achieved by means of market-like strategies, such as dis-
tinguishing between purchasers and suppliers. The roles of
purchaser and supplier became very clear when the county coun-
cil’s role in the procurement process was described:
As owners, we are only involved at an early stage e the PTA
presents the overall contents of the procurement. You don’t
interfere, in bus route proposals, for example e these are the
operational responsibility of the PTA. (Interview C)
This view of the roles of the principal and the PTA differs from
those of both the regional cooperation body and type A munici-
palities, which seek active relationships with the PTA, inviting it to
join strategic groups, etc., and making more detailed suggestions as
to what to procure and how to locate the transport routes. The
county council’s view of its political role is also very much in line
with the managerial model. The managerial model assumes that
the elected official’s main role is to define long-term objectives for
service production, while the actual services should be produced at
a distance from politics. In the county council, the politicians were
mainly involved just after the election, setting the budget and the
general vision of what the PTA should do. Political activities were
then mainly carried out through the PTA board. The county council
also talks about follow-ups and evaluations, matters rarely
mentioned in interviews with municipal or regional cooperation
body actors. A county council bureaucrat explained that “the PTA
makes the calculations concerning their work and then leaves them
The regional
cooperation body
Policy objectives Participation
Key instruments Deliberation
(broad and narrow)
Participation Elite of group of
public actors (mainly
bureaucrats)
Steering focus Process
Key evaluative Participation
criterion
Most similar to the Corporatist model
theoretical model
described in section 2
Fig. 1. Steering cultures found at the strategic level of public transport.
to us for evaluation . the PTA must be skilled at delivering follow-
ups and show that it can deliver the public transport that we have
decided to support and finance” (Interview C). In addition, the focus
on evaluations is in line with the managerial model. The main
objective of the county council is to enhance efficiency. In inter-
views, council respondents cite several examples of how the
council has managed to enhance its budget, in turn prioritizing new
services. It is clear that the steering focus of the county council was
an outcome and that the process itself had little relevance. County
council actors were not actively involved in the procurement work;
for example, the broad open meetings initiated by the regional
cooperation body or the PTA often lacked county council repre-
sentation (see, e.g., participant list in P.D. 5, 2005, Interview J).
The characteristics of the principals are summarized in Fig. 1. As
can be seen, a hybrid of steering cultures exists in the governance of
public transport.
4.3. Reaching an effective network and a successful procurement
outcome
As been described above the public authorities in the gover-
nance of public transport in discussed case represents several
different steering cultures, their objectives and strategies differ
from each other. When actors from different steering cultures are
involved in policy making, it is argued that conflicts or “governance
gaps” often arise (Peters, 2001). This was also present in the early
2000 in the studied county. In 2002 the regional cooperation body
was established in the county, this challenged the existing struc-
tures by changing the formal roles of the county council. In times
when the political majority of the regional cooperation body and
the county council were the same this cooperation was functional,
but it was a weak relation only dependent on the political majority
being the same (Interview K). The county has also undergone
expensive public procurements on the regional level, for example
the procurement contracts started in 2001 brought a cost increase
of 28% percent (P.D.12, 2001). There was no cohesive procurement
strategy between the regional traffic and the local traffic (P.D. 13,
Type A municipalities Type B The county council
municipalities
Growth (strategic Redistribution Efficiency, holding
lines) down the budget
Partnerships and Network with patrons Clear division of roles
process (principal–agent)
Inter-organizational, Bureaucrats Low
including politicians
and bureaucrats
Outcome Undefined Outcome
Growth Equity Efficiency of
performance
Pro-growth model Welfare model Managerial model
 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
2002). The municipalities procured their own local traffic and they
were very miss content with the lack of transparency at the PTA
(Interview J). They believe the PTA was too autonomous and the
legitimacy towards the PTA was low (Interview A).
However over the last ten years the governance of public
transport has, despite the hybrid of steering cultures, gone from
having a fragmented policy formulation and expensive procure-
ment outcomes to an efficient governance network and a successful
procurement in 2008. Some of the achievements in terms of
procurement outcome were as follows (P.D. 1, 2008):
 Transport output was doubled on the routes between the three
major municipalities in the county.
