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(1) ALFON V.

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980


Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte prayed that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

She was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital and she was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office
as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. She was also baptized using the same name. Her parents are
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. She has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector

The petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition: 1) She has been using the name
Estrella Alfon since her childhood; 2) She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same
name; 3) She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and
acquaintances know her by this name; 4) She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

The lower court ruled that the petition as the change of first name is granted but denied with respect to the

Article 364 of the Civil Code: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the

Whether or not the petitioner can change her name


Yes. There is ample justification to grant fully her petition to avoid confusion.

The word “principally” as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

Moreover, the Court in Haw Liong v. Republic considered the grant of petitioner to change of name when the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; when the request for
change is a consequence of a change of status , such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated;
and when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.
G.R. No. L-28742 April 30, 1982

Appellant, a resident of Pampanga and a contractor, entered into a sub-contract with appellee for the
construction of vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the Feati Bank building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. The
parties agreed that the same should be completed on or before June 5, 1967. The subcontract also contained a
stipulation that all actions arising out or relating to the contract "may" be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Naga City. Since appellee finished the construction only in June 20, 1967, appellant filed an action
against the former for recovery of consequential damages for the delay with the Court of First Instance of

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue contending that the case can only be filed
in Naga City as stipulated in their agreement. Appellant opposed the motion claiming that their agreement to
hold the venue in Naga City was merely optional. Upholding the appellee, the lower court dismissed the
complaint. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the stipulation of the parties as to venue is only permissive for
they did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga, and that
since the action was filed in the court where the plaintiff resides, the venue was properly laid.

Section 2(b) Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
Actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Whether or not the appellant can recover the consequential damages for the delay with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga.

Yes, It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party.
Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is
an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
(3) Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc vs. NTC
L-63318 August 18, 1984
Makasiar, J.


The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) applied for an increase of their Subscriber Investment Plan to
National Telecommunication Commission (NTC). The NTC approved the said application on a decision dated November
22, 1982 and the order dated January 14, 1983.

The petitioner, Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc. filed a petition praying that the said decision of NTC approving the
NTC approving the increased in SIP application of the PLDT be annulled and set aside on the ground that the NTC has no
jurisdiction over applications for increased in SIP because the NTC has not yet promulgated the pertinent rules and
regulations under PD 217.


SEC.2 PD 217


Whether or not the NTC has no jurisdiction over the application for increased in SIP schedule?


Yes, the NTC has jurisdiction.

Because under the PD 217, sec 2 provides that: “The Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, through its board of communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared
policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations

The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning
unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase “may be promulgated” should not be construed
to mean “shall” or “must.” It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of the
delegate – department or the Board of Communications then, not the NTC – Whether or not to promulgate pertinent rules
and regulations. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which commands that the phrase “may be promulgated” should be
construed as “shall be promulgated”. The NTC can function and has functioned without additional rules, aside from the
existing Public Service Law, as amended, and the existing rules already issued by the Public Service Commission, as well as
the 1978 rules issued by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC.

That what is patently mandatory on the ministry or National Telecommunications Commission is the immediate
implementation of the policies declared in PD no. 217. To repeat, the ministry or the NTC “shall see to it that the herein
declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented xxx”. The formulation of rules and regulations is
purely discretionary on the part of the delegate.

Gutierrez, J: Separate Opinion

Public Utilities:

My point is – increase rates and increased in the ‘subscribers’ ‘self-financing plan’ must be matched by equivalent
and demonstrably improved telephone services. More than its duty to increase rates and subscribers fees whenever
warranted, the respondent Commission has the statutory and greater obligation to supervise “the attainment of efficient
telephone service for as wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the subscribers”

I must stress, however, that consumers would not mind paying reasonable increases if they get satisfactory
services. The respondent telephone company has yet to solve this elementary and glaringly obvious problem. Pinpointing
the cause and applying the solution should be the company’s number one concern
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985

Private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from
November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. He was terminated by NHC for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds involving 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation.

