Holographic Wills

1. Roxas v. De Jesus

Petitioner​: IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA
ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS

Respondent​: ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.

Summary​: The testatrix made a holographic will which is questioned because she did not put the
MONTH, DAY AND YEAR when she signed it. Instead, she only wrote FEB./61 as the date.

Facts:

· ​On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator in Special Proceeding No.
81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus."

· ​After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a
document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

· ​Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Will on July 21, 1973.

· ​On said proceeding, Simeon Roxas testified that he found a notebook belonging to testatrix and that on
pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed
in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found.

· ​The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "​This is my win which I want to be respected although it is not
written by a lawyer. ...

· ​This testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro and Manuel, children of the deceased.

· ​Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature. They testified that
she understood English and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by
their mother.

· ​Luz Roxas de Jesus Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with
law because it did not follow the requirement of Article 810, to state the month, day and year.

Issue​:

· Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased is a valid
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Ruling:

Yes.​ The will is valid and may be probated.

· ​The Supreme Court allows for the liberal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due
execution of Wills.

· ​The reason behind the liberal interpretation of the Civil Code in relation to Wills is, in case of doubt, to
prevent intestacy.

· The object of the law is giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator.

· ​The prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege.

· ​If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.

· ​Purpose of solemnities in the execution of Wills:

· ​The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...

· ​Purpose of a complete date (Month, Day, Year):

· ​Complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed
on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed in the
case of Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720.

· ​Here, there is no such contingency.

· ​General Rule:
· ​The "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution.

· ​Exception:
· ​When there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of
the Will is established; and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic
Will should be allowed under the ​principle of substantial compliance​.

2. Labrador v. CA
G.R. Nos. 83843-44
PETITIONERS​: SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA
LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR

DEFENDANTS​:​ COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR

DOCTRINE: The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will.
The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator, which
means that a (holographic) will must be written and signed by the testator himself, as required under
Article 810 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
- On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where
he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 and the following
heirs, namely: ​Sagrado​, ​Enrica​, ​Cristobal​, ​Jesus​, ​Gaudencio​, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita
Labrador, and a holographic will.

- On July 28, 1975, Sagrado, (substituted by his heirs), Enrica and Cristobal Labrador, filed a
petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

- Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, ​Jesus (substituted by his heirs), ​and Gaudencio Labrador
filed an opposition to the petition ​on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging that on September 30, 1971, before Melecio's death, for the
consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916

- In 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.

- Sagrado filed an action on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for
the annulment of said purported (1971) Deed of Absolute Sale, over that land in Melecio’s will,
which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio under the
holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, and that the said Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

- The ​Trial court rendered a decision on February 28, 1985, ​allowing the probate of the holographic
will ​AND ​declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale​. The court also directed the
respondents Jesus and Gaudencio to reimburse to the petitioners (Sagrado etc) the sum of
P5,000.00 representing the redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner
Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was redeemed by him from
Navat.

- Respondents appealed the decision to the ​Court of Appeals​, which on March 10, 1988 ​modified
said decision of the trial court ​by denying the allowance of the pro​bate of the will because said will
was undated ​AND reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration but was Denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the holographic will of Melecio Labrador was dated, in accordance with and as required by
Article 810 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
YES, it is dated

- The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.
It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning
the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of ​March,
17th day,​ in ​the year 1968,​ and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR,
their father…

- The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will.
The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of
the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.

- Respondents are ​INCORRECT in claiming that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was
when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves
about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond,"
and was not the date of execution of the holographic will. And allegedly, the will is more
of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of
other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was allegedly a failure to comply with
Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate,
to take effect after his death."

- The intention to show ​17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will ​is ​plain from
the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. The will was not an agreement
but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was
a will.

- The act of partitioning and the declaration of properties, that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision is to be followed after his death, reveal that Melecio
Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the
character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

3. Ajero v. CA

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO vs.CA and CLEMENTE SAND

Facts: The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for allowance of decedent's holographic
will and alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s body nor the
signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting and the will contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent and the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and
undue influence.