 Adaptations to accommodate disabled travellers continued,
including required lifts/ramps or low entry on buses and space
for wheelchairs in rural transport.
 Major improvements were made regarding the fuel consumed.
All buses were replaced, and 53% of operations in terms of
kilometres are to be driven free of fossil fuels, for example,
using canola-based synthetic diesel or biogas.
 Road safety was strengthened, including requirements for
three-point seatbelts and alcohol interlocks in all buses.
 The budget was held.
In addition, the procurement process itself, from planning to
execution, was seen as a success among the principals. Almost
every respondent expressed satisfaction with the procurement, and
representatives of several municipalities and the regional cooper-
ation body felt that they had been included and involved in the
process in a very satisfying way.
For a network to function properly, some actor or a group of
actors must assume the role of metagovernor, and in the gover-
nance context of public transport studied here, in which various
steering cultures exist among the principals, the PTA, the agent, has
assumed this role. The county public transport authority (PTA) is
the organization responsible for conducting the procurement in
accordance with the principals’ wishes. A key to the success is how
the PTA acts towards the principals. The section will show how the
metagovernor has used these tools towards the principals, but in
different ways depending on the principals institutional variables/
steering cultural. The PTA’s key strategy in events connected with
the process is to approach and negotiate with the principals based
on their own premises.
I will describe the actions taken by the metagovernor by refer-
ring to the different metagovernance tools provided by Sørensen
and Torfing (2009); network design, network framing, network
management and network participation.
Network design is the actions taken to influence the scope,
character and procedures for the network. A network design is not
only important in the initial face when a network is formed, but
also involves subsequent adjustment to their institutional design
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). The current institutional framework in
the network was established in 2002 when the Regional coopera-
tion body was formed. Within the network the PTA had established
a technical working group in which the bureaucrats of the princi-
pals could attend. There was a political board connected to the PTA
in which15 politicians from the principals were elected (P.D. 14,
2000). However the formal procedures in the network were not
optimally used. Bureaucrats from some principals did not attend
the technical group and the political board was not a cohesive voice
that gave the PTA clear directions. At the end of 2002 the PTA hired
a new president. The new president managed to use the existing
formal institutional framework and adjust it to become more effi-
cient and functional, i.e. he made adjustments to the overall insti-
tutional design to the network. From the early 2000 to the end of
181
the 2008 the formal network was redesigned making the opera-
tional group that were deciding on the public transport much
tighter and more management efficient. The PTA suggested that the
political board should be smaller and consist of head politicians in
the county. The board shrunk from 15 board members to 5 in 2003,
a new chairman of the board was also appointed (P.D. 15, 2003). The
PTA also made clear that they would take an active role in emerging
local and regional transport, for those municipalities that wanted
this. “The PTA sets its service-ability and organization to the
owners’ disposal at the re-planning and procurement of e.g. school
bus services” was it stated in the 2003 annual report of the PTA (P.D.
15, 2003:1). The PTA also added an administrative unit to their
organization especially designed to focus on special transport (P.D.
15, 2003). This change, taking an active part in promoting an
integrated regional and local transport opened up a more flexible
relation between the PTA. The municipalities with a steering
culture similar to the pro-growth model have taken the opportu-
nity to use this option (P.D. 15, 2003). The PTA also clearly initiated
and declared several long term goals, for example they constructed
a 5 year market plan and initiated new solutions regarding fare
sales (P.D. 15, 2003). These were the main changes introduced
during the early years of 2000. The PTA took on an active role in the
network by initiating organizational changes and new forms of
collaborations.
