The People, the Masses, and the Mobilization of Power: The Paradox of Hannah Arendt's

"Populism"
Author(s): MARGARET CANOVAN
Source: Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 2, Hannah Arendt's "The Origins of Totalitarianism":
Fifty Years Later (SUMMER 2002), pp. 403-422
Published by: The New School
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The People,theMasses,/
of/
and theMobilization
Power:The Paradox /
ofHannahArendt's/
"POpUUSm"* CANOVAN
/BY MARGARET

A his paper is concernedwitha puzzlingfeatureof Arendt's

thought, whatmightbe called the paradoxof her "populism."
The paradoxis thatwhileshewelcomeddirectactionbythepeo-
ple,she also fearedand deploredalmostall actualcasesofgrass-
rootsmobilization.
MuchofTheOrigins is devotedtoanalyzing
ofTotalitarianism the
activitiesof totalitarianmovementsand racistor anti-Semitic
mobs,and the book makesclearArendt'sdistrust of almostall
casesin whichlargenumbersofpeople madetheirpresencefelt
in politics.AndyetRichardBernstein is rightto saythatthereis
a case forcallinghera "populist" (Bernstein, 1996:61, 111,126-
33). "The People"wasan honorific term in her vocabulary,and
sheoftenseemssympathetic to informal politicalaction.Buthav-
ingseen theriseofNazismand communism in Europe,she had
good reason to know that informal and powerful mobilization
is
notnecessarily to be welcomed.
Herownsolutiontothepuzzlewastoclaimthatmosteruptions
fromthegrassroots are nottheworkof thePeople at all,butof

*I amindebtedtotheBritish
Academyforsupportinpreparing thispaper,andalsoto
JohnHortonandAprilCarterfortheirhelpfulcommentson an earlierversion.

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Summer2002)

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404 SOCIAL RESEARCH

someothercollectivity, suchas themobor themasses.Ifshe still

hadfaithin thePeople,thiswasbecauseshesharply distinguished
the caseswhenit reallywasthe People takingaction,fromthe
morefrequent occasionswhenitwasnot.In Origins, in OnRevo-
lution, and elsewhere, betweenthePeople and
she distinguishes
variousothercollectivities. Indeedshecomesup withatleastfour
different non-Peoples: theMob,theMasses,and theTribein Ori-
gins,and thestarving multitude in OnRevolution.Alloftheseare
mobilizedforaction,all are powerful, butnone is thePeople.1
Whatis it thatmakesthedifference? She herselfdoes notuse
anysuchtermas "non-People," and she does notgivethereader
a greatdeal ofhelpin understanding whatdistinguishes thePeo-
ple fromitsimitators. So I wouldliketo lookfirstat heraccounts
ofmobilization byotherswhoare Not-the People,and trytowork
outwhathercriteriaare fordistinguishing thePeople fromthe
rest.But I am also interested in findingout whyshe thoughtit
important to make that fundamental Afterall,as she
distinction.
surveyedcases of politicalmobilization, genuineexamplesof
actionbythePeopleseemedtoherveryrare,leadingone towon-
derwhyshewantedtohangon to thelanguageof"thePeople"at
all. LaterI shallsuggesta possibleexplanation, and arguethatit
shouldgiveus food forthought.The firsttask,though,is to
attempt a briefsketchofthevariousnow-Peoples thatshe identi-
fiesin TheOrigins and elsewhere.
ofTotalitarianism A good deal of
what she has to saysounds harsh to contemporary ears,some-
timesoutrageously so.

//

is concernedwiththepowergen-
of Origins
A largeproportion
eratedbyindividuals in
moving concert, butmostofthetimeitis
notthePeoplewhoarebeingmobilized.In facttherealPeopleare
hardlyevermentionedin the book, exceptas somethingwith
is contrasted.
whicha seriesofnon-Peoples

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 405

The firstto appear is the Mob, in the anti-Semitic riotsthat

accompaniedtheDreyfus affair in France.Arendtspeaksof"the
fundamental errorofregarding themob as identicalwithrather
thanas a caricatureofthepeople"(1967:107). Theyare,shesays,
easilyconfusedbecausethePeopleincludes"allstrataofsociety,"
whiletheMob is recruited fromall classes.She does notactually
explain what the difference is,butshe speaksof theMob as the
"residue"(107) or eventhe"refuseofall classes"(155), accumu-
latedfromthoseleftbehindaftereach of capitalism's economic
cycles.These individuals havelosttheirplace in the classstruc-
ture.Theyare burningwithresentment againstorderedsociety,
and easilymobilizedforviolenceby demagogues.By contrast,
(sheclaims)"thepeoplein all greatrevolutions fortruerep-
fight
resentation" (107). She also maintainsthatat the timeof the
Dreyfus onlythosewhostoodwithClemenceauin support
affair,
of Dreyfus were"thetruepeople of France"(114). So it seems
thatthePeopleare distinguished fromtheMob on theone hand
bytheirfirmanchoragein theclassstructure, and on theotherby
theirpublic-spiritedaction.
The Mob turnsup againin thesectionon "Imperialism," in the
shapeofthe"superfluous men,""spatout"bysociety(1967: 189),
whofoundtheirwayto SouthAfricain therushforgoldand dia-
mondsin thelate nineteenth century.Theymaysoundlikevic-
timsoffate,butArendtclaimsthattheyhad an alternative: they
could have chosentojoin "theworkers'movements, in which"
(she says)"thebestofthesuperfluous men.. .established a kind
of countersociety through which men could findtheir wayback
intoa humanworldoffellowship and purpose"(189). Thisis not
theonlyplace whereshe claimsthatin thelate nineteenth and
earlytwentieth centuriesthe workers' movement was actuallythe
authenticPeople,as distinct fromnon-Peoplessuchas theMob
(cf.1958:215-9). Andthereis a hintherethatwhatmakesthedif-
ferencebetweenbelongingand not belongingto the People is
whether or notone sharesa human"world."