The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house
and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed
by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
The Court of Appeal found that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code. "The holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity."

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated.It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complied with.

Ruling:​ YES.

It is proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The separation and distinction
adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and
not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some
of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.

Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself.

The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. Moreover, the list enumerated
in Article 839 of the New Civil Code is exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
Kalaw v. Relova

Facts:

· ​On Spetember 1, 1971, Private respondent Gregorio k. Kalaw, claiming to be the sole
heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw
·​ ​Gregorio filed a petition for Probate the holographic will at CFI Batangas.
·​ ​The holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
· ​The Holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of testatrix as sole
heir.
· ​On November 10, 1971 petitioner Rosa Kalaw opposed the probate alleging, in
substance, ​that the holographic will contained alteration, corrections, and insertions
without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
ART. 814.
· ​Rosa’s position was that the holographic will as first written, should be given effect
and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
· ​CFI denied the probate for the reason of lack of authentication as required by ART
814 of the NCC

Issue:
· ​WON original unaltered text after subsequent alteration and insertions were avoided
due to lack of authentication by full signature? – YES

Held:
· ​Originaly when a number of erasures, correction and interlineation made by the
testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole but at most only as respects the particular words
eraed, corrected or interlined.
· ​However, when in case, the holographic will in disputed had only one substantial
provision which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration didn’t carry the requisite of full authentication by full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoke for the simple
reason that nothing remains In the will after that which could remain valid. To state
that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature.

4. Gan v. Yap

Parties​: TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN,

petitioner-appellant, vs ILDEFONSO YAP

Doctrine​:
The execution and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed.
Facts​:
· Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

· Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any
will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

· Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina
Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez.

· The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence.

· The trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed
such holographic will.

Issue:

May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

Held​:

No.

Ratio​:

In the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated,
they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof
of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be
— in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it
shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar
with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents
of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have
seen and/or read such will.

Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this opinion as a Rule
of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of
this controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the
sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.

Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either complying with the
will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. Such purpose is frustrated when the
document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because
anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage,
and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right which they should not be
denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.

5. Rodelas v. Aranza

Doctrine: ​“The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.”

Facts:
1.) On January 11, 1977, Marcela filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary.
2.) It was opposed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and
Ephraim Bonilla stating that
a. ​The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise It would produce no effect, as held in Gan v. Yap, 104Phil. 509.
3.) Bonillas moved for consolidation of cases for opposition of will and was granted by court and alleged
that
a. The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
Ricardo B. Bonilla.
b. ​Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills.
4.) Opposition of Bonillas were again denied by Court.
5.) Again Bonillas filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by court and Reversed its decision
dismissing the probate proceedings of will stating that once the original copy of the holographic will is
lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
6.) Rodelas filed motion for reconsideration but was denied hence she filed an appeal with CA.

ISSUE: ​WON a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.

HELD: YES

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary
that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten
will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison
can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

In the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased maybe exhibited and tested
before the probate court.” Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will
may be used

6. Azaola v. Singson

PARTIES:
Federico Azaola - petitioner
Francisco Azaola-Witness
Cesario Singsong - oppositor
Fortunata S.Vda. De Yance - testatrix

Doctrine: ​art. 811 requiring 3 witnesses in the probate of a contested holographic will is merely directive
and not mandatory.

FACTS:
​ Fortunata Yance died in her house on sept. 9, 1957.
​ Francisco Azaola submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Azaola was made the sole heir of
the deceased.
​ the probate of the will was contested on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence,
that the document was not intended to be the will of the deceased.
​ in this case, the proponent of the will only presented once witness to prove that the body of and the
signature in the will was that of testator.
​ probate was denied on the ground that under art.811 of the civil code, the proponent must present 3
witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix.
​ proponent argued that they are not bound to produce more than 1 witness because the will's
authenticity was not questioned and art.811 does not mandatorily require production of 3 witnesses.