The metagovernance tool network framing is referred to an
ongoing process aimed at shaping the arena for network interac-
tion through the use of indirect means such as the formulation of
the overall goal, the specification of the fiscal conditions and the
discursive storytelling that defines the joint mission of the network
(Sørensen & Torfing 2009:249). The focus on goal is evident in the
actions taken by the PTA. Their strategy was to get an early
agreement from the principals that everyone could agree on; in this
case the goal was that public transport should lead to increased
economic growth. The PTA took several actions to anchor the
overall goal that they believed would be the most sufficient way to
plan and structure the traffic. They had glanced at the county of
Skane and were impressed with the increased travel demands they
had. Also the country of Skane had increase economic growth as
their main public transport policy objective. In the county of Skane
they strived to achieve economic growth by constructing of
a cohesive functional public transport system using the central
towns as nodes. This was done by focusing on strong routes,
meaning that investments should be made on routes that had high
or increasing travel demands. New routs should be initiated, only if
the route had a potential 50% cost recovery (P.D. 16). “The thought
Skane has that the cost efficient lanes should support non-cost
efficient, resulting in that existing non-cost efficient lane has to
wait until they have become potential cost efficient” is very inter-
esting and should be able to work here to, stated the president of
the PTA in an interview (Interview K). The president of the PTA
decided to invite representatives from the county of Skane to meet
the principals and inform them on how they are thinking regarding
their strategies. This meeting was held before the operational work
with the procurement of 2008 had started (Interview K). The
meeting was seen with approval among the principals and they all
agreed that an increase of economic growth would be good. When
the overall agreement of the goal direction was done, the PTA
focused on operating this goal towards the principals in different
ways. For example if the PTA was discussing the regional cooper-
ation body they referred increased economic growth to regional
development and when they were discussing with the county
council they spoke about increasing travel demands within the
existing budget (Interview K). However it was important from the
PTA to keep the goal consistent, the PTA does not question whether
if some principals change their mind over time. “We took that on
182 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
board [the direction the principals set], but did not ask again”
stated the one bureaucrat at the PTA (Interview K). Instead the PTA
during the planning process of the procurement tried to operate
the goals in to suitable solutions that fit each principal.
How the PTA managed to tackle problems that have been
occurring during the last decades has also been central for the
successful outcome of the procurement in 2008. These actions will
example the use of the metagovernor tool network management. In
year 2004e2006 the public transport in the county were under-
going a large amount of problems, one being the largest storm in
the Swedish history had hit the county and innovative traffic
solutions were taken to tackle the non-functional railways, the
passengers went down with 2% year 2005. But the county also
suffered problems that were not caused by external effects. A large
procurement of regional busses that was implemented in 2001 was
to be extended for two more years. Part of the extension became
appealed to court by one of the operators. The case went so far as
the European commission (for a detail descriptions of the events
taken in the appealed procurement see, Hansson, 2010). Other
procurement problems were also challenging the county, one being
that a train operator went bankruptcy and new contracts were to be
arranged (P.D. 17, 2004). One example of how the PTA tackled the
large problems that occurred in 2004e2006 was to create “parallel
processes” in the sense that the PTA in 2005 appointed one
bureaucrat to exclusively work with the planning of the procure-
ment in 2008, while other personnel at the PTA had to manage the
existing procurement problems. In this way the work with the
procurement in 2008 could go one undisturbed (Interview K) “he
was totally decupled, and had nothing to do with the procurement
appeals. He lived his own life so to say and sat the foundation for
the procurement of 2008” described one of the interviewees
(Interview K).
According to the PTA the creation of a parallel process was
critically important in order to get the procurement in 2008 final-
ized and legitimated by the principals (Interview K). The other
“parallel process” was to manage the problems that had arisen
concerning the procurements that were appealed to court. This was
tackled by the PTA in a very strategic way. The PTA believe they had
a clear mandate from the principals to correct the mistakes made in
the procurement despite that they took several actions that were
not to the content of the European Commission, for example they
chose to not annul the existing contracts (Hansson, 2010). One way
to uphold the principals’ mandate was to make their decisions
transparent as the process went on. For example they reported
their actions to the political board, they described their actions in
their protocols, which were sent to the principals. The interven-
tions from the principals were very small. Several politicians and
bureaucrats that I have interviews didn’t recall much of the process
and state that it was a matter that the PTA handled this despite the
cost increase of 12% that followed (Hansson, 2010). In this
perspective the metagovernor, in form of the PTA also took on the
role to negotiate with the external parties (the Swedish national
government and the European commission) and released
presumptive tensions that could have arisen if the question was
more open in the network. The legal process came however to
a turning point in the fact that the Swedish national government
threatened to withdraw a large amount of the coming health
founding to the county if the PTA did not annul the contracts. In this
sharp moment of the process the PTA decided to not approach all
the principals, instead it was the county council and the largest of
the municipalities that got involved. Then when they had agreed on
what to do, the political board was summoned to support the
decision of annulling the contracts (Hansson, 2010). This is both an
example of tackling problems within the network, but also an
example of how the PTA approaches the principals that were most
affected by the outcome, in this case the two financial strongest
principals.