He professed innocence of the criminal acts imputed against him contending "that he was dismissed based on
purely fabricated charges purposely to harass him because he stood as a witness in the theft case filed against
certain high officials of the respondent's establishment"

He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the
NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn
appealed to the SC.

Sec.11, Article XII-B of the Constitution
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including
every government owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil
service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the
full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.


Whether the employees of the National Housing Corporation are covered by the Labor Code or by laws and
regulations governing the civil service.

NHC employees are covered by the laws and regulations governing the civil service.

It is 100% government-owned corporation organized in accordance with Executive Order No. 399. It never had
any private stock holders. Thus, there should no longer be any question that the employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations are governed by civil service law and civil service rules and regulations.

Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution used the word “every” to modify the phrase “government owned or
controlled corporation”. “Every” means each one of a group without exception.
(5) Rura vs Lopena
G.R. Nos. L-69810-14, June 19, 1985


This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended), more specifically
Section 9 thereof which disqualifies from probation those persons:

(c) Who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.

Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different
dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried
and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen
(17) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15)

Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for
probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground Chat Rura is disqualified
for probation under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law quoted above. The court denied the application for
probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.


Section 9 of P.D. 968

(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonmnet of
not less than one month and one day/or a fine of not less that Two Hundred Pesos


Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation


There is no previous conviction by final judgment to speak of. The five (5) cases of Estafa were tried jointly and
there is only one decision rendered on the same date—August 18. 1983. It could not be presumed that
accused-petitioner had been convicted one after the other for the five cases of Estafa because the conviction in
these cases took place within the same day, August 18, 1983 by means of a Joint Decision, and not in a
separate decision.

Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a prior sentence or that there was already a decision
rendered which convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however, there is only one decision rendered on
the five (5) counts of Estafa which was promulgated on the same date. In other words the effects of conviction
does not retract to the date of the commission of the offense as the trial court held.

The statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission as contended by the
respondent judge who denied application for probation. The petition for probation is granted and the
respondent judge is directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for probation.
(6) Baranda vs. Gustilo
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
Gutierrez, J.

Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the rightful owners of a parcel of land located in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo.
However, the land was also claimed by Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao, who also presented a TCT over
the said land. The court however, declared the TCT possessed by the latter null and void for it was fraudulently acquired,
and declared the TCT of Baranda and Hitalia, valid and subsisting. A writ of possession and demolition was issued
Several motions were filed which were all dismissed until the group of Gotera filed G.R. No. 62042 before the
Supreme Court, but it was also denied with finality. Thus, the group of Baranda, filed G.R. No. 64432 before the
Intermediate Appellate Court, contending that the writs of possession and demolition issued before should now be
implemented. The petition was granted and the decisions in the preceding cases was reiterated. Furthermore, the Acting
Register of Deeds of Iloilo was ordered to register the TCT possessed by Baranda and Hitalia.
Subsequently, another civil case was filed, this time by the Providos, which was raised by the Acting Register of
Deeds of Iloilo as the reason for the annotation of lis pendens on the new TCTs issued to Baranda. The petitioners moved
the annotation be cancelled but it was denied.
The petitioners thus, filed the instant petition against the trial court Judge and the acting register of deeds. They
contended that the pending civil case was just a way to delay the implementation of the decisions in GR No. 62042 and
64432, and that the respondents erred in considering such as a valid reason for annotating lis pendens.

LAW IN QUESTION: Section 10 of PD 1529

ISSUE: WON the acting register of deeds erred in annotating lis pendens, in view of a pending case, in the new TCTs and
the judge erred in upholding such contention

Yes. The facts show that the Providos were not new parties to the present issues for they were originally named in
the fraudulent TCT. Thus, it is clear that the “pending case” was for delaying the implementation of the decisions in GR No.
62042 and 64432. Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of
Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals.
It was found that the said case was originally dismissed by him which prompted the Providos filing an appeal to the CA,
thus, the pending case.
Regarding the duty of the Acting Register of Deeds, it is ministerial in nature. Section 10 of PD 1529 made use of
the word “shall” which means “ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory”.
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what it says.
Section 10, states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... .
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest thru the Register of Deeds."
The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of
the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed or
other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration.