ISSUE: ​WON the 3 witness rule is mandatory and applicable in this case. ​NO

HELD:
​ art. 811 requiring 3 witnesses in the probate of a contested holographic will is merely directive and not
mandatory.
​ SC ruled that petitioner is not bound to produce more than 1 witness as the authenticity of the will is not
in question.
​ also, even if the genuiness of the will is contested, art.811 shouldnot be interpreted to require the
compulsary presentation of the 3 witnesses.
Reasons:
1. In holographic wills, no witness is required in the execution thereof, thus the existence of the witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
2. The law itself contemplates a situation where no competent witness can be produced thus allowing the
court to resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

​ the option to require expert evidence depends on the discretion of the court. If the court is convinced by
the testimony of the witness, it may no longer ask for expert evidence. However, if there is no
competent witness or if those produced were not convincing, the court may accordingly call for expert
evidence.
​ thus, case is remanded to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence including expert testimony.

7. Codoy v. Calugay

Parties:

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners

EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

Doctrine:

Facts:

· Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic
will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 18, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased.

· In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and
disposing mind when she executed the will, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.

· Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging
that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a
third hand of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the
holographic will.

· Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition
is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates
and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.

· Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of
presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal.
RTC​ - denied probate
CA - sustained authenticity of the will; allowed probate and disregarded the requirement of three
witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the
requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the provisions of 811 are permissive or mandatory? - Mandatory

2. Whether or not the witnesses presented by the respondent sufficiently established the authenticity of
the deceased's holographic will? – NO

Ruling:

1. Mandatory.

· ​
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The
word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the
word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory.

· Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to
prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil
to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator.

· So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of
the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the
true intent of the testator.

2. No

· In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will.

· However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that
the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

· The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who
kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will
was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.
· There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased
with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was
during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

· A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared
with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not
readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

· Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated
June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be
certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

D. Rules on Conflict of laws

1. Dela Serna v. Potot

Parties​: Paula De la Cerna – Petitioners

Manuela Rebeca Potot & CA – Respondents

Doctrine:

Where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon the death of the husband said will was admitted
to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife dies later, it is held that said first
decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife,
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the
estate of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir,
unless some other valid will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentary heir is the
only heir of said wife.

Facts​:

• Spouses, Bernabe De La Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby
they willed that their 2 parcel of land acquired during their marriage shall be given to Manuela their niece
who they took care as a child.

• Manuela (the niece and beneficiary of the Spouses Dela Serna) married Nicolas Potot.

• Bernabe De La Serna died on August 30, 1939 and the aforesaid will was submitted to be probated in
the CFI of Cebu – will was approved

• Upon the death Gervasia Rebaca another petition to probate a will was filed but the case was dismissed
for the reason of failure of Manuela and her atty, manuel Potot to appear in the said petition ( for the same
Will)

• CFI ordered that the petition was null and void for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills
in the Civil Code
• On appeal CA reversed the CFI on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by the
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the statement

• CA further declared that:

“it is true the law prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use,
and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and
testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to
be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, wherein our
Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, ‘assuming that the
joint will in question is valid”

ISSUE​:

WON the ruling of the Probate Court is Final - Yes ( but only as to the estate for Bernabe )

Ruling:

• The CA is correct when it held that the Probate made in 1939 by CFI has conclusive effect as to the will
and testament of Bernabe.

• The Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally or in favor of 3rd party.

• The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision, however erroneous

• public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium.

• the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely
because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator’s lifetime. ( Note: wills under the new civil code can be probated
by the testator )

2. Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete

Petitioner:​ Salud Teodoro Vda. de Perez

Respondent:​ Hon. Zotico A. Tolete, Presiding Judge

Doctrine​: The wills executed abroad will only be effective in this country upon compliance with Art. 816 of
the Civil Code: “The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed
in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”

Facts:

• Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and
residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions that in the event
that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have
predeceased his wife.

• Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home.