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406 SOCIAL RESEARCH

In hersectionon imperialism, Arendtisconcernedwith"super-

fluousmen" who hadn'tjoined workers'movements but had
insteadbecomepartof theimperialist mob.Thesewereoutside
any"humanworldoffellowship and purpose"in a numberofsig-
ways.Liketheanti-Dreyfusard
nificant mob,theyhad no placein
a structuredsociety.They were also physically uprooted,freed
fromnormalexpectations and restraints.Arendtsaysthatthey
had "escapedthereality ofcivilization"intoa "phantom-like" exis-
tencewheretheyhad no senseofresponsibility fortheiracts,par-
becausein Africatheywerepreying
ticularly on an utterly alien
nativepopulationthat had itself
never been gathered into Peo-
ples,onlyintotribes.She explicitly contrasts "Tribe"with"Peo-
ple,"and explicitly linksthedifference to the "world."Genuine
she
"Peoples," claims, have worked on nature to create"a human
world,a humanreality" (1967:192),and therefore havehistories;
whereas/^¿historic tribeslivedin and on nature,like animals,
withoutbuilding a human artificeand a "humanreality."2 She
maintainsthattheBoers,demoralized bythisexample,had them-
selvesturnedinto a tribe,"alienatedfrom thepridewhichWest-
ern man feltin livingin a worldcreatedand fabricatedby
himself (194). Faced withAfricantribes,the Boers had also
respondedbydevelopinga racistideology,and thiswas eagerly
adoptedby the immigrant whitemob. It legitimized theirvio-
lence,and offeredthema newbond of unity based on nothing
butthecoloroftheirskin.
Arendtlinksthesepathologiesof overseasimperialism with
whatshe calls"Continental Imperialism" in Eastern Europe,the
Pan-German and Pan-Slavmovements thatalso recruitedmobs.
She attributeswhatshe calls"tribalnationalism" to thesemove-
ments,contrasting theirracismwiththecivilizednationalism of
Westernnation-states, notablyFrance. The difference is that
Western nationalism wastheexpressionofa people in possession
of an objectiveworld. In a country likeFrance,humanachieve-
mentshad been passeddownthroughgenerations, unitingand
definingthepeople. These rangedfromthecultivated territory

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 407

and the citiesto the polityand memoriesof ancestraldeeds.

Tribal nations,bycontrast, did notshareanysolidhumanworld
of territory and institutions.Instead (accordingto theirideol-
ogy),theysharedGermanblood or the Russiansoul. In other
words,theysharedinternal, portablecharacteristics,notan exter-
nal objectiveworld.
FromArendt'spointofviewitwasprecisely thisshiftingworld-
lessnessthatmade themob availableformobilization bymove-
ments.Fora movement(in hersense) wasa newwayofholding
individualstogetherwithoutgatheringthem round a stable
world.Instead,theycouldbe setin motionand held together by
a racistideologythatproclaimedthemsuperiorbydefinition,
and byjoining in violentaction to forceanothergroup into
inferiority.
Arendtsometimes givestheimpression thatthiskindofworld-
lessmob isjust a shapelesshorde.However, herbook is notpri-
marily concerned with theshort-termactivitiesofracistmobs.She
is interestedaboveall in theformidable politicalphenomenonof
totalitarian and
movements, those, as she pointsout,were tri-
umphsoforganization. Theyinvolvedlargenumbersofindividu-
als actingtogether on a long-term basis,and theygeneratedreal
power(1967:xviii,387-8,418). Nevertheless, thisisin herviewnot
thepowerof thePeople. Instead,we havehereanotherkindof
non-People:theMasses.
Whatis thedifference betweentheMassesand theMob in her
theory? It seemsto have a lot to do withthe sheerscale of the
crisesthatgeneratedthem.Wherethe Mob was a fringephe-
nomenon,theMassesincludedalmosteverybody in a societythat
had suffered catastrophicupheavalthrough war,revolution, eco-
nomiccollapse.The members oftheMob havelosttheirplacesin
a worldthatis stillstanding;theMassesare leftstrandedbythe
collapseof the worlditself.Arendtuses the image of a house
dividedintoapartments. As longas thehousestands,theinhabi-
tantsare relatedto one anotherand forma groupsimply byshar-
ing the house. But if the structurecollapses,they are leftas