NOTE (Baka matanong):

Lis pendens - literally means a pending suit. It is a written notice that a lawsuit has been filed concerning real estate,
involving either the title to the property or a claimed ownership interest in it.

G.R. No. L-4712 July 11, 1952


Plaintiff, Ramon Diokno is a holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness amounting to 75, 857.14 issued under RA
304. He had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) of which 47, 355.28 was still unpaid.

He sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan. The defendant
resisted the suit on the ground that plaintiffs' demand is not only not authorized by section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but
contrary to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtain on January 27, 1950, much after the
passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only "acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not
the repayment of loans.


Sec.2 of RA 302

…That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject
to the availability of loanable funds, and any provision of the their charters, articles of incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years
such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the
building or construction of the residential house of the payee of said certificate: . . .


Whether or not RFC is mandated to accept the backpay certificate as repayment of loan


No. RFC has the discretion to accept the back pay certificate as imposed in the modifiers provided in Sec.2 of RA 302
stating that the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable
funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are
“available loanable funds.”

It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be
construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

The acceptance and discount to back pay certificates has been placed within the sound discretion of the rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, and subject to the availability of loanable funds, and said discretion may not be reviewed or
controlled by the Court. It is clear that this remedy must be available in other quarters, not in the courts of justice.
(8) Manikad vs. Tanodbayan (Feb. 20, 1984)

FACTS: Sometime in November, 1982, the respondents who are both members of the EPZA Police
Force in Bataan, filed a complaint with the deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, respondent Benjamin T.
Vianzon, charging the petitioners, who are a director and members, of the EPZA Police Force, with the
crimes of smuggling, qualified theft, violations of the Anti-Graft Law, as well as the Anti-Fencing Law.
On the date scheduled for the preliminary investigation of the complaint, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss advancing as grounds therefor that Tanodbayan Prosecutor Vianzon had no authority to
conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation. Petitioners submit that respondent Fiscal
Vianzon acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in having assumed
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents Santos and Yambao, arguing in support thereof
that the power to investigate complaints of this nature is lodged exclusively upon the EPZA under
Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A.
LAW IN QUESTION: Section 7 of PD 1716-A
ISSUE: Whether the power vested by Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1716-A on the EPZA is
exclusive in character as to prohibit the Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary
investigation on a complaint against the director and members of the EPZA Police Force for offenses
committed within said zone.

HELD: A mere cursory reading of the legal provision relied upon by petitioners shows their
submission to be devoid of merit. Said Section 7 provides:
"The EPZA, in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones and areas
owned or administered by the authority, shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints
relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones and areas owned and administered by
the Authority, and when the evidence warrants, to file and be deputized herein to prosecute the
corresponding criminal cases before the appropriate court or body."

Indubitably, the aforecited provision empowers the EPZA not only to exercise police authority,
including the conduct of ordinary police operations such as the maintenance of peace and order,
enforcement of the law, prevention and detection of crimes and apprehending of criminals, but also,
as an incident to its police authority, to perform such functions as are usually assigned to the
prosecution service. Thus, it has been empowered to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violations of penal laws committed inside the zones and areas owned and be deputized under said
presidential decree to prosecute the corresponding criminal cases before the appropriate court or
It bears emphasis, however, that there is nothing in the context of said Section 7 to even intimate that
the latter functions are to be exercised in an exclusive manner. While the adjective "sole" was used in
conjunction with "police authority", no similar term or synonym was employed to describe the other
powers vested by Section 7 on the EPZA. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a meaning
that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
G.R. No. L-34428 December 29, 1930

Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the poblacion
of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a
decision to that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims to be the owner of the land, but he was not
advised to the registration proceedings and was not informed thereof until the early part of the month of
September, 1930. He thereupon filed a motion on September 18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
for the reconsideration of the decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may still be
pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought the present action praying that the
aforesaid decision be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with section 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

Section 38 of Land Registration Act
…however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree Land
Registration a petition for a review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest."