• Rafael Cunanan, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the
wills with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York.

• These two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

• Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan.

• Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir; the said wills of Jose and Evelyn who were
American citizens were executed in accordance with New York law; and that by New York law, he and
his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings,
which Salud failed to give.

• Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the
reprobate court disallowed the wills.

• Respondent Judge issued an order stating that the insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law
was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days
to submit the evidence to that effect.

• Salad filed another motion stating that she was “ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining
in the State of New York” and praying that she be granted “the opportunity to present evidence on
what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills”

• Respondent Judge denied the motion: to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding “would
be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one
will.” He pointed out that even in New York “where the wills in question were first submitted for
probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings”

• Hence, this petition.

Issue:​ Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

Ruling:​ Yes.

Ratio:

• Art. 816 provides that, “The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”

• The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with the above provision.

• Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.

• The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the
laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills

• Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

• The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

• With regard to the lack of notice to Jose’s heirs, the court ruled that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving
the wills. (Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court)

• The questioned Order is SET ASIDE.

• Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for
the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate
proceedings.

E. Qualifications & Disqualification of witnesses

1. Gonzales v. CA

Doctrine:
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the
trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is
enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.

Facts​:
· June 24 1961 - Private respondent Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will allegedly executed
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as principal beneficiary and
executrix.
· Isabel Gabriel died as a widow in Navotas on June 7, 1961 at the age of 85. Private respondent is the
deceased’s niece, whom along with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latter’s
residence prior to and up to the time of her death. Petitioner is also the deceased’s niece.
· Characteristics of said will: typewritten; in Tagalog; executed in Manila barely two months prior to
deceased’s death; contains 5 pages, including pages whereon attestation clause and
acknowledgement of notary public; signatures of deceased appear at the end of the will on page four
and at the left margin of all pages
· At the bottom of the attestation clause, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of
Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the
heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss
Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the
left margin of all the other pages.
· The petitioner alleges that the will was not valid as there was no proof that the three instrumental
witnesses were credible witnesses.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been
executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel
Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear
at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.

Issue​:
1. ​Whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law – Yes
2. Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will - No

Ruling​:
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article
821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the
trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is
enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
The SC rejects petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of
the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise
by the opposing party.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this
Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of
any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of
unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental
capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may
be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other
cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St.
Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent
witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness
that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann.
Civ St. art. 8283. ​Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde,​ Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888,
889. (​Ibid,​ p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two
credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are
legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the
will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not
of the timr it is offered for probate, ​Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145.
(​Ibid​.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, such
persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity,
interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or
rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs.
Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42.
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by
the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his
testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.

G. Revocation, Republication & Revival of Wills

1. Molo v. Molo

Petitioner / Appellee : Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI, JUANA JUAN
VDA. DE MOLO
Oppositors​ / Appellants: LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO

Doctrine​:

Principle of Dependent Relative Revocation​. This doctrine applies where the testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails
of effect for some reason. The doctrine can be established where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the
old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be
made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remain in full force.

Facts:

· Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal,
without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by
his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the
oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of
Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939.

· On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition,
seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition,
the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court
admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both
parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.

· In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed
another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same
court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds:
(1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918;
(2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and
(3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

· But before the hearing of the second petition, battle for liberation came and the records of the case were
destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was deemed to be
impossible because neither party could produce copies for reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a
new petition on September 14, 1946 similar to the one destroyed, to which oppositors filed an opposition
based on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition. Case was set for trial on May
28, 1948. The court issued an order admitting the will to probate. Hence, this appeal by oppositors.

Issue/s:

(1) WON Molo’s will of 1918 was subsequently revoked by the revocatory clause in his 1939 will,
notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will.

(2) Assuming that the destruction of the will of 1918 was but a necessary consequence of the testator’s
belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given
effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?

Ruling:
(1) NO​. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson vs. Naval that, “a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was
 not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to
the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void.