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408 SOCIAL RESEARCH

unrelatedindividuals.Similarly, ifthestructures thatholdpeople

togetherin societycollapse,the inhabitants are turnedinto a
massofisolatedindividuals (Arendt,1994:357).
The sectionon theMassesin Origins referstocatastrophicexpe-
riencesin Germany and RussiaaftertheFirstWorldWar.Arendt
laysparticularstresson thecollapseoftheclassstructure, which
had been theone apparently solidfeatureofa society inwhichall
stableinstitutionswerebeingunderminedby capitalism(1967:
314;cf.1963:162). Earlierwesawthata salientfeatureoftheMob
was thatitsmembersweredéclassés; nowwe findthatloss of the
entirefamiliarclassstructure leftbehinda Mass of bewildered
individuals.
Arendtclaimsthattotalitarian movements succeededbecause
theygavetheselostindividuals the"senseofhavinga placein the
world"(1967: 324), and thattheyprovidedan alternative world
based on fictionssuch as theJewishconspiracy and the Aryan
race.Totalitarianideologyprovideda consistent explanationfor
theeventsthathad settheseindividuals adrift(352). ButArendt
stressesthattheGermanmassesfoundmuchmorethana sooth-
ing doctrinein Nazism.More important, theyfounda parallel
world in whichtheycould live.The Nazisorganizedtheirmove-
mentas iftheircrazydoctrines weretrue;as iftherereallywerea
Jewish and
conspiracy, as ifAryanbloodreallyweredifferent. The
wholeorganization wasbased on fiction, butit nevertheless
cre-
ated "a kindofspuriousstability" world,"one
(356), a "fictitious
"fitto competewiththerealone" (361-2).
Let me trynowto sumup whatit is thatmakesthedifference
betweenthePeopleand non-Peoples in Origins.
Lookingat thevariouscontrasts we haveencountered, twodis-
tinguishingfeatures stand out. The difference between the Peo-
ple and theirOthersseemsrepeatedly tohingeon relationto the
"world"and relationto "reality." Non-Peoplesare in somesense
whereas
"worldless," the People sharea humanworld.The People
also havea common-sense gripon reality, whereasnon-Peoples

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDT'S "POPULISM" 409

inhabita twilight zone of unreality, a "phantom-like" existence,

"fiction."
These contrastsare suggestive and resonant,but neitheris
entirelyclear.In Origins, Arendtdrawson thedistinction between
thenatural"earth" and thehuman-built "world" thatshe laterset
out in TheHumanCondition, butappliesitin waysthatare some-
timesopaque. Wesaw,forexample,thatsheattributes "worldless-
ness"both to the Masseswhojoined the Nazi partyand to the
indigenousTribesthatimperialists encounteredin Africa.But
bothworldand worldlessness seem to mean different thingsin
the twocases,referring to the classsystemin one case and to
deliberateshapingof the naturalenvironment on the other.
Although Africantribesmen in
mightlacka world thesenseofa
humanizedlandscape,theywerenot sociallyuprooted - not,at
any rate, until conqueringimperialists uprootedthem. Con-
versely,the German masses who voted for Hitlermayhave lost
theirsocialstructure, buttheystillinhabiteda humanartifice that
was relatively intact.So worldliness and worldlessness seem to
have a range of meanings,and it is not clear whyparticular
aspectsshouldhavepoliticalrelevanceat particular timesand in
particularplaces.
Thereare further puzzlesconcerning theassociationofworld-
linesswithaccessto reality. This is a recurrent themein Origins.
Rememberthatthe "superfluous men" whojoined the South
African goldrushhad (in Arendt 's words)"escapedthereality of
civilization"
as theyconfronted African tribeswhohad nevercon-
structed"a humanreality." Similarly, when themasseslose their
stablesocioeconomicworld,theyalso lose theircommon-sense
gripon reality.Itseemsas ifnon-Peoples arein somesensecursed
withexclusionfromreality, whereasthetruePeoplein possession
ofa stableworldare epistemically privileged: theyhaveaccessto
realitythrough their common sense, which comes fromseeing
theircommonworldfromdifferent angles.Thereis an authenti-
callypopulistring to the notion that itis thePeople,ratherthan
thePhilosopher, whocan escapefromthecaveofillusionintothe