Whether or not the appellant can file a review under section 38 of the Land Registration Act

No, there can no be no review until the final decree has been issued. This indication is only obiter dictum and
was not voted upon by the court; the determination of the case rested on other grounds and the dictum was
not taken into consideration by the court as a whole. A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the
force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.

The plaintiff's view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous. This
court had no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and
such remedies are not lacking in the present case.
(11) Javellana vs. Kintanar
G.R.No. L-33169 July 30, 1982
Abad Santos, J.


Petitioner, Glicerio Javellana is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago City,
Negros Occidental. It consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls all leased to vendors. The
market have served for more than 20 years the City of Bago and its adjacent municipalities, with a Mayor’s
permit up to second quarter of 1968.

Then, the City Treasurer refused to accept the payment for municipal license of Javellana for the third
quarter on the ground that, Ordinance 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or
operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, association or corporation other than the
city government of Bago.

This prompted Javellana and several stallholders to file a petition contending that the said market was
not a “public market” because the building and lot where it was constructed is privately owned.


Whether or not the said market is not a public market and therefore is not covered by Ordinance 150.


Yes, it is a “Public Market” and must be, therefore subjects to the provision of Ordinance 150.

The Court agrees with the Trial Court that the test of a “public market” is its dedication to the service of
the general public and not its ownership. Thus this Court has had occasion to state: “Petitioners allege
that the Aranque Market Extension is not a public market within the meaning of all laws ordinances, orders and
regulations governing public markets because said market stands on private property and its building was
erected with private funds. This contention is not well within. A market is “public market” when it is dedicated
to the service of the general public and is operated under government control and supervision as a public
utility, whether it is owned by the government or any instrumentality thereof or by any private individual” (Vda.
De Salgado vs De la Fuente, 87 Phil. 343)

Also a scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market is meant one that is
intended to serve the public in general. This is the only conclusion which can be drawn when it used the word
“public” to modify the word “market” for if the meaning sought to be conveyed is the ownership thereof then
the phrase “by any city” will serve no useful purpose.

The Court hold that Javellana’s , market falls within the scope of Ordinance No. 150 and the trial court
committed no error in so holding and in dismissing the petition.

That words and phrases having a technical meaning are construed according to their technical sense,
unless it is apparent that a different meaning was intended by the legislature. (82 C.J.S. Statutes 330)
(12) Aparri vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984
Makasiar, J.:

A petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals (now Intermediate
Appellate Court under BP 129, for affirming the decision of RTC. The events prior to this is that: On the 15 th of
January 1960, the private respondents (members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160, approved June 18, 1954
— NARRA) had approved the resolution no. 13, series of 1960 which appoints Mr. Bruno O. Aparri as the
general manager of NARRA which shall take effect on January 16, 1960. And the president thereafter shall be
informed of the appointment. He (Aparri) was appointed by Remedies O. Fortich with her capacity as the
chairman of NARRA.
The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general manager is provided
for in paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160 (approved June 18, 1954). Now there was a resolution no.
24 which includes the petitioner’s fixed term (until March 31, 1962) which he prays to annul and allow him to
continue in office until he vacates the position of General Manager in accordance to law and pay him P95,000
for actual damages plus costs.
NARRA ‘s powers had been transferred to Act No. 3844 also known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, and due to this the case had become academic and to be dismissed for that reason.
Several attempts of the petitioner for reconsideration and petition for certiorari were denied for
lack of merit.