The other example of managing network in the sense of
reducing tension in the network concerns the discussion in the
county of emerging working regions. The geographic structure of
the county is that it is a long but narrow county with a coast line
covering one of the one long-sides. The county has three large
towns and they are all located along the coast line, one in the south,
one in the north and one in the middle of the county. There has
been a long conflict on weather how to direct the traffic between
these three cities; the middle town is arguing that the more rural
traffic should be directed towards their town while other principals
are arguing that the middle town should instead be linked towards
one or the other towns (either north or south). This is especially an
important issue for the Regional cooperation body that has an
outspoken aim to make two strong working regions instead of
three. Also several of the municipalities that have similar charac-
teristics as the well-fare state is affected because how the traffic
lines are drawn depend on if they will get regional traffic through
their municipalities. The approach the PTA took towards the prin-
cipals when working on the procurement of 2008 was to not focus
explicitly on the question on two or three working regions when
approaching the principals in larger groups, instead the PTA spoke
in terms of a cohesive transport system in the county and the
importance of first focusing on strong, cost efficient lanes
(Interview K). The idea of two working regions was supported by
the PTA, but they chose to not address it directly. They also
approach the municipality that belong to the middle town the same
way; arguing that a focus should first be on the cost efficient lanes
first but adding that this is just one step and if there are founding
left, we can discuss adding more lanes (Interview K). The munici-
palities that have the main cities have characteristics similar to the
pro growth model and the fact that showing cost increase related to
investments was something that worked for getting their approval,
this also included the municipality having the middle town.
The last metagovernance tool proposed by Sørensen and Torfing
(2009) are network participation. Network participation is when the
metagovernor becomes one among other network participants but
still retains a reflexive gaze on the governance network in order to
influence its operations and promote effective governance argue
Sørensen and Torfing (2009:251) As the examples above show, the
PTA has continually participated actively in influencing the policy
direction on public transport in the county. The participation has
been strategic, which the work with the procurement of 2008
shows (for a detailed review of the events taken see Hansson,
2011b). The PTA send out letters to all the principals stating that
they wanted an open dialogue concerning the procurement. The
PTA continued to coordinate the process by initiating individual
meetings with each principal. In these negotiations, the PTA
approached each principal from the principal’s point of view,
basing the negotiations on the particular characteristics of each
principal. For example, with the county council, which has a steer-
ing culture in line with the managerial model, the PTA focused its
discussion on fiscal aspects and not the actual content of the
procurement (Interview K). When the PTA negotiated with the
regional cooperation body, which displays characteristics of
corporate steering culture, the PTA participated in various steering
groups, deliberative meetings, etc. The PTA knew such participation
was important for the regional cooperation body. Since the prin-
cipals’ steering cultures differ from each other, different methods
were required to accommodate their demands. The PTA also took
an active role in alone summarizing the different principals
requirements into a proposal that was sent to the principals for
comments (P.D. 11, 2007). The PTA then evaluated the comments
and wrote a procurement proposal, the invitation to tender. In the
 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
Fig. 2. The governance of public transport when the PTA is taking on a meta-
governance role and are successfully tackling the hybrid steering cultures among the
principals.
comments there were strong demands from several principals that
the tender should strive to achieve high environmental standards.
The PTA needed to meet the requirement of high environmental
demands as well as keeping the procurement within the budget.
The PTA advised experts an managed to construct a “environmental
chart” that was focusing on adding points related to how much the
environmental standard was valued in money. By constructing this
chart it was possible to both be open for high environmental
standards without losing the control of cost increase (Interview K).