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410 SOCIAL RESEARCH

sunshineofreality. Butlargephilosophicalquestionsseemto be
beggedin thesevariousreferences to "reality,"
and Arendtdoes
not give us much help in understanding preciselywhat she
means.
We mayfeel thatat least we knowwherewe are withher
accountof the "fictitious world"of the totalitarian movement,
since the term"fictitious"apparently refersto systematic lying
about mattersof fact.But thisis less transparent than it may
seem.The "fictitious world"ofNazismwassustainedbylies and
based on thefantasiesof racistideology,but Nazi organization
was not a fiction:thinkof the Nuremburg ralliesand the mas-
sively visible of
presence organization. Arendt herselfsaysthat
totalitarianism in powerestablishes"thefictitious worldof the
movementas a tangibleworkingrealityof everyday life."Fur-
thermore, she seemsto be preparedto admitthatthis"fictitious
world"ofthetotalitarian movement had thepotentialtobecome
a realworld.She saysthatNazismmighthavesettleddowninto
"a newwayoflife"thatcouldeventually "takeitsplaceamongthe
widelydiffering and profoundly contrasting waysof lifeof the
nationsoftheearth"(1967: 391). Presumably itwouldstillhave
been organizedaroundan irrational ideology, butit could have
established a genuineworldwith"lastinginstitutions," no doubt
includinga castesystem withtaboosagainstintermarriage. Itdid-
n't do so, becausetotalitarianmovements are dedicatedto per-
manentrevolution. The massesareheldinwhatArendtcalls"the
ironband of terror"(1967: 466) and cannotbecome a plural
people gatheredarounda sharedworld.Butit seemsto be the
momentum ratherthanthefictions
oftotalitarianism ofideology
thatstandin thewayofestablishing a "real"humanworldand a
realPeople.
It is hardto saythatwe emergefromthebookwithclearcrite-
riafordistinguishing thePeople fromtheirmanyimitators. Fur-
thermore,in Originsthe genuinePeople are conspicuousby
theirabsence.Whyis it,then,thatArendthangson to thenotion
so doggedly?Whydoes she not reactto her traumaticexperi-

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 41 1

enees of massmobilizationas othersdid, bycondemningpop-

ulismoutright?
Theremaybe biographical answers tothisquestion.Butleaving
aside anypersonalmotivationsshe mayhavehad, I wantto sug-
gestthatArendthad twoconnectedreasonsforretainingher
populistnotionof thePeople. First,thenotion
idiosyncratically
representedforhera distinctive
and attractive
politicalideal,inti-
matedin Origins not
though yetclearlyformulated in thatbook.
Second,thetermpointedtoa politicalphenomenon thatwasall the
morepreciousforbeingrare.Bothof thesepointswillperhaps
becomeclearerifwe look at the treatment of People and non-
People in On Revolution.

Ill

On Revolution is organizedrounda contrastbetweenthe two

greateighteenth-century revolutions.The AmericanRevolution
succeededin establishing a republicand a constitution
thatare
stillgoingstrongafter200years.The FrenchRevolution failedto
establish a republic,and rapidlybecamederailedintotheTerror.
Arendt's reflections on thecontrastarecomplex,butin heranaly-
sisthePeople havea good deal to do withthedifference in out-
come.In baldsummary, theAmericanRevolution wascarriedout
by a mobilized People who shareda world, whereastheFrench
Revolution wasdrivenoffcoursebya mobilizednon-People,the
starving poor.
It is clearerin OnRevolution thanin Origins
whatitmeansfora
People to share a world because Arendtcan pointto political
institutions roundwhichthe (free,white,male) Americans gath-
eredand in defenseofwhichthePeople couldtakeaction.Even
beforethe Revolution, whiletheywerestillBritishsubjects,the
Americans had been "organizedin self-governingbodies"(1963:
164). And since theywere alreadyaccustomedto movingfreely
withinthatsharedpoliticalworld,it was easierforthemtojoin

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412 SOCIAL RESEARCH

together to buildthenewfederated worldoftherepublic,while

at thesametimeremaining pluraland havingscope fordebates
betweendifferent opinions(143-5).The outcomewasa constitu-
tionthatwas,in Arendt'swords,"a tangibleworldly an
reality,"
"objective thing"ofexceptionaldurability (156).
In France,bycontrast, therewas no organizedor constituted
People. Once themonarchy wasdisplaced,therewasno shared
politicalworld already there (179). Earlyattempts to buildone
werederailedby the presencein the streetsof a wow-People -
-
ironicallyknownas le people the starvingParisianmultitude.
Arendtsaysthatthe potentialof the revolution, the incipient
"uprising of the people for freedom," was overwhelmed by the
eruptionof "themultitude of the poor and the downtrodden,"
who emergedfor the firsttimeinto the public realm (41).3
Despiteitsenormouspathos,thiswas politically disastrous.
The
of
project building a free was
republic displacedby futile
attempts
tocurepoverty bypoliticalmeans, whilethesheer urgency ofstar-
vationjustifiedtyranny. But the experiencealso deformedthe
concept of "thepeople,"becauseparticipants and observers mis-
tookthemultitude in thestreets fortherealPeople.
WhyweretheynottherealPeople?Becausealthoughthepoor
weremobilizedand united,theywereunitedin thewrongway.
Insteadof beinggatheredrounda sharedworldoutsidethem-
selves,theywereheld togetheronlybybodilynecessity, by the
identicalpangsofhungertheysuffered. Arendtdescribesthemas
"a multi-headed monster, a massthatmovesas one bodyand acts
as thoughpossessedbyone will"(1963:89). Likethenon-Peoples
in Origins,theywerepowerful, butonlyfordestruction, and quite
unableto build"lasting institutions."
So Arendtoffers us a starkcontrast. On theone side,in Amer-
ica, standsan articulated People,mobilizedfromthegrassroots
forthesakeofsomething objective and outside
themselves. On the
in
otherside, France,we have a non-Peopleunited onlybythings
insidethemselves, like the "tribal mobs
nationalist" in with
Origins,