Whether or not the petitioner’s term should be ended in accordance with Resolution No. 24,
Series of 1962

Yes, In the light of the foregoing facts, it is evident that Bruno O. Aparri accepted the position of
General Manager without fixed term and his appointment is, in essence, terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing power which, in this case, is the Board of Directors.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the
purview of statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination . In the
case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of
Directors subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the
term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the
words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature
must be determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term. Rather, his
right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to hold such office.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986


Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.

The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official

In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil
code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.


Article 2 of the Civil Code

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.


Whether or not all laws shall be published


Yes. SC hold that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended.
CASE #14
TOPIC: Meaning of Language: Associated Words
Maxim: Noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates) - the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word should
be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the context.

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966


In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”,
which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station
will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to
the Post master General which enclosed a copy of the contest rules and tried to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex’s request stating that the
contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Caltex’s request
for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the
contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his
view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as “Gift
Enterprise”, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE: WON Caltex promo violates Anti-lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a lottery that may be
administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law nor does it transgress any of its provisions. A
lottery or gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize,
chance and consideration; and, there being no consideration derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance with regards to this contest means it is not one.
It is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included.
(15)San Miguel Corp vs. NLRC (May 31, 1988)

Facts: Petitioner sponsored an Innovation Program and under which, the management undertook to grant
cash awards to "all SMC employees ... except [ED-HO staff, Division Managers and higher-ranked personnel"
who submit to the Corporation Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation.

The private respondent Rustico Vega submitted an innovation proposal, which was entitled "Modified Grande
Pasteurization Process." He at that time had been in the employ of petitioner for 13 years and was then holding
the position of mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery. Petitioner, however, did not
find the aforequoted proposal acceptable and consequently refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a
cash award under the Innovation Program.

On 22 February 1983, a Complaint was filed against petitioner on the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Private respondent alleged that his proposal "[had] been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented
by the Corporation [in] October 1980," and that the same "ultimately and finally solved the problem of the
Corporation in the production of Beer Grande" and thus claimed the entitled cash prize of P60,000.00 (the
maximum award per proposal offered under the Innovation Program).

In the Petition for certiorari filed, petitioner is invoking Article 217 of the Labor Code, seeks to annul the
Decision of public respondent Commission in Case No. RAB-VII-01 70-83 upon the ground that the Labor
Arbiter and the Commission have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the Commission have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

Held: No. While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that
the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should be
read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 related to unfair labor
practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4
(claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5
(relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to employers).

It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer
to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other
words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of
paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. The Court reach the
above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended by B.P. Blg. 227,
and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer employee relations," which clause was not
expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money
claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and
which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the
legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an
exclusive basis. The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the money claims of workers" referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-
employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money
claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
Applying the foregoing reading to the present case, it can be noted that petitioner's Innovation Program is an
employee incentive scheme offered and open only to employees of petitioner Corporation, more specifically to
employees below the rank of manager. Without the existing employer-employee relationship between the
parties here, there would have been no occasion to consider the petitioner's Innovation Program or the
submission by Mr. Vega of his proposal concerning beer grande; without that relationship, private respondent
Vega's suit against petitioner Corporation would never have arisen. The money claims of private respondent
Vega in this case, therefore, arose out of or in connection with his employment relationship with petitioner.

GR No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting
the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to establishment for the operation of
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that both violated P.D. 1869, permitting the
operation of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR.

Petitioners contend that pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to
prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid exercise of police power.

No. The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general. Ordinances should not contravene a statute because local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred to them by Congress.
(17) Mutuc vs Commission on Election
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
Fernando, J.


Petitioner, Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy
was given due course by then respondent, Commission on Election (COMELEC) but he was prohibited from
playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because it was a violation of COMELEC’s Ban stated in its
resolution in which:

“To purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foregin origin”

The COMELEC said that the jingle proposed to be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a
singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material because it falls under “and the like’s” category and was
justified that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, RA 6132 stated
above. That the jingle proposed to be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material.


Whether or not the COMELEC contention to ban the jingle is valid


No, by virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class
as those specifically referred to.