The process that followed, bid evaluation and contract signing, was
handled solely by the PTA. By participating actively in the process
and taking on the role of negotiation among the principals the PTA
manage to make a procurement that meet several needs that the
principals had set up. But this process, of achieving the success of
the procurement, was also a result of a long term participation and
taking an active part in the network. It was the combination of
reshaping the network design, framing the overall goal and making
the goal suitable for each principal as well as tackling problems
over time. The combination of metagovernance tools were central
to a successful outcome. When using the tools it was also important
that the PTA did not treat the principals as “a single purchaser”;
instead, the PTA has made the diversity of steering cultures
something positive. The PTA treated these disparate cultures as
forming a network in which each principal contributed to different
aspects of the procurement and, by both designing the process and
negotiating individually with each principal, the PTA managed to
combine the main objectives of each principal.
5. Conclusion: a successful steering model in the governance
of public transport
This paper has provided a theoretical framework that can be
used to capture the diversity of steering culture that exist in
a multi-principal setting. The framework has been used to struc-
ture, clarify, and summarize the actions and values (here called
steering cultures) found among the principals in a Swedish gover-
nance context. As stressed in the beginning of the paper gover-
nance structures are contextual (see also discussion in Macario’s
(2001) paper) and the actions taken in this case may not be
183
similar in other contexts. However the framework of Pierre (1999)
enables comparative studies, and may be productive when ana-
lysing public transport contexts in other countries besides Sweden.
Hybrid steering cultures are often argued to be problematic, as
they may allow governance gaps to occur. In this paper, the plan-
ning process for a public transport procurement was the basis of
the empirical analysis. Principals’ various views of steering are
forced to meet in such planning processes. The analysed case was
categorized as successful in terms of both the procurement process
and outcome, despite the hybrid of steering cultures. This success
was explained by the role the PTA (the agent) played in the process.
The PTA assumed a “metagovernor” role and managed both to
design the planning process and formulate a procurement that
satisfied the principals. The PTA’s strategy was long term and
involved negotiations separately with each principal, focusing on
the particular characteristics of each. For example, the county
council steering culture is in line with the managerial model, so in
meetings with the council, the PTA focused on fiscal considerations.
The presence of a metagovernor meant that the principals did
not have to agree on applying one type of steering method in
dealing with the PTA; instead, the principals are allowing the PTA to
assume a great role in the process. To treat the PTA as a meta-
governor calls into question the boundaries between agent and
principal. A more nuanced view is preferred in which the roles of
“principal” and “agent” are replaced, instead each organization is
being viewed as a contributing party in one governance context.
Formal regulations defining the PTA as a provider and the county
council and municipalities as purchasers do exist, but to under-
stand these parties’ actions, as shaped by the regulations, their roles
must be analysed in a more nuanced way, based on each principal’s
and each agent’s particular characteristics. For example the case
referred to in this paper the relationship between the principals
and the agent can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 2.
5.1. A short glance at the future governance of the Swedish public
transport
The classifications of steering cultures (Table 1 and Fig. 1) may
also be used as a basis for discussing various organizational and
institutional changes in the governance of public transport. Sweden
is currently undergoing reforms in which the PTA’s function is to be
organizationally and institutionally changed. The PTA will go from
being a public company to a department, directly connected with
either one principals or a joint organization of several principals
(SFS, 2010:1065). The regulators hope that this reform will increase
political involvement in the PTA, making politicians more active in
public transport governance (SOU, 2009:39). The findings
summarized in Fig. 1 in this paper can be used as a basis for dis-
cussing and evaluating the type of steering culture that will be
dominant depending on where the PTA is placed. The new law will
come into effect in January 2012, and in several counties the PTA
will become a department under the county council (Interview M).
This paper has demonstrated that the type of political involvement
found in the county council (i.e., the managerial model) is a very
passive one, steering at a distance, compared with, for example, the
political role found in type A municipalities (i.e., the pro-growth
model). A steering culture based on the managerial model is
unlikely to increase political involvement in the PTA as hoped for in
the reforms.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the Swedish Governmental
Agency for Innovation Systems e VINNOVA for funding this study.
The author would also like to thank the interviewees for their
184 L. Hansson / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 175e184
participation. The author is also thankful for the comments
received on the Thredbo 12 conference in Durban 2012 as well as
for the helpful comments received during the anonymous review
process of this paper.
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