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDT'S "POPULISM" 413

nothingsolid thatcould hold themtogetherwhileallowingfor

separateperspectives.
So far,though,whatshe has to sayaboutthePeople in OnRev-
olutionseemsfarfrompopulist,forthePeople in possessionofa
world are an elite,raisedabove the preoccupationwithbread
thatdooms le peuple.Arendtis uncompromisingly frankabout
this.She also pointsout thatwithintheclassicalrepublicantra-
dition,whichhad keptalive the memoryof an alternative to
monarchy, "people"alwayshadmeanta minority of thepopula-
tion(1963:61).
Her understanding of "thePeople" is certainly in some ways
sociallyconservative.Buttheothersideofthebookis a stresson
the possibilityof newbeginnings, and people evidently do not
haveto belongto a privileged classto be capableofthat.Human
beingsmayor maynot inheritpoliticalworlds,but theyalways
have it in themto build new ones. Americaitselfprovidesevi-
denceforthisgoingbacktothePilgrim fathers.Arendtpointsout
thatthefirst uprootedemigrants had established institutions and
builta newworldbythepowerofmutualpromises(173-5),and
she insiststhatthisworld-building capacityis alwaysthere - with
the corollarythata genuinePeople is alwayspotentially there.
She sees signsof thesamegrassroots impulse to establish a new
politicalworldemergingin almosteverysubsequentrevolution,
in the "councils"that"sprangfromthe people as spontaneous
organsofactionand oforder"(275; cf.242,247,265). Although
theseefforts had failed,sheseemstobe sayingthatindividuals set
adrift and
bycatastrophe upheaval do not haveto turn intoa mob
or a mass.Unlikelyas it maybe, theycan build sharedworldly
institutionsfromthegroundup- and iftheydo so, theywillbe a
Peopleand an eliteat thesametime(282).
I suggestedearlierthatOnRevolution mighthelpus to see why
itmadesensetoArendtto stickto herkindofpopulism,despite
hersuspicionofthemob,themasses,thebarbarians and lepeuple.
So whydid she clingto the notionof the collectivePeople in
action?I thinkwemaybe able tosee twoconnectedreasons.One

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414 SOCIAL RESEARCH

is conceptual:she had developedan understanding of"thePeo-

ple"thatgavegroundsforwanting suchan entity toappearin pol-
itics. The other- and perhaps the more important - is
phenomenological. She wasconvincedthatsucha Peoplehad on
occasionmadean appearance,and coulddo so again;thatitwas
a politicalphenomenon, notjusta politicalconcept.
The phenomenological pointis,I think,themoreinteresting,
ifalso themorecontentious, and I am goingtospendmostofthe
remainder ofthepaperconsidering it.Butletus takea moment
-
to look at theconceptualaspect at whatArendtmeantby"the
people,"and whyactionbya People of thiskindmighthave a
claimto legitimacy. In On Revolution, itseemsthattheAmerican
revolutionaries act as a People because,unlikeU peuple, theyare
acting in and fora world of lastinginstitutions,partinherited,
part established from the ground up by their own mutual
promises. Anda Peoplelinkedbythatsortofworld a claimto
has
politicalrespect,forthreereasons.
In thefirstplace,becausethePeople are mobilizedarounda
sharedworld,theycan actas one whilemaintaining theirplural-
ityas distinctindividuals.In contrast to Rousseau's"people,"who
aresupposedtobe unitedbyan identicalGeneralWillinside them
all,members ofArendt's People are held together bybeinggath-
ered aroundthe objective,federated, worldof the
institutional
Republic(1963: 70-1).As she famously saysin TheHuman Condi-
tion,"theworld,likeeveryin-between, relatesand separatesmen
at thesametime"(1958:52).
In On Revolution she contrasts thefutileand destructive quest
for unanimityin the FrenchRevolutionwiththe Founding
Fathers'remarkably relaxedacceptanceofdebatebetweendiffer-
entopinions(1963:88).
So thefirstreasonwhya worldly People mayhavea claimto
politicalrespectis thattheyare unitedandplural.Second,since
theirshort-term privateinterests are diverse,theycan be mobi-
lized most successfullyin favor of the intereststheyall share,