The COMELEC contended that the ban makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda
gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”

The Supreme Court did not agree. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the said law
violated by Mutuc was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. It does not include campaign jingles for they
are not gadgets as contemplated by the law

That the Commission fail to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should
be interpreted to assure its beings in consonance with any constitutional command or prescription. The
Constitution prohibits an abridgement of free speech or free press. It has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in
effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.

(18) Vera vs. Cuevas
G.R. No. L-33693-94,May 31, 1979


Plaintiffs, private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines
Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk
Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the
brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is
a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of
local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

The plaintiffs pray for an for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation
to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.

The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now
petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with
said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order.

Sec. 169 Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in
whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which
such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
year of age”


Whether or not the product of filled milk is within the scope of the said tax code.


Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying
terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular
terms they follow in the statute.

The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty
part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to
skimmed milk and filled milk.
CASE #19
TOPIC: Meaning of language: Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis-When applicable
Maxim: Ejusdem Generis (Of the same kind) - Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then
refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically

G.R. No. L-41315 November 13, 1986

Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with
petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual
commitments, Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other
petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to Yap who continued to ignore these demands
letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights and issued the required 90-day written notice to
terminate their contract.
Yap filed a complaint in the trial court for preliminary injunction against shell and questioned the
validity of the exercise by petitioner of its contractual right to terminate the contract. However, barely less than
a month from the filing of his complaint, Yap again filed with OIC raising the same issues. Without affording
the petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the matter, respondent OIC issued a preliminary mandatory
injunction commanding petitioner to perform the following acts: to continue selling to respondent Yap
petroleum products and to submit a statement of the unpaid accounts of respondent Yap.
Shell filed with the trial court to collect from Yap his long overdue debts. Despite the pendency of the
controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a
decision stating it has jurisdiction over the issue and reiterated their earlier decisions.

ISSUE: WON OIC has the jurisdiction over the cases.

No. It is a well settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act (RA
6173) will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and
decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.
A contrary interpretation would collide with the familiar principles of statutory construction that, in
making a detailed enumeration, the law-making body intended to accomplish a purpose and that the all-
embracing and general word "jurisdiction" must be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory (not judicial)
Thus, the Supreme Court declared all decisions made by OIC in this case, null and void.
(20) Republic vs. Migrino

G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990


The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as
amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged
that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the
alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means
while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his
being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.


Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate private respondents.


No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and authorizing it to
investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active
service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as “ejusdem generis” the term “subordinate” as
used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in
E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly,
this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

(21) THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO
G.R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909

Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: "An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and
transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this
Act." Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger,
kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in possession of persons
who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act." library
The amended complaint in this case is as follows:
"The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No. 1780, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo
Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had in his possession and concealed about his person a deadly
weapon, to wit: One (1) iron bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end and a string
on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly
weapon. "With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine Commission."

Whether or not the accused should be charged in violation of Act No. 1780.

No, the court held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the person would not be a violation of this
Act. The rule of construction above referred to be resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the
intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and
such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would reached by application of the rule of
ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in the view of
the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it
manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
The phrase "or other deadly weapon" in Act No. 1780, an Act prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons, includes arms which are of a different class from those particularly specified in the law.

(22) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs Social Security Commission
January 20, 1961
Gutierrez, J.


The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that
“Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,” be exempted from
compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, the Social Security Law of 1954.

The Appellant, invoking the Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis, contends that the term “employer as defined
in R.A. No. 1161 should be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of
profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the
definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking.”


Whether or not the Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis can be applied?


No, the Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is not applicable in this case.

The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of
persons or things, the general words, will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same
general nature of class as those enumerated, unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown.

The Par C Sec 8 of the Social Security Law defines the term “employer” as “any person, natural or
juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking,
or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the
employment, except the Government, and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government.”

That from the legal provision stated above, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is
predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and
extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.