· Counsel for oppositors contended that the ruling in Samson vs. Naval is archaic or antiquated and runs
counter to the modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence, for the sections in our Code of Civil
Procedure is of American origin, and as such, should follow the prevailing trend.

· Court stated that, “although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions
perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject
of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent authorities
that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.”

· It is true that our law (Code of Civ Pro) provides that a will may be revoked by “some will, codicil, or
other writing executed as provided in case of will”; but it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be
regarded, not as a will within the meaning of the said word, but as “other writing executed as provided in
the case of wills,” simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as ​any other writing
within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said writing is admitted to
probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation.

(2) ​YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of “dependent relative
revocation”. This doctrine applies where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute
for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason. The doctrine
can be established where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the
new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remain in full force. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon
whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and
hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the
place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.

· The Court held that. “even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could
be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the
effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that
the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this
principle is predicated is that the testator did not intended to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifested when he executed 2 wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal
heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

2. Diaz v. De Leon

(2 Pages lang po yung case – full text na natin )

The only question raised in this case is whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now
deceased, was revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator
revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former.

We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not clothed with all the necessary
requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.

But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with animo
revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)

From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution cution of
the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the
testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse
who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will,
said that it had been destroyed.

The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own
statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.

The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now
be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgment is affirmed with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

3. Casiano v. CA

Parties:

Petitioners:
· Testate of Late Adriana Maloto
· Aldina Maloto Casiano
· Constancio Maloto,
· Purificacion Miraflor
· Roman Catholic Church of Molo and
· Asilo de Molo

Respondents:
· CA
· Panfilo Maloto and
· Felino Maloto

Facts:

· Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto- Casiano and
Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto.
· They did not think there was a will so they decided to commence intestate proceedings. Aldina,
Constnacio, Panfilo and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate
dividing it equally amongst themselves.

· 3yrs later, A former associate of Adriana’s counsel discovered Adriana’s will dated January 3, 1940. In
the will, although all of them are named therein, the distribution was different such that Aldina and
Constancio are given much bigger and more valuable shares. The will likewise gives devises and
legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

· Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for
the allowance of the will.

RTC​: denied motion.

CA: It was shown that the will has been revoked allegedly by the burning of it by the househelp of Adriana
upon her instructions.

Issue: ​WON the will has been revoked?

Held:

· It was not sufficiently proven that the will has been revoked thus, the will stands.

· the testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive."
Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses who were illeterates, were
unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. The helper believed that
the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. The other
witness only obtained of the information from someone else rendering his testimony inadmissible for
double hearsay.

· The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is
not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by
another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

· In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is
paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less
the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where
 the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned.

· Res judicata will not lie as there has been no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana’s
will.

4. Gago v. Mamuyac

Petitioner​:
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant

Respondent​:
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. L- 26317
January 29, 1927

DOCTRINE​:
· Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when las
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed.

FACTS:
· The testator Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922.

· Within the same month, Gago presented to the court, a will supposed to have been executed by the
testator on July 27, 1918.

· The will was not admitted to probate on the ground that the testator had on April 16, 1919 executed a
new will and testament.

· Gago then petitioned for the probate of the 2ndwill which was denied again by the court on the ground
that the same will had been revoked by the testator as testified by Fenoy, the person who typed the
will, and Bejar, to whom a house and lot in the 1919 will was sold to.

· Another witness testified that the 1919 will was in the possession of the testator but could not be found
after his death.

· It was also successfully established that another will was executed in 1920.

· The 1919 will presented was found by the Lower Court to be a mere carbon copy of the original.

ISSUE(S):

1.Whether or not the 1919 will has been revoked - YES

RULING + RATIO:
Yes, will was revoked.

· The law does not require any evidence of the cancellation or revocation of the will to be preserved. The
fact that suchcancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred
from evidence showing that after due search, the original will cannot be found.

· Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when las
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled
or destroyed.

· The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death.

· It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without knowledge or
authority of the testator.

· The force of presumption of the cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being
weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof
that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

· In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence

DISPOSITION:

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate
had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.