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 415

namelythelong-term publicinterestsoftheirsharedworld.Act-
ingas a Peopleliftsthemoutofpreoccupation withprivateinter-
estsintocarefortherepublic.
Third,since the pluralPeople look at theircommonworld
fromdifferent angles,theyhaveaccessto a variety ofperspectives
thatenable themto see thingsin the round.Insteadof being
blinkeredby ideology,theythereforehave the potentialto
developa politicsofrealismand commonsense,as theFounding
Fathersindeeddid.
None of thisimpliesthathavingthe good fortuneto sharea
republicmustpermanently raisethoseconcernedto theheights
of public-spiritedness and politicalrealism.In On Revolution
Arendtalso deploredthedegeneration ofAmericanpoliticsinto
tradeoffsbetweenprivateinterests. But at the conceptuallevel,
she offersan ideal of thePeople thatis worththinking about,if
onlybecauseit contrasts withbothof themostfamiliar concep-
tions.The People as she understands it is quite differentfrom
populistpersonifications ofthePeopleas a singlebeingspeaking
witha singlevoice.Butitavoidswhattendsto be seenas theonly
alternative:antápopulistdissolutionof thepeople intoan aggre-
gateofindividuals withno collectivecapacityat all (Riker,1982).
Conceptually, if
thisisinteresting,lessclearthanwemightwish.
We mustremember, though,thatArendt 's conceptualinnova-
tionsareneverintended justas movesin a theoretical game.They
are meantto pointto neglectedphenomena - especiallyto those
rare,memorablephenomenain which,she believed,humansig-
nificanceis to be found.And I suspectthatthereasonshe hung
on to thenotionofthepeoplewasnotsimplythatitrepresented
an idealofrepublicanpolitics, butalsobecause,in herview,itwas
a formof politicalmobilization thatdid occasionallyoccur.In
otherwords,despitetheoverwhelming presencein her timeof
thoroughly undesirableformsof mobilization, she believedthat
on a fewoccasions - such as the AmericanRevolutionand the

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416 SOCIAL RESEARCH

failedHungarianRevolutionof 1956- it was possibleto seethe

phenomenonofthePeoplein action.

IV

Now,whatarewe tomakeofthis?Shouldn'tweputa collective

Peoplethatoccasionally manifests itselfintothesamecategory of
phenomenaas UFOs?Skepticism mayseemtheonlyappropriate
response.
However,I wantto suggestthatdespiteour misgivings, and
despitetheundeniableobscurities ofherthought, Arendtis on to
somethingimportant. For one thing,it is clear thatcollective
politicalentitiesdo come and go, simplybecause theyare the
resultsofmobilization. It is a matterofcommonobservation that
individualscan combineto bringinto existence a or
party move-
mentor organization thatdid notexistbefore,and thathas new
powerto act.It is also a matterofobservation thatcollective enti-
tiesofthiskindcan crumbleand fallapartagain.We continually
witness thephenomenaofmobilization and demobilization.
References to "thepeople"withinthediscourseofdemocracy
tendto givethe impressionthatifit existsat all as a collective
entity,itmustexisteverywhere and always.Butwe mightbe less
skepticalabout it ifwe thoughtof it as the kindof collectivity
that existsoccasionallyand intermittently. And I thinkthat
whenArendtdistinguishes betweenPeople and non-Peoples,
she is not claimingthattheseare permanententitieswithdis-
tinctmemberships, but ratherthattheycome intobeingwhen
individualsare mobilizedin different ways.Fromher pointof
view,thePeople are individuals mobilizedin defenseofa shared
publicworld.Despiteitsrarity, thisseemsto her highlysignifi-
cant.Once in a whileitmaybe powerful enoughtogeneratethe
"lastinginstitutions" of a republic,legitimizedby the memory
and mythof thePeople in action.But evenifit dissolvesagain
withoutleavingthatworldly legacy,it can stillleavebehindthe

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 417

memoryand myththatofferglimpsesofrepublicanfreedomto
inspireothersintoaction.
Thisaccountseemsto me to makesenseof theconundrumI
startedwith:howArendtcould be a "populist"whiledeploring
mostcasesofwhatothersmightclassify as popularmobilization.
ButI wantto end bysuggesting thatit mayalso shedsomelight
on an obscureand embarrassing aspectofcontemporary democ-
racy. Foras democratic theorists
political at thestartof thetwenty-
firstcentury, we do not seem to be able to do withoutthe
legitimizing idea of thePeople,butwe do notknowwhatto do
withit.
Since the collapse of communism,it seems that the only
remaining sourceofpoliticallegitimacy (forthoseofus whoare
notreligiousfundamentalists) is theconsentofthepeople.Even
themostunpopulistofdemocratic theorists
cannotactually write
itoutofthescript.Habermas(forinstance)saysthathe does not
rejectwhathe calls"theintuition connectedwiththeidea ofpop-
-
ularsovereignty"thoughhe does hisbestto renderitharmless
by translating it into anonymousprocessesand procedures
(Habermas,1994:10). Similarambivalence canbe foundin other
contemporary commentators, and itpromptsfurther questions.4
Ifthecollective People cannot exercise if
power, they cannot take
actionon thepublicstage,howis it thatlegitimacy can be based
on them?WhybotherwithHabermas's "intuition connectedwith
theidea ofpopularsovereignty" ifthenotionofa sovereign Peo-
ple in actionis reallyquitemeaningless?
The answermayofcoursebe that"thepeople"isjust a neces-
sarymyth:thisemperorhas no clothes,but to keep the system
functioning we mustgo on admiringhis imaginary robes.But
thereis a lesscynicalwayoflookingat myths thatsees themnot
as purefictions butas transformed memories. Andwe mayafter
all ask howwas it thatthe notionof the collectivePeople as a
source of legitimacy ever enteredthe vocabularyof politics?
There is certainly nothingself-evident about it. Historically
we
can tracetheidea tocertainstrikingly powerful of
examples polit-