In this case, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply to the definition of the term “employer” in the
Social Security Law. That definition is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable
institutions or entities, not organized for profit and it is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included, and certainly, had the Legislature really
intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an
“employer” in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.
(23) Colgate-Palmolive Philippine, Inc. vs. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1961


The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. Several times, it imported from abroad
various materials (irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium
phosphate) used as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as
amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.

The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in
the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that
"foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into
the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon
satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven

The Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the total sum of
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used to import. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for
the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste
stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.


Whether or not the imported items of the petitioner are exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by R.A.
No. 601 (Tax Exchange Law).


Yes, The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials
actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language
will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose."
The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is
preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

It cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the
principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we

Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the
manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in
their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular
recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely
as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.

(24) Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals

Facts: A shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs, declared in the name of the private respondent Eusebio Dichoco. arrived
on December 16, 1970 at the Port of Manila. The shipment was covered by a "Customs No-Dollar Declaration", dated
December 15, 1970. Against this shipment the Collector of Customs of Manila issued, on December 28, 1970, a warrant of
seizure and detention for violation of Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 247, 289, 294, and 295 and section 102 (k) of the said Code. On the same date, private respondent requested the
release of the shipment upon the posting of a cash bond, but, was denied by the Commissioner of Customs. However, the
proper taxes and duties were imposed on the shipment and paid by private Respondent. After hearing, the Collector of
Customs issued his decision decreeing the seizure and forfeiture of the shipment "for the simple reason that claimants
failed to comply with the regulations, that is, with the Central Bank circulars requiring the production of release certificates
for importations similar to the subject articles." On appeal, the Commissioner of Customs affirmed the decision on January
21, 1971.

The private respondent filed a "petition for review, with a motion for release of goods under bond,” which the respondent
court granted the motion to release the goods subject to the condition that a cash bond in the sum of P43,854.59 be filed
by private respondent with the Bureau of Customs. After that respondent Court issued an order, directing petitioner to
release the shipment. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration upon the ground that the importation in question,
classified as non-essential consumer goods, is banned by Central Bank Circulars No. 289, dated February 21, 1970, No. 294
of March 10, 1970, and No. 295 of March 20, 1970, and "acquired the status of prohibited importation or importation
contrary to law" and cannot be released under bond. Respondent court in its resolution dated March 8, 1971, granted the
motion for reconsideration, declaring that "Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that articles the
importation of which is prohibited by law cannot be released under bond" and set aside its resolutions of February 3 and
February 9, 1971. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent court’s resolution of March 8, 1971,
and said court, in its resolution of March 24, 1971, reversed its resolution of March 8, 1971 and reinstated the resolution of
February 3, 1971, ordering the immediate release of the foodstuffs.

On April 22, 1971 petitioner filed an "Urgent omnibus Motion and Manifestation", praying the respondent Court to
reconsider and set aside its order of March 24 and April 19, 1971 and reinstate its order of March 8, 1971; that the case be
immediately set for hearing on the merits; and to excuse him from complying with the order of April 19, 1971. Respondent
court denied the omnibus motion in its order dated April 27, 1971. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the importation in question is a prohibited importation under Section 102 (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code.

Held: The importation in question is a prohibited importation under Section 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code which
provides, in part, as follows:
"SEC 102. Prohibited Importations. — The importation into the Philippines of the following articles is prohibited: k. All
other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law."
Respondents contend that this last paragraph must, by application of the principles of ejusdem generis, be restricted only
to those articles the importation of which is "absolutely prohibited," or to contraband. This contention is not acceptable. In
the first place, the specific things enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (j), inclusive, of Section 102 have no distinguishable
common characteristics and they differ greatly from one another, and the rule of ejusdem generis "applies only where the
specific words preceding the general expression are of the same nature. Where they are of different genera, the meaning
of the general word remains unaffected by its connection with them."

Moreover, calling contraband only the things "absolutely prohibited by law" is a misnomer, for contraband means any
article the importation or exportation of which is prohibited by law.

Section 102, when examined, shows that it prohibits the importation of two categories of articles, namely those which are
absolutely prohibited, for example, those enumerated in paragraphs b, c, d, f, h, and j, and those articles which are
qualifiedly prohibited, that is, those that may be imported subject to certain conditions or limitations. Accordingly, the
general provision in paragraph k, to wit: "all other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law" cannot be so
restricted as to comprise only those articles the importation of which is absolutely prohibited like explosives. Articles of
prohibited importation cover not only absolutely prohibited articles but also qualifiedly prohibited articles. Paragraph (k) is
comprehensive in the sense that it prohibits the importation of all articles not mentioned in the preceding provision but
prohibited by other existing statutes. The legal effects of the importation of qualifiedly prohibited articles are the same as
those of absolutely prohibited articles.

The laws which prohibit importation mentioned in Section 102 (k) include the pertinent Central Bank Circulars which have
the force and effect of laws. "Customs law" includes not only the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code but also all
other laws and any regulation made pursuant thereto that is subject to enforcement by the Bureau of Customs or
otherwise subject to its jurisdiction (Sec. 3514 of Tariff and Customs Code) and articles imported in violation of Central
Bank Circulars have the status of "merchandize of prohibited importation". It cannot be gainsaid that the importation in
question violated Central Bank Circulars, inasmuch as in the words of petitioner Commissioner of Customs in its decision
of January 21, 1971, "it was established thru the admission of claimant (Dichoco) that the necessary release certificate in
connection with his importation was not secured from the Central Bank. In view thereof, the collector after instituting the
necessary seizure proceedings forfeited the 438 packages of foodstuffs for alleged violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos.
247, 289, 294 and 295 in relation to Section 2530 (f) and Section 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code." 4 If the
importation in question was made contrary to Central Bank circulars, then said importation is an importation prohibited by
law. That importation, even if it be termed "importation effected contrary to law", as respondents call it, is nonetheless a
"prohibited importation."
CASE #25
TOPIC: Meaning of language: Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis-When not applicable

G.R. No. 78413 November 8, 1989

La Tondeña, Inc. (LTI) registered with the Philippine Patent Office the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has
been using for its gin popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel". On November 10, 1981, LTI filed in the Court
of First Instance of Isabela for injunction and damages, against Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. for using the
said bottles by filling the same with Cagayan's liquor product bearing the label "Sonny Boy" for commercial
sale and distribution, without LTI's written consent. On November 16, 1981, the court a quo issued a temporary
restraining order against Cagayan and its officers and employees from using the patented bottles.
Cagayan contented that LTI has no cause of action because it failed to comply with the requirement of
giving notice that its aforesaid marks are registered by displaying and printing the words "Registered in the
Phil. Patent Office" or "Reg Phil. Pat. Off.,". It further contended that LTI is not entitled to any protection under
Republic Act No. 623, because its products, consisting of hard liquor, are not among those listed therein. What
is protected under said law are beverages like Coca-cola, Royal Tru-Orange, Lem-o-Lime and similar beverages
which the bottles bear the words "Reg Phil. Pat. Off.;"
After trials, the court ruled in favor of LTI. Cagayan appealed in the CA but likewise, denied. Thus, the
present petition.

ISSUE: WON LTI’s products are covered by the provisions of RA 623.

Yes. The title of the law itself, which reads "An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked
Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers" clearly shows the legislative intent to
give protection to all marked bottles and containers of all lawful beverages regardless of the nature of their
contents. The words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general sense, referring to all beverages not
prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although regulated, is not
prohibited by law, hence it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623.
The proposition that Republic Act No. 623, as amended, protects only the containers of the soft drinks
enumerated by petitioner and those similar thereto, is unwarranted and specious. The rule of ejusdem generis
cannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is
to be resorted to only in determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent
clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result
which would be reached by the appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and Cagayan was fined for 1,000 pesos for contempt having
arisen from the act of Cagayan in violating the writ of preliminary injunction of the lower court prohibiting the
further use of the bottles.