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418 SOCIAL RESEARCH

ical mobilization, above all to thepopulusRomanus, who gener-

atedso muchpowerand suchlastinginstitutions as theygathered
aroundtheirrespublica, thepublicsomething thattheyshared.The
memoryand the mythof thatcollectiveactionand collective
powerlastedmuchlongerthantheinstitutions themselves, and
to
helped inspire latercases of popular mobilization that in turn
renewedthemyth.
Withinmoderndemocracy, as Habermasand otherspointout,
themythhas been usefully domesticated intoa legitimation for
complexprocessesand procedures. ButI do notthinkitisa flight
offancyto saythatwe havewitnessed therenewalofthemythin
our owntime,in eventsthatArendtdid notliveto see. Cases of
whatis sometimes called"PeoplePower"havebeen quitenumer-
ous in thepastcoupleofdecades,butthemostnotableis surely
the Solidarity movementin Poland in the 1980s.This was the
mostspectaculargrassroots mobilization of our time,conjuring
power out ofnowhere, creating itsown world ofinformal institu-
tions,and shakingthe existingpoliticalstructure to itsfounda-
tions.Butthesamecouldhavebeen saidofNazismin the1930s,
and ofmanyotherexamplesofpoliticalmobilization. Whymight
Solidarityin particular countas a manifestation ofthePeople?
If we weresimplyto drawon the multiplemeaningsof the
word"people"in English,thenwe mightargue thatSolidarity
countsthreetimesover.Starting as a tradeunion,it wasin the
firstplace a movement ofwhatused to be called "thecommon
people" againstthe richand powerful. Equallyclearly, it was a
movement ofthenationalpeople ofPolandagainstSovietimpe-
rialism.And third,in viewofitsconcernwithdemocraticrights
and theoverwhelming supportit attracted acrossPolishsociety,
itevidently had a betterclaimthantheofficial "People'sDemoc-
racy"to be thedemocratic people as ultimatesovereign author-
et
ity(Touraine al., 1983: 2).
Butdo Arendt'sdistinctions betweenPeople and non-Peoples
help us to analyze what was specialabout thismovement? Note
thataction,however large-scale and spectacular, is notenoughto

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 419

signalthepresenceofthePeople.It is onlyifwe forget Arendt's

experienceof Nazismthatwe can see heras thepatronsaintof
directaction,welcomingeveryeruptionof the populationinto
thestreets. Butifwelookbacktothecharacterization ofactionby
the People that emergedfromour examinationof Arendt's
books,we do findsomeinteresting similarities.
One of thestrik-
ingfeaturesof Solidarity waswhatArendtwouldhavecalled its
"worldly" character:itsdevotion to institutionbuildingfromthe
groundup. Nothingcould have been less like an amorphous,
impulsive,violentmob or a helpless mass. To quote Alain
Touraineand his associates,"Here was a popular movement
whichbehavedlike a legislative assemblyinfinitely anxiousto
respectlegal procedures"(Touraineet al., 1983: 2; cf.50). Fur-
thermore, despiteits tradeunion originsand economicgriev-
ances, the movementwas overwhelmingly concerned with
long-term publicinterestssuch as freedom
political and national
independence(Touraineet al., 1983:4). Itsformidable unitywas
unideological,allowingforintenseinternaldebateat all levels.
Andthefeaturethatwasin somewaysthemostremarkable ofall
wasa politicalsobriety worthy ofArendt'sFoundingFathers:an
exceptionaldegree of politicalrealismand common sense,
together witha remarkable capacityto exerciseself-restraint and
putsharedlong-term interestsaboveprivateinterests and short-
termimpulses.
Up toa point,Arendt'sconceptionofthePeopleunitedbyand
in defenseofa sharedinstitutional worldbuiltfromthegrassroots
fitsquitewell.Butonlyup to a point.One conspicuousfeatureof
Solidarityas a movement ofthePeople does notfiguremuchin
Arendt's and
analysis, that is thenationaland religiousdimension
thatwasevidently crucialin theemergenceofSolidarity as a col-
lectiveactor(Bakuniakand Nowak,1987),and in motivating that
disciplined devotion to the public interest.
As Solidarity leader
Lech Walesaputit,"The interests ofthePolishnationwillalways
overrideourownparticular interests" (Touraineet al., 1983:45).
Whenlookingearlierat TheOrigins we sawthat
ofTotalitarianism,

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420 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Arendtwasat timeswillingto recognizetheconnectionbetween

nationhoodand thePeople,at anyratein thecase ofFrance(cf.
Canovan, 1999). Butheremphasiswassquarelyon Franceas an
inheritedhumanartifice, ratherthanas an "imaginedcommu-
nity"(Anderson, 1983).
As a practicaltestof Arendtvsthinkingabout the People,
therefore, the case of Solidarityis suggestive ratherthancon-
clusive.As a phenomenon,however,it was significant - and
-
Arendtian in yetanotherway.Arendtalwaysinsistedthatthe
meaningof human activity, and especiallypolitics,was to be
foundlessin itshumdrum regularities thanin rareevents.Occa-
-
sional appearancesbythe People memorably representedby
Solidarity - fallinto thiscategory.5 greatdaysof anysuch
The
mobilizationare alwayslimited.But Solidarity leftbehind the
memory - which rapidlycrystallized into a -
myth ofthePeople
in action,of themomentwhenthepublicarena,whichClaude
Lefortcallsan "empty place,"wasbriefly occupiedbya collective
yetpluralPeople.6
As Arendt'sanalysesof the Mob and the Massesforcefully
remindus,mostcasesoflarge-scale mobilization arenotlikethat.
It is therefore notsurprising thatso muchin moderndemocratic
institutions and democratictheoryis designedto guardagainst
informal mobilization ratherthanto encourageit.Butifdemoc-
racycontinuestodrawlegitimacy fromthemyth of
and possibility
thePeoplein action,thenitis a matterofsomeimportance and
delicacyto distinguish thefewcasesofmobilization thatreallydo
the
reinvigorate republican tradition of the People fromthe
manythatdo not.Whetheror notwe can go alongwithArendt's
judgments, herthinking mayencourageus topaymoreattention
to thePeopleas a phenomenonas wellas a concept,and particu-
larlyto reflect on contemporary casesofpopularmobilization.

Notes
1Arendtdoes notherself
capitalize"people,"etc.;I use capitalsin this
paperforthesake ofclarity.

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 THE PUZZLE OF ARENDTS "POPULISM" 421

2Thereare echoesofLocke,Hegel,and Marxin Arendfsclaimthat

youhavetoworkon natureand transform ittobe fullyhuman;youhave
tobuilda humanartifice on a humanizedterritory tohaveaccesstoreal-
Thereis in herviewnothinggeneticaboutthis.
ityand to be a people.
Although youmayhavebeen born intoa tribe,youcan stillbe redeemed
through"regularlaborand urbanlife"(1967:205). Butshe claimsthat
in theirpre-imperialist condition,Africantribeswereworldlessand
couldnotactpolitically as Peoples,thoughtheycouldat timesbe gath-
eredintoa horde,as in ChakavsZulu conquests(1967: 192). Allofthe
variousnon-Peoples thatappearin Origins are mobilizedand powerful,
butonlyfordestruction. None ofthemsharesa solid,lastingworld,or
hasanyprospectofcreating one.
3For an alternative treatment witha markedlymore sympathetic
emphasis see Arendt (1958: 218-9),whereshe takesle peuple,repre-
sentedbythesans-culottes in theFrenchRevolution, to mean"theactual
politicalbody,distinguished as suchfrom the populationas wellas from
society."
4Amoreingenious wayofdealingwithitisprovidedbyClaudeLefort,
whoexplicitly recognizestheproblematic natureofthePeople.Forhim,
the historicmistakethatmade totalitarianism possiblewas to suppose
thatdemocracy wasanalogousto monarchy: tosuppose,in otherwords,
thatthe People as a bodycould fillthe politicalspace leftwhenthe
sacredbodyofthekingwasexpelled.Instead,democracy is in hisviewa
moresubtleformofpolity:

The legitimacyofpoweris basedon thepeople;buttheimageof

popularsovereigntyis linkedto the imageof an emptyplace,
impossible occupy,suchthatthosewhoexercisepublicauthor-
to
itycan neverclaimto appropriateit.Democracycombinesthese
twoapparently contradictory on theone hand,power
principles:
emanatesfromthe people; on the other,it is the powerof
nobody.Lefort(1986:279).
5Cf.Goodwyn (1991:117): "Thepointcan neverbe overstressed: pop-
ulardemocratic politicsis rarein history."
Goodwyn is somewhat critical
(403) ofArendt'saccountoftheHungarianuprising of 1956.
6Cf.theattempt by Bruce Ackerman (1991, 1998) to articulate
what
he sees as the unscripted role of the People withinthe constitutional
developmentof the Americanrepublic.Like Arendt,Ackermanis
responding to whathe sees as neglectedphenomenathatare realand
significantdespitetheproblemsofconceptualizing them.His practical

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422 SOCIAL RESEARCH

aim is to devise procedures that can accommodate the rare moments

when the population is jolted out of its privatepreoccupations and
mobilizedbehind a greatconstitutionalreform:moments,as he putsit,
when The People speak. Ackerman(1991: 6; 1998: 409).

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